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Lobbying na regulacao contabil: evidencias do setor petrolifero.

1 INTRODUCAO

Olhando a regulacao contabil das atividades de exploracao e producao petrolifera, o debate em torno da definicao do melhor modelo contabil capaz de capturar as transacoes economicas do setor remonta as decadas de 1960 e 1970. Nos Estados Unidos, pais pioneiro quando se trata do arcabouco teorico e normativo da contabilidade do setor petrolifero, tanto a Security Exchange Commission (SEC) quanto o Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) divergiram entre si em relacao as normas atinentes e permitiram a existencia de dois metodos contabeis conflitantes denominados "esforcos bem sucedidos" (successful efforts) e "capitalizacao total" (full cost) (Cortese, Irvine, & Kaidonis, 2009).

O cenario em que as empresas petroliferas podem escolher livremente entre esses dois metodos contabeis foi fruto de um intenso jogo de interesses que colocou o FASB e a SEC em situacoes antagonicas, com o FASB, de um lado, defendendo a norma Statements of Financial Accounting Standard n. 19--Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing Companies (SFAS 19) que regula o metodo dos esforcos bem sucedidos; e de outro lado, a SEC, defendendo o metodo da capitalizacao total por meio de sua Regulation S-X 4-10, situacao essa que ainda permanece vigente.

No ambito do normatizador internacional tambem nao foi diferente, dado que, desde 1998, tenta-se emitir uma norma contabil, completa, para o setor petrolifero, mas sem sucesso. Para permitir que as empresas europeias do setor extrativista pudessem adotar as normas internacionais em 2005, o International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) emitiu em 2004 a International Financial Reporting Standard n. 6--Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources (IFRS 6) dando orientacoes gerais, mas sem entrar no merito sobre qual metodo deveria ser utilizado pelas empresas.

Mais de seis anos se passaram desde a emissao do IFRS 6 e as discussoes relacionadas a emissao da norma contabil internacional definitiva aplicavel ao setor extrativista continuam presentes com a publicacao do Discussion Paper Extractive Activities (DPEA daqui em diante), decorrente do projeto do IASB de revisao/substituicao do IFRS 6, colocando em discussao dez questoes chaves relacionadas ao reconhecimento, mensuracao e divulgacao dos eventos contabeis relativos as atividades extrativistas.

No que tange ao processo de regulacao contabil, recorrese a teoria economica da regulacao e as proposicoes de Watts e Zimmerman (1978) de que os agentes possuem incentivos economicos para influenciar os orgaos reguladores, via lobbying, com o objetivo de obter normas que atendam a seus interesses. Com isso, busca-se responder a seguinte questao de pesquisa: quais os fatores determinantes a realizacao de lobbying na regulacao contabil do setor petrolifero, tendo por base a estrategia de submissao de cartas comentarios?

O objetivo consiste em identificar os fatores determinantes da adocao de estrategias de lobbying sobre a regulacao contabil do setor petrolifero de modo que se possam avaliar as caracteristicas marcantes que levam o grupo de interesse formado pelos preparadores de demonstracoes financeiras de empresas petroliferas a realizar essa atividade, qual seja, tentar influenciar o IASB por meio da submissao de cartas comentarios as audiencias publicas.

Para atingir o objetivo proposto, verifica-se, por meio de tecnicas multivariadas de analise de dados (regressoes logisticas, binomial e multinomial, e regressao de Poisson), se existe correlacao entre as variaveis representativas das caracteristicas das firmas e o fato de terem apresentado comentarios ao DPEA do IASB. Dessa forma, busca-se definir os fatores que determinam a adocao dessa estrategia de lobbying no processo regulatorio contabil do setor petrolifero.

Utiliza-se modelagem econometrica em amostra formada por empresas petroliferas lobistas (aquelas que submeteram cartas comentarios ao IASB) e por empresas petroliferas nao lobistas (aquelas que nao submeteram cartas comentarios) para identificar quais seriam os fatores economicos preponderantes envolvidos na adocao da estrategia de lobbying por parte desse grupo de interesse (empresas petroliferas) junto ao IASB.

Essa estrategia de pesquisa tem sido comumente utilizada com o objetivo de se identificar os motivos e as estrategias de lobbying empregadas pelos diversos grupos de interesse, a exemplo das pesquisas desenvolvidas por Dhaliwal (1982), Sutton (1984), Francis (1987), Deakin (1989), Kenny e Larson (1993), Tutticci, Dunstan, e Holmes (1994), Weetman, Davie, e Collins (1996), Georgiou e Roberts (2004), Asekomeh, Russel, e Tarbert (2006), Hansen (2011) e Ginner e Arce (2012), dentre outras.

Nesse particular, faz-se necessario esclarecer que a utilizacao do conceito de lobbying empregado neste estudo apresenta uma visao bem particular e refere-se as manifestacoes explicitas contidas nas cartas comentarios submetidas em audiencias publicas de discussao de uma norma contabil, como e o caso do DPEA.

Analisando o modus operandi do IASB para emissao de uma IFRS, por exemplo, e possivel identificar que esse processo de influencia nao se da apenas pela submissao de cartas comentarios. Diversas sao as estrategias de lobbying possiveis, como as listadas a seguir:

(a) participacoes em reunioes com membros do board ou do staff, sejam formais ou informais, presenciais ou a distancia (videoconferencia);

(b) participacao em secoes publicas (mesas redondas) ou visitas de campo (outreach) realizadas durante o periodo de audiencia estabelecido;

(c) indicacao de membros para a fundacao mantenedora e seus diversos organismos, como o board, comites tecnicos ou de assessoria, a exemplo do IFRS Advisory Council, do IFRS Interpretation Committee e do novissimo Accounting Standards Advisory Forum (ASAF) --forum consultivo em que se busca a contribuicao de seus membros para o desenvolvimento de padroes normativos aceitos globalmente e de elevada qualidade ou, ainda, para os diversos grupos de trabalhos;

(d) financiamento para as mantenedoras dos orgaos reguladores;

(e) utilizacao de firmas de auditorias e entidades de classe como mediadoras junto ao board;

(f) pesquisas de opiniao; panfletagem; dentre outras estrategias.

Orens, Jorissen, Lybaert, e Tas (2011) fornecem um esquema que demonstra um conjunto de estrategias de lobbying que podem ser utilizadas durante os diferentes estagios do processo de emissao das normas pelo IASB, conforme Tabela 1.

Assim, sabendo-se que na pratica se trata de conceito muito mais abrangente, opta-se, por restricoes metodologicas, como estrategia de lobbying aquela referente a utilizacao de cartas comentarios em resposta as audiencias publicas dos orgaos normatizadores.

Em defesa da utilizacao das cartas comentarios, Asekomeh et al. (2006) argumentam que, diferentemente das respostas dadas a perguntas feitas em pesquisas que se utilizam de questionarios, que podem ser enviesadas/tendenciosas, os comentarios as questoes colocadas em audiencia publica e respondidas via carta comentario mostram de forma mais fidedigna as acoes de lobbying, contribuindo significativamente para o entendimento das posicoes de cada agente do processo.

Ainda na direcao da utilizacao das cartas comentarios, Georgiou (2004) investigou a efetividade dos metodos de lobbying nao apenas por meio de cartas comentarios, e os resultados mostraram que, mesmo utilizando outros metodos, como intermediacao da firma de auditoria e encontros com membros da ASB (U.K's Accounting Standards Board), essas estrategias estavam associadas significativamente ao uso de cartas comentarios. O autor concluiu que companhias que submetiam cartas comentarios tinham maior probabilidade de utilizar outros metodos complementares do que companhias que nao o faziam (Georgiou, 2004).

A escolha do setor petrolifero e, consequentemente, das normas contabeis a ele aplicaveis, decorre do fato de as evidencias historicas trazidas por Collins, Dent, e O'Connor (1978); Solomons (1978); Deakin (1979); Collins, Rozeff, e Salatka (1982); Deakin (1989); Zeff (2005); King (2006), dentre outros, revelarem que o processo de regulacao contabil norte-americano aplicavel ao setor petrolifero decorreu de um forte sistema de lobbying, pressoes e influencia sobre a SEC e FASB. Esse fato tambem foi observado no ambito do IASB, por ocasiao da emissao do IFRS 6, como mostram as evidencias trazidas por Cortese, Irvine, e Kaidonis (2010) de que o orgao internacional foi capturado pelos regulados, resultando em uma norma que manteve o status quo (escolha livre do metodo contabil), atendendo claramente aos interesses das empresas petroliferas.

Nesse contexto, com a emissao do DPEA, tem-se novamente um cenario para se observar o lobbying exercido pelas empresas petroliferas no que se refere a normatizacao contabil do setor no ambito do IASB, motivo pelo qual este estudo ganha importancia e se fundamenta.

2 FUNDAMENTACAO TEORICA

A teoria da regulacao, conforme Viscusi, Harrington, e Vernon (2005), pode ser vista sob tres prismas: a teoria do interesse publico; a teoria da captura; e a teoria economica da regulacao ou teoria dos grupos de interesse. Para os propositos deste estudo, este se enquadra no prisma da teoria economica da regulacao ou dos grupos de interesse.

O pressuposto basico da teoria economica da regulacao corresponde ao fato de que a regulacao e exercida de forma a atender as necessidades e o bem-estar do grupo de interesse que exercer maior pressao relativa sobre o normatizador (Viscusi, Harrington, & Vernon, 2005). Em funcao desse pressuposto, a teoria tambem e conhecida como teoria dos grupos de interesse, tendo como expoentes principais os pesquisadores Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Peltzman (1976) e Becker (1983).

No contexto dessa teoria, a regulacao e feita para atender aos interesses dos grupos que forem mais politicamente efetivos em convencer o regulador a agir em beneficio deles. Watts e Zimmerman (1978, 1986), em consonancia com Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976) e Posner (1974), assumem que os individuos agem para maximizar sua propria utilidade e, sendo assim, o processo de regulacao (normatizacao) contabil e resultado de um processo politico em que os individuos e grupos competem entre si por transferencia de riqueza em seu proprio interesse.

Stigler (1971) e Peltzman (1976) argumentam que a teoria economica no processo politico foca nos incentivos aos individuos para se unirem em grupos com o objetivo de realizar lobby (influenciar reguladores) visando a transferencia de riquezas em interesse proprio. Assim, admitindo que o processo seja politico, de acordo com Solomons (1978), as normas contabeis nao estariam pautadas necessariamente por questoes teoricas ou tecnicas, mas sim pelos diferentes interesses das partes envolvidas que exercerem pressao para obter ganhos em particular.

Segundo Kothari, Ramanna, e Skinner (2010), os reguladores sao dotados de uma ideologia propria e as normas seriam fruto de um conjunto de ideologias e dos efeitos proporcionados pela pressao (lobby) realizada por alguns grupos de interesse junto ao regulador. Nessa concepcao, o lobby nao e visto como uma atitude ilegal ou imoral, mas um mecanismo utilizado pelo regulador para se informar sobre as praticas e politicas adotadas pelas empresas.

As modelagens de diversas pesquisas que tiveram como objeto de estudo o lobbying na regulacao contabil podem ser vistas como um subconjunto de pesquisas sobre escolhas contabeis (Francis, 1987; Kenny & Larson, 1993), uma vez que as atividades de lobbying referem-se apropriadamente a uma das dimensoes das escolhas contabeis, conforme Francis (2001).

Sendo uma escolha contabil, conforme Fields, Lys, e Vicent (2001), qualquer decisao cujo proposito primario seja influenciar (na forma ou na substancia) as saidas do sistema contabil de um modo particular, a teoria das escolhas contabeis se conecta com a teoria dos grupos de interesses pelo fato de as politicas contabeis serem estabelecidas tendo por base os diversos incentivos economicos existentes e que tais incentivos tambem se fazem presentes no proprio processo de regulacao. Assim, os gestores realizam lobbying para tentar influenciar o orgao normatizador na origem da elaboracao da norma, ou seja, para obter uma regulacao que atenda a seus interesses no seu nascedouro.

Watts e Zimmerman (1986) definiram tres hipoteses para os motivos das escolhas contabeis e que tambem podem ser entendidas no processo de regulacao contabil: (1) hipotese da remuneracao, na qual os gestores teriam incentivos para realizar escolhas que maximizem suas remuneracoes; (2) hipotese do endividamento, em que os gestores tendem a fazer escolhas que evitem a violacao das clausulas de emprestimo; e (3) hipotese do custo politico, pelo qual os gestores fazem suas escolhas contabeis para evitar a visibilidade politica da empresa perante a sociedade.

De forma mais explicita, a hipotese da remuneracao, ou do plano de incentivo, estabelece que os gestores que recebem remuneracao variavel (bonus, acoes ou opcoes de acoes) usarao frequentemente metodos contabeis que aumentem o resultado da empresa no periodo e, dessa forma, a remuneracao variavel recebida, ao antecipar lucros de periodos futuros para o atual (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986).

Em relacao a hipotese do endividamento, Watts e Zimmerman (1986) argumentam que os gestores de empresas que possuem graus de endividamento maiores estao mais sujeitos a usar metodos contabeis que aumentem os lucros. O pressuposto e o de que quanto maior o grau de endividamento, mais sufocada a empresa estara pelas restricoes e condicoes impostas pelos credores. E, ainda, quanto mais rigorosas forem as restricoes impostas pelos credores, maior sera a probabilidade de a empresa violar as restricoes. Assim, os gestores, aumentando os lucros, acabam por relaxar as restricoes impostas pelos credores (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986).

Sob a hipotese dos custos politicos, os autores estabelecem que grandes empresas tendem a usar metodos contabeis para reduzir os lucros mais frequentemente do que pequenas empresas, sendo o "tamanho" um estimulador de atencao politica que a empresa recebe. O pressuposto e o de que lucros mais elevados podem atrair atencao adversa de orgaos reguladores, entidades de classe, imprensa, ambientalistas, grupos de defesa dos consumidores etc. (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986).

Watts e Zimmerman (1978, 1986), em consonancia com a teoria economica da regulacao (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Posner, 1974; Becker, 1983), argumentam que a regulacao e feita de acordo com os interesses dos grupos que forem mais efetivos politicamente em convencer o regulador/normatizador a agir em beneficio deles.

Alinhando as escolhas contabeis com o processo de regulacao contabil, os gestores teriam incentivos economicos para realizar lobbying contra ou a favor de uma regulamentacao contabil de modo a tentar influenciar o orgao emissor a optar por modelos contabeis que lhes permitam, por exemplo: reduzir ou diferir o pagamento de tributos; diminuir os custos politicos e a producao de informacoes (divulgacao); ou aumentar o recebimento de bonus.

Watts e Zimmerman (1978) testaram empiricamente as hipoteses formuladas utilizando analise discriminante em uma amostra com 52 cartas comentarios submetidas por empresas ao Discussion Memorandum da norma contabil sobre os efeitos das mudancas no nivel geral de precos do FASB e concluiram que os gestores possuem incentivos economicos para participarem do processo de elaboracao das normas realizando lobbying junto ao regulador.

A partir dos estudos de Watts e Zimmerman (1978), diversas outras pesquisas foram conduzidas sob a tematica do lobbying na regulacao contabil. Francis (1987) e, posteriormente, Ndubizu, Choi, e Jain (1993) investigaram o processo de emissao da norma SFAS 87 (Contabilidade dos Fundos de Pensao dos Empregados). Na primeira pesquisa, Francis (1987) formulou um modelo logit e o empregou numa amostra composta por 218 empresas que submeteram cartas comentarios ao Preliminary Views do SFAS 87 (empresas lobistas) mais 582 outras empresas (as nao lobistas). O autor formulou hipoteses para "tamanho", "divida" (como proxy para os efeitos da norma no balanco patrimonial) e "despesas com fundo de pensao" (como proxy para os efeitos da norma na demonstracao do resultado) e os resultados indicaram que nao apenas o "tamanho" e importante na decisao de influenciar o orgao normatizador, mas tambem a possibilidade de a nova norma causar efeitos negativos adversos nas demonstracoes contabeis.

Ndubizu et al. (1993) investigaram a etapa do Exposure Draft do SFAS 87 do FASB, utilizando uma amostra com 1.802 empresas, sendo 156 empresas lobistas e que se manifestaram contrarias ao Exposure Draft e outras 1.646 empresas (as nao lobistas). Os resultados de Ndubizu et al. (1993) divergiram daqueles apresentados por Francis (1987), uma vez que apenas a "volatilidade dos lucros", novidade em relacao ao estudo anterior, mostrou-se relevante para explicar a decisao de apresentar comentarios ao Exposure Draft, confirmando a hipotese formulada de que empresas com alta volatilidade nos lucros pre-adocao de uma nova norma teriam maior probabilidade de realizar lobbying.

Com a pesquisa desenvolvida por Deakin (1989), buscou-se estudar o processo de normatizacao contabil do setor petrolifero junto ao FASB. O autor utilizou uma amostra com empresas que adotavam o metodo da capitalizacao total apenas, uma vez que essas seriam as mais afetadas pela proposta do FASB. Para definir a variavel dependente, o autor classificou as empresas em lobistas (apresentaram comentario ao Discussion Memorandum ou ao Exposure Draft do FASB) e em nao lobistas (nao apresentaram qualquer comentario). Utilizou o modelo de regressao logistica para testar as hipoteses relacionadas a existencia de clausulas contabeis restritivas (covenant) e planos de compensacao gerencial, as quais foram comprovadas empiricamente.

Destaque ainda para a pesquisa de Georgiou e Roberts (2004) que investigaram o comportamento das empresas em relacao ao lobbying promovido sobre a norma "tributos diferidos" do UK' ASB. Os resultados indicaram que tamanho e o comportamento da empresa em audiencias publicas passadas (frequencia em realizar lobbying) foram os fatores chaves determinantes para a decisao de fornecer comentarios ao UK' ASB sobre tributos diferidos.

Os resultados indicam tambem que empresas que apresentaram comentarios contrarios a proposta de norma sao as que, provavelmente, apresentam contratos com covenants, enquanto aquelas com posicionamentos favoraveis apresentaram maior probabilidade de nao possuirem contratos com covenants.

Por fim, as evidencias mostram que empresas possuidoras de planos de compensacao gerencial tem maior probabilidade de oferecer comentarios favoraveis a proposta colocada em audiencia publica, enquanto que as empresas contrarias a minuta de norma em discussao seriam aquelas com maior probabilidade de nao possuirem planos de compensacao gerencial (Georgiou & Roberts, 2004).

Mais recentemente, o processo de lobbying na regulacao contabil tambem tem sido estudado sob a perspectiva da teoria institucional (Bengtsson, 2011; Chatham, Larson, & Vietze, 2010; Fogarty, 1992; Giner & Arce, 2012; Kenny & Larson, 1993; Koh, 2011; Larson, 2002, 2008; Larson & Kenny, 2011), a qual sugere que as acoes das organizacoes devem ser entendidas como a busca por legitimidade na sociedade ou manutencao da credibilidade perante os agentes externos a organizacao (Fogarty, 1992).

Tavares, Paulo, Anjos, e Carter (2013) recorrem a afirmacao de Riahi-Belkaouri (2004) que diz que a promulgacao de um padrao e uma escolha social que forca os reguladores a adotar um processo politico com o objetivo de encontrar acomodacoes para os diversos interesses, inclusive o seu proprio, ou seja, alinhado a teoria institucional, o regulador e motivado a adotar estrategias visando a manutencao do seu poder, da credibilidade perante a comunidade ou da reeleicao dos seus membros.

A teoria institucional coloca as organizacoes dentro de um cenario social e explicitamente reconhece as influencias e interacoes do ambiente social externo nas atividades internas das organizacoes, as quais buscam a legitimidade ou a se manterem aceitas dentro do ambiente social (Kenny & Larson, 1993).

Nesse contexto, organizacoes como o IASB buscam legitimidade por parte de seus constituintes para sobreviver, sendo a solicitacao de comentarios sobre os seus produtos (normas contabeis) diretamente as partes interessadas um dos caminhos seguidos nessa busca por legitimidade (Kenny & Larson, 1993).

Consequentemente, os diversos grupos de interesses, tambem na busca por legitimidade e reconhecimento por parte dos seus pares, podem participar livremente do devido processo de emissao de normas desses orgaos, mesmo nos casos em que eles nao sejam diretamente afetados por uma proposta normativa (Chatham et al., 2010).

Considerando que o processo de emissao de normas e um processo politico, as organizacoes como o IASB precisam continuamente monitorar as necessidades e influencias de seus constituintes para ajustar suas operacoes visando acomodar as necessidades demandadas do ambiente externo, alinhando-as as suas proprias necessidades (Kenny & Larson, 1993; Larson & Kenny, 2011).

A teoria institucional, de acordo com Bengtsson (2011), tem sido usada em pesquisas sobre a emissao de normas contabeis para complementar os pressupostos da economia politica, de onde decorre a teoria economica da regulacao, com foco no entendimento de como as pressoes exercidas influenciam a adocao das normas contabeis.

Tendo em vista que este estudo tem por base um documento para discussao (DPEA) e, por isso, nao sendo possivel saber ainda a posicao final do IASB sobre quais opinioes foram aceitas ou rejeitadas, para a compreensao das acomodacoes realizadas, os pressupostos da teoria institucional aparecem neste estudo para complementar o entendimento de que a participacao no processo de audiencia publica (lobbying) e legitima e que as empresas buscam fazer valer no processo de regulacao as suas escolhas contabeis, retornando a teoria economica da regulacao com vista a buscar identificar fatores que levam as empresas a participarem desse processo.

Um resumo dos principais estudos sobre o tema e apresentado na Tabela 2.

Das pesquisas comentadas, destaque para os estudos de Watts e Zimmerman (1978), Francis (1987), Deakin (1989), Ndubizu et al. (1993) e Georgiou e Roberts (2004) por se alinharem metodologicamente com o objetivo deste trabalho, o qual envolve estabelecer os fatores determinantes que levaram as empresas petroliferas a oferecer comentarios ao DPEA do IASB, ou seja, fazer lobbying.

3 METODOLOGIA

Para que se possam identificar os determinantes da atividade de lobbying na regulacao contabil do setor petrolifero sao utilizadas as estrategias de pesquisa descritas a seguir.

Com base nas 141 cartas comentarios disponibilizadas pelo IASB em seu site na internet, primeiramente e realizada uma analise de conteudo das cartas submetidas pelas empresas petroliferas com vistas a mensuracao da variavel dependente utilizada nos modelos econometricos.

A segunda etapa do estudo esta baseada em analises quantitativas, com a utilizacao de modelos econometricos para se estabelecer os fatores economicos determinantes da adocao da estrategia de lobbying via submissao de cartas comentarios.

Em funcao das caracteristicas da variavel dependente, utilizam-se as regressoes logisticas, binomial e multinomial e a regressao de Poisson. No primeiro caso, a variavel dependente assume valores "1" para o caso de se ter oferecido comentarios ao documento do IASB ou "0" se for o contrario.

Na regressao logistica multinomial, a variavel dependente e decomposta em tres categorias: "0" para representar as empresas que nao ofereceram comentarios ao documento do IASB; "1" para representar as empresas que ofereceram comentarios predominantemente favoraveis; e "2" para representar as empresas que ofereceram comentarios predominantemente desfavoraveis as proposicoes contidas no documento do IASB.

Por fim, emprega-se a regressao de Poisson em que a variavel dependente pretende expressar o grau de concordancia ou discordancia em relacao as dez questoes colocadas em discussao no documento do IASB. Assim, ela pode assumir valores de zero, para os casos de empresas que nao ofereceram comentarios, ate dez, que representa a quantidade maxima de vezes em que a empresa foi favoravel ou desfavoravel as questoes apresentadas no DPEA.

3.1 Definicao das Variaveis e Hipoteses de Pesquisa.

Como exposto anteriormente, a variavel dependente utilizada como proxy para lobbying refere-se as manifestacoes explicitas contidas nas cartas comentarios submetidas a audiencia publica de discussao do DPEA. Trata-se de modelagem amplamente utilizada na literatura contabil sobre lobbying, a exemplo de Watts e Zimmerman (1978), Francis (1987), Deakin (1989), Ndubizu et al. (1993) e Georgiou e Roberts (2004).

Tendo em vista que a adocao de outras estrategias para mensuracao da variavel dependente envolve, na maioria das vezes, informacoes privadas, o que torna a modelagem de dificil execucao (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983), tem-se uma limitacao inerente ao estudo pelo fato de que as estrategias de lobbying estao limitadas as cartas comentarios. Diversos sao os estudos que defendem essa modelagem, como Asekomeh et al. (2006), Chung (1999), Sutton (1984) e Georgiou (2004), e esse e o caminho adotado nesta pesquisa.

Dessa forma, e tendo por base o tipo de regressao utilizada, a variavel dependente apresenta as caracteristicas constantes da Tabela 3.

Em relacao as variaveis independentes, o "tamanho", como visto, tem sido comumente utilizado na literatura sobre lobbying na regulacao contabil para expressar a exposicao da empresa (hipotese do custo politico) (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978; Francis, 1987; Deakin, 1989; Ndubizu, Choi, & Jain, 1993; Georgiou & Roberts, 2004).

O "tamanho" tambem tem sido associado com a hipotese de que uma estrategia de lobbying somente e adotada se os beneficios obtidos forem maiores que os custos do lobbying (Sutton, 1984). Nesse sentido, Koh (2011) expressa que grandes empresas, por possuirem mais recursos, usualmente tendem a influenciar o resultado final e, consequentemente, colhem favoravelmente os frutos do lobbying.

Para operacionalizar a variavel tamanho, foram utilizadas quatro proxies, a saber: receitas liquidas do periodo (RECLIQ); ativo total do periodo (ATIVTOT); lucro liquido medio dos ultimos tres periodos (LUCMED); e gastos de exploracao e desenvolvimento incorridos no periodo (UPSTREAM). A hipotese de teste subjacente ao tamanho e definida como:

[H.sub.1]: Grandes empresas petroliferas possuem maior probabilidade de realizarem lobbying, favoravel ou desfavoravel, do que as demais empresas petroliferas.

A literatura vigente expoe ainda duas outras variaveis representativas dos incentivos economicos para as escolhas contabeis (no caso, a possibilidade de influenciar uma norma junto a orgaos normatizadores). Pressupoe-se que gestores de empresas que possuem compensacao remuneratoria baseada em desempenho (medidos com base em indicadores derivados das informacoes contabeis) tenderao a escolher os modelos contabeis para beneficiarem-se, ou seja, optarao por propostas de normas que reflitam metodos contabeis que aumentem ou diminuam o lucro, de acordo com o seu interesse.

A existencia de clausulas contabeis restritivas (covenants) em contratos de financiamento e/ou captacao de recursos e a outra caracteristica. A teoria prega que os gestores tenderao a escolher modelos contabeis que levem a nao violacao dessas clausulas restritivas, ou seja, quanto mais proxima a empresa estiver de um limite fixado em um covenant, baseado em numeros contabeis, maior sera a probabilidade de o administrador utilizar procedimentos que aumentem o resultado e/ou reduzam o nivel de endividamento (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983).

Para operacionalizar essas duas caracteristicas, sao utilizadas as variaveis binarias COMPGEN e COVENANT, que assumem valor "0" para os casos em que a empresa nao apresente a caracteristica de interesse, e valor "1" para os casos em que a empresa possua a caracteristica testavel. Utilizaram-se diretamente as notas explicativas das demonstracoes financeiras das empresas disponiveis em seus websites para mensurar essas variaveis, pesquisando referencias a existencia ou nao de compensacao gerencial e de clausulas restritivas.

Reconhece-se que e possivel operacionalizar essas variaveis de diversas maneiras e assume-se a atribuicao binaria de "0" ou "1" para essas variaveis a partir da existencia ou nao da caracteristica testavel como uma limitacao da pesquisa. Isso se torna relevante pelo fato de que as variaveis binarias, da forma como foram operacionalizadas, podem nao capturar a magnitude da caracteristica que se quer investigar de maneira apropriada. Deakin (1989), Georgiou e Roberts (2004), Georgiou (2005) e Koh (2011), por exemplo, apresentam outros caminhos para se operacionalizar essas variaveis.

As hipoteses testaveis correspondem a:

[H.sub.2]: Empresas petroliferas que apresentem planos de compensacao gerencial possuem maior probabilidade de realizar lobbying, favoravel ou desfavoravel, do que empresas petroliferas que nao possuem planos de compensacao gerencial.

[H.sub.3]: Empresas petroliferas que apresentem clausulas restritivas possuem maior probabilidade de realizarem lobbying, favoravel ou desfavoravel, do que empresas petroliferas que nao possuem clausulas restritivas.

Visando capturar o risco de possiveis mudancas na regulacao contabil do setor petrolifero, tambem sao consideradas no modelo de teste as variaveis USLISTING e METODO. A atual regulacao contabil internacional aplicavel as atividades extrativistas baseia-se na norma IFRS 6. Tal padrao estabelece que as empresas extrativistas podem definir sua politica contabil livremente. Na pratica, o IFRS 6 nao definiu nenhum metodo especifico de reconhecimento e mensuracao e as empresas sujeitas as normas internacionais acabaram por escolher entre um dos dois metodos mais conhecidos mundialmente e que foram estabelecidos pelos Estados Unidos, quais sejam, os metodos dos esforcos bem sucedidos e da capitalizacao total.

Tal atitude pode ser entendida sob a perspectiva da teoria institucional, notadamente quanto a concepcao do isomorfismo mimetico, no qual as organizacoes copiam as praticas umas das outras, particularmente dentro do mesmo setor, mesmo nao sendo obrigadas a seguir normas especificas (Koh, 2011).

Com isso, a adocao dos metodos dos esforcos bem sucedidos ou da capitalizacao total e uma realidade mundial, inclusive para facilitar as empresas nao norte-americanas a publicarem suas demonstracoes financeiras naquele pais por ocasiao da listagem da empresa para negociacao de suas acoes na bolsa de valores de Nova Iorque, por exemplo.

A utilizacao da variavel USLISTING teve por objetivo capturar o risco da possivel mudanca na regulacao contabil sob duas perspectivas: uma considerando as empresas norte-americanas e outra considerando as empresas estrangeiras, mas com acoes negociadas no mercado norteamericano.

No primeiro caso, mesmo que nao se tenha um horizonte claro de que os Estados Unidos venham a adotar as normas internacionais (IFRS) para as empresas estadunidenses, evidencias mostram que a participacao dos norteamericanos no processo de emissao de normas pelo IASB e relevante, chegando, em alguns casos, a serem os mais participativos nas audiencias publicas (Larson, 1997; Larson & Kenny, 2011; Giner & Arce, 2012).

No presente estudo, das 141 cartas recebidas pelo IASB na audiencia publica do DPEA, 27 cartas (ou 19%) foram de interessados norte-americanos, atras apenas dos europeus, que submeteram 76 cartas.

Analisando o processo de emissao do IFRS 2, por exemplo, Giner e Arce (2012) evidenciam que, das 539 cartas recebidas pelo IASB, 264 foram encaminhadas por norteamericanos e argumentam que essa forte participacao no devido processo de emissao de normas pelo IASB e motivada por receios quanto a possibilidade de mudanca na posicao do FASB/SEC em relacao a adocao das IFRS para as empresas nativas (Giner & Arce, 2012).

Sob a perspectiva das empresas nao estadunidenses e que adotam as IFRS, tem-se que mudancas nas normas internacionais podem elevar os custos de transacao, necessitando de ajustes e informacoes adicionais para atender as necessidades dos investidores norte-americanos, como argumentam Larson (1997) e Georgiou (2005). Com isso, essas empresas teriam incentivos para fazer lobbying junto ao IASB visando a manutencao da situacao vigente.

Dessa forma, considera-se que as empresas petroliferas norte-americanas ou aquelas que possuem acoes negociadas no mercado norte-americano possuem incentivos para realizar lobbying junto ao IASB visando a manutencao do status quo, ou seja, em que se pode escolher entre os metodos dos esforcos bem sucedidos ou da capitalizacao total para, dessa forma, evitar-se possiveis custos de transacao com a convergencia para novas regras. A hipotese de teste corresponde a:

[H.sub.4]: Empresas petroliferas listadas no mercado norteamericano possuem maior probabilidade para realizar lobbying desfavoravel, do que empresas petroliferas nao listadas no mercado norte-americano.

A proposta colocada em discussao pelo IASB no DPEA estabelece um novo metodo de reconhecimento e mensuracao aplicavel as atividades extrativistas e elimina a possibilidade de escolha por parte das empresas entre os metodos dos esforcos bem sucedidos ou da capitalizacao.

A proposta do IASB estabelece que os direitos legais para exploracao dos recursos naturais e o ponto chave para o reconhecimento do ativo e que os demais gastos necessarios para confirmacao dos recursos e garantir sua exploracao comercial seriam extensoes desse direito legal. Com essa proposta, tem-se um cenario totalmente diferente do ambiente atualmente institucionalizado e que compreende os metodos dos esforcos bem sucedidos e da capitalizacao total.

Zeff (2002) argumenta que, quando o normatizador prescreve uma nova norma que elimina a possibilidade de escolha ou impoe exigencias para divulgacoes adicionais, isto se torna um gatilho para que os constituintes realizem pressoes junto ao normatizador para fazer valer as suas necessidades. Esse argumento tambem e encontrado em Saemann (1999), que complementa argumentando que, em geral, esse cenario leva os interessados a se oporem as propostas do normatizador.

Tavares et al. (2013) explicam que regular e restringir as opcoes de escolhas contabeis na medida em que o regulador tem o poder de decidir sobre as politicas contabeis que os regulados devem seguir.

Nesse contexto, a proposta contida no DPEA elimina a possibilidade de escolha por parte das empresas petroliferas ao propor um metodo unico de reconhecimento e mensuracao e, dessa forma, as empresas, na concepcao de Zeff (2002), teriam incentivos para realizar lobbying junto ao IASB visando manter o status quo. Tal incentivo tambem encontra respaldo em Watts e Zimmerman (1978, 1986), na medida em que preparadores levam em conta o potencial impacto de um novo tratamento contabil na expectativa futura de fluxo de caixa para decidir sobre o lobbying.

Como analisado em Santos, Lopes, e Silva (2010), empresas que seguem o metodo dos esforcos bem sucedidos seriam as mais afetadas pela proposta apresentada pelo IASB no DPEA, com mudancas significativas em suas politicas contabeis. Assim, espera-se que essas empresas tenham maior probabilidade de realizar lobbying contrario a proposta do IASB.

Dessa forma, a variavel METODO presta-se a investigar se existe associacao entre a escolha do metodo dos esforcos bem sucedidos (identificado como "1") e a probabilidade de se oferecer comentarios contrarios ao documento do IASB. A hipotese testavel corresponde a:

[H.sub.5]: Empresas petroliferas que seguem o metodo dos esforcos bem sucedidos possuem maior probabilidade de realizar lobbying desfavoravel junto ao IASB do que as empresas petroliferas que seguem o metodo da capitalizacao total.

3.2 Especificacao dos Modelos Econometricos.

Do exposto, chega-se aos seguintes modelos econometricos:

[EXPRESION MATEMATICA IRREPRODUCIBLE EN ASCII]

Em que i denota empresa, e LOBBYING assume valor "1" nas empresas que ofereceram comentarios ao DPEA e "0" para os casos de empresas que nao ofereceram comentarios. O termo de erro da regressao e indicado pelo parametro s; a e o intercepto e [[beta].sub.1], [[beta].sub.2], [[beta].sub.3], ..., [[beta].sub.8] sao os coeficientes estimados, dos quais se espera que sejam estatisticamente significantes e positivos.

De acordo com Favero, Belfiore, Silva, e Chan (2009), a analise dos resultados reside nos coeficientes das variaveis independentes (P), que precisam ser estatisticamente relevantes e esta baseada na ideia de que quando o coeficiente e maior que zero, maior e a probabilidade de ocorrencia do evento de interesse (lobby ng ao documento do IASB) e vice-versa.

Em relacao a regressao logistica multinomial, tem-se a seguinte especificacao:

[EXPRESION MATEMATICA IRREPRODUCIBLE EN ASCII]

Em que LOBBYING assume valores "0" nas empresas que nao ofereceram comentarios ao DPEA do IASB; "1" nas empresas que apresentaram comentarios predominantemente favoraveis ao documento do IASB; e "2" para os casos em que as empresas apresentaram comportamento predominantemente desfavoravel ao documento do IASB.

As analises sao realizadas comparando (1) as empresas que ofereceram comentarios predominantemente favoraveis com aquelas que nao ofereceram comentarios e (2) as empresas que ofereceram comentarios predominantemente desfavoraveis com aquelas que nao ofereceram comentarios (Favero, Belfiore, Silva, e Chan, 2009).

No modelo de regressao de Poisson, utiliza-se a seguinte especificacao:

[EXPRESION MATEMATICA IRREPRODUCIBLE EN ASCII]

Em que LOBBYING assume valores que variam de "0" a "10", sendo zero os casos de empresas que nao ofereceram comentarios ao DPEA do IASB e dez o valor maximo possivel de concordancia (ou discordancia) em relacao ao documento do orgao internacional.

Para exemplificar a utilizacao desses tres modelos, suponha-se uma empresa que tenha oferecido comentarios ao DPEA, sendo que das 10 perguntas apresentadas, 7 obtiveram respostas discordantes e 3 foram respondidas com comentarios favoraveis. No primeiro modelo (regressao logistica binomial), a empresa sera codificada como "1" (ofereceu comentarios); no modelo de regressao logistica multinomial, recebera o codigo "2" (posicao predominantemente desfavoravel) e, por fim, na regressao de Poisson sera codificada como "3" no painel "lobbying favoravel" e "7" no painel "lobbying desfavoravel".

3.3 Caracteristicas da Amostra.

Como a amostra deve conter empresas lobistas e empresas nao lobistas, inicialmente identificaram-se as empresas petroliferas que participaram da audiencia publica do DPEA. O IASB recebeu 141 cartas comentarios, sendo que 39 (ou 28%) delas foram submetidas por empresas extrativistas e 33 (23%) por entidades nao governamentais. Por fim, o grupo formado pelos emissores nacionais, entidades de classe contabil e reguladores do mercado de capitais contribuiu com 25 cartas (18%). Os grupos formados por investidores/usuarios individuais, empresas de consultoria do setor/associacoes profissionais e firmas de auditoria submeteram 17, 12 e 8 cartas comentarios, respectivamente. Outras 8 cartas foram submetidas por interessados diversos.

Dentre as 39 cartas comentarios submetidas ao IASB pelas empresas extrativistas, 28 delas sao de empresas petroliferas e 11 de mineradoras. Com isso, focou-se inicialmente nessas 28 petroliferas, sendo que 3 delas nao puderam ser aproveitadas em funcao da indisponibilidade das informacoes necessarias ao estudo.

Recorreu-se a base de dados da Evaluate Energy[R], empresa de consultoria lider no fornecimento de informacoes sobre o setor de oleo e gas. Como o DPEA ficou em audiencia publica no periodo de abril a julho de 2010, utilizaramse as informacoes disponiveis do ano de 2009 e, para esse ano, a base de dados da Evaluate Energy[R] contava com informacoes de 262 empresas do setor petrolifero.

Como da base de dados da Evaluate Energy[R] nao constam informacoes necessarias para operacionalizar as variaveis COMPGEN e COVENANT, optou-se por realizar uma selecao aleatoria dentre as 237 empresas da base de dados (excluindo as 25 ja pre-selecionadas e que representam as empresas lobistas) visando a escolha das empresas nao lobistas.

Para a definicao do tamanho da amostra, visando a selecao aleatoria, utilizou-se a expressao, n = N x [n.sub.0]/N + [n.sub.0] em que [n.sub.0] = 1/[E.sup.2.sub.0], sendo [n.sub.0] = primeira aproximacao do tamanho da amostra; [E.sup.2.sub.0] = erro amostral toleravel; N = tamanho da populacao alvo; e n = tamanho da amostra. Assim, para uma populacao alvo (N) de 237 empresas e erro amostral toleravel ([E.sup.2.sub.0]) de 6%, chegou-se a 127 empresas que, somadas as 25, resultaram em uma amostra final com 152 empresas petroliferas.

A amostra utilizada se caracteriza por conter empresas de diferentes tamanhos, conforme pode ser observado na Tabela 4. Por exemplo: em media, a receita liquida (RECLIQ) obtida em 2009 foi (em valores logaritmados) de US$ 8,84 milhoes. Contudo, tem-se uma variacao consideravel entre o valor minimo de US$ 2,42 milhoes e o valor maximo de US$ 12,54 milhoes, o que proporciona um desvio padrao de US$ 1,95 milhao. Esse mesmo comportamento e observado nas demais variaveis, a exemplo do lucro liquido medio (LUCMED), que variou de um valor minimo de US$ 1,60 milhao para um maximo de US$ 20,7 milhoes.

Mesmo que o pressuposto da normalidade dos residuos nao seja uma exigencia para a regressao logistica, optouse por calcular o logaritmo natural das variaveis continuas, buscando uma distribuicao normal para elas, visando mitigar possivel "efeito escala" nas regressoes. Como consta na Tabela 4, apos a transformacao, apenas a variavel UPSTREAM permaneceu com distribuicao nao normal.

Em relacao as variaveis dicotomicas (Tabela 5), das 152 empresas da amostra, 25 ofereceram comentarios ao DPEA do IASB, correspondente a 16% da amostra. Essas empresas, para efeito deste estudo, sao caracterizadas como empresas lobistas, enquanto as demais empresas da amostra sao as nao lobistas.

Quanto as variaveis COVENANT e COMPGEN, observa-se que as empresas da amostra possuem praticamente a mesma distribuicao entre aquelas que possuem clausulas restritivas (73%) ou compensacao gerencial (74%) e aquelas que nao possuem esses atributos.

Em relacao aos metodos contabeis utilizados pelas empresas da amostra, observa-se que existe equilibrio, com 51% das empresas seguindo o metodo successful efforts e 49% o metodo full cost. Ja em relacao as empresas que possuem acoes negociadas no mercado norte-americano, sao maioria na amostra utilizada, com 88 empresas ou 58% da amostra.

Quanto a correlacao entre as variaveis, e possivel observar, na Tabela 6, que as variaveis relacionadas ao "tamanho" apresentam razoavel associacao estatisticamente significante com a variavel dependente LOBBYING, com correlacao variando de 24% a 42%, o que nao ocorre em relacao as demais, diferentemente do esperado.

A correlacao entre as variaveis explicativas permite que sejam feitas inferencias a respeito do pressuposto da multicolinearidade. Nesse sentido, percebe-se que as variaveis relacionadas a "tamanho" apresentam altos graus de associacoes significativas, principalmente entre RECLIQ e LUCMED e ATIVTOT, variando de 77% a 89%, sendo um indicativo de possivel quebra desse pressuposto.

Em funcao disso, e elaborado um modelo contendo todas as proxies para tamanho e se realiza o teste Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) para analise do pressuposto da mul ticolinearidade. Posteriormente, outros modelos sao elaborados apenas com uma dessas proxies, visando dar robustez as analises realizadas.

4 ANALISE DOS RESULTADOS

As empresas petroliferas que participaram da audiencia publica (empresas lobistas no caso deste estudo) se manifestaram favoravelmente, pode-se dizer, em quatro das dez questoes colocadas em discussao pelo IASB (1a, 6a, 7a e 8a questoes), como pode ser visto na Tabela 7.

As empresas sao amplamente favoraveis a concepcao de que o escopo da norma contabil do setor extrativista deveria abranger somente o segmento conhecido como upstream (1a questao) e foram unanimes em considerar o custo historico como base de mensuracao das atividades do setor extrativista em oposicao a mensuracao baseada no valor justo (6a questao). Importante destacar, nesse ponto, que o grupo de trabalho argumentou no DPEA que o valor justo seria a melhor representacao dos eventos economicos relacionados e produziria informacao mais util aos usuarios. Contudo, a mensuracao seria complexa e muito subjetiva, restando considerar que o custo historico deveria, por falta de opcao, ser a base utilizada pelos preparados das demonstracoes financeiras.

Tambem concordaram, em sua maioria, com as proposicoes relacionadas a aplicabilidade da norma IAS 36 (7a questao) e de quais deveriam ser os objetivos das demonstracoes contabeis elaboradas pelas empresas extrativistas (8a questao).

Contudo, analisando a questao que implica na adocao de um novo e unico metodo contabil, com a eliminacao dos metodos dos esforcos bem sucedidos e da capitalizacao total (4a questao) ou, ainda, as questoes que trazem como proposta o aumento do nivel de divulgacao em nota explicativa (9a e 10a questoes), percebe-se um posicionamento amplamente desfavoravel as propostas do IASB.

Os principais argumentos utilizados foram o de que o conceito de ativo contido no DPEA fere a estrutura conceitual, ao permitir que gastos nao relacionados a beneficios economicos futuros sejam ativados e de que as informacoes exigidas para divulgacao obrigatoria eram demasiadas e que os custos de producao de tais informacoes superariam o beneficio atinente a divulgacao destas.

Olhando o conjunto das questoes, percebe-se um quase empate, com 115 opinioes favoraveis as proposicoes contidas no DPEA e 118 opinioes contrarias. Contudo, ao segregar apenas as proposicoes que implicam em mudancas no status quo vigente (estabelecimento de um novo metodo de reconhecimento; possibilidade de adocao do valor justo; ou aumento dos itens de divulgacao obrigatoria--4a, 5a, 6a, 7a, 9a e 10a questoes), e possivel verificar que as empresas fizeram lobbying no sentido de rejeitar qualquer possibilidade de mudanca no status quo. Foram 107 opinioes (71%) que levam a manutencao da situacao vigente e apenas 39 (26%) que argumentam favoravelmente as propostas de mudancas trazidas pelo IASB.

Esses achados estao condizentes com os observados por Kenny e Larson (1993) de que as empresas lobistas agem no sentido de se evitar qualquer mudanca no status quo vigente ou nos argumentos de Holthausen e Leftwich (1983) de que a possibilidade de mudanca no status quo afeta a decisao do gestor em influenciar o processo de regulacao contabil.

Pode-se inferir, dessa forma, que o atual modelo de reconhecimento das transacoes economicas das empresas petroliferas, bem como o atual conjunto de informacoes divulgadas obrigatoriamente parece satisfazer as necessidades das empresas petroliferas, o que implica em considerar, tendo por base a teoria institucional, que qualquer evolucao no status quo vigente tera que ser bem "costurado" pelo IASB com vistas a acomodar as necessidades de seus diversos constituintes, inclusive dos mais afetados, como e o caso das empresas petroliferas.

Buscando atingir o objetivo de se encontrar quais as caracteristicas preponderantes que levaram as empresas petroliferas a submeterem cartas comentarios a audiencia publica do DPEA, passa-se aos resultados obtidos por meio da utilizacao das tecnicas de analise multivariada de dados. Os resultados da regressao logistica estao expressos em cinco regressoes (Tabela 8), sendo a primeira considerando todas as variaveis do modelo. As demais regressoes levam em conta cada uma das variaveis selecionadas para a hipotese do "tamanho".

Por meio da distribuicao Qui-quadrado, teste analogo ao teste F para a regressao multipla, e possivel constatar que coletivamente as variaveis do modelo sao significativas do ponto de vista estatistico, com razao de verossimilhanca estimada em 35,296 e p-valor de 0,000. Dessa forma, ha pelo menos um coeficiente diferente de zero ao nivel de 1%.

A medida de Nagelkerke assemelha-se ao [R.sup.2] da regressao multipla e informa o grau de ajuste do modelo. No resultado obtido, o modelo possui um poder explicativo de 40,8%. Como o interesse deste estudo reside na significancia estatistica dos coeficientes das variaveis utilizadas e nao necessariamente em se realizar previsoes, considera-se que esse grau de ajustamento esta aderente aos objetivos propostos.

Outra maneira de se analisar o ajuste do modelo e verificando o quanto este classifica corretamente os eventos, considerando o ponto de corte utilizado, que neste estudo foi de 16,5%, ou seja, o percentual de empresas da amostra que apresentam o evento de interesse. Os resultados obtidos indicam que o modelo classificou corretamente 76,3% dos casos.

Ainda sobre a qualidade de ajuste do modelo, tem-se a Curva ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) que mede o poder discriminatorio do modelo. Com valor de 86,9%, a especificacao final do modelo apresenta poder de discriminacao que se pode dizer excelente, conforme referencia apresentada em Favero et al. (2009): para Curva ROC menor ou igual a 0,5 (50%), nao ha discriminacao; entre 0,5 e 0,8 (80%), ha discriminacao aceitavel; e Curva ROC maior que 0,8, ha excelente discriminacao.

Os resultados evidenciam que apenas a variavel LUCMED apresenta significancia estatistica dentro dos niveis normalmente utilizados. Como o coeficiente estimado mostrou-se maior que zero, a interpretacao e a de que quanto maior for o lucro liquido medio da empresa, maior sera a probabilidade de a empresa fazer lobbying via carta comentarios. O coeficiente estimado indica que o aumento em US$ 1 milhao no lucro liquido medio, aumenta o logit em 0,348 ou, entao, calculando-se o antilogaritmo, a probabilidade da realizacao de lobbying e aumentada por um fator de 1,416 com o aumento do lucro liquido.

E possivel identificar, ainda, que a variavel COMPGEN apresentou significancia estatistica marginal de 14,4%, fora dos niveis usuais e verdade, mas que, a depender do risco que se quer correr, pode-se considera-la relevante.

Tendo em vista o alto grau de correlacao observado entre as variaveis independentes, em especial as representativas do tamanho, conforme especificado anteriormente (Tabela 6), recorreu-se ao teste VIF para a avaliacao formal do pressuposto da multicolineariedade. Como se suspeitou, observa-se o nao atendimento desse pressuposto, com alto valor de VIF para ATIVTOT e RECLIQ. A implicacao desse problema reside no fato de que variaveis independentes altamente correlacionadas fornecem informacoes similares para explicar e predizer a variavel dependente, tornando dificil a separacao dos efeitos de cada uma e fazendo com que uma delas perca significancia na explanacao do comportamento do fenomeno (Corrar, Paulo, & Dias Filho, 2007).

Como a presenca da multicolineariedade tende a distorcer os coeficientes angulares estimados, prejudicando a compreensao do real efeito da variavel independente para o entendimento do fenomeno investigado, os resultados da regressao do primeiro modelo estao enviesados, o que pode explicar a nao relevancia estatistica de algumas delas e mesmo o sinal negativo de RECLIQ.

Para contornar essa questao, novos modelos sao elaborados contendo apenas uma das variaveis para tamanho. Confirmando o efeito causado pela multicolinearidade, quando as variaveis relacionadas a tamanho foram colocadas no modelo isoladamente, cada uma delas se mostrou estatisticamente significativa e o sinal do coeficiente atendeu ao esperado.

Os parametros gerais das regressoes mantiveram-se praticamente estaveis qualitativamente, sendo que todas elas, olhando-se o conjunto das variaveis, indicam modelos significativos do ponto de vista estatistico, conforme os testes da razao de verossimilhanca. O [R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke dos modelos situou-se entre 17,5% e 39,6%, sendo que a Curva ROC desses modelos apresentou excelente discriminacao (excecao ao modelo 2, com discriminacao apenas aceitavel--66%).

Observou-se novamente a relevancia marginal da variavel COMPGEN (10,9%) no modelo 4 e que contou com a variavel LUCMED como proxy para tamanho. Isso sugere que empresas petroliferas que apresentam planos de compensacao gerencial possuem maior probabilidade de realizarem lobbying, via carta comentarios, do que empresas petroliferas que nao possuem planos de compensacao gerencial. E mais, as que possuem plano de compensacao gerencial aumentam a probabilidade de se fazer lobbying por um fator de 3,347 (antilogaritmo de 1,208) em relacao as que nao tem qualquer plano de compensacao gerencial.

Os resultados apresentados sustentam a aceitacao da hipotese dos custos politicos desenvolvida por Watts e Zimmerman (1978) de que, dentro do plano das escolhas contabeis, grandes empresas tendem a realizar lobbying sobre uma regulamentacao, visando obter resultados que lhes sejam mais favoraveis. Os resultados tambem estao condizentes com os achados de Francis (1987), Deakin (1989) e Georgiou e Roberts (2004) no que se refere a "tamanho". Dessa forma, reportando-se as hipoteses de testes estabelecidas, nao se tem evidencias para rejeitar a hipotese [H.sub.1], considerando-se a modelagem da regressao logistica binomial.

De forma menos contundente, e com base na regressao logistica binomial, pode-se aceitar a hipotese teorica apresentada pela literatura de que gestores de empresas que possuem compensacao remuneratoria baseada em desempenho medido a partir de indicadores derivados de informacoes contabeis tenderao a realizar lobbying sobre uma regulamentacao, visando escolher os modelos contabeis que melhor lhes beneficie.

A modelagem econometrica aqui utilizada e por boa parte dos estudos sobre lobbying (Francis, 1987; Deakin, 1989; Ndubizu et al., 1993; Georgiou & Roberts, 2004) e eventualmente criticada em funcao de a variavel dependente binaria utilizada nao conseguir capturar a intensidade da posicao do respondente (Holthausen & Leftwich, 1983), mas apenas se este apresentou (codigo 1) ou nao (codigo 0) comentarios, ou se foi a favor (1) ou contra (0) a proposta.

Como o DPEA possui dez questoes, os respondentes podem oferecer comentarios a todas as questoes ou somente a algumas delas, ou, ainda, ser favoraveis a algumas das questoes e desfavoraveis a outras. Essas situacoes nao sao capturadas pelo modelo de regressao logistica binomial. Para tratar essa questao, lanca-se mao do modelo de regressao logistica multinomial, cujo resultado e apresentado na Tabela 9.

As regressoes logisticas multinomiais sao dispostas em dois blocos, em que o primeiro conjunto contem os resultados da comparacao entre as empresas petroliferas com posicoes favoraveis as questoes do DPEA e as empresas petroliferas que nao apresentaram comentarios ao documento do IASB, enquanto que os resultados do segundo bloco se referem a comparacao entre empresas petroliferas com posicoes desfavoraveis e empresas petroliferas que nao apresentaram comentarios.

Tendo em vista a questao relacionada a multicolinearidade, as regressoes logisticas multinomiais foram realizadas considerando as variaveis independentes para tamanho isoladamente. Os parametros gerais dos modelos das quatro regressoes sao validos, uma vez que o teste Quiquadrado revela significancia estatistica ao nivel de 1%. O grau de ajustamento dos modelos, conforme pseudo [R.sup.2] de Negelkerke, varia entre 33% e 41%, valores adequados para este estudo. Por fim, observa-se que mais de 85% dos casos foram corretamente previstos, o que aponta para um bom ajustamento das regressoes realizadas.

Analisando os coeficientes estimados, constata-se que as variaveis de tamanho, em cada modelo, sem contar a constante, mostraram-se estatisticamente significantes, nos dois blocos de resultados (excecao de UPSTREAM no primeiro bloco), reforcando os achados sobre a hipotese dos custos politicos. A leitura que se faz e a de que grandes empresas petroliferas possuem maior probabilidade para fazerem lobbying via carta comentarios do que as demais empresas petroliferas.

Analisando mais detidamente a probabilidade de se realizar lobbying via carta comentarios, observa-se que essa tendencia e maior no sentido de se fazer lobbying contrario a proposta apresentada, pois veja-se: o aumento na receita liquida (RECLIQ), por um lado, proporciona um aumento por um fator de 1,421 (antilogaritmo de 0,352) na probabilidade de se realizar lobbying favoravel em relacao a nao se realizar lobbying. Por outro lado, tem-se um fator de aumento de 4,031 na probabilidade de se realizar lobbying desfavoravel em relacao a nao se realizar lobbying no caso de aumento na receita liquida.

O mesmo comportamento observa-se nos outros casos: LUCMED, aumento por um fator de 1,381 contra 2,227; ATIVTOT, aumento por um fator de 1,895 contra 6,321. No caso dos gastos exploratorios (UPSTREAM), a probabilidade de se realizar lobbying so e observada se este for contrario as propostas apresentadas.

Os resultados obtidos por meio da regressao logistica multinomial dao robustez para considerar o "tamanho" como fator economico determinante para as empresas realizarem lobbying via carta comentarios. Assim, nao se tem evidencias para se rejeitar novamente a hipotese [H.sub.1].

Para a modelagem utilizando a regressao de Poisson (Tabela 10), foram executadas regressoes considerando a intensidade com que as empresas petroliferas foram favoraveis as propostas contidas no DPEA contra a posicao de nao se ter realizado lobbying (painel A) e tambem a intensidade com que as empresas foram desfavoraveis contra a posicao de nao se realizar lobbying (painel B).

Quanto aos parametros gerais das regressoes realizadas, os resultados contidos na Tabela 10 revelam que todas podem ser consideradas validas, uma vez que a significancia estatistica do teste Qui-quadrado ficou dentro do nivel de 1%. Alem disso, o [R.sup.2] de MacFadden variou de 13% a 35%, grau de ajustamento relativamente baixo, mas aderente aos objetivos deste estudo.

Analisando os resultados considerando a intensidade com que a empresa foi favoravel as propostas do DPEA (painel A), primeiramente, as variaveis receita liquida (RECLIQ), lucro liquido medio (LUCMED) e ativo total (ATIVTOT) se destacam por apresentarem significancia estatistica e mais uma vez dao robustez para considerar o "tamanho" como indicativo da posicao das empresas para realizarem lobbying via carta comentarios.

E possivel destacar ainda, estatisticamente, a significancia da variavel COMPGEN na presenca das variaveis RECLIQ, LUCMED e ATIVTOT. Esse resultado, de certo modo, ja havia sido apontado na regressao logistica binomial, confirmando as analises realizadas anteriormente, com a observacao de que, via regressao de Poisson, essa caracteristica (possuir plano de compensacao gerencial) e relevante para a realizacao de lobbying favoravel ao DPEA.

Os resultados da regressao de Poisson, quando se considera a variavel dependente na perspectiva da intensidade com que se foi desfavoravel as questoes do DPEA, tambem apontam para a relevancia estatistica das variaveis RECLIQ, LUCMED e ATIVTOT.

Trata-se de evidencias que referenciam mais uma vez a hipotese dos custos politicos de Watts e Zimmerman (1978) de que grandes empresas tendem a realizar lobbying visando obter vantagens por meio de regulamentacao que lhes seja mais favoravel. No caso da regressao de Poisson, a analise dos coeficientes indica que a propensao de rejeicao da proposta contida no DPEA e maior do que a aceitacao e, com isso, tem-se que o lobbying seria no sentido de se refutar qualquer mudanca do status quo vigente.

Interessante observar que os gastos exploratorios (UPSTREAM) nao se mostraram significantes em nenhum dos modelos estabelecidos, utilizando-se da regressao de Poisson (regressoes 11 e 15), fato diferente do que se desenhou anteriormente.

Depreende-se desses resultados (regressao de Poisson) que, independentemente da intensidade com que a empresa foi favoravel ou desfavoravel as proposicoes do IASB no DPEA, o tamanho e a existencia de plano de compensacao gerencial (de forma marginal) representam fatores determinantes a realizacao de lobbying por parte das empresas petroliferas, indicando que as empresas com essas caracteristicas tenderiam a possuir uma postura lobista, seja contra ou a favor de uma regulamentacao contabil a respeito das atividades extrativistas, suportando, portanto, a teoria desenvolvida ao longo deste estudo.

A partir das hipoteses de testes formuladas, reforca-se a conclusao de que nao se tem evidencias para rejeitar a hipotese [H.sub.1]. Alem disso, a hipotese [H.sub.2] nao pode ser integralmente descartada.

Tentando estabelecer uma analise conclusiva quanto as variaveis representativas do tamanho, dado que elas servem para explicar um mesmo fenomeno e estao altamente correlacionadas, como visto anteriormente, buscou-se, via tecnica de analise fatorial (Tabela 11), o estabelecimento de um fator representativo para o tamanho que pudesse ser utilizado como variavel dependente nas regressoes logisticas, binomial e multinomial; e na regressao de Poisson.

Os pressupostos da analise fatorial foram atendidos: normalidade das variaveis, exceto para UPSTREAM; correlacoes significativas entre as variaveis RECLIQ, UPSTREAM, LUCMED e ATIVTOT; adequacao da amostra a analise fatorial, com medida de KaiserMeyer-Olkin (KMO) de 0,826 e, por fim, que a matriz de correlacao nao e igual a matriz identidade, com teste de esfericidade de Bartlett altamente significativo (p < 0,001).

Para obtencao dos fatores, utilizou-se a analise de componentes principais (ACP), a qual busca resumir a maior parte da variancia das variaveis a um numero minimo de fatores. Pelo criterio de Kaiser (descarte dos autovalores menores do que 1, pela sua insignificancia), foi possivel definir um unico fator, que explica 86,1% da variancia dos dados. Os resultados da analise fatorial constam do Apendice 1.

Assim, com base nos valores dos coeficientes dos escores fatoriais de cada uma das quatro variaveis (RECLIQ, UPSTREAM, LUCMED e ATIVTOT), se estabeleceu uma nova variavel preditora decorrente da analise fatorial que foi denominada de "TAMANHO". Assim, novas regressoes foram geradas e seus resultados constam da Tabela 11.

Os resultados evidenciam e referendam as conclusoes anteriores de que o "tamanho" e uma caracteristica relevante que aumenta a probabilidade de a empresa realizar lobbying via carta comentarios. Em todas as situacoes (regressoes 18 a 22), a variavel "tamanho" foi estatisticamente significativa. Analisando os coeficientes obtidos, a probabilidade e maior para se realizar lobbying, de forma geral, contraria as proposicoes do DPEA.

Nao se confirmou, entretanto, nessa configuracao, a relevancia dos planos de compensacao gerencial (COMPGEN) como caracteristica da realizacao de lobbying via carta comentarios. Nas situacoes testadas, apenas quando se testou a intensidade quanto a aceitabilidade da proposta do DPEA, via regressao de Poisson (regressao 21), e que se encontrou significancia estatistica, mas de forma marginal.

5 CONCLUSOES

Os resultados apresentados sao robustos para considerar que existem fatores determinantes a adocao de estrategias de lobbying em relacao a uma dada regulamentacao contabil (ou proposta de), quando se considera a realidade das empresas petroliferas, e comprovam a hipotese dos custos politicos (ou do tamanho) defendida por Watts e Zimmerman (1978) de que grandes empresas tendem a realizar lobbying sobre uma regulamentacao contabil visando influenciar o normatizador para obter uma norma que atenda a seus interesses.

O fator "tamanho", modelado sob diversas perspectivas, mostrou-se relevante em todas as modelagens econometricas utilizadas, suportando a hipotese de que grandes empresas petroliferas possuem maior probabilidade para realizar lobbying. Essa propensao foi verificada para posicionamentos essencialmente desfavoraveis as propostas apresentadas no Discussion Paper que trata da regulamentacao contabil do setor extrativista.

As evidencias tambem mostram, de forma marginal, que empresas petroliferas que apresentam planos de compensacao gerencial possuem maior probabilidade de realizar lobbying do que as demais empresas petroliferas, como mostraram Watts e Zimmerman (1978), Deakin (1989) e Georgiou e Roberts (2004).

Ao conjugar os resultados, pode-se inferir que as estrategias de lobbying promovidas pelas grandes empresas do setor se farao presentes junto ao IASB numa eventual nova regulamentacao contabil do setor petrolifero para nao se permitir alteracoes na situacao vigente, ou seja, pode-se dizer que os preparadores sao favoraveis a utilizacao do custo historico como base de valor e a existencia de dois modelos contabeis concorrentes (esforcos bem sucedidos e capitalizacao total) e desfavoraveis as mudancas que levem ao aumento do nivel de divulgacao das informacoes.

Sob a perspectiva da teoria institucional, o devido processo normativo do IASB busca uma grande participacao de seus constituintes em todas as fases de elaboracao da norma para tornar o processo mais neutro e legitimo. Ao mesmo tempo, pela teoria economica da regulacao, sabe-se que a participacao no devido processo normativo tem por objetivo tentar influenciar as decisoes do board em interesse proprio.

Assim, considerando o processo de elaboracao de normas por parte do IASB um processo politico e que um mosaico de interesses conflitantes interage na fixacao dos padroes contabeis do IASB, espera-se que a operacionalizacao de revisao/substituicao do IFRS 6 seja complexa e sujeita a grandes pressoes por parte das empresas petroliferas no sentido de manutencao do status quo. Tudo isso reforca os argumentos de Larson (2002) de que, em decorrencia de fatores externos e politicos, o IASB pode seguir uma linha menos neutra visando a acomodacao de interesses ou, ate mesmo, de que o IASB pode, novamente, ser capturado pela industria como sugerido em Cortese, Irvine, e Kaidonis (2010), por ocasiao da emissao do IFRS 6.

Os resultados apresentados ao longo deste trabalho devem ser analisados sob o prisma das empresas petroliferas, nao podendo ser generalizados para outros setores economicos ou processo de normatizacao do IASB. No entanto, os modelos econometricos utilizados sao generalizaveis e podem ser replicados em outras pesquisas, principalmente as modelagens que utilizam as regressoes logistica multinomial e de Poisson, novidades em estudo sobre lobbying na regulacao contabil.

Apesar de ser amplamente utilizado na literatura contabil, o conceito de lobbying empregado e um limitador dos resultados encontrados, dado que se considerou apenas o ato de enviar cartas comentarios as consultas publicas do IASB. Assim, outras modelagens de pesquisas sao possiveis de ser realizadas com vistas a ampliar essa visao, notadamente com o emprego de questionarios e entrevistas com o objetivo de contemplar outras formas de lobbying, a exemplo do realizado por Georgiou (2004).

Ainda no estudo sobre lobbying, e importante destacar que as proxies utilizadas para definicao das caracteristicas das firmas nao se limitam aquelas utilizadas, podendo existir outros determinantes economicos. Mesmo considerando-se as variaveis utilizadas, estas podem assumir outras dimensoes, especialmente as variaveis relacionadas as clausulas restritivas (COVENANT) e a compensacao gerencial (COMPGEN). A titulo de exemplo, ao inves de se assumir apenas valores binarios (0 ou 1), poder-se-ia modelar a variavel COMPGEN como uma variavel continua como, por exemplo, o percentual que a remuneracao variavel do gestor representa na sua remuneracao total, com a hipotese de que quanto maior a dependencia da remuneracao variavel, mais propenso o gestor estaria para realizar escolhas contabeis em seu favor.

Por fim, nao se pode deixar de relatar as limitacoes inerentes a utilizacao da base de dados da Evaluate Energy [R], pois ha de se considerar, como toda base de dados, que erros em relacao aos inputs dos dados podem existir. Assim, o julgamento quanto a integridade da base de dados contempla um vies dos pesquisadores.

ANEXO 1

Questoes apresentadas pelo IASB no Discussion Paper Extractive Activities

Questao no. 1: Voce concorda que o escopo da IFRS Extractive Activities deve incluir somente as atividades de upstream relacionadas as operacoes de mineracao e de oleo e gas?

Questao no. 2: Voce concorda que deve haver um modelo de contabilizacao e divulgacao unico aplicado tanto para as atividades de mineracao quanto de oleo e gas?

Questao no. 3: Voce concorda que a definicao de reservas e recursos minerais deve seguir o estabelecido pelo Committee for Mineral Reserves International Reporting Standards e as definicoes de reservas e recursos de oleo e gas sejam aquelas definidas pela Society of Petroleum Engineers (em conjunto com outros orgaos do setor) na IFRS Extractive Activities?

Questao no. 4: Voce concorda com a analise de que os direitos legais, tais como os direitos de exploracao e extracao devem ser a base de reconhecimento para os ativos minerais ou de oleo e gas, sendo que as informacoes subsequentes quanto as atividades de exploracao e avaliacao e o trabalho para desenvolver o acesso aos depositos minerais ou de oleo e gas devem ser tratados como uma extensao desses direitos legais?

Questao no. 5: Voce concorda que o limite para sumarizar as informacoes das atividades de exploracao, avaliacao e desenvolvimento deve ser inicialmente definido de acordo com os direitos exploratorios mantidos, nao sendo maior do que uma simples area ou grupos de areas continuas e de onde se esperam gerar fluxos de caixa independentes?

Questao no. 6: Voce concorda que os ativos minerais ou de oleo e gas devam ser mensurados com base no custo historico e que informacoes adicionais devem ser detalhadamente divulgadas com o objetivo de fornecer uma maior relevancia as demonstracoes financeiras?

Questao no. 7: Voce concorda com a visao de que o IAS 36 nao deve ser aplicado para os ativos vinculados aos gastos exploratorios, a nao ser que evidencias disponiveis sugiram que a totalidade desses gastos nao serao recuperaveis?

Questao no. 8: Voce concorda que os objetivos da divulgacao das atividades extrativistas sao para capacitar os usuarios dos relatorios financeiros em avaliar: (a) o valor atribuido aos ativos minerais ou de oleo e gas de uma entidade; (b) a contribuicao desses ativos para o desempenho financeiro do periodo corrente; e (c) a natureza e extensao dos riscos e incertezas associados a esses ativos?

Questao no. 9: Voce concorda que as informacoes a serem divulgadas em notas explicativas das demonstracoes financeiras devem incluir: (a) a quantidade de reservas provadas mais as reservas provadas e provaveis, com divulgacao das quantidades de reservas separadamente por commodity e area geografica material; (b) as principais premissas usadas para estimar as quantidades de reservas e uma analise de sensibilidade; (c) uma reconciliacao entre as mudancas de estimativas nas quantidades de reservas de um ano para outro; (d) uma mensuracao a valores correntes das quantidades de reservas divulgadas e uma reconciliacao em relacao as mudancas ocorridas; (e) identificacao separada dos fluxos de caixas da exploracao, desenvolvimento e operacoes do periodo corrente em uma serie de tempo, como por exemplo, de cinco anos; e (f) identificacao separada das receitas de producao por commodity?

Questao no. 10: Voce concorda que os pagamentos feitos aos governos devem ser uma exigencia quanto a divulgacao em nota explicativa as demonstracoes financeiras, justificando os custos da divulgacao frente aos beneficios da informacao?

APENDICE 1

Resultados da Analise Fatorial
Tabela Teste KMO, Bartlett e Comunalidades

Medidas                  Valor    Comunalidades

                                  Variaveis   Inicial   Extracao

Teste Kaiser-                      RECLIQ      1,000     0,878
  Meyer-Olkin (KMO)
Adequacao da             0,826
  Amostra                         UPSTREAM     1,000     0,805

Teste de Esfericidade
  de Bartlett
Qui-Quadrado            607,017    LUCMED      1,000     0,864
df                         6
Significancia            0,000     ATIVTOT     1,000     0,896

Tabela Autovalores e percentual de variancia explicada
pelos fatores

Componentes   Autovalores Inicial

              Total    % de Variacao   % Acumulado

1             3,443       86,080%        86,080%
2             0,2 70      6,749%         92,829%
3             0,192       4,797%         97,627%
4             0,095       2,373%        100,000%

Componentes   Percentual de Variancia Explicada

              Total   % de Variacao   % Acumulado

1             3,443      86,080%        86,080%
2
3
4

Tabela Cargas fatoriais e matriz de coeficientes dos escores
fatoriais

Cargas Fatoriais           Matriz de Coeficientes dos
                           Escores Fatoriais

Variaveis   Componente 1   Variaveis   Componente 1

RECLIQ         0,937        RECLIQ        0,2 72
UPSTREAM       0,897       UPSTREAM       0,261
LUCMED         0,929        LUCMED        0,2 70
ATIVTOT        0,946        ATIVTOT       0,2 75


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Odilanei Morais dos Santos

Professor Doutor, Departamento de Contabilidade, Instituto Brasileiro de Mercado de Capitais, Rio de Janeiro

E-mail: odilaneisantos@terra.com.br

Ariovaldo dos Santos

Professor Titular, Departamento de Contabilidade e Atuaria, Faculdade de Economia, Administracao e Contabilidade, Universidade de Sao Paulo

E-mail: arisanto@u$p.br

Recebido em 23.9.2013--Aceito em 30.9.2013--3a' versao aprovada em 4.6.2014.

* Artigo apresentado no VII Congresso Anpcont, Fortaleza, Brasil, 2013.
Tabela 1 Metodos de participacao para influenciar o IASB

                    Metodos de Lobbying   Metodos de Lobbying
                    Formais               Informais

Metodos de          * Submissao de        * Participacao em
Lobbying Direto     cartas comentarios    reunioes privadas ou
                    em resposta as        teleconferencia com
                    audiencias publicas   membros do Board.
                    para emissao de
                    normas.

                    * Participacao dos
                    grupos de projetos
                    como consultores.

                    * Participacao das
                    discussoes em mesas
                    redondas publicas.

Metodos de          * Submissao de        * Intermediacao via
Lobbying Indireto   comentarios aos       auditor externo.
                    membros do IFRS
                    Advisory Council,
                    antigo Standards
                    Advisory Council
                    (SAC).

                    * Submissao de        * Intermediacao via
                    comentarios ao        entidades de classe.
                    European Financial
                    Reporting Advisory
                    Group (EFRAG).

Fonte: Orens, Jorissen, Lybaert, e Tas (2011).

Tabela 2 Pesquisas sobre lobbying na regulacao contabil

Pesquisa               Objetivo

MacArthur (1988)       Investigar se a
                       submissao de
                       comentarios ao UK'
                       ASB (28 propostas)
                       tem relacao com
                       qualquer questao
                       economica (impacto
                       nos numeros
                       contabeis) ou
                       politica (hipotese
                       dos custos
                       politicos).

Fogarty (1992)         Analisar a
                       existencia e o
                       processo operativo
                       do FASB por meio da
                       teoria
                       institucional.

Kenny e Larson         Investigar as
(1993)                 atividades de
                       lobbying ao Exposure
                       Draft sobre joint
                       venture.

Meier, Alam, e         Investigar o
Pearson (1993)         lobbying realizado
                       pelas firmas de
                       auditoria em sete
                       propostas de normas
                       com efeito sobre os
                       bancos e sobre
                       associacao de
                       credito e
                       emprestimos.

Tutticci, Dustan, e    Entender o devido
Holmes (1994)          processo de emissao
                       de normas do
                       Australian
                       Accounting
                       Standard-setting.
                       Para tanto, utilizam
                       a analise de
                       conteudo do exposure
                       drafts relacionada
                       ao Ativo Intangivel.

Weetman, Davie, e      Procura responder as
Collins (1996)         questoes como: (a)
                       As estrategias dos
                       lobistas podem ser
                       identificadas? (b)
                       Quais as possiveis
                       razoes para nao se
                       apresentar
                       comentarios pelas
                       empresas nao
                       lobistas?

Tandy e Wilburn        Investigar a
(1996)                 participacao da
                       comunidade academica
                       no processo de
                       emissao das normas,
                       analisando as cartas
                       submetidas aos
                       Discussion
                       Memorandums e
                       Exposure Drafts para
                       os SFAS 1 a 117.

Larson (1997)          Investigar as
                       caracteristicas dos
                       respondentes e
                       analisar se existiam
                       diferencas
                       significativas entre
                       as empresas lobistas
                       e nao lobistas no
                       que se refere ao
                       tamanho da empresa,
                       pais de origem do
                       respondente (13
                       paises) e mercado de
                       negociacao das acoes
                       (norte-americano).

McLeay, Ordelheide,    Examinar o impacto
e Young (2000)         das atividades de
                       lobbying na
                       regulacao contabil
                       alema, tendo em
                       vista a posicao dos
                       preparadores,
                       auditores e
                       academicos.

Hill, Shelton, e       Investigar as
Stevens (2002)         atividades de
                       lobbying no processo
                       de emissao da norma
                       SFAS
                       123--Contabilizacao dos
                       Pagamentos Baseados
                       em Acao.

Larson (2002)          Estabelece, com base
                       na teoria
                       institucional, uma
                       estrutura para
                       avaliar se o
                       Standing
                       Interpretations
                       Committee (SIC) tem
                       sido efetivo e
                       legitimo.

Georgiou (2004)        Definir a estrategia
                       de lobbying mais
                       favoravel, se mais
                       cedo (formacao da
                       agenda de discussao
                       do board) ou mais
                       tarde (periodo de
                       audiencia publica da
                       minuta de norma).

Georgiou (2005)        Capturar a tendencia
                       na estrategia de
                       lobbying pelas
                       empresas numa
                       perspectiva de longo
                       prazo, analisando
                       uma serie de eventos
                       (emissao de varias
                       normas) ao longo do
                       tempo.

Larson (2008)          Investigar se as
                       pressoes politicas
                       ao inves das
                       discussoes
                       eminentemente
                       tecnicas afetaram
                       decisivamente a
                       emissao do padrao
                       contabil SIC 12, que
                       trata da
                       consolidacao das
                       empresas de
                       propositos
                       especificos.
                       Fundamenta-se na
                       teoria
                       institucional.

Chatham, Larson, e     Analisar os
Vietze (2010)          comentarios enviados
                       ao discussion paper
                       sobre instrumentos
                       financeiros visando
                       identificar os
                       principais pontos da
                       proposta, alinhado
                       ao fato de que a
                       Uniao Europeia
                       rejeitou a adocao
                       integral do IAS 39,
                       exigindo esforco
                       adicional do IASB
                       para reverter a
                       situacao.
                       Fundamenta-se na
                       teoria
                       institucional.

Georgiou (2010)        Investigar a
                       natureza e
                       participacao dos
                       fundos de
                       investimentos do
                       Reino Unido nas
                       audiencias publicas
                       realizadas pelo IASB
                       no periodo de 2001 a
                       2006.

Stenka e Taylor        Compreender a
(2010)                 complexidade das
                       atividades de
                       lobbying no ambito
                       de quatro exposure
                       drafts. Os lobistas
                       sao classificados em
                       dois grupos:
                       corporativos e nao
                       corporativos, e as
                       analises sao
                       realizadas com o
                       emprego da ANOVA e
                       regressao
                       univariada.

Hansen (2011)          Fornecer evidencias
                       de como o IASB gera
                       seus padroes
                       normativos na
                       presenca de lobistas
                       com preferencias
                       distintas. Para
                       tanto, utiliza-se
                       das cartas
                       comentarios (629
                       cartas) de cinco
                       audiencias
                       promovidas pelo
                       IASB.

Larson e Kenny         Investigar o
(2011)                 comportamento do
                       IASB quando da
                       emissao das normas
                       contabeis frente as
                       doacoes financeiras
                       voluntarias
                       recebidas de seus
                       constituintes.

Bengtsson (2011)       Utiliza a teoria
                       institucional para
                       investigar como o
                       IASB, apos a crise
                       financeira mundial,
                       respondeu as
                       pressoes politicas
                       promovidas pela
                       Uniao Europeia como
                       a observada em
                       relacao a norma de
                       instrumentos
                       financeiros.

Koh (2011)             Examinar as
                       caracteristicas das
                       firmas quanto a
                       decisao de se fazer
                       ou nao fazer
                       lobbying. Para
                       aquelas que
                       submeteram opinioes
                       sobre a norma de
                       stock option do
                       FASB, analisou se o
                       lobbying foi a favor
                       ou contra a norma em
                       discussao.

Giner e Arce (2012)    Analisar o
                       comportamento dos
                       lobistas, tendo por
                       base a teoria
                       institucional, e
                       avaliar a influencia
                       destes sobre as
                       decisoes do IASB no
                       que se refere a
                       norma IFRS 2.

Tavares, Anjo,         Investigar quais
Paulo, e Carter        foram as opinioes
(2013)                 mais frequentes
                       submetidas ao
                       IASB/FASB em relacao
                       ao Revised Exposure
                       Draft Revenue from
                       Contracts with
                       Customers.

Matos, Goncalves,      Investigar se as
Niya-ma, e Marques     normas que possuem
(2013)                 maior nivel de
                       inconsistencia com
                       GAAPs locais foram
                       alterados/aprovados
                       de acordo com a
                       participacao
                       geografica do membro
                       do conselho do IASB.

Oliveira, Costa        Analisar o processo
Junior, e Silva        de audiencia publica
(2013)                 do Comite de
                       Pronunciamentos
                       Contabeis (CPC) nos
                       anos de 2007 a 2011,
                       concluindo-se que o
                       CPC concentrou seus
                       esforcos visando a
                       uma maior
                       convergencia
                       possivel com as
                       IFRS.

Tabela 3 Caracteristicas da variavel dependente

Regressao Logistica   Regressao de Poisson
Binominal
                                            Intensidade
                                            Desfavorabilidade

                      Intensidade
                      Favorabilidade

Codigo   Frequencia   Codigo   Frequencia   Codigo   Frequencia

0           127         0         127         0         127
1            25         1          0          1          2

Regressao Logistica     2          3          2          2

Multinominal            3          3          3          3

Codigo   Frequencia     4          9          4          5

0           127         5          4          5          3
1            13         6          2          6          6
2            12         7          1          7          1
                        8          2          8          3
                        9          1          9          0
                        10         0          10         0

Tabela 4 Estatistica descritiva das variaveis continuas

"Variavel (em US$   Media   Mediana   Minimo
milhoes)"

RECLIQ              8,84     9,00      2,42
UPSTREAM            0,95     6,34     -20,72
LUCMED              12,79    12,72     1,60
ATIVTOT             9,52     9,60      4,38

"Variavel (em US$   Maximo   Desvio   "Teste KS
milhoes)"                    Padrao   p-valor"

RECLIQ              12,54     1,95      0.953
UPSTREAM            10,08    11,55      0,000
LUCMED              20,70     4,01      0,994
ATIVTOT             12,69     1,58      0,984

Nota: RECLIQ: receitas liquidas do periodo; UPSTREAM:
gastos de exploracao e desenvolvimento incorridos no
periodo; LUCMED: lucro liquido medio dos ultimos tres
periodos; ATIVTOT: ativo total do periodo. Teste KS:
Teste de Kolmogorov-Smirnov para normalidade
(p-valor > 0,05).

Tabela 5 Estatistica descritiva das variaveis dicotomicas

Variavel     Valor "0"   Valor "1"   Total

LOBBYING        127         25        152
                84%         16%      100%
COVENANT        41          111       152
                27%         73%      100%
COMPGEN         40          112       152
                26%         74%      100%
METODO          74          78        152
                49%         51%      100%
US LISTING      64          88        152
                42%         58%      100%

Nota: LOBBYING: "0" se nao apresentou comentarios e "1" se
apresentou comentarios; COVENANT: "0" se nao apresenta
covenant e "1" se apresenta; COMPGEN: "0" se nao apresenta
compensacao gerencial e "1" se apresenta; METODO: "0" se
adota o full cost e "1" se adota o successful efforts;
USLISTING: "0" se negocia em outros mercados de capitais
e "1" se negocia no mercado norte-americano.

Tabela 6 Matriz de correlacao de Pearson

            LOBBYING    RECLIQ     UPSTREAM    LUCMED

LOBBYING       1
RECLIQ      0,335 **       1
UPSTREAM    0,245 **    -0,004        1
LUCMED      0,422 **    0,767 **    0,363 **      1
ATIVTOT     0,400 **    0,894 **    0,269 **    0,882 **
COVENANT    0,070      -0,265 **    0,148      -0,203 *
COMPGEN     0,104      -0,197 *     0,084      -0,181 *
METODO      0,148       0,130       0,363 **    0,266 **
USLISTING   0,127      -0,236 **    0,226 **   -0,066

            ATIVTOT     COVENANT    COMPGEN    METODO

LOBBYING
RECLIQ
UPSTREAM
LUCMED
ATIVTOT        1
COVENANT    -0,194 *    1
COMPGEN     -0,181 *    0,445 **    1
METODO       0,236 **   0,031       0,016       1
USLISTING   -0,155      0,412 **    0,489 **   0,075

Nota: LOBBYING: "0" se nao apresentou comentarios e "1"
se apresentou comentarios; RECLIQ: receitas liquidas do
periodo; UPSTREAM: gastos de exploracao e desenvolvimento
incorridos no periodo; LUCMED: lucro liquido medio dos
ultimos tres periodos; ATIVTOT: ativo total do periodo;
COVENANT: "0" se nao apresenta covenant e "1" se apresenta;
COMPGEN: "0" se nao apresenta compensacao gerencial e "1"
se apresenta; METODO: "0" se adota o full cost e "1" se
adota o successful efforts; USLISTING: "0" se negocia em
outros mercados de capitais e "1" se negocia no
mercado norte-americano.

Significancia: ** (1%) e * (5%).

Tabela 7 Analise do posicionamento das empresas ao DPEA

QUESTAO No. 1

Concorda   Discorda   NR    Total

18            2        5     25
72%           8%      20%   100%

QUESTAO No. 2

Concorda   Discorda   NR    Total

9             10       6     25
36%          40%      24%   100%

QUESTAO No. 3

Concorda   Discorda   NR    Total

11            13       1     25
44%          52%      4%    100%

QUESTAO No. 4

Concorda   Discorda   NR    Total

6             19       0     25
24%          76%      0%    100%

QUESTAO No. 5

Concorda   Discorda   NR    Total

12            12       1     25
48%          48%      4%    100%

QUESTAO No. 6

Concorda   Discorda   NR    Total

25            0        0     25
100%          0%      0%    100%

QUESTAO No. 7

Concorda   Discorda   NR    Total

14            9        2     25
56%          36%      8%    100%

QUESTAO No. 8

Concorda   Discorda   NR    Total

13            11       1     25
52%          44%      4%    100%

QUESTAO No. 9

Concorda   Discorda   NR    Total

6             19       0     25
24%          76%      0%    100%

QUESTAO No. 10

Concorda   Discorda   NR    Total

1             23       1     25
4%           92%      4%    100%

RESUMO

Concorda   Discorda   NR    Total

115          118      17     250
46%          47%      7%    100%

MANUTENCAO DO STATUS QUO

SIM          NAO      NR    Total

107           39       4     150
71%          26%      3%    100%

Nota: NR--nao respondeu a questao. A relacao das questoes
consta do Anexo 1.

Tabela 8 Resultado da regressao logistica binomial

PROB([LOBBYING.sub.i]) = 1/1 + e ([[alfa].sub.0] +
[[beta].sub.1-4][TAMANHO.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.5][COMPGEN.sub.i]
+ [[beta].sub.6][COVENANT.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.7][USLISTING.sub.i]
+ [[beta].sub.8][METODO.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.i])

Coef.            Variaveis    "Sinal     Regressao 1
                             Esperado"

                                          Coef.       Sig.       VIF

[alfa]           CONSTANTE               -10,858     0,002        --
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ         +       -0,022      0,959      7,485
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM        +        0,047      0,452      1,881
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED         +        0,348     0,023 **    5,137
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT        +        0,258      0,590      10,857
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT        +        0,732      0,393      1,406
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN        +        1,151      0,144      1,483
                                                   ([dagger])
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO         +       -0,126      0,824      1,183
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING       +        0,209      0,744      1,522
Teste Qui-quadradado                     41,946    0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke                              40,8%
Casos "corretamente                                  76,3%
  previstos"
Curva ROC                                            86,9%
Numero de Observacoes                                 152

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 2

                             Coef.      Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -7,408     0,000
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ     0,689    0,000****
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --        --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED       --        --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT      --        --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT    0,724      0,267
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN    0,671      0,340

[[beta].sub.7]    METODO     0,451      0,383
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   0,553      0,347
Teste Qui-quadradado         28,833   0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke      29,2%
Casos "corretamente          76,3%
  previstos"
Curva ROC                    80,9%
Numero de Observacoes         152

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 3

                             Coef.      Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -2,264     0,007
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --        --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM    0,173     0,097 *
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED       --        --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT      --        --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT    -0,017     0,978
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN    0,494      0,475

[[beta].sub.7]    METODO     0,283      0,564
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   0,261      0,653
Teste Qui-quadradado         16,568   0,005 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke      17,5%
Casos "corretamente          59,9%
  previstos"
Curva ROC                    81,2%
Numero de Observacoes         152

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 4

                             Coef.       Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -7,905     0,000
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --         --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED     0,468    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT      --         --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT    0,767      0,262
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN    1,208      0,109
                                      ([dagger])
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO     -0,029     0,958
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   0,255      0,676
Teste Qui-quadradado         40,553   0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke      39,6%
Casos "corretamente          75,7%
  previstos"
Curva ROC                    86,1%
Numero de Observacoes         152

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 5

                              Coef.      Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -11,359     0,000
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --         --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED       --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT     1,019    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT     0,731      0,280
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN     0,919      0,209

[[beta].sub.7]    METODO      0,164      0,762
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING    0,376      0,534
Teste Qui-quadradado         35,932    0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke       35,6%
Casos "corretamente           77,6%
  previstos"
Curva ROC                     84,5%
Numero de Observacoes          152

Nota: RECLIQ: receitas liquidas do periodo; UPSTREAM:
gastos de exploracao e desenvolvimento incorridos no
periodo; LUCMED: lucro liquido medio dos ultimos tres
periodos; ATIVTOT: ativo total do periodo; COVENANT:
"0" se nao apresenta covenant e "1" se apresenta;
COMPGEN: "0" se nao apresenta compensacao gerencial e
"1" se apresenta; METODO: "0" se adota o full cost e
"1" se adota o successful efforts; USLISTING: "0" se
negocia em outros mercados de capitais e "1" se negocia
no mercado norte-americano. VIF: teste variance inflation
factor. Significancia: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%) e + (15%).

Tabela 9 Resultado da regressao logistica multinomial

ln [PROB (LOBBYING = 1|X)/PROB (LOBBYING = 0|X)] = [[alfa].sub.1]
+ [[beta].sub.1-4][TAMANHO.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.5][COMPGEN.sub.i]
+ [[beta].sub.6][COVENANT.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.7][USLISTING.sub.i]
+ [[beta].sub.8][METODO.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.i]

ln [PROB (LOBBYING = 2|X)/PROB (LOBBYING = 0|X)] = [[alfa].sub.1]
+ [[beta].sub.1-4][TAMANHO.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.5][COMPGEN.sub.i]
+ [[beta].sub.6][COVENANT.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.7][USLISTING.sub.i]
+ [[beta].sub.8][METODO.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.i]

Coef.            Variaveis    "Sinal     Regressao 6
                             Esperado"

                                          Coef.      Sig.

Posicao Predominantemente Favoravel

[alfa]           CONSTANTE               -6,932    0,002 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ         +        0,332     0,067 *
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM        +         --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED         +         --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT        +         --         --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT        +        0,838      0,341
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN        +        0,776      0,391
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO         +        0,433      0,481
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING       +        0,026      0,970

Posicao Predominantemente Desfavoravel

[alfa]           CONSTANTE               -18,242   0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ         +        1,394    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM        +         --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED         +         --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT        +         --         --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT        +        0,770      0,404
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN        +        0,286      0,788
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO         +        0,276      7,488
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING       +        1,212      0,237
Teste Qui-quadradado                     41,739    0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke                  33,6%
Casos "corretamente previstos"           84,9%
Numero de Observacoes                    132

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 7

                              Coef.      Sig.

Posicao Predominantemente Favoravel

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -3,360    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --         --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM     0,073      0,133
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED       --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT      --         --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT     0,483      0,381
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN     0,730      0,422
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO      0,132      0,808
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   -0,363      0,399

Posicao Predominantemente Desfavoravel

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -14,368   0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --         --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM     1,431    0,001 ***
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED       --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT      --         --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT    -0,270      0,772
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN     0,663      0,364
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO     -0,330      0,700
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING    1,027      0,438
Teste Qui-quadradado         39,107    0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke      33,6%
Casos "corretamente previstos86,8%
Numero de Observacoes        132

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 8

                              Coef.      Sig.

Posicao Predominantemente Favoravel

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -8,283    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --         --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED      0,323    0,003 ***
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT      --         --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT     0,932      0,281
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN     1,180      0,206
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO     -0,013      0,982
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   -0,164      0,813

Posicao Predominantemente Desfavoravel

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -17,044   0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --         --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED      0,801    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT      --         --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT     0,800      0,411
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN     1,312      0,240
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO     -0,134      0,839
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING    0,838      0,412
Teste Qui-quadradado         49,798    0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke      41,4%
Casos "corretamente previstos86,8%
Numero de Observacoes        132

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 9

                              Coef.      Sig.

Posicao Predominantemente Favoravel

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -10,010   0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --         --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED       --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT     0,639    0,012 **
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT     0,869      0,321
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN     0,960      0,294
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO      0,134      0,808
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   -0,034      0,938

Posicao Predominantemente Desfavoravel

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -23,972   0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --         --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED       --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT     1,844    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT     0,773      0,434
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN     0,763      0,496
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO      0,037      0,931
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING    1,126      0,313
Teste Qui-quadradado         47,089    0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke      39,3%
Casos "corretamente previstos86,2%
Numero de Observacoes        132

Nota: RECLIQ: receitas liquidas do periodo; UPSTREAM: gastos
de exploracao e desenvolvimento incorridos no periodo;
LUCMED: lucro liquido medio dos ultimos tres periodos;
ATIVTOT: ativo total do periodo; COVENANT: "0" se nao apresenta
covenant e "1" se apresenta; COMPGEN: "0" se nao apresenta
compensacao gerencial e "1" se apresenta; METODO: "0" se adota
o full cost e "1" se adota o successful efforts;
USLISTING: "0" se negocia em outros mercados de capitais e "1"
se negocia no mercado norte-americano.
Significancia: *** (1%), ** (5%) e * (10%).

Tabela 10 Resultado da regressao de Poisson

[LOBBYING.sub.i] = [[[my].sup.LOBBYING] e -  ([[alfa].sub.1]
+ [[beta].sub.1-4] [TAMANHO.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.5] [COMPGEN.sub.i]
+ [[beta].sub.6][COVENANT.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.7][USLISTING.sub.i]
+ [[beta].sub.8][METODO.sub.i])LOBBYING!] + [u.sub.i]

Painel A: Lobbying a Favor do DPEA

Coef.            Variaveis    Sinal     Regressao 10
                             Esperado

                                        Coef.          Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE              -5,089      0,002 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ        +       0,373       0,007 ***
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM       +         --            --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED        +         --            --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT       +         --            --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT       +       0,551         0,378
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN       +       0,950    0,139 ([dagger])
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO        +       0,182         0,707
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING      +       0,001         0,998
Teste Qui-quadrado                      49,003      0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de McFadden                   13,2%
Numero de Observacoes                   152

Painel B: Lobbying Contra o DPEA

Coef.            Variaveis    Sinal     Regressao 14
                             Esperado

                                        Coef.          Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE              -7,224      0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ        +       0,608       0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM       +         --            --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED        +         --            --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT       +         --            --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT       +       0,413         0,401
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN       +       0,111         0,853
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO        +       0,278         0,536
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING      +       0,665         0,228
Teste Qui-quadrado                      25,343      0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de McFadden                   28,5%
Numero de Observacoes                   152

Painel A: Lobbying a Favor do DPEA

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 11

                             Coef.      Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -1,892     0,314
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --        --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM    0,159      0,441
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED       --        --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT      --        --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT    0,150      0,773
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN    0,952      0,159
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO     -0,046     0,915
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   -0,243     0,603
Teste Qui-quadrado           41,021   0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de McFadden        13,8%
Numero de Observacoes        152

Painel B: Lobbying Contra o DPEA

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 15

                             Coef.      Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -2,190     0,470
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --        --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM    0,232      0,537
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED       --        --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT      --        --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT    -0,214     0,701
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN    0,045      0,946
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO     0,282      0,528
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   0,600      0,265
Teste Qui-quadrado           45,651   0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de McFadden        16,5%
Numero de Observacoes        152

Painel A: Lobbying a Favor do DPEA

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 12

                             Coef.      Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -5,740   0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --        --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --        --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED     0,290    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT      --        --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT    0,624      0,284
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN    1,271    0,035 **
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO     -0,224     0,648
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   -0,247     0,585
Teste Qui-quadrado           34,856   0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de McFadden        23,4%
Numero de Observacoes        152

Painel B: Lobbying Contra o DPEA

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 16

                             Coef.      Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -6,844   0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --        --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --        --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED     0,373    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT      --        --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT    0,377      0,404
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN    0,525      0,338
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO     -0,045     0,913
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   0,394      0,421
Teste Qui-quadrado           23,623   0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de McFadden        35,1%
Numero de Observacoes        152

Painel A: Lobbying a Favor do DPEA

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 13

                              Coef.      Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -7,510    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --         --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED       --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT     0,589    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT     0,602      0,320
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN     1,096     0,070 *
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO     -0,004      0,993
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   -0,146      0,757
Teste Qui-quadrado           42,237    0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de McFadden        18,4%
Numero de Observacoes        152

Painel B: Lobbying Contra o DPEA

Coef.            Variaveis   Regressao 17

                              Coef.      Sig.

[alfa]           CONSTANTE   -10,139   0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    RECLIQ       --         --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    LUCMED       --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    ATIVTOT     0,855    0,000 ***
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT     0,390      0,423
[[beta].sub.6]    COMPGEN     0,311      0,553
[[beta].sub.7]    METODO      0,169      0,710
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING    0,476      0,363
Teste Qui-quadrado           19,001    0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de McFadden        33,9%
Numero de Observacoes        152

Nota: RECLIQ: receitas liquidas do periodo; UPSTREAM: gastos
de exploracao e desenvolvimento incorridos no periodo;
LUCMED: lucro liquido medio dos ultimos tres periodos;
ATIVTOT: ativo total do periodo; COVENANT: "0" se nao
apresenta covenant e "1" se apresenta; COMPGEN: "0" se nao
apresenta compensacao gerencial e "1" se apresenta;
METODO: "0" se adota o full cost e "1" se adota o successful
efforts; USLISTING: "0" se negocia em outros mercados de
capitais e "1" se negocia no mercado norte-americano.
Signiiicancia: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%) e + (15%).

Tabela 11 Regressoes apos analise fatorial

                             Regressao Logistica  Regressao Logistica
                             Binomial             Multinomial

                                                  Posicao
                                                  Predominantemente
                                                  Favoravel

Variaveis   Sinal Esperado   Regressao 18         Regressao 19

                             Coef.      Sig.      Coef.      Sig.

CONSTANTE                    -1,379   0,000 ***   -3,601   0,000 ***
TAMANHO           +          1,076    0,000 ***   0,697    0,036 **
COVENANT          +          0,776      0,294     0,778      0,380
COMPGEN           +          0,884      0,251     0,904      0,326
METODO            +          0,280      0,594     0,367      0,554
USLISTING         +          -0,022     0,971     -0,301     0,663
Teste Qui-quadradado         30,194   0,000 ***   38,492
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke      30,5%                33,2%
[R.sup.2] de McFadden        --                   --
Numero de Observacoes        152                  152

                             Regressao Logistica
                             Multinomial

                             Posicao
                             Predominantemente
                             Desfavoravel

Variaveis   Sinal Esperado   Regressao 20

                               Coef.       Sig.

CONSTANTE                     -4,643     0,000 ***
TAMANHO           +            1,446     0,000 ***
COVENANT          +            0,772       0,481
COMPGEN           +            0,672       0,571
METODO            +            0,059       0,946
USLISTING         +            0,592       0,594
Teste Qui-quadradado         0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke
[R.sup.2] de McFadden
Numero de Observacoes

                             Regressao de Poisson

                             Lobbying a Favor do DPEA

Variaveis   Sinal Esperado   Regressao 21

                             Coef.          Sig.

CONSTANTE                    -1,474       0,016 **
TAMANHO           +          0,445       0,000 ***
COVENANT          +          0,550         0,337
COMPGEN           +          0,949    0,141 ([dagger])
METODO            +          0,119         0,801
USLISTING         +          -0,338        0,509
Teste Qui-quadradado         50,017   0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke      --
[R.sup.2] de McFadden        11,8%
Numero de Observacoes        152

                             Regressao de Poisson

                             Lobbying Contra o DPEA

Variaveis   Sinal Esperado   Regressao 22

                             Coef.      Sig.

CONSTANTE                   -1,255    0,047 **
TAMANHO           +          0,595    0,000 ***
COVENANT          +          0,418    0,420
COMPGEN           +          0,072    0,902
METODO            +          0,196    0,678
USLISTING         +          0,267    0,635
Teste Qui-quadradado        40,312    0,000 ***
[R.sup.2] de Nagelkerke      --
[R.sup.2] de McFadden        25,1%
Numero de Observacoes        152

Nota: TAMANHO: variavel decorrente da analise fatorial, elaborada
com base nos valores dos coeficientes dos escores fatoriais de
cada uma das variaveis RECLIQ, UPSTREAM, LUCMED e ATIVTOT;
COVENANT: "0" se nao apresenta covenant e "1" se apresenta;
COMPGEN: "0" se nao apresenta compensacao gerencial e "1" se
apresenta; METODO: "0" se adota o full cost e "1" se adota o
successful efforts; USLISTING: "0" se negocia em outros mercados
de capitais e "1" se negocia no mercado norte-americano.
Significancia: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%) e + (15%).


Lobbying on Accounting Regulation: Evidence from the Oil Industry

1 INTRODUCTION

In the field of accounting regulation of oil exploration and production activities, the debate over which accounting model best captures economic transactions in the oil industry dates back to the 1960s and 1970s. Even in the U.S., which has been a pioneer in the development of the theoretical and normative frameworks of accounting in the oil industry, both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have disagreed with each other about the appropriate standards for the oil industry; as a result, two conflicting accounting methods have been allowed to coexist in the U.S.: the "successful efforts" method and the "full cost" method (Cortese, Irvine, & Kaidonis, 2009).

This scenario, in which oil companies can freely choose between two different accounting methods, was the result of an intense lobbying campaign by oil and gas companies that effectively pitted the FASB and the SEC against each other. On one side, the FASB defended the successful efforts method in its Statements of Financial Accounting Standard no. 19--Financial Accounting and Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing Companies (SFAS 19); on the other side, the SEC defended the full cost method in its Regulation SX 4-10. The two accounting standards continue to coexist in the U.S. today.

The same situation exists within the context of international standard setting, wherein attempts since 1998 to develop a single international accounting standard for the oil industry have been unsuccessful. In 2004, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued International Financial Reporting Standards 6--Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources (IFRS 6) to provide guidance to extractive companies listed in the European Union, which were required to adopt International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 2005. Although IFRS 6 provided general guidelines for the different accounting methods used by international companies in extractive industries, it did not address the merits of each method and did not indicate which method should be adopted by international companies.

More than six years have passed since the issuance of IFRS 6, and discussions relating to the issuance of definitive international accounting standards for extractive industries are still ongoing. In this regard, the discussion paper Extractive Activities (DPEA), which was published by the IASB as part of its IFRS 6 review/replacement project, presents and discusses ten key questions regarding the recognition, measurement and disclosure of financial events relating to extractive activities.

With respect to the accounting regulation process, this study is based on the economic theory of regulation and the proposition of Watts and Zimmerman (1978) that agents have economic incentives to influence regulatory bodies through lobbying to obtain regulatory standards that satisfy their interests. This study thus aims to answer the following research question: what are the determining factors in the submission of comment letters to lobby on accounting regulation of the oil industry?

The objective is to identify the determining factors in lobbying strategies in accounting regulation of the oil industry to ascertain the key features that cause interest groups comprising oil companies' financial statement preparers to try to influence the IASB by submitting comment letters to public comment period.

To achieve the proposed goal, multivariate data analysis techniques (binomial and multinomial logistic regressions and Poisson regression) are used to ascertain whether there is correlation between variables representing firms' characteristics and the submission of comments on the DPEA to the IASB. The study therefore aims to define the factors that determine the adoption of this lobbying strategy for the oil industry's accounting regulation process.

Econometric modeling is conducted for a sample comprising both lobbying oil companies (those that submitted comment letters to the IASB) and non-lobbying oil companies (those that did not submit comment letters) to identify the preponderant economic factors involved in the adoption of lobbying strategies by such interest groups (oil companies) before the IASB.

This research strategy has been used to identify the reasons for lobbying and the lobbying strategies adopted by various interest groups in numerous studies, including the studies of Dhaliwal (1982), Sutton (1984), Francis (1987), Deakin (1989), Kenny and Larson (1993), Tutticci, Dunstan and Holmes (1994), Weetman, Davie and Collins (1996), Georgiou and Roberts (2004), Asekomeh, Russel and Tarbert (2006), Hansen (2011) and Ginner and Arce (2012), among others.

In this regard, it is necessary to clarify that the concept of lobbying employed in this study is very particular and refers to explicit statements contained in comment letters submitted at public consultation on accounting standards, as in the case of the DPEA.

However, analysis of the modus operandi of the IASB in issuing an IFRS, for example, reveals that the lobbying process does not only occur via the submission of comment letters. A number of lobbying strategies are possible, including those listed below:

(a) participation in meetings with board or staff members, whether formal or informal, in-person or remote (e.g., videoconferences);

(b) participation in public sessions (round-tables) or field visits (outreach) during the established public comment period;

(c) appointing members to the sponsor foundation and its various bodies, such as the board and its technical or advisory committees (e.g., the IFRS Advisory Council, IFRS Interpretation Committee and the new Accounting Standards Advisory Forum (ASAF), which is a consultative forum wherein members attempt to contribute to the development of globally accepted, high-quality normative standards) or even participation in different working groups;

(d) funding for the sponsors of the regulatory bodies;

(e) use of audit firms and professional associations as mediators before the board; and

(f) other strategies, including surveys and leafleting, among others.

Orens, Jorissen, Lybaert and Tas (2011) developed a schematic diagram that describes a set of lobbying strategies that can be used during different stages of the IASB's standard-setting process, as shown in Table 1.

Notwithstanding this acknowledgment that 'lobbying' is a much more comprehensive concept in practice, due to methodological constraints, this study considers a lobbying strategy to be a strategy that uses the submission of public comment letters in response to public consultation of standard-setting bodies.

In defense of the use of comment letters to assess lobbying activities, Asekomeh et al. (2006) argue that unlike responses to questionnaires, which can be skewed/biased, comment letters provided in response to questions raised in public consultation provide a more accurate picture of lobbying actions because the statements contained in comment letters contribute significantly to the understanding of the position of each agent involved in the standard-setting process.

Georgiou (2004) investigated the effectiveness of multiple lobbying methods, including but not limited to comment letters. The results showed that even when parties used other lobbying methods--such as intermediation by audit firms and meetings with the UK's Accounting Standards Board (UKASB)--these methods were significantly associated with use of comment letters. The author concluded that companies that submitted comment letters were more likely to use other, complementary lobbying methods than companies that did not submit comment letters (Georgiou, 2004).

The selection for this study of the oil industry and, consequently, of the accounting standards applicable to the oil industry stems from the fact that historical evidence provided by Collins, Dent and O'Connor (1978); Solomons (1978); Deakin (1979); Collins, Rozeff and Salatka (1982); Deakin (1989); Zeff (2005); and King (2006), among others, has shown that the U.S. regulatory framework applicable to accounting in the oil industry emerged as a result of a strong lobbying system that exerted pressure and influence on the SEC and FASB. This phenomenon was also observed with respect to the issuance of IFRS 6 by the IASB. Specifically, Cortese, Irvine and Kaidonis (2010) presented evidence that demonstrated that the international accounting body was captured by the regulated companies, resulting in a standard that maintained the status quo (i.e., the free choice of accounting methods), which clearly serves the interests of the oil companies.

In this context, the publication of the DPEA provides another opportunity to observe lobbying by oil companies to influence the IASB's regulation of oil industry accounting. This is the basis for this study and the reason why it is important.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

According to Viscusi, Harrington and Vernon (2005), the theory of regulation can be viewed from three angles: the public interest theory; the capture theory; and the economic theory of regulation, which is also known as the interest group theory. This study adopts the perspective of the economic theory of regulation.

The basic assumption of the economic theory of regulation is that regulation is conducted to meet the needs and contribute to the welfare of the interest groups that exert the greatest pressure on standard setters (Viscusi, Harrington & Vernon, 2005). Given this assumption, the economic theory of regulation is also known as the interest group theory. The main exponents of the economic theory of regulation are researchers Stigler (1971), Posner (1974), Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983).

According to the economic theory of regulation, regulation is performed to serve the interests of groups that are more politically effective in convincing regulators to act on their behalf. Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986), in line with Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976) and Posner (1974), assume that individuals act to maximize their own utility and, therefore, that the process of accounting regulation (standardization) is the result of a political process in which individuals and groups compete for wealth transfers.

Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) argue that economic theory in the political process focuses on incentives for individuals to come together in groups in order to lobby (influence regulators) for transfers of wealth. Thus, according to Solomons (1978), assuming that the standard-setting process is political, accounting standards are not necessarily guided by theoretical or technical issues but by the different interests of the affected parties, who exert pressure for individual gain.

According to Kothari, Ramanna and Skinner (2010), regulators are endowed with their own ideologies, and standards are the joint result of the regulators' ideologies and the effects of the pressure (lobbying) exerted by special interest groups. Under this theory, lobbying is not viewed as an illegal or immoral activity but as a mechanism through which regulators are informed of companies' policies and practices.

The studies on lobbying in accounting regulation can be considered a subset of the studies on accounting choice (Francis, 1987; Kenny and Larson, 1993) because, according to Francis (2001), lobbying activities represent only one dimension of accounting choice.

According to Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001), an accounting choice is a decision whose primary purpose is to influence (in form or in substance) the output of the accounting system. Based on this definition, the theory of accounting choice is linked with the theory of interest groups because accounting choice is based on various existing economic incentives, and such incentives are present in the regulation process itself. Thus, managers lobby the standard-setting body at the origin of standard development to obtain standards that meet their interests from the outset.

Watts and Zimmerman (1986) formulated three hypotheses regarding firms' accounting choices that are relevant to the accounting regulation process: (1) the management compensation hypothesis, which states that managers have incentives to make choices that maximize their compensation; (2) the debt covenant hypothesis, which predicts that managers will make choices that avoid violating the terms of a loan; and (3) the political cost hypothesis, which posits that managers make accounting choices that will avoid political and public scrutiny.

More specifically, the management compensation hypothesis, also known as the bonus plan hypothesis, states that managers who receive variable compensation (e.g., bonuses, stock or stock options) often use accounting methods that shift reported earnings from future periods to the current period, thereby increasing their variable compensation for the current period (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).

Regarding the debt covenant hypothesis, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that managers of companies that have higher degrees of debt are more likely to use accounting methods that increase profits. The assumption is that the higher the debt level, the more the company will be stifled by restrictions and conditions imposed by creditors, and the more stringent the restrictions imposed by creditors, the greater the likelihood that the company will violate the restrictions. By increasing company profits, managers ultimately relax the restrictions imposed by creditors (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).

Under the political cost hypothesis, the authors assert that large companies tend to use accounting methods that reduce profits more often than small companies, because size influences the amount of political attention received by a company. The assumption is that higher profits may attract adverse attention from regulators, professional associations, media, environmentalists and consumer groups, among others (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).

Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986) argue that regulation is performed according to the interests of groups that are more politically effective in convincing the regulator/ standard setter to act on their behalf, which accords with the economic theory of regulation (Stigler 1971, Peltzman, 1976, Posner, 1974; Becker, 1983).

By aligning accounting choice with the process of accounting regulation, managers have economic incentives to lobby regulators against or for accounting standards that enable the managers to, e.g., reduce or defer the payment of taxes; reduce political costs and information production (disclosure); or increase the receipt of bonuses.

Watts and Zimmerman (1978) empirically tested the formulated hypotheses using discriminant analysis on a sample of 52 comment letters submitted by companies on the FASB discussion memorandum regarding the accounting standard for general price level adjustments, and they concluded that managers have economic incentives to participate in the standard-setting process by lobbying the regulator.

Several other studies on the subject of lobbying on accounting regulation have been conducted based on the work of Watts and Zimmerman (1978). For example, Francis (1987) and, later, Ndubizu, Choi and Jain (1993) investigated the issuance process of SFAS 87 (Employers' Accounting for Pensions). In the first study, Francis (1987) formulated a logit model that was applied to a sample of 218 companies that submitted comment letters on the FASB's preliminary views of SFAS 87 (lobbying companies) and 582 other companies (non-lobbying companies). The authors formulated hypotheses for size, debt (as a proxy for the effects of the standard on the balance sheet) and pension expense (as a proxy for the effects of the standard on the financial statement). The results indicated that size is not the only important factor in the decision to lobby a standard-setting body; rather, there is also the possibility that the new standard will have adverse effects on financial statements.

Ndubizu et al. (1993) investigated the exposure draft step of SFAS 87 using a sample of 1,802 firms, including 156 lobbying companies who spoke against the exposure draft and 1,646 other (non-lobbying) companies. The results of Ndubizu et al. (1993) differed from those reported by Francis (1987) in that Ndubizu et al. (1993) found that only earnings volatility--a variable not included in the previous study--was relevant in explaining the decision to submit comments on the exposure draft. This result confirmed the formulated hypothesis that companies with high earnings volatility prior to the adoption of a new standard are more likely to lobby.

Deakin's (1989) work sought to study the process of accounting regulation in the oil industry for companies that made submissions to the FASB. The author used a sample of companies that used the full cost method because these companies would be most affected by the FASB proposal. To define the dependent variable, the author classified companies as lobbying (those submitting comments on the FASB discussion memorandum or exposure draft) and non-lobbying (those not submitting any comments). The author used a logistic regression model to test hypotheses related to the existence of restrictive financial covenants and performance-based management compensation plans and found that the empirical evidence was consistent with these hypotheses.

Also noteworthy is the study by Georgiou and Roberts (2004) that analyzed the behavior of companies that lobbied the UKASB on the "deferred tax" standard. Their results indicated that the size and behavior of a company in past public consultation (frequency of lobbying) were key factors in the decision to submit comments to the UKASB on deferred taxes. Their results also indicated that companies submitting comments against the proposed standard were more likely to have contracts with debt covenants than companies in favor of the proposed standard.

Finally, their evidence showed that companies with performance-based management compensation plans were more likely to provide comments in favor of the proposal than companies without performance-based management compensation plans (Georgiou and Roberts, 2004).

More recently, the process of lobbying on accounting regulation has been studied from the perspective of institutional theory (Bengtsson, 2011; Chatham, Larson and Vietze, 2010; Fogarty, 1992; Giner and Arce, 2012; Kenny and Larson, 1993; Koh, 2011; Larson 2002, 2008; Larson and Kenny, 2011). This theory suggests that the actions of organizations should be understood as attempts to obtain legitimacy and to maintain credibility with external constituents (Fogarty, 1992).

Tavares, Paulo, Anjos and Carter (2013) reiterated Riahi-Belkaouri's (2004) assertion that the promulgation of a standard is a social choice that forces regulators to adopt a political process aimed at accommodating various interests, including their own. In other words, according to institutional theory, the regulator is motivated to adopt strategies that will maintain its power and credibility in the community and facilitate the re-election of its members.

Institutional theory places organizations within a social setting and explicitly recognizes the influence of the external social environment on the internal activities of an organization, which seeks to obtain legitimacy or to retain social acceptance (Kenny and Larson, 1993).

In this context, organizations such as the IASB seek legitimacy from their constituents in order to survive. The solicitation of comments on its products (accounting standards) from interested parties is one strategy employed by the IASB in its quest for legitimacy (Kenny and Larson, 1993).

Consequently, various interest groups, which also seek legitimacy and recognition from their peers, can freely participate in the standard-setting process of these regulatory bodies, even when the interest groups are not directly affected by a normative proposal (Chatham et al., 2010).

Given that the standard-setting process is a political one, organizations such as the IASB must continuously monitor the needs of their constituents and adjust their operations to accommodate those needs (Kenny and Larson, 1993; Larson and Kenny, 2011).

According to Bengtsson (2011), institutional theory has been used in studies on accounting standard setting to complement the explanatory framework of political economy (from which the economic theory of regulation follows), and the focus of these studies has been on how external pressures influence the adoption of accounting standards.

Because this study is based on a discussion paper (the DPEA), it is not yet possible to know which opinions will ultimately be accepted or rejected by the IASB. To understand the accommodations that are made, this study uses the assumptions of institutional theory to complement the notions that participation in the public consultation process (lobbying) is legitimate and that companies seek to promote their accounting choices in the regulatory process. The study then turns to the economic theory of regulation to identify factors that lead companies to participate in the regulatory process.

A summary of the major studies on the topic is shown in Table 2.

The cited studies, especially those by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Francis (1987), Deakin (1989), Ndubizu et al. (1993) and Georgiou and Roberts (2004) are methodologically aligned with the objective of this work, which is to establish the determining factors that led oil companies to submit comments on the DPEA, i.e., to lobby.

3 METHODOLOGY

The following research strategies are used to identify the determinant factors of lobbying activity on accounting regulation in the oil industry.

Based on the 141 comment letters published by the IASB on its website, the first step is to perform content analysis of the letters submitted by oil companies to measure the dependent variable used in the econometric models.

The second step of the study is based on quantitative analysis and uses econometric models to identify the economic factors that determine the adoption of a lobbying strategy that employs the submission of comment letters.

Depending on the characteristics of the dependent variable, binomial and multinomial logistic regressions and Poisson regression are used. In the case of binomial regressions, the dependent variable takes a value of "1" where comments on the DPEA have been submitted and a value of "0" otherwise.

In multinomial logistic regression, the dependent variable is decomposed into three categories: "0" to represent companies that submitted no comments on the DPEA; "1" to represent the companies that submitted predominantly favorable comments; and "2" to represent companies that submitted predominantly unfavorable comments.

Finally, Poisson regression is employed when the dependent variable is intended to express the degree of agreement or disagreement with the ten questions presented in the DPEA. Thus, it can take values from zero, in the case of companies that submitted no comments, up to ten, which represents the maximum number of times a company could agree or disagree with the proposals addressed in the DPEA questions.

3.1 Definition of Variables and Research Hypotheses.

As stated earlier, the dependent variable used as a proxy for lobbying refers to the explicit statements contained in comment letters submitted to the public consultation on the DPEA. This model has been widely used in accounting studies on lobbying, including studies by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Francis (1987), Deakin (1989), Ndubizu et al. (1993) and Georgiou and Roberts (2004).

In this study, lobbying strategies are limited to comment letters because the use of other lobbying strategies to measure the dependent variable usually involves private information, which makes modeling difficult to implement (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). Although the exclusive use of comment letters is an inherent limitation of the present study, several studies have defended this modeling approach, including Asekomeh et al. (2006), Chung (1999), Sutton (1984) and Georgiou (2004). Thus, this modeling approach is adopted for the present study.

Accordingly, depending on the type of regression used, the dependent variable has the characteristics listed in Table 3.

Regarding the independent variables, size has often been used in the literature on lobbying on accounting regulation to express a company's exposure (political cost hypothesis) (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Francis, 1987; Deakin, 1989; Ndubizu, Choi and Jain, 1993 and Georgiou and Roberts, 2004).

Size has also been associated with the hypothesis that a lobbying strategy is only adopted if the benefits of lobbying outweigh the costs (Sutton, 1984). In this sense, Koh (2011) states that because large companies have more resources, they usually tend to influence the final result and hence reap the benefits of lobbying.

To operationalize the size variable, the following four proxies were used: net revenue for the period (NETREV); total assets for the period (TOTASS); average net profit for the last three periods (AVPROF); and exploration and development costs incurred in the period (UPSTREAM). The test hypothesis for size is defined as:

[H.sub.1]: Large oil companies are more likely to lobby, whether for or against the proposed standard, than other oil companies.

The extant literature presents two other variables representing economic incentives for accounting choice (in this case, the decision to lobby the standard-setting body). First, it is assumed that managers of companies with performance-based compensation plans that depend on indicators derived from financial information tend to choose accounting models that benefit themselves. In other words, these companies will opt for proposed standards that incorporate accounting methods that increase or diminish profits, according to their respective interests.

The second characteristic is the existence of restrictive debt covenants. This theory holds that managers tend to choose accounting standards that result in the non-violation of those covenants. Thus, the closer the company is to a covenant threshold based on accounting numbers, the greater the probability that the manager will use accounting procedures that increase revenue and/or reduce the level of debt (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983).

To operationalize these two characteristics, the MANCOMP and COVENANT binary variables are used, which take the value of "0" in cases in which the company does not have the characteristic of interest and the value of "1" in cases in which the company has the characteristic of interest. These variables are measured by searching the explanatory notes to companies' financial statements (available on their websites) for references to the existence (or absence) of performance-based management compensation plans and restrictive debt covenants.

These variables can be operationalized in different ways, and the binary coding of "0" or "1" for these variables based on the existence or absence of the testable characteristic is a limitation of the study. This is because the manner in which binary variables are operationalized cannot properly capture the magnitude of the characteristic they aim to investigate. Deakin (1989), Georgiou and Roberts (2004), Georgiou (2005) and Koh (2011) are examples of studies that offer alternative methods of operationalizing these variables.

The testable hypotheses are:

[H.sub.2]: Oil companies with performance-based management compensation plans are more likely to lobby, whether in favor of or against the proposed standard, than oil companies without performance-based management compensation plans.

[H.sub.3]: Oil companies with restrictive debt covenants are more likely to lobby, whether in favor of or against the proposed standard, than oil companies without restrictive debt covenants.

To capture the risk of possible changes in the accounting regulation of the oil industry, the test model also considers the USLISTING and METHOD variables. Current international accounting regulation applicable to extractive activities is based on the IFRS 6 standard, which states that extractive companies can freely define their respective accounting policies. In practice, IFRS 6 does not mandate any specific method for asset recognition and measurement. As a result, companies subject to international standards ultimately choose between one of the two best-known international accounting methods, namely, the successful efforts and full cost methods, both of which were established by the United States.

Such an attitude can be understood from the perspective of institutional theory and the concept of mimetic isomorphism in particular. According to the concept of mimetic isomorphism, organizations tend to copy the practices of other organizations, particularly within the same industry, even when the organizations are not required to follow specific standards (Koh, 2011).

The adoption of the successful efforts or full cost method is therefore a global reality and facilitates the publication of financial statements by non-US companies in the U.S. when, for example, non-U.S. companies are traded on the New York stock exchange.

The use of the USLISTING variable aims to capture the risk of possible changes in accounting regulation from the perspectives of both U.S. companies and non-U.S. companies whose stocks are traded on the U.S. market.

In the case of U.S. companies, although there is no clear expectation that the U.S. will adopt the IFRS for U.S. companies, the evidence shows that the participation of U.S. companies in the process of IASB standard-setting is relevant; in some cases, U.S. companies are the parties with the greatest involvement in IASB public consultation (Larson, 1997; Larson and Kenny, 2011; Giner and Arce, 2012).

In the present study, 27 letters (19%) of the 141 letters received by the IASB on the DPEA were from interested U.S. parties. Thus, U.S. parties were second only to European parties, who submitted 76 letters.

Giner and Arce (2012) analyzed the IFRS 2 issuance process and showed that 264 of the 539 letters received by the IASB were submitted by U.S. companies. They argued that the strong participation by U.S. companies in the IASB's standard-setting process was motivated by fears about the possibility that the FASB and SEC will change their position regarding the adoption of IFRS for domestic companies (Giner and Arce, 2012).

From the perspective of non-U.S. companies that adopt IFRS, Larson (1997) and Georgiou (2005) argued that changes in international standards can increase transaction costs by requiring accounting adjustments and the disclosure of additional information to meet the needs of U.S. investors. Thus, non-U.S. companies have an incentive to lobby the IASB to maintain the status quo.

Therefore, this study considers that U.S. oil companies and oil companies that trade on the U.S. stock market have an incentive to lobby the IASB to maintain the status quo, i.e., to maintain the companies' freedom to choose between the successful efforts and full cost methods, and thereby avoid the possible transaction costs associated with convergence to new standards. The test hypothesis corresponds to:

[H.sub.4]: Oil companies listed on the U.S. stock market are more likely to lobby against the proposed standard than oil companies not listed on the U.S. stock market.

One of the proposals under consideration by the IASB establishes a new method for asset recognition and measurement applicable to extractive activities and eliminates the choice between the successful efforts and full cost methods.

The IASB's proposal would establish that the legal right to exploit natural resources is the key basis for the recognition of assets and that other costs incurred to confirm and ensure the commercial exploitation of resources are enhancements of that legal right. Thus, this scenario is a departure from the experience of companies accustomed to the successful efforts or full cost method.

Zeff (2002) argued that the setting of a new standard that eliminates choice or imposes additional disclosure requirements is a trigger for constituents to put pressure on the standard setter to meet their needs. This argument is also found in Saemann (1999), who maintained that such a scenario typically leads interested parties to oppose the standard setter's proposals.

Tavares et al. (2013) argued that regulation restricts accounting choice to the extent that the regulator has the power to decide the accounting policies that regulated companies should follow.

In this context, the DPEA proposal eliminates oil companies' choice by establishing a single method of asset recognition and measurement. Thus, under Zeff's (2002) theory, companies have an incentive to lobby the IASB to maintain the status quo. This incentive is also supported in Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986), who argue that financial statement preparers consider the potential impact of a new accounting approach on expected future cash flows when deciding whether to lobby.

As discussed in Santos, Lopes and Silva (2010), companies that follow the successful efforts method would be most affected by the proposal in the DPEA because adoption of this proposal would lead to significant changes in the accounting policies of these companies. Accordingly, it is expected that companies using the successful efforts method are more likely to lobby against the proposals in the DPEA.

Thus, the METHOD variable aims to determine whether there is an association between the choice of the successful efforts method (labeled "1") and the probability of submitting comments against the DPEA. The testable hypothesis corresponds to:

[H.sub.5]: Oil companies using the successful efforts method are more likely to lobby against the proposed standard than oil companies using the full cost method.

3.2 Specification of Econometric Models.

The reasoning presented above leads to the following econometric model:

[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]

where i represents the company, and LOBBYING takes the value "1" for companies who submitted comments on the DPEA and the value "0" for companies that did not submit comments. The error term of the regression is indicated by parameter [epsilon]; [alpha] is the intercept; and [[beta].sub.1], [[beta].sub.2], [[beta].sub.3], ..., [[beta].sub.8] are the estimated coefficients, which are expected to be statistically significant and positive.

According to Favero, Belfiore, Silva and Chan (2009), the analysis of the results focuses on the coefficients of the independent variables ([beta]), which must be statistically relevant, and is based on the idea that when the coefficient is greater than zero, the probability of occurrence of the event of interest (i.e., lobbying on the DPEA) is greater, and vice versa.

The multinomial logistic regression has the following specification:

[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]

where LOBBYING assumes a value of "0" for companies that did not submit comments on the DPEA; "1" for companies that submitted comments that were predominantly in favor of the DPEA; and "2" for companies that submitted comments that were predominantly against the DPEA.

The analyses are conducted by comparing (1) companies that submitted predominantly favorable comments to companies that did not submit comments and (2) companies that submitted predominantly unfavorable comments to companies that did not submit comments (Favero, Belfiore, Silva and Chan, 2009).

The Poisson regression model uses the following specification:

[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]

where LOBBYING assumes values ranging from "0" to "10", with "0" assigned to companies that did not submit comments on the DPEA and "10" being the maximum possible value of agreement (or disagreement) with respect to the DPEA.

To exemplify the use of these three models, suppose that a company submitted comments on the DPEA and that the company's responses to the 10 questions comprised 7 responses against the proposed standards and 3 responses in favor of the proposed standards. In the first model (binomial logistic regression), the company would be coded as "1" (submitted comments); in the multinomial logistic regression model, it would receive code "2" (predominantly against the proposed standards); and, finally, in the Poisson regression it would be coded as "3" in the "lobbying in favor" panel and "7" in the "lobbying against" panel.

3.3 Sample Characteristics.

Because the sample must contain both lobbying and non-lobbying companies, oil companies that submitted comment letters on the DPEA were identified. The IASB received 141 comment letters, of which 39 (28%) were submitted by extractive companies and 33 (23%) were submitted by non-governmental entities. The group comprising national issuers, accounting profession entities and capital market regulators contributed 25 letters (18%). The groups comprising investors/individual users, oil industry consulting firms/professional associations and audit firms submitted 17, 12 and 8 comment letters, respectively. Eight other letters were submitted by various stakeholders.

Of the 39 comment letters submitted to the IASB by extractive companies, 28 of the letters were from oil companies and 11 were from mining companies. Thus, the initial focus was on these 28 oil companies, 3 of which could not be used due to the unavailability of information necessary for the study.

The database of Evaluate Energy[R], which is a leading consultancy firm that provides information about the oil and gas industry, was consulted. Because the DPEA was in public consultation from April to July 2010, industry information for 2009 was used. The Evaluate Energy[R] database had 2009 information from 262 companies in the oil industry.

Because the Evaluate Energy[R] database does not include information necessary to operationalize the MANCOMP and COVENANT variables, a random selection from the 237 companies in the database (excluding the 25 already pre-selected to represent lobbying companies) was conducted to select non-lobbying companies.

To define the sample size for the random selection, the expression n = N x [n.sub.0]/N + [n.sub.0] was used, in which [n.sub.0] = 1 / [E.sup.2.sub.0], where [n.sub.0] is the first approximation of sample size; [E.sup.2.sub.0] = is the tolerable sampling error; N is the size of target population; and n is the sample size. Thus, for a target population (N) of 237 and tolerable sampling error ([E.sup.2.sub.0]) of 6%, we arrive at 127 companies, which, when added to the 25 lobbying companies, yields a final sample of 152 oil and gas companies.

The sample comprises companies of different sizes, as shown in Table 4. For example, the average net revenue (NETREV) in 2009 was (in logarithmic values) USD 8.84 million. However, there is considerable variation between the minimum value of USD 2.42 million and the maximum value of USD 12.54 million, which provides a standard deviation of USD 1.95 million. The same behavior is observed for other variables, such as the average net profit (AVPROF), which range from a minimum value of USD 1.60 million to a maximum value of USD 20.7 million.

Although the assumption of normality of the residuals is not a requirement for logistic regression, the continuous variables were natural-log transformed to achieve a normal distribution in an effort to mitigate possible "scale effects" in the regressions. As shown in Table 4, after transformation, only the UPSTREAM variable remained non-normally distributed.

Regarding the dichotomous variables (Table 5), 25 of the 152 sampled companies provided comments on the DPEA to the IASB, corresponding to 16% of the sample. For the purposes of this study, these 25 companies are characterized as lobbying companies, whereas the remaining companies in the sample are considered non-lobbying companies.

Regarding the COVENANT and MANCOMP variables, the sampled companies have almost the same distribution among those that have covenants (73%) or performance-based management compensation plans (74%) and those that do not.

As for the accounting methods used by companies in the sample, the results are balanced, with 51% of companies using the successful efforts method and 49% using the full cost method. Companies with stocks traded on the U.S. stock market constitute a majority of the sample, corresponding to 88 companies, or 58% of the sample.

Regarding the correlation between the variables, Table 6 shows that variables relating to size exhibit a reasonably statistically significant association with the dependent variable LOBBYING, with correlation ranging from 24% to 42%. Unexpectedly, such association is not observed with the other variables.

The correlation between the explanatory variables allows an inference on the assumption of multicollinearity. Specifically, the results show that the variables relating to size feature high degrees of significant associations, especially among NETREV, AVPROF and TOTASS, ranging from 77% to 89%, which indicates a possible violation of the assumption of multicollinearity.

As a result of the above, a model was developed containing all proxies for size, and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test was performed to analyze the assumption of multicollinearity. Other models were then constructed with only one of these proxies to provide robustness to the analyses.

4 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

It can be said that oil companies that submitted comment letters (lobbying companies in this study) were in favor of the proposals presented in four of ten the questions in the DPEA (the 1st, 6th, 7th and 8th questions), as shown in Table 7.

Companies were largely in favor of the notion that the scope of an extractive activities IFRS should be limited to upstream activities (1st question), and unanimously agreed that historical cost should be the basis for measuring the assets of the extractive sector, as opposed to the assets' fair value (6th question). On this point, it is important to note that the DPEA working group argued that although fair value would offer the best representation of relevant economic events and would provide more useful information to users, measurement based on fair value would be very complex and subjective. Accordingly, the DPEA working group concluded that historical cost should be the basis used by financial statement preparers, due to the lack of a better choice.

The majority of lobbying companies also agreed with the propositions relating to the applicability of the IAS 36 standard (7th question) and the objectives of financial statements prepared by extractive companies (8th question).

However, the results show largely unfavorable positions with respect to the question regarding the possible adoption of a new and unique accounting method (and the implied elimination of the successful efforts and full cost methods) (4th question), as well as with respect to questions regarding proposals to increase the level of disclosure in the explanatory notes of financial statements (9th and 10th questions).

The main arguments presented by companies opposed to the adoption of a new accounting method and increased disclosure requirements were that the concept of assets contained in the DPEA damaged the conceptual framework by allowing costs that are unrelated to future economic benefits to be recognized; that the increased disclosure requirements would mandate the disclosure of too much information; and that the costs of producing the information required to be disclosed under the proposal in the DPEA would outweigh the benefits of its disclosure.

A review of all of the comments shows that there is almost a stalemate, with 115 opinions in favor of the propositions contained in the DPEA and 118 opinions against. However, when considering only the propositions that imply changes in the status quo (the establishment of a new asset recognition method, the adoption of the fair value basis, and an increase in mandatory disclosure items, i.e., the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 10th questions), the results show that companies lobbied to reject any possibility of changing the status quo. Specifically, 107 opinions (71%) were in favor of maintaining the current situation, and only 39 (26%) argued in favor of the changes proposed in the DPEA.

These findings are consistent with the finding by Kenny and Larson (1993) that lobbying companies act to avoid any change to the status quo, as well as with the argument of Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) that possible changes to the status quo affect managers' decisions whether to lobby on accounting regulation.

Therefore, one can infer that the oil companies' current asset recognition model and the current disclosure requirements satisfy the needs of the oil companies. Thus, institutional theory suggests that any change to the status quo would have to be well "tailored" by the IASB to accommodate the needs of its diverse constituents, including the constituents most affected by the proposed changes, i.e., the oil companies.

To ascertain the main characteristics that led oil companies to submit comment letters on the DPEA, multivariate data analysis was conducted on the results described above. The logistic regression results are expressed in five regressions (Table 8). The first regression considers all model variables, whereas the remaining regressions each consider one of the selected variables for the size hypothesis.

Using a chi-square distribution, which is analogous to the F test for multiple regression, it is clear that the model variables are collectively significant from a statistical point of view, with an estimated likelihood ratio of 35.296 and a p-value of 0.000. Therefore, there is at least one nonzero coefficient at the 1% level.

The Nagelkerke measure resembles the [R.sup.2] of a multiple regression and is used to measure the goodness-of-fit of the model. The result shows that the model has an explanatory power of 40.8%. Because this study is interested in the statistical significance of the coefficients of the variables used, and not necessarily in making predictions, this goodness-of-fit is consistent with the proposed objectives.

Another way to analyze the goodness-of-fit of the model is to check the extent to which the model correctly classifies events considering the cutoff point used, which in this study is 16.5% (i.e., the percentage of sampled companies that present the event of interest). The results indicate that the model correctly classified 76.3% of cases.

The ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve, which measures a model's discriminatory power, was also used to evaluate model fit. With a value of 86.9%, the final model specification has excellent discriminatory power according to the classifications of Favero et al. (2009), who state that an ROC curve less than or equal to 0.5 (50%) indicates no discrimination; an ROC curve between 0.5 and 0.8 (80%) indicates acceptable discrimination; and an ROC curve greater than 0.8 indicates excellent discrimination.

The results show that only the AVPROF variable is statistically significant within normally used levels. Because the estimated coefficient was greater than zero, the interpretation is that the higher the company's average net profit, the greater the likelihood that the company will lobby by comment letter. The estimated coefficient indicates that an increase of USD 1 million in average net profit increases the logit by 0.348 or, calculating the antilogarithm, an increase in net profit increases the likelihood of lobbying by a factor of 1.416.

It is also possible to determine that the MANCOMP variable showed marginal statistical significance of 14.4%, which, although it is outside the usual levels, may be considered relevant depending on the risk.

Given the high correlation observed between the independent variables, especially those representing size (as shown in Table 6), the VIF test was used to formally evaluate the assumption of multicollinearity. As suspected, this assumption was not met, due to the high VIF values for TOTASS and NETREV. The issue is that highly correlated independent variables provide similar information to explain and predict the dependent variable, which makes it difficult to separate the effects of each independent variable and causes one of them to lose significance in the explanation of the phenomenon under analysis (Corrar, Paulo, & Dias Filho, 2007).

Because the presence of multicollinearity tends to distort the estimated slope coefficients, thereby hindering the assessment of the real effect of the independent variable on the phenomenon under investigation, the regression results of the first model are biased. This may explain the lack of statistical relevance of some of the independent variables and may even explain the negative sign of NETREV.

To work around this issue, new models were constructed, each including only one of the size variables. When variables related to size were placed in the model separately, each of them was statistically significant and the sign of the coefficient was as expected, which confirms the effect of multicollinearity.

The general parameters of the regressions remained practically stable from a qualitative point of view, which, when considering all of the variables, suggests that the models are statistically significant, in accordance with the likelihood ratio tests. Nagelkerke's [R.sup.2] of the models was between 17.5% and 39.6%, and the ROC curves showed excellent discrimination (except for model 2, which had only acceptable discrimination--66%).

The marginal relevance of the MANCOMP (10.9%) variable was observed again in model 4, which included the AVPROF variable as proxy for size. This suggests that oil companies with performance-based management compensation plans are more likely to lobby via comment letters than oil companies without performance-based management compensation plans. Further, oil companies with performance-based management compensation plans were more likely to lobby by a factor of 3.347 (antilogarithm of 1.208) compared to companies without performance-based management compensation plans.

The results support acceptance of the political cost hypothesis developed by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), according to which large companies tend to lobby on accounting legislation to obtain results that are more favorable to them. The results are also consistent with the findings of Francis (1987), Deakin (1989) and Georgiou and Roberts (2004) regarding size. Thus, there is no evidence to reject hypothesis [H.sub.1] based on binomial logistic regression modeling.

The binomial logistic regression also supports (albeit less convincingly) the theoretical hypothesis presented in the literature that company managers who receive performance-based compensation that depends on financial indicators tend to lobby on legislation to obtain the accounting models that best benefit them.

The econometric model used here and in the majority of the studies on lobbying (Francis, 1987; Deakin, 1989; Ndubizuet al, 1993; Georgiou and Roberts, 2004) has been criticized because the binary dependent variable used in the model cannot capture the extent of the respondent's position (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). Rather, the variable only captures whether comments are submitted (code 1) or not (code 0), or whether companies were in favor of (1) or against (0) the proposal.

Because the DPEA has ten questions, respondents may have provided comments in response to all of the questions or only to some of them, and may have been in favor of some of the proposals but against others. These situations are not captured by the binomial logistic regression model. To address this issue, a multinomial logistic regression model was used, the results of which are shown in Table 9.

The multinomial logistic regressions are arranged in two blocks. The first set contains the results of the comparison between oil companies in favor of the DPEA proposals and oil companies that did not submit comments on the DPEA, whereas the results of the second block refer to the comparison between oil companies opposed to the proposals in the DPEA and oil companies that did not submit comments.

In view of the multicollinearity issue, the multinomial logistic regressions were performed separately for each independent variable for size. The general parameters of the four regression models are valid because the chi-square test reveals a statistical significance at the 1% level. The goodness-of-fit of the models according to Nagelkerke's pseudo [R.sup.2] varies between 33% and 41%, which are adequate values for this study. Finally, over 85% of cases were correctly predicted, which indicates a good fit of the regressions performed.

Analyzing the estimated coefficients, the results show that the size variables in each model, apart from the constant, were statistically significant in both blocks of results (except for UPSTREAM in the first block), which reinforces the findings on the political cost hypothesis. It can therefore be inferred that large oil companies are more likely to lobby via comment letters than other oil companies.

A closer look at the likelihood of lobbying via comment letters indicates that this trend is greater for companies lobbying against the proposal, as demonstrated by the results obtained with increased net revenue. On the one hand, an increase in net revenue (NETREV) increases the likelihood of lobbying in favor of a proposal relative to not lobbying by a factor of 1.421 (antilogarithm of 0.352). On the other hand, there is a 4.031 factor increase in the likelihood of lobbying against a proposal relative to not lobbying when net revenue increases.

The same behavior is observed with respect to increases in AVPROF (increases the likelihood of lobbying in favor by a factor of 1.381 compared with a factor of 2.227 for lobbying against) and TOTASS (increases the likelihood of lobbying in favor by a factor of 1.895 compared with a factor of 6.321 for lobbying against). In the case of exploration costs (UPSTREAM), the likelihood of lobbying is observed only if the lobbying is against the proposals presented.

The results obtained by multinomial logistic regression give robustness to the consideration of size as a determining economic factor for companies to lobby via comment letters. Thus, there is still no evidence to reject hypothesis [H.sub.1].

For modeling using Poisson regression (Table 10), regressions were performed considering the extent to which oil companies lobbied in favor of the proposals contained in the DPEA as opposed to not lobbying (panel A) and the extent to which companies lobbied against the proposals contained in the DPEA as opposed to not lobbying (panel B).

The results contained in Table 10 show that all general parameters of the regressions performed can be considered valid because the statistical significance of the chi-square test was within the 1% level. In addition, McFadden's [R.sup.2] ranged from 13% to 35%, which is a relatively low goodness-of-fit but consistent with the objectives of this study.

Starting with an analysis of the results that consider the extent to which companies lobbied in favor of the DPEA proposals (panel A), the net revenue (NETREV), average net profit (AVPROF) and total assets (TOTASS) variables show statistical significance and once again give robustness to the consideration of size as indicative of companies' likelihood to lobby via comment letters.

It is also possible to show the statistical significance of the MANCOMP variable in the presence of the NETREV, AVPROF and TOTASS variables. This result was suggested somewhat in the binomial logistic regression analyses, and the Poisson regression confirms those analyses, demonstrating that this characteristic (having a performance-based management compensation plan) is relevant to lobbying in favor of the DPEA.

When the dependent variable considers the extent to which the company lobbied against the DPEA proposals, the results of the Poisson regression also point to the statistical relevance of the NETREV, AVPROF and TOTASS variables.

This evidence also supports Watts and Zimmerman's (1978) political cost hypothesis, i.e., large companies tend to lobby to obtain regulation that is more favorable to them. In the case of the Poisson regression, an analysis of the coefficients indicates that the propensity to reject a proposal in the DPEA is greater than the propensity to accept a proposal in the DPEA; therefore, lobbying is conducted to reject any change to the status quo.

Interestingly, exploration costs (UPSTREAM) were not significant in either of the Poisson regression models (regressions 11 and 15), which is inconsistent with expectations.

Based on the Poisson regression results, it appears that regardless of the extent to which a company was in favor of or against the DPEA proposals, size and the existence of a performance-based management compensation plan (marginally) represent determining factors for lobbying by the oil companies. This finding indicates that companies with these characteristics tend to have a lobbyist posture, either for or against accounting regulations regarding extractive activities, which supports the theory developed throughout this study.

With respect to the formulated test hypotheses, there is no evidence to reject hypothesis [H.sub.1], and hypothesis [H.sub.2] cannot be completely ruled out.

This study attempted to establish a conclusive analysis regarding the variables representing size, because these variables serve to explain the same phenomenon and are highly correlated. For that purpose, this study conducted technical factor analysis (Table 11) to establish a factor representative of size that could be used as a dependent variable in binomial and multinomial logistic regressions and in Poisson regression.

Factor analysis assumptions were met: normality of the variables (except for UPSTREAM); significant correlations between NETREV, UPSTREAM, AVPROF and TOTASS variables; adequacy of the sample to factor analysis, with a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 0.826; and, finally, inequality between the correlation matrix and the identity matrix, with Bartlett's sphericity test being highly significant (p < 0.001).

Principal component analysis (PCA) was used to obtain the factors. PCA seeks to summarize most of the variance of the variables in a minimum number of factors. Using the Kaiser criterion (discarding eigenvalues less than 1 due to their insignificance), it was possible to define a single factor that explained 86.1% of data variance. The results of factor analysis are presented in Appendix 1.

Thus, based on the values of the coefficients of the factor scores for each of the four variables (NETREV, UPSTREAM, AVPROF and TOTASS), the factor analysis establishes a new predictor variable named "SIZE". New regressions were generated using this variable; the results are shown in Table 11.

The results demonstrate and confirm the previous findings that size is a relevant feature that increases the likelihood that a company will lobby via comment letter. In all cases (regressions 18 to 22), the size variable was statistically significant. Analyzing the coefficients obtained, the likelihood is greater that lobbying in general will be against the DPEA proposals.

However, this configuration does not confirm the relevance of management compensation plans (MANCOMP) to the likelihood of lobbying via comment letter. In the situations tested, there was statistical significance only when the extent of agreement (disagreement) with the DPEA proposals was tested using Poisson regression (regression 21), and such significance was marginal.

5 CONCLUSIONS

The results are robust and support the fact that there are determining factors in the adoption of lobbying strategies by oil companies regarding established (or proposed) accounting regulations. The results also confirm the political cost hypothesis (the size hypothesis) advocated by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), which holds that large companies tend to lobby standard setters on accounting regulation to obtain standards that meet their needs.

The size factor was modeled using different approaches and proved relevant in all econometric models used, which supports the hypothesis that large oil companies are more likely to lobby. This trend was especially evident for companies that were predominantly opposed to the proposals in the DPEA.

The evidence also indicates, in a marginal way, that oil companies with performance-based management compensation plans are more likely to lobby than other oil companies, as was previously demonstrated by Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Deakin (1989) and Georgiou and Roberts (2004).

By combining the results, one can infer that large companies in the oil industry will lobby against changes to the status quo when the IASB attempts to introduce new accounting regulations for the oil industry. In other words, financial statement preparers are in favor of the use of historical cost as the basis for asset value and the freedom to choose between two different accounting methods (successful efforts and full cost). Furthermore, they are opposed to changes that would increase disclosure requirements.

From the perspective of institutional theory, the IASB's due process for standard setting seeks high levels of participation by its constituents at all stages of standard development to make the standard-setting process more neutral and legitimate. At the same time, according to the economic theory of regulation, companies participate in the due process of standard setting to obtain standards that benefit themselves.

Therefore, considering that standard-setting by the IASB is a political process characterized by the interaction of numerous conflicting interests, it is expected that the review/replacement of IFRS 6 by the IASB will be complex and subject to significant pressure from oil companies to maintain the status quo. All of this reinforces Larson's (2002) argument that due to external and political factors, the IASB may adopt less neutral positions to accommodate its constituents' interests; it also supports the possibility that the review/replacement of IFRS 6 by the IASB could be captured by the oil industry, as suggested by Cortese, Irvine, and Kaidonis (2010).

The results presented in this study pertain only to oil companies and cannot be generalized to other economic sectors or to the overall IASB standard-setting process. However, the econometric models used in this study can be generalized and reproduced in other studies, particularly the models that use multinomial and Poisson regressions, which are new to research on lobbying on accounting regulation.

Although the concept of lobbying used here has been widely used in the accounting literature, it limits the results of this study, given that the submission of comment letters to the IASB's public consultation was the only lobbying activity considered. Therefore, other modeling studies could be conducted to expand on the present study; for example, future studies could use questionnaires and interviews to include other forms of lobbying in the analysis, similar to the work performed by Georgiou (2004).

In addition, it is important to note that the proxies used to define firms' characteristics are not necessarily limited to those used here, and other economic determinants may be possible. Moreover, the variables used here--especially the variables relating to restrictive covenants (COVENANT) and management compensation (MANCOMP)--may take on other dimensions. For example, instead of assuming only binary values (0 or 1), the MANCOMP variable could be modeled as a continuous variable representing, e.g., the percentage of a manager's total compensation attributable to variable compensation, based on the hypothesis that a greater dependence on variable compensation makes it more likely that the manager will make accounting choices that benefit him or her.

Finally, the limitations inherent in the use of the Evaluate Energy[R] database must be reported because it is necessary to consider the possibility of errors in data entry (as is true with respect to all databases). Thus, judgments regarding the integrity of the database may represent researcher bias.

ANNEX 1

Questions presented by the IASB in the discussion paper Extractive Activities

Question # 1: Do you agree that the scope of an extractive activities IFRS should include only upstream activities for minerals, oil and gas?

Question # 2: Do you agree that there should be a single accounting and disclosure model that applies to both the minerals industry and the oil and gas industry?

Question # 3: Do you agree that the mineral reserves and resource definitions established by the Committee for Mineral Reserves International Reporting Standards and that oil and gas reserve and resource definitions established by the Society of Petroleum Engineers (together with other industry bodies) should be used in an IFRS for extractive activities?

Question # 4: Do you agree that legal rights, such as rights of exploration and extraction, should be the basis for recognizing mineral or oil and gas assets and that the information obtained from subsequent exploration and evaluation activities and development works to access minerals or oil and gas deposits should be treated as enhancements of these legal rights?

Question # 5: Do you agree that the geographical boundary of the unit of account for a minerals or oil and gas property should be defined initially based on the exploration rights held, and that as exploration, evaluation and development activities take place, the unit of account would contract progressively until it becomes no greater than a single area or group of contiguous areas for which the legal rights are held and which is expected to generate largely independent cash flows?

Question # 6: Do you agree that minerals and oil and gas assets should be measured based on historical cost but that detailed information should be disclosed to enhance the relevance of the financial statements?

Question # 7: Do you agree that exploration properties should not be tested for impairment in accordance with IAS 36 and that an exploration property should be written down to its recoverable amount in those cases where management has enough information to make this determination?

Question # 8: Do you agree that the disclosure goals for extractive activities are to enable users of financial statements to evaluate: (a) the value attributable to an entity's minerals or oil and gas assets; (b) the contribution of these assets to current period financial performance; and (c) the nature and extent of the risks and uncertainties associated with these assets?

Question # 9: Do you agree that information to be disclosed in the explanatory notes of financial statements should include: (a) quantities of proved reserves and proved plus probable reserves, with reserve quantities disclosed separately by commodity and material geographical area; (b) the main assumptions used in estimating reserves quantities and a sensitivity analysis; (c) a reconciliation of changes in reserve quantity estimates from year to year; (d) a current value measurement that corresponds to reserves quantities disclosed with a reconciliation of changes in current value measurement from year to year; (e) separate identification of the exploration, development and production cash flows for the current period and as a time series over a defined period (for example, five years); and (f) separate identification of production revenues by commodity?

Question # 10: Do you believe that a requirement to disclose the payments made by an entity to governments on a country-by-country basis is justifiable on cost-benefit grounds?

APPENDIX 1

Factor Analysis Results
Table KMO, Bartlett and Communalities test

Measures             Value              Communalities

                               Variables   Initial   Extraction

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin              NETREV      1.000      0.878
  (KMO) Test
Sample Adequacy       0.826
                               UPSTREAM     1.000      0.805
Bartlett's
  Sphericity Test
Chi-Square           607.017    AVPROF      1.000      0.864
df                      6
Significance          0.000     TOTASS      1.000      0.896

Table Eigenvalues and percentage of variance
explained by factors

Components   Initial Eigenvalues

             Total      % of          %
                      Variance   Accumulated

1            3.443    86.080%      86.080%
2            0.2 70    6.749%      92.829%
3            0.192     4.797%      97.627%
4            0.095     2.373%     100.000%

Components   Percentage of
             Explained Variance

             Total     % of          %
                     Variance   Accumulated

1            3.443   86.080%      86.080%
2
3
4

Table Factor loadings and coefficient matrix
of factor scores

Factor Loadings          Matrix of
                         Coefficients of
                         Factor Scores

Variables   Component1   Variables   Component1

NETREV        0.937       NETREV       0.272
UPSTREAM      0.897      UPSTREAM      0.261
AVPROF        0.929       AVPROF        0.27
TOTASS        0.946       TOTASS       0.275


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* Paper presented at the VII Congresso Anpcont, Fortaleza, Brazil, 2013.

Odilanei Morais dos Santos

Ph.D., Accounting Department, Brazilian Capital Markets Institute, Rio de Janeiro

E-mail: odilaneisantos@terra.com.br

Ariovaldo dos Santos

Full Professor, Department of Accounting and Actuarial Science, School of Economics, Administration and Accounting, University of Sao Paulo

E-mail: arisanto@usp.br

Received on 9.23.2013-Desk acceptance on 9.30.2013-3rd-version approved on 6.4.2014
Table 1 Methods of participation to influence the IASB

                   Formal Lobbying Methods   Informal Lobbying
                                             Methods

Direct Lobbying    * Submission of           * Participation in
Methods            public comment            private meetings or
                   letters on proposed       teleconferencing
                   standards.                with Board members.

                   * Participation in
                   project groups as
                   consultants.

                   * Participation in
                   public round-table
                   discussions.

Indirect           * Submission of           * Intermediation via
Lobbying Methods   comments to members       an external auditor.
                   of the IFRS Advisory
                   Council (formerly
                   known as the
                   Standards Advisory
                   Council--SAC).

                   * Submission of           * Intermediation via
                   comments to the           associations.
                   European Financial
                   Reporting Advisory
                   Group (EFRAG).

Source: Orens, Jorissen, Lybaert and Tas (2011).

Table 2 Studies on lobbying in accounting regulation

Study                  Objective

MacArthur (1988)       Investigate whether the submission of
                       comments to the UKASB (on 28 proposals)
                       is related to any economic issue (impact
                       on accounting numbers) or political
                       issue (political costs hypothesis).

Fogarty (1992)         Analyze the existence and operating
                       process of the FASB using institutional
                       theory.

Kenny and Larson       Investigate lobbying on the exposure
(1993)                 draft regarding joint ventures.

Meier, Alam and        Investigate lobbying undertaken by audit
Pearson (1993)         firms on seven proposed standards
                       affecting banks and savings and loan
                       associations.

Tutticci, Dustan and   Understand the Australian
Holmes (1994)          standard-setting due process by
                       performing content analysis of
                       submissions on the exposure draft
                       regarding intangible assets.

Weetman, Davie and     Answer questions such as (a) Can the
Collins (1996)         strategies of lobbyists be identified?
                       (b) What are the possible reasons why
                       nonlobbying companies do not submit
                       comments?

Tandy and Wilburn      Investigate the participation of the
(1996)                 academic community in the
                       standard-setting process by analyzing
                       letters submitted on the discussion
                       memorandums and exposure drafts for SFAS
                       1-117.

Larson (1997)          Investigate the characteristics of
                       respondents and analyze significant
                       differences between lobbying companies
                       and nonlobbying companies with regard to
                       company size, country of origin of the
                       respondents (13 countries) and listing
                       on stock exchanges (U.S.)

McLeay, Ordelheide     Examine the impact of lobbying
and Young (2000)       activities on German accounting
                       regulation with respect to the positions
                       of preparers, auditors and scholars.

Hill, Shelton and      Investigate lobbying activities in the
Stevens (2002)         issuing process of SFAS 123 (Accounting
                       for Stock-Based Compensation)

Larson (2002)          Establish a framework based on
                       institutional theory for evaluating
                       whether the Standing Interpretations
                       Committee (SIC) has been effective and
                       legitimate.

Georgiou (2004)        Analyze the effectiveness of lobbying
                       during different stages of the
                       regulatory process, i.e., earlier stages
                       (formation of the discussion agenda of
                       the board) and later stages (period of
                       public consultation regarding the draft
                       standard).

Georgiou (2005)        Capture the trend in lobbying strategy
                       by companies over the long-term by
                       analyzing a series of events (setting of
                       several standards) over time.

Larson (2008)          Investigate whether political pressures
                       rather than highly technical discussions
                       decisively affected the issuance of SIC
                       12, which addresses the consolidation of
                       special purpose entities. This study is
                       grounded on institutional theory.

Chatham, Larson        Analyze the comments submitted on the
and Vietze (2010)      discussion paper regarding financial
                       instruments to identify the main issues
                       cited by respondents, in light of the
                       fact that the European Union rejected
                       full adoption of IAS 39, which in turn
                       required additional effort by the IASB
                       to reverse the situation. This study is
                       grounded on institutional theory.

Georgiou (2010)        Investigate the nature and volume of
                       participation by UK investment fund
                       managers in the standard-setting process
                       of the IASB during 2001-2006.

Stenka and             Understand the complexity of lobbying
Taylor (2010)          activities on four exposure drafts.
                       Lobbyists are classified into two groups
                       (corporate and non-corporate) and
                       analyses are performed with the use of
                       ANOVA and univariate regression.

Hansen (2011)          Provide evidence on how the IASB
                       generates its standards in the presence
                       of lobbyists with different preferences.
                       Comment letters (629 letters) submitted
                       during five public consultation
                       organized by the IASB were used.

Larson and             Investigate the behavior of the IASB
Kenny (2011)           when issuing accounting standards
                       regarding voluntary financial donations
                       received from its constituents.

Bengtsson (2011)       Use institutional theory to investigate
                       how the IASB responded to political
                       pressure from the European Union
                       following the global financial crisis as
                       observed based on financial instrument
                       standards.

Koh (2011)             Examine the characteristics of firms
                       regarding the decision to lobby or not.
                       For firms that submitted opinions on the
                       FASB stock option standard, the study
                       analyzed whether lobbying was for or
                       against the standard under discussion.

Giner and Arce         Analyze the behavior of lobbyists based
(2012)                 on institutional theory and evaluate
                       lobbyists' influence on the decisions of
                       the IASB regarding IFRS 2.

Tavares, Anjo,         Investigate the most frequent opinions
Paulo and Carter       submitted to the IASB/FASB regarding
(2013)                 Revised Exposure Draft--Revenue from
                       Contracts with Customers.

Matos, Goncalves,      Investigate whether standards with a
Niya-ma, e Marques     higher level of inconsistency with local
(2013)                 GAAPs were changed/approved in
                       accordance with the geographical
                       participation of the IASB board member.

Oliveira, Costa        Analyze the public consultation process
Junior, e Silva        of the Accounting Pronouncements
(2013)                 Committee (Comite de Pronunciamentos
                       Contabeis--CPC) during 2007 to 2011.
                       The study concludes that the CPC focused
                       its efforts on obtaining maximum
                       convergence with IFRS.

Table 3 Characteristics of the dependent variable

Binomial                Poisson Regression
Logistic
Regression

                     Extent of          Extent of
                   Favorability       Unfavorability

Code   Frequency   Code   Frequency   Code   Frequency

0         127       0        127       0        127
1         25        1         0        1         2

Multinomial         2         3        2         2
Logistic            3         3        3         3
Regression

Code   Frequency    4         9        4         5

0         127       5         4        5         3
1         13        6         2        6         6
2         12        7         1        7         1
                    8         2        8         3
                    9         1        9         0
                    10        0        10        0

Table 4 Descriptive statistics of continuous variables

Variable (in     Mean    Median   Minimum
USD millions)

NETREV          8.843    9.001     2.422
UPSTREAM        0.945    6.338    -20.720
AVPROF          12.787   12.719    1.596
TOTASS          9.520    9.603     4.378

Variable (in    Maximum   Standard    KS Test
USD millions)             Deviation   p-value

NETREV          12.536      1.947      0.953
UPSTREAM        10.083     11.550      0.000
AVPROF          20.703      4.009      0.994
TOTASS          12.694      1.579      0.984

Note: NETREV: net revenue for the period; UPSTREAM:
exploration and development costs incurred in the
period; AVPROF: average net profit for the last
three periods; TOTASS: total assets for the period;
KS test: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality
(p-value > 0.05).

Table 5 Descriptive statistics of dichotomous variables

Variable    Value "0"   Value "1"   Total

LOBBYING       127         25        152
               84%         16%      100%
COVENANT       41          111       152
               27%         73%      100%
COMPGEN        40          112       152
               26%         74%      100%
METHOD         74          78        152
               49%         51%      100%
USLISTING      64          88        152
               42%         58%      100%

Note: LOBBYING: "0" if no comments were submitted and "1"
if comments were submitted; COVENANT: "0" if no covenant
is present and "1" if covenant is present; MANCOMP: "0"
if no performance-based management compensation plan is
present and "1" if performance-based management compensation
plan is present; METHOD: "0" if company uses the full cost
method and "1" if company uses the successful efforts
method; USLISTING: "0" if company does not trades on the U.S.
stock market and "1" if company trades on the U.S. stock market.

Table 6 Pearson correlation matrix

            LOBBYING    NETREV     UPSTREAM    AVPROF

LOBBYING       1
NETREV      0,335 **       1
UPSTREAM    0,245 **   -0,004
AVPROF      0,422 **    0,767 **   0,363 **    1
TOTASS      0,400 **    0,894 **   0,269 **    0,882 **
COVENANT    0,070      -0,265 **   0,148      -0,203 *
MANCOMP     0,104      -0,197 *    0,084      -0,181 *
METHOD      0,148       0,130      0,363 **    0,266 **
USLISTING   0,127      -0,236 **   0,226 **   -0,066

             TOTASS    COVENANT   MANCOMP    METHOD

LOBBYING
NETREV
UPSTREAM
AVPROF
TOTASS         1
COVENANT    -0,194 *      1
MANCOMP     -0,181 *   0,445 **      1
METHOD       0,236 **  0,031      0,016       1
USLISTING   -0,155     0,412 **   0,489 **   0,075

Note: LOBBYING: "0" if no comments were submitted and "1" if
comments were submitted; NETREV: Net revenue for the period;
UPSTREAM: exploration and development costs incurred in the
period; AVPROF: Average net profit for the last three periods;
TOTASS: total assets for the period; COVENANT: "0" if no covenant
is present and "1" if covenant is present; MANCOMP: "0" if no
performance-based management compensation plan is present and
"1" if performance-based management compensation plan is present;
METHOD: "0" if company uses the full cost method and "1" if
company uses the successful efforts method; USLISTING: "0" if
company does not trades on U.S. stock market and "1" if company
trades on the U.S. stock market. Significance: ** (1%) and * (5%).

Table 7 Analysis of companies' positioning
toward the DPEA

QUESTION # 1

Agrees   Disagrees   NA    Total

18       2           5     25
72%      8%          20%   100%

QUESTION # 2

Agrees   Disagrees   NA    Total

9        10          6     25
36%      40%         24%   100%

QUESTION # 3

Agrees   Disagrees   NA    Total

11       13          1     25
44%      52%         4%    100%

QUESTION # 4

Agrees   Disagrees   NA    Total

6        19          0     25
24%      76%         0%    100%

QUESTION # 5

Agrees   Disagrees   NA    Total

12       12          1     25
48%      48%         4%    100%

QUESTION # 6

Agrees   Disagrees   NA    Total

25       0           0     25
100%     0%          0%    100%

QUESTION # 7

Agrees   Disagrees   NA    Total

14       9           2     25
56%      36%         8%    100%

QUESTION # 8

Agrees   Disagrees   NA    Total

13       11          1     25
52%      44%         4%    100%

QUESTION # 9

Agrees   Disagrees   NA    Total

6        19          0     25
24%      76%         0%    100%

QUESTION # 10

Agrees   Disagrees   NA    Total

1        23          1     25
4%       92%         4%    100%

SUMMARY

Agrees   Disagrees   NA    Total

115      118         17    250
46%      47%         7%    100%

MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO

YES      NO          NA    Total

107      39          4     150
71%      26%         3%    100%

Table 8 Results of binomial logistic regression

PROB([LOBBYING.sub.i]) = 1 +/1 + e - ([[alpha].sub.0] +
[[beta].sub.1-4] [SIZE.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.5][MANCOMP.sub.i]
+ [[beta].sub.6] [COVENANT.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.7]
[USLISTING.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.8][METHOD.sub.i] +
[[epsilon].sub.i])

Coef.            Variables   Expected   Regression 1
                               Sign

                                         Coef.      Sign.       VIF

[alpha]          CONSTANT               -10.858     0.002        --
[[beta].sub.1]    NETREV        +       -0.022      0.959      7.485
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM       +        0.047      0.452      1.881
[[beta].sub.3]    AVPROF        +        0.348     0.023 **    5.137
[[beta].sub.4]    TOTASS        +        0.258      0.590      10.857
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT       +        0.732      0.393      1.406
[[beta].sub.6]    MANCOMP       +        1.151      0.144      1.483
                                                  ([dagger])
[[beta].sub.7]    METHOD        +       -0.126      0.824      1.183
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING      +        0.209      0.744      1.522
Chi-Square Test                         41.946    0.000 ***
Nagelkerke [R.sup.2]                                40.8%
"Correctly Predicted"                               76.3%
  Cases
ROC Curve                                           86.9%
Number of Observations                               152

Coef.            Variables   Regression 2          Regression 3

                             Coef.      Sign.      Coef.      Sign.

[alpha]          CONSTANT    -7.408     0.000      -2.264     0.007
[[beta].sub.1]    NETREV     0.689    0.000 ****     --        --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --         --       0.173     0.097 *
[[beta].sub.3]    AVPROF       --         --         --        --
[[beta].sub.4]    TOTASS       --         --         --        --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT    0.724      0.267      -0.017     0.978
[[beta].sub.6]    MANCOMP    0.671      0.340      0.494      0.475

[[beta].sub.7]    METHOD     0.451      0.383      0.283      0.564
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   0.553      0.347      0.261      0.653
Chi-Square Test              28.833   0.000 ***    16.568   0.005 ***
Nagelkerke [R.sup.2]         29.2%                 17.5%
"Correctly Predicted"        76.3%                 59.9%
  Cases
ROC Curve                    80.9%                 81.2%
Number of Observations        152                   152

Coef.            Variables   Regression 4          Regression 5

                             Coef.      Sign.       Coef.     Sign.

[alpha]          CONSTANT    -7.905     0.000      -11.359    0.000
[[beta].sub.1]    NETREV       --         --         --         --
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM      --         --         --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    AVPROF     0.468    0.000 ***      --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    TOTASS       --         --        1.019    0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT    0.767      0.262       0.731     0.280
[[beta].sub.6]    MANCOMP    1.208      0.109       0.919     0.209
                                      ([dagger])
[[beta].sub.7]    METHOD     -0.029     0.958       0.164     0.762
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING   0.255      0.676       0.376     0.534
Chi-Square Test              40.553   0.000 ***    35.932    0.000 ***
Nagelkerke [R.sup.2]         39.6%                  35.6%
"Correctly Predicted"        75.7%                  77.6%
  Cases
ROC Curve                    86.1%                  84.5%
Number of Observations        152                    152

Note: NETREV: net revenue for the period; UPSTREAM: exploration and
development costs incurred in the period; AVPROF: average net profit
for the last three periods; TOTASS: total assets for the period;
COVENANT: "0" if no covenant is present and "1" if covenant is
present; MANCOMP: "0" if no performance-based management compensation
plan is present and "1" if performance-based management compensation
plan is present; METHOD: "0" if company uses the full cost method and
"1" if company uses the successful efforts method; USLISTING: "0" if
company does not trades on U.S. stock market and "1" if company
trades on the U.S. stock market. VIF: variance inflation factor
test. Significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%) and + (15%).

Table 9 Results of multinomial logistic regression

ln [PROB (LOBBYING = 1|X)/PROB (LOBBYING = 0|X)] =
[[alpha].sub.1] + [[beta].sub.1-4][SIZE.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.5][MANCOMP.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.6]
[COVENANT.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.7][USLISTING.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.8][METHOD.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.i]

ln [PROB (LOBBYING = 2|X)/PROB (LOBBYING = 0|X)] =
[[alpha].sub.1] + [[beta].sub.1-4][SIZE.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.5][MANCOMP.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.6]
[COVENANT.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.7][USLISTING.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.8][METHOD.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.i]

Coef.            Variables   Expected
                              Sign.

[alpha]          CONSTANT               Predominantly
[[beta].sub.1]    NETREV        +         in Favor
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM       +          of DPEA
[[beta].sub.3]    AVPROF        +
[[beta].sub.4]    TOTASS        +
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT       +
[[beta].sub.6]    MANCOMP       +
[[beta].sub.7]    METHOD        +
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING      +
[alpha]          CONSTANT               Predominantly
[[beta].sub.1]    NETREV        +        Against of
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM       +           DPEA
[[beta].sub.3]    AVPROF        +
[[beta].sub.4]    TOTASS        +
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT       +
[[beta].sub.6]    MANCOMP       +
[[beta].sub.7]    METHOD        +
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING      +
Chi-Square
  Test
Nagelkerke
  [R.sup.2]
"Correctly
  Predicted"
  Cases
Number of
  Observations

Coef.            Regression 6          Regression 7

                  Coef.      Sign.      Coef.      Sign.

[alpha]          -6.952    0.002 ***   -3.360    0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    0.352     0.067 *      --         --
[[beta].sub.2]     --         --        0.073      0.153
[[beta].sub.3]     --         --         --         --
[[beta].sub.4]     --         --         --         --
[[beta].sub.5]    0.838      0.341      0.485      0.581
[[beta].sub.6]    0.776      0.391      0.730      0.422
[[beta].sub.7]    0.433      0.481      0.152      0.808
[[beta].sub.8]    0.026      0.970     -0.365      0.599
[alpha]          -18.242   0.000 ***   -14.568   0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    1.394    0.000 ***     --         --
[[beta].sub.2]     --         --        1.451    0.001 ***
[[beta].sub.3]     --         --         --         --
[[beta].sub.4]     --         --         --         --
[[beta].sub.5]    0.770      0.404     -0.270      0.772
[[beta].sub.6]    0.286      0.788      0.663      0.564
[[beta].sub.7]    0.276      7.488     -0.330      0.700
[[beta].sub.8]    1.212      0.257      1.027      0.438
Chi-Square       41.759    0.000 ***   39.107    0.000 ***
  Test
Nagelkerke              35.6%                 33.6%
  [R.sup.2]
"Correctly              84.9%                 86.8%
  Predicted"
  Cases
Number of               152                   152
  Observations

Coef.            Regression 8          Regression 9

                  Coef.      Sign.      Coef.      Sign.

[alpha]          -8.285    0.000 ***   -10.010   0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]     --         --         --         --
[[beta].sub.2]     --         --         --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    0.323    0.003 ***     --         --
[[beta].sub.4]     --         --        0.639    0.012 **
[[beta].sub.5]    0.952      0.281      0.869      0.321
[[beta].sub.6]    1.180      0.206      0.960      0.294
[[beta].sub.7]   -0.015      0.982      0.154      0.808
[[beta].sub.8]   -0.164      0.813     -0.054      0.938
[alpha]          -17.044   0.000 ***   -23.972   0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]     --         --         --         --
[[beta].sub.2]     --         --         --         --
[[beta].sub.3]    0.801    0.000 ***     --         --
[[beta].sub.4]     --         --        1.844    0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.5]    0.800      0.411      0.775      0.434
[[beta].sub.6]    1.312      0.240      0.763      0.496
[[beta].sub.7]   -0.154      0.859      0.057      0.951
[[beta].sub.8]    0.858      0.412      1.126      0.313
Chi-Square       49.798    0.000 ***   47.089    0.000 ***
  Test
Nagelkerke              41.4%                 39.5%
  [R.sup.2]
"Correctly              86.8%                 86.2%
  Predicted"
  Cases
Number of               152                   152
  Observations

Note: NETREV: net revenue for the period; UPSTREAM:
exploration and development costs incurred in the period;
AVPROF: average net profit for the last three periods;
TOTASS: total assets for the period; COVENANT: "0" if no
covenant is present and "1" if covenant is present; MANCOMP:
"0" if no performance-based management compensation plan is
present and "1" if performance-based management compensation
plan present; METHOD: "0" if company uses the full cost
method and "1" if company uses the successful efforts
method; USLISTING: "0" if company does not trades on the
U.S. stock market and "1" if company trades on the U.S.
stock market. Significance: *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%).

Table 10 Results of Poisson regression

[LOBBYING.sub.i] = [[[mu].sup.LOBBYING]e - ([[alpha].sub.1]
+ [[beta].sub.1-4][SIZE.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.5]
[MANCOMP.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.6][COVENANT.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.7][USLISTING.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.8]
[METHOD.sub.i])/LOBBYING!] + [u.sub.i]

Panel A: Lobbying in Favor of DPEA

Coef.            Variables   Expected   Regression 10
                              Sign.

                                        Coef.         Sign.

[alpha]          CONSTANT               -5.089      0.002 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    NETREV        +       0.373       0.007 ***
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM       +         --            --
[[beta].sub.3]    AVPROF        +         --            --
[[beta].sub.4]    TOTASS        +         --            --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT       +       0.551         0.378
[[beta].sub.6]    MANCOMP       +       0.950    0.139 ([dagger])
[[beta].sub.7]    METHOD        +       0.182         0.707
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING      +       0.001         0.998
Chi-Square                              49.003      0.000 ***
  Test
McFadden                                      13.2%
  [R.sup.2]
Number of                                     152
  Observations

Panel B: Lobbying Against DPEA

Coef.            Variables   Expected   Regression 14
                               Sign

                                        Coef.         Sign.

[alpha]          CONSTANT               -7.224      0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]    NETREV        +       0.608       0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.2]   UPSTREAM       +         --            --
[[beta].sub.3]    AVPROF        +         --            --
[[beta].sub.4]    TOTASS        +         --            --
[[beta].sub.5]   COVENANT       +       0.413         0.401
[[beta].sub.6]    MANCOMP       +       0.111         0.853
[[beta].sub.7]    METHOD        +       0.278         0.536
[[beta].sub.8]   USLISTING      +       0.665         0.228
Chi-Square                              25.343      0.000 ***
  Test
McFadden                                      28.5%
  [R.sup.2]
Number of                                     152
  Observations

Panel A: Lobbying in Favor of DPEA

Coef.            Regression 11        Regression 12

                 Coef.      Sign.     Coef.      Sign.

[alpha]          -1.892     0.314     -5.740   0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]     --        --         --        --
[[beta].sub.2]   0.159      0.441       --        --
[[beta].sub.3]     --        --       0.290    0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.4]     --        --         --        --
[[beta].sub.5]   0.150      0.773     0.624      0.284
[[beta].sub.6]   0.952      0.159     1.271    0.035 **
[[beta].sub.7]   -0.046     0.915     -0.224     0.648
[[beta].sub.8]   -0.243     0.603     -0.247     0.585
Chi-Square       41.021   0.000 ***   34.856   0.000 ***
  Test
McFadden               13.8%                23.4%
  [R.sup.2]
Number of              152                  152
  Observations

Panel B: Lobbying Against DPEA

Coef.            Regression 15        Regression 16

                 Coef.      Sign.     Coef.      Sign.

[alpha]          -2.190     0.470     -6.844   0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]     --        --         --        --
[[beta].sub.2]   0.232      0.537       --        --
[[beta].sub.3]     --        --       0.373    0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.4]     --        --         --        --
[[beta].sub.5]   -0.214     0.701     0.377      0.404
[[beta].sub.6]   0.045      0.946     0.525      0.338
[[beta].sub.7]   0.282      0.528     -0.045     0.913
[[beta].sub.8]   0.600      0.265     0.394      0.421
Chi-Square       45.651   0.000 ***   23.623   0.000 ***
  Test
McFadden               16.5%                35.1%
  [R.sup.2]
Number of              152                  152
  Observations

Panel A: Lobbying in Favor of DPEA

Coef.            Regression 13

                  Coef.      Sign.

[alpha]          -7.510    0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]     --         --
[[beta].sub.2]     --         --
[[beta].sub.3]     --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    0.589    0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.5]    0.602      0.320
[[beta].sub.6]    1.096     0.070 *
[[beta].sub.7]   -0.004      0.993
[[beta].sub.8]   -0.146      0.757
Chi-Square       42.237    0.000 ***
  Test
McFadden                18.4%
  [R.sup.2]
Number of               152
  Observations

Panel B: Lobbying Against DPEA

Coef.            Regression 17

                  Coef.      Sign.

[alpha]          -10.139   0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.1]     --         --
[[beta].sub.2]     --         --
[[beta].sub.3]     --         --
[[beta].sub.4]    0.855    0.000 ***
[[beta].sub.5]    0.390      0.423
[[beta].sub.6]    0.311      0.553
[[beta].sub.7]    0.169      0.710
[[beta].sub.8]    0.476      0.363
Chi-Square       19.001    0.000 ***
  Test
McFadden                33.9%
  [R.sup.2]
Number of               152
  Observations

Note: NETREV: net revenue for the period; UPSTREAM:
exploration and development costs incurred in the period;
AVPROF: average net profit for the last three periods;
TOTASS: total assets for the period; COVENANT: "0" if no
covenant is present and "1" if covenant is present; MANCOMP:
"0" if no performance-based management compensation plan is
present and "1" if performance-based management compensation
plan is present; METHOD: "0" if company uses the full cost
method and "1" if company uses the successful efforts
method; USLISTING: "0" if company does not trades on U.S.
stock market and "1" if company trades on the U.S. stock
market. Significance: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%) and
([dagger]) (15%).

Table 11 Regressions after factor analysis

                       Binomial             Multinomial
                       Logistic             Logistic
                       Regression           Regression

                                            Predominantly in
                                            Favor of DPEA

Variables   Expected   Regression 18        Regression 19
              Sign

                       Coef.      Sign.     Coef.      Sign.

CONSTANT               -1.379   0.000 ***   -3.601   0.000 ***
SIZE           +       1.076    0.000 ***   0.697    0.036 **
COVENANT       +       0.776      0.294     0.778      0.380
MANCOMP        +       0.884      0.251     0.904      0.326

METHOD         +       0.280      0.594     0.367      0.554
USLISTING      +       -0.022     0.971     -0.301     0.663

Chi-Square Test        30.194   0.000 ***   38.492
Nagelkerke             30.5%                      33.2%
  [R.sup.2]
McFadden                 --                       --
  [R.sup.2]
Number of               152                       152
  Observations

                       Multinomial             Poisson
                       Logistic                Regression
                       Regression

                       Predominantly           Lobbying in
                       Against DPEA            Favor of DPEA

Variables   Expected   Regression 20           Regression 21
              Sign

                         Coef.       Sign.     Coef.      Sign.

CONSTANT                -4.643     0.000 ***   -1.474    0.016 **
SIZE           +         1.446     0.000 ***   0.445    0.000 ***
COVENANT       +         0.772       0.481     0.550      0.337
MANCOMP        +         0.672       0.571     0.949      0.141
                                                        ([dagger])
METHOD         +         0.059       0.946     0.119      0.801
USLISTING      +         0.592       0.594     -0.338     0.509

Chi-Square Test        0.000 ***               50.017   0.000 ***
Nagelkerke                      33.2%                --
  [R.sup.2]
McFadden                        --                   11.8%
  [R.sup.2]
Number of                       152                  152
  Observations

                       Poisson Regression

                       Lobbying
                       Against DPEA

Variables   Expected   Regression 22
              Sign

                       Coef.    Sign.

CONSTANT               -1.255   0.047 **
SIZE           +       0.595    0.000 ***
COVENANT       +       0.418      0.420
MANCOMP        +       0.072      0.902

METHOD         +       0.196      0.678
USLISTING      +       0.267      0.635

Chi-Square Test        40.312   0.000 ***
Nagelkerke                   --
  [R.sup.2]
McFadden                     25.1%
  [R.sup.2]
Number of                    152
  Observations

Note: SIZE: variable resulting from factor analysis, which
is based on the values of the coefficients of the factor
scores of each of the NETREV, UPSTREAM, AVPROF and TOTASS
variables; COVENANT: "0" if no covenant is present and "1"
if covenant is present; MANCOMP: "0" if no performance-based
management compensation plan is present and "1" if
performance-based management compensation plan is present;
METHOD: "0" if company uses the full cost method and "1" if
company uses the successful efforts method; USLISTING: "0"
if company does not trades on U.S. stock market and "1" if
company trades on the U.S. stock market. Significance: ***
(1%), ** (5%), * (10%) and ([dagger]) (15%).
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Title Annotation:texto en portugues e ingles
Author:Morais dos Santos, Odilanei; dos Santos, Ariovaldo
Publication:Revista Contabilidade & Financas
Date:May 1, 2014
Words:34820
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