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Kantian and nietzschean aesthetics of human nature: a comparison between the beautiful/sublime and Apollonian/Dionysian dualities.

Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that the 'satyr', as the aesthetic extension of the 'Dionysiac', became the raw and monstrous artistic expression of the sublime in nature as well as the sublime in human nature (75). It is the tragic and aesthetic idea that links the omnipotent and destructive Titanic forces of nature to the primal image of man as represented in Greek tragedy. This is why Nietzsche identifies the chorus of satyrs as "a metaphorical expression of that original relationship between thing-in-itself and phenomenon" (76) or between the supersensible and the sensible, the idea of nature and individual appearances. Through the artistic representation of this original relationship, the Dionysian Greek wants to see and experience "truth and nature at full strength" (77). Nietzsche describes the chorus of satyrs as "the highest, which is to say Dionysiac, expression of nature and therefore speaks in its enthusiasm, as does nature herself, oracular and wise words" (78). Purely aesthetic and tragic representation of the sublime in nature, for Nietzsche, is the first demand of art. "In order to explain tragic myth, the very first requirement is to seek the kind of delight that is peculiar to it in the purely aesthetic sphere, without reaching across into the territory of pity, fear, or the morally sublime." (79). This passage plainly shows that Nietzsche posits his tragic sublime or the Dionysian against Kant's moral sublime, which reaches across to the territory of morality and rationality in its explanation of the enthusiasm triggered by the experience of the sublime in nature. In contrast, he defends the necessity of fully exploring the experience and the resulting enthusiasm to gather more wisdom regarding nature and human nature and their interdependence, which, he thinks, is successfully depicted in early Greek tragedy. Then, asks Nietzsche, "how can things which are ugly and disharmonious, the content of the tragic myth, induce aesthetic delight?" and responds, "only as an aesthetic phenomenon do existence and the world appear justified" (80). In that sense, Nietzsche does not only consider tragedy as an artistic representation (of the beautiful and the sublime) but also as a wisdom that situates human nature and its values on the constantly changing and infinite (thus monstrous) dynamic landscape of nature/cosmos. At this point, he identifies the Heraclitean metaphor of the child building up and knocking down stone and sand structures with eternal delight, as "a Dionysiac phenomenon" that "reveals to us the playful construction and demolition of the world of individuality as an outpouring of primal pleasure and delight." (81) In his article on Nietzsche's understanding of the sublime, Ansell-Pearson points to the same metaphor first mentioned by Nietzsche in his Pre-Platonic Philosophers lecture series arguing that Nietzsche had the sublime image of the "ocean" in mind when conversing his Heraclitean idea (and reality) of becoming which "strikes mortal human being as terrifying" (82). The experience of natural phenomena of the stormy ocean and strong earthquake when one "observes all things in motion," (which could be considered as monstrous, sublime and purely aesthetic as experiences of raw nature) for instance, makes us aware and conscious of the eternal becoming of nature. Nietzsche praises this Heraclitean metaphor for its depiction of a "purely aesthetic Weltanschauung' and exclusion of teleological and moralistic tendencies (evidently in response to Kant's moral sublime) as follows:

"Only in the play of the child does there exist a Becoming and Passing Away without any moralistic calculations. He (Heraclitus) conceives of the play of children as that of spontaneous human beings: here is innocence and yet coming into being and destruction.... The eternal living fire plays, builds, and knocks down ... directed by justice, may be grasped only as an aesthetic phenomenon. We find here a purely aesthetic view of the world. We must exclude even more any moralistic tendencies to think teleologically here, for the cosmic child (Weltkind) behaves with no regard to purposes but rather only according to an imminent justice" (83)

Kant and Nietzsche agree that the magnitude and dynamism of nature is also evident in the experience of the sublime phenomenon of 'ocean'. Kant uses the phenomenon of the stormy ocean as an example of the dynamically sublime which disturbs our imagination and forces it to resort to the ideas of reason by which the subject is elevated above nature (84). Kant says, "we gladly call these objects sublime because they elevate the strength of our soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature." (85) As Ansell-Pearson suggests, Nietzsche rejects Kant's teleological interpretation of the sublime as the consequential realization of the superiority of our faculty of reason but rather argues that during such sublime experiences, one reconciles with nature's lack of purpose and finally overcomes and purifies his human nature through reestablishing the connection between ethos and phusisS6. One similar experience of 'raw nature' is the experience of 'giving birth,' which can be understood as sublime both in terms of its purely aesthetic essence and its ethical consequences. Aesthetically, while giving birth, the person immediately realizes that she is an inseparable part of the whole of nature with her reproductive potential and during the experience, she feels entirely subjected to the experience. Therefore, her judgment (of the experience), like the judgments on monstrous phenomena such as infinite space, being in the middle of an earthquake or stormy ocean, would not be disinterested but rather inseparably attached to the experience (while contributing to the becoming of nature). This purely aesthetic judgment would also reveal the inseparability of human nature from nature or motion as a whole (phusis), which is the main function of the tragic sublime or namely the Dionysian. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche interestingly mentions a very similar example (with reference to the Dionysian) as follows:

"the 'woes of a woman in labour' that "sanctify pain in general,--all becoming and growth, everything that guarantees the future involves pain ... There has to be an eternal 'agony of the woman in labour' so that there can be an eternal joy of creation, so that the will to life can eternally affirm itself. The word 'Dionysus' means all of this: I do not know any higher symbolism than this Greek symbolism of the Dionysian. It gives religious expression to the most profound instinct of life, directed towards the future of life, the eternity of life." (87)

On the other hand, the person 'giving birth' could also focus on the consequential happiness or virtue of becoming a mother or (as Kant would argue) on the realization of her potential duty as a mother instead of the experience itself, and moralize the experience by restricting it to universalizable human values, which is the main function of the Kantian moral sublime (instead of placing it--the experience--on the cyclicality of life and the ever-changing landscape of nature). The sublime experience of giving birth, as Kant would argue, cannot be considered sublime unless it is suffered for a purpose, namely to affirm the continuation and potential progress of humanity, and this resembles his identification of courage displayed in war as sublime provided that the war is fought for a good purpose, e.g. promoting such human values as freedom. This is the way Kant's moral teleology operates and the disinterested judgment on the (morally) sublime diverges from the actual aesthetic judgment of the sublime experience.

Based on these examples, it would not be wrong to consider Nietzsche's ideaprinciple of the Dionysian and the tragic sublime as a critical reaction against Kantian-Schopenhauerian morally sublime (88) which in turn led to his Heraclitean doctrine of eternal recurrence and his ethics of becoming (as opposed to the normative ethics of being). In The Gay Science, for instance, referring to the aesthetic values, he asks whether the artistic creation is caused by hunger, lack, "a desire for fixing, for immortalizing, for being" or rather by superabundance, over-fullness, "a desire for destruction, for change, for novelty, for future, for becoming." And he answers that the latter, or namely, "the expression of an overflowing energy pregnant with the future" represented in the Dionysian force-idea-principle whose intuition belongs to him as his "proprium and ipsissimum" (89), is the real source of creation, change, novelty and future that defines and is defined by an aesthetics and ethics of becoming. In his Attempt, Nietzsche confirms the predominant presence of the Heraclitean doctrine of panta rhei as well as this idea of aesthetic/ethical becoming in The Birth of Tragedy. These ideas are represented by "an utter unscrupulous and amoral artist-god who frees (lost) himself from the dire pressure of fullness and over-fullness" and who "wishes to become conscious of his autarchic power and constant delight and desire, whether he is building or destroying whether acting benignly or malevolently" (90) in order to become an extension of the eternal change through the affirmation of Dionysian suffering and pessimism. In the famous passage from The Gay Science called "What is Romanticism?", he identifies two types of sufferers. The first type suffers from "an impoverishment of life" seeking "quiet, stillness, calm seas, redemption from themselves through art ... " or "mildness, peacefulness, goodness in thought and deed ... as well as logic ... for logic soothes, gives confidence" to which "all romanticism in art and in knowledge fits" alongside Schopenhauer and Wagner. The second type suffers from "a superabundance of life" he wants "a Dionysian art as well as a tragic outlook and insight to life" because he can face the terrible, evil, destructive, non-sensical and ugly aspects of human life and life in general thanks to the rich, overflowing and fertilizing forces dominant in his character. (91) This helps him to say 'yes' to every challenge and possible suffering to affirm change or becoming in itself and thereby attaches his very existence to the existence of the whole of nature, instead of detaching himself by declaring the superiority of his rational/moral faculties over nature. In Nietzsche contra Wagner, describing Wagner and Schopenhauer as his antipodes, Nietzsche repeats this argument once more establishing a link between the Dionysian aesthetics and ethics as follows:

"He who is richest in fullness of life, the Dionysian god and man, can allow himself not only the sight of what is terrible and questionable but also the terrible deed and every luxury of destruction, decomposition, negation; in this case, what is evil, non-sensical, and ugly seems allowable, as it seems allowable in nature, because of an overflow in procreating, fertilizing forces capable of turning any desert into bountiful farmland." (92)

This Dionysian idea-experience that Nietzsche first introduces and elaborates in The Birth of Tragedy as the grounding part of the Apollonian/Dionysian duality (although it was already used as the main principle in the unpublished Dionysian Worldview), becomes the primary force-idea of Nietzsche's ethics and metaphysics in his late period works starting from the book IV of The Gay Science. In these works, the Dionysian pessimism makes good and evil and their associated valuations obsolete by situating morality within the world of phenomena to show its deceptive appearance and the final hollowness of its content. (93) This, Nietzsche argues, is because of the strict separation between aesthetic/phenomenal reality and the ethical/metaphysical reality imposed by ascetic belief systems with static descriptions of good, just, fair, evil, unjust and unfair. While Kant, through his conceptions of the beautiful and sublime, situates the aesthetic within the ethical necessity of human valuations, Nietzsche, through the Dionysian, situates these 'delusional' valuations back in the aesthetic necessity of human senses to demonstrate how unbecoming and groundless these valuations look when placed within life and nature. He goes even further and criticizes the human valuation of the beautiful in Twilight of the Idols:

"Nothing is more highly conditioned...more limited--than our feeling for beauty. Anyone trying to think about this feeling in abstraction from the pleasure human beings derive from humanity will immediately lose any sense of orientation. 'Beauty in itself' is an empty phrase, not even a concept. In beauty, human beings posit themselves as the measure of perfection; in select cases, they worship themselves in it. In this way, a species cannot help but say yes to itself and only itself ... People think that the world itself is overflowing with beauty,--they forget that they are its cause. They themselves have given the world its beauty--but oh! only a very human, all too human beauty ... the judgment 'beautiful' is the vanity of their species" (94)

Here, Nietzsche's criticism of the judgment 'beautiful' should not be understood as disapproval of the aesthetic Weltanschauung (for there are more than sufficient passages in his works to suggest the opposite) but rather as of the narrow human valuations (both aesthetic and ethical) in general. Moreover, the judgment and valuation of the beautiful Nietzsche mentions in this passage is very similar to the Kantian account of it. For, according to Kant, the beautiful is a result of the pleasure acquired through the harmony between human understanding and imagination (of nature), and it therefore orientates humanity helping it to posit itself 'as the measure of perfection', as the species with capacity for disinterested pleasure, superior purpose and detached and harmonious way of living. In that sense, it would not be wrong to claim that Nietzsche in this passage attacks the narrow ethical reconstruction of the conception and judgment of the beautiful as generally understood by Kant and the idealist Enlightenment thought.

As early as The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche defends the argument that such ascetic ethical ideals as good, evil, just, unjust look unnatural, groundless and superficial by claiming that the Ancient Greek gods including Dionysus (or namely the Olympians) are entirely devoid of morality, ascetic ideals, spirituality and duty, and rather that they represent the fully affirmative superabundance of life disregarding such simplistic human valuations. (95) Here, the function of the Dionysian as the critical, destructive yet aesthetic and reconciliatory force-principle between nature and humankind becomes more apparent. The Dionysian, according to Nietzsche, is the purest and true aesthetic representation of human nature as the most sublime extension (or the noblest clay) of nature (phusis) or the real 'world of appearances'. Nietzsche puts this as follows:

"... there now sounds out from within man something supernatural: he feels himself to be a god, he himself now moves in such ecstasy and sublimity as once he saw the gods move in his dreams. Man is no longer an artist, he has become a work of art: all nature's artistic power reveals itself here, amidst shivers of intoxication, to the highest, most blissful satisfaction of the primordial unity. Here man, the noblest clay, the most precious marble, is kneaded and carved and, to the accompaniment of the chisel-blows of the Dionysiac world-artist, the call of the Eleusinian Mysteries rings out: 'Fall ye to the ground, ye millions? Feelst thou thy Creator, world?" (96)

Nietzsche later expands on his criticism (in The Birth of Tragedy) of the idea of the moralized singular god, which has been over-idealized again by way of the idea of Uberlegenheit, and "demonstrated from the world we know" (97), or which has been defined from within the narrow human valuations of good and evil. This critique rests on his earlier argument on the profundity of the amoral or not-yet-moral Greek myths, the direct deifications representing the human existence in itself. In the Dionysian Worldview, for instance, Nietzsche says: "What speaks out of them is a religion of life, not one of duty or asceticism or spirituality. All these figures breathe the triumph of existence ... all that exists is deified in them, regardless of whether it is good or evil." (98) These gods served as mirrors in which the Greeks could see their existence within a greater landscape and know themselves by sketching the aesthetics of their nature in their tragedies. Moreover in Ecce Homo, after having announced himself as the disciple of the philosopher Dionysus, Nietzsche describes his discovery of the phenomenon of the Dionysian as the result of his own innermost experience, the aesthetic transformation of human instincts into a life-affirming deity, and presents it as a necessary motivational (religious) symbolism which empowers the human will for the final 'Yes' to life (99):

"... Saying yes to life, even in its strangest and harshest problems; the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through the sacrifice of its higher types--that is what I called Dionysian, that is the bridge I found to the psychology of the tragic poet. Not to escape horror and pity, not to cleanse yourself of a dangerous affect by violent discharge--as Aristotle thought -: but rather, over and above all horror and pity, so that you yourself may be the eternal joy in becoming,--the joy that includes even the eternal joy in negating ..." (100)

Since the very early stages of his philosophy, Nietzsche's aesthetics focuses on the transformative effect of the sublime, tragic and ecstatic idea-experience of the Dionysian. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche reconciles his Dionysian themes of intoxication and self-overcoming and explains how the sublimity of the Dionysian cult of nature was transformed among the Greeks into the force of transfiguration, which in turn rendered the pathos of humanity the most aesthetic event-phenomenon of nature. For Nietzsche, an optimistic rational justification of human life (e.g. Kant's and the Enlightenment's affirmation of humanity) would be false, limited and illusory--especially considering the fact that we are too fragile within the infinite and monstrous background of moving forces and that one global disaster can terminate our existence. Thus, in order to affirm our life, we need to see this fact (even though this would certainly cause suffering and pain), experience the sublime motion and aesthetically represent it to affirm our existence as well as the blind overabundant force (Macht) of nature, so as to cultivate a second higher nature. While Kant conceptualizes this second (sublime and moral) human nature above and beyond as well as transcending sensual interests and natural inclinations, Nietzsche is the first philosopher to understand transcendence as a 'bidirectional process', an aesthetic process that moves both from the human ethos towards the metaphysical/cosmological unity of nature and from the cosmological level towards the human level. (101) However, the very bidirectionality of this process transforms transcendence into a transition (Ubergang) as it renders the object-subject relation and the resulting dichotomy obsolete. Remarkably, Kant also acknowledges the mediating role of aesthetics between metaphysics and ethics, while adding that the feeling of the sublime may threaten the purity and freethinking ability of the human mind unless the faculty of practical reason is sufficiently cultivated. For otherwise, the experience of the sublime may lead to the domination of the interest of senses over judgment, which may in turn lose its disinterestedness. There arises another discrepancy between Kant and Nietzsche in relation to their understanding of free aesthetic judgment. While for Kant, free aesthetic judgment can only be acquired through its intellectual disinterestedness and purity, for Nietzsche, free and proper aesthetic judgment is the one that can be made with reference to the degree of immediacy of the natural instincts and pure irrational feelings communicated by the natural or artistic phenomena. While, for Kant, purity of aesthetic judgment depends on the judge's degree of eletachment and freedom from the experience, for Nietzsche, it depends on his degree of attachment or involvement within the experience. And this could be one of the reasons why the beautiful, as a disinterested and universalizable idea-judgment, acquired the central stage in Kant's third Critique, and why the sublime (in the form of the Dionysian), as an aesthetic force that attaches the judge to the judgment, artist to the art, doer to the action, person to the experience, came to be the central idea-principle of Nietzschean philosophy.

Kant is evidently reluctant to associate the sublime or beautiful with such contingent motive pleasures as represented by the religions or belief systems from the so-called pagan cultures to Christianity (respectively based on bodily satisfaction and the weakness of the human soul). For him, sublime representations must necessarily refer to the ideas of reason in order to become real and intellectually purposive. (102) Against Kant's idealization of disinterested and intellectually purposive aesthetic judgment, Nietzsche proposes that the essentially motive natural forces have immediate effect on our senses and they are immediately intelligible as sublime feelings and can be represented subjectively as ideas. This is why, in his early works, he defines the Dionysian artist as the one who "has command over the chaos of the Will before it has assumed the individual shape". (103) Through the Dionysian intoxication, the individual becomes conscious of the terrible and absurd aspects of his nature and existence and understands life in the form of the tragic art which in turn functions as natural healing making life sufferable, justifiable and even afirmable (104). Nietzsche's zeal to show the godly in human nature and the humanly in the metaphysical ideas of nature (e.g. the gods) is very apparent even in his early conceptualization of Dionysus as "the god who experiences the sufferings of individuation in his own person", like the tragic hero, and who "has a double nature; he is both cruel, savage demon and mild, gentle ruler". (105) Dionysus comes to represent the metaphysical unification through his double nature which originates from the most complex and deepest insights of human nature as well as the force (Machi) of nature. (106) Nietzsche defines the highest aesthetic achievement of human kind as the aesthetic deification of nature and the earth through the acceptance of its pathos and the representation of this acceptance in the aesthetic idea of the Dionysian. He states in his late notebooks:

"From that height of joy, where man feels himself to be altogether a deified form and a self-justification of nature, down to the joy of healthy farmers and healthy half-human beasts [was what] the Greek called [...] by the divine name: Dionysus." (107)

In farathustra, Nietzsche echoes the necessity of the Dionysian-Apollonian reconciliation he defended in The Birth of Tragedy for the creation of the sublime art of tragedy and points to the final embodiment of the sublime and beautiful in the Ubermensch. However, this necessity does not resemble Kant's teleological affirmation of the moral nature of humanity, which, while affirming human nature at the same time negates the appearing or sensual nature (phusis), thereby standing as a negative affirmation. In contrast, Nietzsche's affirmation has a double nature, it is both the affirmation of human existence on earth and the affirmation of life as a whole with all its sensual and metaphysical presencing, thereby standing as a positive affirmation, or affirmation that does not associate itself to any sort of negation. This last distinction is very crucial in the sense that both monotheistic moral teleology and teleological Enlightenment philosophy derive from the former affirmation of humanity through the negation of its dependence on life and nature. According to Nietzsche, on the other hand, the pathos of humanity not only is ethical, just and fair in itself (without resorting to any meaning or purpose beyond its very existence (108)), but also sublime, beautiful and aesthetic all at once. Its very affirmation is accomplished by the ultimate reconciliation of the beautiful and sublime within the ideas of the Apollonian and Dionysian, through which Nietzsche aims to bring together the aesthetic and the ethical with the affirmation of tragic essence of human nature through his concept of amor fati (109). In The Gay Science Nietzsche describes amor fati as the love of aesthetic necessity as follows:

"I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them--thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love from now on! I do not want to wage war against ugliness. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse the accusers. Let looking away be my only negation! And, all in all and on the whole: some day I want only to be a Yes-sayer!" (110)

In another place he adds, "Not only laughter and gay wisdom but also the tragic, with all its sublime unreason, belongs to the means and necessities of the preservation of the species" (111) Here, Nietzsche does not try to affirm life or what is through the affirmation of the necessity of the beautiful. Rather, he argues that the yes-saying or affirmation is itself an act of accepting and more importantly seeing one's fate as an aesthetic necessity. He borrows this thought from the Dionysian aesthetics, the only path to pursue for a yes-sayer or life-affirmer. Therefore, seeing or intuiting or looking at is simultaneous with the affirmation, not only of life, but also of the transition between living and thinking, willing and conceptualizing, phusis and ethos. While willing requires a transition to seeing, seeing requires a transition to willing, and thus aesthetic understanding becomes an ethical necessity. Amor fati is in this sense the very affirmation of the transition between seeing and willing, and as a result of this affirmation it leads to experiencing (112). The experience of life became the motto of Nietzschean thought, which has culminated in the doctrine of the will-to-power and willing through becoming. And the principle of aesthetic necessity built on a Dionysian affirmation or amor fati has become the driving force of Nietzsche's aesthetic revaluation of ethos. Nietzsche articulates this in his Attempt at Self-Criticism as follows:

"... as an advocate of life my instinct invented for itself a fundamentally opposed doctrine and counter-evaluation of life, a purely artistic one, an anti-Christian one. What was it to be called? As a philologist and man of words I baptized it, not without a certain liberty--for who can know the true name of the Antichrist? by the name of a Greek god: I called it Dionysiac" (113)

The Dionysian affirmation is necessary so as to repair the belief in the possibility of the construction of bridges that can put an end to the present stagnation or exhaustion of humanity. The aesthetic ethos is necessary to re-establish the link between being-human and being as a whole. This is the only way to overcome nihilism. If we agree to consider the tragic art as a disturbance for humanity's discovery of its real phusis, then, similarly, the sublime art functions as the disturbance or change of direction in human history or the history of human being. This is because the human act of creation can only mimic the ever-evolving and ever-changing purpose of human existence, and therefore art stands as a necessity for the affirmation of human life. In The Gay Science, he articulates this argument regarding artistic self-overcoming and self-creation with reference to a phusis-based or physiological ethics as a reaction against Kant's idealist morality (114). This also strengthens humanity's role of transition between nature and art, through the Dionysian affirmation, as well as the argument that whatever 'comes to be' is an aesthetic and thus ethical necessity (115).

Arguably, one of the main purposes of Nietzsche's Zarathustra is to demonstrate the affirmation of tragic (both aesthetic and ethical) necessity. In Ecce Homo, for instance, Nietzsche describes Zarathustra as the most affirmative spirit and the Ubermensch as the one who says the loudest 'Yes' to life, and embodies all oppositions in human nature such as the sweetest (the beautiful) and the most terrible (the sublime):

"But this is the concept of Dionysus himself--Another consideration also leads to this conclusion...Zarathustra is a dancer--how someone with the hardest, the most terrible insight into reality, who has thought 'the most abysmal thought', can nonetheless see it not as an objection to existence, not even to its eternal return, but instead find one more reason in it for himself to be the eternal yes to all things, 'the incredible, boundless yes-saying, amen-saying' ... 'I still carry my blessed yea-saying into all abysses' ... But this is the concept of Dionysus once more." (116)

In his Attempt at Self-Criticism, Nietzsche once more associates Zarathustra with the "Dionysiac monster" (117) he introduces in The Birth of Tragedy, also quoting a passage from his Zarathustra titled 'On the higher man'. This again justifies our attempt to link the sublime and monstrous idea-experience of the Dionysian to the idea of the Ubermensch as well as Zarathustra's own experience of the sublime and his self-overcoming.

As Pippin rightly states, the overman's "self-overcoming is not transcending a present state for the sake of an ideal, stable higher state (as in a naturally perfected state or any other kind of fixed telos)." (118) Rather, I argue, to achieve a higher state of being, the Ubermensch has to embrace the constancy of change (represented in the idea of the Dionysian) and the impossibility of positing an unchanging "I" (or an unchanging telos) along with his phusis as it is and as it appears. The affirmation of change and the entailing idea of Ubermensch (as the affirmer of change) are posited against Kant's transcendental moral teleology. While for Kant, a higher state of being is necessarily a purer state (of rationality, freedom and moral autonomy) not influenced by external factors, Nietzsche understands those so-called external factors (or namely the world of appearances) or the earthly (and not otherworldly or spiritual) life as the only reality to which the Ubermensch needs to submit his very existence as an individual together with his will and values. He articulates this thought in Zarathustra as follows:

"The overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman shall be the meaning of the earth! I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth and do not believe those who speak to you of extraterrestrial hopes! They are mixers of poisons whether they know it or not. They are despisers of life, dying off and self-poisoned, of whom the earth is weary: so let them fade away!" (119)

Here, Nietzsche considers the actual world as the highest possible ideal whose sublimity can only be discovered, not via reason, but via strength. For the latter is more universal and substantial owing to its direct and immediate reference to phusis.

But this self-overcoming requires the Ubermensch to become the abundant flow and relentless change with all its resulting chaos and madness, the most essential prerequisite for an artistic and creative transformation (or in Nietzsche's words, "to give birth to a dancing star"). Therefore, unlike Kant's linear moral teleology, which ideally leads to the peaceful and universal humanity ruled by reason, Nietzsche's aesthetic and transformative teleology seeks after the ultimate ideal of the Ubermensch:

"Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this lightning, he is this madness ... Mankind is a rope fastened between animal and overman--a rope over an abyss. What is great about human beings is that they are a bridge and not a purpose: what is lovable about human beings is that they are a crossing over and a going under" (120)

While for Kant, cultivated and universal humanity itself remains to be the one and only purpose through which our moral and aesthetic judgments are determined, for Nietzsche, this very humanity Kant praises is nothing but "a polluted stream" which will eventually flow under the great ocean of the Ubermensch (121) (which is the real meaning of humanity's very existence). In other words, the only thing that could redeem and justify the weaknesses and ascetic ideals of the present humanity is its affirmation of new beginning(s) and its eventual self-overcoming and becoming the aesthetically justifiable Ubermensch.

In Zarathustra, Nietzsche also adds that the force exerted by the Ubermensch does not derive from the will-to-exist, but rather "what is not cannot will; but what is in existence, how could this still will to exist! Only where life is, is there also will; but not will to life, instead--thus I teach you--will to power!". (122) Nietzsche argues that the actual world is the highest possible ideal that can only be affirmed through will-to-power, and through the concentration of motion in one man's (or overman's) imagination. For this world assigns him the task of representing the artistic extension of nature thanks to which he can mediate between humanity and the forces in nature, between ethos and phusis (123). To become an artistic extension of phusis, the Ubermensch also needs to extend beyond his sublimity, let his beauty arise and represent the taste of the earth "invigorating the entire landscape" (124) as well as the motion underlying nature. Thus, Nietzsche defends the eventual necessity of the reconciliation between the sublime and the beautiful in order for the 'hero' to be able to overcome himself, to become an over-hero and continues:

"I saw a sublime one today, a solemn one, an ascetic of the spirit; oh how my soul laughed at his ugliness! ... He has not yet overcome his deed. I do love the bull's neck on him, but now I also want to see the angel's eyes. He must also unlearn his hero's will; he shall be elevated, not merely sublime--the ether itself shall elevate him, the will-less one! But precisely for the hero beauty is the most difficult of all things. Beauty is not to be wrested by any violent willing ... When power becomes gracious and descends into view; beauty I call such descending. And from no one do I want beauty as I do from just you, you powerful one: let your kindness be your ultimate self-conquest. I know you capable of all evil--therefore from you I want the good ... Yes, you sublime one, one day you shall be beautiful and shall hold the mirror up to your own beauty ... For this is the secret of the soul: only when the hero abandons her, she is approached in dream by--the over-hero" (125)

Nietzsche here reconciles the sublime and the beautiful in his idea of the overhero. But the sublime he mentions in this passage refers to the Schopenhauerian sublime (and the consequential self-overcoming of individuality or becoming will-less) rather than the Dionysian (aesthetic) sublime of his early works. The importance of this passage lies in its reconciliation of the ascetic sublime and the beautiful in the overhero's willing and only through this reconciliation, can the overhero be 'elevated' not only through transcendence but rather by descending into view or through the Apollonian principium individuationis. Here, we observe the reconciliation of the sublime and the beautiful of the idealists in Nietzsche's Dionysian ideas of self-overcoming, self-creation and finally the Ubermensch. This passage defining sublimity as the initial elevation of man through his overcoming of the ethical-cultural-social reality, and beauty as his necessary descent into the aesthetic-earthly reality (126) confirms Nietzsche's understanding of elevation (or transcendence) as a bidirectional aesthetic transition between ethos and phusis. It also shows that, in his Zarathustra, Nietzsche continues to employ the beautiful-sublime duality in his description of Ubermensch and his transformation.

The sublimity and beauty or the metaphysical and aesthetic substance of this transition is determined by how well the hero has understood or how deep he has travelled into phusis as well as his very own phusis, instead of whether or not he could transcend or rise above the contingent reality of so-called appearances to employ pure rationality and become a purely moral agent following a definitive and pre-determined telos. The depth of his apprehension of phusis depends on his experience of the metaphysical-aesthetic idea-criterion Nietzsche proposes against Kant's moral, linear and finally (in the third Critique) aesthetic-natural teleology, namely the idea of eternal recurrence. The overcoming of Kant's linear moral teleology, his idea of ethical progress as well as his idea of the necessity of a detached reasoning and unchanging state of mind (for the thinking agent to become aesthetically disinterested and morally free and autonomous) were some of Nietzsche's targets when he decided to revive the Heraclitean notion of panta rhei in his idea of eternal recurrence. In Zarathustra, by calling the path of eternity 'crooked',127 he confronts the very idea of moral progress and the Enlightenment's ideal of the universal individual free of social-historical contingency and ethnic limitations. In this sense, the eternal recurrence represents the idea of history as cyclical change, which, according to Nietzsche, needs to be the forceidea that shapes and reshapes human nature, so far defined as something unmoved, sated and everlasting (which he calls misanthropic). (128) However, the very acknowledgment of the force-idea of eternal recurrence entails the transformative suffering (namely the Dionysian), and the acceptance and affirmation of life as it is {amor fati) 129. This is the only anthropic, aesthetic and becoming way to understand human nature which is why Nietzsche describes Zarathustra as "the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of the circle" whose most abysmal thought is the idea of the eternal recurrence (130) and whose ultimate telos is to impart the Ubermensch as the full discovery and overcoming of being-human. (131) The new human being, he says, is the highest soul that "loves being, but submerges into becoming [and] wants to rise to willing and desiring--the soul that flees itself and catches up to itself in the widest circle [...] in which all things have their current and recurrent and ebb and flow" (132) While the submerging into becoming is an affirmation of the Dionysian as a cosmological-tragic principle, the coming back into being through willing and desiring power (Wille-zur-Macht) is an affirmation of the formal artistic and earthly Apollonian self-creation. And the entirety of this process of eternal recurrence is a drill penetrating into the static abyss of non-being dragged forward by human will-to-power through its yearning for fire (as the element representing relentless change, destruction and regeneration) which, Nietzsche predicts, will in turn lead humanity to new beginnings, towards the great noon of the blessed isles (133). Therefore, it would not be wrong to argue that the element of fire (represented in such metaphors as the great noon and the blessed islands of the hottest south) brings together the Heraclitean notion of panta rhei (underlying Nietzsche's idea of eternal recurrence) and the Dionysian art of self-overcoming (underlying his idea of will-to-power).

Nietzsche repeatedly brings forward in Zarathustra the sublime and beautiful ideals of the new beginnings, the great noon, the hottest south and the blessed isles (134) in relation to his ideas of eternal recurrence and will-to-power which constitute his ultimate Weltanschauung. This worldview is not entirely new but stems from the not-yet-metaphysical or namely cosmological ancient origins (particularly Heraclitean notion of panta rhei). As a result of the UbermenscUs creative activity of drilling (into the depths of the past) the new beginnings and new wells will eventuate and their untouched waters will be used to grow new cultures, (135) cultures that embrace change, fire and eternal recurrence. The great noon (preceded by the pillars of fire in cities (136)) and the hottest south (which have not yet been discovered for mankind (137)) are the metaphors Nietzsche uses to describe this necessary destruction of established but lifeless or exhausted metaphysical ideas and ideals of the "world-weary cowards and cross spiders" (138) followed by the necessary deification of change and fire. On the blessed isles of the hottest south, fire, change and cyclicality are embraced and affirmed as the greatest signs of life, and the ceremonies, dances and social events are held to represent them aesthetically. The blessed isles are the lands (the great distant human empire far away from the rabble and the remnants of its ideals) and the great noon (filled with the reflection of the Sun's bliss (139)) is the time of Nietzsche's ideal "higher, stronger, more victorious, more cheerful" and beautiful new species or laughing lions (140) dancing and playing with new colorful shells (141) purified not by rationality and transcendence nor by metaphysical deities, but by the affirmation of the element of fire and the cyclical change it represents. These islands are the lands,

"where dancing gods are ashamed of all clothing ... Where all becoming seemed the dance of gods and the mischief of gods ... Where all time seemed to me a blissful mockery of moments, where necessity was freedom itself, which played blissfully with the sting of freedom: Where I once again found my old devil and arch-enemy, the spirit of gravity, and everything he created: compulsion, statute, necessity and consequence and purpose and will and good and evil...It was there too that I picked up the word 'overman' along the way, and that the human is something that must be overcome,--that human being is a bridge and not an end; counting itself blessed for its noon and evening as the way to new dawns: the Zarathustra-words about the great noon" (142)

This passage plainly shows that Nietzsche's ideals are indeed reactions against 'the spirit of gravity' (Christian and normative ethics) and its creations such as the Kantian ideals of free willing individual (143) and moral, progressive and civilized humanity. It also substantiates our earlier argument that the only way to overcome these ideals that clothe the reality and necessity of change is by willing the aesthetic ethos where the inexhaustible sun of the 'great noon' while illuminating and beautifying, at the same time, heats, moves, alters, and makes sublime every thing, idea, belief and tradition. This is the topos where the beautiful and sublime Ubermensch will ideally dwell, regenerate, and create their new values, ideals and heroes. Such is the picture that Nietzsche had in mind when he reconciled the sublime and the beautiful in his description of the ideal human nature or the aesthetic ethos. Nietzsche also mentions these semi-fictitious islands in The Gay Science to criticize idealism in general for its fear and denial of the senses as the grounding of ethics as follows:

"Why we are not idealists.--Formerly, philosophers feared the senses: is it possible that we have unlearned this fear all too much? Today we are all sensualists, we philosophers of the present and future, not in theory but in praxis, in practice. The former, however, saw the senses as trying to lure them away from their world, from the cold kingdom of 'ideas', to a dangerous Southern isle where they feared their philosophers' virtues would melt away like snow in the sun" (144).

This reveals how steadfastly Nietzsche defends this aesthetic ideal against Kant's moral teleology. Unlike Kant's, Nietzsche's philosophy remains non-essentialist as it does not attribute a certain and unchanging set of characteristics to human nature. Rather along with its valuations, ideas and concepts (e.g. good, evil, just, unjust), human nature is also in flux. (145) And the very affirmation of this fact and the Heraclitean doctrine of panta rhei, together with the negation of the duality between essence and appearance, constitute the primary telos of Nietzsche's aesthetic ethics.

CONCLUSION

Kantian and Nietzschean aesthetics aim to look beyond the forms of objects to provide substantial explanations for the concepts of beauty, nobility and sublimity of human art, life and nature. However, in doing so, they take different ways to affirm human life: the main difference lies in their very conceptualization of the idea and ideal of humanity deriving from the way they relate aesthetic judgment (e.g. the judgment on the picture of humanity within a greater landscape of nature), and ethical judgment (e.g. the judgment on whether an action fits into this picture or whether it is becoming). According to Nietzsche, the transformation of aesthetic taste and judgment through the tragic is the first step in the justification of nature and of existence as a whole. The metaphysical Greek deity Dionysus should be regarded as an active category for all works of art including the art of self-transformation and self-overcoming. In contrast, in the third Critique, Kant conceives the sublime as a passive phenomenon to be sensed. He claims that the ultimate significance of the sublime lies in its consequential ethical value in attaining the finally acquired consciousness of the sublimity of human rationality and of the moral justification of human existence. But, Kant adds, the value of the sublime and the tragic is never as significant as the beautiful for the aesthetic judgment. Moreover, according to Kant, the aesthetic experience of the beautiful or the sublime cannot transform one's life-experience and Weltanschauung, but rather assures the person of the elevated nature of human morality and of the purposefulness of human existence. This crucial discrepancy substantiates the argument that while Kantian aesthetics is essentially ethical and moral, Nietzschean ethics is a reaction against this moralizing tendency and remains essentially aesthetic. Although both attempted to provide novel justifications for human life and art or ethos, their justifications differ with regard to the function they attribute to the faculty of aesthetic judgment which is partly determined by the way they construe the dynamic (constantly diverging and converging) dualities of the beautiful and sublime, and the Apollonian and Dionysian. In the last analysis, both Kant and Nietzsche define aesthetic judgment as the human faculty that transforms the movements in/of the phenomena of nature and represents them as the appearances taking place as part of the unity of nature based on the always-underlying principles of human nature and human ratio. Therefore, the discrepancies between their definitions derive neither from their understanding of art nor from their views on the faculty of judgment, but rather from their construal of the real and ideal human nature which determines their essential teloi and influences their treatment of the so-called duality between the beautiful and the sublime. Against Kant's linear affirmation and deification of the human intellect, reason and morality confirmed via his teleological construal of the feelings and ideas of the beautiful and sublime (still posited as dualistic in the third Critique), Nietzsche proposes the cosmological/physiological (or namely phusis-based) affirmation of human life, art and nature through the very unity of the Apollonian and Dionysian (joy and suffering (146)) within the post-metaphysical principle of becoming. On the one hand, Kant provides a moral re-definition of the beautiful and the sublime based on their positive (mostly in case of the beautiful) and negative (mostly in case of the sublime) consequences on the perceiving and intuiting individual. Consequently, he advocates the beautiful as a potentially moralizing and liberating universal idea, and disqualifies the sublime as a culturally dependent and less universalizable feeling which unsuccessfully tries to make sense of the senseless forces or determine the indeterminate concepts. On the other hand, in late Nietzschean philosophy, the category of the Apollonian submerges into the aesthetic idea of the beautiful, while the Dionysian is further developed into a metaphysical (both cosmological and ontological) idea-principle which aesthetically manages to represent the very origins of the familiar concepts of ethos in the indeterminate motion. The transformation of these post-dualistic ideas coincides with Nietzsche's aesthetic reformation of metaphysics and ethics in The Gay Science and farathustra where he draws an aesthetic picture of human nature using natural imagery and metaphors. In the end, Nietzsche seems to argue that the Ubermensch, as the ultimate purpose of human existence, aesthetically affirms the earth and life as it is and as it appears by means of embodying the beautiful through the beauty of its purpose (Ubermensch), the sublime through the sublimity of its constitution (phusis) and the ethical through its aesthetic links to phusis or motion. This is why he defines the new origin of virtue as an abundant human will (of the Ubermensch) making itself a necessity by flowing broad like a river commanding, affecting, liberating, changing and revaluing all things and values around it (147) thereby becoming a moving force whose affirmation comes from its very existence. In contrast, Kant's ideal of enlightened humanity glorifies the beautiful through its universality, sublimity through its consequential justification of human morality, and the aesthetic through its ethical links to human faculties of understanding and reason. This is why Kant expresses the need for the introduction of an end that has an unconditional value or an end-in-itself beyond the indeterminate and organic teleology of nature. And this ultimate end-initself, argues Kant, is humanity itself with its moral-rational capacity (and not merely human virtue), which also exists in nature (148) but as an already-transcended and already-elevated state of being with its unique faculty of reasoning, a self-justificatory and self-affirmative purpose of all existence.

ERMAN KAPLAMA

School of Government, Development and International Affairs

The University of the South Pacific (USP)

Email: erman.kaplama@usp.ac.fj

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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(1) Nabais, in his Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic, rightly suggests that Nietzsche's duality of the Apollonian and Dionysian is comparable to Kant's duality of the beautiful and the sublime and that Nietzsche's aesthetic idea of the tragic can be better understood when compared to the Kantian sublime. (Nabais, Nuno. Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic, trans. Earl, Martin, London: Continuum, 2006, p.10) However, here Nabais also questions whether the same kind of relationship governs both considering the fact that the Apollonian completely disappears in Nietzsche's late period works. Moreover, Ansell-Pearson also confirms the significance of the sublime in Nietzsche's aesthetics and ethics stating, "in accordance with the tradition stretching from Longinus to Kant, Schiller, and Schopenhauer, Nietzsche employs the sublime in connection with notions of elevation, exaltation, loftiness, ennoblement and the attainment of newly discovered heights of experience". He also adds that Nietzsche treats it as the "tragic sublime in The Birth of Tragedy, in which nauseous thoughts about the dreadful and absurd character of existence, as human beings encounter it, are transformed into mental images with which it is possible to live, and in which the sublime represents the artistic taming of the dreadful and the ridiculous or the comic the artistic discharge of the dreadful". (Ansell-Pearson, Keith. 'Nietzsche, The Sublime, and the Sublimities of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Dawn' in Nietzsche Studien 2010, pp. 204-5) Similarly, Haar establishes the link between Kant's and Nietzsche's aesthetics as follows: "As a result of his partial belonging to the metaphysics of subjectivity, Nietzsche remains de facto blindly dependent upon 'aesthetics' in the Kantian sense of the word, i.e., upon the definition of aesthetic pleasure as a pleasure of 'reflection,' as enjoyment in the creator or the spectator" (Haar, Michel. Nietzsche and Metaphysics, trans. Gendre, Michael, Albany: SUNY Press, 1996, p. 156)

(2) Nabais clearly confirms this point I will be using to compare Kant's consequentially moral aesthetics and Nietzsche's essentialy aesthetic ethics. He argues that unlike Kant and Schopenhauer Nietzsche does not prioritize ethics and morality over aesthetics, and that the sublime cannot be reduced to its possible moral consequences and should be analyzed fully as an aesthetic experience. (Nabais, Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic, p. 9)

(3) This paper will purposefully avoid analyzing Nietzsche's middle period works (particularly Daybreak and Human, All Too Human) both because the Dionysian is almost non-existent in these works and to be able to restrict the focus of the paper to Nietzsche's tragic sublime which is the dominant aesthetic, ethical and metaphysical idea-principle of his early and late period works. For an extensive analysis of Nietzsche's understanding of the sublime in his middle period works, see Ansell-Pearson, "Nietzsche, The Sublime, and the Sublimities of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Dawn".

(4) Immanuel Kant' Sammtliche Werke, ed. G. Hartenstein (Leipzig, 1868), VIII, 625; quoted by Goldthwait, 'Translator's Introduction' in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 1960, p.8 and Paul Arthur Schilpp, Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics Evanston and Chicago, Northwestern Univv I938, p.73

(5) Goldthwait, 'Translator's Introduction' in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 1960, pp.8-9

(6) Goldthwait, 'Translator's Introduction', p.18

(7) Goldthwait, 'Translator's Introduction', p.18

(8) Goldthwait, 'Translator's Introduction', p.25

(9) Goldthwait, 'Translator's Introduction', p.34

(10) This is one of the main arguments of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment. He articulates this idea in multiple ways both in The Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment and in The Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment. In the former, for instance, he argues that the sublime objects in nature "elevate the strength of our soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature," and he adds this resistance is "found in our own faculty of reason...which has that very infinity under itself as a unit against which everything in nature is small, and thus found in our own mind a superiority over nature itself ..." (Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.144-5) Furthermore, he continues, "... sublimity is not contained in anything in nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of being superior to nature within us and thus also to nature outside us (insofar as it influences us). Everything that arouses this feeling in us, which includes the power of nature that calls forth our own powers, is thus (although improperly) called sublime; and not only under the presupposition of this idea in us and in relation to it are we capable of arriving at the idea of the sublimity of that being who produces inner respect in us not merely through his power, which he displays in nature, but even more by the capacity that is placed within us for judging nature without fear and thinking of our vocation as sublime in comparison with it" (Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, pp.147-8) In another place Kant says, "For the human being ... is the ultimate end of creation here on earth, because he is the only being on earth who forms a concept of ends for himself and who by means of his reason can make a system of ends out of an aggregate of purposively formed things" (Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, pp.294-5) Korsgaard, in her introduction to Kant's Groundwork, also confirms this arguing that all human desires, needs and wants must be transcended for the overarching telos of an ideal human community based on human rationality conceived above and beyond the contingent realm of nature. (Korsgaard, Christine. 'Introduction', in Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp.xxv-xxvi)

(11) Kant, Immanuel. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 1960, p.51

(12) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, p.55

(13) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, pp.58-59 Then, Kant adds, "Accordingly, true virtue can be grafted only upon principles such that the more general they are, the more sublime and noble it becomes. These principles are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and extends itself much further than over the particular grounds of compassion and complaisance...only when one subordinates his own inclination to one so expanded can our charitable impulses be used proportionately and bring about the noble bearing that is the beauty of virtue" (Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, pp.58-59)

(14) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, p.61

(15) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, p.74

(16) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, pp.74-75

(17) This is Kant's general understanding of the "I" or the subject. Interestingly though, as if to challenge the grounding of his moral philosophy, Kant makes a much-unexpected confession in a much-unexpected place. In the Criticism of the third paralogism of transcendental psychology of the first Critique Kant accepts the irrefutability of the Heraclitean notion of universal becoming or the transitory nature of all things, admitting the impossibility of positing a totally persistent and self-conscious subject: "Even if the saying of some ancient schools, that everything is transitory and nothing in the world is persisting and abiding, cannot hold as soon as one assumes substances, it is still not refuted through the unity of self-consciousness. For we cannot judge even from our own consciousness whether as soul we are persisting or not, because we ascribe to our identical Self only that of which we are conscious; and so we must necessarily judge that we are the very same in the whole of the time of which we are conscious. But from the standpoint of someone else we cannot declare this to be valid because, since in the soul we encounter no persisting appearance other than the representation "I," which accompanies and connects all of them, we can never make out whether this I (a mere thought) does not flow as well as all the other thoughts that are linked to one another through it." (Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Guyer and Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.424, A364)

(18) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, p.65

(19) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, p.65

(20) Nietzsche challenges this dichotomy in his later works (e.g. Zarathustra) by exposing the sublimity underlying human nature through such ideas as the will-to-power, strength of character, artistic or creative abilities, tragic character of human life and finally the Ubermensch. Ansell-Pearson eloquently confirms this as follows: "What Nietzsche is opposed to, I believe, is any attempt to revivify for us moderns the old religiously-inspired sublime. In taking this to task, however, he leaves open the possibility of other and new experiences of the sublime. Nietzsche's challenge consists in asking the following question: can we be ennobled and elevated by the passion of knowledge and by the insight that the human is an "experiment"? Even when he posits the Ubermensch as the new meaning of the earth Nietzsche is, in fact, also inviting us to return to the human, to discover it anew and learn what the human is through purifying knowledge. The human does not cease to remain the focus of Nietzsche's attention and concern." (Ansell-Pearson, 'Nietzsche, The Sublime, and the Sublimities of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Dawn', p.231-232)

(21) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, p.45

(22) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, p.46

(23) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, p.57 Here Kant also mentions the mathematically sublime and tries to link it to the meditations of metaphysics and immortality of our souls and simply fails to provide an elaborate argument on that. He also goes on to resort to the idea of "Providence" who has supposedly inserted in us a stronger impulse towards beautiful actions such as goodheartedness, righteousness, kindness and nobility. (Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, pp. 60-61)

(24) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, p.53

(25) For further discussion on this point see Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed., trans. Guyer, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.147-8

(26) This is the way Nietzsche puts it: "You say it is the good cause that hallows even war? I tell you: it is the good war that hallows any cause. War and courage have done more great things than love of one's neighbor. Not your pity but your bravery has rescued the casualties so far. What is good? You ask. Being brave is good" (Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke farathustra: A Book for All and None, ed. Del Caro & Pippin, Cambridge University Press, Kindle edition, 2006, Loc.1285)

(27) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, pp.47-53

(28) Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, pp.47-53

(29) Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation Volume I, trans. E. F. J. Payne, Dover Publication, 1969, p.532

(30) Nietzsche, Friedrich. 'The Birth of Tragedy' in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.14

(31) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', pp.26-7

(32) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.39

(33) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.39

(34) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.30

(35) Nietzsche, Friedrich. 'The Dionysian Worldview' in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings ed. Geuss and Speirs Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.130

(36) Nietzsche, 'The Dionysian Worldview', p.131

(37) Nietzsche, 'The Dionysian Worldview', p.131

(38) Nietzsche, Friedrich. 'An Attempt at Self-Criticism' in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Geuss and Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.7

(39) Although we have sufficient evidence to argue that Dionysian, as already the essential drive of Nietzsche's early works, has revealed itself and dominated the later works such as Zarathustra, Twilight of the Idols, The Gay Science, Beyond Good and Evil and Ecce Homo, he does also mention and discuss the ideas of the Apollonian and Dionysian in dualistic form in his Ecce Homo and Late Notebooks while commenting on The Birth of Tragedy. For instance, he says: "Being as a fabrication by the man suffering from becoming. A book constructed entirely of experiences about the states of aesthetic pleasure and unpleasure, with a metaphysics of the artiste in the background...Fundamental psychological experiences: the name 'Apollonian' designates the enraptured lingering before a fabricated, dreamed-up world, before the world of beautiful illusion as a redemption from becoming. Dionysos, on the other hand, stands namesake for a becoming which is actively grasped, subjectively experienced, as a raging voluptuousness of the creative man who also knows the wrath of the destroyer. Antagonism of these two experiences and the desires that underlie them: the first wants appearance to be eternal, and before it man becomes quiet, free of wishes, smooth as a still sea, healed, in agreement with himself and all existence; the second desire urges men towards becoming, towards the voluptuousness of making things become, i.e., of creating and annihilating. Becoming, felt and interpreted from within, would be continual creating by someone dissatisfied, over-wealthy, endlessly tense and endlessly under pressure, by a god whose only means of overcoming the torment of being is constant transformation and exchange...This metaphysics of the artiste stands counter to the one-sided view held by Schopenhauer, who cannot appreciate art form the standpoint of the artist but only from that of the recipient" (Nietzsche, Friedrich. Writings from the Late Notebooks, ed. Bittner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp.80-81)

(40) Nabais, Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic, p.63

(41) Moreover, Sallis asks, "Does Nietzsche's thinking of the Dionysian turn outside, turn against, exceed, the space between intelligible and sensible? Or does it not remain situated precisely within the compass of that distinction in the guise that it assumes beginning with Kant, as the distinction between thing-in-itself and appearances? Or even in its Schopenhauerian guise, as the distinction between the will (as the thing-in-itself) and appearances produced through the operation of representation? Is the fundamental distinction of The World as Will and Representation, the distinction that reinscribes the metaphysical order of fundament, that is, of ground--is this distinction not reinscribed in The Birth of Tragedy?" (Sallis, John. Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, p.60)

(42) Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy, p.60 On the other hand, Sallis defends the argument that young Nietzsche's admiration of Schopenhauer was only regarding his philosopher-character, not the content of his philosophy which stems from the Platonic separation of reality and appearances. This view can be justified referring to Nietzsche's radical and critical approach against "the simple oppositional thinking" whose attributes ascribed to the will are simply the binary opposites of the attributes of appearances." (Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy, pp.64-5)

(43) Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy, p.68

(44) Sallis, Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy pp.71-2 Moreover, in his book, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, Haar agrees with Sallis as follows: "The reasoning through which Nietzsche overcomes Schopenhauer is the following: If the will needs representation, the representation is already in the will or is originarily associated with it. Isn't such an association or such a primitive link the Dionysian itself?" (Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, p.44)

(45) Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Twilight of the Idols" in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, ed. Ridley and Norman Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.170 Nietzsche resumes this discussion in his Late Notebooks as follows: "Only aesthetically can the world be justified. Happiness with existence is only possible as happiness with illusion. Happiness with becoming is only possible in annihilating the reality of 'existence', of the beautiful semblance, in the pessimistic destruction of illusion. Dionysian happiness reaches its peak in the annihiliation of even the most beautiful illusion." (Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, pp.81-82)

(46) Haar substantiates a similar argument as follows: "...in itself Dionysian feeling is more the joyful feeling of the necessity of a universal link than the will that follows from it. The Dionysian feeling, which is also called "tragic wisdom," is that of the necessity of coexistence and mutual relativity of contraries such as perfection/imperfection, joy/suffering, creation/destruction" (Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, p.146)

(47) Hollingdale, R J. "Introduction" in Nietzsche, Friedrich. Dithyrambs of Dionysus, London: Anvil Press Poetry, 1984, p.17

(48) Goldthwait, 'Translator's Introduction', pp.21-22

(49) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.89, pp.102-3

(50) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.148

(51) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.150

(52) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.156

(53) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.155

(54) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.156

(55) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, pp.156-7

(56) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, pp. 148-9

(57) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.149

(58) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.149

(59) Guyer, Paul, 'Editor's Introduction' in Kant, Immanuel Critique of the Power of Judgment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.xiv

(60) Guyer, 'Editor's Introduction', p.xxi

(61) Guyer, 'Editor's Introduction', p.xxii

(62) Guyer, 'Editor's Introduction', pp.xxiv-xxv However, unlike in reflecting and teleological judgment, in aesthetic judgment "the only universal that we seek is the idea of interpersonal agreement in pleasure in a beautiful object or in awe at a sublime one (which is actually both awful and pleasurable)" (Guyer, 'Editor's Introduction', p.xxiv)

(63) Guyer, 'Editor's Introduction', xxxi

(64) Guyer, 'Editor's Introduction', p.xxii Here, despite putting considerable emphasis on the abstract idea of reflecting judgment, he somehow decides to omit it in his conceptualization of the moral middle ground between aesthetics and teleology.

(65) Among other places, Kant most explicitly communicates this idea in the following passage from the third Critique referring to the Jewish Book of the Law and highlighting the similarity of the associated enthusiasm to the moral law: "Perhaps there is no more sublime passage in the Jewish Book of the Law than the commandment: Thou shalt not make unto thyself any graven image, nor any likeness either of that which is in heaven, or on the earth, or yet under the earth, etc. This commandment alone can explain the enthusiasm that the Jewish people felt in its civilized period for its religion when it compared itself with other peoples, or the pride that Mohammedanism inspired. The very same thing also holds of the representation of the moral law and the predisposition to morality in us. It is utterly mistaken to worry that if it were deprived of everything that the senses can recommend it would then bring with it nothing but cold, lifeless approval and no moving force or emotion. It is exactly the reverse: for where the senses no longer see anything before them, yet the unmistakable and inextinguishable idea of morality remains, there it would be more necessary to moderate the momentum of an unbounded imagination so as not to let it reach the point of enthusiasm, rather than from fear of the powerlessness of these ideas..." (Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.156)

(66) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.136

(67) In his Late Notebooks, Nietzsche, once more associating the Dionysian monstrous force with his doctrines of eternal recurrence and will to power, confirms this argument as follows: "do you know what 'the world' is to me? Shall I show you it in my mirror? This world: a monster of force, without beginning, without end, a fixed, iron quantity of force which grows neither larger nor smaller, which does not exhaust but only transforms itself, as a whole unchanging in size, an economy without expenditure and losses, but equally without increase, without income, enclosed by 'nothingness' as by a boundary ... as a play of forces and force-waves simultaneously one and 'many' ... blessing itself as what must eternally return, as a becoming that knows no satiety, no surfeit, no fatigue--this, my Dionysian world of eternal self-creating, of eternal self-destroying, this mystery world of dual delights, this my beyond good and evil, without goal, unless there is a goal in the happiness of the circle ... This world is the will to power--and nothing besides! And you yourselves too are this will to power--and nothing besides!" (Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, pp.38-9)

(68) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, pp.140-1

(69) Nietzsche, 'An Attempt at Self-Criticism', p.4

(70) Nietzsche, 'An Attempt at Self-Criticism', p.4 And continues Nietzsche, "Conversely, those things which gave rise to the death of tragedy--Socratism in ethics, the dialectics, smugness and cheerfulness of theoretical man--might not this very Socratism be a sign of decline, of exhaustion, of sickness..." (Nietzsche, "An Attempt at Self-Criticism", p.4)

(71) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.21

(72) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.23

(73) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.27

(74) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.41

(75) Nietzsche himself emphasized this relationship represented in the 'satyr', and later commented on it as follows: "What does the synthesis of goat and god in the satyr point to? What experience of their own nature, what impulse compelled the Greeks to think of the Dionysiac enthusiast and primal man as a satyr?" (Nietzsche, 'An Attempt at Self-Criticism', 1999, p.7)

(76) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.41-2

(77) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.41-2

(78) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.45

(79) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.113

(80) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', pp.113-4

(81) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', pp.113-4

(82) Ansell-Pearson,. 'Nietzsche, The Sublime, and the Sublimities of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Dawn', pp.207-8

(83) Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, trans., ed. Whitlock, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006, p.70

(84) Ansell-Pearson puts this as follows: "For Kant the "boundless ocean heaved up" is one example of several phenomena of nature where we see at work a dynamical sublime. Here nature is called sublime whenever it "elevates (erhebt) our imagination" by exhibiting cases in which the mind comes to feel its own sublimity, that is, in a vocation that elevates it "above nature". As already noted, for Kant the task is to judge nature beyond a state of fear. (Ansell-Pearson, 'Nietzsche, The Sublime, and the Sublimities of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Dawn', p.207)

(85) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, pp.144-5 However, Kant's account of the experience of the sublime is very interesting as here, he actually seems to be discussing it as an aesthetic phenomenon instead of referring to its possible moral-rational consequences: "(We) must not take the sight of the ocean as we think it, enriched with all sorts of knowledge (which are not, however, contained in the immediate intuition) ... rather, one must consider the ocean merely as the poets do, in accordance with what its appearance shows, for instance, when it is considered in periods of calm, as a clear watery mirror bounded only by the heavens, but also when it is turbulent, an abyss threatening to devour everything, and yet still be able to find it sublime. (Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, pp.152-3)

(86) Ansell-Pearson, "Nietzsche, The Sublime, and the Sublimities of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Dawn", pp.207-8 Furthermore, Ansell-Pearson asks: "What sublime state is it that the human being might attain here? How can the human being cease being itself? Is this what has really taken place in this experience?" and he adds: "One response might be to suggest that the encounter with the sea challenges us as humans and our sense of scale and measure, confronting us with something immense and monstrous. But here we have to be careful because of the "mockery" that greets us in the experience. All the names we might come up with to describe the mute sea will come back to us: profound, eternal, mysterious. Are we not endowing the sea with our own names and virtues? Do we ever escape the net of language, ever escape the human?" (Ansell-Pearson, "Nietzsche, The Sublime, and the Sublimities of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Dawn", p.216)

(87) Nietzsche, Friedrich, 'Twilight of the Idols' in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, ed. Ridley and Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.228

(88) He also confirms this point in Ecce Homo among other places as follows: Anyone who does not just understand the word 'Dionysian' but understands himself in the word 'Dionysian' does not need to refute Plato or Christianity or Schopenhauer--he smells the decay" (Nietzsche, 'Ecce Homo' in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, ed. Ridley and Norman Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.109) Moreover, in his Late Notebooks, Nietzsche also posits the Dionysian against Schopenhauerian metaphysics, Christian ideals and things-in-themselves as follows: "Around 1876 I had the terrible experience of seeing compromised everything I had previously willed, when I realised which way Wagner was going...Around the same time I realised that my instinct was after the opposite of Schopenhauer's: it aspired to a justification of life, even in its most dreadful, ambiguous and mendacious forms--for this I had ready the formula 'Dionysian'." (Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, p.149)

(89) Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.370, pp.235-6

(90) Nietzsche, 'An Attempt at Self-Criticism', p.8

(91) Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science, ed. Williams, Bernard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, sec.370, pp.234-5 Nietzsche later expands on this as follows: "I myself have attempted an aesthetic justification: how is the world's ugliness possible?--I took the will to beauty, to remaining fixed in the same forms, as being a temporary remedy and means of preservation: fundamentally, though, it seemed to me that the eternally-creating, as an eternally-having-to-destroy, is inseparable from pain. Ugliness is the way of regarding things that comes from the will to insert a meaning, a new meaning, into what has become meaningless: the accumulating force which compels the creating man to feel that what has gone before is untenable, awry, deserving of negation--is ugly?--Apollo's deception: the eternity of the beautiful form; the aristocratic law that says 'Thus shall it be forever!' Dionysos: sensuality and cruelty. Transience could be interpreted as enjoyment of the engendering and destroying force, as continual creation" (Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, p.79)

(92) Nietzsche, Friedrich. 'Nietzsche Contra Wagner' in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, ed. Ridley and Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.272

(93) Nietzsche, 'Nietzsche Contra Wagner', p.8

(94) Nietzsche, 'Twilight of the Idols' in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, ed. Ridley and Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.201 Nietzsche expresses a very similar thought but this time blaming human beings for being selfless for calling natural phenomena and intellectual ideas beautiful and sublime as follows: "All the beauty and sublimity we've lent to real and imagined things I want to demand back, as the property and product of man: as his most splendid vindication. Man as poet, as thinker, as God, as love, as power--oh, the kingly prodigality with which he has given gifts to things, only to impoverish himself and himself feel miserable! That has been man's greatest selflessness so far, that he admired and worshipped and knew how to conceal from himself the fact that it was he who created what he admired." (Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, p.215)

(95) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.22 He clearly repeats this argument in the preface of Ecce Homo calling himself 'a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus' as follows: "I am a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus; I would rather be a satyr than a saint...I won't be setting up any new idols;...Knocking over idols (my word for 'ideals')--that is more my style. You rob reality of its meaning, value, and truthfulness to the extent that you make up an ideal world...The 'true world' and the 'world of appearances'--in plain language, the made-up world and reality" (Nietzsche, "Ecce Homo", p.71)

(96) ibid, pp.18-19 This argument can be traced in many of Nietzsche's later works including Zarathustra

(97) Nietzsche, Friedrich The Will To Power, trans. Kaufmann & Hollingdale ed. Kaufmann, New York: Random House, 1968, p.533

(98) Nietzsche, Friedrich, 'Dionysian Worldview', p.124

(99) Nietzsche also defends the significance of art in the affirmation of human life in the following passage: "Honesty would lead us to nausea and suicide. But now our honesty has a counterforce that helps us avoid such consequences: art, as the good will to appearance. We do not always keep our eyes from rounding off, from finishing off the poem; and then it is no longer eternal imperfection that we carry across the river of becoming--we then feel that we are carrying a goddess, and are proud and childish in performing this service. As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable to us, and art furnishes us with the eye and hand and above all the good conscience to be able to make such a phenomenon of ourselves...we need all exuberant, floating, dancing, mocking, childish, and blissful art lest we lose that freedom over things that our ideal demands of us. It would be a relapse for us, with our irritable honesty, to get completely caught up in morality.We have to be able to stand above morality--and not just to stand with the anxious stiffness of someone who is afraid of slipping and falling at any moment, but also to float and play above it!" (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, pp.104-5)

(100) Then continues Nietzsche, "And with this I come back to the place that once served as my point of departure--the 'Birth of Tragedy' was my first revaluation of all values: and now I am back on that soil where my wants, my abilities grow--I, the last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus,--I, the teacher of eternal return" (Nietzsche, 'Twilight of the Idols', pp.228-9)

(101) The bidirectionality of this process can be observed in the following passage (among others) in Zarathustra: "You great star! What would your happiness be if you had not those for whom you shine? ... But we awaited you every morning, took your overflow from you and blessed you for it...Bless the cup that wants to flow over, such that water flows golden from it and everywhere carries the reflection of your bliss! Behold! This cup wants to become empty again, and Zarathustra wants to become human again." (Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, ed. Del Caro & Pippin, Cambridge University Press, Kindle edition, 2006, loc.793-806)

(102) Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, p.85

(103) Nietzsche, 'Dionysian Worldview', p.122

(104) Ansell-Paerson confirms this as follows: "Interestingly, in his treatment of the ancient Greeks Nietzsche had viewed tragic art as the means by which a people had conquered a world-weary pessimism (e.g. the wisdom of Silenus) and to the point where they loved life to such an extent that they wanted long lives. The pain and suffering of life no longer counted as an objection but became the grounds of a beautifying and sublime transfiguration of existence." (Ansell-Pearson, 'Nietzsche, The Sublime, and the Sublimities of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Dawn', p.225)

(105) Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.52

(106) Here, Nietzsche heavily criticizes the historical-pragmatic construal of mythology which lacks these complex motives (Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.53)

(107) Nietzsche, The Will To Power, p.541

(108) Nietzsche clearly articulates his critique of moral teleology and the concept of purpose in The Gay Science as follows: "...one is used to seeing the driving force precisly in the goals (purposes, professions etc.), in keeping with a very ancient error; but it is only the directing force--one has mistaken the helmsman for the stream. And not even always the helmsman, the driving force...Is the 'goal', the 'purpose', not often enough a beautifying pretext, a self-deception of vanity after the fact that does not want to acknowledge that the ship is following the current into which it has entered accidentally? That it 'wills' to go that way because it--must? That it certainly has a direction but--no helmsman whatsoever? We still need a critique of the concept of purpose" (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p.225)

(109) Nabais rightly argues that the tragic justification of life has always been the driving force in many of Nietzsche's works either overtly or covertly. He even goes further and claims that it "is probably more present in the texts that remain silent on the subject of tragedy than in those in which Sophocles and Euripides are the subjects" (Nabais, Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic, p.xiii)

(110) Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p.157

(111) Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p.29

(112) Nabais rightly argues that Nietzsche's notion of amor fati stands for immanent or aesthetic necessity as a transitory, neither moral nor teleological, idea-experience bringing together ethos and phusis (Nabais, Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic, p.65)

(113) Nabais, Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic, p.9 Among other places, Nietzsche also mentions this argument in his Late Notebooks as follows: "This is where I set the Dionysos of the Greeks: the religious affirmation of life, of life as a whole, not denied and halved ... Life itself, its eternal fruitfulness and recurrence ... existence is held to be blissful enough to justify even monstrous suffering. The tragic man says Yes to even the bitterest suffering: he is strong, full, deifying enough to do so...Dionysos cut to pieces is a promise to life: it will eternally be reborn and come home out of destruction" (Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, pp.249-250)

(114) This is how Nietzsche puts it: "Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of our opinions and value judgments and to the creation of tables of what is good that are new and all our own: let us stop brooding nauseous about some people's moral chatter about others. Sitting in moral judgment should offend our taste. Let us leave such chatter and such bad taste to those who have nothing to do but drag the past a few steps further through time and who never live in the present--that is, to the many, the great majority! We, however, want to become who we are--human beings who create themselves! To that end we must become the best students and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary in the world: we must become physicists in order to be creators in this sense..." (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p.189) And he concludes: "...while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been built on ignorance of physics or in contradiction to it. So, long live physics! And even more long live what compels us to it--our honesty!" (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p.189)

(115) In Birth of Tragedy, referring to Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, Nietzsche expresses a similar idea as follows: "The double essence of Aeschylus' Prometheus, his simultaneously Apolline and Dionysiac nature, could therefore be expressed like this: 'All that exists is just and unjust and is equally justified in both respects'" (Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', p.51) Moreover, Haar, describing the Dionysian transfiguration as the all-affirming sublime wisdom, states: "A Dionysian "magical" power pushes Greek humanity to affirm the enigma as enigma, to find "just" even the terrifying destiny of undeserved suffering, to affirm everything...Sublime wisdom dissolves the woe of existence into a possessed transfiguration" (Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, p.171)

(116) Nietzsche, "Ecce Homo", pp.130-1

(117) ibid, p.12

(118) Pippin, Robert B., "Introduction" in Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, ed. Del Caro & Pippin, Cambridge University Press, Kindle edition, 2006, Loc.442

(119) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.837-844

(120) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.861-867

(121) Nietzsche articulates this as follows: "Truly, mankind is a polluted stream. One has to be a sea to take in a polluted stream without becoming unclean. Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this sea, in him your great contempt can go under." (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.849) Then he adds, "Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this lightning, he is this madness...Mankind is a rope fastened between animal and overman--a rope over an abyss. What is great about human beings is that they are a bridge and not a purpose: what is lovable about human beings is that they are a crossing over and a going under" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.861-867)

(122) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.2199

(123) Kaplama, Erman. Cosmological Aesthetics through the Kantian Sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian, University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 2013, p.140

(124) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.4440 Here, on this new relationship and reconciliation between the sublime and the beautiful, Ansell-Pearson, also referring to Gooding-Williams, notes that "in the discourse entitled "On Those who are Sublime" in part two of Z Nietzsche has his eponymous hero reflect on what lies at the bottom of his sea and forces him to acknowledge that it harbours "sportive monsters" (Z II, Von den Erhabenen, KSA 4.150). He encounters a "sublime one" and notes how ugly he appears as a "penitent of the spirit". The sublime one is "decked out with ugly truths" and although many thorns hang on his attire, no rose can be seen on him. Such a spirit has learned neither laughter nor beauty but has returned from the forest of knowledge bearing a gloomy disposition. Not until he has grown weary of his sublimity (Erhabenheit), Zarathustra states, will beauty radiate from this spirit and only at this point would Zarathustra find him a creature of taste and something tasty. He needs to become 'elevated' (ein Gehobener) and not merely 'sublime' (ein Erhabener): "He has subdued monsters, he has solved riddles: but he should also redeem his own monsters and riddles, and transform them into heavenly children" (ibid., KSA 4.151). In his interpretation of this discourse in his magisterial study of Z, Robert Gooding-Williams maintains that what is being criticised in it is the sublime as we encounter it in Kant and Schopenhauer, namely the idea of a supersensible subject.54 Whilst this is relevant I think that the criticism developed in this discourse is, in fact, a self-criticism. Nietzsche is directing his thinking on the need to conquer the gloomy sublime with the gracious beautiful at himself and as a task which needs to inspire his own philosophical practice. (Ansell-Pearson, "Nietzsche, The Sublime, and the Sublimities of Philosophy: An Interpretation of Dawn", pp.230-231)

(125) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.2211-2240

(126) Nietzsche's Zarathustra later adds, "we do want to enter the kingdom of heaven at all: we have become men--and so we want the kingdom of the earth" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 4959) Inspired by this thought, Heidegger, in his Letter on Humanism, says: "Thinking builds upon the house of Being, the house in which the jointure of Being fatefully enjoins the essence of man to dwell in the truth of Being. This dwelling is the essence of 'being-in-the-world'... Holderlin's verse, 'full of merit, yet poetically, man dwells on this earth', is no adornment of a thinking that rescues itself from science by means of poetry. The talk about the house of Being is no transfer of the image 'house' to Being. But one day we will, by thinking the essence of Being in a way appropriate to its matter, more readily be able to think what 'house' and 'to dwell' are" (Heidegger, Martin. 'Letter On Humanism' in Basic Writings ed. Krell, Routledge: London, 1978, pp.259-260) Here, Heidegger confirms the poetic essence of man's dwelling on earth or the aesthetic ethos as the only type of ethos where human is actually on earth, and not one of its replicas. Heidegger further discusses this understanding of human dwelling on earth or ethos situated on and within phusis in The Origin of the Artwork as follows: "the Greeks called this coming forth and rising up in itself and in all things phusis. At the same time, phusis lights up that on which man bases his dwelling. We call this the earth. What this word means here is far removed from the idea of a planet. Earth is that in which the arising of everything that arises is brought back--as, indeed, the very thing that it is and sheltered. In the things that arise the earth presences as the protecting one". (Heidegger, Martin. 'The Origin of the Work of Art' in Off The Beaten Track, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p.21)

(127) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 3595-3601

(128) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.1807-1813

(129) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.1807-1813 Nietzsche puts this as follows: "Oh my brothers, am I perhaps cruel? But I say: if something is falling, one should also give it a push! Everything of today--it is falling, it is failing: who would want to stop it! But I--I want to push it too! Do you know the kind of lust that rolls stones down into steep depths?--These people of today; just look at how they roll into my depths! I am a prelude of better players, my brothers! An exemplary play! Act according to my example! And whomever you cannot teach to fly, him you should teach--to fall faster!" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 3483)

(130) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.3578

(131) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.3546 In another passage, Zarathustra converses a similar idea as follows: "Beware! The time approaches when human beings no longer launch the arrow of their longing beyond the human, and the string of their bow will have forgotten how to whir! I say to you: one must still have chaos in oneself in order to give birth to a dancing star. I say to you: you still have chaos in you" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 893-899) And he continues, "I want to teach humans the meaning of their being, which is the overman, the lightning from the dark cloud 'human being.'" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 938) Nabais confirms this by arguing that Nietzsche's Ubermensch, as the ultimate culmination of the Dionysian experience, becomes an eternal and unconditional necessity converging the actual and the unchangeable in the idea of eternal recurrence while still positing it within the actual motion of nature or phusis (Nabais, Nietzsche and the Metaphysics of the Tragic, p.83)

(132) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.3470-3476.

(133) Nietzsche puts this as follows: And soon they shall stand there before me like parched grass and steppe, and truly, weary of themselves--and yearning for fire more than for water! Oh blessed hour of lightning! Oh secret before noon!--Wild fires I want to make of them some day and heralds with tongues of fire some day they shall proclaim with tongues of fire: It is coming, it is near, the great noon!" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 2972) He later comments on this in Ecce Homo with reference to the Dionysian as follows: "One of the preconditions of a Dionysian task is, most crucially, the hardness of the hammer, the joy even in destruction. The imperative 'become hard!', the deepest certainty that all creators are hard is the true sign of a Dionysian nature" (Nietzsche, 'Ecce Homo', pp.134)

(134) Nietzsche is particularly convinced about the existence of "the blessed isles" which can be interpreted as the future realm of thought that is completely unaffected by or purified from Christian and European metaphysics and morality: "'But all is the same, nothing is worth it, searching does not help, and there are no blessed isles anymore!' Thus sighed the soothsayer; but at his last sigh Zarathustra became bright and certain once more, like someone who comes form a deep chasm into the light. 'No! No! No! Three times no!' he cried in a strong voice, stroking his beard. ' That I know better! There are still blessed isles! Be silent about that, you sighing sadsack!" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 3893-3899)

(135) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.3516

(136) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.3061

(137) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.2594

(138) This is how Nietzsche describes the so-called selfless idealists and moralists referring to altruists, humanists and ascetics: "And 'selfless'--that is how they wished themselves, with good reason, all these world-weary cowards and cross spiders! But for all of them now the day is coming, the transformation, the judgment sword, the great noon: then much shall be revealed! And whoever pronounces the ego hale and holy and selfishness blessed, indeed, he tells what he knows, this foreteller: 'Look, it is coming, it is near, the great noon!'" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.3229-3237)

(139) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.793-806

(140) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.4466-4478 In another place, Nietzsche describes this new species as follows: "You should love your children's land; let this love be your new nobility - the undiscovered land in the furthest sea! For that land I command your sails to seek and seek! You should make it up in your children that you are the children of your fathers; thus you should redeem all that is past! This new tablet I place above you!" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 3405)

(141) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.1945

(142) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.3306-3326

(143) In Zarathustra, Nietzsche explicitly defines the idea and ideal of freedom as delusion as follows: "There is an old delusion called good and evil. So far the wheel of this delusion has revolved around soothsayers and astrologers. Once people believed in soothsayers and astrologers, and therefore they believed 'Everything is fate: you should, because you must!' Then later people mistrusted all soothsayers and astrologers, and therefore they believed 'Everything is freedom: you can, because you want to! Yes, my brothers, so far we have merely deluded ourselves, but not known about the stars and the future, and therefore we have merely deluded ourselves, but not known about good and evil!" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 3373-3379)

(144) Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p.237

(145) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 3359-3373 Moreover, Nietzsche makes Zarathustra say: "...good and evil that would be everlasting--there is no such thing! They must overcome out of themselves again and again" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.2204)

(146) Here is how Nietzsche reconciles joy and suffering in farathustra through his notion of 'eternal recurrence': "Pain says: 'Refrain!' Away, you pain!" But everything that suffers wants to live, to become ripe and joyful and longing,--longing for what is farther, higher, brighter. 'I want heirs,' thus speaks all that suffers, 'I want children, I do not want myself--But joy does not want heirs, not children--joy wants itself, wants eternity, wants recurrence, wants everything eternally the same" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 5043)

(147) Nietzsche, Thus Spoke farathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.1657-1663 Nietzsche puts this as follows: "When your heart flows broad and full like a river, a blessing and a danger to adjacent dwellers: there is the origin of your virtue. When you are sublimely above praise and blame, and your will wants to command all things, as the will of a lover: there is the origin of your virtue...When you are the ones who will with a single will, and this turning point of all need points to your necessity: there is the origin of your virtue. Indeed, it is a new good and evil! Indeed, a new, deep rushing and the voice of a new spring! It is power, this new virtue; it is a ruling thought and around it a wise soul: a golden sun and around it the snake of knowledge" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke farathustra: A Book for All and None, loc.1657-1663) And then Nietzsche continues, "Like me, guide the virtue that has flown away back to the earth--yes, back to the body and life: so that it may give the earth its meaning, a human meaning! ... Let your spirit and your virtue serve the meaning of the earth, my brothers: and the value of all things will be posited newly by you! Therefore you shall be fighters! Therefore you shall be creators. There are a thousand paths that have never yet been walked; a thousand healths and hidden islands of life. Human being and human earth are still unexhausted and undiscovered" (Nietzsche, Thus Spoke farathustra: A Book for All and None, loc. 1669-1675)

(148) Guyer, "Editor's Introduction", p.xxxviii
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Title Annotation:p. 191-217
Author:Kaplama, Erman
Publication:Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy
Article Type:Essay
Date:Jan 1, 2016
Words:17018
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