Printer Friendly



It is widely accepted that doxa, which plays a major role in Plato's and Aristotle's epistemologies, is the ancient counterpart of belief. The authors argue against this consensus: doxa is not generic taking-to-be-true but instead something closer to mere opinion. We then show that Plato shows little sign of interest in the generic notion of belief; it is Aristotle who systematically develops that notion, under the rubric of hupolepsis (usually translated as "supposition"), a much overlooked notion that is central to his epistemology. The authors close by considering the significance of this development, outlining the shifts in epistemological concerns enabled by the birth of belief as a philosophical notion.

Ulrich of Strasburg (1225-1277) on Divine Univocal Causality, VICTOR M. SALAS

This article explores Ulrich of Strasburg's teaching on divine univocal causality and finds therein both a point of continuity and one of discontinuity with the Dominican philosophico-theological tradition he inherited from his master, Albert the Great. Albert also makes reference to divine univocal causality, but develops his own account within the larger framework of his doctrine of the analogia entis. In contrast, Ulrich retools the Aristotelian notions of "univocal" and "equivocal" in order to accommodate the pseudo-Dionysian metaphysical scheme of divine transcendence. Here, unlike his predecessor, Albert, and his confrere, Thomas Aquinas, Ulrich's metaphysical vision of creation focuses on the nothingness from which creatures have been drawn and the means whereby they are able to enter into a metaphysical community with God.

Between Atoms and Forms: Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics in Kenelm Digby, HAN THOMAS ADRIAENSSEN and SANDER DE BOER

Kenelm Digby is now best remembered for his attempt at reconciling Aristotelianism with the new philosophies of his time. In his Two Treatises of 1644, Digby argued that, while the notion of form has no place in natural philosophy, it remains indispensable in metaphysics. This division of labor has not received much attention, but the authors argue that it played an important role in Digby's thought. The notion of form is central to his account of bodily identity over time, but by removing it from the domain of natural philosophy, he avoids some of the standard criticism of forms in authors like Descartes. In the final part of this paper, the authors turn to Digby's friend and follower, John Sergeant. They argue that, in Sergeant, we get an answer to the question of how the atomic parts out of which a body is built up relate to its form, which had remained open in Digby.

Reid on Conception and Object-Directedness: Moving Beyond the Framework of Intentionality, LAURA S. KEATING

In this paper, Keating argues that using the notion of intentionality to interpret Reid on conception and object-directedness misrepresents his views on both, and generates unnecessary interpretative puzzles about sensation and consciousness. Keating develops an alternative, consciousness-based, interpretation of his view of conception, object-directedness, his distinction between sensation and perception, and his overall mental taxonomy. This approach clarifies the continuity of his views of conception and sensation with those of the moderns, especially Locke and Descartes. It also makes clear how Reid uses his notion of object-directedness to save the moderns' claims about sensation while avoiding the theory of ideas.

Kant and Crusius on Causal Chains, MICHAEL OBERST

There are two rival models of how to interpret causal chains in Kant. Traditional event-event models take it that events are causes of events, which are in turn causes of other events. Watkins's causal powers interpretation, on the contrary, has it that substances have unchangeable grounds, and the series of events is only a series within the effect. By comparing Kant to Crusius, Oberst argues that, to some extent, both approaches can be combined. For the powers of substances are made active by other powers, but at the same time powers belong to the nature of a substance and are unchangeable. Moreover, noncausal properties that resemble Crusian existential grounds contribute to the effect as well. Finally, Oberst gives an account of the mereology of events by drawing on Kant's resolution of the Second Antinomy.

What Is Wrong with Blind Necessity? Schelling's Critique of Spinoza's Necessitarianism in the Freedom Essay, FRANZ KNAPPIK

Spinoza's necessitarianism--the doctrine that everything that is actual is necessary--is an important matter of debate in German idealism. Knappik examines Schelling's discussion of Spinoza's necessitarianism in his 1809 Freedom Essay and focus in particular on an objection that Schelling raises against this view, namely, that it has "blind necessity" govern the world. While Schelling draws on Leibniz's critique of Spinoza's necessitarianism in this context, he rejects the assumption of divine choice that stands behind Leibniz's version of the charge of blind necessity. Knappik develops an interpretation that shows both how Schelling consistently avoids necessitarianism despite denying divine choice, and how his own version of the charge of blind necessity offers objections against Spinoza's necessitarianism that focus on the issues of divine personhood and love.
COPYRIGHT 2019 Philosophy Education Society, Inc.
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2019 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Article Type:Author abstract
Date:Mar 1, 2019
Previous Article:THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY: Vol. 115, No. 12, December 2018.
Next Article:MIND: Vol. 128, No. 509, January 2019.

Terms of use | Privacy policy | Copyright © 2021 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters