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Mid-Victorian liberalism and foreign affairs: "Cretan atrocities" and liberal responses, 1866-69.

IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN the defense of political liberty and the promotion of free institutions in continental Europe were consistent with the policy and the language of leading figures in the Liberal camp. Between the 1850s and 1870s debate in Britain turned on "the ideals that the British should promote there" and about the dangers of continental "illiberalism." (1) From the days of of Palmerston as foreign secretary, the appeal to Britain's role as an example and promoter of constitutionalism abroad and as the defender of political liberty against political oppression became an integral part of a doctrine directed to Liberal opinion at home, which tried to "reconcile the radical and pragmatic foreign policy traditions." (2) In accordance with this doctrine, many Liberals even prescribed intervention for the direct assistance of popular movements for liberation from foreign domination. (3)

Moreover, the late 1850s and early 1860s was an age when events in foreign countries caused intense excitement in Britain among the general public, which was channeled into public meetings, the organization of support associations, and the columns of the daily press. Liberal and Radical circles read continental nationalism as another sign of the continuous battle between the liberal forces, headed by Britain, and the reactionary powers in Europe. This manifested itself in the cases of the Italian unification (1858-61), the revolution in Poland against the Russian occupation (1863-64), and the Hungarian struggle against Austria (1848-67). In this climate even a Philhellenic Committee was formed in 1863, which enlisted sixteen MPs with a Liberal, or Radical, disposure. (4)

During the period 1866-69 an insurrection raged against Turkish rule among the Christian population of the island of Crete. Crete was then an Ottoman province, but the claims of the Greek kingdom on the island made a revival of the "Eastern Question" (somewhat dormant since the end of the Crimean War in 1856) seem likely. (5) Highly colored reports from Crete supplied the London newspapers with accounts of Turkish atrocities throughout the crisis and British naval officers corroborated some of these testimonies. The British war correspondent John Edwin Hilary Skinner (1839-94) visited Crete twice during the insurrection (between March and July 1867 and again between July and September 1868), and during both visits he stayed at the insurgents headquarters. His correspondence in the columns of the Daily News described in detail the "atrocities" committed by the Turkish army and irregulars aiding the sultan's cause. (6) William J. Stillman (1828-1901), the American consul in Crete, published an article in favor of the Cretans and was probably the author of a series of letters which described the behavior of the Ottoman authorities in Crete. (7) The extent and motives of British response to these reports has become a point of controversy.

Indeed, the failure of Liberal politicians to react to the alleged atrocities committed by the Turks has come under consideration as it seems to contradict earlier attitudes towards national movements and questions the identification of Liberalism with the "Christian cause" in the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s. Both Richard Shannon and Ann Pottinger Saab, in their studies of the Bulgarian atrocities agitation of 1876 and its aftermath, cited the insurrection in Crete as establishing a precedent for subsequent massacres in the Ottoman Empire, albeit "fail[ing] to arouse public indignation" in Britain. (8) In an article on the Cretan insurrection itself, Saab attributed to "the Porte's skilful diplomacy" and "British perceptions of the alternative" to Ottoman rule the absence of calls for an anti-Turkish crusade in Britain during the late 1860s. (9)

An inquiry into British reactions to the Cretan insurrection, which emerged on the political agenda in the late 1860s, could prove extremely constructive to the study of the relation between ideological developments, party politics, and foreign policy in mid-Victorian Britain. By adopting a new approach, the study of the issue intersects with two other fields of historical inquiry, namely the study of Victorian ideas and their impact on the politics of foreign policy and within this framework the acknowledgment of the role of Liberal hopes and politics for the Philhellenic movement in nineteenth-century Britain. As to the latter, it has been convincingly argued with reference to the 1820s that British interest in modern Greece "is national, but English, not Greek," making it "a nationalism by proxy, entwined around the nationalism of home." (10) In broader terms, as David Brown has argued, historians recently tend "to seek to place foreign policy in a much broader context ... to regard it as illuminating domestic political situations as much (if not more) external ones." (11) And at the end of the 1860s the question of the purposes and values that British foreign policy should assert was politically important primarily for the Liberals after the departure of the towering figure of Palmerston. Indeed, the debate in parliament and the press departed from the particular facts of the Cretan revolt to become an investigation into the foreign policy of Britain in the past and its principles during both a Conservative and a Liberal ministry, and the episode is of particular interest with regard to Liberalism. The dispute broke out a year after the death of Palmerston in 1865 and a decade before Gladstone's active involvement in the Eastern Question in 1876, a period during which the certainties of the Palmerstonian handling of foreign policy gave way to the articulation of a new doctrine guiding Liberal policies abroad.

The main argument of this article is that the Liberal stand towards the Cretan insurrection was in fact similar to Liberal responses to the Eastern Question in the 1870s in the sense that it reflected both contemporary diplomatic necessities and the political expediency of the time. In other words, the intensity of Liberal feelings towards outcries for alleged "atrocities" committed against Christians in south-eastern Europe and Liberals' contribution to the Philhellenic manifestations of the British public were determined by, and should be examined within, the framework of British politics.

Therefore, I will follow Liberal comments on Greece and on the Greeks, as they were expressed by political leaders and in the press during the Cretan crisis of 1866-69. Of course examples of "celebrated philhellenes," such as William E. Gladstone (1809-98), are also examined here. However, this article tries to evade the danger of reducing British interest in the Cretan insurrection to a series of biographical notes, because such an approach fails to grasp aspects of Philhellenism that make it a significant element in the history of Liberal agitation in the Victorian age. The examination of the membership, language, and activities of the Candian Refugees' Relief Fund, which turned its attention to issues related to the Cretans' uprising, underlines the ideological, religious, and political functions of Philhellenism in Victorian Britain and further clarifies Liberal interest in the Cretan question in the years 1866-69. The inclusion of the case of the Candian Refugees' Relief Fund in the assessment of Liberal response to the Cretan insurrection, moreover, recognizes the paramount importance of pressure groups and charitable funds as a mode of expressing opinion in the 1860s and 1870s and provides an interesting example for the study of Victorian pressure groups. (12)

The overall goal of this article is to contribute to the study of Liberal reactions to continental nationalism a decade before the identification of sections of the Liberal party and of its leadership with the championship of the Greek cause in Britain. I also hope that this article will provide a useful background to the study of British attitudes during the Eastern crisis of the 1870s.

After the accession of Prince William of Denmark to the Greek throne, as King George I (1843-1913, r. 1863-1913), and the annexation of the Ionian Islands to the Greek kingdom in 1864, escalating political tensions in the country caused considerable concern among British diplomats. (13) In December 1865 and during the first months of 1866 the problem of brigandage in Greece came to the fore, when three British travellers were kidnapped by brigands in a western province of the country, provoking an outcry against the incompetence of the Greek authorities in maintaining law and order at home. (14) However, political turmoil and brigandage had already previously attracted British public interest in the affairs of modern Greece. But when in the summer of 1866 an insurrection broke out among the Greek population of the island of Crete, Greece and the Greeks reappeared on the scene of European politics at first as a participant in, and subsequently as prime instigator of, a crisis in the eastern Mediterranean.

Apprehension for the possible complications that an insurrectionary movement in a Christian province of the Ottoman Empire could generate and their impact on the peace and stability of Europe remained the prevailing mindset in Britain throughout the Cretan crisis. British political, strategic, and economic interests required the preservation of the Ottoman Empire against the looming Russian advance into the Mediterranean and led to the promotion of various schemes for the internal reform of the Ottoman state. (15) In the early nineteenth century, "Britain's interests were mainly commercial." (16) Britain's entanglement in the Crimean War in 1854, however, was held as a sign of its heightened determination to check Russian aggression in the "name of civilization." (17) The Russian defeat as recognized in the 1856 Treaty of Paris seemed to realize the British plan "to create their main buffer state against Russia" through a reinvigorated Turkish state. (18)

Any renewed attack to the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, however, could test the Great Powers' unanimity on the need for their survival before they could agree that it remained the best solution for everyone. In the first months of the insurrection Lord Edward Henry Stanley (1826-93), who was foreign secretary between 1866 and 1868, repeatedly recorded in his Journal his "feeling that the eastern question is coming on in earnest." (19) The press reflected a similar surprise and anxiety about what seemed to be an unexpected revival of a problem, which "of the many difficulties which for the last half century have disturbed the peace of Europe ... is the most complicated, the least capable of solution." (20) Therefore, in Britain the Cretan crisis was throughout its various phases linked to the Eastern Question, a revival of which in the years 1866-69 was held as detrimental to the political interests of Britain in Europe. (21)

The interference of the independent Greek kingdom into the Turkish-Cretan conflict became increasingly the focus of consideration, and during the last stages of the crisis the role of Greece in the eastern Mediterranean superseded concerns about the Cretan insurrection itself in Britain. By the end of 1866 the activities of Greek volunteers in Crete and the employment of Greek blockade-runners in supplying the insurgents provoked attacks in the press against the Greek kingdom "for fanning the flame of the Cretan revolt, and supplying the fuel which keeps it burning." (22) In 1867 and 1868 members of the British government, the Conservative press, and the pro-Turkish Morning Post fostered the notion that the Cretan insurrection was a conspiracy against the Ottoman Empire engineered by Greece with the probable connivance of Russia; this interpretation of the Cretan crisis justified the government's policy and exculpated the Turkish authorities from the charge of failing to suppress a local movement. Finally, British attention was decisively directed to the conduct of the Greek state in December 1868 and January 1869, when the Ottoman Empire issued an ultimatum virtually denouncing the Greek government for violating international law by its action in Crete. The imminent possibility of a Greek-Turkish war that could lead to a general conflagration in the East alarmed the Powers, which gathered in Paris, in January 1869, to deal with this question. (23) By that time, it was the behavior of Greece that constituted the sole subject of discussion, for the affairs of Crete had receded into the background, the revolt having been suppressed by the Ottomans.

Conservative newspapers and supporters of the Ottoman Empire who applauded the handling of the Cretan question by the British government from 1866 through 1868 imputed any criticism of its foreign policy and any protestation of sympathy for the Greeks to the abstract political theories of the Liberals. In July 1867, the Morning Herald, in commenting on the debates in parliament about the Cretan insurrection and Britain's traditional policy of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, attacked the "extreme Liberals ... who are more entitled to the first epithet than to the second" for repudiating "everything that they happen not to like." (24) Their inexplicable tendency to challenge "our Indian Empire, now our colonies, now the Established Church, now the House of Lords, now almost the Crown itself" was reflected in the field of foreign affairs in their denunciation of Ottoman rule and the endorsement of the Greek claims in the East. (25) Lord Strangford also identified the sympathizers of the Cretans in Britain with "the most liberal and influential public men and newspapers in this country," who had been misled into believing that "the cause of Italy and the cause of Greece are ... identical in principle," thus adopting the Greek plea for national unity. (26)

Inferring alleged support by Liberals for the Cretan insurrection and their sympathy for the Greek cause by a portion of the British press was a common assumption about the relation between Liberalism and Philhellenism, but the claim that in the years from 1866 to 1869 Liberal circles in Britain devoted their energies to defending the Cretan insurgents, or the Greek people in general, cannot be substantiated. In the 1820s, and again in the late 1850s and the early 1860s, the notion of constitutional liberty and a rejection of oppressive alien regimes did inform Whig and Liberal commitment to the struggles of continental nations for independence. Along with "a cold assessment of material and strategic self-interest," Palmerston favored national movements in Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Hungary, and Italy and their struggle for constitutional regimes on the basis of "a more liberal tradition in British foreign policy that stressed his commitment to the principles of freedom and constitutionalism for Europe." (27) In addition, in 1859 the unification of Italy became the cause which rallied the Liberal party against the Conservatives, because different hues of Liberals could adopt it for diverse reasons: "its ambiguities greatly helped to strengthen and widen the Liberal coalition." (28)

As a result of political and ideological developments in the Liberal camp, Greeks, and the Greek kingdom, did benefit from support for their cause in radical and liberal opinion in the decades before the Cretan insurrection. In the 1820s, the Greeks' War of Independence roused the public's interest and led to the formation of the London Greek Committee. Enlisting 37 MPs among its 85 members, the Committee was dominated by Whigs, Radicals, and Benthamites, while Jeremy Bentham himself presided. (29) In 1863, the Philhellenic Committee was formed in London with the explicit objective of promoting the "Greek cause" in Britain. Members of Parliament with a Liberal or Radical disposition composed the single largest group in the Committee; even some advocates of "extreme Radicalism" found shelter in it, while many Committee members also shared their advocacy of other national movements in Europe, supporting in particular the Italian, Polish, and Hungarian causes both in and outside Parliament. (30) When the Cretan crisis broke out, misgiving at the receptiveness of Liberal opinion to the cause of continental nationalities was, therefore, justifiable and founded on numerous examples in the past. But did Liberals actually react in a similar manner during the Cretan insurrection?

In fact, the Duke of Argyll (1823-1900) was the only prominent figure in the Liberal party who publicly and consistently displayed interest in the fate of the Cretan population; he represented one of the few links between British reactions to events in the Ottoman empire in the 1860s and the excitement which was generated in the 1870s. Argyll, variously described as "a life-long Whig" and "a Peelite with Palmerstonian sympathies ... close to Gladstone," began his ministerial career in 1853 at the age of twenty-nine and thereafter participated in all Liberal governments until his resignation in 1881 over the Irish problem. He was also a distinguished writer on a wide range of subjects, from science to theology and from geology to economics. (31) During the Great Eastern Crisis of 1876-78, Argyll was among the few Whigs who openly supported the (anti-)Bulgarian-atrocities movement and Gladstone personally; both joined in the movement of 1896 protesting the Armenian massacres. (32)

Argyll became the main apologist for the Cretans in the House of Lords. In Argyll's analysis, the fact that "a large majority of Christians, having no share whatever in government, but ruled over by a Mussulman minority" combined with "the practical grievances suffered by the people" and the existence of "free Greece" had forced the Cretans to revolt in 1866. (33) Since the object of Britain's involvement in the Crimean War had been "to resist the encroachments of Russia," the attainment of this aim also implied that "we, the Western Nations of Europe, occupy her [Russia's] place to a certain degree" as the guarantors of the Christians' rights. (34) Argyll, who repeatedly stressed that "the war had been carried on with great cruelty and brutality on the part of the Turkish troops," criticized the Conservative government for not helping "to remove from Crete any Christian women and children who might escape to the shore and find refuge on board ship." (35) But Argyll did not consider the cession of the island to the Greek kingdom as a viable, or, indeed, desirable solution. Argyll admitted in 1867 that "free Greece ... next to Turkey it is perhaps the worst governed country in Europe" and stated in the next year that "it was preposterous to desire the annexation of any territory to Greece," calling instead for the grant of autonomy to Crete. (36) Argyll's subsequent views on Ottoman rule and the obligations of Britain in the East during the Bulgarian atrocities agitation were reminiscent of his earlier stand on the Cretan question. Crucially, however, in the late 1860s his solitary voice had a very limited appeal to Liberal statesmen and did not raise public feeling.

In the House of Commons, the Cretan question attracted the attention of politicians who either had previous connections with south-eastern Europe or developed an interest in the humanitarian and moral aspects of the insurrection. Overall between 1866 and 1869, however, the House of Commons only twice debated the Cretan insurrection. (37) Long-standing "friends of Greece" and more recent recruits (such as Baillie Cochrane [1816-90], Darby Griffith [1804-85], and William Gregory [1817-92]) emerged as the recognized advocates of the Greek cause in parliament. (38) Baillie Cochrane's father had fought in the Greek War of Independence and he himself had visited Greece in the late 1830s as part of a traditional Grand Tour of Europe; already in 1844 the Illustrated London News remarked that the Conservative MP "is an ardent friend of the cause of constitutional liberty in Greece and advocate of measures that might promote her internal prosperity." (39) Gregory's participation in the debate about Crete stemmed from a wider preoccupation with the nationalities of the Ottoman empire, while Darby Griffith, a "Liberal-Conservative" like Gregory, manifested an enthusiasm about the Greeks that was grounded in a permanent interest in continental nationalities revolting against domestic and foreign oppressors. (40) None of this threesome was a Liberal, it might be noted.

For the small number of Liberal MPs who for the first time raised questions about Greek affairs during the Cretan insurrection, their political affiliation was not the only, or even the predominant, motivation in addressing the issue. Charles James Monk (1824-90), who in the 1870s and 1880s became the main spokesman for Greek interests in Parliament, was related by marriage to the Rallis, the leading family of the Greek community in England. (41) Sir Harry Verney (1801-94) was a philanthropist who was active in a number of religious organizations and later became vice-president of the Evangelical Church Association: He rose to question the government whether the Turks abided by their earlier promises to respect the religious liberties of their Christian subjects. (42) John Stuart Mill (1806-73) challenged the government as to the appointment of a British officer "for the purpose of re-organizing the Turkish navy," which he thought inconsistent "with [the British government's] declared principle of non-intervention." (43) Mill's participation in the Parliamentary debate regarding Crete was symptomatic of the failure of the insurgents to be recognized by Liberal circles as fighters for national freedom. Mill had little sympathy "with specific nationalist movements," preferring "foreign causes ... which implied radical criticism of the ruling class at home," and had nothing to say about the essence of the Cretans' demands, at a time when, in 1866, he had taken the lead in organizing the Jamaica Committee, which protested against the conduct of another British officer, governor Edward John Eyre (1815-1901) of Jamaica. (44)

Baillie Cochrane and Monk, the most dedicated supporters of Greece in Parliament, were, in fact, the only MPs who not only consistently defended the Cretan insurgents, but also the Greek kingdom's foreign and domestic policy. Both exploited the opportunity, which the Cretan crisis provided, to display their long-standing Philhellenism, which, however, had limited appeal to their colleagues. The Times accused both for representing in the House of Commons "the Greek view of the question, painted in that broad and effective contrast of purest white and darkest black which distinguishes the Hellene pictures of their conflict with the Ottoman." (45)

Outside Parliament and the political circles, the most notable recruit to the championship of the Cretan cause was the poet Algernon Charles Swinburne (1837-1909). His support attests to the appeal of the insurrection to sections of the British public whose literary interests combined with uncompromising liberal feelings and political radicalism. Swinburne might be considered the embodiment of two different elements of British Philhellenism: the legacy of early-nineteenth century Byronism and the advocacy of liberal principles.

Swinburne was already writing about Italy when the Cretan insurrection broke out and during its course his interest in continental nationalities increased further after a meeting with "one of his heroes," Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-72), the great forefighter of nationalist causes in Italy and elsewhere. (46) In March 1867, Swinburne's "Ode on the Insurrection in Candia" appeared in the pages of the Fortnightly Review establishing his reputation as "the most famous literary philhellene of his generation." (47) Swinburne modeled his "Ode" upon Shelley's Hellas and, like the source of his inspiration, he assigned to Crete and Greece symbolic significance as the birthplace of freedom and the starting point for a crusade against "monarchs and tyrants." (48) However, Swinburne's verse did not emanate from a spontaneous sympathy for the Cretan cause, for he was asked by the Greek consul to write something for the Cretan refugees in January 1867; he appears to have become remorseful about it later in life, when he was rather concerned with the "Ode's" literary shortcomings and "disliked to hear it mentioned." (49)

In the press, the Cobdenite Morning Star, which throughout the Cretan crisis unequivocally agitated for the Cretan insurgents and supported the line of action of the Greek kingdom, stood for a blend of Liberal and Radical ideas that did not reflect the views of mainstream Liberalism and had negligible influence on the public. Launched in 1856 by Richard Cobden (1804-65) "to preach the doctrine of non-intervention" in foreign policy, the Morning Star's circulation had by the 1860s dropped to "approximately 12,000 copies daily, one tenth of its major daily rivals." (50) Indeed, the paper lasted only until 1868 and, despite Cobden's preoccupation with it, the limited appeal of the Morning Star to the public "proved to be a source of frustration." (51)

The Morning Star hailed the developments in the "East" as another episode in the series of national and liberal struggles, stating how "it would be impossible for any man of liberal mind, and generous heart, not to sympathize with the ardent desire of a Greek population to break away from Turkish government," while deeming the aggressive policy of the Greek kingdom as fair "as the risings of the Italians and the Spaniards have been against the Austrians and the BOURBONS." (52) Moreover, echoing Cobden's criticism of Britain's policy during the Crimean War, the Morning Star attacked "the traditions of the Foreign Office," which "had led us into warfare for a power [Turkey] whose depression would have been better for the world than its maintenance." (53) But the views of the Morning Star on Greek nationalism, and indeed the paper's principles and aims, appeared out of touch in the late 1860s; when its publication was finally suspended in 1868, its circulation had fallen to 5,000. (54)

The leading Liberal newspapers, the Daily News and the Daily Telegraph, scarcely touched upon the policy of the Greeks in terms of a national struggle and, even when the two papers recognized the nationalist element of the Cretan insurrection, they tended to reproach the Greeks for the mode of fulfilling their ambitions. The Greek kingdom did not follow the example of Piedmont, which "began by organizing her finances, and developing her material resources," as Greece "was possessed with the 'nationality' craze," its claims, "which are not blameable in the Greek kingdom, are eagerly appropriated and ably used by other powers who hope to land big fish for themselves out of the troubled waters in the East." (55)

The few British defenders of the Greek cause in and outside parliament during the years 1866-9 were prompted in their initiatives by a diversity of reasons, which cannot be described simply in terms of the Liberal political tendencies that characterized most of them.

Key in assessing the Liberal response to the Cretan insurrection is an examination of Gladstone's stand on the question; after all he replaced Lord John Russell as opposition leader in 1867 and subsequently became prime minister, during the last stages of the crisis. When the Liberal Party and Gladstone came to power at the end of 1868, the alleged propensity of British Liberals to criticize Turkish rule in the East and to be favorably disposed towards the Greek nation was again raised, not only by Conservative but even by some Liberal newspapers. Thus, the then Liberal Spectator reiterated the notion that leading Liberal politicians and their supporters were influenced by their affection for Greece, which would eventually guide their actions on the Cretan and the Greek questions. Referring to the Paris Conference of January 1869 and its success in solving the dispute between the Greek kingdom and the Ottoman Empire, the Spectator observed that Gladstone in particular would never consent to an offensive against the independence of Greece, because by committing such an act he would "drive Mr. Bright out of the Cabinet, and irritate every Radical in the kingdom." (56) Gladstone's Philhellenic sentiments were virtually undisputed, although their actual impact on his government's foreign policy was called into question. The Conservative Standard noted how, while in opposition, "Mr. GLADSTONE ... flirted with the great Greek idea and displayed in the House of Commons a sneaking sympathy with the Cretan insurrection," but the foreign policy of the new government hardly differed from that implemented by Stanley. (57)

During the Cretan crisis, Gladstone's only contribution to the debate about Crete consisted of some relatively brief remarks on the situation in the island in February 1867. In his speech in Parliament, Gladstone recognized the "grievances of the island of Candia" as the main reason behind "the production of those disturbances," acknowledged the existence and role of "the strong Hellenic feeling which pervades the population," but, nevertheless, he congratulated Stanley, the Foreign Secretary, for his determination "to observe and to enforce the laws of neutrality even though at the expense of the calls of mere humanity [which] it was his duty to repress, and he has repressed them." (58)

When the Liberals came to power in December 1868, they were confronted with the prospect of a Greek-Turkish war, which was only prevented by the joint intervention of the European Powers. (59) At first, Gladstone and his Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Clarendon (1800-70), were concerned about the possible complications that might arise from staging a conference to diffuse the tension, but finally they agreed on the need for this method of intervening in the conflict. While Gladstone favored the grant of "local autonomy under Suzerainty & tribute," he was ready to abandon the scheme "if the concession of it is only to be made a pretext or a standing ground for disturbing the Porte"; and he adopted a very circumspect stand even on the wording of the Powers' resolution, suggesting that to describe "the sympathy of a Greek of Greece with a Greek of Crete as patriotism was by implication to give a sanction to the Panhellenic principle." (60) As to the prospects of the Greek kingdom, Gladstone's diagnosis highlighted "bad finance" as the root of the country's problems:
   It is really bad finance that renders Greece unable to play a part
   in the East. If that little state could and would pay her way, she
   would count for much in Eastern affairs. But she is above these
   vulgar ideas, and such an epoch is indefinitely distant. (61)

The Liberal response to the Cretan insurrection in the years 1866-69 demonstrates, on the one hand, the limits of sympathy that a Greek cause could inspire in mid-Victorian Britain. Only recently, less than a decade ago in the cases of Italy, Poland, and Hungary, the "oppressor" mattered to the British as much as the "oppressed," but Austria, Russia, and the temporal power of the Pope were looked upon with distrust long before subject European nations challenged their political authority. As Orlando Figes highlights, the Crimean War became the turning point for Britain's self-portrayal, when "the idea of John Bull coming to the aid of the weak against tyrants and bullies became part of Britain's essential narrative." (62) While the nationalist character of the Cretan insurrection appeared undisputed, the "oppressor," the British idea about the Ottoman Empire and its future remained ill-defined, a decade after it had bailed out the Turks in the Crimean War. Meanwhile, the Greek kingdom with its internal problems could hardly be portrayed as an inspiring liberal and constitutional alternative to rule the island.

On the other hand and above all, however, the ideological stance and the political calculation behind the Liberals' previous responses to events in European countries explains the limited appeal of the Cretan question in the late 1860s. In the late 1850s and in the first years of the 1860s, the cause of continental nationals and the Italian unification in particular provided the means for the Liberals to rally against the Conservatives with "a degree of purpose and unity" and allowing Liberalism "to combine national assertiveness with the defence of oppressed people." (63) However, "with Palmerston's career ambitions sated," and after British failure to resolve the continental crises in 1864, attention turned to domestic issues; in his last years, Palmerston's approach to foreign policy became "pragmatic" and depended on "developing military-industrial complexes" in Europe. (64) When before the elections of 1868 the Liberal party found itself in need of a unifying mission, it was Ireland and not continental nationalism that supplied it and brought the Liberals back to power. (65)

William Gladstone's response to the Cretan insurrection in the period 1866-69 is emblematic for the main Liberal perception of the rebellion. Firstly, his well-documented religious and Homeric concerns did not find expression in his public utterances about Crete and Greece. (66) Equally, while in 1859 the Italian cause provided Gladstone "with an easy rationale for joining a Liberal ministry" under Palmerston, in 1866 the urgent calls "for speedy intervention [in Crete] by the powers" on humanitarian grounds "failed to animate" him "with a view to Liberal unity." (67) The Liberal disarray over Parliamentary reform and the need to rally his party "around a fresh political aim pushed him towards Irish Church reform in 1867-8," rather than Greek unification. (68)

The limited appeal of the Cretan insurrection to Liberalism and Radicalism in Britain transformed the Greek question from a political to a humanitarian issue. This transition was reflected on the objective and membership of the Candian Refugees' Relief Fund, the only significant organized expression of British sympathy with the Cretans.

The main characteristic of the Candian Refugees' Relief Fund, which constituted at the same time a prerequisite for its success, was the "respectability" of its objective and membership. The usually cautious members of the affluent Greek expatriate community joined forces with leading figures of the City's financial, political, and social life in the ranks of a charitable group that aimed at relieving the Cretan civilians who fled to Greece.

On 15 December 1866, an insertion in the Daily News announced the formation of a "Candian Refugees' Relief Fund," described the objects of the newly established committee, listed the names of its members, and urged the public to contribute to the success of the Fund. (69) The aim of the committee was to help "upwards of ten thousand innocent persons--women, children, and old and infirm men--[who] have been compelled to fly from their homes" in Crete. (70) The London committee would cooperate with a committee at Athens, "composed of British and other gentlemen resident there," in distributing the money raised in Britain among the Cretan refugees who had found shelter in the towns of the Greek kingdom. (71) A list of bankers, to whom contributions could be addressed, completed this first public appeal. The announcement stressed that the whole endeavor was "entirely independent of all political or sectarian considerations"; this was "a work of pure and imperative charity." (72)

More than a month after the opening notice about the committee's existence, William Thomson (1819-90), Archbishop of York, a member of the Candian Refugees' Relief Fund, addressed the British public through the columns of the London Times. He stressed that the effort at helping "the unhappy Candiote refugees ... twelve thousand women and children and helpless men ... is no question of politics," and he estimated the cost of providing for the Cretans who had found refuge "in Athens and the Greek islands" at 14,000 [pounds sterling]. (73) The Archbishop of York mentioned that "already the British public and the Greek community in Britain have contributed, almost unasked, one half of this sum" and pointed out the reasons why the fate of the Cretan refugees should stir the British public:
   Because they will perish without us, because they are Christians
   like ourselves, because the naked and hungry, the fatherless and
   widows are especially instructed to our compassion, I venture to
   commend their cause in the name of Christ to all who try to live by
   Christian rules. (74)

The purely philanthropic nature of the proposed undertaking was extensively belabored in the press. The formation of a committee with the manifest object to assist the non-combatant victims of the Cretan insurrection was favorably commented upon in newspaper reports. The Morning Post, which admitted that "we shall not be suspected of sympathy with the insurgents or advocacy of their cause," overtly dissociated the case of "ten thousand innocent persons" from the political aspects of the Cretan insurrection, professing that "the spectacle of suffering, wholly disconnected with any participation in the crime from which it springs, is that which no cold sense of expediency, no personal prejudice or political bias, can shut out from our warmest and most practical sympathy." (75) The Pall Mall Gazette, moreover, accused the Greeks of the Greek kingdom of calling the "Candian Refugee Committee in London ... the Philo-Cretan Committee, for the sake of the colour of political significance", while the committee "has always been most careful to describe itself as a purely charitable body absolutely divested of all political significance whatever." (76)

Members of the Greek community in London composed the single largest group in the committee, the philanthropic character of which offered them an opportunity to manifest their natural interest in the Cretan affair in a non-controversial manner, which would be "acceptable" in Britain. In the period from 1862 to 1864, the Greeks in England hailed the change of dynasty in the Greek kingdom, but refrained from participating in the Philhellenic Committee as the latter was dominated by British radical politicians. (77) In stark contrast, the names of members of all the leading families of the Greek merchant community in London figured on the list of the Candian Refugees' Relief Fund in 1866. (78)

Leading non-Greek entrepreneurs active in the City were also involved in the charitable endeavor of 1866 and their enlistment to the Fund probably resulted rather from their business and social contacts than from any political party allegiance. William James Cotton (1822-1902), Robert Wigram Crawford (1813-89), Charles Kaye Freshfield (1808-91), Sir John Lubbock (1834-1913), Sir Andrew Lusk (1810-1909), Sir David Salomons (1797-1873), and Sir William Tite (1798-1873) were, or had been, active members of London's business community, who would usually go on to crown their public life with a place in the House of Commons. (79) Among them, Salomons, the veteran champion of Jewish emancipation in Britain, and Lubbock, honorary secretary of the London Bankers' Committee and a prolific writer on natural science, were the most distinguished names. Although mainly Liberal in politics, these men's participation in pressure groups and the patronage of "good causes" were integral parts of their activities in the public domain rather than an expression of their party affiliations; for most of them, the Candian Fund represented only one, lesser known, case in a long list of political and charitable efforts. (80) Moreover, with regard to the Candian Fund, the massive presence of eminent Greek merchants in its ranks provided these "men of the City" with another incentive to support a cause which was so near to the hearts and interests of their business and social associates.

The presence of the names of two highly ranked dignitaries of the Anglican Church, the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of London, at the top of the list of members of the Candian Refugees' Relief Fund confirms the philanthropic character of the committee and reveals the fact that the Cretan struggle did raise some interest in religious circles in Britain. William Thomson, Archbishop of York, was related by marriage to a Greek family and maintained bonds of friendship with his Greek relatives and the Greek community in London. (81) Archibald Campbell Tait (1811-82), Bishop of London, organized and led the "Bishop of London Fund" in the years from 1863 to 1867 as well, even if it did not include in its nine stated aims provisions for charitable undertakings abroad. (82) The participation of the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of London in the Candian committee can be adequately explained on grounds of charity and a general spirit of sympathy for "distressed Christians."

Moreover, the special relations between the High Churchmen within the Anglican Church and the Greek Orthodox Church, to which the Christians of Crete belonged, likely reinforced the urge to extend traditional philanthropy to the sufferings of the Cretans. In the 1830s and 1840s, High Churchmen, who emphasized the "catholic" (as in traditional) character of Anglicanism and felt threatened by the defections to the Roman Catholic Church, turned to the Eastern Churches for cooperation and possible intercommunion and, in 1865, the Eastern Church Association was formed to intensify the religious dialogue between the two Churches. (83) Indeed, in June 1867, the report of the committee on "Intercommunion with the Orthodox Eastern Churches" presented to the Holy Synod of Canterbury mentioned "the miserable condition of the fugitives from Crete" and cited the Bishop of Gibraltar's statement that the display of "the sympathy of England" in alleviating their plight "may become the means of drawing the hearts of Christians in different branches of the church towards each other." (84) During the Cretan insurrection, theological interest thus turned into concern for the welfare of the Orthodox Christians of the island.

The appeal of the Cretan question to High Anglican circles and the limitations of "religious philhellenism" were revealed in the coverage of the insurrection in the religious press. Next to the Morning Star, the Anglican High Churcher's Churchman and Church Review retained a more or less continuous interest in the Cretan affair throughout the period from 1866 to 1869. The advantage of the Cretans over their opponents, the element that recommended them to the attention of every Englishman, was their Christian faith: "They use the same Scriptures, they receive the same Sacraments, they confess the same Creed that we do, with one inconsiderable addition which the West has made." (85) Moreover, the Cretan insurrection, which was caused by "the cruel injustice with which the Moslem rulers treat their Christian subjects," provided these papers with an opportunity to slate successive British governments for their pro-Turkish policy in Eastern Europe since the beginning of the Crimean War. (86) Englishmen had bolstered up "a decrepit, effete and unchristian tyranny," because Britain and France "once in their madness came forward to save from a deserved fate" the Ottoman Empire, which "is now paying back the favour by ruthlessly destroying Christians in Candia." (87)

Anglican religious newspapers dealing with the Cretan insurrection focused on the "Christian" inhabitants of an island under "Mahometan" rule rather than on the application of the principle of nationalities to the Cretan case. Their attitude adopted towards an essentially political problem was based on previously established theological interest in the Orthodox Church and on the traditions of Christian philanthropy. The notions of "muscular Christianity" and the "Christian soldier" whose duty was to fight on God's side, which emerged during and immediately after the Crimean War, did not resurface during the Cretan insurrection. (88)

The piecemeal information available on the activities of the committee formed in December 1866 with the objective of assisting the Cretan refugees does not allow for any definitive conclusions as to the commitment and the contribution of its members, or its appeal to the British public. Lord John Hay (1827-1916), member of the committee and a Liberal MP, raised the question of Crete and the Cretan refugees in the House of Commons and, privately, to Stanley, the Conservative foreign secretary. (89) In addition, it seems that the various endeavors of the journalist Hilary Skinner (1839-94) to raise money and provisions for the Cretan refugees were related to the Candian Refugees' Relief Fund, although Skinner's name did not figure on the list of its members. Skinner addressed "a large and fashionable audience, including a considerable sprinkling of Greeks [which] met in Willis's Rooms" in July 1867 and appealed for funds in aid of the Cretan refugees, after which William James Cotton, a prominent member of the Candian Fund, expressed his hopes that "diplomacy would soon begin its work and interfere on behalf of the deserving Cretans," in thanking Skinner for his lecture on the subject. (90) In fact, Skinner's activity provides the only indication of the Candian committee's existence throughout the Cretan crisis.

The Candian Refugees' Relief Fund was a charitable organization, not a committee of support for any of the parties engaged in the struggle. Moreover, members of the Greek community in England and their acquaintances in the financial and social circles of the City dominated the Fund. The dignitaries of the Anglican Church, whose names figured on the membership list, represented the small portion of the British public that had previously displayed interest in the religious aspects of the Eastern Question and primarily the philanthropic spirit of Victorian Britain. (91) However, this group of supporters interpreted the Cretan insurrection on religious and humanitarian and not on national grounds, separating the Cretan case from the core of Greek nationalism. Liberalism and Liberals were strikingly absent from the ranks and public expressions of the Fund.

From 1866 to 1869, the Cretan insurrection drew British attention anew to the Greek kingdom and the Greek people. But in this period of domestic political agitation (especially in connection with the Second Reform Bill) and international concerns other than the fate of Crete, the public interest in Greek affairs was intermittent throughout the crisis. As Richard Millman suggests, when the Cretan insurrection broke out, British attention was diverted by other crises:
   In the winter and spring of 1866-7 Luxemburg was the least of
   British worries. The Irish question and the Fenian movement were
   constant preoccupations of the Government. There was also concern
   with the Alabama claims and the introduction of a new reform bill,
   and, of course, Belgium. (92)

In this climate, during the entire spell from 1866 to 1869, the charges levied against the Ottoman Empire for alleged atrocities committed against its Christian subjects in Crete and the Greeks' cry for help clearly failed to move Liberal political opinion in Britain. Liberal MPs who figured in Parliamentary debates on the Cretan problem had, in most cases, undistinguished careers and close personal ties with South-Eastern Europe in general, or the Greeks in particular. Likewise, developments in Crete failed to cause any public excitement: There were no large meetings in London, no public demonstrations of sympathy in provincial towns, and no fund raising. When the Liberal party came to power, in late 1868, Gladstone was as unwilling to get involved in the Eastern Question as he was later, in 1876, even if in the 1870s he realized that the Greek case provided him with a new opportunity to denounce the odious "Beaconsfieldism" of his Conservative foe Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81).

As a result, during the Cretan insurrection, British interest in the alleged atrocities committed by the Ottoman authorities and sympathy for the Greek nation failed to rise even to the (low) level of the Philhellenic sentiment in the early 1860s. In this climate of apprehension or, at least, indifference towards the Greek claims, British commentators were more interested in highlighting the evident indications of the Greeks' shortcomings, which deprived them of the right to territorial expansion. The Candian Refugees' Relief Fund, the body that "succeeded" the Philhellenic Committee of 1863 as the organized expression of British sympathy with Greece, was a charitable attempt organized on religious and humanitarian grounds, not a political body dominated by Liberals.

Between 1866 and 1869, Liberals shared in most of the anxieties of their Conservative contemporaries about domestic issues and foreign affairs. Internal political considerations regarding the extension of the electorate and the future behavior of the newly enfranchised superseded interest in continental nationalism in the priorities of the British public. Tensions in Europe and the perilous turn of affairs in Ireland rendered a possible revival of the Eastern Question undesirable. Therefore, the Palmerstonian legacy of upholding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire remained virtually unchallenged from within the Liberal Party. In the late 1860s, the entry of the newly enfranchised into the electorate made leading Liberals optimistic about the implementation of an on-going reforming program and conclude that the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries was highly desirable in the light of the Liberals' domestic agenda.

As late as 1869, the Liberals' timid handling of the Cretan question did not provoke any considerable reaction within their party or in the Conservatives' ranks. In 1870 and 1871, however, several events in Europe "mostly flowing from the Franco-Prussian War, which began in July 1870" made the world "look a more threatening place, and the government seemed too weak in defending Britain's interests in the world." (93) The Russian denunciation of the Black-Sea clauses of the 1856 Treaty of Paris, for example, irritated the British public and led to "an extraordinary outburst of russophobia and bellicose patriotism," and the conduct of "a public debate on some fundamental aspects of British foreign policy, an inquest into 'Palmerstonianism'." (94) Rhetoric on national "pride" and condemnation of Gladstonian foreign policy marked the reaction of a portion of the press to Britain's stand on the question of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine to Prussia. (95) On the eve of these developments, however, Gladstone had applauded the Conservative Stanley's cautious policy on the Cretan insurrection, while his own stand was not challenged.

When Gladstone, in 1876, tried to construct a theoretical framework for British policy abroad and to trace its line of succession from the Conservative Canning to himself, he accommodated Palmerston, British Philhellenism, and the championship of the rights of oppressed nationalities in the tradition of Liberal foreign policy. (96) It was in this context that he came to lead and inspire a strong popular feeling, which he never endeavored to rouse during the Cretan insurrection.

Pandeleimon Hionidis teaches "General History of Europe" for the Hellenic Open University. His latest publication in English is "The Drawbacks of Philhellenism in Mid-Victorian Britain: The Case of the Philhellenic Committee of 1863," Journal of Modern Greek Studies 30:2 (2012), 191-213.

(1.) J.P. Parry, The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830-1886, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006, 14.

(2.) J.P. Parry, The Rise and Fall of Liberal Government in Victorian Britain, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1993, 187. Lord Palmerston (1784-1865) was secretary of state for foreign affairs from 1830 to 1841 and from 1846 to 1851, and served as British prime minister from 1855 to 1858, and from June 1859 until his death in October 1865, while at other times serving in various other capacities in an extremely long governmental career that began in 1809. Starting out as a Whig, he was a Liberal from 1830 onwards.

(3.) F.R. Flournoy, "British Liberal Theories of International Relations (1848-1898)," Journal of the History of Ideas 2, 1946, 195-217: 202.

(4.) Pandeleimon Hionidis, "The Drawbacks of Philhellenism in Mid-Victorian Britain: The Case of the Philhellenic Committee of 1863," Journal of Modern Greek Studies 2, 2012, 191-213.

(5.) The "Eastern Question" was the term then commonly used caused by the problems that arose from the dwindling power of the Ottoman Empire, in essence asking what the future of especially the European territories under Ottoman rule should be.

(6.) See for example Daily News, 23 March 1867, [page]5 [column]c; ibid., 1 July 1867, 5ab; ibid., 21 July 1868, 5c; ibid., 7 August 1868, 5f; ibid., 14 August 1868, 5b.

(7.) For Stillman's role during the Cretan crisis, see Arthur J. May, "Crete and the United States, 1866-1869," Journal of Modern History 1/4, 1944, 286-293: 287, 292-3. For the humani tarian concerns of British officers, see Ann Pottinger Saab, "The Doctor's Dilemma: Britain and the Cretan Crisis, 1866-69," Journal of Modern History 4, 1977, D1377-D1407: D1384-5.

(8.) Richard T. Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876, London: Nelson, 1963, 18; Ann Pottinger Saab, Reluctant Icon: Gladstone, Bulgaria, and the Working Classes, 1856-1878, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991, 71-2.

(9.) Saab, "Dilemma," D1399, D1404.

(10.) Maria Koundoura, The Greek Idea: The Formation of National and Transnational Identities, London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012, 64.

(11.) David Brown, Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy 1846-55, Manchester: Manchester UP, 2002, 214.

(12.) The group studied in this article is not mentioned in Howard LeRoy Malchow, Agitators and Promoters in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli: A Biographical Dictionary of the Leaders of British Pressure Groups Founded between 1865 and 1886, New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1983.

(13.) In April 1865 foreign secretary Lord John Russell (1792-1878) ascertained with relief that the danger of a new revolution in Greece was no longer immediate; Public Record Office, Kew [hereafter cited as PRO], Russell Papers, 30/22/108, ff. 101-2.

(14.) Pall Mall Gazette, 10 January 1866, 9ab.

(15.) G.D. Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Prom Missolonghi to Gallipoli, London: U. of London P., 1971.

(16.) Orlando Figes, The Crimean War: A History, New York: Picador, 2010, 46.

(17.) Parry, Politics of Patriotism, 328.

(18.) Figes, Crimean War, 52.

(19.) Entry for 10 December 1866, in John Vincent, ed., Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party: Journals and Memoirs of Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-1869, Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978, 278.

(20.) For example, Daily Telegraph, 30 January 1867, 5a.

(21.) For the policy of Stanley and his successor, the Earl of Clarendon (1800-70), on the Cretan problem, see Kenneth Bourne, "Great Britain and the Cretan Revolt, 1866-1869," Slavonic and East European Review 84, 1956, 74-94: 75, 81-7; Maureen Robson, "Lord Clarendon and the Cretan Question 1866-69," Historical Journal 1, 1960, 38-55: 40-7.

(22.) Daily News, 10 December 1866, 4b. On the policy of Greece during the Cretan insurrection see Tassos Tatsios, The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897, New York: East European Monographs, 1984, 29-39.

(23.) For the Paris conference and its outcome see Robson, "Lord Clarendon," 46-55.

(24.) Morning Herald, 22 July 1867, 4b.

(25.) Ibid.

(26.) Pall Mall Gazette, 29 July 1867, 10[394]a. Percy Smythe (1826-1869), Eighth Viscount Strangford, served in the British embassy at Constantinople, where he acquired a mastery of "Eastern" languages; at the time of the Cretan insurrection, he was president of the Royal Asiatic Society; his views on the Eastern Question were published in numerous contributions to the Pall Mall Gazette and the Saturday Review (see Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009, 99).

(27.) David Brown, Palmerston: A Biography, New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2011, 488.

(28.) Parry, Politics of Patriotism, 233.

(29.) Allan Cunningham, "The Philhellenes, Canning, and Greek Independence," Middle Eastern Studies 2, 1978, 151-81: 156-9, 162-7. 30

(30.) Hionidis, "Philhellenic Committee," 201.

(31.) John W. Mason, "The Duke of Argyll and the Land Question in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain," Victorian Studies 2, 1978, 149-70: 151-3; J.P. Parry, Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 1867-1875, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986, 75.

(32.) Shannon, Bulgarian Agitation, 36.

(33.) Hansard's Parliamentary Debates [hereafter cited as Hansard], 3rd series, 8 March 1867, CLXXXV, col. 1513.

(34.) Ibid., col. 1529.

(35.) Hansard, 20 June 1867, CLXXXVIII, col. 158; ibid., 8 March 1867, CLXXXV, col. 1517.

(36.) Hansard, 8 March 1867, CLXXXV, col. 1518; 3 April 1868, CXCI, col. 808.

(37.) Hansard, 15 February 1867, CLXXXV, cols. 406-50 (motion moved by Gregory); 24 April 1868, CXCI, cols. 1225-68 (motion moved by Monk).

(38.) See for example Hansard, 15 February 1867, CLXXXV, cols. 406-21 (Gregory); cols. 421-5 (Baillie Cochrane); cols. 439-41 (Darby Griffith).

(39.) Illustrated London News, 9 March 1844, 156c.

(40.) For their previous involvement in the advocacy of Greece see Hionidis, "Philhellenic Committee," 196-7.

(41.) Monk was a Liberal, who became a Liberal-Unionist in the 1880s; on his marriage, see Michael Stenton, ed., Who's Who of British Members of Parliament. A Biographical Dictionary of the House of Commons, Harvester Press, 1976-9, 3 vols, vol. 2, 252.

(42.) Hansard, 19 February 1867, CLXXXV, cols. 587-8. On Verney, see Howard Malchow, Agitators and Promoters, 212.

(43.) Hansard, 16 July 1867, CLXXXVIII, cols. 1621-2.

(44.) Christopher Harvie, The Lights of Liberalism: University Liberals and the Challenge of Democracy 1860-1886, London: Allen Lane, 1976, 154.

(45.) Times, 25 April 1868, 8f.

(46.) Rikky Rooksby, A.C. Swinburne: A Poet's Life, Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1997, 148.

(47.) David E. Roessel, In Byron's Shadow: Modern Greece in the English and American Imagination, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001, 111; A.C. Swinburne, "Ode on the Insurrection in Candia," Fortnightly Review 1, 1867, 284-9.

(48.) Roessel, Byron's Shadow, 111-2.

(49.) See Rooksby, Poet's Life, 148; Roessel, Byron's Shadow, 111.

(50.) David Brown, "Cobden and the Press," in Anthony Howe and Simon Morgan, eds, Rethinking Nineteenth-Century Liberalism: Richard Cobden Bicentenary Essays, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, 80-95: 95.

(51.) Martin Ceadel, "Cobden and Peace," in Howe and Morgan, eds, Rethinking Liberalism, 189-207: 204-5.

(52.) Morning Star, 20 September 1866, 4b; ibid., 8 February 1869, 4d. On the political views of the paper, see Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, vol. 1: Nineteenth Century, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981, 107-11.

(53.) Morning Star, 31 December 1866, 4c.

(54.) Koss, Political Press, 123-8.

(55.) Daily News, 8 October 1866, 4c; Daily Telegraph, 11 February 1869, 4e; ibid., 26 July 1867, 6d.

(56.) Spectator, 2 January 1869, 4ab.

(57.) Standard, 29 December 1868, 4e.

(58.) Hansard, 15 February 1867, CLXXXV, col. 444.

(59.) Robson, "Lord Clarendon," 42-52.

(60.) H.C.G. Matthew, ed., The Gladstone Diaries: With Cabinet Minutes and Prime-Ministerial Correspondence, XVI-XX, 1861-1883, 5 vols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978-1990, vol. 7, 12 (Gladstone to Clarendon, 18 January 1869); ibid., vol. 7, 13-14, 20 January 1869.

(61.) Matthew, Gladstone Diaries, vii, 19 (Gladstone to Clarendon, 30 January 1869).

(62.) Figes, Crimean War, 479.

(63.) Parry, Politics of Patriotism, 221, 230.

(64.) Ibid., 239; Brown, Palmerston, 450.

(65.) Parry, Politics of Patriotism, 257.

(66.) In 1869 Gladstone published his Juventus Mundi: The Gods and Men of the Homeric Age, which was the outgrowth of his classical education and Homeric interests; see Richard Shannon, Gladstone, God and Politics, London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007, 209.

(67.) Parry, Politics of Patriotism, 432; Shannon, Gladstone, God and Politics, 202.

(68.) G. Machin, Politics and Churches in Great Britain 1832 to 1868, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, 357.

(69.) Daily News, 15 December 1866, 4a.

(70.) Ibid.

(71.) Ibid.

(72.) Ibid.

(73.) Times, 31 January 1867, 10d.

(74.) Times, 31 January 1867, 10d.

(75.) Morning Post, 17 December 1866, 4e.

(76.) Pall Mall Gazette, 2 January 1867, 8 [24J b.

(77.) Hionidis, "Philhellenic Committee," 204-6.

(78.) On the economic activities and social contacts of the Greek residents, see Stanley Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking, London: George Allen Sc Unwin, 1984, 65-6, 127-9, 165-6.

(79.) On Cotton, Freshfield, Lusk, Salomons, and Tite see respectively Michael Stenton and Stephen Lees, eds, Who's Who of British Members of Parliament: A Biographical Dictionary of the House of Commons 1832-1945, Brighton: Harvester Press, 1976-79, vol. 1, 91-2, 150, 246, 340, 378.

(80.) Cotton was a "Conservative", Freshfield a "Liberal-Conservative"; Lubbock, Lusk, Salomons, and Tite were "Liberals". On the role of businessmen in the pursuit of extra-parliamentarian causes see H.L.R. Malchow, Gentlemen Capitalists: The Social and Political World of the Victorian Businessman, London: Macmillan, 1991, 137-40, 388-91.

(81.) For Thomson's family connections and his contacts with the Greek community in England, see Ethel H. Thomson, ed., The Life and Letters of William Thomson, Archbishop of York, London: John Lane, 1919, 34, 78.

(82.) Randall Thomas Davidson and William Benham, Life of Archibald Campbell Tait, Archbishop of Canterbury, London: Macmillan, 1891, vol. 1, 446-7.

(83.) On the Eastern Church Association see Henry R.T. Brandreth, "The Church of England and the Orthodox Churches in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in E. G. W. Bill, ed., Anglican Initiatives in Christian Unity: Lectures Delivered in Lambeth Palace Library 1966, London, 1967, 19-39: 30-3.

(84.) William Fraser, The Reports on Intercommunion Made to the Holy Synod of the Province of Canterbury by the Committees on "Intercommunion with the Orthodox Eastern Churches", London: Rivingtons, 1869, 5.

(85.) Churchman, 6 December 1866, 1181b.

(86.) Churchman, 20 September 1866, 912a.

(87.) Churchman, 10 January 1867, 24c; Church Review, 15 December 1866, [1193)b.

(88.) On the two notions see Figes, Crimean War, 473-4. Figes does not mention the Cretan insurrection, although he does comment on developments in Serbia in 1867; according to him, the years between 1867 and 1874 "were a period of relative calm in the Balkans" (ibid., 458).

(89.) See, respectively, Hansard, 2 November 1867, CXC, 512, and Vincent, Lord Stanley, 29 December 1866,281: "Ld J. Hay sent a letter from the Candian relief committee, asking help for the ejected villagers and families of those who have killed in the [Cretan] war. This is a ticklish matter to deal with, as the object of the askers is to make it appear that we are supporting the insurgents if we comply, and to raise a cry of inhumanity against us if we refuse."

(90.) Daily News, 30 July 1867, 4e.

(91.) For an interesting approach to mid-Victorian discovery of "the oppressed Christian nationalities and the discovery of the Victorian poor", see Todorova, Balkans, 100.

(92.) Richard Millman, British Foreign Policy and the Coming of the Franco-Prussian War, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965, 57.

(93.) Parry, Politics of Patriotism, 321.

(94.) W. E. Mosse, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The British Public and the War-Scare of November 1870," Historical Journal 1, 1963, 38-58: 38.

(95.) Deryck Schreuder, "Gladstone as 'Troublemaker': Liberal Foreign Policy and the German Annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, 1870-1871," Journal of British Studies 2, 1978, 106-35: 132-4.

(96.) Shannon, Bulgarian Agitation, 175.
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