Lessons learned from OJF: an SF battalion S2's perspective.
The purpose of this article is to offer some lessons learned from my tour in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Due to the unique nature of my job as a Special Forces battalion S2, I had the opportunity to observe and participate in the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of intelligence. The observations below are not restricted to any specific part of the country or any specific phase of the war; rather, they are general observations noted by the author and others in the theater.
While the target audience of this article is tacticallevel intelligence professionals operating or planning to operate in the Iraq Theater of Operations (ITO), many of these lessons are applicable at all levels of the intelligence community. This article begins with some comments that are generally applicable to S2s and then moves to some specific to the ITO. The topics covered include networking, selling your assessment, intelligence support to information operations, dissemination versus fusion, targeting and exploiting, insurgency targeting cycle, reporting standards, conveying locations in populous areas, naming conventions in OIF, and spotting foreign fighters. Networking
Networking is an invaluable tool for an intelligence officer in OIF. After eight months in theater, the author developed contacts in almost every intelligence element in theater, to include coalition partners and interagency personnel so when an issue or problem arose, a contact was available in nearly every case who could work with us to solve it. I made it a point to meet everyone with whom I corresponded via E-mail on a regular basis (when practical), which aided the flow of information.
Networking is not an easy task to accomplish in a nonpermissive environment (that is, where we lack freedom of movement). Take every opportunity available to get out of the work area to visit other units. Find a good reason to visit your higher headquarters and any other intelligence-producing element in theater.
Selling Your Assessment
An S2 section does an analysis of the city of Baghdad and determines that a specific highway is critical to coalition operations. The S2 then recommends that efforts focus on the least stable district(s) along the highway to ensure the route remains open. However, no action is taken until after an improvised explosive device (IED) attack shuts down the highway for a 12-hour period.
Intelligence is useless if your commander does not accept it. One can discover the "golden nugget" of intelligence that will lead to the capture of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden and a suit-case nuclear device, but if you cannot sell it to the commander, one will never truly know what could have happened.
Here are some tips for making your first "sell:"
Establish Credibility. There are multiple ways to establish credibility and rapport with your commander. The first, and most obvious way is to make correct assessments. This will come with time but will not help your first sell. As an intelligence professional, you will be wrong more times than you are right. However, here are some things that S2s can do to establish credibility without being right all the time.
 It is imperative to speak the language of the commander. Generally, that language is doctrine. Impress the commander with your understanding of operations and of doctrine.
 Understand operations and the decisions your commander has to make. If your reporting and assessments are not relevant to the commander's mission, why are you briefing them to him or her?
 Tell the commander what he needs to hear, not what he wants to hear. A commander must understand the situation from different perspectives, and the S2 brings the commander the threat's perspective. If the commander does not agree with your assessment, do not back down but respectfully "agree to disagree."
 Prepare yourself and the S2 analysts for the brief. Rehearsals are important for anyone conducting the brief. Rehearse the brief with others and "sharp shoot" each other. One goal of this rehearsal is to predict any follow-up questions the commander will ask you. Be prepared to answer these questions when asked, or simply brief it before the commander has the chance to ask.
 Know your commander as you know your enemy. Know what your commander expects. For example, some commanders want to know the source of every report. Every commander also has pet peeves, quirks, and peculiarities. Be aware of them and try to minimize their impact.
Presentation. Presentation is everything. A poorly presented assessment will affect your credibility and will greatly decrease your chance of getting the assessment accepted by the decision makers. Keep it simple, logical and easy to follow. Explain your thought process step-by-step, leading the commander to the most logical, threat-based assessment available, yours.
For difficult situations, use terms and formats with which the commander is comfortable. For example, S2 analysts may assess that threat forces are using school assemblies to plan operations and recruit, and your recommendation to the commander is to break up the assemblies. When conducting mission analysis, use a format that he is used to hearing, such as OAKOC (observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment).
 Observation and Fields of Fire. The threat elements conducting the assembly have clear observation and a clear field of fire to their targets, the students (potential recruits). This forum favors the threat because it isolates the key terrain. During operations in cities, streetlights at night affect observation, countering the advantage of night vision.
 Avenues of Approach. The threat spreads lies about the coalition forces and instills fear; this appeal to the students fear and gullibility is the major avenue of approach. This element favors the threat because they better understand the needs and desires of the youth, and can therefore manipulate them more effectively. Do not forget that an urban environment is a three-dimensional world so underground tunnels, subways, and storm drains should be considered avenues of approach as well.
 Key Terrain. In this situation (the school assembly), the hearts and minds of the youth in the community are the key terrain. Who are the key leaders or sheiks in the community? Whoever seizes this terrain is favored in the long term.
 Obstacles. Obstacles could include rules of engagement (ROE), a language barrier, or cultural misunderstandings that may lead to second and third order effects on a given course of action (COA). These obstacles favor the threat and hinder our ability to prosecute the target. In addition, vehicular or pedestrian traffic is an obstacle during certain hours of the day.
 Cover and Concealment. To conceal their intent, assemblies may be in schools because they are beyond our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection capabilities. A school meeting serves as cover for their true intent. This cover and concealment limits our ability to collect and then justify an offensive mission (justification may be required to accept the risk of losing favor in the community).
Facts, Figures, and Historical Examples. Sometimes one bases assessments on patterns and probabilities; sometimes intuition rather than actual hard fact forms the basis. Commanders may consider this to be "gray" when they want "black or white." Something more concrete to back your assessment is helpful.
First, commanders in general are students of history. Use historical examples from current or previous conflicts to back your assessment. Second, beware of statistics. Statistics can "lie" if users produce or manipulate numbers to prove or disprove any theory they want. If you are careful, statistics can be effective in the absence of other data, but again, this S2 stresses caution.
Note that intuition is a critical ingredient in the success of an intelligence professional. Intuition is the result of the combination of knowledge (e.g., schools, doctrine, and history books) and experience. Do not be afraid to use intuition--many times it will be all you have on which to base your assessment. However, if you do base an assessment purely on intuition, you should let your commander know.
Intelligence Support to Information Operations (IO)
Intelligence did not drive IO; often, political issues or reactions to bad press drove it. IO planners failed to the tap the greatest collection resource available in Iraq, the "presence patrols." Planners did not issue relevant talking points to these patrols. (For example, at a time when electricity and water were still major concerns in the city, IO planners wanted presence patrols to talk about when and how the Iraqis would exchange old currency for new Dinar.) They did not order IO-driven information requirements. When issues regarding IO appeared in reports, there was no system in place to route these issues directly to IO planners quickly and then in turn send authorized responses to the presence patrols.
Intelligence must also provide IO with the threat's IO plan. During the military decision-making process (MDMP), intelligence planners should develop most probable and most dangerous COAs for the threat's IO response. This can allow IO planners to be proactive instead of reactive, intelligence can also provide summaries of the threat's IO message delivered through electronic and print media. Tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) teams (THTs) on the streets can report threat IO messages circulated through rumors and public assemblies (sermons). However, we cannot rely on THTs alone to provide ground truth reporting. The best and most plentiful intelligence collectors on the battlefield are the presence patrols.
Presence patrols can also assist by providing "ground truth" information and measures of effectiveness. These patrols can determine whether an IO theme or message is reaching the target population, and then report this feedback to IO planners. IO planners can then determine the effectiveness of their means of delivery. This entire process can be accomplished in a four-stage continuous cycle.
 Stage 1. IO planners task presence patrols to collect information on issues and concerns of the local population. This information goes directly to IO planners through dedicated channels to ensure timeliness of information receipt.
 Stage 2. IO planners process information sent from presence patrols and determine what the primary issues are on the street. The planners staff the issues and develop responses that they formulate into IO themes and messages for delivery via multiple means (e.g., psychological operations [PSYOPs], media, and the public affairs office [PAO]). They issue talking points as an order to the presence patrols to help spread the message as well.
Measures of effectiveness are critical to the success of IO. IO planners measure success by determining what percentage of the population must receive and understand the message to consider the IO mission a success.
 Stage 3. Presence patrols simultaneously deliver the message to the targeted population, gather feedback, and collect new issues. The patrol will determine if the target population received and understood the message. If the message is not reaching the desired audience, the patrol can make an assessment of why it did not. They will send this information directly to the IO planners.
 Stage 4. IO planners analyze the feedback to determine what percentage of the target population received the message. If the standard is met, the planners may decide to discontinue the message. If the standard is not met, the planners may reevaluate the method of delivery and the message itself--they can only do this effectively with the feedback from the presence patrols. Planners also receive new issues from the collectors and the cycle starts again.
This is nothing more than a modification of the intelligence process. Since units at the brigade level and lower usually do not have IO officers, the intelligence officer must become the IO officer by default. The intelligence officer needs to incorporate these talking points into his or her collection plan and also the daily patrol debriefs. (Another candidate as the IO officer is the fire support officer [FSO]).
Detainees will provide much information that is of value to IO. If you want to know why the bad guys are fighting, ask a detainee. S2s should assess second and third order effects of tactical operations and civil-military operations (CMO). In a land where nobody speaks English, actions are the IO operation.
Understanding local history, culture, and geography is critical to successful IO. First, an S2 must realize that all people have certain needs. People across the board, regardless of race, religion, or creed, will first worry about the basic necessities: food, shelter, water, and the safety of their families. Once these things are taken care of (and only after they are taken care of), will other factors in their lives come into prominence. Second, an S2 must know the local culture. This is crucial to ensuring that the IO plan works and is important to all other aspects of the fight.
Dissemination Versus Fusion
Dissemination is the act of getting intelligence to the consumers. Dissemination does not guarantee that the consumer who needs the intelligence will get it and tends to be unidirectional. One can define "fusion" as "intelligence disseminated to the consumer who needs it," which allows a synergistic effect of shared intelligence. Good fusion is multidirectional and allows for exchange of ideas and analysis both horizontally and laterally.
Intelligence is useless if we do not disseminate it to the consumer who needs it. Intelligence dissemination can be active or passive and "push" or "pull" is often how we describe it. "Push" intelligence is intelligence that the generating unit sends to the consumers while "pull" intelligence requires the consumer to retrieve the intelligence.
Having to go to a unit's tactical website or web information center is a perfect example of "pulling" intelligence. The consumer must surf through multiple pages and menus to find the intelligence that he is seeking. If the consumer does not know what exactly he wants (or the right terminology to use) or is not familiar with the tactical website, it can be a slow process. This also assumes that consumers outside the tactical site can even access it. Often bandwidth restrictions, firewalls, and other security measures make it very difficult and slow for outside consumers to "pull" intelligence from such a site. Of course, the consumer may not even know that the intelligence exists. (This should not be considered tactical website bashing; it is a good tool but is a very passive means of disseminating intelligence).
"Pushing" is a very proactive process, and we found this is the best way to get the intelligence to the specific consumers who need it. It requires a soldier who understands the mission of other friendly units in the area of operations, knows their priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and has a point of contact and means of disseminating the intelligence to that consumer in a timely manner.
One way of accomplishing this is to have liaison officers (LNOs) from the consumer units in your section. However, this is impractical because you would need an LNO for every unit in the theater. This author thinks that a huge "fusion pit" located at the joint task force headquarters is a waste of personnel resources; it slows the process down and is ineffective. This would be an attempt to centralize control of intelligence in a decentralized war.
It is more practical to designate one soldier (or a small section) as the dissemination specialist for a unit. The job of the dissemination specialist is to ensure that intelligence reaches the consumers, both horizontally and vertically across the chain of command. The tactical website has its uses, and is effective for internal sharing, but the dissemination specialist needs to help out the external intelligence elements by disseminating specific intelligence to the unit that needs it; the specialist can accomplish this through good sharing of operational information between units. The unit's dissemination specialist needs an address book or access to a courier that can contact as many units in theater as possible. The dissemination specialist should have access to information on each units' mission statement, area of responsibility (AOR), and PIR. Also, it is not enough to simply understand other military units' missions. There is currently little in the way of formal information sharing between military and civilian agencies. This is where personal networking is really important and can pay huge dividends for the unit.
This is a huge job but it can be done, we did it on a smaller scale. While we did not need to understand the mission of every unit in theater, this S2 did have a long list of contacts throughout the country, and anytime a detachment in the battalion collected pertinent intelligence, that specific report went directly to the point of contact who worked that AOR or that mission. For example, if a detachment collected information on a mosque, the S2 section did analysis and we passed that intelligence via Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) directly to the brigade or division responsible for the AOR containing that mosque.
We also found that the points of contact that received our intelligence were more willing to help answer our PIRs and sent intelligence directly to us. This is decentralized fusion for decentralized warfare. Someday some great supercomputer database, perhaps a future joint interagency All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) version, will figure out how to do this for us. Until then, thinking, breathing soldiers will need to accomplish this task.
Targeting and Exploiting
A successful raid captures a targeted individual. The raiding element leaves the objective with a cell member, a small bag of money and smiles on their faces. The next day, the source that led the unit to the target reports that the cell leader lived next door and has already left town as a result of the raid, The smiles are gone.
The raid is not over once you have positively identified the target. Intelligence exploitation of the objective is critical to the targeting process and maximizes our efforts. Threat personnel usually do not work alone and the raiding element can derive a lot of information from site exploitation. To assist raiding units during exploitation, S2s should develop and enforce a standing operating procedure (SOP) that clearly defines what actions should take place during exploitation. The following is a short but not exhaustive checklist for site exploitation.
Editors Note: Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) is developing ST 3-90. 15, TTP for Tactical Operations Involving Sensitive Sites. Publication data is unknown at this time.
* An initial battlefield interrogation by HUMINT collectors of the target can yield information that the unit can act on immediately if the ground commander is prepared to do so.
* What do the neighbors know about the target just hit? If the locals felt secure enough to talk to you, they might say, "go hit that house right across the street, all of your target's friends are in there. "Talk to everyone you can.
* Anything that stores information has potential intelligence value. Grab it, bag it, and label it. It is imperative to label bags with a list of contents, date and location of capture, and circumstance of capture at a minimum, and ensure that the exploitable materials reach the appropriate entity. The S2 must be involved in the "chain of custody" of detainees and exploitation of materials. The operations order (OPORD) must spell out what the raiding element is seeking, how to handle captured items, and where they should go.
Occasionally S2s failed to recognize that the small cell in their city has connections to larger cells elsewhere. In this decentralized war, it is important for intelligence officers at the lowest level to have a basic understanding of the "big picture." The S2s can then determine how their little piece of the war ties into that picture. In counterinsurgency, the lines between tactical, operational, and strategic levels are completely blurred. A cell leader can at one time have strategic intelligence value and be planting IEDs at night, etc.
Insurgency Targeting Cycle
The following discussion is a modification of the technique used by 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Infantry Division. It covers the detect, decide, deliver, and assess phases of the cycle.
Detect. There are three types of targets you can detect using multiple disciplines; however, at the tactical level most of the collectors will be HUMINT. At higher levels, more all-source integration is available including reach capabilities to national agencies like the National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA, formerly NIMA [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), etc. These types of targets include--
 Target personalities.
 Target areas commonly targeted by insurgents where we can conduct counterambush operations.
 Local CMO opportunities.
Decide. This phase uses tools including link diagrams and association matrices for personalities. These tools help the commander determine if and why the unit should prosecute a target. Then the commander needs to decide--
 If sufficient credible intelligence is available to hit a target. Locals will use U.S. forces to sort out their local politics. Source deconfliction and reporting from multiple intelligence disciplines can resolve this.
 Which targets to prosecute, where and when. In a target rich environment, it is crucial that the S2 assists the S3 and commander in deciding which targets to go after first and how to allocate limited resources to achieve desired effects. (For instance, counterambush operations are an effective and proactive means of hunting lED cells, but they are personnel intensive. Figuring out which house to hit is another example.)
Deliver. Use aerial observation (preferred), HUMINT sources, and/or observation posts (least preferred) to determine target patterns. Then conduct the raid, put out the counterambush force, or do the CMO project.
Assess. For raids, this consists of interrogation and document exploitation. These are extremely important because they confirm who you caught, provide needed evidence to hold the target(s), and nearly always lead to another target. For counterambush operations, the assessment would be dead and captured insurgents and a change in the attack trends in the targeted area. For CMO, the usual feedback is gathering information through PSYOPs surveys. For instance, we knew that our operations to counter black marketing were working when locals reported the price for black market fuel was down to almost the same level as legal fuel.
Reporting during the initial phase of OIF operations following the fall of the Iraqi regime was poor and there was no standard in use. The senior leadership quickly recognized this problem and the SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) report became the standard. This improved our ability to determine what time of day and what parts of town were more likely for attacks. While the attacks still seemed random, they were not. The majority of the attacks were against civil affairs and engineer units, while attacks on infantry and Special Forces elements were very rare. (This trend changed over time as the attacks became more sophisticated.)
The SALUTE report has been the Army standard for decades. It is a simple and effective report for most operations. It is an excellent format to use for initial reports but reporting has a tendency to stop there. The SALUTE report, designed in a time when means of conveying battlefield information were very limited, conveys the information on who, what, when, and where. On a linear, symmetric battlefield, enemy action is often to disrupt the timing of our operation or to protect or seize specific terrain. The where and when of these attacks helped to explain the why. On the linear battlefield, the SALUTE report is usually enough for any intelligence analyst to figure out the last, most important piece, the why.
For example, a report may say two BTRs (armored personnel carriers), a T-72 tank, and 30 dismounted soldiers (unit unknown) at this grid and time fired upon the reconnaissance patrol. From this report, the analyst can assess that the enemy fired on the patrol because the enemy unit is a part of an integrated defense and is conducting a counterreconnaissance mission. The analyst can go a step further and assess that the reported element matches a template for a combat security outpost and can then use this information to template the entire defense using a doctrinal template.
Now try this example: Two unidentified individuals wearing disdashas dropped an IED on a U.S. convoy at this grid and at this time. More information is necessary for pattern analysis than simply time and place. Pattern analysis may help us determine what time of day or where these attacks are more likely to occur, but we still have not determined why. Why was that convoy attacked instead of the one that passed that location ten minutes earlier?
On a nonlinear battlefield the threat is not overly concerned with terrain and often can dictate the tempo of the battle. The threat, by the definition of "asymmetric," has a smaller force and therefore must be risk-aversive to persist. They choose the time and place of their attacks, they pick a fight that they know they will not only win, but also from which they can escape. So how do they choose it and why do they attack one convoy or element instead of another? The threat is targeting easy or "soft" targets. So how does an analyst determine what the enemy considers a "soft" target? Information using the SALUTE format alone does not provide sufficient information to permit this type of assessment. Figure 1 includes some other suggested reporting requirements.
These reporting requirements are not ones to answer at the time of contact; rather, intelligence personnel should pose these questions to the patrol during the debriefing after the mission. Your unit needs to conduct regular patrol debriefs using a unit SOP (the questions in Figure 1 can be part of the debrief SOP). Using this level of detail, an analyst can assess why the threat targeted that particular convoy or patrol.
If the analyst sees a pattern emerging, that pattern can turn into engagement criteria. The analyst can then advise the commander of force protection measures to ensure that the convoys are outside the threat's engagement criteria, and are therefore at lower risk of attack. Engagement criteria can also serve as one piece of the puzzle in linking attackers to organizations. If we observe similar engagement criteria over a large area, this can be a useful indicator that some level of organization or training exists.
When possible, units should do full investigations and studies of attacks to learn as much about the threat as possible. With digital cameras and PowerPoint[TM], it is very easy to put together a graphical description of exactly how they conducted the ambush. It is also important to note that unsuccessful attacks require at least as detailed an analysis as sucessful ones do. Learning why an attack was unsuccessful can be extremely valuable in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to defeat the threat.
Conveying Location In Densely Populated Environments
Street addresses as we know them do not exist in Baghdad, Residential streets very rarely have names unless they are major roads. There are no street addresses in Iraq because people define the terrestrial geography using human geography. In Al Anbar province (Governorate), names for locations on a map are based on the tribal group living there. This means that to figure out where a person lives, an S2 must understand the tribal history of the area. When asking a person where a target lives, a common type of answer is fin the Nimr tribal area near Mohammed's house down the street from the mosque where Imam Hassan preaches." It may be twenty feet from the Euphrates River, but the source will not think to use that as a landmark because human geography is more important to their culture.
Without street addresses, units resort to the Military Grid Reference System (MGRS). A good HUMINT report may have an eight-digit grid of the target or better. However, we found that even ten-digit grids are not accurate enough pinpoint target locations in a densely populated environment. There are several reasons for this:
 Buildings are so close together that there is no room for error. If your grid is off a meter or two either way, the raiding element may be targeting the wrong house.
 A soldier using a Global Positioning System (GPS) usually cannot get close enough to the target for an accurate ten-digit grid.
 Imagery that is not orthorectified will not line up with a grid obtained on the ground. The variation can be 50 meters or more.
There are several things that can improve the location of targets in populous areas like Baghdad. They include:
 Always include a physical description of the target. This should contain enough detail to permit identification of the target from FalconView imagery and on the ground (day and night). The collector must provide a detailed picture, for example:
"The target is a two-story house connected to other houses on both sides. The front door faces the street (north) and there is one window right of the front door. The second story has three windows facing north. The house is red-orange and made of plaster, with ceramic orange shingles and a six-foot white stone wall with an iron gate. The iron gate is black, opens toward the street, and has no visible lock."
 Use digital photographs or video.
 Use a landmark. Acquire a ten-digit grid location of a landmark easily picked out on imagery such as a road intersection. The ten-digit grid number will likely not match up perfectly with the landmark; however, it should be close enough to pinpoint the landmark to be useful as a reference point. Using this reference point, report directions to the target from the landmark. For example, "From the fourway intersection at MB1234567890, face north. The target is the third house on the left."
 If you cannot achieve clarity of intelligence and cannot pinpoint the target location, consider a larger cordon and plan on entering multiple houses. You can recommend a "cordon and knock" procedure to the commander to search all the potential targets until the patrol locates the target individual.
How many times have you heard, "Intelligence drives operations'? It is a common catch phrase often quoted, but rarely realized. Here is the bottom line: Intelligence is at the center of everything we do, yet it is understood less than any other discipline in warfare. We must collect and analyze information, put it into a package the consumers can understand, disseminate, and constantly reevaluate. All these tasks are mandatory for intelligence to drive operations, and if we as intelligence professionals do not do this, who will?
 Date-time group (DTG).
 Reporting unit.
 Patrol mission.
 Activities conducted by patrol prior to attack
 Mounted or dismounted? What was the size of the patrolling element?
 What types of vehicles or weapons systems were in the patrol?
 Route used by patrol? Has the patrol used this route in the last week and at what times?
 Patrol stationary or moving?
 Was fire returned?
 Description of attackers (numbers, dress, weapons, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), etc.)
 What was the result of the contact (enemy and friendly)?
 Were there civilian bystanders? What were their reactions?
 Detailed description of attack site.
 Why was the patrol attacked (patrol's assessment)?
Captain Gellman's article highlights several crucial issues and procedures that recent doctrinal publications should solve.
FM 2-0, Intelligence, approved in January 2004, incorporated many of the recommendations included in the article. FM 2-0, defines "PIRs" in paragraph 1-32 as--
...those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task for planning and decisionmaking. PIRs are associated with a decision based upon enemy action or inaction or the battlespace that will affect the overall success of the commander's mission.
Based upon the new definition, PIRs are what the commander needs to know about the enemy or environment. They focus the unit's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan in order to support the commander's situational understanding. Doctrine ties PIRs to a decision, not to a decision point.
PIRs still focus the unit's overall ISR plan and higher echelons use them in developing their overall schemes of intelligence support. Greater use of intelligence requirements--those requirements for the Intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) to fill a gap in the commander's and staff's knowledge or understanding of the battlespace or threat--better focus the intelligence support. During stability operations and support operations, these intelligence requirements have greater importance and emphasis.
FM 2-0 provides additional ISR guidance. Chapter 1 details ISR synchronization. This section explains staff participation within the synchronization process and the S2/G2's role within the intelligence synchronization and ISR integration processes.
FMs 3-0, Operations, 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, and the draft version of 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, all follow this thread. Units, leaders, and soldiers must incorporate these FMs into their section and unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) in order to benefit from this latest doctrine.
The author developed the observations and recommendations above on collaboration with other intelligence professionals in theater including Captain Bret Woolcock, Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF)-7 (now the Multi-National Force Iraq [MNFI]) Analysis and Control Element Targeting; CPT Mark Rowan, Ranger Regiment MI Detachment Commander; First Lieutenant Noel Cline, HUMINT Operations Cell, 1st Armored Division; CPT Kyle Teamey, Brigade Assistant S2, 1st Brigade, 11D; and many others.
Captain Brian Gellman is currently serving as the S2 for 3d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group Alpha (SFG(A)). He deployed to OIF after graduating from the MI Officer Transition Course and MI Captains Career Course. His earlier assignment was a branch-detail to the Infantry with the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light). CPT Gellman has a Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology from the University of Texas at Arlington. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at firstname.lastname@example.org.
|Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback|
|Publication:||Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin|
|Date:||Apr 1, 2004|
|Previous Article:||Excess reporting--handoff issues for both HUMINT collectors and CI agents.|
|Next Article:||The Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer--a capability that is long overdue.|