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Legislative activity for FY2010.

Summary of Quantities and Funding

Table 3 summarizes congressional action on F-35 FY2010 procurement quantities and procurement and research and development funding levels.

FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84)

Conference

Quantities and Funding

The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) authorizes funding for procuring a total of 30 F35s in FY2010, as requested (pages 933 and 948). The report authorizes $215 million in Air Force research and development funding (page 1017) and $215 million in Navy research and development funding (page 1005) for continued development of the F136 alternate engine, and $130 million in Air Force advance procurement funding to begin procurement of F136 engines (page 948).

Legislative Provisions

Section 131 of the act requires a report on the procurement of "4.5"-generation fighters that is to include, among other things, "a discussion regarding the availability and feasibility of procuring F-35 aircraft to proportionally and concurrently recapitalize the Air National Guard during fiscal years 2015 through fiscal year 2025." Section 217 requires future DOD budgets to provide separate line items for the F-35B and F-35C within the Navy aircraft procurement account and the Navy research and development account. Section 244 requires, for the period 2010-2015, an annual GAO report on the status of the F-35 program.

Section 131 states:

SEC. 131. REPORT ON THE PROCUREMENT OF 4.5 GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

(a) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the procurement of 4.5 generation fighter aircraft. The report shall include the following:

(1) The number of 4.5 generation fighter aircraft needed to be procured during fiscal years 2011 through 2025 to fulfill the requirement of the Air Force to maintain not less than 2,200 tactical fighter aircraft.

(2) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through annual procurement contracts.

(3) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through multiyear procurement contracts.

(4) The estimated savings that could be derived from the procurement of those aircraft through a multiyear procurement contract, and whether the Secretary determines the amount of those savings to be substantial.

(5) A discussion comparing the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through annual procurement contracts with the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through a multiyear procurement contract.

(6) A discussion regarding the availability and feasibility of procuring F-35 aircraft to proportionally and concurrently recapitalize the Air National Guard during fiscal years 2015 through fiscal year 2025.

(b) 4.5 GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT DEFINED.-In this section, the term "4.5 generation fighter aircraft" means current fighter aircraft, including the F-15, F-16, and F18, that--

(1) have advanced capabilities, including--

(A) AESA radar;

(B) high capacity data-link; and

(C) enhanced avionics; and

(2) have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments.

Section 217 states:
   SEC. 217. SEPARATE PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND
   EVALUATION LINE ITEMS AND PROGRAM ELEMENTS FOR THE F-35B AND F-35C
   JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

   In the budget materials submitted to the President by the Secretary
   of Defense in connection with the submission to Congress, pursuant
   to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, of the budget for
   fiscal year 2011, and each subsequent fiscal year, the Secretary
   shall ensure that within the Navy research, development, test, and
   evaluation account and the Navy aircraft procurement account, a
   separate, dedicated line item and program element is assigned to
   each of the F-35B aircraft and the F-35C aircraft, to the extent
   that such accounts include funding for each such aircraft.


Section 244 states:

SEC. 244. ANNUAL COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT ON THE F-35 LIGHTNING II AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION PROGRAM.

(a) ANNUAL GAO REVIEW.--The Comptroller General shall conduct an annual review of the F-35 Lightning II aircraft acquisition program and shall, not later than March 15 of each of 2010 through 2015, submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the results of the most recent review.

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.--Each report on the F-35 program under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) The extent to which the acquisition program is meeting development and procurement cost, schedule, and performance goals.

(2) The progress and results of developmental and operational testing and plans for correcting deficiencies in aircraft performance, operational effectiveness, and suitability.

(3) Aircraft procurement plans, production results, and efforts to improve manufacturing efficiency and supplier performance.

Report Language

The conference report states:
   F-35 and alternate propulsion system program

   The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 211) that would:
   (1) increase in funding for procurement of UH-1Y/AH-1Z rotary wing
   aircraft and for management reserves for the F-35 Joint Strike
   Fighter program; and (2) prohibit the obligation of funds
   authorized to be appropriated for development or procurement of an
   alternate propulsion system for the F-35 until the Secretary of
   Defense certifies in writing to the congressional defense
   committees that development and procurement of the alternate
   propulsion system would: (a) reduce life cycle costs of the F-35;
   (b) improve operational readiness of the fleet of F-35 aircraft;
   (c) will not disrupt the F-35 research, development, test, and
   evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement phases of the program; and (d)
   will not result in the procurement of fewer F-35 aircraft during
   the life cycle of the program.

   The House bill contained a provision (sec. 218) that would limit
   obligations for the F-35 RDT&E program to 75 percent until 15 days
   after the later of the dates on which: (1) the Under Secretary of
   Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics certifies in
   writing to the congressional defense committees that all fiscal
   year 2010 funds for the F-35 competitive propulsion system have
   been obligated; (2) the Secretary of Defense submits the report on
   F/A-18 multiyear procurement costs required by section 123 of the
   Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
   2009 (Public Law 110-417); and (3) the Department submits the
   30-year aircraft procurement plan required by section 231a of title
   10, United States Code.

   The House bill also contained a provision (sec. 242) that would
   require the Secretary of Defense to include in annual budget
   requests submitted to the President, beginning in 2011, such
   amounts as are necessary for the full funding of continued
   development and procurement of a competitive propulsion system for
   the F-35.

   Both the House and Senate recede from their respective provisions.

   The conferees agree to authorize the budget request for 30 F-35
   aircraft in Aircraft Procurement, Navy, and Aircraft Procurement,
   Air Force. The conferees also agree to authorize an increase of a
   total of $430.0 million in RDT&E, Navy, and RDT&E, Air Force for
   continued F136 engine development; and $130.0 million in Aircraft
   Procurement, Air Force, for F136 engine procurement. The conferees
   expect that the Secretary of Defense will comply with the direction
   in section 213 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
   Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), and ensure that sufficient annual
   amounts are obligated and expended, in each fiscal year, for the
   continued development and procurement of two options for the F-35
   propulsion system in order to ensure the development and
   competitive production of the F-35 propulsion system. (Pages
   706-707)


House

Quantities and Funding

The House Armed Services Committee's report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on H.R. 2647 recommends the following:

* procuring 19 F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine Corps and Navy-a reduction of one aircraft from the requested figure of 20 (page 57);

* procuring nine F-35As for the Air Force-a reduction of one aircraft from the requested figure of 10 (page 93);

* a net reduction of $122 million in Navy aircraft procurement funding for the procurement of F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine Corps and Navy, consisting of a reduction of $164 million for the one-aircraft reduction and an addition of $42 million for the F136 alternate engine (page 57; line 006);

* an increase of $5 million in Navy aircraft advance procurement funding for the F136 alternate engine (page 57, line 007);

* a decrease of $4 million in procurement funding for F-35 spares, and an increase of $2 million in procurement funding for F136 spares (page 60, line 057);

* a net reduction of $67 million in Air Force procurement funding for the procurement of F-35As for the Air Force, consisting of a reduction of $131 million for the one-aircraft reduction, a reduction of $9 million for F-35 initial spares, an increase of $57 million for the F136 alternate engine, an increase of $21 million for spares for the F136 alternate engine, and an increase of $129 million for F-35 spares and support equipment (page 93; line 001);

* an increase of $13 million in Air Force advance procurement funding for the F136 alternate engine (page 93; line 002);

* a net increase of $153.5 million in Navy research and development funding for the F-35 program, consisting of an increase of $231.5 million for the F136 alternate engine and a reduction of $78 million for "program excess" (page 169); and

* a net increase of $153.5 million in Air Force research and development funding for the F-35 program, consisting of an increase of $231.5 million for the F136 alternate engine and a reduction of $78 million for "program excess" (page 190).

As discussed below in the section on report language, the recommended one-aircraft reduction in the number of F-35Bs and Cs to be procured is for an F-35B, making for a recommended procurement of 15 F-35Bs and 4 F-35Cs.

Legislative Provisions

H.R. 2647 contains four sections relating directly to the F-35 program--Section 214, which concerns the display of funding for F-35Bs and Cs in budget materials; Section 218, which limits the obligation of FY2010 F-35 research and development funds until certain conditions (including one related to the alternate engine program) are met; Section 232, which requires an annual GAO report on the F-35 program; and Section 242, which concerns the alternate engine program.

A fifth provision--Section 133--requires a report on the procurement of "4.5"-generation aircraft. The report is to include, among other

things, "a discussion regarding the availability and feasibility of F-35s in fiscal years 2015 through fiscal year 2025 to proportionally and concurrently recapitalize the Air National Guard."'

The texts of these five provisions appear below.

Section 214 states:
   SEC. 214. SEPARATE PROCUREMENT AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND
   EVALUATION LINE ITEMS AND PROGRAM ELEMENTS FOR THE F-35B AND F-35C
   JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT.

   In the budget materials submitted to the President by the Secretary
   of Defense in connection with the submission to Congress, pursuant
   to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, of the budget for
   fiscal year 2011, and each subsequent fiscal year, the Secretary
   shall ensure that within the Navy research, development, test, and
   evaluation account and the Navy aircraft procurement account, a
   separate, dedicated line item and program element is assigned to
   each of the F-35B aircraft and the F-35C aircraft, to the extent
   such accounts include funding for each such aircraft.


Section 218 states:

SEC. 218. LIMITATION ON OBLIGATION OF FUNDS FOR F-35 LIGHTNING II PROGRAM.

Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2010 for research, development, test, and evaluation for the F-35 Lightning II program, not more than 75 percent may be obligated until the date that is 15 days after the later of the following dates:

(1) The date on which the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics submits to the congressional defense committees certification in writing that all funds made available for fiscal year 2010 for the continued development and procurement of a competitive propulsion system for the F-35 Lightning II have been obligated.

(2) The date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees the report required by section 123 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (P.L. 110-417; 122 Stat. 4376).

(3) The date on which the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees the annual plan and certification for fiscal year 2010 required by section 231a of title 10, United States Code.

Section 232 states:

SEC. 232. ANNUAL COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT ON THE F-35 LIGHTNING II AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION PROGRAM.

(a) Annual GAO Review- The Comptroller General shall conduct an annual review of the F35 Lightning II aircraft acquisition program and shall, not later than March 15 of each of 2010 through 2015, submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the results of the most recent review.

(b) Matters to Be Included- Each report on the F-35 program under subsection (a) shall include each of the following:

(1) The extent to which the acquisition program is meeting development and procurement cost, schedule, and performance goals.

(2) The progress and results of developmental and operational testing and plans for correcting deficiencies in aircraft performance, operational effectiveness, and suitability.

(3) Aircraft procurement plans, production results, and efforts to improve manufacturing efficiency and supplier performance.

Section 242 states:

SEC. 242. INCLUSION IN ANNUAL BUDGET REQUEST AND FUTURE-YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM OF SUFFICIENT AMOUNTS FOR CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT OF COMPETITIVE PROPULSION SYSTEM FOR F-35 LIGHTNING II.

(a) Annual Budget- Chapter 9 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

'Sec. 235. Budget for competitive propulsion system for F-35 Lightning II

'(a) Annual Budget- Effective for the budget of the President submitted to Congress under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2011 and each fiscal year thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall include, in the materials submitted by the Secretary to the President, a request for such amounts as are necessary for the full funding of the continued development and procurement of a competitive propulsion system for the F-35 Lightning II.

'(b) Future-Years Defense Program- In each future-years defense program submitted to Congress under section 221 of this title, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the F-35 Lighting II, for each fiscal year of the period covered by that program, include sufficient amounts for the full funding of the continued development and procurement of a competitive propulsion system for the F-3 5 Lightning II.

'(c) Requirement to Obligate and Expend Funds- Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2010 or any year thereafter, for research, development, test, and evaluation and procurement for the F-35 Lightning II Program, the Secretary of Defense shall ensure the obligation and expenditure in each such fiscal year of sufficient annual amounts for the continued development and procurement of two options for the propulsion system for the F-35 Lightning II in order to ensure the development and competitive production for the propulsion system for the F-35 Lightning II.'.

(b) Clerical Amendment- The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by at the end the following new item:

'235. Budget for competitive propulsion system for F-35 Lightning II.'.

(c) Conforming Repeal- The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181) is amended by striking section 213.

Section 133 states:

SEC. 133. REPORT ON 4.5 GENERATION FIGHTER PROCUREMENT.

(a) In General- Not later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on 4.5 generation fighter aircraft procurement. The report shall include the following:

(1) The number of 4.5 generation fighter aircraft for procurement for fiscal years 2011 through 2025 necessary to fulfill the requirement of the Air Force to maintain not less than 2,200 tactical fighter aircraft.

(2) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through single year procurement contracts.

(3) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through multiyear procurement contracts.

(4) The estimated savings that could be derived from the procurement of those aircraft through a multiyear procurement contract, and whether the Secretary determines the amount of those savings to be substantial.

(5) A discussion comparing the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through annual procurement contracts with the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through a multiyear procurement contract.

(6) A discussion regarding the availability and feasibility of F-35s in fiscal years 2015 through fiscal year 2025 to proportionally and concurrently recapitalize the Air National Guard.

(7) The recommendations of the Secretary regarding whether Congress should authorize a multiyear procurement contract for 4.5 generation fighter aircraft.

(b) Certifications- If the Secretary recommends under subsection (a)(7) that Congress authorize a multiyear procurement contract for 4.5 generation fighter aircraft, the Secretary shall submit to Congress the certifications required by section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, at the same time that the budget is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 2011.

(c) 4.5 Generation Fighter Aircraft Defined- In this section, the term '4.5 generation fighter aircraft' means current fighter aircraft, including the F-15, F-16, and F-18, that--

(1) have advanced capabilities, including--

(A) AESA radar;

(B) high capacity data-link; and

(C) enhanced avionics; and

(2) have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments. Report Language

Regarding Air Force research and development funding for the F-35 program, the committee's report states:
   The budget request contained $1.9 billion in PE 64800F, and $1.7
   billion in PE 64800N, for development of the F-35, but contained no
   funds for development of a competitive F-35 propulsion system. The
   committee notes that the aggregate amount requested for F-35
   development is $1.4 billion higher than projected last year, and
   that $476.0 million of that amount conforms to increases
   recommended by a recent joint estimating team, and understands this
   amount will be used primarily for management reserve. The budget
   request also contained $2.0 billion for procurement of 10 F-35As
   and $300.6 million for F-35 advance procurement in Aircraft
   Procurement, Air Force, but contained no funds for either
   procurement of competitive F-35 propulsion systems or for advance
   procurement of competitive F-35 propulsion system long-lead
   components. Additionally, the budget request contained $4.0 billion
   for the procurement of 16 F-35Bs and four F-35Cs and $481.0 million
   for F-35 advance procurement in Aircraft Procurement, Navy, but
   contained funds for neither procurement of competitive propulsion
   systems nor advance procurement of competitive F-35 competitive
   F-35 propulsion systems long-lead components. The Aircraft
   Procurement, Navy budget request also contained $1.3 billion for
   spares and repair parts.

   The competitive F-35 propulsion system program is developing the
   F136 engine, which would provide a competitive alternative to the
   currently-planned F135 engine. For the past three years, in the
   committee report (H.Rept. 109-452) accompanying the John Warner
   National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, in the
   committee report (H.Rept. 110-146) accompanying the National
   Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, and in the
   committee report (H.Rept. 110-652) accompanying the Duncan Hunter
   National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the
   committee recommended increases for the F-35 competitive propulsion
   system, and notes that in all cases, the other three congressional
   defense committees also recommended increases for this purpose.
   Despite section 213 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
   Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), which requires the Secretary
   of Defense to obligate and expend sufficient annual amounts for the
   continued development and procurement of a competitive propulsion
   system for the F-35, the committee is disappointed that the
   Department of Defense (DOD) has, for the third consecutive year,
   chosen not to comply with both the spirit and intent of this
   provision by opting not to include funds for this purpose in the
   budget request.

   The committee notes that the F135 engine development program has
   experienced cost growth since the engineering and manufacturing
   development (EMD) program began in fiscal year 2002. At the
   beginning of EMD in fiscal year 2002, the F135 engine development
   program was expected to cost $4.828 billion in then-year dollars.
   The F-35 program manager reports that as of the end of 2008,
   development costs have grown to $6.7 billion in then-year dollars,
   an increase of $1.872 billion, or 38 percent. Additionally, the
   committee notes that the F-35 program manager has reported an
   increase of approximately 38 to 43 percent in F135 engine
   procurement cost estimates between December 2005 and December 2008,
   in the annual selected acquisition reports for the F-35C and F-35A
   variants. Between December 2005 and December 2008, engine
   procurement cost estimates for the F-35B have grown approximately
   47 percent, but the F-35B engine procurement cost growth is
   attributable to both the F135 engine and the F-35B's lift fan.
   Conversely, the F136 engine program has not experienced any cost
   growth since its inception. The F136 pre-EMD contract, which began
   in 2002 and was completed in 2004, was for $411.0 million and did
   not experience cost growth. The F136 EMD contract was awarded in
   2005, and the cost estimate, at $2.486 billion, has been stable
   since contract award. Given the F135 development and procurement
   cost increases, the committee is perplexed by the Department's
   decisions over the past three years to not include an F-35
   competitive propulsion system program in its budget requests. Based
   on the F135 cost growth, F135 test failures noted in the committee
   report (H.Rept. 110-652) accompanying the Duncan Hunter National
   Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, and resultant
   schedule delays due to F135 engine test failures, the committee
   remains steadfast in its belief that the non-financial factors of a
   two-engine competitive program such as better engine performance,
   improved contractor responsiveness, a more robust industrial base,
   increased engine reliability and improved operational readiness,
   strongly favor continuing the F-35 competitive propulsion system
   program.

   The committee also notes that the Office of the Secretary of
   Defense's Director of Portfolio Acquisition testified before the
   Air and Land Forces Subcommittee on May 20, 2009, and stated that
   the Department planned a 75 percent higher year-over-year
   production rate for the F-35 program for fiscal year 2010 and that
   this rate, "seems to be an achievable rate." The committee further
   notes that the production rate for fiscal year 2009 is 17 aircraft,
   of which 14 are for the Department of Defense and 3 are
   international aircraft. A 75 percent higher production rate for
   fiscal year 2010 would total 30 aircraft, and the committee notes
   that 2 international aircraft are planned, leaving 28 DOD aircraft
   in fiscal year 2010 necessary to achieve the 75 percent
   year-over-year production rate, two less than the 30 F-35s
   contained in the Department of the Navy and Department of the Air
   Force budget requests. Therefore, the committee recommends a
   reduction of one F-35B in Aircraft Procurement, Navy and one F-35A
   in Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, and report.

   The committee understands that $320.0 million of the $476 million
   recommended by the recent joint estimating team would meet
   requirements for sufficient management reserve, and therefore
   recommends an aggregate reduction of $156.0 million in PEs 64800N
   and 64800F as noted in the tables elsewhere in this report.

   For continued development of the competitive F-35 propulsion system
   program, the committee recommends a total increase of $463.0
   million in PEs 64800F and 64800N as noted in the tables elsewhere
   in this report. The committee also recommends an aggregate increase
   of $140.0 million as noted in the tables elsewhere in this report
   in Aircraft Procurement, Navy and Aircraft Procurement, Air Force
   for the procurement of four F136 engines, F136 spare parts, and
   advance procurement of F136 long-lead components to continue F136
   procurement in fiscal year 2011. (Pages 201-203)


In the section on the operation and maintenance account, the report states:
   The committee is concerned that the lessons learned regarding the
   prevention and management of corrosion in the F-22 Raptor aircraft
   have not been fully applied to development and acquisition of the
   F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft. The committee's desire to have
   corrosion prevention and management addressed early in weapons
   system development and acquisition prompted inclusion of a
   provision in the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009
   (Public Law 111-23) requiring the development of systems
   engineering master plans for major defense acquisition programs
   that include considerations of lifecycle management and
   sustainability.

   Therefore, the committee directs the Director of Corrosion Policy
   and Oversight (as designated by section 2228 of title 10, United
   States Code) to evaluate the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The
   evaluation should include, but not be limited to, information
   obtained from floor inspections and examination of program
   documentation and should involve any and all manufacturing and
   engineering processes. The Director of Corrosion Policy and
   Oversight is directed to consult with the Office of the Under
   Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to
   determine the appropriate level of access necessary to conduct an
   effective and comprehensive evaluation of the F-35. The committee
   directs that the findings of the evaluation be reported to the
   congressional defense committees within 180 days after the date of
   enactment of this Act. The evaluation report should also include
   implications for existing and future weapons systems based on the
   findings of the F-35 evaluation. The committee directs the
   Comptroller General of the United States to provide an assessment
   to the congressional defense committees of the completeness of the
   evaluation within 60 days of the evaluation's delivery to the
   congressional defense committees. (Pages 289-290)


The report discusses the project Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall on pages 61-62. The report discusses the projected Air Force fighter shortfall, and requires a report on the topic, on page 101. The report summarizes Sections 133, 214, 218, 232, and 242 on pages 125, 240, 241, 243-244, and 244-245, respectively.

Statement of Administration Policy

A June 24, 2009, statement of administration policy on H.R. 2647 states the following regarding the F-35 program:
   F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program: The Administration strongly
   objects to the addition of $603 million for development and
   procurement of the alternative engine program, and the requirement
   for the Department to fund the alternative engine program in future
   budget requests to the President. These changes will delay the
   fielding of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) capability and capacity,
   adversely impacting the Department's overall strike fighter
   inventory. In addition, the Administration objects to provisions of
   the bill that mandate an alternative engine program for the JSF.
   The current engine is performing well with more than 11,000 test
   hours. Expenditures on a second engine are unnecessary and impede
   the progress of the overall JSF program. Alleged risks of a
   fleet-wide grounding due to a single engine are exaggerated. The
   Air Force currently has several fleets that operate on a
   single-engine source. The Administration also objects to the limit
   on the obligation of overall JSF development funding to 75% of the
   amount authorized until Department of Defense (DOD) has obligated
   all funds provided in FY 2010 for the alternative engine program.
   If the final bill presented to the President would seriously
   disrupt the F-35 program, the President's senior advisors would
   recommend a veto. (153)


Senate (Committee Markup)

Quantities and Funding

In the FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390) as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009), Division D presents committee's detailed the linetem funding recommendations. Division D does the following:

* approves the administration's request to procure 20 F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine Corps and Navy, and approves the administration's request for procurement and advance procurement funding for these aircraft (page 613 of the printed bill);

* approves the administration's request to procure 10 F-35As for the Air Force, and approves the administration's request for procurement and advance procurement funding for these aircraft (page 629);

* recommends a net increase of $141.45 million in Navy research and development funding for the F-35 program, consisting of an increase of $219.45 million for the F136 alternate engine and a reduction of $78 million for excess management reserves (page 678); and

* recommends a net increase of $141.45 million in Air Force research and development funding for the F-35 program, consisting of an increase of $219.45 million for the F136 alternate engine and a reduction of $78 million for excess management reserves (page 687).

Legislative Provisions

Section 211 of S. 1390 states:
   SEC. 211. CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITIVE PROPULSION SYSTEM
   FOR THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM.

   Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made
   available for fiscal year 2010 for research, development, test, and
   evaluation for the F-35 Lightning II aircraft program, not more
   than 90 percent may be obligated until the Secretary of Defense
   submits to the congressional defense committees a written
   certification that sufficient funds have been obligated for fiscal
   year 2010 for the continued development of a competitive propulsion
   system for the F-35 Lightning II aircraft to ensure that system
   development and demonstration continues under the program during
   fiscal year 2010.


Report Language

Regarding Section 211, the committee's report states:
   The committee recommends a provision that would require the
   Department to obligate sufficient funds for fiscal year 2010 for
   the continued development and procurement of the F136 competitive
   propulsion system for the F-35 Lightning II to ensure that the
   Department continues the system development and demonstration (SDD)
   program during fiscal year 2010. The committee understands that
   current plans for the F136 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) propulsion
   system would complete the development in sufficient time to conduct
   a first competitive contract award in fiscal year 2012, concurrent
   with the award for the sixth lot of low-rate initial production
   aircraft.

   The budget request included $1,741.3 million in PE 64800N, and
   $1,858.1 million in PE 64800F for continued development of the JSF
   program, but included no funds for continuing the SDD phase of the
   F136 program.

   The committee continues to believe that, in light of studies
   performed by the Department of Defense, the Institute for Defense
   Analyses, and the Government Accountability Office, it is in the
   best interests of the Nation to continue the development of the
   F136. Though the results of these studies were, in the aggregate,
   inconclusive on whether there would be a financial benefit to the
   Department in continuing to develop a competitive propulsion system
   for the JSF program, the committee notes that all studies
   identified significant non-financial factors of a two-engine
   competitive program. These included better engine performance;
   improved contractor responsiveness; a more robust industrial base;
   increased engine reliability; and improved operational readiness.
   The committee believes that the benefits, which could be derived
   from the non-financial factors, favor continuing the JSF
   competitive propulsion system program.

   Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $438.9 million
   for continuing F136 SDD, with half that amount added to PE 64800N
   and the other half added to PE 64800F. (Page 35)


The committee's report states that the recommendation to include additional Navy and Air Force research and development funding for the F-35 alternate engine was approved in full-committee markup by a vote of 12-10, with the votes as follows: "In Favor: Senators Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Nelson of Florida, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill, Hagan, Begich, Thune, Wicker, and Vitter. Opposed: Senators Lieberman, Reed, Akaka, Nelson of Nebraska, Udall of Colorado, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Martinez, and Collins." (Page 276)

Regarding funding for management reserves within Air Force and Navy research and development funding for the F-35 program, the committee's report states:
   The budget request included $1,741.3 million [Navy research and
   development funding] in PE 64800N, and $1,858.1 million [Air Force
   research and development funding] in PE 64800F for continued
   development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, including
   $476.0 million for management reserves to cover unforeseen problems
   that may arise during the system development and demonstration
   (SDD) phase of the program.

   The Department conducted a review of JSF program costs and
   schedules last year. The group conducting the review, called the
   Joint Estimating Team (JET), recommended, among other things, that
   the management reserves available to the program executive officer
   (PEO) be increased throughout the remainder of SDD program. As a
   result of the JET recommendations, the Department increased
   management reserves to the level requested in the budget.

   The Department has informed the committee that the PEO now believes
   that he can fully execute the fiscal year 2010 SDD program with
   only $320.0 million, or $156.0 million less than was included in
   the request.

   Therefore, the committee recommends a decrease of $78.0 million in
   PE 64800N and a decrease of $78.0 million in PE 64800F to eliminate
   these excess management reserves. (Page 82)


The report discusses the project Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall on pages 20-22.

Statement of Administration Policy

A July 15, 2009, statement of administration policy on S. 1390 states the following regarding the F-35 program:
   F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: The Administration
   strongly objects to the addition of $438.9 million for development
   of the alternative engine program. The Administration also objects
   to provisions of the bill that mandate an alternative engine
   program for the JSF. The current engine is performing well with
   more than 11,000 test hours. In addition, the risks associated with
   a single engine provider are manageable as evidenced by the
   performance of the F-22 and F/A- 18E/F, Air Force and Navy programs
   supplied by a single engine provider. Expenditures on a second
   engine are unnecessary and impede the progress of the overall JSF
   program. The Air Force currently has several fleets that operate on
   a single-engine source. The Administration also objects to the
   limit on the obligation of overall JSF development funding to 90
   percent of the amount authorized until the Secretary of Defense
   submits a written certification that sufficient funds have been
   obligated in FY 2010 for the alternative engine program. If the
   final bill presented to the President would seriously disrupt the
   F-35 program, the President's senior advisors would recommend a
   veto. (154)


Senate (Floor Consideration)

Summary

On July 23, 2009, as part of its consideration of S. 1390, the Senate rejected by a vote of 38 to 59 (Record Vote 240) an amendment (S .Amdt. 1767) that would have modified Section 211 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee so as to preserve the additional research and development funding for the alternate engine program, but make that funding available through an offset taken from a place in the defense budget other than what was recommended in the Senate Armed Services Committee markup.

Following its rejection of S.Amdt. 1767, the Senate adopted by voice vote another amendment (S.Amdt. 1627) that rewrites Section 211 so as to remove the research and development funding that was added in committee markup for an alternate engine program. The amendment also prohibits the obligation or expenditure of FY2010 funding on an alternate program until the Secretary of Defense makes certain certifications regarding its cost effectiveness. As amended by S.Amdt. 1627, S. 1390 is now generally consistent with the Administration's proposal to terminate the alternate engine program.

S.Amdt. 1767 (Not Agreed To)

S.Amdt. 1767 would have:

* preserved the language from Sec. 211 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee that would prohibit DOD from obligating more than 90% of FY2010 F-35 research and development funds until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a written certification that sufficient funds have been obligated for FY2010 for the continued development of a competitive propulsion system for the F-35 to ensure that system development and demonstration continues under the program during FY2010;

* preserved the additional research and development funding for the alternate engine program that was added in the Senate Armed Services Committee markup;

* restored reductions to the UH-1Y/AH-1Z helicopter program and to F-35 program management reserves that were made so as to make available the funding that was added for the alternate engine program; and

* instead reduced funding for the HC/MC-130 aircraft program-a program that received $504 million in procurement funding in the FY2009 supplemental appropriations act (H.R. 2346/P.L. 111-32 of June 24, 2009). (155)

The text of S.Amdt. 1767 is as follows:

SEC. 211. CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITIVE PROPULSION SYSTEM FOR THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM.

(a) In General.-Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2010 for research, development, test, and evaluation for the F-35 Lightning II aircraft program, not more than 90 percent may be obligated until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a written certification that sufficient funds have been obligated for fiscal year 2010 for the continued development of a competitive propulsion system for the F-35 Lightning II aircraft to ensure that system development and demonstration continues under the program during fiscal year 2010.

(b) Additional Amount for UH-1Y/AH-1Z Rotary Wing Aircraft.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by section 102(a)(1) for aircraft procurement for the Navy is hereby increased by $282,900,000, with the amount of the increase to be allocated to amounts available for the procurement of UH-1Y/AH-1Z rotary wing aircraft.

(c) Restoration of Management Reserves for F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program.--

(1) NAVY JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by section 201(a)(2) for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Navy is hereby increased by $78,000,000, with the amount of the increase to be allocated to amounts available for the Joint Strike Fighter program (PE # 0604800N) for management reserves.

(2) AIR FORCE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by section 201(a)(3) for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby increased by $78,000,000, with the amount of the increase to be allocated to amounts available for the Joint Strike Fighter program (PE # 0604800F) for management reserves.

(d) Offset.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by section 103(1) for aircraft procurement for the Air Force is hereby decreased by $438,900,000, with the amount of the decrease to be derived from amounts available for airlift aircraft for the HC/MC-130 recapitalization program.

S.Amdt. 1627 (Agreed To)

S.Amdt. 1627 would:

* eliminate the language from Sec. 211 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee that would prohibit DOD from obligating more than 90% of FY2010 F-35 research and development funds until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a written certification that sufficient funds have been obligated for FY2010 for the continued development of a competitive propulsion system for the F-35 to ensure that system development and demonstration continues under the program during FY2010;

* replace the eliminated language with new language that prohibits the obligation or expenditure of FY2010 funding on an alternate engine program until the Secretary of Defense makes certain certifications regarding cost effectiveness of such a program;

* eliminate the additional research and development funding for the alternate engine program that was added in the Senate Armed Services Committee markup;

* restore reductions to the UH-1Y/AH-1Z helicopter program and to F-35 program management reserves that were made so as to make available the funding that was added for the alternate engine program.

The text of S.Amdt. 1627 is as follows:

SEC. 211. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE PROPULSION SYSTEM FOR THE F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM; INCREASE IN FUNDING FOR PROCUREMENT OF UH-1Y/AH-1Z ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT AND FOR MANAGEMENT RESERVES FOR THE F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM.

(a) Limitation on Use of Funds for an Alternative Propulsion System for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program.-None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be obligated or expended for the development or procurement of an alternate propulsion system for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a certification in writing that the development and procurement of the alternate propulsion system--

(1) will--

(A) reduce the total life-cycle costs of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program; and

(B) improve the operational readiness of the fleet of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft; and

(2) will not--

(A) disrupt the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program during the research, development, and procurement phases of the program; or

(B) result in the procurement of fewer F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft during the life cycle of the program.

(b) Additional Amount for UH-1Y/AH-1Z Rotary Wing Aircraft.-The amount authorized to be appropriated by section 102(a)(1) for aircraft procurement for the Navy is increased by $282,900,000, with the amount of the increase to be allocated to amounts available for the procurement of UH-1Y/AH-1Z rotary wing aircraft.

(c) Restoration of Management Reserves for F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program.--

(1) NAVY JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by section 201(a)(2) for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Navy is hereby increased by $78,000,000, with the amount of the increase to be allocated to amounts available for the Joint Strike Fighter program (PE # 0604800N) for management reserves.

(2) AIR FORCE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by section 201(a)(3) for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby increased by $78,000,000, with the amount of the increase to be allocated to amounts available for the Joint Strike Fighter program (PE # 0604800F) for management reserves.

(d) Offsets.--

(1) NAVY JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER F136 DEVELOPMENT.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by section 201(a)(2) for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Navy is hereby decreased by $219,450,000, with the amount of the decrease to be derived from amounts available for the Joint Strike Fighter (PE # 0604800N) for F136 development.

(2) AIR FORCE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER F136 DEVELOPMENT.--The amount authorized to be appropriated by section 201(a)(3) for research, development, test, and evaluation for the Air Force is hereby decreased by $219,450,000, with the amount of the decrease to be derived from amounts available for the Joint Strike Fighter (PE # 0604800F) for F136 development.

FY2010 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)

Final Version

In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. 3326. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118.

The explanatory statement states that it "is an explanation of the effects of Division A [of H.R. 3326], which makes appropriations for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2010. As provided in Section 8124 of the consolidated bill, this explanatory statement shall have the same effect with respect to the allocation of funds and the implementation of this as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of the conference."

The explanatory statement provided $2,083.8 million for Air Force F-35 procurement. This represented a $35 million increase over the Administration request, with the additional funds designated for the F-35 alternate engine program.

The explanatory statement also provided $278.6 million in Air Force advance procurement funds for F-35, $22 million below the Administration request, noting that advance procurement funding for two aircraft requested in FY2010 had already been provided in FY2009.

In the explanatory statement, Air Force research and development funding for the Joint Strike Fighter program was $2.073.1 million, an increase of $215 million over the Administration request, with the additional funds designated for the F-35 alternate engine program.

The explanatory statement set Navy research and development funding for the Joint Strike Fighter program at $1,956.3 million, an increase of $215 million over the Administration request, with the additional funds designated for the F-35 alternate engine program.

The explanatory statement also included this text:
   JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

   Concerns persist regarding the progress of the F~35 Joint Strike
   Fighter (JSF) program. Last year, the Department of Defense
   established a Joint Estimating Team (JET) to evaluate this program.
   The JET reported that the program would cost significantly more and
   take longer to fully develop and test than the Department was then
   projecting. Although the JET has yet to officially report out for
   2009, the initial indications are that cost growth and schedule
   issues remain. Nevertheless, the Department insists that the
   program is on track to achieve both the cost and schedule currently
   reflected in the program of record.

   Therefore, the JSF procurement program is provided $6,840,478,000,
   and the JSF program is designated as a congressional special
   interest item. The Secretary of Defense is directed to ensure that
   all 30 aircraft be procured as requested in the budget. The Under
   Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics is
   directed to provide the findings of the JET along with recent
   studies on the test program and causes of cost growth to the
   congressional defense committees no later than January 15, 2010.


House

Quantities and Funding

The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-230 of July 24, 2009) on H.R. 3326, recommends the following:

* procuring 18 F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine Corps and Navy--a reduction of two aircraft from the requested figure of 20 (page 148);

* procuring 10 F-35As for the Air Force--the requested figure (page 184);

* a reduction of $420.6 million in Navy aircraft procurement funding for the procurement of F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine Corps and Navy, consisting of a reduction of $300 million for "Reduction of two aircraft--no FY 2009 advance procurement," and a reduction of $120.6 million for non-recurring equipment execution" (page 151, line 6);

* a net increase of $18.6 million in Air Force procurement funding for the F-35 program, consisting of a reduction of $111.4 million for "Reduction to nonrecurring engineering" and an increase of $130 million for the alternate engine (page 187, line 1);

* a reduction of $22 million in Air Force advance procurement funding for the F35 program for "Reduction of 2 aircraft previously funded in fiscal year 2009" (page 187, line 2);

* an increase of $215 million in Navy research and development funding for the F35 alternate engine (page 258, line 127); and

* an increase of $215 million in Air Force research and development funding for the F-35 alternate engine (page 273, line 84).

As discussed below in the section on report language, the recommended two-aircraft reduction in the number of F-35Bs and Cs to be procured is for F-35Bs, making for a recommended procurement of 14 F-35Bs and 4 F-35Cs.

Report Language

Regarding procurement funding for the F-35 program, the committee's report states:
   F-35 LIGHTNING II JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

   Last year, the Congress appropriated advance procurement funding
   for 14 fiscal year 2010 F-35 Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing
   (STOVL) aircraft [i.e., F-35Bs]. However, this year's request
   contains full funding for the procurement of 16 STOVL aircraft.
   Without the proper advance procurement funding, two of the fiscal
   year 2010 aircraft will not execute until fiscal year 2011. Since
   these aircraft will execute as fiscal year 2011 aircraft, they
   should be funded in fiscal year 2011. Therefore, the recommendation
   removes $300,000,000, the cost of two STOVL aircraft, from the
   program. This adjustment is consistent with the Navy's own
   adjustments to other aircraft procurement programs. (Pages 153-154)


The report also states:
   JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER NON-RECURRING EQUIPMENT

   The Joint Strike Fighter program budgets for and procures equipment
   and tooling to outfit the manufacturing facility with sufficient
   capacity to produce aircraft in larger quantities as the production
   program ramps up. Since the program began production in fiscal year
   2007, the Congress has appropriated over $900,000,000 for this
   effort. However, in actuality, the program has executed just over
   $700,000,000, largely because the production ramp up has been lower
   than originally predicted. Therefore, the recommendation reduces
   the request for non-recurring equipment by $232,000,000 to fund
   this activity at a level consistent with historical execution.
   (Page 119)


Regarding administration proposals to terminate programs, including the F-35 alternate engine program, the report states:
   The Committee also seeks to reverse a recent and increasing trend
   to curtail the development of systems before such efforts realize
   any benefit to the taxpayer. The Committee strongly supports
   realistic budgeting that matches available funding to overall
   programs. Indeed, many of the program terminations proposed in the
   fiscal year 2010 budget request are supported in this bill.
   Nevertheless, the Committee is concerned that the proposal to
   terminate some programs is premature, and believes that continuing
   certain efforts may yield significant payback. The Committee
   believes that this is clearly the case for the presidential
   helicopter, wherein five aircraft have been purchased that could be
   pressed into service. Similarly, in the Committee' s view, there is
   potential for significant payback associated with the Joint Strike
   Fighter alternative engine and certain missile defense activities
   provided in this recommendation. (Page 4)


The report also states:
   JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER ALTERNATE ENGINE

   The F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter program truly represents
   the Nation's future with respect to tactical aviation. The Navy,
   Marine Corps and Air Force plan to procure over 2,500 of these
   fifth generation stealthy aircraft and will fly them well into the
   future. The Department's original plan for the F-35 propulsion
   engine was to have two engine variants. Cost growth in other areas
   of the development program resulted in the Department abandoning
   the alternate engine program. Currently, all three variants of the
   F-35 aircraft will be powered by the same propulsion engine.
   Although this will make the logistics for the aircraft less
   complex, this practice presents problems. The Committee is
   extremely concerned that in the near future when the F-35 will
   comprise the majority of the Nation's tactical aircraft inventory
   any technical problems with the engine could theoretically ground
   the entire fleet of aircraft. If this situation were to arise in a
   time of crisis, the Commander-in-Chief's flexibility would be
   severely limited.

   Another area of concern for the Committee is the lack of
   competition for the Joint Strike Fighter engine program. With over
   2,500 aircraft envisioned for this program, the potential for cost
   savings through an engine competition is enormous. The Committee is
   aware that the Department conducted a business case analysis that
   compared the cost of the program of record (sole source engine
   provider) to a program using a dual source strategy for the engine
   program. The business case concluded that the costs of the two
   programs were essentially the same. Since the Congress has put
   several hundred million dollars into the development of an
   alternate engine program since this business case was published,
   the Committee is puzzled by the Department's decision to not fund
   the alternate engine. With the majority of the upfront development
   cost having been sunk into the program, it seems clear that from
   this point forward the dual source strategy is the most cost
   effective method to acquire the propulsion engine for the Joint
   Strike Fighter. Therefore, the recommendation provides an
   additional $430,000,000 for the continued development of the
   alternate engine and $130,000,000 for alternate engine production
   costs for a total of $560,000,000 above the request for the
   alternate engine program. Further, since a dual source engine
   strategy is the most cost effective method for acquiring engines
   from this point forward, the Secretary of Defense is directed to
   include funding for the alternate engine program in future budget
   requests. (Pages 215-216)


Statement of Administration Policy

A July 28, 2009, statement of administration policy on H.R. 3326 as reported in the House states the following regarding the F-35 program:
   Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) Alternate Engine. The Administration
   strongly objects to the addition of $130 million to produce, and
   $430 million to continue the development of, the Joint Strike
   Fighter (JSF) alternate engine, which was proposed for termination
   by the President. Expenditures on an alternate engine for the JSF
   are unnecessary and divert resources from the overall JSF program.
   The current engine is performing well, and the risks associated
   with a single engine provider are manageable. If the final bill
   presented to the President would seriously disrupt the F-35
   program, the President's senior advisors would recommend that he
   veto the bill. (156)


Senate

Quantities and Funding

The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-74 of September 10, 2009) on H.R. 3326, recommends the following:

* procuring 20 F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine Corps and Navy--the requested figure (page 101);

* procuring 10 F-35As for the Air Force-the requested figure (page 129);

* a reduction of $22 million in Air Force advance procurement funding for the procurement of F-35As in a future fiscal year for "Reduction of two aircraft" (page 133, line 2);

* a reduction of $78 million in Navy research and development funding for the F35 program for "Excess to need" (page 184, line 127);

* a reduction of $78 million in Air Force research and development funding for the F-35 program for "Excess to need" (page 197, line 84); and

* an increase of $3 million in Air Force research and development funding for the Aerospace Propulsion and Power Technology program for "Silicon Carbide Power Modules for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter" (page 196; line 22).

The committee's report recommends no funding for F-35 alternate engine development.

Report Language

The committee's report mentions the F-35 program on page 257 as part of a discussion of its recommendation for procurement of Navy F/A-18E/F strike fighters, stating: "The Committee is concerned about the shortfall in the Navy's strikefighter inventory created by the aging of the older F/A-18 models and the fact that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program will not start delivering carrier aircraft in significant numbers for several years."

Appendix A. Alternate Engine Program: Prior-Year Legislative Activity

This appendix presents details from the legislative history of the F-35 alternate engine program for the period FY1996-FY2009. The appendix focuses on presenting final bill language and committee and conference report language. It omits bill language in House- or Senate-reported versions of bills, as well as numerous instances in which committee or conference reports recommended additional funding for the F-35 alternate engine program but did not otherwise discuss the program in report language. The F-35 program was known in FY1996 and FY1997 as the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program.

FY1996

Defense Authorization Act (S. 1124/P.L. 104-106 of February 10, 1996)

Section 213 of S. 1124/P.L. 104-106 authorized funds for the JAST program, required DOD to submit a report on the JAST program, and limited the obligation of JAST program funds until 30 days after the report is submitted. Subsection (b)(2) of Section 213 stated that $7 million of the research and development funding authorized in the act "shall be available to provide for competitive engine concepts" for the JAST program. Subsection (d) required a report on requirements for the JAST program and other combat aircraft, and on certain planning assumptions that affect those requirements.

The conference report (H.Rept. 104-450 of January 22, 1996) on S. 1124 discussed Section 213 on pages 705-707, stating in part:

The Senate report (S.Rept. 104-112) questioned whether the program could fulfill the needs of the three services, and directed the Department to include two separate approaches in the JAST program to reduce program risk. The Senate amendment directed the Secretary of the Navy to: ...

(2) evaluate at least two propulsion concepts from competing engine companies as part of those demonstrations....

The conferees share the concerns expressed in the Senate report (S.Rept. 104-112) regarding the lack of engine competition and the size of flying prototypes. The conferees direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) (USD (A&T)) to ensure that: (1) the Department's JAST program plan provides for adequate engine competition in the program; and (2) the scale of the proposed demonstrator aircraft is consistent with both adequately demonstrating JAST concepts and lowering the risk of entering engineering and manufacturing development (EMD). The conferees direct the Secretary of Defense to include in the report required by section 213(d) the Department's plan for competitive engine programs and demonstrator aircraft.

The conferees recommend authorization of funds reflecting these changes, and agree to a provision (sec. 213) that would: ...

(4) authorize $7.0 million for competitive engine concepts.

The Senate Armed Services Committee report (S.Rept. 104-112 of July 12, 1995) on S. 1026, an earlier version of the FY1996 defense authorization bill, discussed the JAST program on pages 95-97, stating in part:
   Further, the committee believes supporting competitive propulsion
   programs would help reduce risk and lead to higher confidence of
   achieving more affordable life cycle costs. The committee fears
   that the current JAST approach may lead to selecting one power
   plant manufacturer prematurely. Therefore, the committee directs
   the Secretary to evaluate at least two propulsion concepts from
   competing engine companies as part of the full scale, full thrust
   aircraft demonstrators. (Page 96)


DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2126/P.L. 104-61 of December 1, 1995)

The House Appropriations Committee report (H.Rept. 104-208 of July 27, 1995) on H.R. 2126 discussed the JAST program on page 150, stating in part:
   The history of recent fighter engine propulsion plants demonstrates
   that development of new engines is difficult. The Navy has
   generally been dissatisfied with the engine performance of early
   model F-14s, and it eventually upgraded later model F-14s with an
   Air Force engine. The Air Force in the late 1970s and early 1980s
   was dissatisfied with both the performance and cost of engines on
   early models of the F-15 and the F-16, and it spent over a billion
   dollars to bring a second engine manufacturer into a position where
   competition could be conducted between two companies for future Air
   Force fighter aircraft. The new engine for the F-22 has suffered
   technical problems and is undergoing a redesign.

   The Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program envisions
   building a common aircraft to satisfy the needs of the Air Force,
   Navy and Marine Corps for fighter aircraft in the next century.
   Yet, it has selected a single power plant design, a derivative of
   the F-22 engine which has yet to be proven. Given the engine
   performance difficulties experienced over the last two decades,
   this is unwise. To cede the manufacture of all jet engines for
   three services' future aircraft without any additional competition
   is not likely to be cost effective. For these reasons, the
   Committee believes it is imperative for the JAST program to
   actively pursue an engine design from a second manufacturer and has
   provided an additional $20,000,000 only for this purpose.


FY1997

Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3230/P.L. 104-201 of September 23, 1996)

The Senate Armed Services Committee report (S.Rept. 104-267 of May 13, 1996) on S. 1745, the companion bill to H.R. 3230, discussed the JAST program on page 181, stating in part:
   The committee is persuaded that the benefits of engine competition
   will outweigh any near-term investment. Accordingly, the committee
   directs that remaining competition funds be rebaselined to
   guarantee integration into the preferred weapons system concept at
   the earliest practical point.


DOD Appropriation Act (H.R. 3610/P.L. 104-208 of September 30, 1996)

H.R. 3610/P.L. 104-208 was an omnibus appropriations act that included the DOD appropriations act. The House Appropriations Committee report (H.Rept. 104-617 of June 11, 1996) on H.R. 3610 discussed the JAST program on page 151, stating in part:
   The Committee recommends $602,100,000, an increase of $13,000,000
   in the Navy account only to accelerate development of an alternate
   engine in order to have it available at the beginning of the
   engineering and manufacturing development phase of the program.
   This increase should be part of a program to develop a demonstrator
   engine and integrate it into the selected weapon systems contractor
   concepts.


FY1998

Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997)

Section 213 of H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 states in part:

SEC. 213. JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM.

(a) REPORT.--Not later than February 15, 1998, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the options for the sequence in which the variants of the joint strike fighter are to be produced and fielded.

(b) CONTENT OF REPORT.--The report shall contain the following: ...

(4) A certification that the Joint Strike Fighter Program contains sufficient funding to carry out an alternate engine development program that includes flight qualification of an alternate engine in a joint strike fighter airframe....

The House Armed Services Committee report (H.Rept. 105-132 of June 16, 1997) on H.R. 1119 discussed the JSF program on pages 189-190, 212, and 243. The discussion on pages 189-190 states in part:
   The committee is also concerned that the 1997 FYDP does not reflect
   adequate funding within the JSF program to continue development of
   the alternative fighter engine (AFE) beyond the current
   demonstration/validation phase. The committee continues to believe
   that a fully developed and flight tested AFE is essential to reduce
   risk to the JSF program and to provide credible competition
   necessary for controlling program cost. Therefore, the committee
   directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the
   Congressional defense committees no later than February 15, 1998,
   detailing the level of funding within the JSF program that is
   identified to fund full development and flight test of the AFE.


The Senate Armed Services Committee report (S.Rept. 105-29 of June 17, 1997) on S. 924, the companion bill to H.R. 1119, discussed the JSF program on pages 119-120, stating in part:
   The budget request included funds for the continuation of a program
   to establish an alternative engine for the joint strike fighter,
   but omitted funds for fiscal year 1998. The committee is persuaded
   that there is a need for an alternative engine for the JSF, but
   expects the Department to program sufficient funds in the future
   years for a robust, accelerated profile. Accordingly, the committee
   recommends an increase in the budget request of $28.0 million to
   accelerate the alternative engine program, with the understanding
   that the Department will provide for the accelerated program in
   fiscal year 1999 and beyond.


FY1999

Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 3616/P.L. 105-261 of October 17, 1998)

The Senate Armed Services Committee report (S.Rept. 105-189 of May 11, 1998) on S. 2060, the companion bill to H.R. 3616, discussed the JSF program on pages 168-169, stating in part:
   Section 213 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
   Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85) required a report on the order of
   fielding the variants of the JSF, and that specifically addressed
   the acceleration of the naval variant. The report included a
   certification that the JSF program contains sufficient funding to
   carry out an alternate engine program that includes flight
   qualification of an alternate engine in a JSF airframe.

   While not in total agreement with the report, the committee notes
   the timely submission and clear presentation of the Department of
   Defense priorities and plans. The certification of a funded program
   for an alternate engine is a positive commitment to cost-effective
   program management. However, the actual demonstration of the
   alternate engine in a JSF airframe has been continuously shifted to
   the "out years," an action that threatens to invalidate the
   whole initiative. If the alternate engine is not completed for use
   for the most stressing of the JSF requirements (the short
   takeoff/vertical landing variant), then it may be too late to
   provide a major benefit to the program. Accordingly, the committee
   recommends an increase of $15.0 million to the budget request to
   accelerate the development of an alternative engine for the JSF.


FY2000

Defense Authorization Act (S. 1059/P.L. 106-65 of October 5, 1999)

The House Armed Services Committee report (H.Rept. 106-162 of May 24, 1999) on H.R. 1401, the companion bill to S. 1059, discussed the JSF program on pages 236-237, stating in part:
   The committee continues its strong support for the development of
   an alternate engine to ensure sustainment of critical industrial
   base capabilities, control of engine cost growth, and reduction of
   risk to the reliability and maintainability of the planned fleet of
   3,000 JSF aircraft. The committee is concerned that while the
   Department now states a commitment to development of an alternative
   engine for JSF, the planned funding levels outlined to sup port
   that commitment do not enable cost-efficient and timely completion
   of the effort.

   Meanwhile, the Department is also conducting other jet engine
   development efforts in PE 27268F as part of the aircraft engine
   CIP. The committee notes that requested funding for this level of
   effort program has increased by $66.6 million, over 40 percent,
   from the level projected for fiscal year 2000 just last year. The
   justification for the requested increase is to reduce backlog of
   proposed engineering tasks for currently fielded engines. While
   supportive of the CIP, the committee does not consider the proposed
   increase to this program to be of higher priority than development
   of a new state-of-the-art alternative engine for JSF. The committee
   notes that full development of a flight qualified jet engine also
   provides opportunities to migrate proven new technologies to
   existing engines.

   Therefore, the committee recommends $130.2 million in PE 27268F, a
   decrease of $30.0 million, and $265.4 million in PE 63800F, an
   increase of $30.0 million, and directs that this increase in JSF
   funding be used only for acceleration of alternate engine
   development.


The Senate Armed Services Committee report (S.Rept. 106-50 of May 17 [legislative day May 14], 1999) on S. 1059 discussed the JSF program on page 204, stating in part:
   The budget request included $476.6 million ($241.2 million in Navy
   research and development and $235.4 million in Air Force research
   and development) for continued development of the joint strike
   fighter (JSF). Within that total, $33.0 million is included for the
   alternate engine program. The committee remains concerned that
   development of an alternate engine for the JSF will not proceed to
   a point where it represents a viable alternative and reduces risk
   for the vertical and short take off and landing (V/STOL) JSF
   variant. The committee recommends an additional $15.0 million in PE
   63800F to reduce risk and accelerate development of the alternate
   engine, a total Air Force authorization of $250.4 million.


FY2001

Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4205/P.L. 106-398 of October 30, 2000) (157)

The conference report (H.Rept. 106-945 of October 6, 2000) on H.R. 4205 discussed the JSF program on pages 677-678, stating in part:
   The conferees are also concerned about the apparent pattern of
   additional contractor funding required to sustain the current
   DEMVAL activities of the program. Since the JSF program is
   potentially one of the largest acquisition programs in the
   Department of Defense, both competing contractors in this
   winner-take-all competition realize the significance of winner
   selection. However, the conferees are opposed to the requirement
   for industry to make additional, unreimbursed investments in the
   JSF program beyond existing contractual agreements. The conferees
   view the additional DEMVAL funding as necessary to provide for the
   execution of those projects presented in the budget request on the
   extended schedule. The conferees expect that risk mitigation
   projects, including the alternate engine, will be funded to the
   levels presented in the budget request.


The House Armed Services Committee report (H.Rept. 106-616 of May 12, 2000) on H.R. 4205 discussed the JSF program on pages 252-253, stating in part:
   Additionally, while the Department is currently reviewing the
   planned JSF "winner take all" strategy to ensure that aircraft
   industrial base concerns are addressed, the committee notes that no
   specific concern has been stated with respect to the future
   stability of the fighter aircraft engine industrial base. The
   committee supports continuation of the JSF alternate engine program
   (AEP) as directed in section 211 [sic: 213] of the National Defense
   Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85) and recommends
   that the Department specifically address measures to ensure the
   health of the fighter aircraft engine industrial base in any
   proposed restructure of the acquisition program for JSF.

   The committee also notes that the JSF AEP, as currently funded,
   will not be capable of completing development and flight
   qualification of the alternate engine until after award of lot five
   of the JSF production program. In order to reduce risk to JSF
   production and aircraft fielding, the Committee supports
   acceleration of AEP development to ensure that the alternative
   engine completes configuration compatibility for the JSF airframe.

   The committee recommends $299.5 million in PE 64800F, $131.6
   million in PE 63800N, and $296.0 million in PE 64800N, the
   requested amounts. The committee also recommends $144.5 million in
   PE 63800F, an increase of $15.0 million, to accelerate the JSF AEP.


DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 4576/P.L. 106-259 of August 9, 2000)

The Senate Appropriations Committee report (S.Rept. 106-298 of May 18, 2000) on S. 2593, the companion bill to H.R. 4576, discussed the JSF program on pages 116-177, stating in part:
   The Committee also continues to support the Alternate Engine
   Program (AEP) for JSF and expects that the recommended changes in
   overall JSF funding will not impact the current AEP schedule and
   that no funds will be diverted from the existing AEP plan.


FY2002

Defense Authorization Act (S. 1438/P.L. 107-107 of December 28, 2001)

The conference report (H.Rept. 107-333 of December 12, 2001) on S. 1438 discusses the JSF program on page 574, stating in part:
   The conferees remain concerned about the technical risks associated
   with the JSF aircraft engine and expect the Department to develop
   and integrate the JSF alternate engine within the EMD program. The
   conferees believe that the Department should execute the alternate
   engine program with a goal of having that engine integrated into
   the JSF prior to full rate production.


The House Armed Services Committee report (H.Rept. 107-194 of September 4, 2001) on H.R. 2586, the companion bill to S. 1438, discussed the JSF alternate engine program on page 220, stating:
   The budget request contained $769.5 million in PE 64800F to begin
   the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the JSF
   program, but included no funds to reduce development schedule risk
   of the alternate engine common hardware components.

   The JSF program will develop and field a family of aircraft that
   meets the needs of the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and allies
   with commonality among the variants to minimize life cycle costs.
   The committee notes that the JSF joint program office (JPO) has
   encouraged two engine manufacturers to work together on the
   co-development of propulsion components which are common to both
   the JSF's current F-119 engine and the F-120 alternate engine (158)
   and understands that this effort will develop two interchangeable
   propulsion systems while preserving the proprietary interests of
   each manufacturer. The committee also understands that the JPO
   supports production of the F-120 alternate engine as part of the
   low-rate initial JSF production scheduled for fiscal year 2009 but
   believes that increased funding in fiscal year 2002 is required to
   reduce development schedule risk of the common hardware components.

   Accordingly, the committee recommends $779.5 million in PE 64800F,
   an increase of $10.0 million, to reduce development schedule risk
   of the JSF alternate engine common hardware components.


FY2003

DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 5010/P.L. 107-248 of October 23, 2002)

The conference report (H.Rept. 107-732 of October 9, 2002) on H.R. 5010 states on page 279:
   The conferees have included an additional $29,750,000 for the Joint
   Strike Fighter Interchangeable Engine Program only to continue the
   current effort to develop and maintain two, competing,
   interchangeable engine programs for the Joint Strike Fighter.


FY2004

Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1588/P.L. 108-136 of November 24, 2003)

The SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE report (S.Rept. 108-46 of May 13, 2003) on S. 1050, the companion bill to H.R. 1588, notes on page 4 the recommendation for $56 million in additional funding for the JSF program. The report discussed the JSF program on page 185, stating in part:
   The committee believes that the interchangeable engine should be
   made available for competitive procurement as early as possible.
   The result of a reduction to this program would be to delay the
   interchangeable engine by at least two years.

   Therefore, the committee recommends an increase of $56.0 million in
   PE 64800N to continue the F136 interchangeable engine development
   on its original schedule. The committee believes that the
   Department of Defense should make the financial adjustments to the
   Future Years Defense Program that are necessary to restore the
   original interchangeable engine schedule.


DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 2658/P.L. 108-87 of September 30, 2003)

The Senate Appropriations Committee report (S.Rept. 108-87 of July 10, 2003) on S. 1382, the companion bill to H.R. 2658 discussed the JSF program on page 157, stating:
   The Committee is dismayed that the Joint Strike Fighter program
   office was permitted to take a reduction for inflation savings
   disproportionately against the F136 Interchangeable Engine. This
   cut resulted in a $56,000,000 reduction to this engine's research
   and development effort in fiscal year 2004.

   The Committee has been supportive of this engine development
   program for several years and has, in fact, increased funding to
   accelerate this engine's development. This cut to the program flies
   in the face of longstanding Committee support.

   The Committee, therefore, recommends a total cut of $56,000,000 to
   the Joint Strike Fighter program which is to be taken equally from
   the Navy and the Air Force Joint Strike Fighter programs with the
   exception of the F136 engine program. The Committee also recommends
   that the fiscal year 2004 cut to the F136 Interchangeable Engine be
   restored to the original program with an appropriate adjustment for
   the inflation cut.

   Finally, the Committee has added $20,000,000 to this program only
   for risk reduction to the F136 Interchangeable Engine program.


FY2005

Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4200/P.L. 108-375 of October 28, 2004)

The House Armed Services Committee report (H.Rept. 108-491 of May 14, 2004) on H.R. 4200 discussed the JSF program on page 183, stating in par:
   In order to maintain competition for the engine for the JSF,
   Congress has mandated the funding of an alternate engine program
   and the JSF Joint Program Office (JPO) is working with the
   contractor propulsion teams to provide for completely
   interchangeable engines.

   The committee believes that the earliest possible engine production
   lot competition is beneficial to the JSF program. The committee
   directs the JSF JPO plan to compete, at the earliest possible date,
   engine common hardware as well as the turbomachinery, while
   maintaining PW F135 and GE F136 engine interchangeability.


FY2006

Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2006)

The House Armed Services Committee report (H.Rept. 109-89 of May 20, 2005) on H.R. 1815 discussed the JSF program on pages 92-93, stating in part:
   Additionally, the committee understands that during the preparation
   of the fiscal year 2006 budget request that there were efforts by
   some within the military services to eliminate planned budgets for
   the JSF competitive engine development program. Despite those
   views, the committee also understands that the Secretary of Defense
   ensured that the engine program was nominally funded. The committee
   believes that a two-engine source for the single-engine JSF would
   be the most cost effective and operationally effective engine
   solution during the JSF's service life, and therefore expects that
   the Secretary, along with Department of the Navy and the Department
   of the Air Force, will remain committed to the development of
   competitive engines for the JSF.


FY2007

Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006)

Section 211 of H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 states:

SEC. 211. ACQUISITION OF, AND INDEPENDENT COST ANALYSES FOR, THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROPULSION SYSTEM.

(a) ACQUISITION.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide for the development and procurement of the propulsion system for the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft through the continued development and sustainment of two interchangeable propulsion systems for that aircraft by two separate contractors throughout the life cycle of the aircraft.

(2) MODIFICATIONS PROHIBITED.--Except as provided by paragraph (3), the Secretary may not carry out any modification to the acquisition program for the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft that would result in the development or procurement of the propulsion system for that aircraft in a manner other than that required by paragraph (1).

(3) MODIFICATIONS ALLOWED.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a modification described in paragraph (2) may be carried out to the extent that each of the following requirements is met:

(A) The Secretary of Defense has notified the congressional defense committees of the modification.

(B) Each of the reports required by subsection (b) has been submitted.

(C) Funds are appropriated for that purpose pursuant to an authorization of appropriations.

(b) INDEPENDENT COST ANALYSES.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--A comprehensive and detailed cost analysis of the Joint Strike Fighter engine program shall be independently performed by each of the following:

(A) The Comptroller General.

(B) A federally funded research and development center selected by the Secretary of Defense.

(C) The Secretary of Defense, acting through the Cost Analysis Improvement Group of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) MATTERS COVERED.--Each such cost analysis shall cover--

(A) an alternative under which the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft is capable of using the F135 engine only;

(B) an alternative under which the program executes a one-time firm-fixed price contract for a selected propulsion system for the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft for the life cycle of the aircraft following the Initial Service Release of the propulsion system in fiscal year 2008;

(C) an alternative under which the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft is capable of using either the F135 engine or the F136 engine, and the engine selection is carried out on a competitive basis; and

(D) any other alternative, whether competitive or sole source, that would reduce total lifecycle cost, improve program schedule, or both.

(3) REPORTS.--Not later than March 15, 2007, the Secretary of Defense, the Comptroller General, and the chief executive officer of the federally funded research and development center selected under paragraph (1)(B) shall independently submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the cost analysis carried out under paragraph (1). Each such report shall include each of the following matters:

(A) The key assumptions used in carrying out the cost analysis.

(B) The methodology and techniques used in carrying out the cost analysis.

(C) For each alternative required by paragraph (2)--

(i) a comparison of the life-cycle costs, including costs in current and constant dollars and a net-present-value analysis;

(ii) estimates of--

(I) supply, maintenance, and other operations manpower required to support the alternative;

(II) the number of flight hours required to achieve engine maturity and the year in which that is expected to be achieved; and

(III) the total number of engines expected to be procured over the lifetime of the Joint Strike Fighter program; and

(iii) an evaluation of benefits, other than cost, provided by competition, to include an assessment of improved performance, operational readiness and warfighting capability, risk reduction, technology innovation, and contractor responsiveness.

(D) A description of the acquisition strategies (including development and production) that were used for, and experience with respect to cost, schedule, and performance under, past acquisition programs for engines for tactical fighter aircraft, including the F-15, F-16, F-18, and F-22 aircraft.

(E) A comparison of the experiences under past acquisition programs carried out on a sole-source basis with respect to performance, savings, maintainability, reliability, and technical innovation.

(F) The impact that canceling the F136 competitive engine would have on the high-performance military engine industrial base, and on the Department of Defense's ability to make competitive engine choices for future combat aircraft systems beyond the Joint Strike Fighter.

(G) Conclusions and recommendations.

(4) CERTIFICATIONS.--In submitting the report required by paragraph (3), the Comptroller General and the chief executive officer of the federally funded research and development center shall also submit a certification as to whether the Secretary of Defense provided access to sufficient information to enable the Comptroller General or the chief executive officer, as the case may be, to make informed judgments on the matters required to be included in the report.

(c) LIFE-CYCLE COSTS DEFINED.--In this section, the term "lifecycle costs" includes

(1) those elements of cost that would be considered for a life-cycle cost analysis for a major defense acquisition program, including procurement of engines, procurement of spare engines, and procurement of engine components and parts; and (2) good-faith estimates of routine engine costs (such as performance upgrades and component improvement) that historically have occurred in tactical fighter engine programs.

The House Armed Services Committee report (H.Rept. 109-452 of May 5, 2006) on H.R. 5122 discussed the JSF program on pages 105-106 and 220-221. The discussion on pages 220-221 states in part:
   The budget request contained $2.0 billion in PE 64800F for the
   Department of the Air Force's development of the joint strike
   fighter (JSF), also known as the F-35, but included no funds for
   research and development of a second aircraft tire source for the
   JSF and other existing combat aircraft, or for development of an
   alternate JSF engine. The committee notes that the budget request
   also includes $2.0 billion in PE 64800N for the Department of the
   Navy's development of JSF....

   The JSF alternate engine program is developing the F136 engine
   which would provide an alternative to the currently-planned F135
   engine. In the committee report (H. Rept. 109-89) accompanying the
   National Defense Authorization Report for Fiscal Year 2006, the
   committee expressed its belief that a two-engine source for the
   single-engine JSF would be the most cost effective and
   operationally effective engine solution during the JSF's service
   life, and is disappointed that the budget request did not include
   funds for development of an alternate JSF engine beyond fiscal year
   2006. During a hearing held by the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and
   Land Forces on March 16, 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense for
   Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics testified, "While the
   benefits of a second supplier are undeniable, our judgment is that
   those benefits are not worth the substantial financial cost of a
   second supplier." To confirm those judgments, the committee
   requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) witness
   at the hearing review and report on the Department of Defense's
   analysis that resulted in the judgment to terminate the JSF
   alternate engine program. On April 12, 2006, the GAO witness
   reported to the committee that the "Department of Defense's
   quantitative analysis focuses only on potential savings for engine
   acquisition and does not appear to fully examine potential savings
   that may be possible when competition exists for providing support
   for maintenance and operations over the lifecycle of the engine."
   The committee concurs with GAO's observation, and believes that the
   JSF alternate engine program should continue until the Department
   of Defense fully analyzes potential costs and savings resulting
   from competition over the JSF engine's lifecycle.

   Accordingly, the committee recommends an increase of $408.0 million
   to continue the JSF alternate engine program for fiscal year 2007.
   Additionally, the committee recommends a provision (section 211)
   that would require that the Department of the Navy and the
   Department of the Air Force obligate not less than $408.0 million,
   of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the system
   development and demonstration program for the Joint Strike Fighter,
   for continued development of an alternate engine for the Joint
   Strike Fighter. The committee also recommends a provision (section
   215) that would require both the Secretary of Defense, acting
   through the Department of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group,
   and the Comptroller General to conduct independent analyses of the
   JSF alternate engine program and provide a report to the
   congressional defense committees by March 15, 2007.


The Senate Armed Services Committee report (S.Rept. 109-254 of May 9, 2006) on S. 2766, the companion bill to 5122, states on page 6:
   In order to confront irregular warfare threats, the Department must
   modernize and transform the armed forces. Since 2001, the
   Department has undergone significant modernization and
   transformation even during a time of war. The committee supported
   the Department's transformational activities, including authorizing
   funds for the construction of eight ships, for a total of $12.1
   billion; including a provision to promote coordinated joint
   development, procurement, and operation of unmanned systems; adding
   funds for the continued development of the Joint Strike Fighter
   interchangeable engine during fiscal year 2007; authorizing the
   budget request of $3.7 billion for the Army's Future Combat Systems
   program; and authorizing an increase of nearly $365.0 million over
   the President's budget request of $11.1 billion for science and
   technology programs.


The report states on page 7:
   Increasingly, the committee has emphasized the importance of
   developing capabilities to plan and conduct coalition operations.
   Ten years ago, the committee expressed concerns regarding the lack
   of engine competition in the Joint Strike Fighter program. As a
   result, the committee included a provision in the National Defense
   Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106) that
   directed the Secretary of Defense to evaluate at least two
   propulsion concepts from competing engine companies. Recently, the
   committee held hearings to review the Department's unilateral
   proposal, despite legislative direction to maintain a two-engine
   program, to eliminate the development of the F136 alternate
   interchangeable engine from the Joint Strike Fighter program. The
   committee remains concerned that relying on one engine provider to
   perform multiple missions, for multiple services and multiple
   nations presents an unnecessary operational and financial risk to
   the United States. Accordingly, the committee authorized provisions
   adding $400.8 million for the continued development of the
   interchangeable engine during fiscal year 2007; and directing the
   Secretary of Defense to continue the development and sustainment of
   the Joint Strike Fighter program with two competitive propulsion
   systems throughout the life of the aircraft or enter into a
   one-time, firm-fixed-price contract for a single propulsion system
   throughout the life of the aircraft.


The report discussed two proposed legislative provisions on pages 129-131, stating:
   Development of the propulsion system for the Joint Strike Fighter
   (sec. 254)

   The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
   Secretary of Defense to continue the development and sustainment of
   the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program with two competitive
   propulsion systems throughout the life cycle of the aircraft, or
   enter into a one-time firm-fixed-price contract for a selected
   propulsion system for the life cycle of the aircraft following the
   initial service release of the JSF F135 propulsion system in fiscal
   year 2008.

   During the 1970's and early 1980's, Pratt & Whitney was the sole
   source provider of engines for the F-14, F-15, and F-16 aircraft.
   Because of persistent engine problems that resulted in the loss of
   aircraft and degraded readiness, Congress directed the Department
   of Defense to develop and produce an engine to compete with Pratt &
   Whitney engines on these aircraft. The benefits that resulted from
   this competition included improved performance, reduced risk,
   increased readiness, lower cost of ownership, improved contractor
   responsiveness to customer needs, and over $4.0 billion of cost
   savings. Congress once again directed the Department to provide for
   an engine competition for the JSF in 1996 out of concerns for a
   lack of competition expressed in the National Defense Authorization
   Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106). Congress has consistently
   supported a competitive engine program for the Joint Strike Fighter
   for the past 10 years.

   The JSF program is the largest acquisition program, in terms of
   funding, in Department of Defense history. Total JSF deliveries may
   well exceed 4,000 aircraft worldwide, with a resultant level of
   propulsion business in the tens of billions of dollars. The
   committee is concerned that relying on a sole engine supplier for a
   single-engine aircraft to do multiple missions for multiple
   services and multiple nations presents an unnecessary operational
   and financial risk to our nation.

   The committee is also concerned that the Department's analysis
   provided to the committee, as justification for the termination of
   the F136 interchangeable engine, accounted for only 3 0 percent of
   the engine costs over the life cycle of the aircraft and failed to
   comply with the Department's policy on economic analysis that would
   have required the inclusion of the total life cycle cost. If the
   Department had conducted a full life cycle analysis, the committee
   believes that the results of the analysis would show significant
   cost savings that could be achieved through a competitive engine
   strategy. The committee believes that through the enduring value of
   competition, sufficient savings will be generated from a series of
   competitive engine procurements over the life cycle of the aircraft
   that will more than offset the cost of completing the F136 engine
   development. In order to ensure that the Congress has the complete
   picture of the full life cycle costs, the committee has recommended
   another provision described elsewhere in this report that would
   require the Secretary of Defense and the Comptroller General to
   conduct independent life cycle cost analyses addressing this issue.

   Independent cost analyses for Joint Strike Fighter engine program
   (sec. 255)

   The committee recommends a provision that would direct the
   Secretary of Defense, a federally-funded research and development
   center (FFRDC) chosen by the Secretary, and the Comptroller General
   to conduct independent life cycle cost analyses of the development
   and sustainment of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program with two
   competitive propulsion systems throughout the life cycle of the
   aircraft, versus terminating the alternate engine development and
   proceeding with only one engine.

   The provision would also require that the Comptroller and the FFRDC
   certify that they had access to sufficient information upon which
   to make informed judgments on the life cycle costs of the two
   alternatives.

   As noted elsewhere in this report, the committee is concerned that
   the Department of Defense analysis provided as justification for
   the termination of the F136 interchangeable engine did not account
   for all of the costs over the life cycle of the aircraft.


The report discussed the JSF program on pages 95-96 and 179. The discussion on page 179 states:
   F136 Interchangeable Engine

   The budget request included $1,999.0 million in PE 64800F and
   $2,031.0 million in PE 64800N for the continued development of the
   Joint Strike Fighter, but included no funding for the development
   of the F136 interchangeable engine. The committee believes
   supporting competitive propulsion systems would help reduce
   operational risk and lead to higher confidence of achieving more
   affordable life cycle costs. The committee expects that the
   Secretary of Defense, along with the Department of the Navy and the
   Department of the Air Force, will remain committed to the
   development and sustainment of competitive propulsion systems for
   the Joint Strike Fighter.

   The committee recommends an increase of $200.4 million in PE 64800F
   and an increase of $200.4 million in PE 64800N for the continued
   development of the F136 interchangeable engine.


DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 5631/P.L. 109-289 of September 29, 2006)

The conference report (H.Rept. 109-676 of September 25, 2006) on H.R. 5631 discussed the JSF program on pages 205 and 228. The discussion on pages 228 states:
   The conferees recommend an additional $170,000,000 in Research,
   Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force and $170,000,000 in
   Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy for continuing
   development of the F-136 engine for the Joint Strike Fighter
   program. The conferees direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
   Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to sponsor a comprehensive
   independent cost analysis of the Joint Strike Fighter engine
   program. The conferees strongly encourage the analysis be conducted
   by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). This analysis shall
   include but not be limited to: (1) a comparison of costs associated
   with the development of the F-135 and F-136 engines; (2) an
   evaluation of potential savings achieved by eliminating or
   continuing the development and production of an alternate engine
   over the program's life cycle; and (3) the potential effects on the
   industrial base of eliminating or continuing the development and
   production of an alternate engine over the program's life cycle.
   This analysis shall be transmitted to the congressional defense
   committees not later than March 15, 2007.

   The conferees in no way intend for this analysis to be an excuse
   for the Department of Defense not to fully fund the development of
   both the F-135 and the F-136 engines in fiscal year 2008. All
   evidence suggests that the development of two alternate engines
   will lead to cost savings through competition, increased
   capabilities for the warfighter, and a strengthened industrial
   base. Accordingly, the conferees direct the Department of Defense
   to fund the continued development of both the engines in the fiscal
   year 2008 budget submission while this cost analysis is ongoing.


The House Appropriations Committee report (H.Rept. 109-504 of June 16, 2006) on H.R. 5631 discusses the JSF program on page 163 and 266. The discussion on page 266 states:
   The budget request provided no funding for development of the F-136
   engine for the Joint Strike Fighter program. The Committee
   recommends an additional $200,000,000 for continued development of
   this alternate engine source. The Committee directs the Under
   Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to
   sponsor a comprehensive independent cost analysis of the Joint
   Strike Fighter engine program to be conducted by a federally funded
   research and development center (FFRDC) with demonstrated
   competence in this area. This analysis shall include but not be
   limited to: (1) a comparison of costs associated with the
   development of the F-135 and F-136 engines; (2) an evaluation of
   potential savings achieved by eliminating or continuing the
   development and production of an alternate engine over the
   program's life cycle; and (3) the potential effects on the
   industrial base of eliminating or continuing the development and
   production of an alternate engine over the program's life cycle.
   This analysis shall be transmitted to the congressional defense
   committees not later than March 15, 2007.

   The Committee is supportive of required studies included in the
   House-passed version of the National Defense Authorization Act,
   2007, and intends that this cost analysis be complementary to those
   studies.


The Senate Appropriations Committee report (S.Rept. 109-292 of July 25, 2006) on H.R. 5631 discusses the JSF program on pages 76-77 and 157. The discussion on page 157 states:
   The Committee is disappointed that the Department of Defense did
   not include funding for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 2nd Engine
   Source in the fiscal year 2007 budget request. Although the
   Committee recognizes that the Department of Defense faces difficult
   budget challenges, the Committee also believes it is premature to
   cancel the second engine source. Experience with the F-16 Fighter
   program engine competition led to a more reliable, better
   performing and lower cost engine. The Committee believes that
   competition for the F-35 engine is critical to procuring the best
   value engine at the lowest price and that competition will likely
   lead to an overall savings across the life cycle of the fighter
   program. Therefore, the Committee recommends an additional
   $170,000,000 to each of the Navy and Air Force Research,
   Development, Test and Evaluation accounts. The Committee also
   directs the Department of Defense to fund the continued development
   of both engines in future budget submissions.


FY2008

Section 213 of H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 states:
   SEC. 213. REQUIREMENT TO OBLIGATE AND EXPEND FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT
   AND PROCUREMENT OF A COMPETITIVE PROPULSION SYSTEM FOR THE JOINT
   STRIKE FIGHTER.

   Of the funds appropriated pursuant to an authorization of
   appropriations or otherwise made available for fiscal year 2008 or
   any year thereafter, for research, development, test, and
   evaluation and procurement for the Joint Strike Fighter Program,
   the Secretary of Defense shall ensure the obligation and
   expenditure in each such fiscal year of sufficient annual amounts
   for the continued development and procurement of 2 options for the
   propulsion system for the Joint Strike Fighter in order to ensure
   the development and competitive production for the propulsion
   system for the Joint Strike Fighter. (159)


H.R. 4986 is a revised version of H.R. 1585, which was vetoed on December 12, 2007. The House Armed Services Committee report (H.Rept. 110-146 of May 11, 2007) on H.R. 1585 discussed the JSF program on pages 213-214, stating:
   The budget request contained $1.8 billion in PE 64800F, and $1.7
   billion in PE 64800N, for development of the Joint Strike Fighter
   (JSF), but contained no funds for development of a competitive JSF
   propulsion system.

   The competitive JSF propulsion system program is developing the
   F136 engine, which would provide a competitive alternative to the
   currently-planned F135 engine. In the committee report (H. Rept.
   109-452) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for
   Fiscal Year 2007, the committee recommended an increase for the JSF
   competitive propulsion system, and notes that the other three
   congressional defense committees also recommended increases for
   this purpose. Section 211 of the John Warner National Defense
   Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364)
   required that the Secretary of Defense, acting through the
   Department of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group, the
   Comptroller General, and a federally funded research and
   development center each provide an independent lifecycle cost
   analysis of the JSF propulsion system, which would include a
   competitive engine program by March 15, 2007. On March 22, 2007,
   the Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces and Seapower and
   Expeditionary Forces held a hearing, which included witnesses from
   the Department of Defense, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and
   the Government Accountability Office (GAO), to receive testimony
   regarding their findings on the JSF propulsion system. The
   committee believes the results of these studies were, in the
   aggregate, inconclusive on whether there would be a financial
   benefit to the Department in continuing to develop a competitive
   propulsion system for the JSF program. However, the committee notes
   that all studies identified significant non-financial factors of a
   two-engine competitive program, which include: better engine
   performance; improved contractor responsiveness; a more robust
   industrial base; increased engine reliability; and improved
   operational readiness. The committee believes that the benefits,
   which could be derived from the non-financial factors, favor
   continuing the JSF competitive propulsion system program, and
   recommends an increase of $480.0 million for this purpose.

   The committee recommends $1.8 billion in PE 64800N, an increase of
   $115.0 million, and directs that $240.0 million of the recommended
   funds be used for the competitive JSF propulsion system program;
   and $1.9 billion in PE 64800F, an increase of $115.0 million, and
   directs that $240.0 of the recommended funds be used for the
   competitive JSF propulsion system program.

   Additionally, the committee recommends a provision (section 213)
   that would require the Secretary of Defense to obligate sufficient
   annual amounts to develop and procure a competitive propulsion
   system for the JSF program, in order to conduct a competitive
   propulsion source selection, from funds appropriated pursuant to an
   authorization of appropriations or otherwise made available for
   research, development, test, and evaluation, and procurement for
   the JSF program. The committee notes that current plans for the
   competitive JSF propulsion system would complete the development of
   the competitive propulsion system so that a competition for the JSF
   propulsion would occur in fiscal year 2012 with the sixth lot of
   low-rate initial production aircraft.


The Senate Armed Services Committee report (S.Rept. 110-77 of June 5, 2007) on S. 1547, the companion bill to H.R. 1585, discussed a proposed legislative provision on pages 139-140, stating:
   The committee recommends a provision that would require the
   Secretary of Defense to obligate sufficient annual amounts to
   develop and procure a competitive propulsion system for the Joint
   Strike Fighter (JSF) program, in order to conduct a competitive
   propulsion source selection, from funds appropriated pursuant to an
   authorization of appropriations or otherwise made available for
   research, development, test, and evaluation, and procurement for
   the JSF program. The committee notes that current plans for the
   competitive JSF propulsion system would complete the development of
   the competitive propulsion system so that a competition for the JSF
   propulsion system would occur in fiscal year 2012 with the sixth
   lot of low-rate initial production.

   The budget request contained $1.7 billion in PE 64800N, and $1.8
   billion in PE 64800F for development of the JSF, but contained no
   funds for development of a competitive JSF propulsion system.

   The competitive JSF propulsion system program is developing the
   F136 engine, which would provide a competitive alternative to the
   current baseline F135 engine. Section 211 of the John Warner
   National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law
   109-364) required that, by March 15, 2007, the Secretary of Defense,
   acting through the Department of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement
   Group, the Comptroller General, and a federally funded research and
   development center, each provide an independent life cycle cost
   analysis of the JSF propulsion system, which would include a
   competitive engine program. The committee has been briefed on the
   results of these reviews and believes those results were, in the
   aggregate, inconclusive on whether there would be a financial
   benefit to the Department of Defense in continuing to develop a
   competitive propulsion system for the JSF program.

   However, the committee notes that all studies identified
   significant non-financial factors of a two-engine competitive
   program that should be considered in deciding between the
   alternatives. These factors include: better engine performance;
   improved contractor responsiveness; a more robust industrial base;
   increased engine reliability; and improved operational readiness.
   The committee believes that the potential benefits from the
   non-financial factors favor continuing the JSF competitive
   propulsion system program. Therefore, the committee recommends an
   increase of $480.0 million for this purpose, including $240.0
   million in PE 64800N, and $240.0 million in PE 64800F.


DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 3222/P.L. 110-116 of November 13, 2007)

The House Appropriations Committee report (H.Rept. 110-279 of July 30, 2007) on H.R. 3222 discussed the JSF program on page 6, stating:
   The success of the Department's Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) program
   is critical to our Nation's ability to field a modern, capable
   fighter aircraft fleet for decades to come. To maintain stability
   in this program-and limit the potential for cost increases over
   time--the Committee recommends an increase of $200,000,000 for F-35
   production enhancements. These funds are to be used to outfit
   facilities with the latest in production line equipment and
   work-flow technology. In addition, the Committee recommends
   including $480,000,000 to continue development of an alternative
   engine for this aircraft, thereby ensuring a competitive base for
   engine production.


The report discussed JSF the program again on pages 161-162, 211, and 360. The discussion on page 360 states in part:
   The fiscal year 2008 budget request includes no funding for
   development of the F-136 as an alternate engine within the Joint
   Strike Fighter program. The Committee recommends $480,000,000 for
   this effort. These funds have been added to the Air Force and
   Navy's respective Joint Strike Fighter development lines.

   The statement of the managers accompanying the conference report on
   the Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2007 directed the
   Department of Defense to fund the continued development of both the
   F-135 and F-136 engines in the fiscal year 2008 budget request. The
   Committee notes that this direction was disregarded by the Office
   of the Secretary of Defense. In exercising its power of the purse,
   the Committee made the necessary program adjustments to the fiscal
   year 2008 budget request to fully fund the requirement for this
   engine development program. The fiscal year 2009 requirement for
   the F-136 is estimated to be $350,000,000. The Committee again
   directs the Department of Defense to fully fund this development
   program in the fiscal year 2009 budget submission.


The Senate Appropriations Committee report (S.Rept. 110-155 of September 14, 2007) on H.R. 3222 discusses the JSF program on page 191, stating:
   The Committee is disappointed that the Department of Defense did
   not continue funding to support the development of an alternative
   engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in the fiscal year 2008
   budget request. Although the Committee recognizes that the
   Department of Defense faces difficult budget challenges, the
   Committee also believes it is premature to cancel the second engine
   source. Experience with the F-16 Fighter program demonstrated that
   engine competition led to a more reliable, better performing and
   lower cost engine. The Committee believes that competition for the
   F-35 engine is critical to procuring the best value engine at the
   lowest price and that competition will likely lead to an overall
   savings across the life cycle of the fighter program. Therefore,
   the Committee recommends an additional $240,000,000 in both the
   Navy and Air Force Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
   accounts. The Committee also directs the Department of Defense to
   fund the continued development of both engines in future budget
   submissions.


FY2009

Defense Authorization Act (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417 of October 14, 2008)

The House Armed Services report (H.Rept. 110-652 of May 16, 2008) on H.R. 5658, the companion bill to S. 3001, discussed the JSF program on pages 227-228, stating:
   The budget request contained $1.5 billion in PE 64800F, and $1.5
   billion in PE 64800N, for development of the Joint Strike Fighter
   (JSF), but contained no funds for development of a competitive JSF
   propulsion system. The budget request also contained $136.9 million
   for F35 advance procurement in Aircraft Procurement, Air Force for
   the long-lead components necessary to procure 12 F-35A aircraft in
   fiscal year 2010, but contained no funds for advance procurement of
   competitive JSF propulsion system long-lead components.

   The competitive JSF propulsion system program is developing the
   F136 engine, which would provide a competitive alternative to the
   currently-planned F135 engine. In the committee report (H.Rept.
   109-452) accompanying the John Warner National Defense
   Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, and once again in the
   committee report (H. Rept. 110-146) accompanying the National
   Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the committee
   recommended increases for the JSF competitive propulsion system,
   and notes that in both cases, the other three congressional defense
   committees concurred. Despite section 213 of the National Defense
   Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), which
   requires the Secretary of Defense to obligate and expend sufficient
   annual amounts for the continued development and procurement of a
   competitive propulsion system for the JSF, the committee is
   disappointed that the Department of Defense (DOD) chose not to
   comply with both the spirit and intent of this provision by opting
   not to include funds for this purpose in the budget request.

   On March 11, 2008, the Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces and
   Seapower and Expeditionary Forces held a hearing at which the
   Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
   (USD (AT&L)) and the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
   Director of Acquisition Sourcing and Management testified.
   Witnesses were asked to provide an update to the independent
   lifecycle cost analysis of the JSF propulsion system required by
   section 211 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act
   for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364) based on the obligation
   of an additional $480.0 million authorized and appropriated for
   fiscal year 2008, performance of the competitive engine program to
   date, and the additional year of development. The GAO Director of
   Acquisition and Sourcing Management complied with the
   subcommittees' request and testified that the Department of Defense
   would recoup its initial investment costs with program savings of
   between 9 and 11 percent, or about 1.3 percent less than the GAO
   reported in 2007. He also testified that at least that amount of
   savings could be achieved in the long run based on analysis of
   actual data from the F-16 engine competition. Opting not to comply
   with the committee request, the USD (AT&L) testified that the
   Department did not direct the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
   Cost Analysis and Improvement Group to update its analysis from the
   previous year, and that there had been no significant changes to
   the program that would have resulted in any changes to their
   findings. Based on this testimony, the committee believes that a
   competitive propulsion system for the JSF offers the promise of
   long-term savings.

   The committee also notes that in August 2007, the currently planned
   F135 engine experienced a hardware failure during test stand
   operations with the short take-off and vertical land (STOVL) lift
   fan engaged, and that a similar failure occurred again in February
   2008, and that these engine failure will result in a currently
   projected delay to the first flight of the F-35 STOVL variant by 30
   to 60 days. While the committee understands that the F135 engine is
   still in development and test failures may occur, the committee
   believes that, over the long-term, a competitive JSF propulsion
   program will result in improved engine performance for all JSF
   variants. These test failure events and the subcommittees' hearing
   testimony cause the committee to remain steadfast in its belief
   that the non-financial factors of a two-engine competitive program
   such as better engine performance, improved contractor
   responsiveness, a more robust industrial base, increased engine
   reliability and improved operational readiness strongly favor
   continuing the competitive propulsion system program.

   For continued development of the competitive JSF propulsion system
   program, the committee recommends $1.8 billion, an increase of
   $247.5 million in PE 64800F, and $1.8 billion, an increase of
   $247.5 million in PE 64800N. The committee also recommends $167.9
   million, an increase of $31.0 million for advance procurement of
   competitive JSF propulsion system long-lead components, for F-35
   advance procurement in Aircraft Procurement, Air Force.
   Additionally, the committee strongly urges the Department of
   Defense to comply with the spirit and intent of section 213 of the
   National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law
   110-181) by including the funds necessary for continued development
   and procurement of a competitive JSF propulsion system in its
   fiscal year 2010 budget request.


The Senate Armed Services Committee report (S.Rept. 110-335 of May 12, 2008) on S. 3001 discussed the JSF program on pages 99-100, stating:
   The budget request included $136.9 million in Aircraft Procurement,
   Air Force (APAF) for advanced procurement for the F-35 Joint Strike
   Fighter (JSF) program. In section 213 of the National Defense
   Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181),
   Congress explicitly directed the Department of Defense to (1)
   develop a competitive propulsion system for the JSF aircraft; and
   (2) continue competition for the propulsion system throughout the
   production phase of the JSF program.

   In order to follow through on that direction and begin competition
   with the F-135 engine in 2012, the Department of Defense must begin
   funding for long lead items for the F-136 production line in 2009.

   Therefore, the committee recommends in increase of $35.0 million in
   APAF for long lead items for the F-136 engine.


The report further discussed the JSF program on pages 123-124 and 197. The discussion on page 197 states:
   The budget request included $1,532.7 million in PE 64800N and
   $1,524.0 million in PE 64800F for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
   (JSF) program. In section 213 of the National Defense Authorization
   Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), Congress explicitly
   directed the Department of Defense to (1) develop a competitive
   propulsion system for the JSF aircraft; and (2) continue
   competition for the propulsion system throughout the production
   phase of the JSF program.

   The committee is disappointed that the administration chose to
   ignore the law by failing to fund the competitive propulsion
   system. Accordingly, the committee recommends an increase of $215.0
   million in PE 64800N and $215.0 million in PE 64800F for
   development of the F-35 JSF competitive propulsion system.


The report further discusses the JSF program on page 222, stating:
   The budget request included $1,524.0 million in PE 64800F for the
   F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. Over the past 2 years,
   Congress has added $820.0 million to continue funding of the F136
   engine, a competitive propulsion source, to ensure there is fair
   and full competition for the propulsion system of the JSF.

   The Department of Defense froze the technology baseline of the F135
   engine several years ago when the JSF and the engine began system
   development and demonstration (SDD). To ensure that both engines
   incorporate the best configuration and most recent technology
   available, the Department should invest in and direct a program for
   the F135 and F136 engine programs that would drive technology
   insertion and provide potential customers with the best performing,
   most efficient engines possible. For example, the committee
   believes that the potential application of new composite materials
   in the F135 engine program could result in life cycle cost savings.
   Because no funds were set aside for the F136 engine in the
   administration's budget request, elsewhere in this report the
   committee has recommended an increase of $430.0 million for the
   development of the F-136 engine.

   In order to maintain a level playing field, the committee
   recommends an increase of $35.0 million in PE 64800F for F135
   engine technology development.


Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008)

The FY2009 DOD Appropriations Act is Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329. In lieu of a conference report for H.R. 2638, there was an explanatory statement that was printed as a House Appropriations Committee print dated October 2008 (print 44-807). The committee print discussed the JSF program on page 215, stating:
   The fiscal year 2009 budget request included no funding for the
   continued development of the F-136 engine as an alternate engine
   within the Joint Strike Fighter program. The bill includes
   $430,000,000 for the continued development of this engine within
   the Navy and Air Force's Joint Strike Fighter development programs
   and $35,000,000 for advance procurement items within the Aircraft
   Procurement, Air Force appropriation. The Secretary of Defense is
   once again directed to fully fund the F-136 engine development and
   procurement efforts in the fiscal year 2010 budget submission.


Appendix B. F-35 Key Performance Parameters

Table B-1 summarizes key performance parameters for the three versions of the F-35.
Table B-1. F-35 Key Performance Parameters (KPPs)

                                                             F-35C
                               F-35A                          Navy
                             Air Force        F-35B         carrier-
Source                          CTOL       Marine Corps     suitable
of KPP         KPP            version      STOVL version    version

Joint    Radio                Very low       Very low       Very low
         frequency           observable     observable     observable
         signature

         Combat radius         590 nm         450 nm         600 nm
                             Air Force     Marine Corps   Navy mission
                              mission        mission        profile
                              profile        profile

         Sortie             3 surge / 2    4 surge / 3    3 surge / 2
         generation          sustained      sustained      sustained

         Logistics            < 8 C-l7       < 8 C-17       < 46,000
         footprint           equivalent     equivalent    cubic feet,
                             loads (24      loads (20      243 short
                                PAA)           PAA)           tons

         Mission                93%            95%            95%
         reliability

         Interoperability       Meet 100% of critical, top-level
                               information exchange requirements;
                                     secure voice and data

Marine   STOVL mission          n/a          550 feet         n/a
Corps    performance--
         short-takeoff
         distance

         STOVL mission          n/a        2 x IK JDAM,       n/a
         performance--                     2 x AIM-l20,
         vertical lift                     with reserve
         bring-back                            fuel

Navy     Maximum approach       n/a            n/a         l45 knots
         speed

Source: F-35 program office, October 11, 2007.

Notes: PAA is primary authorized aircraft (per squadron);
vertical lift bring back is the amount of weapons with
which plane can safely land.


Appendix C. The "Great Engine War" of 1984-1994160

Congress's interest in establishing and funding an F-35 alternate engine program may have been informed by "the Great Engine War"--an annual competition from 1984 to 1994 between Pratt and Whitney and General Electric to produce and maintain engines for Air Force F-16 fighters. (161) Pratt and Whitney's engine for the F-16 was the F100, which was originally developed for the Air Force F-15 fighter. General Electric's alternate engine for the F-16 was the F110.

Historians trace the Air Force's interest in pursuing an alternate engine for the F-16 to Air Force frustrations in the 1970s with Pratt and Whitney's management of the effort to develop the F100, and to Air Force concerns about using a single type of sole-sourced engine to power their entire fighter fleet of F-15s and F-16s. (162) After a number of contentious hearings in 1979, Congress provided funding through the Engine Model Derivative Program (EMDP), a congressionally directed program, for General Electric to develop its F101 engine (which later became the F110) as an alternate engine for the F-16. DOD spent more than $376 million to develop the F110 to compete with the F100, and $600 million to improve the F100's durability and reliability to make it a stronger competitor.

The use of annual competitions for procuring engines for an aircraft procurement program was unprecedented and controversial. Proponents believe it produced better engines, on better terms, for less money than would purchasing from a single company facing no competition. Other observers believed it "unjustifiably jeopardized combat effectiveness and pilot survivability." (163) Most of the studies have concluded that contractor responsiveness--not dollar savings--was the primary benefit of the competition. Testimony presented at a 1984 hearing suggested that requiring General Electric and Pratt and Whitney to compete for annual production and O&S work generated benefits for DOD in areas such as better contract terms and conditions, better warranties to assure engine quality, consistency, and long term stability of support. (164) A 1987 assessment stated that after competition was introduced, the incumbent (Pratt and Whitney) offered "engine improvements to the Air Force earlier than the Air Force had been led to expect without the competition." (165)

The benefits of the Great Engine War have been attributed in part to the particulars of how the engine competition was managed. Prior to the first contract award, for example, the Air Force demanded that General Electric and Pratt and Whitney provide six years of cost projections to include the production of engines, support equipment, spare engines, technical data and dual sourcing data and second sourcing data for operations and support (O&S). The contractors were held to these cost projections for six years: the Air Force let six years of firm-fixed price, or "notto-exceed" contracts from the first production lot. Prior to the Great Engine War, government had succeeded in negotiating firm-fixed price contracts only after the engine had been operating in the field for several years. Never before had contractors agreed to provide cost projections into the future, and contracts were typically for production only, not O&S work. To avoid potential disruptions in production, and to protect itself against price gouging, DOD "required (each contractor) to provide his plan for providing dual sources of critical parts. These separately priced options in the proposals would allow the Government to reprocure spare parts from sources other than the prime contractors." (166)

Acknowledgments

This report owes much to the efforts of Ronald O'Rourke, CRS' Specialist in Naval Affairs, who rewrote and maintained it for six months following the passing of Christopher Bolkcom, CRS' previous Specialist in Military Aviation.

Author Contact Information

Jeremiah Gertler

Specialist in Military Aviation

jgertler@crs.loc.gov, 7-5107

(1) Fifth-generation aircraft incorporate the most modern technology, and are considered to be generally more capable than earlier-generation (e.g., 4th-generation and below) aircraft. Fifth-generation fighters combine new developments such as thrust vectoring, composite materials, supercruise (the ability to cruise at supersonic speeds without using engine afterburners), stealth technology, advanced radar and sensors, and integrated avionics to greatly improve pilot situational awareness.

Among fighters currently in service or in regular production, only the Air Force F-22 air superiority fighter and the F35 are considered fifth-generation aircraft. Russia and China reportedly have fifth-generation fighters under development. Regarding Russia's fifth-generation fighter project, see, for example, Douglas Barrie, "Russian Fifth-Gen Fighter Will Not Fly This Year," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, November 19, 2009: 2; and Dmitry Solovyov, "Sukhoi Says New Fighter Will Fly In '09," Moscow Times, August 21, 2009. Regarding China's fifth-generation fighter project, see, for example, David A. Fulghum, "China Revs Up Pursuit Of Stealth Technology," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, November 20, 2009: 4; the item entitled "DIA on China's new fighter" in Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, November 19, 2009: B1; Bradley Perrett, "China Close To Testing Next-Gen Fighter," Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 16, 2009; David A. Fulghum and Bradley Perrett, "Experts Doubt Chinese Stealth Fighter Timeline," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, November 13, 2009: 1-2; the item entitled "New China Fighter" in Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, November 12, 2009: B1; and Ted Parsons, "China's Fifth-Generation Fighter To Fly 'Soon,'" Jane's Defence Weekly, November 12, 2009.

Strike fighters are dual-role tactical aircraft that are capable of both air-to-ground (strike) and air-to-air (fighter) combat operations.

(2) The program's operational requirements call for 70% to 90% commonality between all three versions. Many of the three versions' high-cost components-including their engines, avionics, and major airframe structural components- are common.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated in 2000 that the JSF's joint approach "avoids the three parallel development programs for service-unique aircraft that would have otherwise been necessary, saving at least $15 billion." (Letter from Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen to Rep. Jerry Lewis, June 22, 2000. The text of letter made available by Inside the Air Force on June 23, 2000.)

(3) Department of Defense. Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)for] F-35 (JSF), December 31, 2007, p. 4.

(4) Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And Requirements (AF/A3/5) [and] Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8) May 20, 2009, p. 10.

(5) Statement of Vice Admiral David Architzel, USN, Principal Military Deputy, Research, Development and Acquisition, LTGEN George J. Trautman III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, [and] RADM Allen G. Myers, USN, Director of Warfare Integration, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Warfare [sic: Forces] Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [hearing] on [the] Department of the Navy's Aviation Procurement Program, May 19, 2009, p. 1.

(6) For more on the F-22 program, see CRS Report RL31673, Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress.

(7) A November 13, 2009, press article states that "The F-22 had a -40dBsm all-aspect reduction requirement [i.e., a requirement to reduce the radar reflectivity of the F-22 when viewed from all angles by 40 decibels per square meter], while the F-35 came in at -30dBsm with some gaps in coverage." (David A. Fulghum and Bradley Perrett, "Experts Doubt Chinese Stealth Fighter Timeline," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, November 13, 2009: 1-2.)

(8) The term high-low mix refers to a force consisting of a combination of high-cost, high-capability aircraft and lowercost, more-affordable aircraft. Procuring a high-low mix is a strategy for attempting to balance the goal for having a minimum number of very high capability tactical aircraft to take on the most challenging projected missions and the goal of being able to procure tactical aircraft sufficient in total numbers within available resources to perform all projected missions.

(9) Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And Requirements (AF/A3/5) [and] Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8) May 20, 2009, pp. 7-8.

(10) To permit STOVL operations, the F-35B has an engine exhaust nozzle at the rear than can swivel downward, and a mid-fuselage lift fan connected to the engine that blows air downward to help lift the forward part of the plane.

(11) For more on the V-22 program, see CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft: Background and Issues for Congress.

(12) For more on the F/A-18E/F program, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress.

(13) Statement of Vice Admiral David Architzel, USN, Principal Military Deputy, Research, Development and Acquisition, LTGEN George J. Trautman III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, [and] RADM Allen G. Myers, USN, Director of Warfare Integration, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Warfare [sic: Forces] Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [hearing] on [the] Department of the Navy's Aviation Procurement Program, May 19, 2009, pp. 1-2.

(14) Features for carrier suitability include, among other things, strengthened landing gear, a strengthened airframe, and an arresting hook so as to permit catapult launches and arrested-wire landings, as well as folding wing tips for more compact storage aboard ship.

(15) Statement of Vice Admiral David Architzel, USN, Principal Military Deputy, Research, Development and Acquisition, LTGEN George J. Trautman III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, [and] RADM Allen G. Myers, USN, Director of Warfare Integration, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Warfare [sic: Forces] Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [hearing] on [the] Department of the Navy's Aviation Procurement Program, May 19, 2009, p. 1.

(16) Pratt and Whitney's parent firm is United Technologies.

(17) DOD information paper on F-35 program dated September 24, 2009, provided to CRS by Air Force Legislative Liaison Office on September 29, 2009.

(18) Bill language since FY2007 includes Section 211 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006) and Section 213 of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008). (For the texts of these two provisions, see Appendix A.)

(19) The JSF program emerged in late 1995 from the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program, which began in late 1993 as a result of the Clinton administration's Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy and programs. The BUR envisaged the JAST program as a replacement for two other tactical aircraft programs that were being terminated (the A-12 program, which was intended to provide a stealthy new carrier-based attack plane to replace the Navy's aging A-6 carrier-based attack planes, and the multi-role fighter [MRF], which was the Air Force had considered as a replacement for its F-16 fighters).

In 1995, in response to congressional direction, a program led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop an advanced short takeoff and vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft was incorporated into the JAST program. This opened the way for Marine Corps and UK participation in the JAST program, since the Marine Corps and the UK were interested procuring a new STOVL aircraft to replace their aging Harrier STOVL attack aircraft. The name of the program was then changed to Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to focus on joint development and production of a next-generation fighter/attack plane.

A Joint Operational Requirements Document for the F-35 program was issued in March 2000 and revalidated by DOD's Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) in October 2001. On October 24, 2001, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) held a Milestone B review for the program. (Milestone B approval would permit the program to enter the SDD phase.) On October 25, 2001, the Secretary of Defense certified to Congress (in accordance with Section 212 of the FY2001 defense authorization act [H.R. 4205/P.L. 106-398 of October 30, 2000]) that the program had successfully completed the CDP exit criteria and demonstrated sufficient technical maturity to enter SDD. On October 26, 2001, the SDD contracts were awarded to Lockheed and Pratt and Whitney. A Preliminary Design Review (PDR) for the F-35 program was conducted in April 2003, and Critical Design Reviews (CDRs) were held for the F-35A, F-35B, and F35C in February 2006 (F-35A and F-35B) and June 2007 (F-35C).

(20) "First Flight," Defense Daily, November 23, 2009: 3.

(21) Marina Malenic, "Pentagon Expects Lockheed To Absorb Some F-35 Cost Overruns," Defense Daily, November 24, 2009: 1-2.

(22) Andrew Tilghman, "Joint Strike Fighter Timeline Moved Up," NavyTimes.com, September 18, 2009; Dan Taylor, "Navy Officially Changes IOC For JSF Carrier Variant From 2015 to 2014," Inside the Navy, September 21, 2009. In November 2009, Lockheed announced that the first flight of an F-35C test aircraft called CF-1 would be delayed from the final quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2010. (Dan Taylor, "Navy Joint Strike Fighter Carrier Variant Test Aircraft Will Not Fly Until 2010," Inside the Navy, November 9, 2009.)

(23) In 1996, preliminary planning estimated over 3,000 F-35s for DOD and the UK: 2,036 for the Air Force, 642 for the Marines, 300 for the U.S. Navy, and 60 for the Royal Navy. In May 1997, the QDR recommended reducing projected DOD procurement from 2,978 to 2,852: 1,763 for the Air Force, 609 for the Marines, and 480 for the Navy. (Quadrennial Defense Review Cuts Procurement in FY1999, 2000, Aerospace Daily, May 20, 1997, p. 280.) In 2003, the Department of the Navy (DON) reduced its planned procurement of 1,089 F-35s to 680 aircraft as part of the Navy/Marine Corps Tactical Aviation Integration Plan. (See CRS Report RS21488, Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan: Background and Issues for Congress, by Christopher Bolkcom and Ronald O'Rourke.)

(24) In 2004, appropriations conferees followed a House recommendation to direct DOD to review this alternative management arrangement. House appropriators believed that "management of program acquisition should remain with one Service, and that the U.S. Navy, due to its significant investment in two variants of the F-35 should be assigned all acquisition executive oversight responsibilities." (H.Rept. 108-553 [H.R. 4613], p. 234) Conferees directed that DOD submit a report on the potential efficacy of this change. Prior to the release of the DOD report, former Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper was quoted as saying that he also supported putting one service in charge of JSF program acquisition. (Elizabeth Rees, "Jumper Supports Single Service Retaining JSF Acquisition Oversight," Inside the Air Force, August 6, 2004.) However, General Jumper highlighted the significant investment the Air Force was making in the JSF program in response to the congressional language favoring the Navy. In DOD's response to Congress, the report noted the current arrangement ensures one Service does not have a "disproportionate voice" when it comes to program decisions and that the current system is "responsive, efficient, and in the best interests of the success of the JSF program." (U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Joint Strike Fighter Management Oversight [forwarded by] Michael W. Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, December 20, 2004.)

(25) Congress insisted from the outset that the JAST program include ongoing efforts by DARPA to develop more advanced STOVL aircraft, opening the way for UK participation in the program.

(26) Currently, the UK, Italy, and the Netherlands have agreed to participate in the IOT&E program. UK, the senior F-35 partner, will have the strongest participation in the IOT&E phase. Italy and the Netherlands are contributing a far smaller amount and will take part only in the coalition concept of operations (CONOPS) validation testing. (Telephone conversation with OSD/AT&L, October 3, 2007.) Other partner nations are still weighing their option to participate in the IOT&E program. The benefits to participation are expedited acquisition of aircraft, pilot training for the test cycle, and access to testing results.

(27) Debate continues in the United Kingdom over whether to base the design of its new carriers on availability of the STOVL F-35B, which would minimize the need for launch and arresting gear and a deck capable of landing CTOL aircraft, or to build them to a more conventional design. (See, inter alia, "Davies: both carriers will take JSF," DefenseManagement.com, November 3, 2009.)

(28) DOD offers Foreign Military Sales (FMS)-level of participation in the F-35 program for countries unable to commit to partnership in the program's SDD phase. Israel and Singapore are believed to have contributed $50 million each, and they are "Security Cooperative Participants." (Selected Acquisition Report, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition. December 31, 2005.)

In October 2008, it was reported that the Bush administration had authorized sale of the F-35 to Israel. (Caitlin Harrington. "US approves F-35 sale to Israel." Jane's Defense Weekly. October 1, 2008) and that Tel Aviv was prepared to spend as much as $15 billion to procure 25 F-35s. ("Israel Looks to Spend $15 Billion for CTOL Variant of F-35." Defense Daily. October 1, 2008.) In July 2009, it was reported that Israel wants to purchase up to 75 F-35s. (Tony Capaccio, "Israel Seeks To Buy Up To 75 Lockheed F-35 Fighter Jets, " Bloomberg News, July 25, 2009: 1C.) In November 2009, it was reported that DOD would provide Israel in January 2010 with final price details for an Israeli purchase of F-35s (Marina Malenic, "Pentagon To Outline F-35 Terms, Pricing For Israel By January, Official Says," Defense Daily, November 6, 2009: 2-3), and that Israel's initial purchase of the plane might consist of a squadron of 25 aircraft (Yaakov Katz, "Israel Wants Production Role In F-35 Fighter," Jerusalem Post, November 13, 2009: 3).

(29) F-35 program officials have also discussed the F-35 with other prospective customers, including Germany, Greece, and Spain.

(30) Andrea Shalal-Esa, "Pentagon sees 6,000 possible F-35 sales," Reuters.com, June 17, 2009. See also Marina Malenic, "F-35 Sales Could Double As Countries Look To Replace Aging Fleets, General Says," Defense Daily, June 18, 2009: 6. See also Marcus Weisgerber, "JSF Program Anticipates Nearly 700 F-35 Buys [For International Customers] Between FY-09 and FY-23, Inside the Air Force, July 31, 2009.

(31) "Japan Mulls F-35 Purchase As Next Main Fighter Jet: Report," Agence France-Presse, November 23, 2009. Obtained from DefenseNews.com, November 26, 2009.

(32) Jim Wolf, "Singapore and Israel eye buying Lockheed fighter," Reuters.com, July 7, 2008.

(33) International participation in the F-35 program is divided into three levels, according to the amount of money a country contributes to the program-the higher the amount, the greater the nation's voice with respect to aircraft requirements, design, and access to technologies gained during development. Level 1 Partner status requires approximately 10% contribution to aircraft development and allows for fully integrated office staff and a national deputy at director level.

Level II partners consist of Italy and the Netherlands, contributing $1 billion and $800 million, respectively. On June 24, 2002, Italy became the senior Level II partner. ("F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Lightning II: International Partners," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-int.htm, accessed on October 3, 2007.) Italy wants to have its own F-35 final assembly line, which would be in addition to a potential F-35 maintenance and upgrade facility. The Netherlands signed on to the F-35 program on June 17, 2002, after it had conducted a 30-month analysis of potential alternatives.

Australia, Denmark, Norway, Canada, and Turkey joined the F-35 program as Level III partners, with contributions ranging from $125 million to $175 million. ("Australia, Belgium Enter Joint Strike Fighter Program as EMD Partners," Inside the Air Force, April 21, 2000.)

Unlike the SDD phase, PSFD phase does not make any distinction as to levels of participation. Also unlike the bilateral SDD MOUs, there is a single PSFD MOU for all partner nations. In signing the PSFD MOU, partner nations state their intentions to purchase the F-35, including quantity and variant, and a determination is made as to their delivery schedule. PSFD costs will be divided on a "fair-share" based on the programmed purchase amount of the respective nation. So-called "offset" arrangements, considered the norm in defense contracts with foreign nations, usually require additional incentives to compensate the purchasing nation for the agreement's impact to its local workforce. F-35 officials decided to take a different approach, in line with the program's goal to control costs, to avoid offset arrangements and promote competition as much as possible. Consequently, all partner nations have agreed to compete for work on a "best-value" basis and have signed the PSFD MOU.

(34) "U.S., U.K. Sign JAST Agreement," Aerospace Daily, December 21, 1995: 451.

(35) BAE is a major partner to Lockheed Martin and is providing the aft fuselage, empennage, and electronic warfare suite for the aircraft. Rolls-Royce is partnered with GE on the F136 engine and is a subcontractor to Pratt and Whitney for producing components for the F-35B's STOVL lift system. In November 2007, it was reported that Rolls Royce was planning to open a new plant in Virginia in 2009 to make parts for the F136 engine. (John R. Blackwell, "New Plant To Add 170 Jobs," Richmond Times-Dispatch, November 21, 2007.) Rolls Royce's 2001 contract with Pratt and Whitney for design and development of the STOVL lift components is valued at $1 billion over 10 years. ("RollsRoyce Finishes First JSF Propulsion System Flight Hardware," Rolls-Royce Media Room, available online at http://www.rolls-royce.com/media/showPR.jsp?PR_ID=40243.) All F-35Bs, regardless of what engine they use, are to employ Rolls Royce components in their STOVL lift systems.

(36) "Norway Signs Industrial Partnership with Eurofighter Consortium," Defense Daily, January 29, 2003. Joris Janssen Lok, "Frustration Mounts Among JSF Partners," Jane's Defence Weekly, March 24, 2004; Thomas Dodd, "Danish Companies Consider Quitting JSF Programme," Jane's Defence Weekly, January 9, 2004. Tom Kingston, "Unsatisfied Italy May Cut JSF Participation," Defense News, May 10,2004. Lale Sariibrahimoglu, "Turkey may withdraw from JSF program," Jane's Defence Weekly, November 10, 2004.

(37) "F-35 International Program Content," JSF Joint Program Office paper, March 4, 2008.

(38) Tom Kington, "Italy Pushes for Europeanized JSF." Defense News, October 13, 2008.

(39) Amy Butler, "Lockheed, Alenia F-35 FACO Proposal To Be Submitted In November," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, October 21, 2009: 1-2.

(40) "Lockheed Martin Dangles F-35 Work Opportunities For S. Korea," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, October 21, 2009: 5.

(41) Yaakov Katz, "Israel Wants Production Role In F-35 Fighter," Jerusalem Post, November 13, 2009: 3.

(42) Gerard O'Dwyer, "Danish Industry Pushes for F-35 Work Guarantees," Defense News, November 23, 2009: 23.

(43) The UK's top defense procurement official reportedly stated in 2006 that his country would cease participation in the F-35 program if the F136 engine were cancelled and technology transfer issues were not resolved to the UK's satisfaction. (Megan Scully, "British Demand Better Access To Fighter." National Journal's Congress Daily AM, March 15, 2006. George Cahlink. "U.K. Procurement Chief Warns Backup Engine Dispute Threatens JSF Deal." Defense Daily, March 15, 2006.)

(44) The text of the provision is as follows:
   SEC. 233. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TECHNOLOGY SHARING OF JOINT STRIKE
   FIGHTER TECHNOLOGY.

   It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense should
   share technology with regard to the Joint Strike Fighter between
   the United States Government and the Government of the United
   Kingdom consistent with the national security interests of both
   nations.


(45) Amy Wilson, "F35 Jet Raises Tensions With US Over Technology Sharing," London Sunday Telegraph, August 30, 2009: B7.

(46) Jim Wolf, "U.S. to Withhold F-35 Fighter Software Code," Reuters.com, November 24, 2009.

(47) Rhys Jones, "UK confident U.S. will hand over F-35 fighter codes," Reuters.com, December 7, 2009.

(48) Robert Wall, "Will Australian JSF Buy Avoid Delays?" AviationWeek.com, December 2, 2009. A similar story appeared in the print edition of Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 30, 2009.

(49) Randall Palmer and David Ljunggren, "Canada to buy fewer F-35 fighters than thought," Reuters.com, May 12, 2008.

(50) Umit Enginsoy and Burak Ege Bekdil, "Fighter Buys Top Turkish Shopping List," Defense News, April 28, 2008.

(51) The F-35 program receives (or in the past received) funding from the Air Force, Navy, and Defense-Wide research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) accounts (the Defense-Wide RDT&E funding occurred in FY1996-FY1998); Non-Treasury Funds (i.e., financial contributions from the eight other countries participating in the F-35 program)-a source of additional research and development funding; the Air Force and Navy aircraft procurement accounts (the Navy and Marine Corps are organized under the Department of the Navy, and Marine Corps aircraft development and procurement costs are funded through the Navy's RDT&E and aircraft procurement accounts); and the Air Force MilCon account and the Navy and Marine Corps MilCon account.

(52) The procurement cost figure of about $198.4 billion does not include the cost of several hundred additional F-35s that are to be procured other countries that are participating in the F-35 program. The $198.4-billion figure does, however, assume certain production-cost benefits for DOD aircraft that result from producing these several hundred additional F-35s for other countries.

(53) Michael Sirak, "F-35 Program May Get First International Orders In Third Production Lot in 2009," Defense Daily International, June 22, 2007.

(54) Graham Warwick and Guy Norris, "Second Engine Could Force F-35 Production Cuts, PEO Warns," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 1, 2009: 3.

(55) Opponents of terminating the alternate engine might argue that having two engine types available would enhance foreign sales of the F-35 because it would give foreign buyers more flexibility in choosing which engine to use (which can be of value to them for political purposes), and because foreign buyers may conclude that the competition between the two engine markers is helping to restrain the engine portion of the aircraft's total cost. A 2006 article quotes one observer as stating that "The F-16 became a much more exportable aircraft when GE and Pratt were killing each other in the international market. So, if you are selling these JSF's and you have got one engine ... that reduces the attractiveness to these international customers ... " (Carlo Munoz. "Congress, Defense Department Square Off Over Second JSF Engine." Inside the Air Force. March 3, 2006.)

(56) The passage at this point has a footnote citing the following two reports: Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP, March 2009; and Congressional Budget Office, Long Term Implications of the Fiscal Year 2009 Future Years Defense Program, January 2009.

(57) Office of Management and Budget. Terminations, Reductions, and Savings, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year, 2010. Washington, May 2009. p. 38.

(58) Statement of Mr. David G. Ahern, Director, Portfolio Systems Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, May 20, 2009, pp. 6-7.

(59) Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And Requirements (AF/A3/5) [and] Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8) May 20, 2009, p. 11.

(60) Graham Warwick and Guy Norris, "Second Engine Could Force F-35 Production Cuts, PEO Warns," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 1, 2009: 3.

(61) Michael Bruno, "JSF Program Chief Cites Advantages Of Competing Engines," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 3, 2009: 1-2.

(62) Jason Simpson, "Heinz: DOD Must Look At Operational Risks of Having One JSF Engine," Inside the Navy, June 8, 2009.

(63) Graham Warwick, "Navy Backs Single JSF Engine As F-35C Rolls Out," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, July 29, 2009: 1-2. See also Marcus Weisgerber and Dan Taylor, "Top JSF Official's Comments Could Help Fight For G.E.-Rolls Engine," Inside the Air Force, July 31, 2009; Antonie Boessenkool, "Pratt & Whitney's Costs Parts-Reject Rate Too High: JSF Official," Defense News, August 3, 2009: 14; Dan Taylor, "Heinz: Pratt Can 'Do Better' On F135; Company Defends Engine," Inside the Navy, August 3, 2009.

(64) "No Means No," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 24, 2009: 1. Ellipsis as in original.

(65) Jason Simpson, "Gates: 'No Reason to Believe' F136 Would Not Encounter Same Problems as F135," InsideDefense.com DefenseAlert - Daily News, August 31, 2009.

(66) Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter[:]Strong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters Most Challenging Phase, Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management. GAO-09711T, May 20, 2009, summary page.

(67) The passage at this point has a footnote citing the following two prior instances of GAO testimony: Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter[:] Impact of Recent Decisions on Program Risks, Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Testimony before the Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-08569T, March 11, 2008; and Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:]Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter Engine Program, Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Testimony before the Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces, and Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-07-656T, March 22, 2007.

(68) The passage at this point has a footnote stating: "Since that time, Congress appropriated $465 million in the fiscal year 2009 budget to continue the alternate engine program."

(69) Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter[:]Strong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters Most Challenging Phase, Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management. GAO-09 711T, May 20, 2009, pp. 4-7.

(70) Jason Simpson, "Gansler: Military Needs Competitive Dual Sourcing For JSF Engine," Inside the Air Force, September 4, 2009. See also John O. King, "Fixing National Defense: JSF Alternative Engine, Dual Sourcing Equals Success," Defense News, November 9, 2009: 37.

(71) Bill Sweetman, "JSF Needs F136, Partners Say At Air Show," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 18, 2009: 2.

(72) This section presents, in edited form, material from an earlier CRS report on the alternate engine program-CRS Report RL33390, Proposed Termination of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136 Alternate Engine, by Christopher Bolkcom.

(73) The competition for the F/A-18 engine differed from the Great Engine War in that both GE and Pratt and Whitney competed to build the same engine - the GE-designed F404. Although this did not permit a competition for engine design, it permitted a competition for production price and production quality.

(74) OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group Report (v6), "F-35/JSF Alternate Engine Acquisition and Independent Cost Analyses," March 15, 2007, Slide 31.

(75) The shift to a steeper learning curve in these analyses is referred to as learning curve rotation. The CAIG study assumed that the learning curve would shift (i.e., rotate) five percentage points. As a notional example, a program might originally have a 90% learning curve, meaning that the second item requires 90% as much labor to build as the first, the fourth requires 90% as much as the second, the eighth requires 90% much as the fourth, the 16th requires 90% as much as the eighth, and so on, with the quantities doubling each time to achieve the next 10% reduction in labor. A five-percentage-point learning curve rotation would mean that this notional learning curve would shift to an 85% slope, so that, for example, the fourth item might now require 85% as much labor to build as the second, and the eighth 85% as much as the fourth, and so on.

(76) An NPV estimate takes into account the real (i.e., above-inflation) investment value of money over time. Government cost-estimating regulations call for using NPV analysis in situations involving an expected stream of expenditures over many years.

(77) OSD CAIG Report, Slide 37.

(78) The CAIG's estimated weight growth prior to IOC is greater than the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) estimate of 3%. The JPO also estimates that the F-35's weight will remain unchanged after IOC.

(79) Ibid. Slides 25 and 26. Note: Since the F136 is earlier in its development cycle, analysts comment that its design is not as set as the F135 and could better incorporate engine growth requirements without major modifications.

(80) Institute for Defense Analyses Report: "Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Engine Cost Analysis: Summary of Results (Revised)," March 2007, Pg S-3. NOTE: IDA determined a 11% savings from competition over the upgraded F100-220 Pratt and Whitney engine and an 18% savings from competition between the original Pratt and Whitney F100 and the GE F110 (Pg 23).

(81) Ibid. Pg 24. However, IDA noted "significant inconsistencies" with studies of past competitions which need to be taken into consideration when evaluating potential savings.

(82) Ibid., p. 20.

(83) Ibid., p. S-3.

(84) Ibid., p. S-3.

(85) Ibid., p. 44.

(86) Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter Engine Program, GAO-07-656T, March 22, 2007, p. 1.

(87) Ibid., p. 2.

(88) Transcript of March 2, 2007, hearing on DOD aircraft programs before the Air and Land Forces subcommittee and the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

(89) Tony Capaccio, "F-35 Engine Shows 'Fairly Significant' Cost Growth," Bloomberg.com, July 27, 2009.

(90) Marina Malenic, "Heinz Raps Pratt On F-35 Engine Manufacturing Practices," Defense Daily, July 29, 2009: 3. Material in brackets as in original.

(91) Marcus Weisgerber, "Pratt & Whitney: Allegations About F135 Engine Scrap Rates 'Not True' (Updated), Inside the Air Force, August 7, 2009. The version shown here is an updated online version. There is an editorial note at the start of this version that states: "Clarification: Subsequent to publication, a Pratt & Whitney spokesman said William Begert, vice president of business development, misspoke when he said some parts of the F135 engine were at "70 to 80 percent scrap rate." In the case of two or three components, there is a 70 percent to 80 percent yield rate, meaning the scrap rate is 20 percent to 30 percent. Also, the original story reported that Begert called F-35 Program Manager Brig. Gen. David Heinz's comments' about the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine "grossly inaccurate" and "demoralizing." Begert was responding to the media reports not the general's comments. The story has been updated to reflect the changes."

(92) Bill Sweetman, "Government Sends F135 Tiger Team Into Pratt & Whitney," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 8, 2009: 3.

(93) John T. Bennett, "Team Must Complete F135 Engine Review by Nov. 20," DefenseNews.com, September 9, 2009.

(94) Marina Malenic, "Pratt Prepares To Counter GE Fixed-Price Gambit On F-35 Engine," Defense Daily, September 10, 2009: 6-7.

(95) Marina Malenic, "Pratt Offers To Trim F135 Costs," Defense Daily, September 16, 2009: 1.

(96) Andrea Shalal-Esa, "Engine Issue Should Not Delay U.S. F-35 Flight Tests (Update 2)," Reuters.com, September 14, 2009.

(97) Graham Warwick, "F135 Engine Damaged In Ground Tests," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 15, 2009. A very similar version of this article was published on September 14, 2009, as Graham Warwick, "F135 Engine Damaged In Ground Tests," AviationWeek.com, September 14, 2009.

(98) Christopher Drew, "Mishap Raises Questions About Pratt & Whitney F-35 Engine," New York Times, September 15, 2009.

(99) Jason Simpson, "GE: No Way Forward In F136 Development Without FY-10 Funding," Inside the Air Force, September 18, 2009.

(100) Christopher Drew, "Maker Of F-35 Engine Traces Problem To A Tube," New York Times, September 19, 2009: B2.

(101) Graham Warwick, "Pratt Identifies Probable Cause Of F135 Failure, Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 21, 2009: 3. See also Jason Simpson, "Pratt & Whitney Discovers Root Cause of F135 Test Engine Failure," Inside the Air Force, September 25, 2009, which presents similar information.

(102) John T. Bennett, "GE Pitches Fixed-Price Deal For Alternate JSF Engine," DefenseNews.com, September 1, 2009.

(103) Guy Norris, "Alternate JSF Engine Team Puts Pressure On Pratt & Whitney," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, September 3, 2009: 1-2. See also Marina Malenic and Emelie Rutherford, "GE, Rolls-Royce Look To Align With Acquisition Reformers In Fixed Price Engine Offer," Defense Daily, September 3, 2009: 6.

(104) Jason Simpson, "F136 Engine Sustains Impact Damage in Test, Possible Cause IDed (Updated)," InsideDefense.com (DefenseAlert - Daily News), October 8, 2009. Other press reports on the same incident include Graham Warwick, "Damage Discovery Halts F136 Engine Testing," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, October 9, 2009: 3 and Marina Malenic, "F136 Engine Testing Suspended After Discovery of 'Dings and Nicks,'" Defense Daily, October 9, 2009: 1.

(105) Andrea Shalal-Esa, "GE, Rolls To Redesign Part Of F-35 Engine," Reuters.com, November 2, 2009.

(106) Mark Oliva, "Pilots defend Harrier jet." Stars and Stripes. (Pacific Edition). January 19, 2003.

(107) Another 66% were due to airframe-related issues. ("JSF Engine Second Source Executive Summary," Whitney, Bradley, and Brown Consulting; December 2006. Slide 23.)

(108) Ibid.

(109) "JSF Alternate Engine Decision" Briefing. OSD/PA&E. February 27, 2006.

(110) Ibid.

(111) Jason Simpson. "Davis: JSF Program Office Anticipated Early-Stage Engine Problems." Inside the Air Force, February 15, 2008.

(112) CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS. Reuters. Congressional Hearings. April 9, 2008. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Airland, hearing on Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for Air Force and Navy Aviation programs..

(113) Tony Capaccio. "United Technologies F-35 Engine Over Cost Estimate." Bloomberg.com. July 21, 2008.

(114) Ibid. Slide 22. Note: See http://www.wbbinc.com on Whitney, Bradley, and Brown, their corporate profile and their clients.

(115) IDA JSF Final Report, p. 165.

(116) OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group Report (v6), "F-35/JSF Alternate Engine Acquisition and Independent Cost Analyses," March 15, 2007, Slide 44.

(117) OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group Report (v6), "F-35/JSF Alternate Engine Acquisition and Independent Cost Analyses," March 15, 2007, Slide 44.

(118) IDA JSF Final Report, p. 169.

(119) IDA JSF Final Report, p. 165.

(120) Loren Thompson. "Powering JSF-One Engine Is Enough." Lexington Institute, January 2008, pp. 14-15.

(121) Maj. John Nix and Maj. Riley Shelnutt. "Behind the Alternate Fighter Engine Competition." Aerospace America. May 1984.

(122) Memorandum of Understanding among the Department of Defence of Australia and the Minister of National Defence of Canada and the Ministry of Defence of Denmark and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Italy and the State Secretary of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway and the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries on behalf of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Turkey and the Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Secretary of Defense on behalf of the Department of Defense of the United States of America Concerning the Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development of the Joint Strike Fighter (Short Title - JSF PSFD MOU), p. 16. The MOU was provided to CRS on September 17, 2009, by the Air Force legislative affairs office.

(123) Source: Untitled information paper on JSF PSFD MOU provided to CRS by Air Force legislative liaison office, September 21, 2009.

(124) Megan Scully, "British Demand Better Access To Fighter." National Journal's Congress Daily AM, March 15, 2006. George Cahlink. "U.K. Procurement Chief Warns Backup Engine Dispute Threatens JSF Deal." Defense Daily, March 15, 2006.

(125) Rodney L. Pringle, "JSF Engine Rumblings," Military Aerospace Technology, October 8, 2006.

(126) Joris Janssen Lok. "Double Dutch; Pratt, Rolls Involve More Dutch Partners in F135, F136 Programs," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 11, 2008.

(127) "Air Force Need For F-35s Under Review," National Journal's CongressDailyPM, June 3, 2009.

(128) Thomas P. Ehrhard, An Air Force Strategy for the Long Haul, Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009, pp. xii and xiv. The report was released on September 17, 2009, according to CSBA's website, and is available online at http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/ R.20090917.An_Air_Force_Strat/R.20090917.An_Air_Force_Strat.pdf.

(129) William Matthews, "F-35 Total May Be Cut In Half, Report Says," NavyTimes.com, October 31, 2009. The Dutch report discussed in the article is Johan Boeder, Market Analysis JSF, How Many JSF's Will Be Produced?, Report prepared for members of Dutch Parliament September 2009, Kesteren, The Netherlands, 2009, 136 pp. The report is available online at http://new.isoshop.com/dae/dae/articles/communiques/ JSF_MARKETANALYSIS_JOBO.pdf.

(130) Christopher J. Castelli, "Carter Seeks Middle Ground on JSF Cost, Schedule Estimates," InsideDefense.com (DefenseAlert - DailyNews), November 23, 2009. See also John T. Bennett, "Carter: Plan Afoot To Halt F-35 Cost Hikes, Delays," DefenseNews.com, November 9, 2009.

(131) Jason Sherman, "Gates To Be Briefed Today On New JSF Cost Estimate, 30Year TacAir Plan," Inside the Air Force, November 6, 2009.

(132) Antonie Boessenkool, "JSF Estimate Team Raises Red Flags," Defense News, November 2, 2009: 3. See also Tony Capaccio and Gopal Ratnam, "Lockheed F-35 Still Raises 'Concerns,' Pentagon Says," Bloomberg.com, October 29, 2009; and "Risky Business," Defense Daily, November 2, 2009: 1-2.

(133) Jason Sherman, "DOD Official: JSF 'Will Likely Breach' Critical Nunn-McCurdy Target," Inside the Air Force, October 30, 2009.

(134) Bob Cox, "Lockheed Downplays Predictions Of Delays, Says F-35 Is On Track," Fort Worth Star-Telegram, October 25, 2009: 1C.

(135) Jason Sherman, "New JSF Assessment Affirms Program Needs Additional Billions, Time," Inside the Air Force, October 23, 2009.

(136) Jason Sherman and Marcus Weisgerber, "Obama Administration Directs Update Of JSF JET Estimate," Inside the Navy, August 3, 2009. See also Dan Taylor, "Crowley: JET Will Meet With Lockheed In Fall To Discuss JSF Issues," Inside the Navy, August 3, 2009; Graham Warwick, "Pentagon Reassessing F-35 Development Cost Estimates," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 30, 2009: 1.

(137) Graham Warwick, "Pentagon Reassessing F-35 Development Cost Estimates," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, July 30, 2009: 1. See also Jason Sherman and Marcus Weisgerber, "Obama Administration Directs Update Of JSF JET Estimate," Inside the Navy, August 3, 2009; Dan Taylor, "Crowley: JET Will Meet With Lockheed In Fall To Discuss JSF Issues," Inside the Navy, August 3, 2009; Bob Cox, "F-35 Is On Track, Says Pentagon Officer," Fort Worth Star-Telegram" August 18, 2009: 1C.

(138) Dan Taylor, "Heinz: Transition of JSF to STOVL Mode Will Not Begin Until August," Inside the Navy, June 8, 2009.

(139) Graham Warwick, "JSF Program Refocusing On Test-Ready Aircraft Deliveries," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 2, 2009: 1-2. Material in brackets as in original.

(140) Statement of Mr. David G. Ahern, Director, Portfolio Systems Acquisition, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, May 20, 2009, p. 7.

(141) Department of the Air Force Presentation to the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, United States House of Representatives, Subject: Air Force Programs, Combined Statement of: Lieutenant General Daniel J. Darnell, Air Force Deputy Chief Of Staff For Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans And Requirements (AF/A3/5) [and] Lieutenant General Mark D. Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) Lieutenant General Raymond E. Johns, Jr., Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans And Programs (AF/A8) May 20, 2009, pp. 10-11.

(142) Statement of Vice Admiral David Architzel, USN, Principal Military Deputy, Research, Development and Acquisition, LTGEN George J. Trautman III, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, [and] RADM Allen G. Myers, USN, Director of Warfare Integration, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Warfare [sic: Forces] Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [hearing] on [the] Department of the Navy's Aviation Procurement Program, May 19, 2009, p. 2.

(143) Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-09326SP, March 2009. p. 94.

(144) Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter[:]Strong Risk Management Essential as Program Enters Most Challenging Phase, Statement of Michael Sullivan, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management. GAO-09711T, May 20, 2009, summary page.

(145) For more on this issue, see CRS Report RL33543, Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress.

(146) Testimony of Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, before an April 9, 2008, hearing on Air Force and Navy aviation programs before the Airland subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. (Source: Transcript of hearing.)

(147) For more on the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress.

(148) There have also been strong differences of opinion over how F-35 costs are calculated and presented. DOD's estimate of the total acquisition cost of the F-35 program, for example, shows the overall cost decreasing from $299 billion in December 2006 to $298 billion in December 2007. Some observers suggested that these figures were misleading, because the largest savings reported by DOD in the December 2007 report were achieved not by improvements in design or manufacture, but instead by moving costs from one category to another. (David Fulghum, "Dueling Analyses; Questions Remain About the Fundamental Soundness of Top Pentagon Programs," Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 14, 2008.) The GAO offered strong criticism of JSF cost estimates, writing that they were not comprehensive, not accurate, not well documented, nor credible. (Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter[:]Recent Decisions by DOD Add to Program Risks, GAO-08-388, March 2008, summarized on pp. 3-4 and addressed in detail throughout the report.) In summary, GAO noted that the JSF cost estimates did not include $7 billion for the F136 engine, and that the official JSF cost estimates are at odds with estimates made by three independent DOD agencies. JSF supporters disputed the GAO's findings, arguing that the program office's cost models are more reliable than those used by other organizations. (Amy Butler, "Cost Question," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 14, 2008.) GAO is not the only organization to question the JSF cost estimates. An internal DOD organization--the Joint Estimate Team or JET-has argued that the JSF program will cost $15 billion more than official DOD cost projections. (Marcus Weisgerber, "'Independent' DOD Assessment Finds JSF Underfunded by $15 Billion," Inside the Air Force, November 28, 2008.)

(149) John Reed, "Air Force Working To More Than Double The Pace Of F-35 Purchases," Inside the Air Force, July 25, 2008.

(150) Dan Taylor, "Lockheed Tells Roughead It Can Handle 30 Additional JSFs Over FYDP," Inside the Navy, August 3, 2009. See also "More F-35s?" Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, August 3, 2009: 1; and "F-35C Acceleration?" Defense Daily, August 3, 2009: 2.

(151) For more information, see CRS Report RL31360, Joint Strike Fighter (JSF): Potential National Security Questions Pertaining to a Single Production Line, by Christopher Bolkcom and Daniel H. Else.

(152) General Accountability Office, Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Observations on the Supplier Base, GAO-04-554, May 2004.

(153) Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 2647--National Defense Authorization Actfor Fiscal Year 2010, June 24, 2009, pp. 1-2. Emphasis as in the original.

(154) Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, S. 1390-- National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, July 15, 2009, pp. 1-2. Emphasis as in the original.

(155) See page 93 of the conference report on H.R. 2346 (H.Rept. 111-151 of June 12, 2009).

(156) Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 3326--Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, July 28, 2009, p. 2. Emphasis as in the original.

(157) H.R. 5408, the FY2001 defense authorization act, is incorporated in H.Rept. 106-945, the conference report on H.R. 4205. The text of H.R. 5408 is included in the conference report.

(158) These were earlier designations for the F135 and F136 engines, respectively. The F135 engine is a derivative of the F119 engine, which is the engine for the F-22 fighter.

(159) In the conference report (H.Rept. 110-477 of December 6, 2007) on H.R. 1585, the text of section 213 reads "two options" rather than "2 options."

(160) This appendix presents, in edited form, material from an earlier CRS report on the alternate engine program--CRS Report RL33390, Proposed Termination of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136 Alternate Engine, by Christopher Bolkcom.

(161) After 1994, Pratt and Whitney and GE continued to compete for engine business among foreign air forces that operated the F-16 and F-15.

(162) The F100 was the most advanced engine ever developed at that time, and its developed was rushed to meet a deadline for initial fielding of the F-15. In addition, one report notes that "[t]he F100 engine was so powerful and the F15 so maneuverable that pilots began pushing the aircraft to the edge of the performance envelope in ways that stressed the engine far more than had been anticipated." (Karl G. Amick, The Next Great Engine War: Analysis and Recommendations for Managing the Joint Strike Fighter Engine Competition, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 2005, p. 8.) Mounting frustrations over Pratt & Whitney's reluctance to fully address the F100's shortcomings without additional funding resulted in the Air Force, Navy, and Congress working in concert to fund work on an alternate engine. (Ibid, p. 92-98)

(163) Robert W. Drewes, The Air Force and the Great Engine War, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1987.

(164) U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Air Force Alternative Fighter Engine, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear systems, 98th Cong. 2nd Sess., March 8, 1984.

(165) Robert W. Drewes. The Air Force and the Great Engine War. NDU Press (Washington, DC) 1987.

(166) Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas Cooper. Air Force Alternative Fighter Engine, Hearings OpCit.
Table 1. Annual F-35 Procurement Quantities

(Figures shown are for production aircraft;
table excludes 13 research and development aircraft)

      FY         F-35A (USAF)   F-35B (USMC)

     2007             2              0
     2008             6              6
     2009             7              7
2010 (request)        10             16

      FY         F-35C (Navy)      Total

     2007             0              2
     2008             0              12
     2009             0              14
2010 (request)        4              30

Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD data.

Table 2. FY2010 Funding Request for F-35 Program

(Figures in millions of then-year dollars; FY2008 and FY2009
figures shown for reference)

                               FY2008

                       Funding      Quantity

RDT&E funding
Air Force              1,939.1         --
Dept. of Navy          1,848.9         --
Subtotal               3,788.0         --

Procurement funding
Air Force              1,412.1         6
Dept. of Navy          1,223.6       6 (a)
Subtotal               2,635.7         12
TOTAL                  6,423.7         12

                               FY2009

                       Funding      Quantity

RDT&E funding
Air Force              1,734.3         --
Dept. of Navy          1,744.6         --
Subtotal               3,478.9         --

Procurement funding
Air Force              1,660.6         7
Dept. of Navy          1,650.1       7 (b)
Subtotal               3,310.7         14
TOTAL                  6,789.6         14

                          FY2010 (request)

                       Funding      Quantity

RDT&E funding
Air Force              1,858.1         --
Dept. of Navy          1,741.3         --
Subtotal               3,599.4         --

Procurement funding
Air Force              2,349.4         10
Dept. of Navy          4,478.0       20 (c)
Subtotal               6,827.5         30
TOTAL                  10,426.9        30

Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD data.

Notes: Figures shown do not include procurement funding for initial
spares, MilCon funding,, or research and development funding
provided by other countries. Air Force funding for initial spares
was $69.8 million in FY2008 and $60.9 million in FY2009, and $129.7
million is requested for FY2010. Department of the Navy funding for
initial spares was zero in FY2008 and $32.7 million in FY2009, and
$249.0 million is requested for FY2010. International partner
funding for research and development was $552.7 million in FY2008
and $250.6 million in FY2009, and is projected to be $1 14.1
million in FY2010.

(a.) All 6 aircraft are F-35Bs for the Marine Corps.

(b.) All 7 aircraft are F-35Bs for the Marine Corps.

(c.) Includes 16 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps and 4 F-35Cs for the
Navy.

Table 2: 1998 and 2002 Program Management Advisory Group Study
Findings on the Benefits of an Alternate Engine Program

                              Beneficial             Marginal

Factor assessed          1998       2002       1998       2002

Costs                                           X          X
Development risk
  reduction
Engine growth                                   X          X
  potential
Fleet readiness           X          X
Industrial base           X          X
Int'l implications        X          X
Other                     X          X
  considerations (a)
Overall                   X          X

                               No Value

Factor assessed          1998       2002

Costs
Development risk          X          X
  reduction
Engine growth
  potential
Fleet readiness
Industrial base
Int'l implications
Other
  considerations (a)
Overall

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

(a.) Other considerations include contractor responsiveness,
improved design solutions, and competition at the
engine subsystem level.

Table 3. Summary of Action on FY2010 F-35 Quantities and Funding
Funding figures in millions of dollars, rounded to nearest tenth

                  Authorization Bill (H.R. 2647/S. 1390)

              Request         HASC            SASC
                              report          report

Procurement quantities
F-35As             10               9              10
(Air Force)

F-35Bs             16              15              16
(Marine
Corps)

F-35Cs              4               4               4
(Navy)

Total              30              28              30

Procurement funding

Air Force        2,048.8         2,115.8         2,048.8
procurement
funding

Air Force          300.6           313.6           300.6
advance
procurement
funding

Navy             3,997.0         3,875.0         3,997.0
procurement
funding

Navy               481.0           486.0           481.0
advance
procurement
funding

Research and development funding

Air Force        1,858.1         2,011.6         1,999.5
Navy             1,741.3         1,894.8         1,882.7

                   Authorization Bill
                   (H.R. 2647/S. 1390)

              As              Conference
              amended         report
              on Senate
              floor

Procurement quantities
F-35As             10              10
(Air Force)

F-35Bs             16              16
(Marine
Corps)

F-35Cs              4               4
(Navy)

Total              30              30

Procurement funding

Air Force        2,048.8         2,178.8
procurement
funding

Air Force          300.6           278.6
advance
procurement
funding

Navy             3,997.0         3,997.0
procurement
funding

Navy               481.0           481.0
advance
procurement
funding

Research and development funding

Air Force        1,858.1         2,073.1
Navy             1,741.3         1,956.3

                     Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)

              HAC             SAC             Conference
              report          report          report

Procurement quantities
F-35As             10              10         Not specified
(Air Force)

F-35Bs             14              16         Not specified
(Marine
Corps)

F-35Cs              4               4         Not specified
(Navy)

Total              28              30              30

Procurement funding

Air Force        2,067.4         2,048.3         2,083.8
procurement
funding

Air Force          278.6           278.6           278.6
advance
procurement
funding

Navy             3,576.4         3,997.0          3997.0
procurement
funding

Navy               481.0           481.0          481.0
advance
procurement
funding

Research and development funding

Air Force        2,073.1         1,780.1         2,073.1
Navy             1,956.3         1,663.3         1,956.3

Source: Prepared by CRS based on committee reports,
bill text, and floor amendments.
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Title Annotation:F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Author:Gertler, Jeremiah
Publication:Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Dec 1, 2009
Words:28458
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