KERVEGAN, Jean-Francois. The Actual and the Rational. Hegel and Objective Spirit.
Part I (chapters 1-3) discusses various employments of Rechtin Hegel's work between 1807 and 1830, with particular attention given to the 1817/18 Natural Right Lectures and the 1820 Philosophy of Right (PhR). Kervegan's decision to use "law" (German Gesetz) instead of "right" to render Recht underestimates Hegel's reliance on the fundamental distinction between jus and lex in the Roman Corpus. This does not diminish the value of Kervegan's discussion, which encompasses not just Hegel's works but also 200 years' worth of literature (from Haym and Rosenzweig to Peperzak and Losurdo). Kervegan references to Kant's Doctrine of Right, indispensable for an appreciation of Hegel's, indulge the generic interpretation of Kant's juridical thought as "legalism." (This may be due to the conflation of Gesetz and Recht.) One consequence is that "fiat justitia, pereat mundus" (from Perpetual Peace) is understood as expressing rigorism, while Kant's mundusrefers instead to the worldly interests of pseudo-politicians intent on undermining human right. Chapter 1 explicates Hegel's plan to deliver "the idea of right--the concept of right and its actualization" (PhR [section]1). Chapter 2 discusses the natural cum historical essence of right. Chapter 3 examines "right" as contract, both in its state-foundational role ("Social Contract") and as regulator of interactions in civil society. The strength of this section lies in Kervegan's thorough familiarity with the evolution of Hegel's thought. It is therefore surprising to find Hegel being credited in the end for theorizing a "law below and beyond law," suggesting a Hegelian pedigree of Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss.
Part II (chapters 4-6) first presents the role of Rousseau's distinction of bourgeois and citoyen in German Idealism. The underlying theme here is a reinterpretation of Hegel's notion of civil society in a liberal key, or as "anticipation" of future liberal doctrines. This "liberal Rechtsstaat' would even harbor an "antistate orientation." From Hegel's diagnosis of a conflict between modern individuals' "right to particularity" and their claims to universality, Kervegan further sees Hegel as also prefiguring Hayek's work. In the end, since Hegel's burgerliche Gesellschaft is construed as a realm of relativism, and juridical personhood is understood as anchored in it--rather than in the Rechtsstaat--Kervegan reaches the unlikely conclusion that for Hegel "the rights of man..., their scope and value are relative."
Part III (chapters 7-9) centers on aspects of "objective spirit" that are of contemporary resonance: Hegel's characterization of modernity (chapter 7); his critical appraisal of democratic representation (chapter 8); his criticism of democracy as such (chapter 9). The first is approached by putting Hegel in dialogue with Tocqueville. The second consists of a rich presentation of the history of political "representation." The third ("Beyond Democracy") discusses Hegel's critique of Aristotle's preference of politeia (here identified with demokratia) over other political arrangements.
Part IV (chapters 10-12) discusses readings of Hegel's "ethicality" (Sittlichkeit) as a "normative" and/or "institutional" theory of the political sphere. Kervegan provides another impressive tour de force through the literature, from Montesquieu all the way to Adorno. Chapter 10 focuses on the relation between Kant's "practical philosophy" and Hegel's "objective spirit," revisiting Hegel's critique of Kant's formalism, his alleged dualism, and the ethics of the "ought-to-be." Chapter 11 presents Hegel's "Ethicality" as the answer to Kant's "Morals." Kervegan rightly stresses Hegel's interest in the political conditions of moral subjectivity. He does not, however, dwell on this political dimensions of the "Morality" section in PhR. Instead, he expounds Hegel's ethical theory as combining deontology and virtue-ethics. Chapter 12 interprets the subjective dimensions of objective spirit--mainly "recognition" and "work"--based on "normativist" and "institutionalist" readings of Sittlichkeit.
The epilogue examines the role of "passion" (understood first as interest-particularism, then as existential suffering) in Objective Spirit. Main themes are the antagonism of private and universal interest, and Objective Spirit's inadequacy to reconcile these. This epilogue announces future venues of research: Kervegan "suspects" that an essential (albeit implicit) connotation of Hegel's concept of the Concept is "a passion of the concept, a suffering of the idea."--Allegra de Laurentiis, Stony Brook University
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|Author:||de Laurentiis, Allegra|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Dec 1, 2019|
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