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Justice and argument: toward development of a dialogical argumentation theory.

Everywhere, these days, one hears the call for dialogue. In the public domain, for instance, the Ford Foundation recently called for "difficult dialogue" initiatives from colleges and universities, and organizations like the Public Conversation Project and Public Dialogue Consortium work with civic organizations and groups to encourage dialogue among Americans on the polarizing issues of the day (see, for instance, Becker, et al., 1995; Chasin and Herzig, 1993; Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997; as well as\ and\). In the academy, the foundational work of Martin Buber, Mikhail Bakhtin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jurgen Habermas has had an impact on scholarship in many fields, including literature, philosophy, psychology, theology, communication studies, and social criticism. There is, suggest Anderson, Baxter, and Cissna (2004, p. 2), a conceptual turn toward dialogue.

For some this interest in dialogue may appear to be a fad. However, there is a tradition in argumentation and rhetorical studies which has repeatedly pointed to the importance of a dichotomy between monological, or functional/instrumental communication, and dialogical communication. In his essay, "The Limits of Rhetoric" (1965a), philosopher Maurice Natanson argued that even though Aristotle related rhetoric to dialectic and ethics, Aristotle's focus on the modes of persuasion led to "a misleading emphasis on rhetorical technique and to a lack of emphasis on the theoretical aspects of rhetoric" (p. 95). For Natanson, the ultimate consequence of this emphasis on technique has been a perception that rhetoric is functional or instrumental in character (see Czubaroff, 2000, on the rhetoric, dialectic, dialogic nexus).

His own studies of argumentation led Natanson (1965b) to recognize an interpersonal and existential dimension in argument. Thus, he noted that the arguer is always situated in the presence of another (p. 10), and that genuine argument entails risk to the particularity of the self (pp. 15-16). However, Clark (1976) comments that Natanson remained interested in argumentation as a cognitive and logical enterprise, and so failed to explore the relational orientations identified by Martin Buber (1970) as I-It and I-You. In differing ways, Ehninger's (1970) and Brockriede's (1972) theoretical work acknowledged a relational tradition in communication, and both, citing Buber's classic distinction between I-It and I-You relations, made a fundamental distinction between unilateral/instrumental and bilateral/personal argumentation. More recently David Gilbert (2003), noting that Brockriede's essay is part of a larger conversation within our field about Plato's Phaedrus, suggests that the relational tradition in argumentation studies has an ethical impetus. That is, he argues that recognition of the relational character of arguing enables researchers to distinguish manipulative communication from communication that entails genuine self-risk and a respect for others (p. 15). (1) Finally, writing from outside the argumentation and rhetorical perspectives, communication scholar Carl Botan (1997) confirms the importance of the relational dimension to communication when he comments, "the ethicality of strategic communication can be analyzed not so much in terms of its content as its process-the relationship it assumes or enforces between the involved parties-and the attitudes and values this reflects" (p. 190). Botan not only confirms the connection between process, relationship, and ethics assumed by Ehninger and Brockriede, he also recognizes that the fundamental choice of orientation is between a monological and dialogical attitude (see pp. 190-192).

The recent theoretical work of Josina M. Makau and Debian L. Marty (2001) in Cooperative Argumentation, and James Crosswhite (1996) in The Rhetoric of Reason contributes to this relational tradition in argumentation studies by elaborating elements of a dialogical argumentation model to be distinguished from competitive and adversarial models. While their work introduces central concepts of a theory of dialogical argument, neither explicitly or systematically elaborates on the interpersonal, relational dimension of argument and neither explicitly grounds its ethical character on this relational dimension. Fortunately, the contextual theory and therapy model of Ivan Boszormenyi-Nagy and his associates based on Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue has much to offer in this respect (see, Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986; Boszormenyi-Nagy, 1986; Boszormenyi-Nagy, et al., 1991; and Friedman, 1989, 1998).

I argue below that the emerging dialogical argumentation theory found in the work of Makau and Marty and Crosswhite shares substantial premises about human relating and dialogue with contextual theory, and that contextual theory further elaborates the concepts and premises in that theory. In light of these findings, I argue, further, that the model of dialogue developed here casts in clearer relief the monological model of persuasion that has tended to be dominant in our field and clarifies the central importance of the monologue-dialogue dichotomy in argumentation and rhetorical studies.


Makau and Marty's theory of cooperative argumentation and Crosswhite's theory of the dialogical nature of genuine argument, together enable the dialogue theorist to identify a cluster of premises and concepts central to the emerging theory of dialogical argumentation. In particular, these theorists argue that the twin ontic realities of difference and profound interdependence among human beings call for reciprocity and fairness if conflicts are to be addressed and social relations are to be stable. Both argue that dialogical argumentation (rather than competitive, monologic argumentation) is the means for achieving reciprocity and fairness, and that dialogical argument at its heart involves a process of claiming and critical questioning as well as a tensional capacity Makau and Marty call "balanced partiality" (p. 56). Finally, they elaborate variations on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's concept of the universal audience to explain how arguments are judged by audiences. An examination of the core concepts and premises of the model of dialogical argument that emerges from these two works is in order.

Makau and Marty ground their theory of cooperative or dialogical argumentation on a theoretical contrast between competitive and cooperative modes of argumentation. For them, the central goal of cooperative argumentation is the building of constructive deliberative communities that are able to make reasonable and fair decisions through the give and take of "ethical and effective" argument, i.e., dialogic argument (p. 45). This goal is undermined by competitive argumentation praxis and enabled by cooperative argumentation praxis. Cooperative arguers experience that they are positively interdependent, that is, dependent upon each other for their well-being and for the generation of meaning (p. 88). Because human beings depend upon each other, successful social life entails commitment to a fair reciprocity in which "'supporting the good of the other leads to self-benefit'" (p. 91).

One obvious criticism made of cooperative argumentation theory is that it has little guidance to offer if one's partners are competitive and inclined toward unilateral argumentation and other forms of manipulative influence, without regard for fairness to others. This critical point, at the heart of much opposition to dialogue studies, raises the question of just how pervasive the competitive, power orientation is in public and private deliberations, and whether, in the long run, trusting human relations are, or are not, essential to stable, enduring human community. In response to those who argue that competitive power permeates society, Makau and Marty emphasize the limits of adversarial, monological advocacy: it fails to resolve conflicts adequately and instead generates the next conflict because the monologic advocate's unilateral standards of success fail to satisfy anyone but him- or herself (pp. 197-8).

Drawing on the work of Quaker mediator Mike Yarrow, Makau and Marty advocate an attitude of "balanced partiality" as a means of actualizing commitment to fair reciprocity when persons in interdependent relations are in conflict. The attitude of balanced partiality, a dialogic tensional stance, has two movements. It requires, on the one hand, that in a given conflict situation we acknowledge our own points of view, and, on the other hand, commit to fair (that is, equitable) consideration of others' points of view and interests as we work out our conflicts and differences (p. 203). This concept resonates with that argumentation tradition which preferences bilateral argument to unilateral argument (see, for instance, Ehninger's discussion of a "posture of restrained partisanship," 1970, p. 104; Brockriede's attitude of lovers, 1972; and Natanson, 1965). Makau and Marty claim that experiences of openness and fairness in a relationship with another lead one to trust that partner, and that trust in the other's fairness is the basis for a willingness to engage in further dialogue over differences (p. 56).

Makau and Marty propose that an advocate develop a "deliberation log," a brief-type document intended to help the advocate describe the multiple positions in a controversy, including all the issues, commonplaces, definitions, claims, values and support associated with each side (pp. 206-223). A "reflective questions" section of the deliberation log seeks to situate the argumentation content in the relevant communication context, and includes questions about the relations between the persons involved (especially the advocate and audience). Reflective questions revolve around issues of standpoint, power, and perspective, and include, "What identifies, roles, or status are relevant factors in the decision-making process? Are there historical or political relations of power shaping the decision-making dynamics? How might individuals' perspectives be informed by their standpoints and by their particular relationships with other standpoints and views?" In addition to these questions relating to standpoint and power, are questions relating to consequences and fairness: "How are members of the deliberative community determining the actual effects of a decision in the lives of those affected?" And, "have they constructed a means of accountability for responding to critique and unintended consequences-both positive and negative--that allows for continued responsible action?" (see, p. 223). Makau and Marty thus identify the communication context as an important element in argumentation. Contextual theory, as we will see, places the context center stage.

Given their aim to write a practical argumentation text, Makau and Marty also do not theoretically explore the relational dynamic between commitment to attitudes of openness and fairness in relationships and the development of trust and dialogue, something contextual theorists do. Makau and Marry do, however, identify emotional orientations, communication and argumentation skills crucial to realizing cooperative argumentation and its core attitude of balanced partiality: critical thinking and questioning, self-awareness, empathy and moral imagination, non-defensive communication, and attentive listening. These emotional, argumentation, and communication skills, together enable individuals to achieve honest and open advocacy, responsible listening, and critical reasoning (see chapter 2, and pp. 104-105).

Rather than being grounded on the interdependence thesis identified by Makau and Marty, Crosswhite's rhetoric of reason is based upon an ethical preference for dialogical argument as a non-violent, non-aggressive, reasoned approach to social conflict. Crosswhite theorizes that fundamental differences and thus conflicts are inherent to human existence, and notes that differences become problematic only when choice is required (pp. 36-7). Argumentation, founded on a respect for persons' differing "disclosures" of the world (p. 190), provides a reliable means of testing these disclosures through claiming, questioning the claims, and responding with clarification, support, qualification, or modification of the claims (p. 202). Within a pragmatic-ethical framework, Crosswhite contributes to the emerging dialogical argumentation theory a speech acts analysis of the dialogical core of argument: claiming, questioning and judging. He also further elaborates on the human relational situation that generates a call for dialogue and elaborates on the nature of the core dialogic response Makau and Marty term an attitude of "balanced partiality."

A pragmatic rhetoric of reason, argues Crosswhite, "does not, like logic, objectify claims as propositions or, like psychology, objectify claiming as the behavior of an objectified subject. Instead, it conceives of [logical] propositions as reified, context-stripped abstractions from claims, and claiming as an activity in which selves come to be, an activity in which agents take shape" (p. 54). Human living entails claiming. Indeed, we are claimed by one another ontically before specific claims are made (p. 68). Unlike abstract logical propositions, a claim is a speech action that has motives (p. 54), it is "a claim on someone-not a claim that something' (p. 60). A claim presumes different disclosures of the world and calls its addressee to change of belief or action (p. 136). Crosswhite's theory of claiming highlights the connection between claiming and conflict by noting that when a claimant addresses a partner she or he initiates a conflict between them. The conflict which is initiated is not one between abstract propositions, but between disclosures of the world which may be incompatible with each other, for, at the deepest level, conflicting claims open up incompatible ways of being (p. 109, 189). Other speech acts than claim-making are possible between two persons with different disclosures of the world. Instead of making a claim on another's assent and permitting the other the opportunity to respond and hold us accountable to his or her response, we may insist, command, demand, or impose-all monologic options.

When we make a claim on someone we initiate an ethical relationship with that person in which to some degree we subordinate ourselves to the partner and the response s/he makes (p. 55-56). Subordination to the partner's response occurs because inherent in claim-making is not only the expectation that the other will recognize our claim on his/her assent, but the understanding that in addressing a claim to the partner we invite and indicate a willingness to be accountable to the partner's questioning, critical response, or possible counter-claim. Crosswhite identifies a number of ways people may respond to being claimed by others besides entering into dialogic argument. They may, for example, ignore or resist being claimed by changing the subject, by quickly deferring to the claim, by not listening, or by not taking the claim seriously. To pay attention to a claim and even to question it, is, argues Crosswhite, "to regard either one's interlocutor or one's audience (as well as oneself) with a measure of respect ... or trust, or love" (p. 96). Claims are thus inherently relational and questionable, and addressing a claim to someone holds us accountable to the other's response (p. 87).

One of Crosswhite's most interesting points in his theory of claiming is the observation that all explicit claims implicitly preference background cultural and group (i.e., ideological) commitments to forms of life, values and purposes, and specific communication competences (pp. 41-43), as well as carry with them "covert" or "underlying" relational and process convictions (pp. 112-113). For this reason, we must always ask even about explicit claims made, what the conflict or argument is really about and who are the real parties to the conflict. Crosswhite, then, like Makau and Marty, notes the importance of the relational context within which argument occurs.

Claiming and questioning responses to claims, according to Crosswhite, are at the heart of our social being (p. 64), and, ultimately, enable peaceful resolution of conflicts, personal growth, inquiry, and learning (p. 47). In response to those who might take the claiming-questioning way of being for granted, Crosswhite reminds us that persons frequently refuse to reason with those with whom they disagree. He notes that Levinas traces that refusal to "indifference," the "counter-concept" to responsibility, and explains this indifference in terms of a failure to experience the transcendence of the other, the other's "irreducible selfhood" (pp. 70-71). Closely linked to the inability or refusal to experience the transcendence of another is an indifference to fairness and justice in one's relation with the other. Going beyond Makau and Marty's analysis of the causes for the failure of dialogue (lack of time, fear of change, commitment to competitiveness, pp. 101, 104), Crosswhite, following Levinas, traces the central cause, self-centered indifference to fairness, to an individual's relational history of "proximity" to others who have hurt or betrayed the person, resulting in distrust and resentment and incapacity for fairness in her or his future relations (pp. 67). Contextual theory concurs with this analysis (see, Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986, chapter 7).

As noted, for Crosswhite, arguing is not only a pragmatic activity, it is also an ethical activity. Following Perelman (1967), argumentation and justice are linked as similar kinds of process because at the heart of both is the requirement that entities which are the same must be treated in the same way (p. 36; Perelman, 1967). Not only is argumentation a non-violent procedure for dealing with conflict over difference, its goal is "to achieve justice in sorting out the ways in which we affect (and effect) one another" (Crosswhite, 1996, p. 70). For Crosswhite, then, dialogical argumentation is a just way to achieve just judgments. He claims that his, Perelman's, and Levinas' accounts of reasoning are similar in that each links justice to reasoning. In fact, for Crosswhite, argumentation is first and foremost a " justice-preserving" rather than "truth-preserving" activity. He argues, "as a cognitive term, 'truth' must be derived from an ethical term, 'justice.' Again, such an approach will take us worlds away from the logic- and truth-based theories.... A rhetoric of reason which conceives of reason as grounded in ethical realities rather than logical ones may prove much more helpful in guiding our actions" (p. 70). A practical consequence of his pragmatic-ethical theory of argument and reason is that, in addition to cultivating critical thinking, educators need to help their students develop moral imagination, that is, an ability to recognize the otherness of the other, and compassion, that is, willingness to take responsibility for the other (p. 71). These ethical abilities clearly encourage the central attitude of balanced partiality identified by Makau and Marty.

We see, then, that the emerging dialogical argumentation theory is grounded on theses about difference, conflict, and interdependence and identifies an activity of claiming and critical responding to that claiming. Finally, the activity of dialogical argument calls for adjudication of an argument exchange by the judging audience. Makau and Marty and Crosswhite recognize that judging arguments requires norms, rules, or criteria to which arguers may appeal and to which they will be held accountable by their audiences. But what criteria and standards are authoritative, if no universal logical standards for evaluating practical arguments are available? Makan and Marty acknowledge a role for standard logical norms (e.g., acceptable premises, internal consistency, structural coherence), and in addition propose democratic process rifles and reliance on an ideal audience, the "composite deliberative community." Important democratic process norms mentioned are inclusion in the argument exchange of everyone affected by the decision; free and open exchange of information and reasons; and substantial political equality for the arguers, including equal opportunity to identify issues and agendas and participate in deliberation and decision-making (pp. 100, 124-127, 170).

Like the above democratic norms, Makau and Marty's "composite deliberative community" performs both an ideal and practical function for persons committed to dialogical argument. This community is composed of individuals who rely on critical thinking skills and are committed to fairness and equity (pp. 170, 246) and to such "cross-cultural" values as compassion, respect, tolerance, and dignity (p. 125). Argumentation which convinces the composite deliberative community is likely to be experienced as ethical and effective by any particular argument partner. In their ideal-audience analysis Makan and Marty and Crosswhite concur. Makau and Marty, however, seem to conclude that dialogical argumentation is not only the most ethical argumentation in a conflict situation, it is the most effective. One wonders, however, if this claim for effectiveness holds. It seems at least possible that an effort at dialogical argument will not be effective with an advocate who is bent on winning and has no concern for fairness to his or her partner.

To the question of how arguers in a particular relational context are to decide which claims and reasons are better justified if there are no absolute, universal logical standards or criteria of fairness to appeal to, Crosswhite proposes an audience-based theory in which the strength of an argument is determined by the audience(s) it is practically able to convince (p. 136). While the audience that is called to judge a claim and its justifications is, finally, those upon whom the claimant is making his or her claim (p. 137), Crosswhite acknowledges that audiences may differ significantly in their standards of judgment, and that claimants can always find an audience for whom a particular argument is persuasive (p. 139). To deal with these realities, audiences themselves must be judged in terms of what they are willing to assent to and in terms of the "quality of the lives such people would lead" (p. 139). Like Makau and Marty, Crosswhite opts for an ideal or "paragon" audience which embodies the critical thinking and ethical norms of the encompassing argument community (or communities), but concludes (following Perelman), that since all ideal/paragon audience constructs are themselves socially constructed and contingent, they must be held open to reassessment by the "undefined universal audience," an audience that is "never grasped directly, but only indirectly-often in feelings, inclinations, reservations, hopes, and hunches" (p. 151,153; also see, Arthos, 2004; Perelman, 1967; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 35). In situations of disagreement among arguers about the adjudicating ideal or paragon audience, we must postpone argumentation until, through exploratory dialogue, question and answer, "we come to a deeper mutual understanding and uncover agreements that can allow us to continue the argumentation" (p. 146). While analysis in terms of the universal audience has conceptual appeal, to the argumentation practitioner it may feel abstract. What is the practical implication? Contextual theory gives some more guidance.


We see, then, that for Crosswhite, Makau and Marty arguing occurs in a social context of difference, interdependence and conflict. The heart of dialogical arguing is the movement of claiming and critical responding, followed by judgment, choice and action. Makau and Marty's attitude of "balanced partiality" is comparable to Crosswhite's attitude of responsibility (in contrast to the attitude of indifference)-where both attitudes refer to a tensional stance in which partners acknowledge their own points of view and commit to fair consideration of others' points of view. Finally, grounding dialogical argument in a fundamental concern for fairness and justice, Makkau and Marty and Crosswhite rely upon audience-based theories for the identification of which claims in a conflict are most justified, thereby recognizing the inherently contextual nature of justice concerns.

Contextual theory, based on Martin Buber's relational theory, contributes to this dialogical argumentation theory in four ways. First, it explicitly elaborates and makes central a concept of the relational-ethical context within which arguing occurs. Second, while being consistent with Crosswhite's speech act analysis of dialogical argument, contextual theory extends the analysis of the two basic acts of claiming and questioning. Further, and third, contextual theory grounds the attitude of responsibility (or, balanced partiality) in an analysis of the trust-distrust dynamic identified by Crosswhite, Makau and Marty. Fourth and finally, contextual theory offers an analysis of the evaluation of arguments which contributes the more concrete and practical concept of "relational tribunals" and counters the concept of universal audience with Buber's concept of the just human order, a concept which clearly subsumes the truth- preserving function of argument under the justice-preserving function.

Contextual theory's central concept is "context," a rich term which refers to the "dynamic and ethical interconnectedness-past, present, and future-that exists among people whose very being has significance for each other" (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986, p. 8). A relational context is multilateral and ethical in the consequentialist sense, and includes, as Grunebaum (1990) notes, not only the immediate interacting partners, but all who may be significantly affected by the issues and questions at stake in their interacting (p. 14). Human relationships have four dimensions: factual, psychological, systemic-transactional, and ethical. The factual dimension of relationships includes concrete facts of the involved persons, for example, their biology, ethnicity, biography, and history of relating. The psychological dimension concerns the individuals' personal life goals, motivations, and cognitive-affective traits, while the systems-transactional dimension (the dimension communication theorists are especially familiar with) includes structures and patterns of behavioral and verbal interaction between the relating partners, including their relational roles, power alignments, and communication patterns. In a theoretically powerful insight, Boszormenyi-Nagy and Krasner (1986) identify a fourth ethical dimension to relationships and relational contexts, a dimension concerned with intentions, choices, actions, and consequences. Because a relating partner's expectations, decisions, and actions affect all the persons who are significantly related to her or him (p. 8), persons in relation constitute ethical contexts and their decisions and actions are inherently moral (p. 37). Thus, people are not just connected by blood or interaction, they are connected by the consequences of their actions (p. 8), and wherever there are consequences, there is potential ethical responsibility (Boszomenyi-Nagy & Krasnet, 1986, pp. 32, 67).

A further aspect of the ethical dimension of relationships beyond their consequential nature is the fact that in every relational context persons have existential and earned "entitlements" (rights) and obligations to each other (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, p. 36). As with the possible consequences of our choices and actions in relation, so entitlements and obligations in relationships need to be clarified and negotiated. Unlike existential entitlements which each person has as a human being (e.g., the fight to thrive biologically, the right to psychological integrity), our participation in social and institutional contexts entails role-related norms and expectations, which we may experience as earned rights and obligations in our interactions with each other. For instance, when professors carefully prepare for a course, and are fair in dealing with their students, they feel entitled to their students' respect, effort, and honesty in return.

Contextual theory's central goal, in the face of inevitable conflicts of multiple, often individually reasonable and valid expectations, rights, and obligations, is to elicit fair multilateral dialogue, that is, to elicit the claiming, justifying, and negotiating of differing claims among all significantly implicated persons (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, p. 32). In this conception of dialogic process, contextual theory contributes to contemporary dialogical argumentation theory by deepening the analysis of what is involved in claiming and critical questioning.

Contextual theory, like Crosswhite's dialogical argumentation theory which focuses on the speech acts of claiming and questioning, identifies a two-fold communication process at the heart of dialogue, namely an on-going reciprocal process of mutual assertiveness or "self-delineation" and giving "due consideration" to others' claims (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986, pp. 75-81; Boszormenyi-Nagy, et al., 1991, pp. 203-4). The contextual concept of self-delineation, however, broadens Crosswhite's analysis of claiming by including not only disclosures of beliefs about the world, but also relational claims, for instance, claims about identity, relationship definition, process, and boundaries, relational rights and responsibilities. Schreck (2005a) explains, "As in good systems theory, I can't know myself on an island. I know myself in relationships. It's on the basis of self-delineation that I know even what claims I can make and which ones I'm entitled to and who I am, my limits and my boundaries, and everything else that comes with that ... it is not just my claim-making, it's also understanding myself in the context of your claims." Contextual theory's focus on self-delineation claims is understandable in light of its therapeutic agenda. Interestingly, its analysis also clarifies what Crosswhite means when he says "selves come to be" in dialogical argumentation, be it personal, professional, or civic selves. The analysis also clarifies, I believe, one category of covert conflict often implicit in many overt conflicts about ideas and policies, namely, relational conflicts and claims about who has credibility, status and authority with whom, who may speak and who should listen, who may question whom and what people owe each other, whether as professionals, citizens, or family members.

Self-delineation in the context of each relationship is a foundational task of advocacy and calls for clarity and courage, for authentic claiming can be a risky, demanding interpersonal task. Not infrequently, note contextual counselors, we refuse to acknowledge the ethical dimension of our relations and evade the personal challenge of self-delineation, engaging in ethically "stagnant" actions (that is, actions that lack personal integrity) because we fear making the claims in situations or relations which we feel entitled to make (Boszormenyi-Nagy, et al., 1991, p. 210). Comments Buber scholar Maurice Friedman (1989), "It takes a life time to learn to meet others and to hold your ground when you meet them" (p. 404).

An example of self-delineation may help to clarify the general significance of this relational-ethical analysis. Each semester that I teach the departmental core Communication Theory and Research course, I begin the semester with an exercise intended to awaken my students to the relational and ethical context constituted in our college classroom. Specifically, I ask them to list in three columns answers to the following three questions about our roles, entitlements, and obligations: What do you believe I, as your professor, owe you this semester; what do you believe you, as a student, owe me; and what do you believe you owe each other as fellow students? I note that I already have completed the exercise from my own point of view. Once they complete their charts, we discuss and negotiate in as much detail as they and/or I wish our needs, beliefs, and expectations of each other in our roles for the semester.

Lists can be remarkably detailed and highlight what is often left implicit at the relational heart of education. Students typically expect me to be on time and prepared for class, to grade their work fairly, to be respectful, to listen patiently and acknowledge their right to say what they really think (to mention some major expectations). They believe they owe me and each other to be prepared regularly, to participate, to be respectful of and listen to each other even if they don't agree, to come to class on time, and to be fair and honest (e.g., don't cheat), both with me and with each other. While the lists generated in my classes are never quite the same, they are remarkably similar. Each semester I draw up a list of the specific points made and distribute the list to the class, noting that it captures many of the expectations, rights and responsibilities we have acknowledged between ourselves. In short, the lists clarify the ethical dimension of our relationship, since there are consequences for each side if the other fails to live up to the listed expectations.

An interesting exchange occurred in a recent section of this course during the first day of the class. Exhibiting more than typical clarity and taking a risk, one sophomore said he felt I should be sure not to focus just on topics and theories I liked, but should cover "all the important theories in communication without being biased!" A degree of tense interest arose in the classroom when he made his point and I fell silent, realizing this was an expectation counter to my own beliefs about knowledge, and my perceived interests as a professor. Finally, I said I was pretty sure that I could not cover "all the important communication theories" in the 15 weeks of class that semester, and that one of the incentives to me for teaching was the opportunity to focus to some degree on topics and theories that I felt were particularly important. After describing my position, I asked him if he would be satisfied if I made an effort to acknowledge those areas not covered as well as my biases. For this student, this was acceptable. However, I can imagine scenarios in which this would not have been enough to satisfy the student. Obviously, this student moved beyond "stagnant seeming" and took a calculated risk on the first day of class, for, in our asymmetrical relation there was always the possibility that I might be displeased and penalize him in some way (see Boszormenyi-Nagy, et al., 1991, p. 210, Buber, 1965a, pp. 75-78; on the difference between symmetrical and asymmetrical relations, see Buber, 1958/2000, Appendix, and Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986, chapter 7).

The relational dynamics of positively interdependent systems require that when we have had an opportunity to assert claims for fair consideration, our partner, in turn, deserves to make claims and has a fight to expect that we will be reciprocally receptive and caring in response to their claiming. For contextual theory, indebtedness or the obligation to give care, and entitlement to concrete acts of caring, are factual relational realities, regardless of whether they are acknowledged in a specific relationship (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986, pp. 36-7). Contextual theory's concept of giving fair consideration to the other's claim is consistent with Crosswhite's analysis of questioning in that it includes such things as the arguer being willing to listen to and be accountable for a responsible response to the partner's claims (perhaps in the form of a question or appropriate counter-claim, as Crosswhite notes). The concept goes beyond Crosswhite's analysis, however, in including a willingness to credit the efforts at fairness shown by the others toward us, for example, crediting their willingness to listen and respond responsibly to our points of view, crediting their open commitment to fair relational outcomes, and, crediting their willingness to take responsibility for the consequences of their past actions (see, Grunebaum, 1990, p. 212; Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986, p. 59). When we credit a partner in these ways, we function in that tensional stance which sees the other's side. When a person listens, responds, and credits his/her partners in the above sorts of ways, following the principle of reciprocity, that person earns merit with the partner and is entitled to comparable efforts from the partner.

Central to Makau and Marty's dialogical argumentation theory and to contextual theory's case for fair multilateral dialogue is the concept of relational justice. While Makau and Marty regularly refer to relational integrity and relational justice (see, for example, p. 59), they do not offer explicit definitions. Boszormenyi-Nagy and Krasner (1986), on the other hand, describe relational justice as centrally concerned with people's effort and capacity to balance the two fundamental human actions of claiming and giving fair consideration to partners' counter-claims (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986, pp. 36-37). The attitude of fair multi-laterality, like Makau and Marty's balanced partiality, captures a tensional balance between asserting one's own side and hearing, considering and crediting the claims of others in a conflict context. Boszormenyi-Nagy and Krasner deepen the analysis of claiming and giving due consideration by arguing that, over time, if partners in relation do not experience a fair balance of claiming and giving due consideration between them, distrust by one (or some) of the persons involved is likely to result. Trust, as Buber (and Makau and Marty) insist, is essential for stable relation and community. I trust you, or find you trustworthy, when, in a situation of significant conflict, I perceive that you have not only your own interests, but my interests and welfare at heart, and will act to benefit us both fairly. Correlatively, I become increasingly distrustful and withholding if your actions and comments suggest to me that you do not care about my welfare. A foundational step toward this trust involves our communication, namely, whether I feel you are willing to let me speak and are genuinely willing to hear and consider what I say. Interestingly, Crosswhite's analysis, following Levinas, that persons who are indifferent to relational fairness and dialogue are typically indifferent as a consequence of a personal history of experienced unfairness, is confirmed by contextual theory which also traces much unbalanced, non-dialogic relating to the "destructive entitlement" felt by some persons who have experienced "unacknowledged and unrequited injustice" (Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986, p. 110). Such persons may have a difficult time either with making claims on others, or with hearing others' claims upon them. In light of Boszormenyi-Nagy and Krasner's claim that trustworthiness is the "glue of viable relationships," and that mistrust "unglues" relationships (p. 74-75), it is interesting to consider the impact on the educational relation of giving or withholding due consideration.

Reflection on the college classroom, again, provides an example. If, as an instructor, I ask my students what their role and process expectations are and provide a forum in the classroom for hearing their points of view and discussing differences in expectations between us, I engage them dialogically and hope that they will appreciate that that dialogic process is a sign of my commitment to relational fairness. Contextual theory contends that such a commitment is likely to build trust between us and entitle me to reciprocal goodwill and willingness to listen in return from my students. However, if, when my students and I conflict (as we did recently over whether they may bring laptops to class), I cite my authority as instructor and am not willing to provide a forum for their views and, instead, ignore, dismiss, or diminish their opposing views, thereby silencing them, I am likely to lose some of their trust and they will feel less obligation to me in return. This, in fact, is what occurred when I, under pressures of time and feeling great annoyance, unilaterally declared computers unwelcome in my current Communication Theory and Research class. While the asymmetrical nature of the student-teacher relation grants such authority to instructors, the fact remains that mutual expectations about education and individual rights and duties are also in play. To those who might ask, is the classroom and teaching relation an appropriate context for dialogical relation, I would ask, how else will dialogue be learned?

Finally, Makau and Marty and Crosswhite's audience-based theory of argument adjudication and resolution is confirmed and elaborated by contextual theory's identification and analysis of the tribunal function that is activated when persons in relation engage in argument. The activated "relational tribunal" which holds members of a relational context implicitly accountable is, according to contextual theory, an actual aspect or facet of human relational dynamics, and "not a forum separate from the aggregate relational intentions and actions of the participants," a "monitoring, recording and executive process" (Boszormenyi-Nagy, 1986, p. 207, 208-209). It is activated as relating partners take turns in disclosing themselves and making claims. In genuine dialogue, as one clearly states a claim which is genuinely considered and responded to by one's partners, one tends to modify and adjust one's claim and its justification, as do others with their claims until the partners come to a concluding judgment of the issues at hand. Referencing Buber's "tug-of-war" metaphor for such dialogical interaction, Friedman (1989) comments that selves come to be in this give and take or "tug of war" between selves (p. 406). Only when this relational tribunal traction fails to satisfy all the participants need other audiences become involved.

While seeing fairness as multilateral and contextual, Boszormenyi-Nagy and his associates recognize, as does Crosswhite, that even as the human desire for fairness is apparently universal, different groups or persons in relation (like different audiences) will have diverse definitions of relational fairness, with some being perceived as more fair than others, at least from some culturally normative points of view. Thus, contextual theorists do not leave final adjudication of what constitutes fairness (or justice) in a particular relational context to the participants-with no prospect for appeal (Boszormenyi-Nagy, et al., 1991). Rather, they regard all relations (and relational tribunals) as finally grounded in the encompassing order of human being and, as such, accountable to what Buber called "the just human order" (see, Friedman, 1989; Buber, 1965b, "Guilt and Guilt Feelings"). Friedman (1989) suggests that this ultimate tribunal may be understood as a "supra-individual regulatory force" that captures the common (that is, intersubjectively constituted) world humans have built together through speech (p. 406). However the just human order is conceptualized, it functions much as does Makau and Marty's composite deliberative community and Crosswhite's paragon and undefined universal audiences, though the concept of the just human order foregrounds the fundamental value of justice in a way that the concepts of deliberative, paragon, or universal audiences do not.

Boszormenyi-Nagy and Krasner hint at some of the dimensions of this just order when they argue that inclusive dialogue aimed at fairness resembles the democratic process (p. 197). In addition, Boszormenyi-Nagy has suggested that the ultimate interests of the just human order include quality of life, and survival of the species, that is, concern for the interests of posterity, our children and our children's children (Boszormenyi-Nagy, 1986, 203). Besides prioritizing the welfare of posterity, without which the human species may die off, contextual theory prioritizes, as do Makau and Marty, multilateral fairness in the relationships of contemporaries, without which relational trust is destroyed and human relations and community deteriorate (Boszormenyi-Nagy, 1986, p. 206).


In this study I have attempted to outline concepts and premises central to a dialogical argumentation theory. Dialogical arguing, according to this theory, occurs in relational contexts of difference and conflict, choice and consequence and requires relating partners to make an initial, ethically consequential choice between what Martin Buber termed monological/unilateral (I-It) or dialogical/multilateral (I-You) orientations toward their partners as they work through their conflicts. Fundamental to this relational ontology is a recognition that argumentation and persuasion, as modes of influence, are not only fundamentally relational, but ethical activities, as Figure 1 shows.

When we take a unilateral or monological orientation, we are so firmly committed to our own needs, ways of seeing the world, and purposes, that we are only able to relate to and treat our partners as objects, that is, in terms of how they may help or obstruct attainment of our goals. In the process, the others' independent interests and claims are eclipsed, disregarded, or dispatched. Instrumentally focused communication may be acceptable among persons who have agreed upon a goal and the means to its attainment, for example, military and surgical teams. However, in more problematic forms of monologue communicators recognize as valid only their points of view, are oblivious, indifferent, or aggressively antagonistic to other points of view, and are willing, overtly or covertly, to impose their will in order to get their way. The result is a communication and relational climate which is not safe, free, or respectful for all individuals. When it comes to their "availability," unilaterally disposed communicators may strategically withhold information about themselves and their points of view and/or fail to make themselves available to hear the others' sides, perhaps by failing to take the time to listen. They may also refuse to participate in forums where reasoned discussion and adjudication of claims are called for, or, if they do so, may take a competitive stance in which they are not concerned with fair accountability, but use situational rules strategically in order to dominate and win. In short, the monologist is unilateral, unavailable, and unaccountable in important ways. As the above analysis makes clear, the monologist's approach encourages relational distrust and diminution of real community.

On the other hand, when we approach a relational context with a bilateral or multilateral consciousness, we recognize that there are many persons or stakeholders involved in a concrete situation of choice and action, acknowledge each person's/stakeholder's right to a claim distinct from our own, and acknowledge that we cannot know, speak for, or summarize the other sides (see, Deetz, 1992). The others have the right and the responsibility to delineate their own sides and speak for themselves. Communicators' multilateral consciousness is powerfully signaled when they consistently tag their claims and assertions with markers of personal ownership and finitude, such as "I believe," "From my perspective," "I may be biased, but." A corollary to the multilateral orientation is respect for other claims as well as recognition of others' right to free (that is, non-constrained) speech and choice. (2)

When arguers have a genuinely bilateral or multilateral orientation to theft argument situation and partners, they make themselves available and accountable to their partners. Availability, on the one hand, is the challenge of authenticity, that is, owning and disclosing one's relevant beliefs, biases, hopes, and claims in the relational context. Availability, on the other hand, is other-focused and includes taking time, without preoccupation or distraction, to attend, listen carefully to, and duly consider and credit other sides. Finally, beyond the risky clarifying and stating of one's own claims and giving due consideration to others' claims, full availability includes a willingness to engage differences in constructive talk and argument. What finally enables bilateral arguing to be fair or just in relational contexts of conflict is the willingness to be held accountable for considering each others' claims in light of jointly (if implicitly) agreed upon norms and concepts of fairness. These standards may pertain to the argumentation process as well as to the substance of the contested claims (see Crosswhite, 1996, chapter 7 on the limits of argumentation).


This ethical understanding of monologic and dialogic relating, often captured by the competitive/collaborative dichotomy, has three implications for argumentation studies. First, recognition of the relational-ethical dimension of arguing has significance for how we view and approach divisive controversies occurring in the public and academy today. In addition, recognition of the "rhetorical situation" as a relational-ethical context has important implications for how advocates conceptualize their persuasive contexts and choices and suggests a new approach to criticism. Finally, the relational-ethical dimension of argument highlights the justice issues facing argumentation and persuasion practitioners.

Conflicts of Ideas in Public Contexts

If, as Crosswhite and Makau and Marty claim, arguments over ideas and policies presuppose covert background commitments, and, if, as Crosswhite urges, we acknowledge the importance of the justice-preserving function of argumentation, then we must work to clarify ideological commitments and relationship issues that do not normally surface in public argumentation. From the relational-ethical point of view, the importance of the contextual grounding of ideas is not a troubling deficit but an ontic reality of human difference and relationalism. The appropriate response to ideological disagreements is a search for a just consideration of ideas. A fully dialogical view of conflict of ideas and worldviews, then, might aim to make more explicit arguers' background commitments and covert relational conflicts by asking reflective questions regarding relationship and and power similar to those identified by Makau and Marty: for example, Who advocates the ideas to whom and what are the arguers' roles and powers relative to each other? Whose interests and well-being are involved and how? What are the consequences for public policy and individual living of each set of ideas? Questions such as these reveal covert claims regarding power and consequence underlying our ideas and cast a strong light on relational contexts in which authority is unquestioned and entrenched, including power relations in academic disciplines and research traditions. Consideration of ethical questions like these does not lead to an "anything goes" relativism but to responsible relationalism--a recognition that we are deeply embedded in political contexts and relational networks and responsible to each other for the implications and consequences of what we believe, say, and do.

From this point of view, public or scholarly conflicts over conflicting ideas, beliefs, and research programs (for example, over stem cell research, homosexuality, and theories of evolution and intelligent design) are understandably intense because of their implications for ideologies, and for individual and institutional roles and practices, relational entitlements and obligations. For instance, in the intelligent design debates, at stake are issues about what counts as science and decisions about whose research should be taken seriously by whom and whether and how people should acknowledge each other. Also at stake are issues about who will receive funding for pursuing what kinds of research with what goals, as well as issues about what will be taught by whom in which part of the curriculum, and about what teachers owe parents and students. At stake, in short, are different views of science, knowledge, education, and research as well as differing views of what people owe each other and deserve from each other.

Dialogical argumentation theory suggests that such conflicts are justly

or fairly handled by clarifying the multilateral context and making explicit the potential relational and ethical consequences for all the major stakeholders. When the American public is polarized on particular topics and cannot agree upon appropriate definitions, values, worldview frameworks and standards for judgment, the democratic public that wishes to maintain trustworthy community is left with majority rule where immediate decisions are needed and fair public dialogues where immediate decisions are not called for.

In acknowledging the relational-ethical context which encompasses or grounds conflicts of ideas and policy, we acknowledge argumentation in its justice-preserving as well as truth-preserving function, as Crosswhite noted (see Stern, 2002).

The Rhetorical Situation and Communication Criticism

In light of the general acknowledgment that all arguments are situated, one application of contextual theory's analysis of the dimensions of relationship is to the central concept of the rhetorical situation (see, Bitzer, 1968, 1980; Garret & Xiao, 1993; Hauser, 1986). Traditionally, the rhetorical situation is conceptualized from the would-be rhetor's point of view and includes an "exigency" (the realities or events which initiate the rhetor's concern), an audience composed of those persons capable of being motivated to mediate the change envisioned by the rhetor, and situational constraints that challenge and delimit the rhetor's discursive action. From the contextual point of view, rhetorical situations, because they involve persons in relation, are not only relational, they are multilateral and therefore ethical contexts. If current rhetorical theory were to conceive of the rhetorical situation as a multilateral relational-ethical context and acknowledge that rhetors may take a dialogic or monologic stance toward their contexts, two initial questions seldom asked would arise for the rhetor. First, "Who are the persons or parties who are significantly implicated in my communication context and what are their potential stakes? The answer to this question would include not only those persons who can help mediate change, but all those persons who may be significantly affected by the rhetor's claiming. Second, the ethically aware rhetor would ask, "Should I approach this situation with these others monologically or dialogically?"

Current rhetorical teaching tends to eclipse these ethical questions, preferencing, instead, a monological-instrumental relation between the rhetor and "empowered" audience in which the persuasive goal of the rhetor is taken as given. To the degree that an arguer uses the rhetorical situation concept and the resources of audience analysis as an aid in developing a persuasive message without considering what the other sides in the situation are or what the possible consequences of his or her rhetorical action on the relational context might be, to that degree, it seems to me, this concept is used monologically. An instrumental focus on strategies and intended effects is part of this orientation.

A more relationally-ethically attuned advocate, having identified the multiple sides in his or her communication context, would also ask, "Whose points of view, among the persons in my relational context, should I acknowledge and how?" "What are my forum options, and who may be heard and held accountable in each forum?" Finally, "Should I (or should I not) communicate in a forum in which others as well as myself are likely to be free to speak and be heard, and in which we will be available and held accountable to each other?" A relational-ethical approach mandates awareness of the multilaterality of rhetorical contexts and a self-conscious decision for monologic or dialogic relating. In keeping with Buber's fundamental dualism, this approach does not necessarily preference dialogue over monologue. As Stewart and Zediker (2000) explain, "Buber's philosophical anthropology was neither simply monologic nor simply dialogic but dualistic or polar, highlighting human reality as the continuous management of the tension between monologue and dialogue" (p. 227).

A communication critic who recognizes the possibility of monological and dialogical rhetorical relationships would attempt to reconstruct the relational-ethical context of an advocacy act, including a descriptively rich account of the multiple stakeholders and their interests and concerns and a detailing of the issues, claims and conflicts (as seen from the multiple sides) within the situation. Such a critic would also identify the forum options available to the advocate and discuss the degree to which the selected forum was inclusive or exclusive of those who are likely to be impacted by the action. The critic would also discuss whether the forum encouraged availability and accountability among all parties and whether the particular persuasion strategies relied upon by the arguer did the same. A central goal of relationally motivated criticism would be to explore when, why, and how monologue or dialogue has been preferenced, and with what relational and communal benefits and costs. Grounded on the dialogic-democratic ideal and its hope for stable community, the critical standards in this approach would evolve from the commitments to multilaterality, availability, and accountability.

The difficulty, from my point of view, of unconsciously privileging the monologic stance in rhetorical situations of choice and influence is that that unconscious privileging eclipses the inherently relational and therefore inherently ethical nature of rhetoric, and fails to reveal the possibility of a dialogical argumentation. Contemporary criticism of persuasive influence and efforts to develop cooperative argument and an invitational rhetoric seem focused on this critical deficiency in our concept of the rhetorical situation. While Gearhart (1979) questioned the integrity of the conscious intent to influence others, the essential question, perhaps, is not whether we intend to influence or persuade someone, but whether we proceed monologically or dialogically (also see Botan, 1997).

The problem with the rhetoric-as-persuasion tradition, then, is its tendency to privilege monological, unilateral power-based modes of influence and eclipse dialogical-multilateral modes of power and influence. What dialogue offers to counterbalance the abuses committed in the name of monological persuasion is multilaterality, availability, and accountability, a willingness to stand one's ground and grant the other that same right.

Justice in Argumentation Practice

The recognition that all communication is inherently relational because it occurs between persons in concrete contexts, coupled with contextual theory's recognition that all relationships have an ethical dimension, provides theoretical grounds for the claim that all forms of advocacy and claiming are inherently moral activities (see Arnett, 1990; Church & Wilbanks, 1986; Hess, 2001). But, how might we act upon this theoretical understanding in our textbooks and classrooms? The explicit teaching of the rhetorical situation as a multilateral relational-ethical context, I believe, would help. In particular, from this conceptual point of view, the advocacy situation may be discussed as a concrete situation which includes the would-be advocate and his or her claim as well as all the stakeholders who are potentially affected by the issue and the advocate's claim. From this point of view students may begin to appreciate that they must decide upon the claim to be made, the audience(s) to be addressed, the forum to be used, and the relational orientation to be taken toward their audience members and all the significant stakeholders in their communication contexts. Arnett and Hess identify such an approach to communication as "applied ethics" or "practical philosophy", which, they argue, should supplement a "skills" or "techniques" approach (Arnett, 1990, p. 16; Hess, 2001, p. 85). Notes Arnett, "Communication ethics assists us in combating the demagoguery of simply asking, 'Can it be done?' without the accompanying ethical question, 'Should it be done?' which is likely to generate debate" (p. 215).

Arnett and Hess further argue that the instrumental focus on techniques and effectiveness encourages serious ethical infractions, in part, because of the ethical vacuum permitted. In their chapter on ethics in their text for argumentation and forensics students, Church and Wilbanks (1986) confirm Hess and Arnett's ethical analysis and propose values for argumentation rooted in rhetorical tradition, democratic ideology, and the transactional (namely, structural and relational) concept of communication (pp. 253-59). A number of the principles they identify concur with dialogical argumentation's concern with fairness and democratic ideology, including a principle of acknowledgement of others, respect for multiple voices, and the search for forums which enable accountability. In fact, Church and Wilbanks make the connection between advocacy and fairness and justice explicit, concluding, "the intercollegiate debater--like any student of advocacy--should develop in [Karl] Wallace's words, 'the habit of justice.' The habit is based on respect for truth and accuracy and respect for fair dealing. Neither can be disassociated from communication in a free society'" (p. 266).


This paper concurs with Thomas Hollihan and Kevin Baaske (1994) who say the time has come to set aside "the assumption that rhetorical theory, argumentation, interpersonal communication, and persuasion are separate and unconnected subfields" (p. vi). As current research increasingly makes clear, all communication is inherently relational. Whenever we communicate, whether by formal argument, persuasion, or simple interpersonal contact, we do so monologically or dialogically, raising issues of power, reason, and relational justice. With a default often in place that favors instrumental and monological relating, those of us engaged in dialogue research have much to do as we work to claim a place for dialogical argumentation.


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(1) Steward and Zediker (9000) identify two traditions in dialogue studies, the descriptive and prescriptive. This paper, following Buber, is in the prescriptive tradition.

(2) Relevant to Buber's no imposing precondition for dialogue, Foss and Griffin (1995) cite commitment to "freedom", namely, each individual's power, fight, and responsibility to choose or decide what she or he will believe or do without external constraints. Their work on "invitational rhetoric" includes important insights into the components of a genuinely multilateral climate or orientation (p. 10-11). Charles T. Brown and Paul W. Keller (1994) also foreground freedom in their dialogic ethics. Also see Baker and Martinson, and Wallace.

Jeanine Czubaroff, Media and Communication Studies, Ursinus College. The author gratefully acknowledges G. Peter Schreck, Ph.D., Eastern University, for his contribution to this project. He brought contextual theory to her attention, helped her understand its theory and application, and reviewed several drafts of this paper. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jeanine Czubaroff, Department of Media and Communication Studies, Ursinus College, P.O. Box 1000, Collegeville, Pennsylvania 19426. E-mail:
Figure 1: Monological and dialogical relations.

Monological Relation                Dialogical Relation
(Power Context)                     (Ethical Context)

Unilateral Orientation              Multilateral Orientation
My side is the side that            I acknowledge and voice my
  should prevail;                     own point of view (voice
Other sides are immature              & ownership);
  or immoral, ignorant,             I acknowledge my relevant
  incompetent, or irrelevant;         limits and biases (finitude);

Therefore, I may dismiss, ignore,   I acknowledge others' right
  dominate, or vanquish the other     to differing points of view
  sides;                              and responsibility to speak
If necessary I may use my moral,      for themselves (respect);
  intellectual material, and/       I confirm our mutual right to free,
  or political powers to impose       informed choice (no imposing).
  my side.

Unavailable                         Available
I decline to be present:            I make myself present:
To disclose my own side fully;      To disclose my own side
To listen to the other's              (authenticity);
  side fully;                       To listen to & consider the
I limit my time to talk.              other's side (attitude of
                                      balanced partiality);
                                    I take necessary time to talk.

Not Responsible and Accountable     Responsible and Accountable
I am not willing to be              I am willing to reason
  accountable to processes or         bilaterally about the
  principles that run counter         issues or interests at stake;
  to my own goals                   I am willing to be held
                                      accountable to jointly agreed
                                      upon processes of
                                      decision-making and principles
                                      of judgment. (Relational
                                      tribunal and Just Human Order)
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Author:Czubaroff, Jeanine
Publication:Argumentation and Advocacy
Article Type:Report
Date:Jun 22, 2007
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