JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: Vol. 57, No. 1, April 2019.
The principal part of the Arabic Plotinus that circulated under the name of the Theology of Aristotle consists largely in the translation and extensive adaptation of parts of Plotinus's works on psychology. Much of the adaptation of the Plotinian source material that we find in the Theology of Aristotle represents original philosophical work in a Neoplatonic paradigm. This article investigates the contributions that the Theology of Aristotle makes to theory of the imagination. The author argues that we can understand these contributions to be of three main kinds: the role of the imagination as mediator between the intelligible and sensible realms is enhanced; the activity of the imagination is represented as close to that of the intellect; and the imagination is associated with artistic creativity.
The Priority of Natures against the Identity of Indiscernibles: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Yahyab. 'Adi, and Avicenna on Genus as Matter, FEDOR BENEVICH
When one studies the history of universals in late antiquity and in the Arabic and Latin Middle Ages, the key notion is "nature." Natures are notions like "redness qua redness," which are neither universal nor particular in themselves, but are immanent either in universals, which exist only in the mind, or in extramental particulars. All recent studies agree that Alexander of Aphrodisias probably developed the idea of "nature." Then it travelled either directly or via the Baghdad Peripatetic Yahya b. 'AdT to Avicenna. From Avicenna, it was transmitted to thinkers of Latin scholasticism, for instance, Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. In this paper, the author shows that this historical reconstruction of the inheritance of the notion of nature neglects an important shift in the middle of the historical chain: natures are ontologically prior to their instances in Alexander and Ibn 'AdT, but posterior in Avicenna. This crucial difference will be shown on the basis of the parallel between (a) natures and universals, and (b) the material and generic aspects of common notions. Avicenna's reason for disagreeing with the previous tradition on this parallel was a concern regarding the compatibility of the priority of natures with the principle of the identity of indiscernibles.
Cartesian Holenmerism and Its Discontents: Or, on the "Dislocated" Relationship of Descartes's God to the Material World, EDWARD SLOWIK
This essay examines recent attempts to defend holenmerism, or the "whole in every part" doctrine, as the preferred view of God's relationship to the material world in the work of Descartes. By focusing on the interrelationship between space, matter, and immaterial entities in Cartesian philosophy, it demonstrates that the textual evidence not only fails to provide support for the holenmerist revival, but that holenmerism also runs counter to many of Descartes's concepts regarding space and bodily extension.
Du Chatelet on Freedom, Self-Motion, and Moral Necessity, JULIA JORATI
This paper explores the theory of freedom that Emilie du Chatelet advances in her essay "On Freedom." Using contemporary terminology, we can characterize this theory as a version of agent-causal compatibilism. More specifically, the theory has the following elements: (a) freedom consists in the power to act in accordance with one's choices, (b) freedom requires the ability to suspend desires and master passions, (c) freedom requires a power of self-motion in the agent, and (d) freedom is compatible with moral necessity but not with physical necessity. While these elements may at first appear disparate, the paper shows that they fit together quite well. The resulting theory is a surprising combination of doctrines that appear to be based on Samuel Clarke's libertarian account of free will and doctrines that are reminiscent of the compatibilist accounts of John Locke, Anthony Collins, Gottfried Leibniz, and Thomas Hobbes.
Kant and the Primacy of Judgment before the First Critique, PATRICK R. LELAND
Some claim that Kant's commitment to the explanatory priority of judgments over concepts is one of his most important contributions to the philosophy of mind. There is, however, extensive disagreement over the nature and extent of this commitment. Existing interpretations ignore a substantial body of textual evidence and offer no account of the origins of Kant's view. This paper corrects for these deficiencies. It explains, first, the relevant accounts of concept possession Kant encountered in the writings of his predecessors; and, second, how within this context he first expressed a commitment to the view that conceptual content is explanatorily dependent on acts of judgment. It then argues that Kant endorsed a second form of discursive primacy, namely, the view that every use of a concept in conscious thought about an object has the form of a judgment.
Shattering Presence: Being as Change, Time as the Sudden Instant in Heidegger's 1930-31 Seminar on Plato's Parmenides, FRANCISCO J. GONZALEZ
The importance of Plato for Martin Heidegger's interpretation of the history of metaphysics is now well known and documented. However, what is arguably his most radical interpretation of a Platonic dialogue, a 1930-31 seminar on the Parmenides, remains largely unknown and for two reasons. First, while Heidegger's notes were published in 2012 as part of the Gesamtausgabe (vol. 83), they are brief, cryptic, and cover barely half the seminar. We know this because a detailed and complete transcript is preserved in the Marcuse Archive in Frankfurt am Main, a transcript ignored by the editor of GA83 and not previously explored in significant detail. Second, Heidegger preserved a puzzling silence elsewhere about the seminar's findings (which undermine his narrative about the history of metaphysics). This paper seeks to reconstruct the argument of the seminar both for its insight into the special role played by the third hypothesis in the deductions of the second half of the Parmenides and for the light it sheds on Heidegger's unfinished Auseinandersetzung with Plato.
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|Title Annotation:||PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Jun 1, 2019|
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