Kennedy and the cold war imbroglio: the case of Algeria's independence.
The Algerian nationalist leaders, however, remained skeptical as to the real intentions of the French authorities, insisting on more information on the new proposal. Their apprehensions were centered round the question of whether the referendum was to apply to Algeria as one entity or rather as two separate communities - Algerian and colon - each choosing its own solutions leading thus to partition. They also wanted to know how an effective supervision of the plebiscite was to be guaranteed if the French government persisted in its intention to give its army full control over the proposed referendum, deliberately ignoring the latter's history of ballot-rigging and interference in the voting process.(2)
The Algerian Provisional Government (G.P.R.A.), with the backing of the Afro-Asian group at the U.N., had long been pressing for an international presence in order to secure free conduct of the plebiscite and to prevent the French generals from using coercive methods which had justified the traditional euphemism election a l'Algerienne.(3) It was against this background that the General Assembly adopted a resolution by 63 votes to 8, with 27 abstentions, recognizing the responsibility of the U.N. to assist Algeria along the road to independence with the preservation of its territorial and national integrity.(4)
The United States, in the last few days of the Eisenhower Administration, and as in the previous sessions, chose a non-committal vote. The State Department reiterated the long-held view that a settlement to the conflict could best be achieved through direct negotiations between the two parties concerned, away from the United Nations or any other international organization.(5) The novelty in such a stance, however, lay in the fact that the Eisenhower Administration, toward the end of its second term, seemed to condone some form of an external role in the conclusion of a possible workable settlement whilst keeping Algeria and the whole of North Africa out of the Soviet's sphere of influence. With regard to the referendum in prospect, it was inclined to validate the Algerian nationalists misgivings as to the credibility of the French-orchestrated vote. Overtly voicing doubts about the workability of the proposed polling process given the French army's unhealthy record of voting frauds, Secretary Herter inferred that this referendum might not after all be honest, free, and fair.(6) Yet, the United States stopped short of any attempt to bring pressure to bear on France to offer sufficient guarantees as to the non-interference of its army in the conduct of the plebiscite.
With the inauguration of the new administration, the issue of the referendum continued to be a major preoccupation of the United States. The Kennedy Administration, and contrary to the high expectations of the Algerian nationalists given Kennedy's stance toward the Algerian question as Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on U.N. Affairs, was to adopt almost the same approach as that of its predecessor regarding the Algerian question. It was, in turn, to opt for calculated diplomatic inducements in the attempt to drive France to bring the conflict to a quick settlement through direct talks between the two parties leading to a flee plebiscite on self-determination. The threat, which international communism was believed to be posing to Algeria and North Africa, was in fact to continue under Kennedy to be the major concern of the White House.(7) Whilst remaining critical of the pace at which France was moving in its handling of the problem, Kennedy the President would manifestly tone down the views he had assertively defended as Senator, as he would thenceforth oppose any attempt to involve the United Nations in the search for a settlement.(8)
John F. Kennedy's first official encounter with the Algerian conflict can be traced back to 2 June 1956 when - as Senator - he had advocated the view that the conflict was strictly a colonial issue, inciting the Eisenhower Administration to help all dependent peoples to achieve freedom.(9) In his famous speech to the Senate as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Sub-committee on United Nations Affairs on 2 July 1957, he had vigorously indicted France's policies in Algeria, which he considered a colony and not an integral part of France as the French authorities claimed. Such policies, he argued, stifled, exiled, or executed their leaders, and outlawed their political parties and activities.(10) Defending the nationalist leadership as led by what he called pro-Western moderates, he had insisted that the Algerian problem was the most critical impasse facing the United States since the crisis in Indochina.(11)
Kennedy the Senator had reproached the Eisenhower Administration for having renounced the American anti-colonial tradition and for providing France with arms to repress the local population: ". . . we cannot long ignore as being none of our own business, or as a French internal problem, a struggle for independence that has been and will be a major issue before the United Nations, that has denuded NATO of its armies, drained the resources of our French allies, threatened the continuation of Western influence and bases in North Africa and bitterly split the Free World we claim to be leading."(12) The Senator had also refuted the argument recurrently voiced by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles that decolonization was a long-term process, rejecting the contention that no less than twenty-five, if not fifty, years were required for the colonized populations to achieve the status of nationhood.(13)
Kennedy had even incited the Eisenhower Administration to involve itself directly in the Algerian conflict in the attempt of finding a solution. The time has come, he had declared, for the United States to face the harsh realities of the situation to fulfill its responsibilities as leader of the Free World - in the UN, NATO, in the administration of its aid programs and in the exercise of diplomacy - in striving of course toward political independence for Algeria.(14) He had also warned that if the United States government continued to ignore the Algerians' legitimate rights to self-determination, the Algerians would likely turn toward the Soviets for assistance.(15) Highlighting the far-reaching international ramifications of the Algerian problem, he had cautioned that its persistence might irretrievably compromise Western interests in the whole region.(16) The National Security Council, pressing the same theme a few months later, stressed the strategic importance of North Africa for the Atlantic Alliance in the Cold War showdown, warning that continuation of the conflict might compromise all endeavors to contain international communism.(17)
Although Senator Kennedy had not succeeded in persuading Congress to adopt his proposed resolution on Algeria, he had at least managed to attract the sympathy and backing of a number of active Congressmen, especially Senators, whose criticism of the Eisenhower Administration's approach to the Algerian problem was to continue to embarrass the White House. The Senator's biting criticism had in fact succeeded on a number of occasions in putting the government on the defensive, driving it to reiterate its expressed determination to contribute to the process of decolonization, albeit without identifying itself 100 percent either with the so-called colonial powers or with the powers which are primarily and uniquely concerned with the problem of getting their independence as rapidly as possible.(18) It was also in the wake of such Congressional criticism led by Kennedy that the State Department ordered the shipment of food and medical supplies through non-governmental institutions to Algerian refugees in the neighboring countries.(19) But, the Algerian nationalists were to remain manifestly skeptical about such aid, considering it negligible when weighed against the substantial assistance estimated at billions of francs provided France by the United States.(20)
The victory of Kennedy in the 1960 Presidential elections rekindled the hopes of the Algerian nationalists because of the stance he had taken as Senator toward their cause. But, the question that remained to be answered was whether the new President could politically and strategically afford to take the same stance he had taken as Senator, especially at a time when East-West rivalry was reaching its peak.
The major preoccupation of Kennedy once in the White House was beyond doubt what he saw as Communist penetration of the Third World. He repeatedly expressed the fear that the Soviets had invested several billion dollars in military and economic aid to developing countries . . . and more arms to the Algerian rebels.(21) The new president continued, however, to pledge American assistance to colonial peoples lest they should be lured by Soviet promises. In defiance of Khruschev's expressed commitment to assist all peoples fighting for liberation, Kennedy insisted two weeks later that his administration was dedicated to supporting the legitimate rights to self-determination of Afro-Asian dependencies.(22) The State Department soon instructed Walter N. Walmsley, Jr., one of its consular officials in Tunis, to establish formal contact with the Algerian Provisional Government in exile. In a meeting with Hafid Boussouf and Mhamed Yazid on 3 April 1961, the American envoy sought to persuade the Algerian nationalists to transform the recent informal pourparlers with France into formal negotiations.(23)
Formal negotiations in fact opened on 7 April at Evian-les-Bains but soon ended in deadlock and collapsed. This came as a direct result of General de Gaulle's voiced threats to cut off economic aid to Algeria, withdraw all Europeans living in the country, and expel all Algerians living in France, if ever complete independence from France were chosen as a solution to the conflict.(24) Yet, the General himself conceded that Algeria would one day be sovereign.(25)
Still obsessed with the idea of a military victory over the F.L.N., the French generals in Algeria led a putsch against their government whom they accused of being too lenient toward the rebels. The putsch was only short-lived as it fell apart four days after its announcement.(26) Once again army mutiny brought France to the brink of anarchy, winning the support of frustrated career officers in Algeria and the die-hard colons who came suddenly to believe that a miracle might still take place and Algeria remain forever French.(27) With the memory of its defeat in Indochina still fresh, the army seized the opportunity at hand in Algeria to take revenge against the weakness, indecision, and treason of the political establishment in Paris.(28)
Amidst allegations that the American government and the C.I.A. had encouraged the putschists in Algiers, President Kennedy sought to reassure de Gaulle of the United States solidarity and support. The course you have chosen to settle the tragic problem of Algeria, he wrote, cannot but meet the approval of those who believe in the principles of democracy and who seek a durable understanding among nations of the world.(29) Meanwhile, The State Department - anxious not to be seen as overtly siding with France - reiterated through Assistant Secretary Chester Bowles the traditional commitment to aiding the emerging nations of Africa toward independence while protecting their freedom against potential communist threats.(30)
Seizing the visit of Premier Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia to Washington, President Kennedy voiced his wish to see the Algerian leadership and France enter into negotiations that could result in the emergence of an independent state while keeping it, and the rest of the newly independent nations of Africa, away from East-West rivalry.(31) He intended to use Bourguiba's good offices and his friendly ties with the Algerians to render their stance toward the question of negotiation with Paris more flexible. Press reports even revealed that the White House had promised the nationalist leaders that if their negotiations with France came to a successful conclusion, the United States would provide them with the required assistance which could enable them to resist foreign inteference.(32) Kennedy's predecessor, it must be recalled - who was an admirer of the Tunisian Premier(33) - had also tried to use the latter's influence to tone down the F.L.N.'s terms for negotiation and at the same time to dissuade it from moving closer to Nasser's Egypt.(34)
No sooner had talks reopened at Evian-les-Bains on 20 May 1961 than the two sides disagreed on a set of subjects. The major stumbling block was the question of the future of the Sahara and that of the colons.(35) The French delegation, under instruction from Paris, insisted that the Sahara should remain under French sovereignty but while associating the new state in the exploration of its natural riches. The Algerian delegation was in turn instructed from Tunis to categorically reject any proposal of partition and to insist on the country's territorial integrity as proclaimed on 1 November 1954. The proposal to grant special privileges to the European community including the suggestion of double nationality were also rejected. Under Algerian citizenship, the Algerian delegates argued, citizens would be guaranteed their fundamental rights regardless of their ethnic origins. Those who were to prefer to keep the French citizenship would be regarded as foreigners but would be guaranteed safety for themselves and for their property. On 13 June the French delegation unilaterally decided to break off the talks for an indefinite period of reflection. The Algerians, who were opposed to such a move, insisted that only by pursuing the negotiations can we find a constructive solution to the problem and restore peace.(36)
The Kennedy Administration kept silent on Algeria during the whole period of these talks. But on 29 May, and perhaps in response to the announced failure of negotiations and without specifically referring to Algeria, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams defended his government's position vis-a-vis Africa and again pledged his country's unequivocal dedication to freedom.(37) At once wary of what it saw as the growing threat posed by international communism and eager to avoid upsetting France despite privately holding it responsible for the deadlock in the talks, the Kennedy Administration spoke only in manifestly mild terms about the Algerian situation, expressing the hope that that was only a suspension and not a failure of the negotiating process.(38)
Yet, President Kennedy hinted at possible American intervention in Algeria in the event of a Chinese or Soviet attempt to intervene directly in the conflict.(39) In the same context, Deputy Undersecretary Roger W. Jones unveiled on 12 July the White House's decision to request Congressional approval to grant 1.2 million dollars to be used to provide significant cash contribution for aiding Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco:(40)
In addition the United States will make significant contributions of surplus tents vital to the relief of the group suffering forced displacement because of the conflict being waged in their homeland. The estimated value of this contribution is $10 million at CCC[Commodity Credit Corporation] prices Jones explained that his governments intention of aid to the refugees was dictated not only by humanitarian considerations but also by strategic, political, and economic ones. A few weeks later, Richard Brown, Director of U.S. Office of Refugees and Migration Affairs, underlined the necessity of American aid to the Algerian refugees who were estimated at 300,000, if the Kennedy Administration really wanted to defend American national interests and to contain communism in the region by preventing the emerging states from turning communist or from falling into communist influence.(42) The idea to equate aid with the endeavour to contain communism and to halt communist subversion was not a novelty of the Kennedy Administration; it had also intrinsically been one of the centerpieces of the Eisenhower Administration's policy toward Algeria.(43)
The decision to provide aid to the refugees coincided with a State Department diplomatic move to be led by Mermen Williams in Tunis in the attempt to persuade the Algerian leaders to compromise on the question of the future of the colons in order to thaw the two sides and bring them back to the negotiating table. In announcing the mission, however, Secretary Rusk went to great lengths to explain that Mermen Williams had met the Algerian representatives only socially, while admitting that his colleague's attempt did not change the situation in any way.(44)
In response to the criticism launched by some African countries at his government's approach to the Algerian conflict, Mermen Williams reasserted that the United States shared the same concern and conviction as the Africans regarding Algeria, arguing that his government was in favor of a democratic settlement to the conflict that would fulfill the aspirations of the Algerian people.(45) He, however, again made it clear that his government was still putting absolute faith in the French government and its policies, insisting that Washington was in agreement with Paris that any settlement to the conflict must guarantee the legitimate interests of the European minority, many of them second- and third-generation settlers.(46)
The insistence on guarantees for the colons in the event of Algeria's independence was motivated by the State Department's fears of possible Algerian acts of revenge in retaliation for the recent terrorist campaign of the O.A.S. (Organisation de l'Armee Secrete). The peculiarity of Algeria had, since the earlier days of the conflict, consisted in the large European community living there and the acute racial divide separating the colons from the Algerians. Such a divide, warned Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade, could be a recipe for disorder and violence which could, in turn, open the way for a large-scale communist infiltration(47)
This new American drive for a quick settlement to the crisis was perhaps prompted by Williams' conclusions, after his recent African trip, that international communism had managed to infiltrate into the Algerian nationalist movement. To him, this state of affairs could seriously jeopardize Western interests in the whole region. This impending belief, it must be recalled, had - ever since the outbreak of the Algerian war - been at the center of American policy.(48) Secretary Dulles had, in this context, on a number of occasions voiced the Eisenhower Administration's fears that the conflict in Algeria, which was tying up half a million troops, might eventually provoke the total disintegration of the Atlantic organization.(49) A Congressional delegation to Algeria had a few months later gone along the same line confirming the same risks.(50)
At the United Nations, the General Assembly was to debate the Algerian-French conflict for the seventh time. But, as it was predicted, it was clear that such a debate would not be the hard-pitched battle that it had been in previous sessions, since a solution was now in the offing through bilateral Franco-Algerian talks. A draft resolution sponsored by the Afro-Asian group urged the immediate resumption of direct negotiations between the two parties concerned, and supported Algeria's right to territorial integrity and its sovereignty over the Sahara. This resolution was eventually adopted by the Political Committee by 61 votes to none with 34 abstentions and was later adopted by the General Assembly by 62 votes to none with 38 abstentions. France, it should be remembered, had since 1955 been boycotting the U.N. debates. While the United States abstained on this resolution during the voting of both the Political Committee and the General Assembly, the Soviet Union endorsed it on both occasions.(51) The Kennedy Administration, like its predecessor, continued to press for a compromise away from the United Nations.(52) American opposition to U.N. interference in the Algerian conflict stemmed partly from international strategic reasons namely the desire to secure France's cooperation in N.A.T.O. and partly from domestic strategic reasons to avoid setting a precedent that would perhaps open the way for the U.N. in cases such as that of Puerto Rico which Americans considered an integral part of the United States.
Yet, as the independence of Algeria started to appear on the horizon, the Kennedy Administration began to show eagerness to win the friendship of the Algerian leaders primarily to prevent an independent Algeria from moving closer toward the East. American officials had hitherto averted formal contacts with the F.L.N. for fear of offending the United States' oldest ally - France.(53) The first high-level social meeting between an American official and G.P.R.A. representatives took place - as pinpointed earlier - in Tunis on 17 October 1961.(54) The first formal Algerian-American meeting was to take place in New York between the Algerian delegation to the U.N. headed by Mohamed Yazid and the American delegation led by Adlai Stevenson.(55)
Secret contacts between the two parties (G.P.R.A. and France) continued earlier in 1962 amidst a certain change of heart in France, with General de Gaulle's declaration that France would be willing to recognize the emergence of a sovereign Algerian state if the nationalist leadership accepted to compromise on the questions related to the future of the colons and to that of the Sahara.(56) The two delegations headed by Louis Joxe and Krim Belkacem chose to meet in Rousses - a remote Village near the Swiss border - from 11 to 19 February to elude the curious eyes of the world press.(57) After eight days of intensive discussions, an ad hoc agreement on a set of points was reached in the prospect of final negotiations to open on 7 March.(58) General de Gaulle yielded ground on the question of the future of the Sahara and gave up the idea of French control over the oil riches. Instead of a Franco-Algerian association, he was now pressing the idea of France's cooperation to the new Algeria for its life and development.(59) The nationalists, while continuing to insist on complete independence, defended the thesis of free cooperation between the new state and France, reassuring the colon community that its security and legitimate rights would be guaranteed in an independent Algeria.(60) The Evian accords, which the two parties finally signed, proclaimed 19 March as the date of ceasefire.(61) The State Department, through Mennen Williams, welcomed the agreement reckoning that it was likely that the remaining disorder in the country [Algeria] will be halted by French and Algerian authorities together.(62)
A ceasefire did not, however, mean full peace. To the Algerians, this transitory period from colonial rule to national independence was perhaps the most critical of their entire colonial history.(63) The O.A.S. (Organisation de l'Armee Secrete), which was able to occupy the minds of the colons, intensified its attacks on civilians and on the economic infrastructure of the country. As a matter of fact, it was widely reported that even patients in hospitals were not safe.(64)
After the failure of all attempts to overthrow the French government and establish a military regime through organized military putsches, and as Algeria's independence was becoming only a matter of time, army-colon desperadoes found in the O.A.S. the tool through which they could embark on a large-scale campaign of terrorism in the attempt to preserve the myth of l'Algerie Francaise.(65) The O.A.S. was, to many observers, only a sinister instrument of indiscriminate bombing, shooting, and burning, far from being a counter-revolutionary force as it claimed.(66) It decidedly did not succeed in its endeavor to become a real political power, and remained essentially a police problem. Its wave of violence resulted in an alarming deterioration of the economic situation in Algeria, especially as the promises of a speedy agricultural and industrial development in Algeria as outlined in de Gaulle's Constantine Plan had not been fulfilled.(67) This underground organization only succeeded in increasing the alienation of the European community and in making peaceful life in an independent Algeria seem quite impossible.(68) As one observer remarked, many of the colons' fears stemmed from a feeling of guilt toward the Algerian population; they simply could not believe that they would be generously treated in an independent Algeria nor could they imagine that their excesses since 1830 could be forgiven or forgotten.(69)
In this context, the G.P.R.A. again warned of retaliation against the unabated atrocities of the O.A.S., accusing the French army of laxity against the trigger-happy gunmen and of brutality toward Algerian civilians: We warn the French authorities one last time of the dangers of testing the patience of our fighters and our people so cruelly.(70) The escalation of the O.A.S. terrorist campaign coincided with the approval of the Evian accords by French voters by 90.7 percent in the wake of the referendum on the future of Algeria.(71)
The State Department, praising the wise statesmanship of both parties, which - it said - contributed greatly to the agreement that represented the Charter of new Algeria guaranteeing cooperation between the two communities and cooperation between France and Algeria - a Charter which, it contended, stood as the appropriate answer to O.A.S. extremism.(72) The Kennedy Administration, wishing to win the confidence and friendship of Algeria's future leadership, reechoed its willingness to assist the new state.(73) This endeavor was, however, to prove too difficult in view of the American officials' own admittance of having been handicapped by their overriding concern for French sensitivities.(74)
Aware of this tide of things, a number of voices in the United States started to call for an effective American assistance to Algeria regardless of the latter's future stance toward France and the West, and without too much apprehension about the socialist pattern of society that was likely to emerge in Algeria after independence.(75) We cannot buy friends in such countries as Algeria, editorialized the N.Y.T. for example. We can, however, make their people realize that our interest in their well-being is genuine.(76) The Kennedy Administrations difficulty to win the friendship of the new state, was soon confirmed by the Algerian leaders' explicit criticism of all the Western powers for their hostile policies toward Algeria's cause of independence, and this as opposed to the expressed gratitude to the socialist countries for both their moral support and material assistance along the road to independence.(77) It was against this background that Adlai Stevenson, while welcoming Algeria's adhesion to the U.N., called upon the leadership of the nascent republic to abandon extremists and reject fanatical counsel, in reference to the F.L.N.'s leaning toward Nasser's Egypt and the Eastern bloc.(78)
Nonetheless, the Kennedy Administration was comforted by the Algerian government's pledge to follow a policy of neutrality in the Cold War showdown and to seek the broadest possible cooperation with other countries regardless of their political system and to avoid foreign dominance under any guise.(79) Maintaining such a positive line of neutrality in the increasingly volatile world arena of the 1960s and 1970s would, however, prove a daunting task for the new state, especially in relation to the ever-rampant Arab-Israeli conflict.
After examining the stance taken by Kennedy toward the Algeian question, this paper has established that as Senator, he had assertively supported the nationalist's cause, advocating an immediate and total independence of the colony and refuting the French authorities claim that Algeria had historically been an integral part of France. He had recurrently urged the Eisenhower Administration to intervene directly in the conflict in order to impose a settlement either through N.A.T.O. or through the U.N. As President, however, he became much more concerned about the threat which international communism was believed to be posing not only to Algeria but also to the entire region, at a time when Cold War rivalry was becoming more endemic. While in the Oval Office, he went to great lengths to press for a settlement but through direct negotiations between France and the Algerian nationalist leaders and away from the U.N. or any other international organization; a settlement that would perforce guarantee France and the West's strategic interests in the region and keep the new state out of the Soviet sphere of influence.
1. President de Gaulle's Proposal for Algeria, 4 November 1960, Speeches and Press Conferences No. 161 (4 November 1960) pp. 224-229, Documents on Algeria III; Text of decree providing for referendum of 6-8 January 1961, taken from Documents on Algeria IV.
2. Joan and Richard Brace, Algerian Voices (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand Co. Ltd., 1960), 369.
3. Editorial: The United States and Africa, The New York Times, 3 December 1960. This euphemism is ironically still being used in reference to elections in Algeria today.
4. Mammeri Khalfa, Les Nations Unies Face a la Question Algerienne, 1954-1962 (Algiers: SNED, 1969), 41-45.
5. Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, "U.S. Explains Position on Algeria, statement made before Political and Security Committee," Department of State Bulletin XLIV. 1124 (9 October 1961), pp. 62-224; Mr. Pineau and Secretary of State Dulles News Conference, Department of State Bulletin XXXV. 903 (15 October 1956), 577.
6. Secretary Herter's Address to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, cited in The New York Times, 7 January 1961.
7. "President Kennedy Sends a Message of Support and Friendship to General de Gaulle," Department of State Bulletin XLIV. 1141 (15 May 1961), 709; "Foreign Aid: The Great Decisions of the Sixties," Department of State Bulletin XLIV. 1142 (15 May 1961), 703; Joint Communique between President Kennedy and Premier Bourguiba [of Tunisia], 5 May 1961, Department of State Bulletin XLIV. 1145 (5 June 1961), 852-853.
8. Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Mifflin Company, 1965), 302-303; The Inaugural Address of President Kennedy, Department of State Bulletin XLIV. 131 (27 March 1961), 431.
9. Congressional Record, Vol. CII. Part 7, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy, Fourth Annual Rockhurst Day Banquet of Rockhurst College, Kansas City, Mo., John F. Kennedy introduced into Congressional Record by Senator Symington (6 June 1956), 9614-9615.
10. For full text of the speech, see John F. Kennedy, "Imperialism - the Enemy of Freedom," Congressional Record CIII. Part 8 (July 1957), 10783-10784.
12. John F. Kennedy, Algeria, Congressional Record, Vol. CIII, Part 8 (8 July 1957), 10966-10967.
13. The United States National Security Council (NSC), Policy Paper Files (NSCPF) Record Group 273, National Archives, Washington D.C., NSC Policy Number 5614/1, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria (3 October 1956), 17.
14. Ibid., 10787.
15. John F. Kennedy, "Imperialism - the Enemy of Freedom," Congressional Record, Vol. CIII, Part 8 (2 July 1957), 10787.
16. John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, ed., Allan Nevins (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), 95.
17. The United States National Security Council, "Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria," the Eisenhower Library, NSC 5911/1 (4 November 1959), 1.
18. Transcript of Scretary Dulles's News Conference, Department of State Bulletin XXXV. 903 (15 October 1956).
19. "Africa and Food for Peace," Department of State Bulletin, XLII (24 September 1962).
20. Al-Moudjahid, No. 9 (20 August 1957).
21. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy, 2nd ed. (London: Pan Brooks Ltd., 1966), 255.
22. Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, 302-303; "The Inaugural Address of President Kennedy," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV. 1128 (6 February 1961), 175.
23. "U.S. Envoy Meets Algerian Leaders," The New York Times, 4 April 1961.
24. The New York Times, 12 April 1961.
25. President de Gaulle Holds Fourth Press Conference, Speeches and Press Conferences No. 162 (11 April 1961), 3, Documents on Algeria, III.
26. Maurice Challe, Notre Revolte (Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1968), 190-194.
27. Edward Behr, The Algerian Problem (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1961), 182.
28. Behr, 134.
29. "President Sends Message of Support and Friendship to General de Gaulle," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV 1141 (15 May 1961).
30. Chester Bowles, "Foreign Aid: the Great Decisions of the Sixties," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV. 1141 (15 May 1961). 31. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV, No. 1145.
32. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 508, 103-106, 507, 510-511.
33. Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President, 24 June 1960, Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Series, Box 14, Intelligence Briefing Notes Vol. II (3), May-June 1960, Eisenhower Library; Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President, 5 July 1960, Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Box 14, Intelligence Briefing Notes Vol. II (4) July 1960, Eisenhower Library.
34. "Algeria Receives Guarantee," The New York Times, 17 May 1961.
35. Declaration of Louis Joxe (French Minister of State in Charge of African Affairs) at Evian-les-Bains, Documents on Algeria, III, 3-4.
36. Text of Press Conference of Krim Belkacem (Algerian Chief Negotiator), al-Moudjahid, 25 June 1961.
37. G. Mennen Williams, "Africa's Challenge to American Trade Unions," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV. 1149 (3 July 1961), 25.
38. Al-Moudjahid, No. 82 (25 June 1961).
39. For more details on FLN relations with Socialist/Communist countries, see Document No. 112, "Entretien Sino-Algerien a l'occasion du Sejour de la delegation du G.P.R.A. en Chine Populaire" (27 September-10 October 1959), in Les Archives de la Revolution Algerienne (Paris: Les Editions Jeune Afrique, 1981), 521-529; see also Document No. 102, "Extrait d'un Rapport Politique Generale sur les pays socialistes dans leurs Relations avec l'Algerie" (28 February 1961), in Les Archives de la Revolution Algerienne, 491.
40. Roger W. Jones, "The Continuing Need for Aid to Refugees and Escapees," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV. 1154 (7 August 1961), 258.
41. Jones, 258.
42. Richard R. Brown, "Our People on the Move," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVI. 1177 (15 January 1962), 102-103.
43. On the Eisenhower Administration's handling of this question, see U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Research (OIR), "Outlook for U.S. Interests in the Middle East," 14 November 1955, Intelligence Report (IR) 7074, pp. 21-23, Department of State Records, Diplomatic Branch, National Archives, Record Group (RG) 59, Washington DC.; see also "Eisenhower's Address to the Sixth Republican Women's National Conference," 18 March 1958, in Public Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, 1958 (Washington DC.: Office of the Federal Register, 1959), 223.
44. Secretary Dean Rusk's News Conference of 18 October 1961, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV. 1167 (6 November 1961), 748.
45. G. Mennen Williams, "Talks and Opportunities in Africa," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV. (20 November 1961), 862.
46. G. Mennen Williams, "The As of Africa: Algeria, Angola and Apartheid," Department of State Bulletin, Vol XLVI. 1169 (27 November 1961), 877; see also G. Mennen Williams, "The Health Frontier of the Developing Nations of Africa," Vol. XLVI. 1173 (1 January 1962), 26.
47. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and African Affairs, "The World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies: A Challenge to America," Department of State Bulletin XXIX. 731 (16 November 1953), 656.
48. The United States National Security Council, Operations Coordinating Board [OCB], Progress Report on Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, NSC Policy Number 5614, 22 November 1957, Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs [OSNSA], OCB Series, Administrative Sub-series, Box 1, Chronological - F.M. Dearborn, November - December 1957 (2), Eisenhower Library.
49. Louis L. Gerson, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy.' John Foster Dulles (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1967), XVIII, 318.
50. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Report of Special Studies Mission to Algeria, 30 December 1960, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Committee Print 792, 13 December 1958, pp. 117-120.
51. Miloud Barkaoui, "The New York Times and the Algerian Revolution, 1956-1962: An Analysis of a Major Newspaper's Reporting of Events," (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Keele, Newcastle Under-Lyme, England, 1988), 239-240.
52. Bernard Noble, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy.' Christian Herter (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1970), XVIII, pp. 150-153.
53. Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, 553.
54. From G. M. Williams to McGhee, U.S. Policy Toward Algeria: Action and Planning, 21 December 1961 (NARS DB, G.M. Williams Records, 1961-1966, Box 9), 1 [National Archives and Records Service, Diplomatic Branch].
55. Reporting the meeting, The New York Times went as far as to brand it as a political turning point for the Algerian leaders, because of the previous U.S. deliberate avoidance of direct talks with the F.L.N. See the paper's issue of 14 December 1961. For further information on the press handling of the Algerian conflict, see the author's unpublished thesis "The New York Times and the Algerian Revolution: An Analysis of a Major Newspaper's Reporting of Events."
56. Address by General de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, Broadcast over French Radio and Television on 5 February 1962, Documents on Algeria III, 4.
57. Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever, La Guerre d'Algerie (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1982), 327; Charles-Henri Favrod, "L'Histoire des Negotiations Secretes," La Nef, Vol. 10, Cahier No. 12, 13 (October 1962-January 1963), 11015.
58. The points upon which the negotiators agreed in principle included the future of the oil riches and nuclear installations in the Sahara, the use of the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir, the withdrawal of French troops from Algeria, the future of the European community in an independent Algeria, economic cooperation between France and Algeria after independence. See L'Annee Politique, 1962, les Accords d'Evian, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), 631-646; see also The Franco-Algerian Settlement, Survey of International Affairs, 1962 (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1970), 438461.
59. Quoted in John Talbott, The War Without a Name (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1980), 219.
60. Krim Belkacem, quoted in Yves Courriere, Les Feux de Desespoir (Paris: Fayard, 1968), 468.
61. Henri Claude, "Les Accords d'Evian," Economic et Politique. No. 93 (April 1962), 2-8.
62. G. Mennen Williams, "Change and Challenge in Africa," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVI. 1192 (30 April 1962).
63. Document No. 58, "Contribution a L'Historique du FLN," in Les Archives de la Revolution Algerienne, 312-321.
64. On the OAS's terrorism, see Gros Vitalis (former police Prefect [chief] of Algiers), Le Temps de la Violence (Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1971), 204205; Paul Henissart, Les Combattants du Crepuscule (Paris: Grasset, 1970); Alain Jacob, D'Une Algerie a l'Autre (Paris: 1963); Georges Bidault (one of the OASs prominent leaders), D'Une Resistance a l'Autre (Paris: Les Presses du Siecle, 1965); the translated version by M. Sinclair, Resistance: The Political Biography of Georges Bidault (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967).
65. B.M. Morland, Histoire de l'Organisation de l'Armee Secrete (Paris: Julliard, 1964); Pierre Sergent, La Bataille (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1968); J. Ferrandi, 600 Jours Avec Salan de l'O.A.S. (Paris: Fayard, 1969).
66. Talbott, 182.
67. Alex Nicol, La Bataille de l'OAS (Paris: Les Sept Couleurs, 1962); Droz and Lever, 271-276.
68. Talbott, 182.
69. Quoted in Brace, 10.
70. A. L. N. (Algerian Army of National Liberation) Communique, cited in Time magazine, 4 May 1962; The New York Times, 14 May 1962.
71. Out of the 20.8 million of those who cast their votes, 17.9 million were for the agreement and 1.8 million were against it, see Le Monde, 14 April 1962; see also L'Annee Politique, 1962, 38.
72. "U.S. Exposes Concern at the Threat of Renewed Violence in Algeria," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVI. 1200 (25 June 1962), 1023. G. Mennen Williams quoted in The New York Times, 28 June 1962.
73. From G. M. Williams to McGhee, "US Policy Toward Algeria: Action and Planning," 21 December 1961 (NARS DB, G.M. Williams Records, 1961-1966, Box 9), 1 (National Archives and Records Service, Diplomatic Branch).
74. Time magazine, 10 August 1962.
75. The Economist, 30 June 1962.
76. Editorial: "American Aid to Algeria," The New York Times, 21 August 1962.
77. Front de Liberation Nationale, Projet de Programme, FLN Documents (Paris, 1962), 87-90.
78. Brace, 221.
79. Mohamed Khemisti quoted in The New York Times, 26 November 1962.
Miloud Barkaoui earned his Ph.D from the University of Keele, Newcastle-Under-Lyme, England. He is currently Maitre de Conferences in the Department of English, Institute of Foreign Languages, University of Annaba, Algeria, and former President of the Scientific Board of the same institute.
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|Title Annotation:||President John F. Kennedy|
|Publication:||Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)|
|Date:||Mar 22, 1999|
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