Printer Friendly

Military Intelligence Architecture for the Brigade Combat Team.

Interoperability is the cornerstone to achieving information superiority on the battlefield. Architecture is the foundation in which to achieve it during the Army's transformation from platform-centric to network-centric warfare. Intraservice, joint, and coalition interoperability drives us to examine carefully how we build architectures today to meet these demands. The Intelligence Center's Directorate of Concepts and Doctrine (DCD) Concepts Division is addressing these requirements with respect to the Army's transformation by developing operational and systems architectures for military intelligence assets.

Architecture Defined

Architecture products implement the combat commander's visions and concepts by graphically documenting an organization's functions and requirements. Our mission is to develop and continually refine the operational and systems architecture for all MI assets, with a current focus on the Initial and Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs).

Our architecture development efforts are under the auspices of the Army Enterprise Architecture (AEA). The AEA is an Army-wide information technologies (IT) architecture that describes the relationships among critical Army institutional processes and IT to ensure--

* Alignment of IT requirements with processes.

* Interoperability of Army, joint, and combined organizations and systems.

* Application and maintenance of the standards by which the Army evaluates and acquires new systems.

* Fulfillment of Clinger-Cohen Act [1] requirements to develop an enterprise-wide IT architecture.

The AEA has three major components (see Figure 1). They are--

* Operational architecture (QA) is the total aggregation of missions, functions, tasks, information requirements, and business rule in support of a warfighting function.

* Systems architecture (SA)--the physical implementation of the QA--is the layout and relationships of systems and communications.

* Technical architecture (TA) provides the technical guidelines for the implementation of systems upon which we base engineering specifications and assemble common building blocks and product lines.

The Challenge-BCT

Architecture Development

Developing a new organizational architecture from scratch to support an initial operating capability in December 2001 poses many challenges. All products must support the need to--

* Maintain a common operational picture (COP) for discussion.

* Capture increasingly detailed views of equipment deployment and interaction.

* Quickly adapt current products to reflect design changes.

* Rapidly affect the requirements determination and force design processes.

OA Development. For the first Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT-1), the development of architecture products began with the development of the draft concept. The Army's executive agent for OA, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Program Integration Office--Army Battle Command System (TPIO-ABCS), began building activity models and high-level operational concept diagrams to reflect the missions, functions, and tasks contained in the concept. TPIO-ABCS then staffed these draft products through the proponents and crosswalked them against mission threads to ensure accuracy. Even in draft, these products were invaluable to proponents for identifying inconsistencies and problems with the initial organization and its functions. An important product of the OA is the Information Exchange Requirements (IER) Matrix. IER matrices document what information needs to be exchanged, by whom, and the performance parameters (frequency, precedence, perishibility, etc.) of the information. It is important to recogniz e that the OA and SA are interdependent. Exaggerating or understating the performance parameters for information exchange between functions can have a extensive impact on an IER materiel solution and can cause a ripple effect throughout the entire process.

SA Development. Normally, SA development starts as soon as the OA defines the organizations. Given the compressed development schedule associated with IBCT-1, however, the Army is developing much of the SA in parallel with the QA. In lieu of an approved QA, we initially used the TRADOC "horseblankets" as a guide to how this unique organization would function and communicate. The Signal Center, as the Army's executive agent for SA, consolidated the proponents' input. We developed our SA in NetViz[R], a software package which lets the user "drill down" through many levels and allows the documentation of equipment at the platform level.

TA Development. The Joint Technical Architecture--Army provides standards with which information technology systems must conform. Eventually, we must develop a TA profile for each system shown in the SA to demonstrate adherence with applicable technical standards. U.S. Army Communications--Electronics Command (CECOM) is the Army's executive agent for TA.

Architecture Relevancy. For the MI portion of IBCT-1 the architecture views and data produced by the Intelligence Center are vital for conducting tradeoff analyses and identifying potential problem areas. In the cases discussed below, our architecture development efforts have provided a common framework to both identify problems and document alternatives.

IBCT-1 Architecture Issues

We discuss four examples of the Ml architecture issues below. They concern the Tactical HUMINT Platoon, the HUMINT soldiers organic to the RSTA Squadron, the Top Secret Enclave at the Brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC), and Ml assets' reporting chain in the RSTA Squadron.

Tactical HUMINT Platoon (MI Company). We identified a requirement for a long-haul data communications system for the tactical HUMINT teams, operational management teams (OMTs), and the S2X to report and pass data amongst themselves outside of the normal brigade operations and intelligence (O&I) net. Based on the capabilities of the Army's existing systems, we selected the UHF single-channel satellite communications (SATCOM) system AN/PSC5 (SPITFIRE) to link the teams throughout their 50 by 50 kilometer (expandable to 100 by 100) area of responsibility (AOR). These radios are voice- and data-capable and as SATCOMs are less affected by terrain. Since the tactical HUMINT teams and OMTs do not normally operate near a TOC, and therefore do not have access to a traditional data network, we also had to devise a way to tie these teams into the Tactical Internet (TI). The solution was to access the TI via the Future Battle Command Brigade and Below ([FBCB.sup.2]) and the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (E PLRS). This allows teams to report over the command and control network ([C.sup.2]) and maintain situational awareness while enroute throughout the AOR.

HUMINT soldiers "embedded in" the Reconnaissance Squads (RSTA Squadron). In IBCT-1, a counterintelligence agent (military occupational specialty 97B) is assigned to each of the reconnaissance squads. The IERs identified their need to pass and receive data through intelligence-specific HUMINT channels as well as through their normal chains of command. This required a lightweight, long-range, data radio system. Sheer numbers (36 total) precluded the use of UHF single-channel SATCOMs. The alternative we identified was an HF radio system with a proven ability to pass data: the PRC-137. The Battle Command Battle Lab--Huachuca believes this radio has better data performance than the current PRC-138. While there is no a decision yet, the requirement for a long-haul lightweight radio system for the HUMINT soldiers in the reconnaissance squads still exists. For the follow-on BCTs, we envision using a high data-throughput, ad hoc networking radio to enable these soldiers to pass reports and images via their Individual Tactical Reporting Tool (ITRT).

Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) Enclave at the Brigade TOC. The planned migration of MI communications requirements to the Signal Corps must address the fact that the Signal Corps does not currently provide Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) connectivity at its worldwide, strategic theater-entry-point sites, nor does it have equipment accredited to tie into the current TROJAN network. Today, the only viable solution is to use "tunneling" devices with dedicated satellite assets to provide the reach-back connectivity to the TROJAN network.

Reporting chain of MI assets within the RSTA Squadron. How MI assets on the battlefield report in a direct support (DS) or general support (GS) role has never been an issue before since there always existed a technical MI chain through which to report. Within the IBCT's RSTA squadron structure, however, this chain does not exist. While providing no significant technical problems, this structure requires the development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures (for both MI and RSTA units) to manage these collection assets effectively.

Conclusion

The architecture products described in this article provide invaluable tools for rapidly designing, documenting, and implementing Army Transformation guidance. From establishing critical functions (OA) through their physical implementation (SA), architecture affects all facets of the IBOT development

Major Jeff Violette, Signal, is Chief of the Architectures Team in the Directorate of Combat Developments, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He holds a Master of Business Administration degree from the University of Texas at Arlington. His Email address is violettej@huachucaemh1.army.mil.

Captain Bill Cater, Signal, is also on the Architectures Team and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Microbiology from Rutgers University His Email address is caterw@huachucaemh1.army.mil.

Endnote

(1.) The Cohen-Clinger Act of 1996 added national security systems under the purview of the corporate information officer. These systems involve intelligence, cryptological, and [C.sup.2] activities, as well as weapons system components critical to fullfillment of military intelligence missions.

INSCOM Units Coverting to TOE Structure

A number of U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) units converted form TDA (table of distribution and allowances) to TOE (table of organization and equipment) units on 16 June 2000. This change is the first of a three-phase conversion of the command to a TOE structure that will occur in the next two years. The change should not affect daily operations, but will be apparent in the units) new designations, flags, guidons, colors, and insignias.
COPYRIGHT 2000 U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2000 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Author:Violette, Jeffrey F.; Cater, William J.
Publication:Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Jul 1, 2000
Words:1528
Previous Article:The Interim Division.
Next Article:The MI-Signal "Rock Drill" for the Initial Brigade Combat Team.
Topics:


Related Articles
VANTAGE POINT.
The Brigade Combat Team--The Transformation Process.
The MI-Signal "Rock Drill" for the Initial Brigade Combat Team.
FROM THE EDITOR.
MI Is Out Front In Army Transformation.
Intelligence Transformation: Beyond Paradigm Shifts, Changes in Ethos.
Transition Training -- IBCT-1 Cadre and Cohort.
R&S Lessons Learned--Brigade Reconnaissance Troop Employment.
209 Military Intelligence Company-3rd Brigade Combat Team(IIBCT), 2d Infantry Division.
USAIC&FH Task Force modularity MTT mission.

Terms of use | Privacy policy | Copyright © 2022 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters |