Like adding wings to a tiger--Chinese information war theory and practice.
During the past five years, numerous Chinese military and civilian scholars published significant works on information war (IW) and related issues. An analysis of their works yields several interesting results.
 First, the Chinese feel compelled to develop a specific Chinese IW theory, in accordance with the Chinese culture, economic and military situation, perceived threat, and their military philosophy and terminology.
 Second, Chinese military art strongly influences Chinese IW theory. China is quickly integrating IW theory into its People's War concept. It is also considering the development of an independent "net force" branch of service (to supplement the Navy, Army, and Air Force), and applying the 36 stratagems of war to IW methods.
 Third, Chinese military science dictates division of IW into subelements very different from those studied in the United States. These include the forms, nature, features, distinctions, principles, types, and levels of IW. These subdivisions are similar to Russia's IW methodology. While a theory of Chinese IW is developing, turning theory into practice has proven more difficult since China is still developing the civilian and military infrastructure to support its philosophy. (1) This article will highlight crucial aspects of the specific Chinese approach to IW. It will begin by discussing how the information age has affected China's attitude toward warfare and the specific Chinese historical factors affecting this interpretation. Finally, it will discuss Chinese IW definitions, and investigate the training courses and organizational structures needed to teach IW.
IW with Chinese Characteristics
The major change of the information age was a reassessment of how to evaluate and conduct warfare. China realized that although it cannot currently threaten other countries as a superpower might, it can do something with its IW force, such as theoretically threaten U.S. financial stability. The characteristics of information (global reach, speed-of-light transmission, nonlinear effects, inexhaustibility, multiple access, etc.) control the material and energy of warfare in a way that nuclear weapons cannot. (2) IW attempts to beat the enemy in terms of promptness, accuracy, and sustainability. (3) It thus makes complete sense to put a significant effort into developing an information-based capability in both the civilian and military sense. From the Chinese point of view, IW is like adding wings to a tiger, making the latter more combat-worthy than before.
Recent reports of hacker attacks on U.S. labs indicate that China is moving from theory to practice in security matters as well. The Washington Times reported on 3 August 2000 that hackers suspected of working for a Chinese Government institute broke into a Los Alamos computer system and took large amounts of sensitive but unclassified information. Los Alamos spokesperson Jim Danneskiold stated that "an enormous amount of Chinese activity" occurs continuously. (4)
The targets of Chinese IW include information sources; channels; destinations; (5) command, control communications, computers and intelligence (C4I); and electronic warfare (EW) assets. First attack objectives will be the computer networking system linking the political, economic, and military installations of a country and the ability to control decisionmaking to hinder coordinated actions. This IW focus implies that not just soldiers will conduct warfare in the future but civilians too. Some Chinese theorists ahve recommended organizing network special warfare detachments and computer experts to form a shock brigade of "network warriors" to accomplish this task.
Chinese IW experts recognize a need to reconsider how to compute the correlation of forces. The Chinese believe one can no longer calculate military strength using the number of armored divisions, air force wings, etc. In the information age, studies must include "invisible forces" such as computing and communications capabilities and system reliability. (6)
A second reevaluation of warfare was more traditional in nature. Chinese theorists believe that the capabilities and qualities of the information era enhance and breathe new life into Mao Zedung's theory of a People's War.
Electronics, computer, and information engineering experts are likely to become the genuine heroes of a new People's War, much like the warrior class of the past. (7) In addition to the economic factors, this may explain why China is willing to reduce its Army--China can "keep up" with other countries by employing a multitude of information engineers and citizens with laptops instead of just soldiers. China clearly has the people to conduct "take home battle," a reference to battle conducted with laptops at home that allow thousands of citizens to hack foreign computer systems when needed. China has a number of superior software writers and much untapped potential in the information field. The problem is how to find more information space and equipment for all of these people. (8)
Ideas for uniting a People's War with IW are finding fertile ground in the 1.5 million-person reserve force of China. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is turning reserve forces in some districts into mini-IW regiments. For example, in the Echeng District (about 700 miles due south of Beijing) in Hubei Province, the People's Armed Forces Department (PAFD) organized 20 city departments (power, finance, television, medical, etc.) into a militia or reserve IW regiment. The PAFD had a network warfare battalion, as well as EW, intelligence, psychological warfare (PSYWAR) battalions, and 35 technical "Fenduis" (squad to battalion units). The PAFD also set up the first reserve IW training base for 500 people. The Echeng District PAFD even gave a website at http://ezarmy.net. (9)
Echeng is not the only district with reserve or militia units conducting IW training. The Fujan Province held a meeting at Xiamen in December 1999 that had reserve and militia forces. The report cited militia high-technology Fenduis that carried out electronic countermeasures, network attack and defense, and radar reconnaissance operations. They conducted these operations as part of an enforced blockade of an island--which may have implications for Taiwan. The Xiamen area is a special economic zone and attracts a higher-than-usual number of science and technology clients to the area; (10) thus, it is a prime area for IW-related activities. There are also reports of reserve IW activity in Xian PAFD, and in the Datong military subdistrict (MSD).
In Xian, the PAFD IW Fendui acted as the opposing forces (OPFOR) for a military district exercise in the Jinan Military Region. They listed ten information operations (IO) methods: planting information mines, conducting information reconnaissance, changing network data, releasing information bombs, dumping information garbage, disseminating propaganda, applying information deception, releasing clone information, organizing information defense, and establishing network spy stations. (11)
A third way the information age affected China's attitude toward warfare is an updating of historical strategies. Some 300 years ago, an unknown scholar compiled The Secret Art of War: The 36 Stratagems, and emphasized deception as a military art that can achieve specific military objectives. In the information age--characterized by anonymous attacks and uncertainty (e.g., uncertain origins of viruses, the existence of "back doors" in programs, etc.)--the stratagems may be revitalized as a tactic. It should therefore be easier to deceive or inflict perception management injuries ("guidance injuries" in Chinese). For example, one of the 36 stratagems is "besiege Wei to rescue Zhao." This means when the enemy is too strong to attack directly, then attack something he holds dear. The IW application is that if you cannot afford a direct (nuclear) attack, then attack the servers and nets responsible for Western financial, power, political, and other systems stability. The journal China Military Science published an article about IW stratagems in 2001 indicating the IW-stratagem tie remains important. The information age is developing into the age of anonymous persuaders.
A May 2000 Chinese article on Internet War offered the logic behind "why" military leaders might use such stratagems today. China is currently a relatively weak IO power and must use tricks and strategy to compensate for the shortage of material assets. (12)
A "net force," if developed, would protect net sovereignty and engage in net warfare, a technology and knowledge-intensive type of warfare. Net technology would include--
 Scanning technology to break codes, steal data, and take recovery (anti-follow-up) actions.
 Superior offensive technology capable of launching attacks and countermeasures on the net, including information-paralyzing software, information-blocking software, and information-deception software.
 Masquerade technology capable of stealing authority from the network by assuming a false identity.
 Defensive technology that can ward off attacks, serve as an electronic gate to prevent internal leaks, and block arbitrary actions, much like an electronic policeman. (13)
Chinese IW Definitions: Focus on Network and Cognitive Processes
Studying Chinese IW definitions consecutively by year offers clues to the developing nature of Chinese IW theory. In 1996, the definition of IW offered by Shen Weiguang stated it is a war in which both sides strive to hold the battlefield initiative by controlling the flow of information and intelligence. Instead of protecting friendly information systems and attacking enemy systems, as the United States defines the term, Shen emphasized protecting oneself and controlling the enemy. (14) Wang Pufeng stated the central issue in achieving victory in IW is control of information. Thus, in 1996, the emphasis was clearly on control.
In 1997, author Liang Zhenxing stated that IW includes all types of war-fighting activities that involve the exploitation, alteration, and paralysis of the enemy's information and information systems, as well as all those types of activities that involve protecting one's own information and information systems from similar enemy actions. Liang added that the Chinese definition of IW should take cognizance of Chinese characteristics but be in line with the definition prevailing internationally.
Another 1997 author, Wang Baocun, covered the forms, nature, levels, distinctions, features, and principles of IW. He listed forms of IW as peacetime, crisis, and wartime; the nature of IW as reflected in offensive and defensive operations; levels of IW as national, strategic, theater, and tactical; and other distinctions of IW as command and control (C2), intelligence, electronic, psychological, cyberspace, hackers, virtual, economic, strategy, and precision. He enumerated the features of IW as complexity, limited goals, short duration, less damage, larger battle space and less troop density, transparency, the intense struggle for information superiority, increased integration, increased demand on command, new aspects of massing forces, and the fact that effective strength may not be the main target. He stated that principles of IW include decapitation, blinding, transparency, quick response, and survival. (15)
In 1998, one analyst defined IW as the ability to hinder an opponent's decisionmaking while protecting friendly decisionmaking abilities. Note that the Chinese emphasis is not on attacking enemy information or information systems but on "hindering" an opponent's decisionmaking.
In 1999, Chinese analysts returned to serious debate over IW issues. Shen Weiguang defined IW this time more broadly as involving two sides in pitched battle against one another in the political, economic, cultural, scientific, social, and technological fields. The fight was over information space and resources. He defined IW narrowly as the confrontation of warring parties in the field of information. The essence of IW is to attain the objective of "forcing enemy troops to surrender without a fight" through the use of information superiority. (16) This definition echoes historical Chinese thoughts on warfare, and implies information superiority is more of a cognitive- than systems-related process. Yuan Banggen, the head of a General Staff Directorate, stated that IW is "the struggle waged to seize and keep control over information," and the struggle between belligerent parties to "seize the initiative in acquiring, controlling and using information." This is accomplished by capitalizing on and sabotaging the enemy's information resources, information system, "informationized" weapon systems, and by using and protecting one's own information resources, information systems, and "informationized" weapon systems. Yuan thus substitutes "capitalizing and sabotaging" for the U.S. term "attacking" while simultaneously emphasizing control. He also noted that IW is a kind of knowledge warfare. (17)
In late December 1999, Xie Guang, the Vice-Minister of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, stated that IW:
... in the military sense means overall use of various types of information techniques, equipment, and systems, using disturbance, misinformation or destruction of the enemy's information systems, particularly his command systems, to shake the determination of the enemy's policymakers, and at the same time the use of all means possible to ensure that one's own information systems are not damaged or disturbed. (18)
In 2000, Wang Pufeng offered a deeper explanation of information war, distinguishing it from information warfare. In Wang's opinion, an information war refers to a kind of war and a kind of war pattern, while information warfare refers to a kind of operation and a kind of operational pattern. The new operational pattern refers to operations in a computer network space. IW embraces information detection systems, information transmission systems, information and weapon strike systems, and information processing and use systems. Information war includes information warfare. Both integrate information and energy and use an information-network-based battlefield as their arena. (19)
Few Chinese authors attempted to define IO but one who did was Yuan Banggen in 1999. Yuan stated that IO are specific IW operations. IW is the core of"informationized warfare," whereas IO are the manifestation of information warfare on the battlefield. IO's theoretical system develops from two levels, fundamental and application. Basic theories consist of fundamental concepts about IO, its organizational structure and technological equipment, C2 for IO, etc. One can categorize application theories into offensive IO and defensive IO; strategic, operational, campaign, and tactical levels; and into peacetime, wartime, and crisis-period IO. All IO activities center upon C2. IO's two missions are preparation and implementation; its principles are centralized command, multilevel power delegation, multidimensional inspection and testing, timely decisionmaking, and the integration of military and civilian actions with a focus on vital links. (20)
Author Qi Jianguo suggested uniting the network with a People's War. He recommended that the PLA establish a People's War organ that is an authoritative, centralized, and united network. It would control IO and networking activities, and allow for the conduct of mobilization exercises and education on People's War on the network. Laws and regulations need formulation in order to standardize the preparations and development of a network People's War. (21) China must uphold the principle of combining the establishment of networks for both wartime and peacetime use, setting up networks for both military and civilian use, and developing Internet service in a limited manner. (22)
Wang Baocun also believes strongly in the union of IW and cognitive processes. He described perception structures, perception systems, and belief systems as IW components. He defined a perception structure as:
... all things that an individual or a group considers correct or true, regardless of whether these things that are considered correct or true have been obtained through perception or belief.
His definition of perception structures says they comprise perception systems, as those ...
systems which are established and operated in order to understand or observe verifiable phenomena by turning such phenomena into perceptible realities and subsequently to make decisions or take action on the basis of intuitive understanding of such realities.
Belief systems are "systems which guide testable empirical information and such information and consciousness that cannot be tested or are hard to test." (23)
Chinese Organizations and Training Needed to Conduct IW
There are several organizations charged with IW instruction for the PLA. The lead organization is the Communications Command Academy. The Academy is in Wuhan, the capital of central China's Hubei Province. In 1998, the Academy announced the publication of two books, Command and Control in IW and Technology in IW that became the leading Chinese IW texts. The Academy is well respected for its IW curriculum that analyzes strategic, operational, and tactical IW requirements. (24) Interestingly, the Academy is not far from the reserve component IW regiment in Echeng district.
A second leading PLA IW institute is the Information Engineering University, established by combining the Institute of Information Engineering, the Electronic Technology College, and the Survey and Mapping College. Located in Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan Province, the University will help cultivate professionals for high-technology warfare involving the use of information, according to President Major General Zhou Rongting, and will create a number of new specialties such as remote-image information engineering, satellite-navigation and positioning engineering, and map databanks. The major specialties include information security, modern communications technology, and space technology. (25)
A third PLA IW location is the Science and Engineering University, established by combining the Institute of Communications Engineering, the Engineering Institute of the Engineering Corps, the Meteorology Institute of the Air Force, and the 63d Research Institute of the General Staff headquarters. It trains new military personnel in fields such as IW, communications and command automation, and other subjects. (26) There are more than 400 experts and professors at the University teaching IW theories and technological subjects. (27)
A fourth PLA IW-related institute is the National Defense Science and Technology University in Changsha. Directly under the supervision of the Central Military Commission, it is where China develops the "Yin He" series of supercomputers. (28) From April to June 1999, some 60 senior officers (average age 53) studied high-technology warfare at the University during the war in Kosovo.
The Navy Engineering College, headed by President Shao Zijun, is a PLA Navy institute studying IW. The general orientation of the College is to combine arms and information. It hopes to help adapt the Chinese Navy to the combat needs of IW.
The system of training advanced in 1996 to handle this problem involved first laying a sound strategic foundation, then improving everyone's knowledge about IW by studying the experiences of foreign armies. Then it stressed expanding basic IW skills, especially in electronic and PSYWAR, and in information attack and defense. Finally, the training would emphasize converting knowledge to ability through the conduct of IW exercises. Press reports indicated that China followed this plan. (29)
What conclusions do we draw, first about Chinese IW and then about recommendations for the U.S. Armed Forces? First, Chinese military theorists have found a relatively cheap and malleable methodology in IW, one that can enable China to catch up with the West in both strategic military and international status. These areas could lead China to play an important strategic role in the Asia-Pacific region and to emerge gradually into an economic competitor.
Second, China has an unusual emphasis on the emerging role of new IW forces. These various groups include the potential development of a net force (separate armed forces branch, although no evidence to date has confirmed the existence of such a separate branch), a shock brigade of network warriors, information protection troops, an information corps, electronic police, and a united network People's War organ, among other units. Interestingly, Western nations are currently the most capable of instituting such a concept, since computers reside in so many homes and offices but the concept of forming an army from society is absent in these countries. Chinese theorists believe the side mobilizing the most computer experts to participate in take-home battle will very likely determine an IW victory. These forces would employ a strategy such as net point warfare, attempting to take out important information nodes and junctions. The Chinese believe in the power of network stability, and focus greatly on the protection of the network.
Third, Chinese IW emphasis reflects a mixture of Western and Chinese thinking that is moving away from the former. It is a Chinese proclivity to stress control, computerized warfare, network warfare, and knowledge warfare in addition to information superiority and "system of systems" theories, which have become the Western norm. Chinese thinking is closer to that of the Russians due to a common frame of reference (military art and the Marxist dialectic). There has also evolved a Chinese specific IW lexicon that is different from that used by Russia and the West.
Fourth, Chinese IW often looks to Chinese military history to find answers to today's problems, such as The Secret Art of War's 36 stratagems. IW appears to fit well with these stratagems. Yet China recognizes the capabilities inherent in Western IW and will think twice before engaging.
Thus for the U.S. military, a study of Chinese IW methods would be not only advisable but also required. Such a study might uncover inherent IW weaknesses in the U.S. system when analyzed through the thought process of another ideological prism or framework. The worst mistake that the United States can make is to use its own process for uncovering vulnerabilities exclusively, since there are other problemsolving schemes (e.g., the dialectic) available. As the Chinese have said, losers in IW will not just be those with backward technology but those who lack command thinking and the ability to apply strategies. It is worth the time of the U.S. analytical community to scrutinize a variety of IW strategies and tactics.
(1.) To some Chinese theorists, the cornerstone of IW's operational theory involves preserving the integrity and stability of the infrastructure of one's side to perform these functions. Infrastructure stability is more important than survivability of units. See Wang Jianghuai and Lin Dong, "Viewing Our Army's Quality Building from the Perspective of What Information Warfare Demands," Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, 3 March 1998, page 6, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 16 March 1998.
(2.) Shen Weiguang, "Focus of Contemporary World Military Revolution--Introduction to Research in IW," Jiefangjun Bao, 7 November 1995, page 6, as translated and reported in FBIS-CHI-95-239, 13 December 1995, pages 22-27.
(3.) Wang Jianghuai and Lin Dong, ID at 1.
(4.) Bill Gertz, "Hackers Linked to China Stole Documents from Los Alamos," The Washington Times, 3 August 2000, page 1.
(5.) Wang Jianghuai and Lin Dong, page 6.
(6.) Hai Lung and Chang Feng, "Chinese Military Studies Information Warfare," Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching (Hong Kong), 16 January 1996, Number 280, pages 22, 23, as translated and published by FBIS-CHI-96-035, 21 February 1996, pages 33, 34.
(7.) Shen Weiguang, pages 22-27.
(8.) Wang Xiaodong, "Special Means of Warfare in the Information Age: Strategic Information Warfare," Jianchuan Zhishi, 30 June 1999, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 27 July 1999.
(9.) China National Defense News, 24 January 2000, provided by Mr. William Belk via E-mail. Mr. Belk is the head of a skilled U.S. Reservist group that studies China.
(10.) China National Defense News, 15 December 1999, page 1, provided by Mr. Belk via E-mail.
(11.) Qianjin Bao, 10 December 1999, provided by Mr. Belk via E-mail.
(12.) Qi Jianguo, "Thought on Internet War," Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, Internet version, 16 May 2000, page 6, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 16 May 2000.
(14.) Shen Weiguang [no title provided], Beijing Zhongguo Guofang Keji X, September-December 1996, No 5/6, pages 87-89, as translated and reported in FBIS-CHI-98-029, insert date 30 January 1998.
(15.) Wang Baocun, "A Preliminary Analysis of IW," Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, Number 4, 20 November 1997, pages 102-111, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 20 November 1997,
(16.) Shen Weiguang, "Checking Information Warfare-Epoch Mission of Intellectual Military," Jiefangjun Bao, 2 February 1999, page 6, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS web site on 17 February 1999.
(17.) Yuan Banggen, "On IW, Digital Battlefields," Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 20 February 1999, pages 46-51, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 17 July 1999.
(18.) Xie Guang, "Wars Under High Tech," Beijing Renmin Ribao, 27 December 1999, page 7, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 30 January 1999.
(19.) Wang Pufeng [no title provided], Hong Kong Hsien-Tai Chun-Shih ( Conmilit), 11 April 2000, pages 19-21, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 3 May 2000.
(20.) Yuan, ID at 17.
(21.) Qi Jianguo, ID at 12, page 6.
(23.) Wang Baocun, "New Military Revolution in the World, 'Subduing Enemy Force without Battle' and Informationized Warfare," Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, 4 May 1999, pages 60-63, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 23 August 1999.
(24.) Lei Yuanshen, "New Breakthrough in the Study of Information Warfare," Jiefangjun Bao, 21 July 1998, page 6, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 12 August 1998.
(25.) "University to Foster Talent for High-Tech Warfare," Xinhua, 17 November 1999, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 17 November 1999.
(26.) Ma Xiaochun, "PLA Sets Up Four New Academies," Beijing Xinhua, 2 July 1999, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 7 July 1999.
(27.) "PLA Trains Personnel for Information Warfare," Hong Kong Tai Yang Pao, 15 September 1999, page A17, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 15 September 1999.
(28.) Guo Hao, "Chinese Military Prepares to Fight Digital Warfare," Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching, 16 March 2000, Number 330, pages 19-21, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 16 March 2000.
(29.) Cheng Bingwen, "Let Training Lean Close to Information Warfare," Jiefangjun Bao, 12 November 1996, page 6, as translated and reported in FBIS-CHI-96-230, inserted on 29 November 1996.
RELATED ARTICLE: U.S. Army Reserve Command MI Augmentation Detachment.
Military Intelligence (MI) soldiers are a critical U.S. Army asset. The nation has a real interest in preserving and employing these skills, especially as the MI soldier gains experience in using these hard-won skills. To retain these soldiers and their skills for the nation, the U.S. Army Reserve Command established the Military Intelligence Augmentation Detachment (MIAD) directly subordinate to the USARC. The MIAD's mission is to facilitate life-cycle management of MI soldiers in the Reserve Component (RC). The Detachment accomplishes its mission by assigning USAR enlisted, warrant, and company-grade soldiers to USARC high-priority MI units with vacancies. The MIAD enables MI-qualified soldiers who do not reside near a USARC Tier 1 unit to be productive members of the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). The primary MIAD focus is the retention of soldiers leaving active duty, soldiers displaced by unit reorganizations or inactivation, and USAR soldiers relocating to an area without a USAR MI unit.
After joining the MIAD, MI soldiers have funding to attend a minimum of six 3-day trips in active-duty-for-training (ADT) status each fiscal year. These normally occur during the unit's weekend training periods. During these six ADT periods, the MIAD funds the soldier's transportation and lodging expenses. The soldier also must perform a minimum of 24 mutual training assemblies (MUTAs) either at a unit close to his home or through other means such as performing intelligence-related work using the World Basic Information Library. The MIAD will also fund travel and base pay for the soldier's annual training period (normally two weeks each year) if it is more than normal commuting distance of the soldier's home. Some USAR MI personnel perform their AT as overseas deployment training (ODT).
Currently the MIAD needs soldiers with language skills in Arabic, Chinese-Mandarin, French, Korean, Persian-Iranian, Spanish, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Thai, Turkish, Urdu, and Vietnamese. Soldiers not skilled in critical languages may be eligible for attendance at the Defense Language Institute (DLI).
Additional MIAD Opportunities
The MIAD also manages soldiers in two other types of units. A limited number of MIAD soldiers can serve as Technical Intelligence Analysts with 203d MI Battalion at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. The 203d is a multiple-component (MultiCompo) unit and the only technical intelligence battalion in the Army. To be eligible for this assignment, soldiers must be qualified Technical Intelligence Analysts. Most of these positions are at the Sergeant, Staff Sergeant, and Sergeant First Class levels. MI NCOs can also serve with one of the five Army Reserve Total Army School System (TASS) units as MI Instructors. These soldiers have the important job of instructing RC soldiers in MI subjects.
Contacting the MIAD
Active duty soldiers leaving the Active Army who are interested in an MIAD assignment can obtain more information from their post transition counselors. Additional information on the MIAD is available from the Army Knowledge Online (AKO). Go the Army Communities/Army Reserve/Direct Reporting Units and click on the MI Augmentation Detachment. You can also contact the MIAD via E-mail at MIAD2@usarc-emh2.army.mil or by telephoning 1-800-359-8483, extensions 9546/8896.
Timothy Thomas (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired) is an analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He was a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer who specialized in Soviet and Russian studies and his military assignments included serving as the Director of Soviet Studies at the United States Army Russian Institute (USARI) in Garmisch, Germany; as an Inspector of Soviet Tactical Operations under the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and as a Brigade S2 and Company Commander in the 82d Airborne Division. He earned a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, and a Master of Arts degree from the University of Southern California. Mr. Thomas has done extensive research and publishing in the areas of peacekeeping, information war, psychological operations, low-intensity conflict, and political-military affairs. He is the Assistant Editor of the journal European Security; an Adjunct Professor at the U.S. Army's Eurasian Institute; an Adjunct Lecturer at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School; and a member of two Russian organizations, the Academy of International Information and the Academy of Natural Sciences. Mr. Thomas' articles also have appeared in Russian publications and Czech Military Thought; and he has co-authored several articles with Russian military officers. Mr. Thomas speaks and reads Russian.
|Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback|
|Author:||Thomas, Timothy L.|
|Publication:||Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin|
|Date:||Jul 1, 2003|
|Previous Article:||Intelligence support to information operations: staff chaplains.|
|Next Article:||Determining battlefield effects in an urban environment: MOUT terrain analysis.|