Legal malpractice statutes of limitation: overview and Pennsylvania case study.
1. An Overview of Legal Malpractice Statutes of Limitation
A majority of jurisdictions have clearly articulated the statutory time period whereby a plaintiff is required to bring a legal malpractice cause of action, either by legislative enactment or by judicial determination by cause of action (negligence or breach of contract) to which the corresponding statute of limitation applies.
Thirty-six of fifty-one jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) have enacted statutes which specifically provide limitation periods for causes of actions against legal service providers or simply assign legal malpractice actions to the "catch-all" limitation period. Those jurisdictions are: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. (1)
Some jurisdictions characterize legal malpractice claims as a derivative of either negligence or breach of contract and thereafter assign the corresponding limitation period. For example, four jurisdictions, Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma and Texas, have determined that legal malpractice is based in negligence, and therefore a negligence statue of limitation applies. (2) Two jurisdictions, Iowa and Virginia, conclude that legal malpractice sounds in breach of contract, and a statute of limitation for breach of contract applies. (3)
Alaska and Vermont analyze the nature of the injury to determine the applicable statute of limitation. In these jurisdictions, distinctions are made between personal injury and economic loss. For example, in Alaska, a two (2) year statute applies if the malpractice caused personal injury or injury to the reputation, but a six (6) year statute applies if the malpractice caused economic loss. (4)
Other jurisdictions have not provided rules with the same clarity as the states noted above. In these remaining jurisdictions, both negligence and breach of contract statutes of limitation are in play when considering a legal malpractice cause of action. Three jurisdictions, Arizona, Connecticut and Kansas, have determined that in a legal malpractice action both a negligence statute of limitation and breach of contract statute of limitation are considered. In these circumstances, in order for the breach of contract statute of limitation to apply, there must have been specific instructions given to the attorney which the attorney failed to perform. (5)
Finally, Georgia, Mississippi, Pennsylvania and West Virginia offer a significant advantage to plaintiffs in legal malpractice actions. In these jurisdictions, the plaintiff is permitted to assert claims in negligence, contract or both and take advantage of whichever statute is longer. (6) There are no restrictions based on the nature of the injury. Moreover, there is no caveat that a failure to follow a specific instruction must be alleged in order to assert a breach of contract claim and have the benefit of a different statute of limitation associated with such claim.
II. Pennsylvania: A Case Study
In Pennsylvania a tort claim has a two year statute of limitation and a breach of contract claim has a four year statute of limitation] Are legal malpractice claims tort causes of action based upon the attorney's failure to provide services consistent with the profession at large, breach of contact causes of action where the attorney fails to follow a specific term of an attorney-client contract, or some combination of both? How one characterizes a legal malpractice action in Pennsylvania can have an impact on the statute of limitation for such a claim. In Pennsylvania, an artfully pied complaint, which includes claims for breach of contract that sound in negligence, permits a plaintiff to bring what is, in reality, a negligence claim under a longer four year breach of contract statute of limitation. (8)
In order to fully understand this issue and the extent of the problems associated therewith, this article traces the development Pennsylvania jurisprudence on this subject.
Pennsylvania courts have recognized that an aggrieved client has a choice of two distinct causes of action against his attorney and can sue his attorney in either negligence--on the theory that the attorney failed to exercise the appropriate standard of care--or in breach of contract--on the theory that the attorney failed to follow specific instructions of his client and breached a contract by doing so. This principal is recognized in cases such as Duke & Company v. Anderson (9) and Hoyer v. Frazee. (10) In Hoyer, an attorney was sued in both breach of contract and negligence for allegedly causing plaintiff to purchase a smaller piece of property than what plaintiff had bargained for. The court determined that if the breach of contract action sounds in negligence, by asserting that the attorney failed to exercise an appropriate standard of care, the claim of breach of contract is not asserting a true cause of action and should be dismissed]I In Storm v. Golden, the court also concluded that a breach of contract claim is, in reality, a claim for professional negligence based in tort and not a true contract claim when the allegations are that the attorney failed to exercise an appropriate standard of care. (12)
Pennsylvania jurisprudence then took a different approach in 1993. In Bailey v. Tucker, (13) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the course of discussing claims for ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings and notice requirements for commencing of the statute of limitations, acknowledged that a claim against an attorney based upon breach of contract is based upon the terms of the existing contract. The Court added, however, "[o]f course an attorney who agrees for a fee to represent a client is by implication agreeing to provide that client with professional services consistent with those expected of the profession at large." (14) This statement has been relied upon by other Pennsylvania courts to reason that every contract for legal services contains, as an implied term in the contract, a promise by the attorney to render legal services in accordance with the profession at large.
For example, in Gorski v. Smith, a client sued his former attorney in both negligence and breach of contract. (15) Rather than relying on precedent established by Duke and Hoyer, which had determined that a plaintiff may only bring a legal malpractice action sounding in breach of contract if that plaintiff alleges that the attorney failed to follow a specific instruction or term of a contract, (16) the Gorski court chose to follow the statement in Bailey for the proposition that "when an attorney enters into a contract to provide legal services, there automatically arises a contractual duty on the part of the attorney to render those legal services in a manner that comports with the profession at large." (17) A similar analysis was undertaken in Fiorentino v. Rapoport, where the court noted that certain expert testimony, which showed that the lawyer failed to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge expected of a lawyer engaged to prepare a contract for the sale of a business, supported a claim for legal malpractice based in contract. (18)
The Pennsylvania legislature subsequently added another layer to this issue. On January 27, 2003, Rules 1042.1 and 1042.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted. These Rules set forth the standards required for asserting claims against a professional for malpractice and that a professional deviated from some professional standard. The Rules require that a Certificate of Merit be filed in the action by the plaintiff that the defendant professional did so. Specifically, in order to allege professional malpractice claims in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff is required to file a Certificate of Merit under Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3 which states that "an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a written statement that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional standards and that such conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm." (19) By filing a legal malpractice case and the requisite Certificate of Merit, a plaintiff is acknowledging that the action is, in fact, a professional negligence claim based upon the notion that a defendant deviated from some professional standard. These Rules were adopted after Bailey, Fiorentino and Gorski were decided.
Against this backdrop, numerous ambiguities and issues arise. Cases that are most in agreement with Rules 1042.1 and 1042.3 and that recognize that legal malpractice claims are claims based in professional negligence involving the failure to exercise an appropriate standard of care are the older cases such as Duke, Hoyer and Storm, and not the more recent cases, Bailey, Fiorentino and Gorski. Are these later cases to be viewed as an aberration, or can they be reconciled with the Rules? The earlier cases are easily reconciled with the Rules because they permit both a malpractice claim based in tort and the breach of a professional duty and standard of care, which is consistent with the Rules, and also permit a malpractice claim based on breach of contract based upon the breach of a specific term in a contract. The earlier cases give meaning to Rules 1042.1 and 1042.3. The more recent cases do not because the breach of contract claim, based upon implied terms that are negligence principles, is permitted to be filed without the Certificate of Merit, thereby circumventing the Rules and frustrating their intent. (20)
In addition, under the Bailey line of cases there is no meaningful distinction between an implied contract cause of action and a tort cause of action because the elements of both almost completely overlap. As a result, any distinction between the causes of action is meaningless, thereby resulting in a plaintiff having the ability to improperly extend the statute of limitation in a legal malpractice claim from two to four years by nothing more than repackaging a negligence claim into a breach of contract claim through artful pleading.
Further, a breach of contract claim based upon implied terms blurs the distinction between tort and contract law and the recovery of damages. It is important to note that the Bailey court refused to allow recovery of consequential damages under a legal malpractice theory sounding in breach of contract, and instead deemed damages (if any) associated therewith were "limited to the amount actually paid for the services plus statutory interest." (21) Bailey makes it clear that even when permitting a plaintiff to sue for breach of contract without pleading a failure to follow a specific instruction, the damages should be limited to the actual attorneys fees paid. In Gorski, however, a jury permitted a plaintiff to bring a legal malpractice claim sounding in breach of contract and recover damages beyond attorneys' fees, effectively converting a breach of contract claim into one for negligence. The jury in Gorski permitted recovery under a breach of contract theory, which reflected an amount paid to settle a related bankruptcy proceeding and closing costs for a mortgage in connection with the settlement of the underlying claim. The trial court molded the verdict for recovery in negligence as well, which was upheld on appeal. (22) As a result, there is a blurring of the lines between contract and tort. Plaintiffs would argue the damages recoverable in a negligence action, which in Pennsylvania is required to be filed in two years, are now recoverable in a breach of contract action with a four year statute of limitation. However, the actual holding of the trial court in Gorski, which was later affirmed by the Superior Court, does not actually serve to support such an argument.
Two recent cases have addressed and commented on the statute of limitation issue. The Honorable Terrence F. McVerry of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed a case sounding in tort but asserted as breach of contract. (23) Further, the Honorable Justice Thomas Saylor of Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in dissent, thereafter endorsed Judge McVerry's analysis of this issue. (24)
In Stacey v. City of Hermitage, Judge McVerry acknowledged the existence of the dual pleading practice commonly adopted by a plaintiff in Pennsylvania. (25) However, Judge McVerry ruled that if the breach of contract action against an attorney in reality stems from negligence or tortious conduct, courts should apply the two-year statute of limitation, not a four year breach of contract statute. The Stacey court explained that:
[o]f course, virtually all legal representation occurs within the scope of a contract between lawyer and client. This does not, however, mean that the contractual limitations period automatically applies. Rather, the courts have looked to the terms of the contract allegedly breached and to the nature of the injury asserted. If the damages requested stem from negligence or other tortious misconduct, then the action sounds in tort and the two-year statute of limitations applies. If the damages arise from a breach of an explicit contractual term, and if the request is only for compensatory damages appropriate in contract, then the action sounds in contract. (26)
The Stacey Court made clear that "a plaintiff may not repackage a negligence-based malpractice claim under [a breach of contract] theory to avoid the statute of limitations." (27) Further, the Stacey Court stated:
[o]ne important limitation on pleading malpractice claims in Pennsylvania under a contract theory, however, is that a malpractice plaintiff may not sidestep the two-year limitation on tort actions by pleading tort claims as breaches of contract.., if allegations of a contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendants, and of an express or implied term of the contract establishing an obligation to exercise reasonable care, were to suffice to state a breach-of-contract malpractice case, the two year limitations statute for tort actions would be a dead letter in ... malpractice cases. (28)
In Stacey, Judge McVerry went on to dismiss the malpractice claim sounding in breach of contract, holding that the gravamen of the Amended Complaint was that the defendants failed to exercise the appropriate standard of care and the plaintiffs could not repackage this claim under a breach of contract theory to avoid the two-year statue of limitations. (29) Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Thomas Saylor endorsed the decision reached by Judge McVerry in Stacey. In Steiner v. Markel, (30) plaintiffs brought a "professional malpractice" claim against defendants but did not specifically describe its claim as a breach of contract claim. (31) The defendant attorney's motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted on the basis that the professional malpractice claim was a tort claim and was barred by the two year statute of limitation. On appeal, the Superior Court, sua sponte, held that the plaintiff's Complaint timely stated a professional malpractice claim sounding in breach of contract and reversed the trial court. (32) The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court's decision and held that the Superior Court should not have determined, sua sponte, that the Complaint stated a malpractice action sounding in breach of contract when the plaintiff-client did not preserve for appeal the issue of whether their professional malpractice claim was a claim for breach of contract. (33)
Justice Saylor, dissenting not to the result but to the methodology utilized in obtaining the result, indicated that he favored a supplemental allowance of appeal to address "'a significant subsidiary question," specifically, "a substantial, underlying, conceptual problem" that the Court "has not detailed the elements of a contract-based cause of action for legal malpractice in a fashion which would meaningfully distinguish them from those necessary to support a tort-based cause." (34) Justice Saylor expressed the problem of the implied contract-based legal malpractice action (as discussed in Bailey v. Tucker (35) in that it: (1) "suggests the elements of tort and contract-based causes of action in [an implied contract] setting overlap substantially, if not completely," and (2) if Bailey is adhered to on its terms, 'any distinction between contract and tort claims is practically meaningless' and plaintiffs, by mere 'skillful pleading' may avail themselves of the longer limitations period." (36) Justice Saylor further indicated that the positions developed by the Stacey Court:
effectively predicted [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] would require averment of a breach of some particular provision of the agreement of representation, or a failure to follow specific client instructions, to support a contract-based claim. In light of such enhanced requirement for contract-based pleading, these courts have admonished, 'a plaintiff may not repackage a negligence-based malpractice claim under [a breach of contract] theory to avoid the statute of limitations.' (37)
Obviously, Pennsylvania needs to clearly articulate the appropriate statute of limitation applicable to legal malpractice claims. It is readily apparent that jurisdictions that have not clearly identified applicable statute of limitation for legal malpractice claims, such as Pennsylvania, open the door for unfair and inconsistent results for defendants and their exposure to claims.
Statutes of limitation should be clear and provide predictable and consistent results. Otherwise, circumstances exist where unpredictable and unfair results, based nothing more than upon artful pleading, exist. Is it proper to take advantage of a longer statute of limitation by asserting a legal malpractice action sounding in breach of contract based upon implied terms and the duty to provide a client with professional services consistent with those expected of the profession at large, rather than a negligence claim based upon the same assertions? By way of example, in Pennsylvania, permitting such tangential breach of contract claims permits a legal malpractice claim to be asserted and sustained beyond that time period required by professional malpractice actions effectively extending all claims against professionals to four years instead of two years. Until Pennsylvania clearly establishes its law concerning statutes of limitation in the legal malpractice context, confusion will occur. Other jurisdictions lacking a statutory statute of limitation would be wise to avoid such confusion.
(1) Alabama (2 years, CODE OF ALA. [section] 6-5 574 (2010)); California (1 year, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. [section] 340.6 (2010)); Colorado (2 years, Torrez v. Edwards, 107 P.3d 1110, 1113 (Col. Ct. App. 2004) applying C.R.S. 13-80-102 (2009)) Delaware ((3 years, Began v. Dixon, 547 A.2d 620 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988) applying 10 DEL. C. [section] 8106); District of Columbia (3 years, Gallucci v. Schaffer, 507 F. Supp. 2d 85, 89-90 (D.D.C. 2007) applying D.C. CODE [section] 12-301 (2010)); Florida (2 years, FLA. STAT. [section] 95.11(4)(a) (2010)); Hawaii (6 years, Higa v. Mirikitani, 517 P.2d 1, 6 (Ha. 1973) applying HRS [section] 657-1(1) (2010)); Idaho (2 years, IDAHO CODE [section] 5-219 (2010)); Illinois (2 years, 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (2010)); Indiana (2 years, Ickes v. Waters, 879 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)); Kentucky (1 year, KRS [section] 413.245 (2010)); Louisiana (1 year, LA. R.S. 9:5605 (2010)); Maine (6 years, 14 M.R.S. [section] 752 (2009)); Maryland (3 years, MD. COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS CODE ANN. [section] 5-101 (2010)); Massachusetts (3 years, ALM GL ch. 260, [section] 4(2010)); Michigan (2 years, MCLS [section] 600.5805 (2010)); Minnesota (6 years, Noske v. Friedberg, 656 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) applying MINN. STAT. [section] 541.05 (2009)); Montana (3 years, MONT. CODE ANNO., [section] 27-2-206 (2010)); Nebraska (2 years, R.R.S. NEB. [section] 25-222 (2010)); Nevada (4 years, Sorenson v. Pavlikowski, 581 P.2d 851, 854 (Nev. 1978) applying NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. [section] 11.190 (2009)); New Hampshire (3 years, Furbush v. McKittrick, 821 A.2d 1126 (N.H. 2003) applying RSA 508:4 (2010); New Jersey (6 years, Sullivan v. Aslanides, 863 A.2d 409, 411 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2005) applying N.J. STAr. [section] 2A:14-1 (2010)); New Mexico (4 years, Brown v. Behles & Davis, 86 P.3d 605,608 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) applying N.M. STAT. ANN. [section] 37-1-4 (2009)); New York (3 years, NY CLS CPLR [section] 214(6) (2010)); North Carolina (3 years, N.C. Gen. Stat. [section] 1-15 (2010)); North Dakota (2 years, N.D. CENT. CODE, [section] 28-01-18(3) (2010)); Ohio (1 year, ORC ANN. 2305.11(A) (2010); Oregon (2 years, ORS [section] 12.110 (2010)); Rhode Island (10 years, Church v. McBurney, 513 A.2d 22 (R.I. 1986) applying R.I. GEN. LAWS [section] 9-1-13 (2010)); South Carolina (3 years, Kelly v. Logan, Jolley, & Smith, L.L.P., 383 S.C. 626 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009) applying S.C. CODE ANN. [section] 15-3-530(5) (2009)); South Dakota (3 years, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS [section] 15-2-14.2 (2009)); Tennessee (1 year, Tenn. Code Ann. [section] 28-3-104 (2010)); Utah (4 years, Williams v. Howard, 970 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1998) applying UTAH CODE ANN. [section] 78-12-25 (2010)); Washington (3 years, Huff v. Roach, 125 Wn. App. 724 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) applying RCW 4.16.080(3)); Wisconsin (6 years, Hicks v. Nunnery, 643 N.W.2d 809, 815-16 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) applying Wis. STAT.[section] 893.53 (2010)); Wyoming (2 years, WYO. STAr. [section] 1-3-107 (2010)).
(2) Arkansas (3 years, Sturgis v. Skokos, 977 S.W.2d 217, 220-21 (Ark. 1998)); Missouri (5 years, Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. 1997)); Oklahoma (2 years, Mahorney v. Waren, 60 P.3d 38, 40 (Okl. Ct. Civ. App. 2002)); Texas (2 years, Murphy v. Gruber, 241 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007)).
(3) Iowa (5 years, Vernard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 165-66 (Iowa 1994)); Virginia (3 years, MacLellan v. Throckmorton, 367 S.E.2d 720 (Va. 1988)).
(4) Alaska (2 years for malpractice causing personal or reputation injury, 6 years for economic loss, Breck v. Moore, 910 P.2d 599 (Alaska 1996)); Vermont (3 years for personal injury, including emotional distress, and 6 years for economic losses, Fitzgerald v. Congleton, 583 A.2d 595,598 (Vt. 1990).
(5) Arizona (generally 2 years and sounds in negligence, unless specific oral instruction for which 3 years applies under breach of contract applies, Keonjian v. Olcott, 169 P.3d 927, 930-31 (Az. Ct. App. 2007)); Connecticut (3 years, unless specific instruction applies for which 6 year statute applies, Caffrey v. Stillman, 829 A.2d 881, 884 (Conn. Ct. App. 2003)); Kansas (2 years, unless specific contractual provision applies a duty for which 3 years (oral) or 5 years (written) applies, Moss v. Mamalis, 138 P.3d 380, 384 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006)).
(6) Georgia (Plumlee v. Davis, 473 S.E.2d 510, 513 (Ga. App. 1996))(legal malpractice action may sound either in tort or contract, with two year statute applying to tort and 4 year statute applying to contract); Mississippi (Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So.2d 926, 928-29 (Miss. 1982))(since both the 3 year statute of limitations for contracts and the 6 year statute of limitation for torts have been applied in different cases, the logical conclusion is that a choice of remedies is available); West Virginia (Smith v. Stacy, 482 S.E.2d 115, 119 (W.Va. 1996)) (the fact that the statute of limitations bars a malpractice action sounding in tort does preclude a malpractice action on contract which is not barred by the applicable limitation statute).
(7) 42 PA. C.S. [section] 5524; 42 PA.C.S. [section] 5525.
(8) For example, consider a complaint that alleges, under a claim identified as breach of contract or breach of implied contract, that the attorney failed to exercise the ordinary skill, knowledge and care in performance of the contract with plaintiff to the level expected to be exercised by members of the legal profession, without identifying any specific term of the contracted alleged to have been breached.
(9) Duke & Company v. Anderson, 418 A.2d 613,616 (Pa. Super. 1980).
(10) Hoyer v. Frazee, 470 A.2d 990 (Pa. Super. 1984).
(11) Hoyer, 470 A.2d at 992-993.
(12) Storm v. Golden, 538 A.2d 61, 65 (Pa. Super. 1988).
(13) Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1993).
(14) Bailey, 621 A.2d at 115.
(15) Gorski v. Smith, 812 A.2d 683 (Pa. Super. 2002) alloc. denied 856 A.2d 834 (2004).
(16) Duke, 418 A.2d at 616.
(17) Gorski, 812 A.2d at 694, citing Bailey, 621 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1993).
(18) Fiorentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208 (Pa. Super. 1997) alloc, denied 701 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1997).
(19) Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3 (2010).
(20) This article recognizes Wachovia Bank, N.A.v. Farretti, 935 A.2d 565 (Pa. Super. 2007) a case published after the Rules were enacted. However, this case merely makes a preliminary and generalized statement about Bailey and Gorski without providing additional analysis or insight and the implications of Rules 1042.1 and 1042.3.
(21) Bailey, 621 A.2d at 1115.
(22) Gorski, 812 A.2d at 705.
(23) Stacey v. City of Hermitage, No. 2:02-cv-1911, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29359 (W.D. Pa., April 7, 2008).
(24) Steiner v. Markel, 968 A.2d 1253, 1262 (2009).
(25) Stacey, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *11, citing Duke v. Anderson, 418 A.2d 613 (Pa. Super 1980).
(26) Id. at *12.
(27) Id. at *14.
(29) Id. at *20-22.
(30) 968 A.2d 1253 (Pa. 2009).
(31) Steiner, 968 A.2d at 1255.
(32) Id. at 1256.
(33) Id. at 1260.
(34) Id. at 1262.
(35) 621 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1993).
(36) Steiner, 968 A.2d at 1262.
Mr. Christof is a Shareholder and Director in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania office of Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C. He is the co-chair of the firm's Commercial Litigation Group. Mr. Christof has practiced in a wide variety of areas during his career, including professional liability, commercial litigation, products liability and environmental law. He is a graduate of the College of the Holy Cross and Vanderbilt University Law School.
Mr. Farrar is a Principal in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania office of Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C. Mr. Farrar's practice includes a wide variety of civil litigation including commercial litigation, professional liability and construction litigation. He is a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh and the Duquesne University School of.
Law. Mr. Flynn is an Associate in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania office of Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P. C. Mr. Flynn practices in the areas of professional liability and commercial litigation. He is a graduate of The Pennsylvania State University and the Duquesne University School of Law
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|Author:||Christof, Joseph S.D., II; Farrar, Brett W.; Flynn, Michael P.|
|Publication:||Defense Counsel Journal|
|Date:||Oct 1, 2010|
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