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Despite the prominent role it occupied, the battle for hearts and minds that transpired from the skies over Southeast Asia remains largely neglected. Americans more than bombed Southeast Asia during the war in Vietnam. They pelted it with leaflets. Billions of them, each year. And they blasted the countryside. Here they used loudspeakers. The louder the better. Ones located on the U--10 Helio Courier usually sufficed. Offered a choice, however, pilots preferred "a higher powered system like the 1800 watt system in the O--2B." (1) The louder the better. This created space. That alone, distance from the ground, provided operators with some sense of safety.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) personnel in the skies over Southeast Asia averaged between 7,000 and 9,000 total flight hours while executing approximately 2,000 sorties per month. They utilized fifteen different types of aircraft, including C-130s. Critics dubbed these "B.S. bombers." (2) Moreover, they derided the leaflet drop program as "one of the wildest excesses of the war." (3) They estimated that by 1970, the United States had dropped 2,000 leaflets for every man, woman and child in Vietnam. One official questioned the effectiveness of the leaflets in reducing the numbers of the enemy. He suggested that rather than dispersing the leaflets, they should be dropped instead by the baleful. This way, he contended, "Maybe we'd get lucky and hit some VC [Viet Cong] on the head." (4)

Perhaps the idea had merit. In 1968, American officials reported that one "particularly glum Vietcong member defected in the Delta." When questioned, he revealed to interrogators the reasoning behind his defection. He became demoralized after the Americans killed his best friend. "A big bundle of paper dropped out of an airplane," he explained, "and landed on his head." (5)

This affords new meaning to the term "smart bomb." It also suggests, in admittedly absurdist fashion, that the battle for hearts and minds that transpired over the skies of Southeast Asia proved more complicated than it first appears. As observed by Air Force officials in 1971, scrutiny of the entire airborne support of PSYOP in Southeast Asia renders "a nebulous picture of a protracted program which almost defies measurement, involving substantial expenditures in dollars and effort." (8) It is one that promises a more sophisticated understanding of the air war in Southeast Asia while also offering potential insights applicable to the utilization of PSYOP in contemporary conflicts. Hearts and minds remain contested terrain between America and its adversaries.

In Vietnam, piloting over this landscape meant to embrace flying "Unarmed, Alone and Unafraid." Even as missions often left operators "Unarmed, Alone and Terrified." (7) Effective PSYOP delivery, especially via loudspeaker, meant flying low and slow, often lingering, over enemy concentrations. This rendered an attractive target for ground fire. PSYOP aircraft took hundreds of hits which, "on several occasions," forced their operators to make emergency landings. (8) United States Air Force Major Kenneth H. Moses, a PSYOP pilot with the 9th Special Operations Squadron, took six hits to his aircraft in two months. Yet he retained his conviction that PSYOP offered "the greatest potential of any new development in warfare." (9)

Maximum Harassment

PSYOP in Vietnam hardly constituted anything new. The American commitment to it did. This began with the appointment of United States Air Force (USAF) Colonel Edward Geary Lansdale to head the Saigon Military Mission (1954-1957). Lansdale, drew from his experience with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II and his more recent efforts on behalf of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group, Philippines. There, his use of psychological warfare and civic action to combat the communist Hukbalahap on behalf of the American allied Filipino government earned him the praise of U. S. policy makers.

As early as April 1962, instructors from the United States Army, Pacific began to assist in developing the psychological training program within the Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF). United States Mobile Training Teams (MTT) further provided assistance to the RVN in radio management, propaganda research, printing management and production, PSYOP and motion picture production management. In 1964, the RVN created the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) assigned to carry out PSYOP that bolstered morale, carried out civic action and destroyed the enemy's will. (10) The VNAF received the mission of airborne support along with the task of carrying out civic action.

These developments reflected the ideas of American policy makers. Following World War II, they increasingly embraced the importance of psychology in combatting communism. They perceived the Cold War as a contest of wills which necessitated the broad application of psychological considerations. They identified psychological operations as a more inclusive term than psychological warfare to characterize the expanding array of activities that America undertook to check communist expansion. The United States created the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee in 1951, an interagency group that worked to incorporate psychological considerations systematically into the formulation of national policy.

On January 24, 1964, the United States established Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Studies and Observations Group (SOG) under the Commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, charged with carrying out covert and clandestine activities against the DRV. Under the charter of OPLAN--34A, MACSOG executed four types of unconventional missions against the DRV under the Footboy program. These included maritime operations (PARBOIL), airborne operations (TIMBERWORK), air operations (MIDRIFF) and psychological operations (HUMIDOR). (11)

A Viable Concept

With the establishment of MACSOG, the USAF assumed an "ever expanding and increasingly large role in support of unconventional warfare operations." (12) This included PSYOP, an element embedded in much of the unconventional activity. The goal of OPLAN-34A's operations, collectively referred to as FOOTBOY, emerged as persuasive. It aimed to "convince the DRV leadership that its current support and direction of the war" in the RVN and Laos should be "stopped and reexamined." It called for strategic and tactical PSYOP targeted against the DRV leadership and the populace to "achieve maximum division, harassment and the establishment of resistance with the DRV." (13)

The effort to provide air support began inauspiciously. It constituted the efforts of nine Air Force personnel, five officers and four enlisted men, who comprised First Flight Detachment. Under assumed names and in plain clothes at Nha Trang Air Base, the members of First Flight received the first of six modified C--123s on June 28, 1964, authorized by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara as Project Duck Hook, later dubbed Heavy Hook. They soon undertook their primary mission, to train aircrews from Taiwan and the VNAF.

Before arriving in Vietnam, the Taiwan crews received initial training, including language instruction, in the United States at Lackland Air Force Base, Hurlburt Field and Mather Air Force Base. While the Americans found the Taiwan air men as "disciplined" and "professional," the crews proved reluctant to fly over the DRV, particularly to execute psychological operations missions at night. Consequently, "for PSYOP missions," MACSOG "obtained approval for the use of American C-123 crews." (14) It also hastened to train Vietnamese crews, "to get rid of the Chinese crews." (15) This aligned with pressures coming from policy makers in Washington who sought to get the mission going with Vietnamese utilized.

Language immediately emerged as a barrier against effective communication

The difficulties inherent to training VNAF proved a harbinger. Language immediately emerged as a barrier against effective communication between Americans and their Vietnamese counterparts. The "very limited number" of Americans who could speak or understand Vietnamese "greatly complicated efforts" of training and supervision. (18) So too did the Vietnamese commitment to the mission. While MACSOG judged the Vietnamese crews as "at least as good as that of the Chinese," it found them "more difficult to control." It observed that the Vietnamese "seemed to feel that they were doing us a favor when they went on a mission." They did not see it from a "nationalist point of view." (17) Due to its "hardship," MACSOG terminated the VNAF training program in 1966 with "minimal impact on operations." (18)

Despite the issues in training Vietnamese, officials deemed the PSYOP initiative against the DRV as MAC-SOG's "most successful program," citing the "numerous North Vietnamese publications and broadcasts which denounced U.S. psychological warfare operations." (19) The HUMIDOR operations steadily increased, from thirty PSYOP missions flown during the first year to forty-two during the second and sixty-seven in the third. On November 3,1966, MACSOG first utilized its newly arrived Combat Spear aircraft, modified C--130s, to execute a PSYOP mission. It initially requested C--130s in 1964, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) denied this, deeming only American crews fit to operate the aricraft. This did not constitute a "viable concept under the current UW [unconventional warfare] program." (20)

The C--130 held advantages over the C--123 for disseminating leaflets. It flew faster and higher, enabling drop points in relatively undefended areas for targets in heavily defended ones that had proved inaccessible to C--123s. Since the end of World War II, American PSYOP personnel experimented with targeting leaflets accurately. This benefitted C--130E crews who required oxygen masks to work in extreme altitudes of operation, up to 25,000 feet. C--130 PSYOP missions required special leaflet boxes and pallets designed to minimize the work needed to handle them.

Each pallet could hold thirty boxes of leaflets with the C--130 able to fit ten pallets, stacked in two tiers of five. Each box of leaflets, equipped with rollers, weighed approximately 140 pounds and could be deployed at a rate of once per every ten seconds by placing the aircraft in a slightly nose-high altitude enabling the boxes to roll to the aircraft's rear. The cut boxes featured webbing attached to a static line. When pushed out the rear of the aircraft, they hit the end of the line and spilled their leaflets into the airstream.

Personnel worked throughout the war to improve the accuracy of drops. An early method involved cutting a cardboard box to fall apart and then retying it with a cord that passed through a fuse. After ignition, once the fuse burned through the cord, the box fell apart and released its contents, ideally from about 500 feet. BLIND-BAT flare ship personnel honed delivery further by developing a Delayed Opening Leaflet System (DOLS). It used rejected flares that featured inserted leaflets in place of parachutes. Each modified flare could hold up to one thousand six-inch by three-inch leaflets. Personnel left the flare candle in and used the flare system in the BLINDBAT aircraft to deploy these DOLS. When dropped, once the timer fired the explosion dropped leaflets rather than opening a parachute. The ignited flare candle revealed the accuracy of the drop. (21)

PSYOP crews devised ingenious methods of delivery to take advantage of the C--130, but the biggest disadvantage remained, increased American exposure. Three American units came to be designated as almost exclusively supporting MACSOG operations over the DRV and, as the program expanded, Cambodia and Laos. These included the First Flight Detachment, the 90th Special Operations Squadron (formerly the 15th SOS) and 20th SOS. Crews wore standard flight uniforms and their aircraft carried USAF markings. Cover stories and stringent security became essential. In event of an incident, PSYOP crews received strict instructions to jettison all materials and claim to be on an authorized search and rescue mission for downed US aircrews. (22)

The Difficulty of Assessment

As America's intervention in Vietnam escalated, the United States additionally mounted an expansive overt PSYOP initiative that the USAF supported. As a consequence of National Security Action Memorandum 330, issued by President Lyndon Baines Johnson on April 9, 1965, the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUS-PAO) assumed direction for American PSYOP policy in Vietnam. In 1967, under United States Army General William C. Westmoreland, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) took charge of executing PSYOP.

Within MACV, the Political Warfare Advisory Directorate, established in May 1965, to support the RVN's GPWD, became the Psychological Operations Directorate (MACPD). It directed tactical PSYOP in support of military operations while MACV Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (MACCORDS) orchestrated PSYOP on behalf of pacification and national development. The 6th PSYOP Battalion, expanded into the 4th PSYOP Group on January 1, 1968, offered tactical PSYOP support. The 7th PSYOP Group, based in Okinawa, used Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINPAC) funds to generate printed materials.

The USAF and the VNAF provided airborne support. To a lesser extent, both forces also engaged in civic action programs. The VNAF first received PSYOP responsibilities in 1964, in support of the RVN's General Political Warfare Department (GPWD). It tasked five tactical wings with PSYOP responsibilities, the 23rd (Bien Hoa), the 33rd (Tan Son Nhut), the 41st (Danang), the 62nd (Nha Trang) and the 74th (Binh Thuy). The wings possessed squadrons equipped mainly with U--17s and U--6s that featured speaker systems ranging from 250 to 1000 watts. Each wing had assigned to it one USAF PSYOP advisor while VNAF headquarters received two. (23)

On the American side, support derived from the 14th Air Commando Wing (ACW) under operational command of the Seventh Air Force. USAF support for overt PSYOP activities arrived in Vietnam shortly after the buildup of US combat troops in 1965. By the end of the year, fifty-four personnel had reported to the 5th Air Commando Squadron (ACS) at Nha Trang Air Base which resided under the operational control of the 6253d Combat Support Group (re-designated in 1966 as the 14th ACW).

By the time of its first major operation, Tet, from January 9-20, 1966, the 5th ACS possessed five C--47 "Gooney Birds," and 24 U--10, all equipped with loudspeaker systems. To complete its first operation, the 5th ACS borrowed four more C--47s and twelve U--10s. It flew 559 missions over the twelve day period, dropping 130 million leaflets and broadcasting 380 hours. It suffered nine aircraft hits that resulted in one wounded. The operation represented the largest PSYOP program ever carried out by US forces overseas. (24)

The United States additionally mounted an expansive overt PSYOP initiative

Such efforts profited from the resources devoted by the Air Force to exploring "the possibilities of applying special air operations to special warfare ground operations" in the early 1960s. (25) In 1962, the Air Force established the Special Air Warfare Center at Eglin Air Force Base which encompassed Hurlburt Field in Florida to serve as the home for the newly activated 1st Air Commando Wing. Training concentrated on utilizing short takeoff or landing aircraft (STOL), such as the U--10, capable of taking off in 225 feet of runway, maneuverable at thirty-five miles per hour and capable of carrying two crew and more than 50,000 leaflets while remaining aloft for nearly four hours.

Exercises took place at various locations, including Panama. There, unit commander Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth D. Hill suggests, they developed the basic principles of PSYOP used in Vietnam. They flew into villagers where runways did not exist. They dropped construction equipment from the aircraft to villagers on the ground and then employed leaflets and loudspeakers to guide them in building an airstrip. According to Hill, this constituted the first time that "this idea was used with such success." (26)

In March 1967, airborne support for PSYOP increased with the formation of the 9th ACS, formed from resources from the 5th ACS. Formerly tasked with supporting PSYOP throughout the RVN, the 5th ACS now had responsibility for III and IV Corps while the 9th ACS took over the support role in I and II Corps. This remained the situation until October 1969, when, as a consequence of the Richard M. Nixon presidential administration's Vietnamization plan, officials deactivated the 5th ACS and renamed the 9th ACS as the 9th Special Operations Squadron (SOS). The 9th SOS, at Phan Rang Air Force Base, remained as the only USAF squadron appropriately configured and dedicated to support PSYOP until the spring of 1971, when airborne support shifted to the Vietnamese, Laotians, Cambodians and Thais. (27)

Throughout the time it operated, much of America's PSYOP in the RVN sought to induce defection through the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program. The appeal, delivered via leaflet and loudspeaker, targeted both regular soldiers and guerilla fighters. It promised amnesty to defectors (Hoi Chanh), fair treatment and resettlement. Choi Hoi centers, funded by the United States and administered by RVN officials, offered Hoi Chanh opportunities to transition back into civilian life. American officials hope to capitalize on Hoi Chanh for intelligence and for testimonials that might induce more defectors. The program ran from 1963 through 1971, and claimed success in securing nearly 200,000 defectors. Its overall effectiveness, debated at the time, remains contested. (28)

So does the impact of the various other PSYOP operations that attempted to erode enemy morale, promote dissent and win the hearts and minds of civilians. Besides Chieu Hoi, the USAF supported operations FACT SHEET/FRANTIC GOAT (DRV), TRAIL (Cambodia and Laos), ARC LIGHT (B--52s), ELEPHANT WALK (rewards), RICE RIVER (Cambodia) and FIELD GOAL (LINEBACKER). Its personnel additionally worked in Thailand as advisors to the Royal Thailand Air Force, training two units in the "flight techniques to be used in aerial loudspeaker operations." (29) Throughout, however, the difficulties of assessment persisted. Officials consistently found that the "results" of it all could "not be quantitatively evaluated." (30)

A Preference for Other Duties

While defectors could be counted, there motivations could not. There existed no way to connect the decisions made by defectors to surrender with their reception of PSYOP material. Officials cited the reactions of communist authorities to PSYOP campaigns, such as radio jamming, censorship and reactive messaging. This activity reveals an awareness of the materials, but it fails to show any direct effectiveness.

The program ran from 1963 through 1971, and claimed success in securing nearly 200,000 defectors

Evidence remained largely anecdotal and mixed. For example, as part of Operation FIELD GOAL, executed in support of Operation LINEBACKER, a renewed bombing campaign against the DRV, one set of PSYOP leaflets counterfeited currency, the one piaster note. The drop occurred in August 1972, and in October American officials detected a response from the DRV broadcast over the radio.

Citing the leaflets, DRV controlled radio accused the Nixon administration of committing "another vile and despicable crime." It condemned the "psychological warfare" ploy to destroy the "DRVs financial and monetary system," but credited citizens for displaying "intense patriotism" and "high revolutionary vigilance" for collecting the fake notes and turning them over to authorities. (31) Meanwhile, interrogations of captured enemy soldiers suggested that the fake currency failed to impress, the notes, pink instead of red, all possessed the same serial number. (32)

Air Force personnel acknowledged the fundamental problems with the PSYOP they supported, citing that it too often "lacked credibility," and that "the quantitative approach" that stressed numbers of leaflets dropped and hours broadcast "overshadowed the qualitative approach of credible, imaginative, selective, programs of persuasion." (31) They understood feedback about their mission remained "limited" and quantifying results proved "difficult," but expressed a high level of satisfaction nonetheless. As one explained to an interviewer in 1968, "everyone here feels he's contributing something vital to the war effort." (34)

An official report collaborated, stating that "high morale exists at the squadrons." (35) Personnel rationalized that "the saving of human life when one fights a leaflet war need not be great." They only asked, "How many leaflets are equivalent to one soldier's life?" (36)

The fundamental issue with PSYOP from the perspective of many of its Air Force personnel resided in its lack of prioritization. Major Kenneth H. Moses, a pilot with the 9th SOS, identified "a stage of acceptance" for PSYOP "before its value is fully realized." In Vietnam, he noted, "the glory kind of falls in other directions while we in PSYOP just go plodding along." (37) While PSYOP crews believed in their mission, they became distressed by the lack of others to do the same.

The notion persisted throughout the war that PSYOP constituted a diversion of resources better suited to conventional warfighting. As the authors of a post war assessment of PSYOP observed, "psychological operations have not generally been viewed as an essential part of US strategic and tactical operations." (38) As Air Force officials noted in regards to Operation FIELD GOAL, in war, "the question of allocating resources and is often difficult and complex." PSYOP required "the use of strike and support aircraft that could otherwise have been employed in striking enemy forces and supporting friendly operations in progress." (39)

Consequently, PSYOP missions received a "relatively low-priority rating," often making it difficult "to obtain adequate equipment, facilities, personnel and even aircraft parking space." PSYOP sorties merited only a "Category 3" mission rating, compared to the "Category 2" offered to strike aircraft and forward air control. This proved difficult for PSYOP personnel to accept as their aircraft spent "as much or more time over targets" and "frequently" received "hits from ground fire." This increasingly resulted in PSYOP crews that "preferred other duties." (40)

The Matter of Appearance

Even more problematic proved the reluctance of the VNAF to participate in the PSYOP effort, a reflection of the RVN's own lack of commitment. The VNAF managed to support only about ten percent of the PSYOP support provided until the process of Vietnamization raised that level to thirty percent by 1971. (41) By 1972, when it became "apparent" that the RVN "could not support aerial PSYOP activities on a large scale," CINPAC assumed management of PSYOP from MACV. Despite the process of Vietnamization as declared complete by American officials, the United States now operated to devise and execute "post-Vietnamization PSYOP aerial activity." This development, planners recognized, "reduced the effectiveness of this current concept of PSYOP." (42)

The fundamental issue with PSYOP ... resided in its lack of prioritization

That concept of PSYOP, one formulated and carried out by Americans, had been flawed from the onset. This remained obscured, however, by the blaring of loudspeakers and billions of leaflets that covered Southeast Asia. American PSYOP crafted an image of the RVN. It remained up to the RVN to make that manifest. Americans served as an inadequate replacement.

This is most clearly evidenced by the Civic Action program, the American nation building effort that became part of the official Air Force mission in May 1966. Its objectives included, to improve living conditions in order to "remove one of the underlying causes of the insurgency," and to "gain and maintain support of the people for the GVN [RVN]." (43) The VNAF, through the General Political Warfare Directorate (GPWD), initiated Civic Action at the same time and its designated personnel received assignment to USAF advisors.

For the Air Force, while "the concept of joint VNAF/USAF participation was unquestionably a desirable one," it failed to work out "very satisfactorily." The VNAF exhibited "problems concerning leadership." Less than ten percent of the VNAF Political Warfare personnel "had any formal training." (44) This resulted in efforts that proved counterproductive at best. For example, in an attempt to "improve the appearance of a VNAF housing area" the base commander "outlawed home laundries and ordered unsightly clotheslines removed." While this improved appearances, it came at the price of "lower morale among VNAF dependents" who lost needed income as the result of the ban on laundries. (45)

In general, USAF personnel tasked with Civic Action found their VNAF counterparts reluctant to engage in manual labor and apathetic. The Americans attributed these characteristics to the "loyalty identification" demonstrated by members of the VNAF which remained "limited to family and clan, rather than to broader entities such as the Air Force or the government [RVN] ." (46)

In all facets, this guided the VNAF's reluctance to "place Psychological Operations on the same level of importance as that of U.S. officials." The VNAF viewed as more pressing "the indoctrination of their own troops." For USAF, this dictated that "opportunities for effectively utilizing Psychological Operations," through the Civic Action program or otherwise, did not emerge as activities "vigorously sought by the RVNAF." (47)

For USAF personnel, this meant attempting to compensate. Because there existed no officers attached to the VNAF's Political Warfare Directorate who possessed the appropriate training, USAF advisors exhibited the tendency to "do the jobs themselves." (48) This proved problematic. Too few of the USAF personnel possessed any expertise in Vietnamese language or culture. Training for USAF advisors included three months language training, four weeks at the Military Advisory Institute, Arlington, VA, and a six to ten week PSYOP course at Fort Bragg, NC.

This all fell far short of the ideal, even as identified at the time. The language training, for example, left advisors with an 800-word vocabulary that consisted of mostly Army-oriented terminology. PSYOP officials suggested that "at least language training" would provide the language capability deemed "necessary for their assignment." They also stressed the need for courses in Vietnamese culture and history to help advisors "function more effectively in their dealings with the Vietnamese." (49)

USAF personnel could not act in place of the VNAF to earn support for the RVN. Their lack of training in Vietnamese language and culture, and in formulating PSYOP, none of the assigned advisors possessed previous experience, presented formidable obstacles to overcome in engaging in meaningful Civic Action.

Faint and Fleeting

The efforts of a Civic Action Coordinating Group established at Tan Son Nhut in July 1966, resulted in a "deteriorated relationship" between VNAF and USAF Civic Action teams that sought to implement an "ambitious program." The initiative sought to bring programs and supplies into the twelve hamlets that surrounded the base, ones that served as "relatively secure havens for many Viet Cong." The plan "never really got off the ground" before the strains evident between VNAF and USAF personnel made it clear that "a disengagement seemed advisable." Officials attributed the collapse to the USAF advisor who "may have been overzealous in pushing projects" causing the VNAF to "'lose face'" because they could not keep up with the Americans. (50)

Elsewhere, between April and September 1967, the Air Force provided assistance to forty-five orphanages. The Air Force learned afterwards that some of these Vietnamese orphanages "were not really orphanages in the American sense of the term." They contained a large number of "day students," the children of wealthy RVN citizens. To compound the matter, the Air Force directed "a majority of the aid" to Christian institutions despite Buddhism constituting the predominant religious group in Vietnam. This prompted a rebuke from RVN officials in April 1967, who cited "too much assistance from non-Vietnamese sources" potentially undercut RVN policy to "promote the participation of the people in social welfare projects as part of Community Civic Action." (51)

Despite such proclamations, the RVN demonstrated little real commitment to the programs promised by PSYOP, whether delivered by leaflet or loudspeaker, or through Civic Action, that represented its claims to legitimacy. That constituted the core of the problem. Americans erred in attempting to fill the vacuum. They knew too little about the hearts and minds of the people who resided there and proved unable to solicit from RVN officials the kind of legitimacy necessary to win them independently.

Air Force officials understood this. They identified the central problem of American PSYOP in Vietnam as one that often "transgressed elementary rules of persuasion and therefore lacked credibility." Psychological appeals in Vietnam, they observed, "violated a basic rule," that whatever the claims made, regardless of the number or form of appeals, "should not diverge widely from the facts as the target population sees them." (52) In Vietnam, that divergence proved unbridgeable. Especially as RVN officials evidenced little sincerity in narrowing it. Billions of leaflets, regardless of how well engineered, could only inspire hopes of closing the gap. These proved both as faint and as fleeting as the reams of paper that Americans dispersed all along the Ho Chi Minh trail.


(1.) Interview Transcript with Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Barmettler re: Aspects of PsyOps Activities Conducted through MACPD and MACV - Support Document from Project CHECO Report #162,2 July 1968, The Vietnam Center and Archive at Texas Tech Univerisity (VCATTU).

(2.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report #163 - Continuing Report: Psychological Operations: Air Support in Southeast Asia - June 1968 to May 1971, p. 12, VCATTU.

(3.) Peter R. Kann, "The War of Words: As Propaganda Battle Rages in Vietnam, Some Question U.S. Tactics," Wall Street Journal, December 5,1969, p. 1.

(4.) Report, Psychological Operations against the DRV, August 1970, VCATTU.

(5.) Kann, "The War of Words," p.29.

(6.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report #163, 56, VCATTU.

(7.) Dennis J. Murray, Those Magnificent Men in Their PSYOP Machines," undated, p. 2, VCATTU.

(8.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in GVN, 16 September 1968, pp. 31-32, VCATTU.

(9.) Murray, p. 2.

(10.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in GVN, 16 September 1968, 1, VCATTU.

(11.) Draft MACSOG Documentation Study, 10 July 1970, C--31, VCATTU.

(12.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, The Role of the USAF in Support of Special Activities in SEA, 1 July 1976, p. 1, VCATTU.

(13.) Draft MACSOG Documentation Study, 10 July 1970, p. C--8, VCATTU.

(14.) Ibid., p. 60.

(15.) Ibid., p. 61.

(16.) Draft MACSOG Documentation Study, p. C--33.

(17.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, The Role of the USAF in Support of Special Activities in SEA, 1 July 1976, 61.

(18.) Draft MACSOG Documentation Study, p. p. C--31.

(19.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, The Role of the USAF in Support of Special Activities in SEA, 1 July 1976, p. 30.

(20.) Ibid., p. 68.

(21.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in GVN, 16 September 1968, p. 23, VCATTU.

(22.) Ibid., p. 72.

(23.) Interview, USAF Major Alan H. Stith, 12 June 1968, p. 2, VCATTU.

(24.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in GVN, 16 September 1968, p. 16, VCATTU.

(25.) Lieutenant Robert Pfohman, "Charlie's Pen Pals: PSYOPS Squadron Gets the Word to the Enemy, The Hurricane: A Publication of II Field Force in Vietnam, number 13, November 1968, p. 34.

(26.) Ibid.

(27.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report #163, p. 59, VCATTU.

(28.) See J. A. Koch, The Chieu Hoi Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971, January 1973:37, folder 12, box 14, Douglas Pike Collection, Unit 03--Insurgency Warfare, VCATTU; Robert J. Kodosky, Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond (Lexington Books, 2007); Daniel C. Pollock, project director, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Apllication, 2 volumes (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 1976).

(29.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report #163, p. 50, VCATTU.

(30.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Psychological Operations against North Vietnam, July 1972-January 1973, 24 May 1974, p. 36, VCATTU.

(31.) Ibid., p. 34.

(32.) Ibid., p. 35.

(33.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report #163, p. 57, VCATTU.

(34.) Dennis J. Murray, Those Magnificent Men in Their PSYOP Machines," undated, p. 4, VCATTU.

(35.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in GVN, 16 September 1968, p. 38, VCATTU.

(36.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report #163, p. 70, VCATTU.

(37.) Dennis J. Murray, Those Magnificent Men in Their PSYOP Machines," undated, p. 2, VCATTU.

(38.) DTIC Technical Report, revised edition, US Defense Logistics Agency - A Study of Strategic Lessons Learned in Vietnam, Volume VI: Conduct of the War, Book 2: Functional Analysis--Part 2 of 3, May 2, 1980, pp. 13-22, VCATTU.

(39.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Psychological Operations against North Vietnam, July 1972-January 1973, May 24, 1974, p. 36, VCATTU.

(40.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in GVN, 16 September 1968, p. 38, VCATTU.

(41.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report #163, p. 24, VCATTU.

(42.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in GVN, 16 September 1968, p. 6, VCATTU.

(43.) Project CHECO Report, USAF Civic Action in Republic of Vietnam, April 1, 1968, p. 20, VCATTU.

(44.) Ibid., p. 51.

(45.) Ibid., p. 57.

(46.) Ibid., p. 61.

(47.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in GVN, September 16, 1968, p. 28, VCATTU.

(48.) Project CHECO Report, USAF Civic Action in Republic of Vietnam, April 1, 1968, p. 31, VCATTU.

(49.) Ibid., p. 52.

(50.) Ibid., p. 28.

(51.) Ibid., p. 41.

(52.) Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report #163, p. 57, VCATTU.

Robert J. Kodosky earned his Ph.D. from Temple University (2006). He chairs the history department at West Chester University, Pennsylvania. He authored Psychological Operations American Style: The Joint United States Public Affairs Office, Vietnam and Beyond (Lexington Books, 2007) and his also appears in the Encyclopedia of Military Science, the American Intelligence Journal, The Routledge History of Social Protest in Popular Music, the Journal of Popular Culture, History: Reviews of New Books, the Michigan War Studies Review, Marine Corps University Journal, Encyclopedia of Greater Philadelphia, Origins and H-War. He has also contributed to C-Span, ABC News Radio, Comcast Newsmakers, the Philadelphia Inquirer, Smart Talk, the Washington Post and USA Today. Robert is a co-founder of Soldiers to Scholars, an initiative to bridge the gap between civilians and military veterans. In 2014, Robert proudly received the Legion of Honor Humanitarian Award granted by the Four Chaplains Memorial Foundation.
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Author:Kodosky, Robert J.
Publication:Air Power History
Geographic Code:90SOU
Date:Sep 22, 2017
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