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Making the most of the EC '92: background, issues, and strategies.

Making the Most of EC '92: Background, Issues, and Strategies


For an expanding number of organizations, the United States market is no longer large enough for their survival. Some of them realize that markets have become increasingly global. Therefore, many firms feel that they need to seize the opportunities for greater exports of their products and to make more investments abroad. A potential challenge and a source of much concern for many American companies - which either export to Europe or have subsidiaries there - is the anticipated maturation of the huge European Community (EC) or Common Market in December 1992.

One can gain an appreciation of the size of the economically integrated European market and the enormous potential it offers for American businesses by examining these figures:

* It will contain 320 million relatively affluent

consumers, making it about one-third larger than

the U.S. market. [1] * It will be a free single market which will

produce $4.5 trillion in goods and services and

will comprise one of the largest trading blocs in

the world. It will be an economic superpower

with a gross domestic product almost as large as

that of the U.S. and much larger than that of

Japan.[2] * Its creation will cause the disappearance of a

doze variations in norms, standards, specifications,

and testing and certification procedures

that should help to reduce the cost of developing

the export market.[3] * Its creation will result in the leveling of nontariff

barriers and other obstacles that have heretofore

sheltered the inefficient home markets of

EC member countries and will allow free

movement of capital, goods, people, and services

between member countries. There will be

simplified shipping, more efficiency in distribution,

reduced paper work, and lower administrative

and overhead costs.[4] * It will cause the creation of two to five million

jobs, and will have the potential of causing a

five percent rise in the EC's annual output of

goods and services as well as a six percent

decrease in prices due to reduced business costs

resulting from economies of scale.[5]

In reviewing the above information, a person can argue that the EC will significantly change the competitive conditions of companies operating and selling in Europe. For example, the removal of physical and technical barriers will reduce the cost of American firms doing business there. Since there will be fewer overlapping and conflicting standards, American firms can base themselves in one country and develop a cost-effective effective network to sell in other countries. Also, inefficient domestic firms will no longer be protected from foreign competition, and as sales increase, economies of scale may be realized. It is not hyperbolic to suggest that the EC will have an economic impact on the U.S. in the 1990s comparable to that which Japan had in the 1980s. Obviously, the stakes are high and the U.S. has a strong economic interest in the creation of a strong internal market in Europe. An invigorated European market could create an immense surge in the demand for imported goods and services.[6,7]

It is interesting to note, however, that many U.S. companies do not have any plans for dealing with the global marketplace changes as a result of European trade unification. For example, a recent survey by Booz, Allen and Hamilton, Inc. of senior executives at major industrial and domestic companies who have business transactions with the European Community shows that about 62 percent of the respondents do not have strategic plans for the new market. Even more surprisingly, over one-half of the respondents indicated that they are not aware of the activities and proposals of the new unified Europe.[8,9]

To avoid further problems and to enhance their position in export/import transactions, U.S. managers need to have a better understanding of the significance and the operational aspects of an enlarged European market that will be as open as that of the U.S. Specifically, five major questions need to be answered:

* How has the European single market developed? * What are the operational arrangements for the

new market? * What are the parochial, bureaucratic, and nationalistic

barriers to integration? * What are the major issues/obstacles surrounding

the new market which face American companies? * What kinds of strategies are recommended to

prepare American competitors for a single

unified trade market in Europe?

Development of the Common


The development of a politically and economically united Europe is not a new phenomenon, but rather a continued expansion of an old idea. The road to unity has been a long one, and it has not always been smooth. The idea was conceived by a far-sighted Frenchman named Jean Monnet about 40 years ago. Monnet and others in the early 1950s attempted to forge economic unification among European nations after centuries of rivalry, hostilities, and adherence to strongly-held and narrow nationalistic positions.[1,10]

The concept of an economically coalesced Europe was applied selectively in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. Then it was applied more generally in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which was an attempt by diplomats and economists in a revitalized Europe to lay the groundwork for the formulation of the EC. The purpose of the Treaty of Rome was to lower trade barriers and help create a single, integrated market among the six original EC members: France, Belgium, West Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy. Membership doubled over the next few years as Britain, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, and Greece joined the Common Market. [1,9,10,11]

In February 1986, representatives from each of the 12 EC countries signed the history-making Single European Act (SEA), which is commonly called "Europe 1992." The SEA essentially completed what was begun in 1958. It provides an agenda and timetable for and commits member countries to a single internal market by December 31, 1992, unencumbered by barriers to trade or impediments to the free movement of workers, capital, and services. To achieve this objective, almost 300 directives (laws) have been prepared and over 200 are in some stage of completion. For the others, the moment of truth is yet to come. Parochial quarrels over specific agricultural, budget, or environmental policies could arise at any time. Yet most observers feel that the prospects are bright for economic unification, and even for later financial unification and political unification. Thus, Europe is on the verge of a formidable presence in the world arena; the developments may be at a point of irreversibility.[6,9,10,12,13]

The SEA concept was driven as much by European businesses as by their governments, since the European economies have been plagued for the past decade with slow growth, high unemployment, and a declining international competitiveness. European businessmen see a barrier-free single European market as an antidote for economic malaise. The SEA is, in effect, an admission by Europeans that they could not hope to compete in a global economy with the U.S. and Japan economic juggernauts as long as they remain fragmented. Only through economic deregulation and unification can they acquire the economic vitality and clout necessary to be a first-class competitor and assert their position against the industrial might of the economic superpowers. However, the benefits of unification to member countries will necessitate considerable adjustment to national policies and, perhaps most distastefully, a dilution of national sovereignty. [11,14]

Institutional Arrangements of the

EC Government

The EC members have long recognized that to have genuine economic union, and later financial and political union, they could not preserve the dominance of their national parliaments. Therefore, they established a still-evolving EC Government. The structure and power of the government lie in its legislative, judicial, and executive bodies.[1,10,15]

Legislative Branch. This function is represented by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Each member nation of the Community has a seat on the Council, with representation according to subject discussed. The Council is considered as the principal decision making body of the Community. Although most decisions require a qualified majority vote, there are some kinds of decisions concerning crucial national interests that require consensual agreement. Votes are weighted according to population.

The number of members representing each member country in the 518-member European Parliament is also weighted according to population. The Parliament has no real power. It's role includes advising the Council of Ministers on various proposals, preparing the budget for the Community, recommending policies, and performing other political functions. Although decisions made by the Parliament are not binding, they have a strong influence on the Council of Ministers. Parliament members serve five-year terms and are elected directly.

Judicial Branch. This branch is represented by the 13-member Court of Justice. The court's main function is to resolve legal disputes involving community laws. Individuals, businesses, institutions, and governments from each of the 12-member nations can seek redress in the Court. It is important to note that the Court's judgments are binding in each member country.

Executive-Administrative Branch. The Commission is known as the executive branch of the Community and has the role of proposing legislation, implementing community policies, and enforcing EC treaties. Its 17-members serve four-year terms and are chosen by consensus of the community governments. They are expected to act in an unprejudiced way and in the interest of the community.

Barriers to Unification

The problems which EC members face in economic unification are staggering. In order for the concept to work, the members must forget about the primacy of the national parliament and learn to coexist peacefully. They must submerge deep-seated ideological, religious, cultural, and historical differences, and they must overcome the linguistic obstacle posed by the nine different languages spoken in the 12 countries. Also, they must rise above the attitudinal differences concerning business relationships and the way that business should be conducted. For example, the Southern EC countries pride themselves on being creative and fun-loving, and are not averse to three-hour lunches. The Northern countries consider themselves to be industrious and disciplined, and prefer to conduct business in a more formal manner.

Several industrial, labor, economic, regulatory, and political issues must be resolved if the proposed unification is to work.[7,9,11,12,14,16, 17,18,19,20]

1. If the proposed union is to be a success, there must be mutual recognition between member countries regarding the quality of goods produced. Mutual recognition means that if a product is good enough to be sold within one country, then it is good enough to be sold in all of them. The content of mutual recognition directives may be difficult to enforce.

2. There must be harmonization of manufacturing standards and patent and copyright laws, opening of public procurement laws, synchronization of rules regarding mutual acceptance of the qualifications of professional people, liberalization of banking and insurance laws, liberalized capital movements, and adoption of a common policy regarding mergers and acquisitions.

3. Many changes must be wrought in the area of artificial physical barriers to free trade. The navigation of subtle customs and border controls currently results in long waits and many manhours lost for truckers at frontier points in every EC member country; this impedes the free flow of investment capital, goods, services, and labor from one country to another. The dismantling of customs and border controls and the reduction of the corresponding red tape would enable EC members to reduce costs and to compete with the U.S. and Japan on a more level playing field.

4. Knotty questions also arise regarding fiscal barriers to the unification of Europe. Member countries must reconcile themselves to the reduction of variations in value-added and excise taxes. There must be some kind of tax uniformity in order to keep the removal of trade barriers from distorting current purchasing patterns in the various countries. Many high tax countries will lose tax revenues and some low tax countries may end up imposing new taxes. Resolution of the tax problem is a politically-charged issue whose solution does not seem imminent.

5. The problem of public procurement is also a thorny one. European governments purchase goods and services worth $600 billion per year or 15 percent of the total EC gross domestic product. The governments have traditionally purchased when possible from firms in their own country. A proposed procurement directive would require that government purchases must have 50 percent EC content and would give preference to local vendors whose bids are no more than three percent above those of non-EC companies. Thus, under the new directive, the procurement process would be opened up to competitive supply by all EC firms and even to foreign firms, within limits. There will undoubtedly be much political maneuvering on this issue, and the degree of its acceptance will be a litmus test of EC member commitment to internal free trade.

6. Trade unions are also an obstacle to a single free Europe. They fear the free movement of capital seeking lower costs for the factors of production. Thus, unions in the northern countries like Germany, France, and Great Britian are fearful that their companies will move to southern countries like Spain and Portugal where labor costs are lower, employee benefits are less costly, and work rules are more flexible.

7. The farm problem is also a barrier to unification. Small farmers in southern countries fear increased competitive pressures from their more organized competitors in the northern countries. The Common Market has been wrestling with this problem for years and no solution appears in sight.

8. Many EC member countries are in opposition to the deregulation of financial services, the creation of a central bank, and a common currency. Action taken by the EC on these issues may have more far-reaching effects than on any others.

Deregulation of financial services is progressing nicely and, when completed, should result in a streamlining of financial operations within member countries. Deregulation will assist in the mobilization of savings and in the allocation of capital. Breaking the barriers against competition in financial services and creating a freer flow of capital across borders should lead to greater efficiency, lower interest costs, and expanded business opportunities for firms in all EC member countries.[11,21]

A form of central banking with at least minimum prudential regulation for banks and harmonized capital standards and accounting practices - with supervision primarily by the home market regulator - is necessary for the creation of a more efficient financial and capital market and a common EC monetary unit. A common currency would provide several potential advantages. It would provide stability against the dollar and yen, which would likely lead to lower interest rates and greater economic growth, and it would provide a viable

alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency. In spite of the opposition to a central bank and a common currency, many financial observers believe that they are vital to the success of the plan. Montary unification is at present only a dream of visionaries.[11,18,19,22]

Another issue facing EC members is the selection of a form of governing bureaucracy. For example, one group led by Germany favors a federalized Europe with a strong central authority. Another group argues that national governments should give up as little independence as possible. Great Britian, in particular, opposes further shifts in the center of power from national governments to the governing bodies of the EC and further economic and monetary integration.[23,24,25,26]

Issues Facing American


The major fear among American businessmen and the U.S. government is that the removal of internal regulatory and economic barriers by the EC may lead to the EC becoming a "muscled bully" intent on protecting its own turf and raising external barriers for other countries. This concern of over protectionism by the EC, of limiting the flow of foreign goods and services into its markets, leads to visions among American businessmen of a "Fortress Europe." For example, one directive says that computer chips must be manufactured in Europe in order to be considered Europe-made. Many Americans read this as a message that the EC wants to keep high-tech investments, technology, and jobs in Europe. Even if there are no outright tariffs and duties and no overt discrimination, Americans can expect to face a growing pressure to assume a "more European" identity.

Proposed policies and directives of the EC which lead Americans to believe that trade may be less open and transparent than previously and that trade doors may not be left completely ajar include the following: * Country-of-origin or local content rules, which require foreign-owned firms in the EC countries to purchase a fixed percentage of their supplies within the country of domicile or face stiff tariffs. This may push American companies into merging with European companies or purchasing equity positions in European-owned plants and facilities. * The development of technical standards and regulatory rules - in which Americans are not likely to be asked to participate - which are incompatible with the global market and which would hamper bilateral trade with the U.S. and other non-EC countries. * The requirement of reciprocity for financial services, meaning that foreign countries must provide the same privileges to EC financial institutions that the EC countries provide to foreign financial institutions. * Temporary and selected protectionism for industries in EC countries to allow them to adjust to the move to open competition. Many observers believe that these constraints are aimed primarily at the Japanese and other Asian imports, but that the spillover may affect U.S. businesses. [4,7,11,14,27]

As expected, the members of the European Community have responded to American charges of protectionism with countercharges of unfair trade practices by the U.S. In its recently released 1989 report on U.S. trade barriers, the Commission of European Community concluded that the U.S. has 40 different tariff and non-tariff trade barriers that affect EC goods. For example, they contend that 20 percent or more of the total research and development funds for key U.S. industries, such as aerospace and communications, are subsidized by the government. [14,27]

Recommended Strategies

Currently, many companies are aware of the interdependence of Europe and the U.S. every time a transaction takes place across the Atlantic. The EC is easily our largest trading partner. Sales by U.S. firms to the EC came to $600 billion in 1988. This sum is almost triple the amount of sales to Canada and quadruple the amount of sales to Japan. Access to a barrier-free Europe offers even more lucrative possibilities. [1,4,6,8,28]

For many American companies, the changes will bring a threat of unwelcome competition, and for others it will offer possibilities for profit and a reward for efficiency. Companies should begin now to assess the impact that the unified market will have on their particular line of business and develop a plan of action for each eventuality. This may mean spinning off marginal operations, exchanging lines of business with other firms, or purchasing new firms. The strategic issues involved are very complex, and many companies will have to rethink the way they have done business in Europe in the past. Some may have to re-examine their strategic direction.

What types of strategies are most appropriate to capitalize on the potential gains of EC '92? Companies profiting most will be those that get started quickly, fine-tune their strategies as the market unfolds, and rethink their strategy at a European level rather than a national level. Prior to the selection of a strategy, however, a company should anticipate the business climate when the barriers come down and examine the competition, technology, political forces, and the changing markets in its industry. [1,2,9,12,25,28] In general, the following strategies are suggested:

1. Expansion through acquisition or merger with European countries. This strategy appears to be the most common practice among American firms who wish to circumvent anticipated or potential post-1992 protectionist pressures. After a period of disinvestment in the early 1980s, American spent $2.4 billion in 1987 acquiring European companies. However, in the same year Europeans spent $37.1 billion in the U.S. The American expenditure picked up in 1988 and 1989. U.S. purchases in 1988 were double those of the previous year, and even more momentum was picked up in the first quarter of 1989. Obviously, more American companies without a base in Europe are seeking to gain a foothold there, and those already established are seeking to lock in the decisive advantages of a continent-wide operating scale. [24,29,30,31]

2. Investing in European manufacturing plants to expand the scope of their European operations. American companies invested $19.7 billion in 1988 on new plant and equipment in EC countries. This tactic enables American firms to purchase ownership in companies to produce made-in-Europe products that are sold under a local name. Many large U.S. firms appear to have the edge in this competitive strategy. For example, GE plans to build a $1.7 billion plastics plant in Spain to narrow the competitive advantage in the chemical industry currently held by large continental firms. Also, with sales of $19.6 billion in the EC in 1988, IBM remains a dominant factor in the computer business in Europe. IBM has successfully used state-of-the-art automation, flexible manufacturing systems, and improved worldwide logistics to keep costs down.

In addition, Ford of Europe, Inc. has fashioned an overall strategy that is paying dividends. It has 22 plants in locations that stretch from Wales to Southern Spain. Ford of Europe seeks to become the low-cost automobile producer on the continent through demands for greater flexibility from its employees, reducing the complexity of its manufacturing operation, and cutting development time. It plans to continue deploying assets aggressively across national boundaries, including an expenditure of over $7.5 billion in EC countries over the next five years to maintain and strengthen its position. Recently, many Japanese companies have also begun using this strategy. For example, Canon is manufacturing photocopiers in France, and Nissan is gearing up to make 200,000 cars a year by 1992 in England and Spain. [24,29,30,31,32]

3. Establishing a joint venture. This strategic agenda enables a firm to acquire a Europe-based focus without the expenditure involved in a merger or acquisition. It is difficult because it involves combining divergent cultures and management styles, but is being used successfully by large firms from several countries in the marketing, manufacturing, financial services, and research and development areas. For example, Matsushita of Japan has recently formed a strategic alliance with Siemens of Germany to produce electronic components. Also, London's Hambros Bank is shedding its foreign image on the continent by building a network of relationships with continental counterparts as it seeks to solidify its relationship with Philps, positioning itself for an immediate ten percent share of the huge European major appliance market. Whirlpool is obviously planning to be a major competitor in the new European market of the future. [24,31,32,33]

4. Expanding distribution and marketing systems with respect to coverage, intensity, and exposure. This strategy can be a very low risk and effective means of fashioning a stronger European identity and creating a European marketing infrastructure, but it can also be very expensive. Many companies like to establish distribution and sales operations initially in England, where the language barrier is minimal, and use their base there as a springboard to the continent.

Perhaps the best historical example of expanding a distribution system to gain local identity rests with the Japanese. Most Japanese auto makers, when they first began selling cars in the U.S. market, attempted to create their own dealer network instead of using established dealers. After years of effort and an investment running into the billions of dollars, the strategy proved to be very successful. In the European trade arena, 3M is using the same tactic. It recently sought to bolster its sales, training, and service network in Europe through the establishment of a distribution center in the Netherlands to sell PC diskettes and other universal products. The use of a pan-European advertising program enabled 3M to reduce the number of ad agencies used, to take advantage of economies of sales, and to reduce advertising costs. [24,30,31,32]

5. Divestiture. This strategy involves downsizing through the sale or closing down of a business due to a change in the scope of its operations. It is practiced most frequently by multinationals who have over-capacity and high fixed costs, and who wish to consolidate strength in core markets. The practice enables the firm to reallocate resources to surviving businesses and/or to focus its resources on new business opportunities. For example, after failing to commit the resources needed to transform a local position to a European scale, Bank America made the choices of selling its Italian subsidiary. In another case, Westinghouse more efficiently organized its European operations by scaling back on the production of mature products such as electrical equipment and concentrated additional resources instead on such growth industries as defense electronics and environmental controls. The company was able to cut its workforce by one-half and slash its operating budget while focusing more clearly on its newly targeted market. [29,31,32,33,34]


[1.] Archer, William T. "What to Expect from EC 92?" Nation's Business, June 1989, p. 24.

[2.] Bailey, Richard. "New Beginning For the Common Market." Accountancy, August 1988, p. 82 and "EC '92." Nation's Business, June 1989, p. 22.

[3.] _____________. "Dismantling the Barriers: It's Later Than We Think." Accountancy, August 1988, p. 76.

[4.] Bennett, Thomas and Craig S. Hakkio. "Europe 1992: Implications for U.S. Firms." Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, April 1989, pp. 3-17.

[5.] Bhatt, Gita. "Europe 1992." Finance and Development, June 1989, pp. 40-42.

[6.] Brookes, Stephen. "Juggling the Scepter in a Unified Europe." Insight, June 19, 1988, pp. 8-27.

[7.] Comes, Frank J., Jonathan Kapstein, John Templeman, and Elizabeth Weiner. "Reshaping Europe: 1992 and Beyond." Business Week, December 12, 1988, pp. 48-51.

[8.] "Countdown to 1992: Opportunities and Threats in the Single European Market." Coopers & Lybrand: Executive Briefing, February 1989, pp. 1-5.

[9.] "DEC: Making the Most of Vanishing Borders." Business Week, December 12, 1988, p. 60.

[10.] "EC '92 Promises Big Market, Big ..." National Journal, May 13, 1989, pp. 1170-1172.

[11.] "The EC Strikes Back: Commission Report Cites Onerous US Trade Barriers." Business International, May 15, 1989, p. 147.

[12.] "A Europe Without Borders by 1992: Answers to Some Questions." The World of Banking, November-December 1988, pp. 21-24.

[13.] Fieleke, Norman S. "Europe in 1992." New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, May-June 1989, pp. 13-15.

[14.] "Ford Is Ready to Roll In the New Europe." Business Week, December 12, 1988, p. 60.

[15.] Holstein, William. "Should Small U.S. Exporters Take the Plunge?" Business Week, December 12, 1988, pp. 64-68.

[16.] "How The European Community Works." Nation's Business, June 1989, p. 26.

[17.] Magee, John F. "1992: Moves Americans Must Make." Harvard Business Review, May-June 1989, p. 82.

[18.] Manasian, David. "A Bold Prescription For Europe." International Management, May 1988, pp. 28-34.

[19.] Melcher, Richard A. "Will the New Europe Cut U.S. Giants Down to Size?" Business Week, December 12, 1988, p. 54.

[20.] _____________. "More Than Ever, Thatcher is Odd Woman Out." Business Week, July 3, 1989, p. 40.

[21.] Moskal, Brian S. "Unprepared for '92." Industry Week, April 3, 1989, pp. 87-88.

[22.] "The New Europe? Yes. Fortress Europe? No." Business Week, December 12, 1988, p. 136.

[23.] Riemer, Blanca. "The Money Man Can't Wait for the Starting Gun." Business Week, December 12, 1988, pp. 72-74.

[24.] Stokes, Bruce. "High Tech Tussling." National Journal, May 13, 1989, pp. 1180-1184.

[25.] _____________. "Getting Ready for 1992." National Journal, May 13, 1989, pp. 1162-1164.

[26.] Stone, Nan. "The Globalization of Europe: An Interview With Wisse Dekker." Harvard Business Review, May-June 1989, pp. 90-95.

[27.] Thimm, Alfred L. "Europe 1992 - Opportunity or Threat for U.S. Business: The Case of Telecommunications." California Management Review, Winter 1989, pp. 54-75.

[28.] Thompson, Roger. "EC '92." Nation's Business, June 1989, p. 18.

[29.] Verity, C. William. "U.S. Business Should Prepare Now for EC 1992." (speech).

[30.] Vernon, Raymond. "Can the U.S. Negotiate for Trade Equality?" Harvard Business Review, May-June 1989, pp. 96-101.

[31.] Wallace, Alan. "Europe 1992: Old World, New Markets." Business Age, June 1989, p. 24.

[32.] Weatherstone, Dennis. "An American Perspective on Europe 1992." The World of Banking, November-December 1988, pp. 13-16.

[33.] Work, Clemens P "Jumping Into the European Market: Is It Cheaper by the Dozen?" U.S. News and World Report, July 3, 1989, pp. 44-46.

[34.] Zolotas, Xenophon. "The European Monetary System and the Challenge of 1992." The World of Banking, November-December 1988, pp. 9-12.

Dr. Sami M. Abassi is Professor of Business at Cumberland University in Lebanon, Tennessee. Dr. Kennth W. Hollman, CLU, ChFC, CIC is Chairholder of the Tommy T. Martin Chair of Insurance at Middle Tennessee State University in Murfreesboro, Tennessee.

Faculty Notes

John F. Marshall (Economic and Finance) was awarded a research grant by the Chicago Board of Trade to further his research on the returns to futures portfolios. He also received a research grant from Brandwine Asset Management. He was a discussant at the Financial Management Association meetings in October 1989.

John F. Marshall (Economics and Finance) and Kevin Wynne of Pace University completed a "Video Series in Investment Banking" for The First Boston Corporation. John F. Marshall and Vipul Bansal (Economics and Finance) signed a contract with Allyn and Bacon to write a textbook on Financial Engineering.

Igor M. Tomic (Economics and Finance) presented a paper entitled "Rate Base Padding: A Reconstruction" at the Eastern Economic Association meeting in Baltimore in March 1989. He also presented a paper at a seminar at St. John's entitled "Management in the Rate Base Padding Environment" in April 1989.

Igor M. Tomic (Economics and Finance) and Ibrahim Badawi (Accounting and Taxation) presented two papers: "Concentration Degree, Clientele and Specialties of Public Accounting Firms in the Northeast U.S." at the Northeastern Business and Economic Association meeting in Hartford in November 1988 and "Privatization and Financial Reporting: The Case of Conrail" at the Southwestern Society of Economists meeting in New Orleans in March 1989.

Ibrahim M. Badawi (Accounting and Taxation) was chosen by the Alpha Sigma Lambda National Honorary Society as Faculty Member of the Year for the Colleges of Business Administration. He was inducted into the Society in May 1989.

Joseph A. Giacalone (Economics and Finance) presented a paper entitled "Economics and the Health Care Delivery System: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow" at the Annual Executive Symposium of the Metropolitan New York Chapter of the Health Care Financial Management Association in June 1989.

Gordon Storholm (Marketing) co-authored a paper with Hershey Friedman entitled "Perceived Mytho and Unethical Practices in Direct Marketing," which has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Business Ethics.
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Title Annotation:European Community's Single European market in 1992
Author:Abbasi, Sami M.; Hollman, Kenneth W.
Publication:Review of Business
Date:Dec 22, 1989
Previous Article:Business outlook for '89 - gateway to the '90s.
Next Article:Why are similar managerial jobs so different?

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