Journal Of Philosophy Vol. 102, No. 2, February 2005.
The paper develops a Hegelian approach to the evaluation of social reasons, reasons whose authority derives from norms of a plural subject. The Hegelian approach is contrasted along two dimensions with a Hobbesian approach, familiar from the work of David Gauthier. Where the Hobbesian requires that all social reasons are ultimately evaluated from an individual standpoint, the Hegelian approach allows social standpoints to play the fundamental evaluative role. Where the Hobbesian builds reasons out of ingredients to be found in an individual psyche that are thus essentially private, the Hegelian builds reasons out of principles of the will, which are essentially public and sharable. After drawing the contrasts, the author of this paper defends the Hegelian approach against some Hobbesian objections and points to further work that needs to be done in order fully to develop the Hegelian approach.
Toward a Projectivist Account of Color, EDWARD WILSON AVERILL
Color objectivism holds that the colors we visually attribute to objects are vision-independent properties (color realism) and that our perceptual representations of objects as colored are, in many cases, not only veridical but caused in a way that justifies the perceiver in believing that his visual representations are veridical. Using color variation arguments, this essay begins with a criticism of the objectivist theory of Alex Byrne and David Hilbert and goes on to set out a projectivist account that gives up their perceptual, but not their realist, assumption. The projectivism developed here explains how colors like red and green enter the visual system, and how the role they play in that system makes the objects we see, which are not colored, look colored. Surprisingly, the color properties we linguistically attribute to objects are not those we visually attribute to objects.
The Dif, KADRI VIHVELIN and TERRANCE TOMKOW
Common sense tells us that there is a moral difference between doing harm and merely allowing it, that killing is morally worse than letting die. But philosophers have found it hard to say what the difference is or why it matters morally. We offer an account of the difference and argue for its moral significance in the context of debates about euthanasia, abortion, and "Bad Samaritan" laws. Common sense moral theory emerges from this analysis as coherent, subtle, and inherently deontological. Understanding the difference between doing and allowing makes it possible to formulate a coherent alternative to consequentialism in ethics.
Wisdom and Perspective, VALERIE TIBERIUS
There are many experiences that can cause us to see life in a different way, to change our priorities or out" values, even if only temporarily. A brush with death, for example, can make us take the perspective of "living for the moment," from which simple pleasures seem much more important than career success or other long term achievements. Even those who have not been in such a threatening situation are likely to recognize the experience of a perspective shift. Major life events trigger shifts in perspective and minor shifts in our attention to values happen frequently. This paper argues that shifts in evaluative perspective are vital for living a prudentially good life and that this fact has important implications for how we conceive of practical wisdom.
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|Title Annotation:||PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS; metaphysical papers|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Sep 1, 2005|
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