Issues in homeland security policy for the 113th Congress.
John Frittelli, Specialist in Transportation Policy (email@example.com, 7-7033)
For more information, see CRS Report RL33512, Transportation Security: Issues for the 113th Congress.
On January 25, 2007, TSA and the Coast Guard issued a final rule implementing the TWIC at U.S. ports. (161) Longshoremen, port truck drivers, railroad workers, merchant mariners, and other workers at a port must apply for a TWIC card to obtain unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities or vessels. The card was authorized under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA, [section]102 of P.L. 107-295). Since October 2007, when TSA began issuing TWICs, about 2.3 million maritime workers have obtained a card. The card must be renewed every five years, so many workers must renew their cards for the first time.
TSA conducts a security threat assessment of each worker before issuing a card. The security threat assessment uses the same procedures and standards established by TSA for truck drivers carrying hazardous materials, including examination of the applicant's criminal history, immigration status, and possible links to terrorist activity to determine whether a worker poses a security threat. A worker pays a fee of about $130 that is intended to cover the cost of administering the cards. A worker must visit an enrollment site twice, once to apply for the card and provide biometric information and a second time to pick up the card and confirm identification with biometric information. (162)
The card uses biometric technology for positive identification. Terminal operators are to deploy card readers at the gates to their facilities, so that a worker's fingerprint template will be scanned each time he enters the port area and matched to the data on the card. However, despite a statutory deadline of 2009 for issuance of a final rule on card reader deployment, TSA has not yet determined what kind of card reader technology to require. (163) In the absence of card readers, the card is currently being used as a "flash pass," and the biometric data on the card are not being used to positively identify the worker.
In March 2013, the Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) (164) in which it proposed requiring card readers only for facilities or vessels handling dangerous bulk commodities (including barge fleeting areas) or facilities handling more than 1,000 passengers at a time--maritime sectors the Coast Guard considers to be of higher risk. The Coast Guard estimates that 38 U.S.-flag vessels and 352 facilities would be required to have card readers, which equates to about 0.3% of the vessels and 16% of the facilities it regulates under MTSA. Other vessels and facilities, including those handling containerized cargo, will continue to use the TWIC as a "flash pass," unless the Coast Guard amends the rulemaking at a future date. The comment period for the NPRM closed on June 20, 2013; the Coast Guard plans to take a year to review the comments. (165)
Recent GAO audits have been highly critical of how TWIC is being implemented. A 2013 audit found that the results of a pilot test of card readers should not be relied upon for developing regulations on card reader requirements because they were incomplete, inaccurate, and unreliable. (166) This audit was discussed at a hearing by the House Subcommittee on Government Operations on May 9, 2013, (167) and by the House Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security on June 18, 2013. (168) Another 2013 GAO audit examined TSA's Adjudication Center (which performs security threat assessments on TWIC applicants and other transportation workers) and recommended steps the agency could take to better measure the Center's performance. (169) A 2011 audit found internal control weaknesses in the enrollment, background checking, and use of the TWIC card at ports, which were said to undermine the effectiveness of the credential in screening out unqualified individuals from obtaining access to port facilities. (170)
Aviation Security-Homeland Security Research and Development
Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-7771)
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress took swift action to create the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), federalizing all airline passenger and baggage screening functions and deploying large numbers of armed air marshals on commercial passenger flights. Despite extensive focus on aviation security over the past decade, a number of challenges remain, including:
* Effectively screening passengers, baggage, and cargo for explosive threats;
* Developing effective risk-based methods for screening passengers and others with access to aircraft and sensitive areas;
* Exploiting available intelligence information and watchlists to identify individuals that pose potential threats to civil aviation;
* Developing effective strategies for addressing aircraft vulnerabilities to shoulder-fired missiles and other standoff weapons; and
* Addressing the potential security implications of unmanned aircraft operations in domestic airspace.
Explosives Screening Strategy for the Aviation Domain
Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy (email@example.com, 7-7771)
For additional information, see CRS Report R41515, Screening and Securing Air Cargo: Background and Issues for Congress, and CRS Report R42750, Airport Body Scanners: The Role of Advanced Imaging Technology in Airline Passenger Screening .
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, explosives screening in the aviation domain was limited in scope and focused on selective screening of checked baggage placed on international passenger flights. Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71) mandated 100% screening of all checked baggage placed on domestic passenger flights and on international passenger flights to and from the United States. In addition, the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) mandated the physical screening of all cargo placed on passenger flights. While TSA has met the requirement for cargo screening domestically, largely through implementation of its Certified Cargo Screening Program to oversee screening at off-airport shipping and consolidation facilities combined with supply chain security measures, additional work is needed to implement similar measures for U.S.-bound international flights. Although TSA has yet to fully implement 100% screening of cargo placed on international flights, recent attention has particularly focused on improving explosives screening of passengers in response to continued threats.
On December 25, 2009, a passenger attempted to detonate an explosive device concealed in his underwear aboard Northwest Airlines flight 253 during its approach to Detroit, MI. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility. Al-Qaeda and its various factions have maintained a particular interest in attacking U.S.-bound airliners. Since 9/11, Al-Qaeda has also been linked to the Richard Reid shoe bombing incident aboard American Airlines flight 63 en route from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001, a plot to bomb several trans-Atlantic flights departing the United Kingdom for North America in 2006, and the October 2010 plot to detonate explosives concealed in air cargo shipments bound for the United States. In response to the Northwest Airlines flight 253 incident, the Obama Administration accelerated deployment of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) whole body imaging (WBI) screening devices and other technologies at passenger screening checkpoints. This deployment responds to the 9/11 Commission recommendation to improve the detection of explosives on passengers. (171)
In addition to AIT, next generation screening technologies for airport screening checkpoints include advanced technology x-ray systems for screening carry-on baggage, bottled liquids scanners, cast and prosthesis imagers, shoe scanning devices, and portable explosives trace detection equipment. The use of AIT has raised a number of policy questions. Privacy advocates have objected to the intrusiveness of AIT, particularly if used for primary screening. (172) The screening of children, the elderly, and individuals with medical conditions and disabilities has been particularly contentious. Recent modifications to pat-down screening procedures, involving more detailed inspection of private areas, have also raised privacy concerns. (173) To allay privacy concerns, TSA required remote screening of images outside of public view and forbade recording or storage of AIT images. Other concerns about AIT included the amount of time it takes to screen passengers and the potential medical risks posed by backscatter x-ray systems, despite assurances that the radiation doses from screening are comparatively small. TSA has also begun implementing automated threat detection capabilities using automated targeting recognition (ATR) software that will eliminate the need for TSA screeners to view AIT-generated images. Because the contractor could not develop ATR software that would work with their AIT units, TSA terminated the contract in January 2013 and began to phase out use of backscatter AIT in favor of millimeter-wave scanning technology that is faster and more compatible with ATR. (174)
Some have advocated for risk-based use of AIT, in coordination with the risk-based approaches to passenger screening discussed below. Some past legislative proposals have specifically sought to prohibit the use of WBI technology for primary screening (see, e.g., H.R. 2200, 111th Congress), while others had sought to accelerate the deployment of ATR software and the phase-out of AIT systems not capable of automated threat detection (see H.R. 3011, 112th Congress).
Risk-Based Passenger Screening
Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-7771)
TSA has initiated a number of risk-based screening initiatives to focus its resources and apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk. Initiatives include a new trusted traveler trial program called PreCheck, modified screening procedures for children 12 and under, and a trial program for expedited screening of known flight crew and cabin crew members. Trial programs are also underway for modified screening of elderly passengers similar to those procedures put in place for children. These various trial programs may allow for improved screening efficiencies and potential cost savings.
A cornerstone of TSA's risk-based initiatives is the PreCheck program. PreCheck is TSA's latest version of a trusted traveler program that has been modeled after similar CBP programs including Global Entry, SENTRI, and NEXUS. It is currently available on a trial basis to members of those programs, frequent flyer program members of five major airlines, and, in some cases, to military service members, at a limited number of airports. Children 12 and younger traveling with PreCheck participants are also permitted to travel through the expedited screening lanes. A similar test program, called the Registered Traveler program, which involved private vendors that issued and scanned participants' biometric credentials, was scrapped by TSA in 2009 because it failed to show a demonstrable additional security benefit. Questions remain regarding whether PreCheck will be an effective tool to assist in directing security resources to unknown or elevated risk travelers while expediting the screening of program participant.
One potential concern raised over PreCheck implementation and expedited screening focuses on the public dissemination of instructions, posted on Internet sites, detailing how to read and decipher boarding passes to determine if a passenger has been selected for expedited screening. The lack of encryption has been cited as a potential security weakness that could be exploited to attempt to avoid detection of threat items by more extensive security measures. Other concerns raised over the program include the lack of biometric identity authentication and the lack of detailed background checks, particularly for participants who qualify for PreCheck solely on the basis of their frequent flyer status. (175)
In addition to passenger screening, TSA, in coordination with participating airlines and labor organizations representing airline pilots, has initiated a known crewmember program to expedite security screening of airline flight crews. (176) In July 2012, TSA expanded the program to include flight attendants. (177)
TSA has also developed a passenger behavior detection program to identify potential threats based on observed behavioral characteristics. In addition to employing observational techniques, TSA Behavior Detection Officers are field testing more extensive passenger interviews based on methods employed at Israeli airports. (178) Questions remain regarding the effectiveness of the behavioral detection program, and privacy advocates have cautioned that it could devolve into racial or ethnic profiling of passengers despite concerted efforts to focus solely on behaviors rather than individual passenger traits or characteristics. While TSA has proposed to increase the numbers of Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) by 72 to 3,131 in FY2013, the House Appropriations Committee did not support this increase, citing TSA's lack of clear evidence that BDOs provide protection against potential aviation security threats. The committee has called for a formal cost-benefit analysis of the BDO program along with a robust risk-based strategy for BDO deployment. (179)
The Use of Terrorist Watchlists in the Aviation Domain
Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy (email@example.com, 7-7771)
For additional information see CRS Report RL33645, Terrorist Watchlist Checks and Air Passenger Prescreening.
The failed bombing attempt of Northwest Airlines flight 253 on December 25, 2009, also raised policy questions regarding the effective use of terrorist watchlists and intelligence information to identify individuals that may pose a threat to aviation. Specific failings to include the bomber on either the no-fly or selectee list, despite intelligence information suggesting that he potentially posed a security threat, prompted reviews of the intelligence analysis and terrorist watchlisting processes. Adding to these concerns, on the evening of May 3, 2010, Faisal Shazad, a suspect in an attempted car bombing in New York's Times Square, was permitted to board an Emirates Airline flight to Dubai at the John F. Kennedy International airport, even though his name had been added to the no-fly list earlier in the day. He was subsequently identified, removed from the aircraft, and arrested after the airline forwarded the final passenger manifest to CBP's National Targeting Center just prior to departure. (180) Subsequently, TSA modified security directives to require airlines to check passenger names against the no-fly list within two hours of being electronically notified of an urgent update, instead of allowing 24 hours to recheck the list. The event also prompted calls to accelerate the ongoing transfer of watchlist checks from the airlines to the TSA under the Secure Flight program, a process which has now been completed. (181)
By the end of November 2010, DHS announced that 100% of passengers flying to or from U.S. airports are being vetted using the Secure Flight system. (182) Secure Flight continues the no-fly and selectee list practices of vetting passenger name records against a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). On international flights, Secure Flight operates in coordination with the use of watchlists by CBP's National Targeting Center-Passenger, which relies on the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and other tools to vet both inbound and outbound passenger manifests.
Central issues surrounding the use of terrorist watchlists in the aviation domain that may be considered during the 113th Congress include the timeliness of updating watchlists as new intelligence information becomes available; the extent to which complete terrorist information available to the federal government is exploited to assess possible threats among airline passengers and airline and airport workers; the ability to detect potential identity fraud or other attempts to circumvent terrorist watchlist checks, including the potential use of biometrics; the adequacy of established protocols for providing redress to individuals improperly identified as potential threats by watchlist checks; and the adequacy of coordination with international partners.
Mitigating the Threat of Shoulder-Fired Missiles to Civilian Aircraft
Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-7771).
The threat to civilian aircraft posed by shoulder-fired missiles or other standoff weapons capable of downing an airliner remains a vexing concern for aviation security specialists and policymakers. The threat was brought into the spotlight by the November 2002 attack on a chartered Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya. In 2003, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell remarked that there was "no threat more serious to aviation." (183) Since then, Department of State and military initiatives seeking bilateral cooperation and voluntary reductions of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) stockpiles have reduced worldwide inventories by at least 32,500 missiles. (184) Despite this progress, an unknown number of such weapons may still be in the hands of insurgents. This threat, combined with the limited capability to improve security beyond airport perimeters and to modify flight paths, leaves civil aircraft vulnerable to missile attacks, especially in conflict zones and other high-risk areas.
The most visible DHS initiative to address the threat was the multiyear Counter-MANPADS program carried out by the DHS Science and Technology Directorate. The program concluded in 2009 with extensive operational and live-fire testing along with FAA certification of systems from two vendors capable of protecting airliners against heat-seeking missiles. The systems have not been operationally deployed on commercial airliners, however, due largely to the high acquisition and life-cycle costs of these units. Some critics have also pointed out that the units do not protect against the full range of potential weapons that pose a potential threat to civil airliners. Proponents, however, argue that the systems do appear to provide effective protection against what is likely the most menacing standoff threat to civil airliners: heat-seeking MANPADS. Nonetheless, the airlines, which continue to face economic difficulties, have not voluntarily invested in these systems for operational use and argue that the costs for such systems should be borne, at least in part, by the federal government. Policy discussions have focused mostly on whether to fund the acquisition of limited numbers of the units for use by the Civil Reserve Aviation Fleet, civilian airliners that can be called up to transport troops and supplies for the military. Other approaches to protecting aircraft, including ground-based missile countermeasures and escort planes or drones equipped with antimissile technology, have been considered on a more limited basis, but these options face operational challenges that may limit their effectiveness.
At the airport level, improving security and reducing the vulnerability of flight paths to potential MANPADS attacks continues to pose unique challenges. While major airports have conducted vulnerability studies, and many have partnered with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to reduce vulnerabilities to some degree, these efforts face significant challenges because of limited resources and large geographic areas where aircraft are vulnerable to attack. While considerable attention has been given to this issue in years past, considerable vulnerabilities remain, and any terrorist attempts to exploit those vulnerabilities could quickly escalate the threat of shoulder-fired missiles to a major national security priority.
Security Issues Regarding the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft
Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy (email@example.com, 7-7771); Jeremiah Gertler, Specialist in Military Aviation (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-5107); and Richard M. Thompson II, Legislative Attorney (email@example.com, 7-8449)
For more information, see CRS Report R42701, Drones in Domestic Surveillance Operations: Fourth Amendment Implications and Legislative Responses.
Provisions in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95) require that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) take steps to accommodate routine operations of civil unmanned aircraft or drones into domestic airspace by the end of FY2015. The operation of civilian unmanned aircraft in domestic airspace raises potential security risks, including the possibility that terrorists could use a drone to carry out an attack against a ground target. It is also possible that drones themselves could be targeted by terrorists or cybercriminals seeking to tap into sensor data transmissions or to cause mayhem by hacking or jamming command and control signals.
Terrorists could potentially use drones to carry out small-scale attacks using explosives, or as platforms for chemical, biological, or radiological attacks. In September 2011, FBI disrupted a home-grown terrorist plot to attack the Pentagon and the Capitol with large model aircraft packed with high explosives. (185) The incident has raised specific concerns about potential terrorist attacks using unmanned aircraft, although the payload capacities of small unmanned aircraft would limit the damage these attacks could inflict using only conventional explosives. However, terrorists may also consider drones as a platform for carrying out a chemical, biological, or radiological attack.
In addition, routine operations of unmanned aircraft by homeland security and law enforcement agencies and others may be vulnerable to jamming or hacking that could result in a crash or hostile takeover since command and control systems typically transit over unsecured radio frequencies. Some have recommended that unmanned aircraft systems be required to have spoofresistant (186) navigation systems and not be solely reliant on GPS guidance, since GPS signals can be easily jammed. (187) While TSA has broad statutory authority to address a number of aviation security issues, it has not taken specific action to formally address the potential security concerns raised regarding unmanned aircraft operations in domestic airspace.
Although drones may pose security risks, they are also a potential asset for homeland security operations, particularly for CBP border surveillance operations. Law enforcement and first responders are also considering the use of drones, and their pending use raises questions regarding the potential use of DHS grants to purchase and operate drones. In addition, legal concerns, particularly Fourth Amendment and privacy concerns, regarding the law enforcement use of drones for surveillance operations have been central issues in recent public policy debate regarding drone operations in domestic airspace.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) currently employs a fleet of 10 modified Predator B unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and has ordered another 14, to augment its capabilities to patrol America's borders. Operating within specially designated airspace, these unarmed UAVs patrol the northern and southern land borders and the Gulf of Mexico to detect potential border violations and monitor suspected drug trafficking, with UAV operators cuing manned responses when appropriate. State and local governments have also expressed interest in operating UAVs for missions as diverse as traffic patrol, surveillance, and event security. Some law enforcement and first responder applications of drones may be eligible for DHS grants. A small but growing number of state and local agencies have acquired drones, some through federal grant programs, and have been issued special authorizations from FAA to fly them. (188) However, several other federal, state, and local agencies involved in law enforcement and homeland security appear to be awaiting more specific guidance from FAA regarding pending regulations covering the routine operation of drones in domestic airspace.
The introduction of drones into DHS's domestic surveillance operations presents a host of novel legal issues. Some argue that the expansion of drones into American skies may infringe upon an individual's fundamental privacy interest protected under the Fourth Amendment. To determine if certain government conduct constitutes a search or seizure under that Amendment, courts apply an array of tests (depending on the nature of the government action), including the widely used reasonable expectation of privacy test. When applying these tests to drone surveillance, a reviewing court will likely examine the location of the search, the sophistication of the technology used, and society's conception of privacy. For instance, while individuals are accorded substantial protections against warrantless government intrusions into their homes, (189) the Fourth Amendment offers fewer restrictions upon government surveillance occurring in public places, (190) and even less at the national borders. (191) Likewise, while drone surveillance conducted with relatively unsophisticated technology might be subjected to a lower level of judicial scrutiny, investigations conducted with advanced technologies such as thermal imaging or facial recognition would be submitted to closer review. Several measures have been introduced by Members of Congress that would require government agents to acquire a warrant before using drones for domestic surveillance, but would create exceptions for patrols of the national border used to prevent or deter the illegal entry of any persons or illegal substances into the United States, and for investigating credible terrorist threats. (192)
Marc R. Rosenblum, Specialist in Immigration Policy (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-7360)
Sources of further information, including additional CRS experts covering specific aspects of this issue, can be found in footnotes throughout this section.
Immigration policy has received substantial attention in both chambers during the 113th session of Congress. (193) In June 2013, the Senate passed the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744), a "comprehensive immigration reform" (CIR) bill that would increase immigration enforcement, require employers to use an electronic employment eligibility verification system similar to the current E-Verify program, establish three different legalization programs for unauthorized immigrants, and revise rules for both permanent and temporary immigration to the United States. (194) In the House, the Homeland Security and Judiciary Committees took action on five different bills between May and July of 2013 addressing border security, employment eligibility verification, interior immigration enforcement, and employment-based immigration. (195) This portion of the report summarizes several homeland security issues related to immigration enforcement at ports of entry and along the international border by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the agency within DHS responsible for these activities.
Immigration Inspections at Ports of Entry
At ports of entry, CBP's Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for conducting immigration, customs, and agricultural inspections of travelers seeking admission to the United States. The vast majority of people entering through U.S. ports are U.S. citizens, U.S. legal permanent residents (LPRs), (196) and legitimate visitors. Thus, as with cargo security (see "Cargo Security"), CBP officers' goals are to identify and intercept dangerous or unwanted (high-risk) people, while facilitating access for legitimate (low-risk) travelers. CBP seeks to accomplish these tasks without excessive infringement on privacy or civil liberties and while controlling enforcement costs.
Travelers seeking admission at ports of entry are required to present a travel document, typically a passport or its equivalent and (for non-U.S. citizens) either a visa authorizing permanent or temporary admission to the United States or proof of eligibility for admission through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). (197) Foreign nationals are subject to security-related and other background checks prior to being issued a visa or to receiving travel authorization through the VWP. CBP officers at U.S. ports of entry verify the authenticity of travelers' documents and that each document belongs to the person seeking admission (i.e., confirm the traveler's identity). Identity confirmation relies in part on biometric checks against DHS's Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) database (see "Entry-Exit System"). Database interoperability allows CBP officers to check travelers' records against biographic and biometric databases managed by the Departments of Justice, State, and Defense.
The concentration of inspection activity at the border--for travelers and imports--means that sufficient resources must be present in order to minimize congestion and ensure efficient operations. CBP faces pressure to provide for the rapid processing of individuals crossing the border, but expedited processing can lead to missed opportunities for interdicting threats. Moreover, investment in ports of entry arguably has not kept pace with rapid growth in international travel and trade, and there may be inadequate infrastructure to manage flows at some ports of entry (also see "Port of Entry Infrastructure and Personnel").
In an effort to streamline admissions without compromising security, CBP has implemented several trusted traveler programs. Trusted traveler programs require applicants to clear criminal and national security background checks prior to enrollment, to participate in an in-person interview, and to submit fingerprints and other biometric data. (198) In return, trusted travelers--like trusted traders (see "Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)")--are eligible for expedited processing at ports of entry. CBP currently operates three main trusted traveler programs: Global Entry, which allows expedited screening of passengers arriving at 34 major U.S. airports and 10 preclearance airports; (199) NEXUS, which is a joint U.S.-Canadian program for land, sea, and air crossings between the United States and Canada, including through dedicated vehicle lanes at 19 land ports; (200) and the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), which allows expedited screening at land POEs on the U.S.-Mexican border, including through dedicated vehicle lanes at 11 land ports. (201) Legislation introduced during the 113th Congress would encourage participation in trusted traveler programs by facilitating enrollment in Global Entry. (202)
Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208, Div. C) required the Attorney General, within two years of enactment (i.e., by September 30, 1998), to develop an automated entry and exit control system that would collect records of alien arrivals and departures and allow the Attorney General to match them in order to identify nonimmigrant aliens (203) who remain in the United States beyond the periods of their visas (i.e., visa overstayers). Congress has amended the system's requirements and deadlines on several occasions since then, including by adding a biometric component in 2001. (204) The system was initially designed primarily to identify and report on visa overstayers--thought to represent one-third to one-half of unauthorized immigrants in the United States (205)--but in the post-9/11 period it also has been seen as an important tool for identifying certain inadmissible aliens. 206
Since 2004, the entry-exit system has been managed by the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) system, renamed the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) in March 2013.207 US-VISIT/OBIM started at 115 airports and 14 sea ports beginning in January 2004, expanded to the 50 busiest land POEs by the end of 2004, and has been operational at almost all U.S. ports of entry since December 2006.208
The system collects biographic entry data including names, date of birth, and travel document information from all foreign nationals entering the United States. These data are added to the Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) database, which included 280 million unique records as of January 2013. (209) Since 2008, ADIS also receives departure data from air carrier and sea vessel departure manifests (i.e., passenger name lists); and since September 2012 an integrated entry-exit pilot program has allowed DHS to use Canadian admissions data as U.S. departure at certain northern border land ports. (210)
OBIM and ICE compare ADIS entry and exit data to generate a list of suspected visa overstayers and to prioritize certain overstay leads for further investigation. But a July 2013 GAO report found that more than 1 million ADIS arrival records could not be matched to departure data and raised questions about the quality of DHS's overstay data. (211) Moreover, DHS and its predecessor agency have not provided Congress with statutorily required reports on visa overstays since 1994, though DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano testified in February 2013 that the department would report to Congress by the end of the year. (212) Some Members of Congress have expressed concern about visa overstays and DHS's overstay analysis; (213) and legislation being considered in the 113th Congress directs attention to visa overstays as they relate to immigration enforcement, (214) and as a metric for countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program. (215)
US-VISIT/OBIM also collects biometric data (i.e., fingerprints and digital photographs). Biometric data are added to the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) database, which included over 150 million unique records as of January 2013.216 But biometric data collection is more time consuming than biographic data collection, and not all travelers are required to provide biometrics. Since January 2009, US-VISIT/OBIM has collected biometric data from non-U.S. citizens entering the United States other than Canadian nationals admitted as visitors, U.S. LPRs returning from cruises that begin and end in the United States or entering at land ports of entry, Mexican nationals with border crossing cards, (217) and travelers with other visas explicitly exempted from the program. (218) These exemptions meant that only about one-third of nonimmigrant admissions in FY2012 were required to provide biometric data. (219) Moreover, as of August 2013, DHS does not collect biometric departure data from any travelers leaving the United States. (220)
The completion of a more comprehensive entry-exit system has been a persistent subject of congressional concern, including in the 113th Congress. Senate-passed S. 744, for example, would require carriers to collect electronic biographic exit data (i.e., through a swiped document) from all departing air passengers, and would make the implementation of this electronic exit system one of the "triggers" for the complete implementation of the bill's legalization provisions for certain unauthorized immigrants. (221) The bill also would require DHS, within two years of enactment, to establish a biometric exit system at the ten U.S. airports with the greatest volume of international air travel. (222) The House-reported Border Security Results Act of 2013 (H.R. 1417) would require DHS, within 180 days, to submit a plan to Congress either to immediately complete a biometric entry-exit system, or to implement an alternative program within two years.
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry
For more information, see CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry.
Between ports of entry, CBP's U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) is responsible for enforcing U.S. immigration law and other federal laws along the border and for preventing all unlawful entries into the United States, including entries of terrorists, unauthorized aliens, instruments of terrorism, narcotics, and other contraband. In the course of discharging its duties, the Border Patrol patrols 7,494 miles of U.S. international borders with Mexico and Canada and the coastal waters around Florida and Puerto Rico. Debate during the 113th Congress has focused on what additional investments are needed to secure the border and on metrics for measuring border security.
With support from Congress, DHS and its predecessor agency the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) have invested in border security personnel, fencing and infrastructure, and surveillance technology since the 1980s, with CBP's budget totaling $11.8 billion in FY2013.223 The Senate CIR bill S. 744 would expand these investments, doubling the number of Border Patrol agents assigned to the southern border and requiring DHS to install at least 700 miles of pedestrian fencing. The bill would pay for these new border assets with about $45 billion in direct spending over a 5-10 year period. (224)
Some Members of Congress have raised questions about whether DHS's investments at the border have been effective, and some have argued that enforcement has been compromised by the fact that DHS does not have a single, overarching strategy for border security. (225) Congress also has raised questions about how to measure border security. The Border Patrol traditionally has used border apprehensions as its primary measure of border security, and these apprehensions have fallen sharply since 2006. (226) Yet falling apprehensions may reflect the downturn in U.S. labor markets and/or a change in tactics by unauthorized migrants, among other variables, in addition to enforcement. Thus, apprehensions are an imprecise indicator of the effectiveness of border enforcement.
Bills in both chambers would require DHS to report to Congress on a strategy to secure U.S. borders and to develop more precise metrics of border security. In the House, H.R. 1417 would require DHS to develop a comprehensive strategy to gain and maintain "operational control" of the border within deadlines established by the bill. The bill defines metrics for such control, and would require DHS to collaborate with outside partners and with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to develop, review, and report on these metrics. The Senate CIR bill, S. 744, also would require DHS to submit a pair of new border strategies, with the contents of the Senate bill's strategies defined to encompass the new border enforcement resources required by the bill.
Congress may also question the relative priority attached to the southern and northern borders. While the Southwest border has experienced more unauthorized immigration, some security experts have warned that the northern border may represent a more important point of vulnerability when it comes to terrorism and related threats to homeland security--especially in light of the more limited enforcement resources deployed there. (227)
An additional issue of possible concern to Congress is the integrity of CBP agents and others involved with security at and between U.S. ports of entry. CBP places a great amount of responsibility upon its inspection officers, and smugglers and other nefarious actors have attempted--sometimes successfully--to infiltrate CBP. Moreover, criminals have reportedly made extensive efforts to surreptitiously enroll CBP officers on their payrolls, particularly in the wake of drug supply chain interruptions by the ongoing Mexican drug-related violence and the tactical measures implemented by DHS. To counteract such efforts, DHS has ramped up its internal investigation efforts to root out any double agents. These integrity programs have been accompanied by increased professionalization measures, such as the addition of law enforcement retirement benefits for CBP officers that incentivize employees to resist corruption. Congress appropriated $10 million in emergency supplemental funding in FY2010 to support these integrity efforts (P.L. 111-230) and held hearings on the subject during the 112th Congress. (228) A December 2012 GAO report found that CBP had not completed an integrity strategy, and that it faced challenges in managing and overseeing integrity-related programs. (229) An August 2013 GAO report found that CBP's integrity strategy was still being drafted, but that the agency's integrity-related training courses were "systematic and integrated." (230) Congress may continue to monitor CBP integrity issues.
Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
Disaster Assistance Funding
Bruce R. Lindsay, Analyst in American National Government (email@example.com, 7-3752)
The majority of disaster assistance provided by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to states and localities after a declared emergency or major disaster is funded with monies from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). (231)
In general, Congress annually appropriates budget authority to the DRF to ensure that funding is available for recovery projects from previous incidents (some of these projects take several years to complete) and to create a reserve to pay for emergencies and major disasters that might occur that fiscal year. Any remaining balance in the DRF at the end of the fiscal year is carried over to the next fiscal year. (232) However, in some cases--particularly in recent years--there have been shortfalls in the DRF. In such cases, additional budget authority has typically been provided through a continuing resolution or an emergency supplemental appropriation. The additional funding traditionally has either been designated as an emergency requirement or as disaster relief under the Budget Control Act, designations that allow funding beyond the limitations of the discretionary budget limits.
From FY2005 to FY2010, Congress provided additional budget authority for the DRF through a combination of supplemental and continuing appropriations nine times. The reliance on emergency supplemental appropriations has been of particular congressional concern. Supplemental appropriations legislation usually carries an emergency designation for its funding, and therefore are not subject to the limits opposed by discretionary spending allocations. However, the number of disasters being declared over the last two decades has risen, as have their costs. (233) These upward trends have led some to discuss how to reduce and/or offset federal spending on major disasters.
Partly in response to these discussions, Congress included provisions on disaster relief spending when it passed P.L. 112-25, the Budget Control Act (BCA). (234) The BCA sets overall discretionary spending caps and provides two types of adjustments that could be applied to make room for disaster assistance--a limited adjustment specifically for the costs of major disasters under the Stafford Act, and an unlimited adjustment for more broadly defined emergency spending. (235) The adjustment limitation is not a restriction on disaster assistance--it is a restriction on how much the discretionary budget cap can be adjusted upward to accommodate the assistance.
FY2013 represented the first fiscal year in which the DRF received all of the funding available under the BCA's allowable adjustment for disaster relief, and the first time that disaster relief in excess of the allowable adjustment was covered by an emergency designation. The DRF had roughly $7.3 billion available for disaster needs when Hurricane Sandy made landfall in the northeastern United States in October 2012. The anticipated demand on the DRF was high enough, however, that Congress approved $11.49 billion in additional pre-sequester resources for the DRF the following January through P.L. 113-2, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013. The total FY2013 funding requested for major disasters under the Stafford Act would have exceeded the available allowable adjustment of $11.78 billion--even before accounting for the other disaster assistance requested by the Administration. (236) The Administration sought, and Congress provided, emergency funding designations to cover most of the supplemental funding that exceeded the allowable adjustment. Of the $11.49 billion provided for the DRF in P.L. 113-2, $5.38 billion used the allowable adjustment for disaster relief under the BCA, and $6.11 billion carried an emergency designation. (237)
However, there were attempts in Congress to offset the costs of the disaster relief. Amendments were offered in both the House and the Senate to offset the disaster package--including the funding for the DRF. H.Amdt. 4 (which would have offset $17 billion in the immediate disaster assistance with an across-the-board cut in discretionary spending) was not agreed to by a vote of 162-258.238 S.Amdt. 4 (which would have offset the entire $51 billion in disaster assistance) was not agreed to by a vote of 35-62.239
Disaster relief funding generally remained subject to the impact of sequestration. Of the $17.89 billion provided to the DRF in FY2013, $898 million was cancelled by sequestration.
In response to concerns over the increasing federal expenditures on disaster relief, Congress may consider passing reforms to reduce these expenditures, or implement other measures to address their impact on the national debt. Some examples include changing emergency and major disaster declaration criteria to limit the number of events eligible for federal assistance, and reducing the standard 75% federal to state cost-share for recovery to a lower percentage (such as 50%).
Hurricane Sandy Recovery
Jared T. Brown, Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-4918)
For more information, see CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief, and CRS Report R42991, Analysis of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013.
On the evening of October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy, the second-largest Atlantic storm on record, made landfall in southern New Jersey. The consequences of the storm were considered to be immense: at least 159 people died, over 23,000 people required temporary shelters, 8.5 million customers were left without power, approximately $65 billion in damages, and 650,000 homes damaged or destroyed. (240) As with other catastrophic natural disasters, Members of Congress responded to Hurricane Sandy by holding a series of hearings to gather information, (241) visiting the affected region for a firsthand assessment of the damage and to confer with state and local officials, and introducing and acting on legislation based on that process. As a result of the storm, the President declared major disasters for 12 states as well as the District of Columbia under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288 as amended). (242)
On January 29, 2013, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, a $50.5 billion package of disaster assistance largely focused on responding to Hurricane Sandy, was enacted as P.L. 113-2. In addition, Congress provided an additional $9.7 billion in borrowing authority for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) as P.L. 113-1 on January 6, 2013. The Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 provided supplemental funding to over 66 different accounts and programs, including $16.0 billion for the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, $11.5 billion for the Disaster Relief Fund, $10.9 billion for the Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program, and $5.4 billion total for disaster-related activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (243)
In addition to evaluating the need for supplemental appropriations in response to Hurricane Sandy, the 112th and 113th Congresses considered reforming provisions of the Stafford Act. Generally, concerns were raised that the recovery from Hurricane Sandy would be plagued by perceived delays and bureaucratic burdens that inhibited the recovery following Hurricane Katrina. The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA), passed as Division B of P.L. 113-2, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, revised the Stafford Act in response to these concerns as well as other considerations. (244)
In recognition of the scale and complexity of Hurricane Sandy, the Administration initiated a coordinated effort across multiple federal agencies to support the region in responding to and recovering from the disaster. On December 7, 2013, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13632, Establishing the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force. (245) The Task Force was intended to coordinate federal interagency efforts to provide for an efficient recovery process. Chaired by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Shaun L. S. Donovan, the Task Force included members from 27 different executive branch agencies and White House offices. (246) The Task Force was supported by an advisory group composed of many state, tribal, and local elected leaders from the most severely impacted cities and towns in the region, mainly from New York and New Jersey. (247)
The key deliverable of the Task Force, as mandated by Section 5 of E.O. 13632, is the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy (HSRS). The HSRS is a wide-ranging, lengthy policy document providing 69 different recommendations for a long-term recovery plan for the impacted region across eight major topic areas, entitled:
* Promoting Resilient Rebuilding Through Innovative Ideas and a Thorough Understanding of Current and Future Risk;
* Ensuring a Regionally Coordinated, Resilient Approach to Infrastructure Investment;
* Restoring and Strengthening Homes and Providing Families with Safe, Affordable Housing Options;
* Supporting Small Businesses and Revitalizing Local Economies;
* Addressing Insurance Challenges, Understanding, and Affordability;
* Building State and Local Capacity to Plan for and Implement Long-Term Recovery and Rebuilding;
* Improving Data Sharing Between Federal, State, and Local Officials; and
* Data Sharing Between Federal Agencies and State and Local Governments.
In their totality, the recommendations of HSRS represent a strategic vision by the Administration for the Hurricane Sandy recovery process, including how federal funds should be expended, how federal agencies should synchronize their efforts, and how the region can leverage the recovery process from Sandy to prepare for future disasters.
There are numerous issues that may arise in the 113th Congress in relation to the recovery process for Hurricane Sandy. For example, the HSRS includes many recommendations that would require further action by the executive branch to apply them to the greater benefit in future disasters. Though each recommendation is subject to unique challenges, in general, effective implementation will require a coordinated regulatory and policy-review process among numerous federal agencies. Several other recommendations would require legislative amendments to apply them both for Hurricane Sandy and for other disasters. Therefore, the 113th Congress may wish to continue its oversight of the Sandy recovery process with an appreciation for its impact on the nation's future disaster recovery capacity. Understandably, the impacted region itself continues to face many known and unknown future challenges in their recovery from the storm. The 113th Congress may also wish to continue its oversight of the expenditure and use of supplemental appropriations in the affected region to improve the delivery of federal assistance in addressing these anticipated challenges.
DHS State and Local Preparedness Grants
Natalie Keegan, Analyst in American Federalism and Emergency Management Policy (email@example.com, 7-9569)
State and local governments have primary responsibility for most domestic public safety functions. When facing difficult fiscal conditions, state and local governments may reduce their level of contribution towards public safety and, consequently, homeland security preparedness, due to increasing pressure to address tight budgetary constraints and fund competing priorities. Since state and local governments fund the largest percentage of public safety expenditures, this may have a significant impact on the national preparedness level. On March 30, 2011, President Obama issued a presidential policy directive that directed the Secretary of DHS to develop and submit to the President a national preparedness goal. The DHS Secretary released the National Preparedness Goal in September 2011:
A secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk. (248)
One means of implementing the National Preparedness Goal is to link grant funded activities to the Goal. Prior to 9/11, there were only three federal grant programs available to state and local governments to address homeland security: the State Domestic Preparedness Program administered by the Department of Justice, the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) administered by the Department of Health and Human Services. Since that time, several additional homeland security grant programs were added to ensure state and local preparedness, including the State Homeland Security Grant
Program (SHSGP), Citizen Corps Program (CCP), Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), Driver's License Security Grants Program (REAL ID), Operation Stonegarden grant program (Stonegarden), Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPG), Public Transportation Security Assistance and Rail Security Assistance grant program (Transit Grants), Port Security Grants (Port Security), Over-the-Road Bus Security Assistance (Over-the-Road), Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP), Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program (IECGP), and Emergency Operations Center Grant Program (EOC).
While state and local governments receive federal assistance for preparedness activities, this federal assistance accounts for only a small percentage of overall state and local spending for public safety. On average, total expenditures for all state and local governments for public safety is $218 billion annually. (249) Public safety expenditures include costs associated with the functions of police protection, fire protection, correction, and protective inspections and regulations. (250) In FY2010, Congress appropriated approximately $4.1 billion to federal grant programs for state and local government homeland security preparedness. (251) In FY2011, Congress appropriated approximately $3.3 billion to federal grant programs for state and local government homeland security preparedness. For FY2012, Congress appropriated $2.3 billion in federal grants for state and local government homeland security preparedness. (252) In FY2013, Congress provided 1.5 billion for state and local programs. (253) These amounts account for less than 2% of state and local government public safety costs. Since state and local governments are critical in the overall preparedness efforts of the nation, Congress may wish to review how to best provide assistance to ensure appropriate levels of state and local preparedness in the changing fiscal conditions facing the nation.
Consolidation of DHS State and Local Programs
In FY2013, the President requested $1.8 billion in federal grants for state and local government homeland security preparedness. The requested funding level included funding to support the establishment of a National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP), which was proposed as a means to consolidate the activities previously funded under a number of state and local preparedness grant programs. Congress did not provide funding or authorization for NPGP in FY2013. In FY2014, the Administration repeated this approach by requesting $1.1 billion for the National Preparedness Grant Program.
Congressional justification for denying the FY2013 preparedness grant consolidation included concern over the lack of congressional authorization for the NPGP and lack of clarity in how the program would be implemented. In its report on FY2013 funding recommendations for DHS, the House Appropriations Committee denied a request by the Administration to consolidate several state and local preparedness grant program activities under a National Preparedness Grant Program because it had not been authorized by Congress, lacked sufficient details regarding the implementation of the program, and lacked sufficient stakeholder participation in the development of the proposal. (254) The Senate Appropriations Committee also expressed concern with the proposal to consolidate the state and local preparedness grants because it was unclear how risk assessments would be used and how funding would be allocated. (255) The Senate Committee also noted its concern over the uncertainty surrounding the allocation of funding to individual grant programs. (256) While the FY2014 proposal by the administration provided additional detail regarding the structure of the proposed NPGP, Congress continues to express concern regarding the program authorization and implementation. (257) The 113th Congress could continue to debate authorization, appropriations, and structure for DHS preparedness grants.
Firefighter Assistance Programs
Lennard G. Kruger, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy (7-7070, firstname.lastname@example.org)
For further information, see CRS Report RL32341, Assistance to Firefighters Program: Distribution of Fire Grant Funding and CRS Report RL33375, Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response: The SAFER Grant Program.
While firefighting activities are traditionally the responsibility of states and local communities, Congress has established federal firefighter assistance grant programs within DHS to provide additional support for local fire departments. In 2000, the 106th Congress established the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program (AFG), which provides grants to local fire departments for firefighting equipment and training. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the scope and funding for AFG were subsequently expanded. Additionally in 2003, the 108th Congress established the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response (SAFER) program, which provides grants to support firefighter staffing.
In the 113th Congress, debate over firefighter assistance programs is likely to take place within the appropriations process. Arriving at funding levels for AFG and SAFER is subject to two countervailing considerations. On the one hand, inadequate state and local public safety budgets have led many to argue for the necessity of maintaining, if not increasing, federal grant support for fire departments. On the other hand, concerns over reducing overall federal discretionary spending have led others to question whether continued or reduced federal support for AFG and SAFER is warranted.
Meanwhile, the 112th Congress reauthorized AFG and SAFER in the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239). The reauthorized statute makes changes in AFG grant caps and distribution formulas, and removes or changes certain SAFER grant restrictions and limitations. The 113th Congress will likely oversee the impact of AFG and SAFER grant changes mandated by the reauthorization. The continuing issue is how effectively grants are being distributed and used to protect the health and safety of the public and firefighting personnel against fire and fire-related hazards.
Emergency Communications Infrastructure and Technology
Linda K. Moore, Specialist in Telecommunications Policy (email@example.com, 7-5853)
Emergency communications systems support first responders and other emergency personnel, disseminate alerts and warnings to residents in endangered areas, and relay calls for help through 911 call networks. Their networks support day-to-day needs to protect the safety of the public and deliver critical information before, during, and after disasters.
The technologies that support emergency communications are converging toward a common platform using the Internet Protocol (IP). Federal, state, and local agencies are investing in IP-enabled communications infrastructure that can be shared to support all forms of emergency communications. Notable examples of new investment are (1) interoperable public safety communications networks; (2) digital alerts and warnings; and (3) Next-Generation 9-1-1 (NG91-1) networks.
Notable federal programs, in addition to grant programs, are the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet); the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS); and the 9-1-1 Implementation Coordination Office (ICO). FirstNet is an independent authority established within the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). IPAWS is coordinated through the National Continuity Programs Directorate of the Federal Emergency Management Agency with the participation of the Federal Communications Commission. The functions of ICO are shared by the NTIA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. None of the enacted legislation that guides these programs requires coordination of planning and investment among them. FirstNet is required to share infrastructure where technically and economically feasible and to provide connectivity to 9-1-1 call centers, but its charter is limited to developing a new wireless network for emergency personnel.
FirstNet was created and ICO reauthorized by the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012,258 Title VI. The act requires both entities to submit periodic reports to Congress. In addition to these oversight responsibilities, the 113th Congress is likely to consider legislation to improve IPAWS, as several bills for this purpose were introduced in the 112th. The survivability, availability, and coverage of commercial communications infrastructure are concerns that are likely to be considered in tandem with emergency communications policies. Commercial telecommunications lines and switches, wireless infrastructure, and radio and television broadcasting facilities are examples of critical components where failure can jeopardize public safety. Multiple federal agencies and congressional committee jurisdictions, as well as state, local, and tribal authorities, have responsibility for different components. While the National Response Framework addresses coordination of response operations efforts across jurisdictions, there is no federal policy that recognizes the need to coordinate technology procurement decisions and infrastructure investments for emergency communications. The transition to IP-based communications provides the opportunity to identify and coordinate infrastructure investments.
Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System
Jared T. Brown, Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-4918)
The United States is threatened by a wide array of hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, viral pandemics, and manmade disasters such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The way the nation strategically prioritizes and allocates resources to prepare for disasters can significantly influence the ultimate cost to society, both in the number of human casualties and the scope of economic damage. Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8), signed and released by President Barack Obama on March 30, 2011, and its component policies intend to guide how the nation, from the federal level to private citizens, can "prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation." (259) These threats include terrorist acts, natural disasters, and other man-made incidents. PPD-8 evolves from, and supersedes, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, which was released under President George W. Bush. (260) PPD-8 is intended to meet many requirements of Subtitle C of the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-295, 6 U.S.C. [section]741-764).
PPD-8 is not a stand-alone document. To date, it is supported by the issuance of a National Preparedness Goal, a report on the National Preparedness System, and the 2012 and 2013 National Preparedness Reports. (261) Additionally, there are four finalized National Planning Frameworks that formulate strategic guidance in each of the mission areas of prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery. (262) A National Protection Framework remains in draft as of September 17, 2013. There are also additional elements of the National Preparedness System that will help operationalize the policy guidance of PPD-8. (263)
In brief, PPD-8 and its many component policies embody the strategic vision and planning of the federal government as it relates to preparing the nation for disasters. PPD-8 sets the goal for how "prepared" the nation should be to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from disasters, and establishes a general framework and roadmap achieving that level of preparedness. In this respect, PPD-8's influence is theoretically similar to the National Security Strategy's influence on military preparedness and foreign affairs in terms of its strategic purpose and potential impact on budgetary decision-making, the assignment of national roles and responsibilities, and long-term policy objectives for disaster preparedness. The actual impact of PPD-8 is yet to be determined and will be difficult to assess, though it will be determined in large part by:
* The quality of the strategic planning and the clarity of the resulting guidance, especially as it relates to the assignment of national roles and responsibilities and the analysis of core capabilities in the National Planning Frameworks and in the Federal Interagency Operations Plans.
* The acceptance of and adherence to the strategic guidance provided in PPD-8 by national stakeholders, especially state, tribal, and local governments and their respective emergency management agencies.
* The way that PPD-8 policies inform the budgetary planning process by the Administration, the appropriations process by Congress, and the budget/appropriations processes of state and local governments, especially as it relates to the prioritization of limited resources to provide homeland security and emergency management core capabilities.
The 113th Congress may wish to continue its oversight of how the Administration implements PPD-8 and manages the National Preparedness System writ large on the above factors and more, such as:
* evaluating how PPD-8 policies conform to the intentions of the PKEMRA statute;
* how federal roles and responsibilities have been assigned to implement and execute PPD-8 policies; and
* how non-federal resources and stakeholders will be impacted by national preparedness guidance.
Public Health and Medical Services
Sarah A. Lister, Specialist in Public Health and Epidemiology (email@example.com, 7-7320)
The nation's public health emergency management laws expanded considerably in the past decade, reflecting lessons from the terrorist attacks in 2001 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, in particular. Incidents since then--the H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009; the earthquake in Haiti and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010; nuclear plant failures following an earthquake and tsunami in Japan in 2011; and Hurricane Sandy in 2012--each revealed persistent gaps in the nation's readiness for public health and medical emergencies. These gaps include existing response plans may not sufficiently anticipate situations that arise; the technology needed to assess threats (such as radiation or chemical exposure) may be limited; medical countermeasures (i.e., vaccines, antidotes, or treatments for harmful exposures) may not be available in adequate amounts, if at all; the means to distribute existing countermeasures in a timely manner may be limited; the medical system lacks sufficient capacity to provide care in response to a mass casualty incident; and funding for response costs may not be immediately available, if at all. Given the robust roles of the private sector and state and local governments in preparedness and response efforts, the federal government's ability to affect these efforts through funding and other policies may also be limited.
The 113th Congress reauthorized the body of law that directs most public health and medical preparedness and response activities in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), through the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 (PAHPRA, P.L. 113-5). The reauthorization focused in particular on improving federal programs to assure the availability of medical countermeasures in an emergency. (264) PAHPRA also reauthorized grants to states for public health and health system preparedness, as well as funding for a number of other specific programs. In general, the appropriations amounts that are authorized for programs under PAHPRA are lower than the amounts authorized for the same programs in the 2006 reauthorization. (265) Finally, PAHPRA required the establishment of a National Advisory Committee on Children and Disasters. This Committee has not yet been established.
Funding for the response to a public health incident is a challenge when the incident does not lead to a declaration under the Stafford Act. (266) The HHS Secretary has authority for a no-year Public Health Emergency Fund, but Congress has not appropriated monies to the fund for many years. (267) Assistance under the Stafford Act can help federal, state, and local agencies with the costs of public health activities such as assuring food and water safety, and monitoring illness rates in affected communities. However, there is no federal assistance program designed specifically to cover the uninsured or uncompensated costs of individual health care--including mental health care--that may be needed as a consequence of a disaster. (There is no consensus that this should be a federal responsibility.) Nonetheless, when faced with mass casualty incidents, hospitals, physicians, and other providers may face considerable pressure to deliver care without a clear source of reimbursement. On several occasions, Congress has provided special assistance to address uncompensated disaster-related health care costs after an incident. (268) The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) may mitigate future concerns about disaster-related health care costs by decreasing the ranks of the uninsured. (269)
Potential Reauthorization of the Defense Production Act of 1950
Jared T. Brown, Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-4918)
For more information, see CRS Report R43118, The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Reauthorization.
The Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (DPA, 50 U.S.C. Appx. [section][section]2061 et seq.), provides the President an "array of authorities to shape national defense preparedness programs and to take appropriate steps to maintain and enhance the domestic industrial base." (270) The term national defense, as defined in the statute, guides the potential use of the authorities of the DPA and includes activities relating to homeland security. (271) Though DPA authorities are most frequently used by the Department of Defense to enhance U.S. military preparedness and capabilities, DPA authorities can be, and have been, used to support domestic homeland security activities and the nation's preparedness for, response to, and recovery from natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other national emergencies. For example, DPA authorities have been used to support the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Screening Center program and the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers' Greater New Orleans Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System program, and to enable the private sector's restoration of rail service following Hurricane Katrina. (272)
The President is granted a wide range of authorities in the DPA. In brief, authorities in Title I of the DPA allow the President to issue priority contracts for critical materials, equipment, and services produced in the private market. Persons receiving these priority contracts are required to fulfill them before any other non-prioritized competing private or government obligation, thereby ensuring that the government has timely access to these goods in the interest of national defense. Authorities in Title III of the DPA allow the government to incentivize and expand the domestic productive capacity and supply of critical equipment, technologies, and resources vital to the national defense. Title VII of the DPA includes a number of provisions, including the authority to establish voluntary agreements within the private sector in the interest of national defense, (273) and authorities that support the activities of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). (274) In the statute, almost all authorities of the DPA are granted to the President. The President, in turn, has delegated many of these authorities to subordinates by issuing executive orders. Most recently, the President issued Executive Order 13603 on "National Defense Resources Preparedness" primarily to establish policies for using DPA authorities and to delegate the authorities to Cabinet Secretaries in the executive branch. (275)
Most DPA authorities are not permanently authorized. Rather, they are time-limited, undergoing periodic amendment and reauthorization. In 2009, Congress amended the DPA and reauthorized the majority of its provisions. That reauthorization is set to expire on September 30, 2014.276 Therefore, the 113th Congress may consider reauthorizing and amending the DPA before it expires. (277) Committees in both chambers of the 113th Congress have held hearings on potential reauthorization. (278) Additionally, Congress may wish to review its oversight of the current use of DPA authorities by federal agencies, especially as it relates to the creation of regulations for Title I authorities and the ongoing activities of the Defense Production Act Committee. (279)
Management Issues at DHS
DHS Reorganization Authority
Henry B. Hogue, Analyst in American National Government (email@example.com, 7-0642)
From the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in January 2003 through 2007, the President and the Secretary of Homeland Security used provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, most notably Section 872,280 to implement a number of major and minor departmental reorganizations. Some reorganization activities under these authorities were carried out in conjunction with the implementation of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. (281)
Since May 2007, Congress has limited the use of appropriated funds for carrying out Section 872 reorganizations. Section 3501 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, enacted on May 25, 2007, instituted such limitations for the balance of FY2007, stating:
None of the funds provided in this Act, or P.L. 109-295 [Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007], shall be available to carry out section 872 of P.L. 107-296 [Homeland Security Act of 2002]. (282)
Succeeding DHS appropriations acts up through and including that for FY2013 included similar provisions. (283)
The scope and effect of this limitation were the subject of a July 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) opinion. (284) This opinion raised the question of whether a reorganization could be undertaken under authorities that, absent Section 872, might be available to the Secretary. These include the authorities identified by the department: implied authority to organize and manage the department; (285) redelegation authority; and authority under 5 U.S.C. Section 301, which authorizes an agency head to "prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property."
Since the appropriations acts are annual, the decision of whether or not to carry over the limitation arises each year. More broadly, the question of whether and how Section 872 might be amended may be at issue as part of a reauthorization process. Such decisions might hinge, in part, on a congressional determination of the impact of Section 872 and the appropriation limitation on the management and functioning of the department.
The Management Budget
William L. Painter, Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-3335)
For more information, see CRS Report R42644, Department of Homeland Security: FY2013 Appropriations.
Title I of the Homeland Security Appropriations bill contains the funding for the primary management functions of DHS. Originally envisioned as a skeleton staff, the headquarters and management functions have grown in response to criticism of the department's ability to effectively oversee its own activities. In debates over departmental funding, questioning the size and effectiveness of the department's management cadre is a common theme.
In FY2003, the first year of DHS operations, $195 million was provided for management accounts. In FY2012, those accounts were funded at $803 million. This growth is due to several factors, including increases in staff size required to perform oversight functions, rising personnel costs, technology investments, and increasing real estate expenses for the department's headquarters offices. In recent years, these accounts have been requested at higher levels than might otherwise be expected due to the inclusion of significant capital initiatives, such as headquarters consolidation and data center migration in these accounts, and personnel initiatives aimed at boosting the department's cadre of acquisition oversight staff and reducing the number of contractors in sensitive positions.
Pre-sequester, these accounts received $643 million in FY2013. The Administration requested funding for the management accounts for FY2014 at $651 million, not including $106 million for headquarters consolidation or $54 million for data center consolidation. House and Senate Appropriations Committees recommended $526 million and $633 million, respectively, for the management accounts with similar exclusions. House amendments reduced the funding in the bill by $51 million from the committee's recommendation, and $176 million below the Administration's requested level.
DHS Financial Management Reforms
Natalie M. Keegan, Analyst in American Federalism and Emergency Management Policy (email@example.com, 7-9569), and William L. Painter, Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-3335)
From its inception, DHS has faced financial management challenges. Transferring components and their budgets between agencies is a complex process in the best of situations, but doing it in the process of establishing a new department that is performing important national security missions from its first day of operations adds additional complexity. This was further compounded by inherited financial management problems that existed at several major legacy components, including the Coast Guard, FEMA, and elements that formed ICE. (286)
The department tried to develop its own financial management system in-house through a project known as "eMerge2," but failed. A second attempt was made to implement a department-wide system through contracting with outside developers under the Transformation and Systems Consolidation initiative, or TASC. After GAO ruled that DHS had improperly awarded the initial $450 million contract--the latest result from a series of protests and legal challenges that had delayed the project--the award was cancelled and the project shelved. (287)
Although the department has been on the GAO High Risk List since it was created, progress has been made on reducing the number of material weaknesses in the department's financial controls. FY2012 was the first year since its establishment that DHS was able to complete an audit of all its financial statements. KMPG, the independent auditor, said that DHS was unable to represent that property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) balances were correct in its financial statements or provide adequate evidence to support the balances included. Nevertheless, the DHS OIG considers even a qualified audit "a significant milestone." (288)
The independent auditor noted five deficiencies in internal controls (289) that were significant enough to be considered material weaknesses:
* Financial Reporting;
* Information Technology Controls and Financial System Functionality;
* Property, Plant and Equipment;
* Environmental and Other Liabilities; and
* Budgetary Accounting.
While all five of these material weaknesses persisted from FY2011 to FY2012, the DHS OIG noted significant progress with the Coast Guard's ability to account for its PP&E--an important step, as the Coast Guard has roughly half of DHS's PP&E. (290)
GAO noted the following in its audit of the government's FY2011 and FY2012 consolidated financial statements:
It is important that DHS continue to remediate its internal control deficiencies and build on the progress it has made as it moves forward to achieve its ultimate goal of obtaining clean audit opinions on its fiscal year 2013 financial statements and on its internal control over financial reporting. (291)
The 113th Congress will likely continue its interest in DHS's efforts to improve its internal financial systems, given the relative size of the department's budget, the interest expressed in this issue by authorizing committee leadership, and the current drive for stricter budgetary oversight.
These issues could be examined at the department, component, or program level. Oversight might include a review of the internal financial and administrative controls in the administration of specific grant programs, and improper payments made under the programs. Consideration of the internal financial and management controls might include the extent to which DHS is complying with existing control standards, penalties for noncompliance, and whether the standards should be adjusted to account for any unique elements in the DHS programs.
William L. Painter, Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy (email@example.com, 7-3335)
For additional information, see CRS Report R42753, DHS Headquarters Consolidation Project: Issues for Congress.
The Department of Homeland Security's headquarters footprint occupies more than 7 million square feet of office space in about 50 separate locations in the greater Washington, DC, area. This is largely a legacy of how the department was assembled in a short period of time from 22 separate federal agencies which were themselves spread across the National Capital region. The fragmentation of headquarters is cited by the department as a major contributor to inefficiencies, including time lost shuttling staff between headquarters elements; additional security, real estate, and administrative costs; and reduced cohesion among the components that make up the department.
To unify the department's headquarters functions, the department approved a $3.4 billion master plan to create a new DHS headquarters on the grounds of St. Elizabeth's in Anacostia. According to GSA, this is the largest federal office construction since the Pentagon was built during World War II. $1.4 billion of this project was to be funded through the DHS budget, and $2 billion through the GSA. (292) Thus far $460 million has been appropriated to DHS for the project and $908 million to GSA through FY2013. Phase 1A of the project--a new Coast Guard headquarters facility--has been completed with the funding already provided by Congress and is now in use.
In 2013, a revised construction schedule was developed, projecting lower levels of appropriations and a longer timeline for the project. Under the new projection, the project would be completed in FY2026 at a cost $4.5 billion. (293) According to GSA, even with the cost increases from delaying funding, the project would still result in over $530 million in projected savings compared to leasing over the next 30 years. This estimate does not take into account the costs GSA would have to incur to stabilize and maintain the St. Elizabeths campus if the project were halted, or the efficiencies for DHS that a consolidate headquarters would generate. (294)
With headquarters consolidation remaining a priority for the Administration, the Coast Guard moving into its new facility on the campus, and current budgetary constraints altering both the growth projections that were the basis for DHS's consolidation plans and the prospects for funding in coming fiscal years, legislative action in the 113th Congress could help clarify the future for this project.
Department of Homeland Security Personnel Issues
Barbara L. Schwemle, Analyst in American National Government (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-8655).
For more information, see the section on Departmental Management in CRS Report R43147, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014 Appropriations.
An essential consideration underlying the mission and performance of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is human resource management (HRM). Responsibility for HRM is vested in the Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO), an entity organizationally and for appropriations purposes located within the Under Secretary for Management. The OCHCO plays a critical role in supporting and executing the department's "Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012-2016." (295) The current chief human capital officer assumed the position on August 4, 2011, and with the change in the appointment from political to career status, is the first career member of the Senior Executive Service to hold the office. During the 113th Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate may conduct oversight of personnel issues at the department. Among the issues that have persisted since the establishment of DHS are those related to the recruitment and hiring of highly qualified candidates, diversity of the workforce, and employee morale. Current initiatives in each of these areas are discussed below.
Recruitment and Hiring of Highly Qualified Candidates
DHS has struggled to develop and maintain a highly skilled workforce in a number of areas, including cybersecurity. In a report published in fall 2012, the Cyberskills Task Force of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (296) recommended that the department build a team of employees, numbering some 600, with cybersecurity skills that are critical to the DHS mission. The task force also recommended that a pilot DHS Cyber Reserve Program be established to make certain that "DHS cyber alumni and other talented cybersecurity experts outside of government are known and available to DHS in times of need." (297) The Secretary of Homeland Security accepted the task force recommendations. (298) In an opinion piece published in April 2013, she said that the department is:
* "creating and implementing standards of performance through a professional certification system,"
* "creating a standardized and comprehensive training and development program to grow and retain our existing cybersecurity workforce,"
* "establishing a dynamic Cyber Surge Capacity Force composed of certified cybersecurity professionals with critical skills in the private sector, who will be readily available for rapid support and deployment,"
* and "extending the scope of cyber education beyond the federal workplace ... to include the public, as well as students from kindergarten through post-graduate school." (299)
DHS has requested legislative authority that would permit it to expedite the hiring process for and provide higher rates of compensation to cyber-skilled employees. Currently pending in the 113th Congress is legislation that would authorize the department to establish cybersecurity positions in the excepted service, directly appoint candidates to positions, and provide compensation and benefits beyond what Title 5, United States Code would authorize. (300)
In the absence of legislative action, DHS has launched a number of initiatives to help develop the workforce it needs, including in cybersecurity.
On October 24, 2012, the Homeland Security Secretary announced the establishment of a Secretary's Honors Program (SHP) "to recruit exceptional recent graduates for careers" in DHS. (301) Under the program, individuals with relevant graduate, undergraduate, or law degrees may apply for one-year or two-year fellowships in information technology, cybersecurity, policy, management, emergency management, and law. Individuals selected for the program will participate in rotations throughout DHS, be mentored, receive training, and participate in programs for professional development. Upon successful completion of the program, participants may be converted to permanent employees within the department. (302)
On February 22, 2013, DHS launched the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS), an online resource for cybersecurity career, education, and training information. The initiative was developed through the close partnership of DHS, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Defense, the Department of Education, the National Science Foundation, and the Office of Personnel Management. It combines government, industry, and academia efforts to "provide a comprehensive, single resource to address the nation's cybersecurity knowledge needs." (303)
In April 2013, the department began the SHP Cyber Student Initiative, "to engage exceptional community college students" in working at a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) forensics lab. The initiative offers "unpaid student volunteer positions to current two-year community college students and student veterans pursuing a program of study in a cybersecurity-related field." (304)
Diversity of the Workforce
The department's strategic plan stated an objective of "pursu[ing] greater diversity in the workforce, especially at senior levels." (305) Other than specifying that a senior-level steering committee, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of DHS, will "direct a sustained effort to improve diversity," the plan did not provide any details on the initiative. Data reported by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) provide some insight on the department's workforce characteristics. As of March 2013 (most current data available) the on-board civilian workforce at DHS numbered 196,799. Of this total, 82,468, or 41.9%, were classified as minority. Among ethnicity and racial groups represented in the department's workforce were American Indian or Alaskan Native (1,306, or 0.7% of the total), Asian (8,947, or 4.5% of the total), Black/African American (29,467, or almost 15.0% of the total), Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (871, or 0.4% of the total), and Hispanic/Latino (23,901, or 12.1% of the total). (306) OPM also reported that DHS had 24 employees on the senior-level (SL) pay schedule, and 610 employees on the Senior Executive Service (SES) pay schedule. None of the SL employees were classified as minority. The SES total included 122, or 20% minority, of which none were American Indian or Alaskan Native, or Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander; 13, or 2.1%, were Asian; 59, or 9.7%, were Black/African American; and 29, or 4.7%, were Hispanic/Latino. (307)
Women employed by DHS numbered 65,147, or 33% of the department's workforce total. (OPM's database does not provide data on gender by ethnicity and race.) Six women were paid on the SL pay schedule (25% of the SL total) and 173 (28.4% of the SES total) are paid on the SES pay schedule. (308) The strategic plan stated that DHS would institute an exit survey department-wide to provide information on employee attrition and its impact on the diversity of the workforce, but information on the department's procedures are not publicly available. The DHS website lists several reports related to diversity in the department. (309) In June 2013, the Secretary stated that the department had prepared its first Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan, but further information about the plan was not provided.
Testifying before a March 22, 2012, hearing conducted by the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management of the House Committee on Homeland Security, the department's CHCO, Catherine Emerson, stated that a concerted effort, characterized by "improved employee communication, training, emphasis on diversity and inclusion, and employee recognition," and strengthened leadership by managers and supervisors, was underway to improve morale among DHS employees. (310) Particular steps to carry out the initiative were not provided. Results from the annual Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey conducted by OPM have consistently found low morale at DHS. The most recent survey results, released by OPM on November 21, 2012, (311) again reported a decline in the department's ratings. In the ranking of agencies represented in the survey, according to four key indices, DHS placed low, and even lower than its relative positions in the 2011 survey. Specifically, the department's ranks (out of 37 agencies) and overall scores for the 2012 survey, as compared with the 2011 survey, were as follows: Leadership and Knowledge Management--36/52 (33/55 in 2011), Results-Oriented Performance Culture--36/46 (35/48 in 2011), Talent Management--35/50 (33/53 in 2011), and Job Satisfaction--35/61 (33/64 in 2011). (312) A May 2013 report from the Partnership for Public Service that was based on the results of the Employee Viewpoint Survey ranked DHS in last place among seventeen other large agencies in terms of innovation. The report gave the department an innovation score of 52.7%, a decline of -2.6% over the previous year. Among the 292 agency subcomponents that were ranked in the report, the United States Coast Guard was the highest placed DHS component with a rank of 74 and an innovation score of 67.2%, an increase of 0.8% over the previous year. (313)
Congress could mandate that the Department of Homeland Security provide periodic updates, during hearings on the budget request and other matters, on the progress of its initiatives to address each of these issues. For example, the House Committee on Appropriations, in its report accompanying the FY2014 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations bill, directed the department to report to the relevant committees of jurisdiction on a corrective action plan to address concerns about morale and innovation. (314)
In addition, review and evaluation of the OCHCO by Congress on a regular basis throughout the year could continue to inform legislative oversight of current and developing HRM policies at DHS. The chief human capital officer also could be directed to provide detailed information on the OCHCO webpage that would be updated at designated intervals and include copies of specific plans (such as the Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan) to fulfill the department's HRM initiatives (such as those related to the recruitment and hiring, diversity, and employee morale issues) and advances in accomplishing them. For oversight purposes, Congress may be interested in examining the department's procedures for exit interviews, (315) the findings of the interviews, and any procedures established by DHS to consider the results.
L. Elaine Halchin, Specialist in American National Government (email@example.com, 7-0646)
The Department of Homeland Security ranked sixth among federal agencies in procurement spending in FY2012. In constant dollars (2012), DHS spent $4.8 billion in FY2003 and $12.4 billion in FY2012.316 During this same time period, government-wide procurement spending increased from $381.7 billion (2012 constant dollars) to $514.4 billion.
As the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) Panel noted in its 2007 report, the federal acquisition workforce has "shortcomings in terms of size, skills, and experience," (317) and DHS is no exception. In 2008, GAO reported that the department did not have "adequate staff to effectively plan and execute contracts." (318) In the same report, GAO acknowledged that "DHS's initiatives are positive steps toward building an effective acquisition workforce," but also noted that the department needs to engage in long-term strategic workforce planning. (319)
Potentially positive steps include the department's development and implementation of a Procurement Staffing Model and a strategic plan for its acquisition function, which includes several acquisition workforce initiatives. DHS reported in June 2012 that it was implementing the staffing model, which was designed to provide "optimal numbers" of personnel needed to award and administer contracts. (320) Additionally, the Chief Procurement Officer's (CPO's) strategic plan for FY2012-FY2014 includes the following acquisition workforce initiatives: "continue [the] acquisition professional career program ... improve [the] quality of [the] contracting workforce ... and promote employee retention." (321) Responsible officials and performance metrics are identified for each initiative.
Balanced Workforce Strategy (BWS)
In early 2009, DHS announced that, as part of its efficiency review, department components would examine how to achieve a proper balance between federal employees and contractor employees. The strategy has three goals:
* Complying with applicable statutes, regulations, and policies, through a repeatable, documented decision-making process;
* Determining the proper balance of federal and contractor employees for programs and functions; and
* Reducing mission risk, while as practicable, reducing or controlling cost. (322)
The department's BWS process involves identifying and analyzing the work (e.g., the statement of work (SOW) included in a service contract), and implementing the sourcing decision that results from the analysis. (323) The department's Balanced Workforce Program Management Office, and an affiliated departmental working group, lead the effort and provide oversight.
The topics discussed here suggest several questions that may be of interest to the 113rd Congress. Regarding the department's acquisition workforce, does the department have sufficient funding to recruit and retain the "optimal numbers" of acquisition staff it needs to conduct procurements properly? What acquisition tasks, activities, and contracts are most likely to be affected by the lack of a fully staffed and trained acquisition workforce? Under its Balanced Workforce Strategy, has DHS discovered contractor employees performing inherently governmental functions? Has the department identified any situations where it had ceded control over its mission and operations to contractor employees? How many contractors, and which contracts, might be affected by the agency's efforts to achieve a balanced workforce?
Homeland Security Research and Development
Dana A. Shea, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-6844)
For more information, see CRS Report R43064, The DHS S&TDirectorate: Selected Issues for Congress.
Many stakeholders have identified advances in research and development (R&D) as key to creating new or improved technologies that defend against homeland security threats. R&D is generally a multi-year endeavor with significant risk of failure. Additionally, it may take years to realize any benefits from R&D investments. The Administration and Congress have differing visions regarding successful R&D performance in DHS, as indicated by marked differences in requested and appropriated funding. In addition, some congressional and stakeholder expectations regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of agency performance have not been met. The 113th Congress may continue to focus attention on whether investments in homeland security research and development net appropriate rewards, how the distribution of investments among homeland security topics and between R&D activities leads to a balanced portfolio, and what the appropriate funding level for DHS R&D is during a time of fiscal constraint.
The DHS homeland security R&D activities have substantial scope, as these activities must attempt to meet the needs of both DHS component agencies and other customers outside of the agency, such as first responders. Many stakeholders continue to debate the optimal approach to maximizing DHS R&D effectiveness. Some advocates call for substantial increases in particular areas of research and development, citing that a dedicated research effort with significant investments is more likely to yield technology breakthroughs. Some stakeholders call for a rebalancing of the investment portfolio with an increased focus on technology development, arguing that many prototypes under development in the private sector need only a small boost to convert them to procurable technologies. Still other stakeholders call for a rebalancing of the investment portfolio towards long-term research activities, warning that DHS will lack research outcomes to develop into prototypes if long-term research languishes. Finally, portions of the stakeholder community suggest using a high-risk, high-reward investment strategy similar to that undertaken by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) so as to make "leap-ahead" advances relative to terrorist capabilities.
DHS is not the sole provider of federal funds for homeland security R&D, but the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology (S&T) is responsible for coordinating homeland security R&D activities within DHS and across the federal government. The DHS Under Secretary for S&T has experienced challenges in attempting to coordinate these activities and has not issued a federal homeland security R&D strategy. The GAO has identified that DHS lacks an established definition for what constitutes R&D within the agency. This may be a key barrier to coordination of R&D investment within DHS and across the broader federal effort. Congress has historically been interested in identifying and overcoming the barriers to such coordination. The 113th Congress may conduct oversight of how any new strategic approaches taken by DHS address these long-standing concerns, set milestones for future performance, and project meeting the needs of DHS components and the first-responder community.
Both the Administration and Congress have contemplated reorganizing DHS R&D activities. For both FY2011 and FY2012, DHS requested that Congress transfer some research and development activities within the purview of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to the S&T Directorate. Congress did not approve this transfer. In contrast, the Senate explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 113-6 directed DHS to consider the advantages of merging the Office of Health Affairs and DNDO, potentially transferring portions of these offices to other DHS components. The results of the proposed merger, R&D reprioritization efforts, and consolidation might change the productivity of DHS R&D activities, which have been criticized by some stakeholders as having little to show for the federal investment. Other stakeholders, including some representatives of DHS operational components, indicate that R&D efforts undertaken by the S&T Directorate have yielded value. Congressional appropriations for the S&T Directorate have fluctuated in recent years. This may indicate that some congressional policymakers find the slow rate of return shown by S&T Directorate R&D investments unacceptable.
Author Contact Information
William L. Painter
Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland
Specialist in Transportation Policy
Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland
Bruce R. Lindsay
Analyst in American National Government
John W. Rollins
Specialist in Terrorism and National Security
Analyst in American Federalism and Emergency
Jerome P. Bjelopera
Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism
Lennard G. Kruger
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Linda K. Moore
Specialist in Telecommunications Policy
Sarah A. Lister
Specialist in Public Health and Epidemiology
Jared T. Brown
Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland
R. Eric Petersen
Specialist in American National Government
L. Elaine Halchin
Specialist in American National Government
Specialist in Resources and Environmental Policy
Barbara L. Schwemle
Analyst in American National Government
Dana A. Shea
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
Henry B. Hogue
Specialist in American National Government
David Randall Peterman
Analyst in Transportation Policy
Specialist in Aviation Policy
Acting Section Research Manager and Specialist in
Paul W. Parfomak
Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure Policy
Marc R. Rosenblum
Specialist in Immigration Policy
(1) President Obama's Administration specifically addresses terrorism and counterterrorism in the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism.
(2) DHS states that it intends to issue the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review in late 2013 or early 2014.
(3) Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics, 2nd ed, Washington, DC, CQPress, 2007, p. 82.
(4) 116 Stat. 2251. The law refers to a definition from OMB's 2002 "Annual Report to Congress on Combatting Terrorism."
(5) Office of Management and Budget, FY2014 Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the United States Government, p.415.
(6) For a fuller discussion of this issue, see CRS Report R41189, Homeland Security Department: FY2011 Appropriations, coordinated by Jennifer E. Lake and William L. Painter.
(7) P.L. 113-6. Analysis of the DHS appropriation in the act can be found in CRS Report R42644, Department of Homeland Security: FY2013 Appropriations.
(8) P.L. 113-2. Analysis of the supplemental appropriation for FY2013 can be found in CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief
(9) CBO, Final Sequestration Report for Fiscal Year 2013, March 2013, p. 4.
(10) Remarks by Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator, State Department, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Before the United Nations Counterterrorism Committees, July 20, 2011.
(11) Spencer Ackerman, "Even Dead, Osama Has a Winning Strategy," Wired, July 20, 2011, http://www.wired.com/ dangerroom/2011/07/even-dead-osama-has-a-winning-strategy-hint-its-muhammad-alis/.
(12) Pierre Thomas, Jack Cloherty, and Mike Levine, "Outgoing FBI Director Warns of Americans Traveling to Syria and Bringing Terrorist Tactics Home," ABC News, Aug. 22, 2013, Outgoing FBI Director Warns of Americans Traveling to Syria and Bringing Terrorist Tactics Home.
(13) Remarks by the John Brennan, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, before the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, June 29, 2011.
(14) CRS does not presume the guilt of indicted individuals in pending federal cases.
(15) For this report, "homegrown" describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. "Jihadist" describes radicalized Muslims using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for belief in the establishment of a global caliphate--a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph--via violent means. Jihadists largely adhere to a variant of Salafi Islam--the fundamentalist belief that society should be governed by Islamic law based on the Quran and adhere to the model of the immediate followers and companions of the Prophet Muhammad.
(16) In a January 13, 2013, report, CRS listed 63 plots and attacks by homegrown jihadists that occurred between September 11, 2001, and December 2012. The number has risen since then, as additional plots occurred after December 2012. See CRS Report R41416, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, by Jerome P. Bjelopera. Hereinafter: Bjelopera, American Jihadist.
(17) In addition, the Tsarnaevs also allegedly killed a police officer after the Boston Marathon bombing.
(18) For more information on these attacks see Appendix A in Bjelopera, American Jihadist.
(19) The two attacks between 9/11 and May 2009 involved Hasan Akbar and Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar. On March 23, 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army Sergeant Akbar killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at U.S. Army Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25 miles from the Iraq border. On March 3, 2006, Taheri-Azar, a 22-year-old naturalized American citizen from Iran, drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at The Pit, a popular student gathering spot at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The SUV struck and injured several people.
(20) White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism, June 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ counterterrorism_strategy.pdf. Hereinafter: National Strategy.
(21) Ibid, p. 3.
(22) Mathieu Rabechault, "U.S. Refocuses on Home-Grown Terror Threat," AFP, June 29, 2011; Karen DeYoung, "Brennan: Counterterrorism Strategy Focused on al-Qaeda's Threat to Homeland," Washington Post, June 29, 2011.
(23) White House, Empowering Local Partners to prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, August 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf.
(24) For more information on the strategy, see CRS Report R42553, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States, by Jerome P. Bjelopera. Eileen Sullivan, "New White House Strategy to Hit Violent Extremism," Associated Press, August 3, 2011.
(25) Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Security Criminal Investigations, Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed, Canada, June 2009, p. 1.
(26) Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 20, no. 3 (July 2008), p. 416.
(27) Home Office, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, p. 108, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/ prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary.
(28) Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, August 2011, p. 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf.
(29) According to the FBI, "Although difficult to define, 'no particular factual predication' is less than 'information or allegation' as required for the initiation of a preliminary investigation (PI). For example, an assessment may be conducted when: (i) there is reason to collect information or facts to determine whether there is a criminal or national security threat; and (ii) there is a rational and articulable relationship between the stated authorized purpose of the assessment on the one hand and the information sought and the proposed means to obtain that information on the other. An FBI employee must be able to explain the authorized purpose and the clearly defined objective(s), and reason the particular investigative methods were used to conduct the Assessment." See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, redacted, 2011 update, pp. 5-1 through 5-2. For more information see CRS Report R41780, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations, by Jerome P. Bjelopera.
(30) Charlie Savage, "F.B.I. Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds," New York Times, June 12, 2011.
(31) Scott Shane and Michael S. Schmidt, "Boston Police Weren't Told F.B.I. Got Warning on Brother," New York Times, May 9, 2013. FBI press release, "Statement by Special Agent in Charge Richard DesLauriers Regarding Information Sharing," May 9, 2013.
(32) Defined as an electronic device that accesses or relies on the transfer of bytes of data to perform a mechanical function. The device can access cyberspace (Internet) through the use of physical connections or wireless signals.
(33) For additional information, see CRS Report RL33123, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues, by John W. Rollins and Clay Wilson.
(34) See "Challenges Remain in DHS' Efforts to Security Control Systems," Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, August 2009. For a discussion of how computer code may have caused the halting of operations at an Iranian nuclear facility see CRS Report R41524, The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability, by Paul K. Kerr, John W. Rollins, and Catherine A. Theohary.
(35) Executive Assistant Director Shawn Henry, Responding to the Cyber Threat, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Baltimore, MD, 2011.
(36) Department of Defense Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III, "Defending a New Domain," Foreign Affairs, October 2010.
(37) Ken Dilanian, "U.S. Spy Agencies to Detail Cyberattacks from Abroad," Los Angeles Times, December 6, 2012.
(39) For discussions of federal law and issues relating to cybercrime, see CRS Report 97-1025, Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws, by Charles Doyle, and CRS Report R41927, The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting U.S. Law Enforcement, by Kristin Finklea.
(40) Symantec, "Symantec Internet Security Threat Report: Trends for 2010," Vol. 16, April 2011. Plain text summary with calculations available at http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20110907_02.
(41) For additional information, see CRS Report RL31787, Information Operations, Cyberwarfare, and Cybersecurity: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues, by Catherine A. Theohary.
(42) Perlroth, Nicole, "Cyberattack On Saudi Firm Disquiets U.S.," New York Times, October 24, 2012, p. A1. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/business/global/cyberattack-on-saudi-oil-firm-disquiets-us.html?pagewanted= all.
(43) The concept of attribution in the cyber world entails an attempt to identify with some degree of specificity and confidence the geographic location, identity, capabilities, and intention of the cyber-aggressor. Mobile technologies and sophisticated data routing processes and techniques often make attribution difficult for U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities.
(44) Emerging cyber-based technologies that may be vulnerable to the actions of a cyber-aggressor include items that are in use but not yet widely adopted or are currently being developed. For additional information on how the convergence of inexpensive, highly sophisticated, and easily accessible technology is providing opportunities for cyber-aggressors to exploit vulnerabilities found in a technologically laden society see Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, National Intelligence Council, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, December 10, 2012.
(45) Information derived from a multi-authored CRS Report R42114, Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Overview and Discussion of Proposed Revisions, by Eric A. Fischer, November 9, 2012.
(46) Information contained in this section was derived from a multi-authored reports and memos produced by numerous CRS analysts working on cybersecurity.
(47) The White House, "The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative," March 5, 2010. For additional information about this Initiative and associated policy considerations, see CRS Report R40427, Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative: Legal Authorities and Policy Considerations, by John W. Rollins and Anna C. Henning.
(48) See, for example, Seymour M. Hersh, "Judging the Cyber War Terrorist Threat," The New Yorker, November 1, 2010.
(49) Nakashima, Ellen, "Obama Signs Secret Directive to Help Thwart Cyberattacks," The Washington Post, Nov. 14, 2012.
(50) Daniel, Michael, "Improving the Security of the Nation's Critical Infrastructure," The White House Blog, February 13, 2013. http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/13/improving-security-nation-s-critical-infrastructure.
(51) CRS Report R42349, The Project BioShield Act: Issues for the 112th Congress, by Frank Gottron.
(52) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund Justification of Estimates for Appropriations Committees FY2013, p. 18.
(53) See, for examples, Senator Bob Graham, Senator James Talent, and Randall Larsen, et al., Bio-Response Report Card, The Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center, Washington, DC, October 2011, pp. 45-49, http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf; and Christopher Nelson, Andrew M. Parker, and Shoshana R. Shelton, et al., Analysis of the Cities Readiness Initiative (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), pp. 31-34.
(54) David Willman, "The Biodefender That Cries Wolf," Los Angeles Times, July 8, 2012.
(55) Dr. Alexander Garza, Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, DHS, "The Truth About BioWatch: The Importance of Early Detection of a Potential Biological Attack," July 12, 2012. Statistics cited in this blog posting were later reported to be inaccurate by a DHS official. See comments of BioWatch Program Manager Dr. Mike Walter before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Continuing Concerns Over BioWatch and the Surveillance of Bioterrorism, 113th Cong., 1st sess., June 18, 2013, CQ transcription.
(56) See for example Robert Roos, "Public Health Officials Respond to Critique of BioWatch," CIDRAP News, August 17, 2012, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/aug1712biowatch.html.
(57) GAO, Biosurveillance: DHS Should Reevaluate Mission Need and Alternatives before Proceeding with BioWatch Generation-3 Acquisition, GAO-12-810, September 10, 2012, p. 3, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-810.
(58) Testimony of William Jenkins, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, GAO, before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and Communications, and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, BioWatch Present and Future: Meeting Mission Needs for Effective Biosurveillance?, joint hearing, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., September 13, 2012, CQ transcription. According to GAO, the estimated Gen-3 life cycle costs are based on DHS's June 2011 Life-Cycle Cost Estimate, which estimates costs through FY2028.
(59) GAO, Biosurveillance: DHS Should Reevaluate Mission Need and Alternatives before Proceeding with BioWatch Generation-3 Acquisition, GAO-12-810, September 10, 2012, highlights page.
(60) Testimony of BioWatch Program Manager Dr. Mike Walter before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Continuing Concerns over BioWatch and the Surveillance of Bioterrorism, 113th Cong., 1st sess., June 18, 2013.
(61) See BioWatch discussions in CRS Reports on annual DHS appropriations, http://www.crs.gov/pages/subissue.aspx? cliid=2345.
(62) House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, "Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Continues Investigation of BioWatch and Surveillance of Bioterrorism," press release, June 18, 2013, with links to committee report and other documents, http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-releases.
(63) House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, "Bipartisan Committee Leadership Requests GAO Study of BioWatch," press release, Aug. 20, 2013, http://energycommerce.house.gov/pressreleases.
(64) White House, Office of the Press Secretary, National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, May 9, 2007, HSPD 51 is also identified as Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 20 A more detailed discussion of national continuity policy is available in CRS Report RS22674, National Continuity Policy: A Brief Overview, by R. Eric Petersen.
(65) NSPD 51 identifies continuity of operations (COOP) as "an effort within individual executive departments and agencies to ensure that Primary Mission-Essential Functions continue to be performed during a wide range of emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related emergencies."
(66) NSPD 51 identifies continuity of government (COG) as "a coordinated effort within the federal government's executive branch to ensure that national essential functions continue to be performed during a catastrophic emergency."
(67) The directive notes "that each branch of the federal government is responsible for its own continuity programs," and requires an executive branch official to "ensure that the executive branch's COOP and COG policies ... are appropriately coordinated with those of the legislative and judicial branches in order to ... maintain a functioning federal government." The legislative branch and the federal judiciary maintain continuity programs consonant with their positions as coequal branches of government. NSPD 51 does not specify the nature of appropriate coordination with continuity planners in the legislative and judicial branch.
(68) 53 FR 47491; November 23, 1988.
(69) Real property is defined as property that is leased or owned by the General Services Administration.
(70) U.S. Government Accountability Office, Federal Real Property: Overreliance on Leasing Contributed to High-Risk Designation, GAO-11-879T, August 4, 2011, p. 1, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11879t.pdf.
(71) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Federal Protective Service: Fiscal Year 2012 Congressional Justification, Washington, DC, February 2011, p. FPS-1.
(72) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Federal Protective Service: Strategic Plan, Secure Facilities, Safe Occupants, Washington, DC, 2011, pp. 3-5.
(73) Food and Drug Administration (FDA), "Food Defense," http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense.
(74) CRS Report RS22600, The Federal Food Safety System: A Primer, by Renee Johnson.
(75) DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Agriculture and Food Sector Snapshot, http://www.dhs.gov/foodand- agriculture-sector.
(76) CRS Report R40443, The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (P.L. 111-353), coordinated by Renee Johnson.
(77) FDA FSMA implementation information, http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/default.htm.
(78) FDA, FSMA Reports and Studies, http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm271961.htm.
(79) GAO, "Revamping Federal Oversight of Food Safety," http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/revamping_food_safety/.
(80) Hazardous liquids primarily include crude oil, gasoline, jet fuel, diesel fuel, home heating oil, propane, and butane. Other hazardous liquids transported by pipeline include anhydrous ammonia, carbon dioxide, kerosene, liquefied ethylene, and some petrochemical feedstocks.
(81) U.S. Attorney's Office, Middle District of Pennsylvania, "Man Convicted of Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al-Qaeda Sentenced to 30 Years' Imprisonment," Press release, November 6, 2007; U.S. Dept. of Justice, "Four Individuals Charged in Plot to Bomb John F. Kennedy International Airport," Press release, June 2, 2007.
(82) Carol Cratty, "Man Accused in Attempted Bombing of Oklahoma Gas Pipeline," CNN, August 12, 2011.
(83) "Grand Jury Indicts Plano Gas Pipeline Bomb Suspect on Weapons Charge," Associated Press, July 11, 2012.
(84) Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), "Gas Pipeline Cyber Intrusion Campaign," ICS-CERT Monthly Monitor, April 2012, p.1, http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICS CERT_Monthly_Monitor_Apr2012.pdf.
(85) Government Accountability Office (GAO), Pipeline Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Help Strengthen Security, but Could Improve Priority-Setting and Assessment Processes, GAO-10-867, August, 2010, Executive Summary.
(86) Transportation Security Administration, personal communication with section author, February 24, 2012.
(87) Jack Fox, General Manager, Pipeline Security Division, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), remarks before the Louisiana Gas Association Pipeline Safety Conference, New Orleans, LA, July 25, 2012.
(88) U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, Actions Needed to Enhance Pipeline Security, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Report No. AV-2008-053, May 21, 2008, p. 6.
(89) The Honorable Gus M. Billirakis, Remarks before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight hearing on "Unclogging Pipeline Security: Are the Lines of Responsibility Clear?," Plant City, FL, April 19, 2010.
(90) U.S. Government Accountability Office, Pipeline Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Help Strengthen Security, but Could Improve Priority-Setting and Assessment Processes, GAO-10-867 August 4, 2010, pp. 56-57.
(91) See, for example, Testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, March 3, 2010.
(92) See, for example, Testimony by Paul Orum, Blue Green Chemical Security Coalition/Independent Consultant to Center for American Progress, before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, September 11, 2012.
(93) See, for example, Testimony of Matthew J. Leary, Pilot Chemical Company, on behalf of the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates, before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy, September 11, 2012.
(94) Testimony of David Wulf, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, National Programs and Protection Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, on August 1, 2013.
(95) Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Efforts to Assess Chemical Security Risk and Gather Feedback on Facility Outreach Can Be Strengthened, GAO-13-353, April 2013.
(96) See, for example, Representative Robert Aderholt, Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, House Committee on Appropriations, Opening Statement as Prepared for Delivery at Hearing on Chemical Security Anti-Terrorism Standards Program, July 26, 2012.
(97) P.L. 107-297; 116 Stat. 2322.
(98) The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act, 116 Stat. 594.
(99) The CFATS anti-terrorism standards were mandated in DHS funding legislation enacted in 2006 (P.L. 109-295). They were initially established on an interim basis for three years, but Congress has been extending them on a year-to- year basis.
(100) Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, Surface Transportation Security FY2013 Congressional [Budget] Justification, p. 14.
(101) United States House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Hearing on TSA's Surface Inspection Program: Strengthening Security or Squandering Resources?, May 31, 2012, http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-tsa%E2%80%99s-surface-inspection-program strengthening-security-or-squandering.
(102) United States Governmental Accountability Office, Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information and Coordination among Four Overlapping Grant Programs, GAO-12-303, February 2012.
(103) For additional information on preparedness grant consolidation, see "Consolidation of DHS State and Local Programs" in this report.
(104) Homicide levels in Mexico--"largely attributable to drug trafficking and organized crime"--began an escalated climb after 2007. There is debate as to whether this violence leveled off or slightly decreased in 2012; nonetheless, researchers have noted that the violence remains "elevated." University of San Diego, Trans-Border Institute, Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis Through 2012, February 2013, pp. 1, 11.
(105) Jeffrey A. Roth, "Psychoactive Substances and Violence," National Institute of Justice (Research in Brief Series), February 1994 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice).
(106) Ramon Bracamontes, "CBP Chief Assesses the Border: Alan Bersin, in El Paso, Assures Safety, Backs Mexico's Fight," El Paso Times, January 6, 2011.
(107) U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, Product No. 2010-Q0317-001, February 2010, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/38661p.pdf.
(108) Oriana Zill and Lowell Bergman, "Do the Math: Why the Illegal Drug Business is Thriving," PBS Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drug s/.
(109) Elyssa Pachio, "Trial of Rogue Tijuana Gang Raises Question of Violence Spilling Over to San Diego," InSight Crime, March 5, 2012.
(110) According to the DEA, "[S]pillover violence entails deliberate, planned attacks by the cartels on U.S. assets, including civilian, military, or law enforcement officials, innocent U.S. citizens, or physical institutions such as government buildings, consulates, or businesses. This definition does not include trafficker on trafficker violence, whether perpetrated in Mexico or the U.S." See Drug Enforcement Administration, Statement of Joseph M. Arabit Special Agent in Charge, El Paso Division, Regarding "Violence Along the Southwest Border" Before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies, March 24, 2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/speeches/s032409.pdf.
(111) Testimony by David Shirk, Director, Trans-Border Institute, University of San Diego, before the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, Federal Law Enforcement Response to US-Mexico Border Violence, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 24, 2009.
(112) See CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence by Kristin M. Finklea. See also U.S. Government Accountability Office, Southwest Border Security: Data Are Limited and Concerns Vary About Spillover Crime Along the Southwest Border, GAO-13-175, February 2013.
(113) For more information on U.S. assistance to Mexico and on bilateral security cooperation, see CRS Report R41349, U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and Beyond, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea.
(114) Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, August 5, 2010, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140888.htm.
(115) U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment 2009, Product No. 2008-Q0317-005, December 2008, p.49, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs31/31379/31379p.pdf. This is the most recent estimate of total annual proceeds. With respect to bulk cash, the most recent NDIC threat assessment (2010) indicates that from 2003 to 2004, an estimated $17.2 billion was smuggled from the United States to Mexico in the form of bulk cash alone. See U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment 2010, Product No. 2010-Q0317-001, February 2010, p. 47, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/ 38661p.pdf. (Hereinafter NDTA, 2010).
(116) The Department of the Treasury defines the BPME as "a large-scale money laundering system used to launder proceeds of narcotic sales in the United States by Latin American drug cartels by facilitating swaps of dollars in the U.S. for pesos in Colombia through the sale of dollars to Latin America businessmen seeking to buy U.S. goods to export," http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/advis04282006.html.
(117) According to the Department of the Treasury, a money services business is any person or entity engaging in activities including exchanging currency; cashing checks; issuing, selling, or redeeming travelers' checks, money orders, or stored value cards; and transmitting money. For more information, see http://www.fincen.gov/ financial_institutions/msb/definitions/msb.html.
(118) See NDTA, 2010, pp. 47-50 for more information on developments in illicit finance.
(119) According to the Code of Federal Regulations, stored value are "funds or monetary value represented in digital electronics format (whether or not specially encrypted) and stored or capable of storage on electronic media in such a way as to be retrievable and transferable electronically," 31 C.F.R. [section]103.11(vv).
(120) Douglas Farah, "Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling: Challenges for the Merida Initiative," in Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime, ed. Eric L. Olson, David A. Shirk, and Andrew D. Selee (2010), p. 144.
(121) 31 U.S.C. [section]5312(a)(3) defines a monetary instrument as "(A) United States coins and currency; (B) as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation, coins and currency of a foreign country, travelers' checks, bearer negotiable instruments, bearer investment securities, bearer securities, stock on which title is passed on delivery, and similar material; and (C) as the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide by regulation for purposes of sections 5316 and 5331, checks, drafts, notes, money orders, and other similar instruments which are drawn on or by a foreign financial institution and are not in bearer form."
(122) Department of the Treasury, "Bank Secrecy Act Regulations Definition of "Monetary Instrument," 76 Federal Register 64049, October 17, 2011. Entities such as the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control have urged the Administration to finalize this rule. See, for instance, Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, The Buck Stops Here: Improving U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Practices, April 2013.
(123) Ken Stier, "Underground Threat: Tunnels Pose Trouble from Mexico to Middle East," Time, May 2, 2009.
(124) Statement of James A. Dinkins, Executive Associate Director, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, before the U.S. Congress, Senate United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Illegal Tunnels on the Southwest Border, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2011.
(125) Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, "CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels," http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-132_Sep12.pdf.
(126) U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "Second Major Cross-Border Drug Tunnel Discovered South of San Diego This Month: Investigators Seize 32 Tons of Marijuana, Arrest 6 Suspects," press release, November 30, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/dea/divisions/sd/2011/sd113011.shtml.
(127) Elliot Spagat and Jacques Billeaud, "Drug Tunnels Discovered Between U.S.-Mexico Border Contained Railcar System, Tons Of Pot," Huffington Post, July 13, 2012.
(128) For more information, see http://www.geophysical.com/militarysecurity.htm.
(129) Statement of Laura E. Duffy, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California, U.S. Department of Justice, before the U.S. Congress, Senate United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, Illegal Tunnels on the Southwest Border, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2011.
(131) CRS analysis of data provided by U.S. Customs and Border Security (CBP) Office of Legislative Affairs, August 23, 2012 and from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), "CBP's 2012 Fiscal Year in Review," February 1, 2013, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national/02012013_3.xml.
(132) The Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210), the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295), the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-293), the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act, P.L. 109-347), and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act, P.L. 110-53).
(133) See CBP, CBP Trade Strategy: Fiscal Years 2009-2013, Washington, DC, 2009, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/ cgov/trade/trade_outreach/trade_strategy/cbp_trade_strategy.ctt/cbp_trade_strategy.pdf.
(134) See U.S. CBP, "C-TPAT: Program Overview," http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/ ctpat_program_information/what_is_ctpat/ctpat_overview.ctt/ctpat_overview.pdf. Commercial truck drivers who are Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) members also are eligible to join the Free and Secure Trade System (FAST), which permits expedited processing at land ports of entry; and C-TPAT members who are residents of the United States and are known importers that have businesses physically established, located, and managed within the United States may be eligible for the Importer Self-Assessment Program (ISA), which exempts importers from certain post-entry enforcement audits. See ibid., and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Fact Sheet: Fast and Secure Trade," http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/travel/fast/fast_fact.ctt/fast_fact.pdf.
(135) See for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade, Supporting Economic Growth and Job Creation through Customs Trade Modernization, Facilitation, and Enforcement, 112th Cong., 2nd sess.. May 17, 2012.
(137) As of August 22, 2012, 10,337 businesses had joined C-TPAT, including 845 customs brokers, according to data provided by CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, August 24, 2012. By comparison, U.S. Census data indicates that there were 181,648 U.S. importers in 2010 and CBP data indicate that there were 11,000 customs brokers; see U.S. Census, "A Profile of U.S. Importing and Exporting Companies, 2009-2010," http://www.census.gov/foreign- trade/PressRelease/edb/2010/edbrel.pdf; and CBP, "Becoming a Customs Broker," http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/ trade_programs/broker/brokers.xml. Nonetheless, data from the CBP Office of Legislative Affairs also indicate that CTPAT members account for 50-56% of all imports by value.
(138) See for example, [section][section]201-202 of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Reauthorization Act of 2013 (S. 662/H.R. 3004), which would direct CBP to consult with private sector entities and coordinate with other federal agencies to ensure that participants in trusted trader programs "receive commercially significant and measurable trade benefits." Certain C-TPAT benefits are described in statute under [section][section]213-216 of the SAFE Port Act of 2006.
(139) See U.S. Department of Commerce, Draft Report: Improving Economic Outcomes by Reducing Border Delays, Facilitating the Vital Flow of Commercial Traffic Across the US-Mexican Border, Washington, DC, 2008, http://grijalva.house.gov/uploads/ Draft%20Commerce%20Department%20Report%20on%20Reducing%20Border%20Delays%20Findings%20and%20 Options%20March%202008.pdf.
(140) Secondary inspection may include both non-intrusive imaging (NII) scans and/or physical inspection, in which the container may be opened and unpacked so that materials can be examined.
(141) CRS analysis of data provided by U.S. Customs and Border Security (CBP) Office of Legislative Affairs, August 23, 2012.
(142) Also see Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), pp. 34-36.
(143) The 100% scanning pilot program is known as the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI). Following DHS's evaluation of the SFI in 2012, the program was scaled back to a single port, Port Qasim, in Pakistan.
(144) The risk-based scanning program is known as the Container Security Initiative (CSI).
(145) CRS analysis of data provided by U.S. Customs and Border Security (CBP) Office of Legislative Affairs, August 23, 2012.
(146) Letter from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator, May 2, 2012. The 9/11 Act permits the Secretary to extend the deadline by two years and in additional two-year increments by certifying that two of the following conditions exist: that scanning systems are not available, are insufficiently accurate, cannot be installed, cannot be integrated with existing systems, will significantly impact trade and the flow of cargo, and/or do not provide adequate notification of questionable or high-risk cargo. In her notification to Congress, Secretary Napolitano certified that the use of systems to scan containers would have a significant and negative impact on trade capacity and cargo flows, and that systems to scan containers cannot be purchased, deployed, or operated at overseas ports due to limited physical infrastructure.
(147) See U.S. CBP, Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilots (Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, [section]231). Also see U.S. GAO, Supply Chain Security: Container Secuirty Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning, GAO-12-422T, February 7, 2012, http://www.gao.gov/ assets/590/588253.pdf. Also see letter from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, to Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator, May 2, 2012.
(148) Spoken response by Kevin McAleenan, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. CBP, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the Border and Maritime Security Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Committee, U.S. House, hearing "Balancing Maritime Security and Trade Facilitation: Protecting our Ports, Increasing Commerce and Securing the Supply Chain--Part I," February 7, 2012. CBP reports that the U.S. government spent a total of about $120 million during the first three years of the Secure Freight Initiative; CBP, Report to Congress on Integrated Scanning System Pilots, p. 13.
(149) See U.S. CBP, "CBP Trade Strategy: Fiscal Years 2009-2013," Washington, DC: 2009.
(150) See for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Balancing Maritime Security and Trade Facilitation: Protecting Our Ports, Increasing Commerce, and Securing the Supply Chain--Part I, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., February 7, 2012.
(151) H.Rept. 113-91, p. 32.
(152) See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Using Technology to Facilitate Trade and Enhance Security at Our Ports of Entry, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., May 1, 2012. On border wait times, also see GAO, CBP Action Needed to Improve Wait Time Data and Measure Outcomes of Trade Facilitation Effort, GAO-13-603, July 24, 2013.
(153) According to a CRS analysis of data provided by CBP Office of Congressional Affairs in January 2013, staffing for enforcement between ports of entry more than doubled between FY2004 and FY2012 (increasing from 10,819 to 21,394), while staffing at ports of entry increased just 20% during this period (from 18,110 to 21,790).
(154) H.Rept. 113-91, pp. 30-31; S.Rept. 113-77, p. 33.
(155) See for example the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744), as passed by the Senate, and the Putting Our Resources Toward Security (PORTS) Act (H.R. 583).
(156) 19 U.S.C. [section]58b restricts CBP's authority to receive reimbursement to cases in which the volume or value of business cleared through the port is too low to justify the availability of customs services and if the governor of the state in which the port is located approves the arrangement; and 19 U.S.C. [section]1451 restricts CBP's ability to collect extra fees as compensation for providing services outside of normal business hours.
(157) Also see CRS Report R43147, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014 Appropriations, coordinated by William L. Painter.
(158) For a brief overview of challenges with the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal and the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System, see Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Developed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain, GAO-11-869T, July 26, 2011.
(159) See CRS Report R41419, The Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress, by Dana A. Shea and Daniel Morgan for background.
(160) See Gowadia, Dr. Huban, written testimony in his capacity as Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Does DHS have an Effective and Efficient Nuclear Strategy," July 26, 2012.
(161) Federal Register, v. 72, no. 16, January 25, 2007, pp. 3492--3604. Codified at 49 CFR 1572.
(162) Many workers have objected to the second visit, asking why the card could not be mailed to them. GAO has reported that mailing the card would not meet government standards for issuing security credentials. GAO, Transportation Worker Identification Credential: Mailing Credentials to Applicants' Residence Would Not Be Consistent with DHS Policy, GAO-11-542R, April 13, 2011. [section]709 of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-213) changes the process to require only one in-person visit by the applicant.
(163) [section]104 of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) set a deadline of April 13, 2009, for the issuance of a final rule on card reader deployment. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, A Review of the Delays and Problems Associated with TSA's Transportation Worker Identification Credential, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., June 28, 2012.
(164) 78 FR 17782, March 22, 2013.
(165) Comments filed can be viewed at http://www.regulations.gov under docket # USCG-2007-28915.
(166) GAO, Transportation Worker Identification Credential--Card Reader Pilot Results Are Unreliable; Security Benefits Need to Be Reassessed, GAO-13-198, May 8, 2013.
(167) U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Operations, Federal Government Approaches to Issuing Biometric IDs, 113th Cong., 1st sess., May 9, 2013.
(168) U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Threat, Risk and Vulnerability: the TWIC Program, 113th Cong., 1st sess., June 18, 2013.
(169) GAO, Transportation Security: Action Needed to Strengthen TSA's Security Threat Assessment Process, GAO-13 629, July 19, 2013.
(170) GAO, Transportation Worker Identification Credential--Internal Control Weaknesses Need to Be Corrected to Help Achieve Security Objectives, May 2011, GAO-11-657.
(171) For additional background, see CRS Report R42750, Airport Body Scanners: The Role of Advanced Imaging Technology in Airline Passenger Screening, by Bart Elias.
(172) See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union. ACLU Backgrounder on Body Scanners and "Virtual Strip Searches," New York, NY, January 8, 2010.
(173) Donna Goodison, "Passengers Shocked by New Touchy-Feely TSA Screening," The Boston Herald, August 24, 2010.
(174) Burns, Bob, The TSA Blog, "Rapiscan Backscatter Contract Terminated--Units to be Removed," January 18, 2013. http://blog.tsa.gov/2013/01/rapiscan-backscatter-contract.html.
(175) Robert Poole, "Problems and Progress with PreCheck," Airport Policy and Security News #84, November 5, 2012, The Reason Foundation, Los Angeles, http://reason.org/news/show/airport-policy-and-security-news-84.
(176) See http://www.knowncrewmember.org/Pages/Home.aspx.
(177) Transportation Security Administration, Press Release: U.S. Airline Flight Attendants to Get Expedited Airport Screening in Second Stage of Known Crewmember Program, Friday, July 27, 2012, http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/ 2012/07/27/us-airline-flight-attendants-get-expedited-airport-screening-second-stage.
(178) Katie Johnston, "A Question for You," The Boston Globe, August 3, 2011.
(179) H.Rept. 112-492, pp. 65-66.
(180) Scott Shane, "Lapses Allowed Suspect to Board Plane," The New York Times, May 4, 2010.
(181) See CRS Report RL33645, Terrorist Watchlist Checks and Air Passenger Prescreening, by William J. Krouse and Bart Elias for additional background.
(182) Department of Homeland Security, "DHS Now Vetting 100 Percent of Passengers On Flights Within Or Bound For U.S. Against Watchlists," Press Release, November 30, 2010.
(183) Katie Drummond, "Where Have All the MANPADS Gone?" Wired, February 22, 2010.
(184) Ibid; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defense System, July 27, 2011, http://www.state.gov/l7pnyrls/fs/169139.htm.
(185) "Mass. Man Accused of Plotting Attack on Pentagon, Capitol," nbcnews.com, September 28, 2011. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/44705648/ns/us_news-security/#.URlBDYbDhOU.
(186) "Spoofing" is sending a counterfeit signal to a target receiver that gives unauthorized commands or false information, but appears to be from a reliable source.
(187) Todd Humphreys, Statement on the Vulnerability of Civil Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Other Systems to Civil GPS Spoofing, Submitted to the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management of the House Committee on Homeland Security, July 19, 2012; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Use in the National Airspace System and the Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, July 19, 2012, GAO-12-889T.
(188) A list of organizations that applied for Certification of Authorization to operate drones is available at http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/.
(189) See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
(190) See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 ("[W]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.") (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
(191) See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) ("The Government's interest in preventing the
entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border.").
(192) H.R. 5925, S. 3287, 112th Cong. 2d Sess. (2012).
(193) For summaries of legislative activity in recent years, see CRS Report R42036, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 112th Congress, coordinated by Andorra Bruno; and CRS Report R40848, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 111th Congress, coordinated by Andorra Bruno.
(194) For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R43097, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress: Major Provisions in Senate-Passed S. 744, by Marc R. Rosenblum and Ruth Ellen Wasem.
(195) House bills receiving committee action as of August 31, 2013 include the Border Security Results Act of 2013 (H.R. 1417), the Legal Workforce Act (H.R. 1772), the Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement Act (SAFE Act, H.R. 2278), the Agricultural Guest worker Act (H.R. 1773), and the Supplying Knowledge-based Immigrants and Lifting Levels of STEM Visas Act (SKILLS Visa Act, H.R. 2131).
(196) Legal permanent residents (LPRs) are foreign nationals authorized to live lawfully and permanently within the United States; see CRS Report RL32235, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
(197) For a fuller discussion of travel requirements, see CRS Report RL31381, U.S. Immigration Policy on Temporary Admissions, by Ruth Ellen Wasem; CRS Report RL32235, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions, by Ruth Ellen Wasem; and CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by Alison Siskin.
(198) Individuals are ineligible to participate in a trusted traveler program if they are inadmissible to the United States; provide false or incomplete information on trusted traveler applications; have been convicted of a criminal offense, have outstanding warrants, or are subject to an investigation; or have been found in violation of customs, immigration, or agriculture laws. Trusted travel enrollees are re-checked against certain security databases every 24 hours, every time they enter the United States, and every time they renew their trusted traveler membership. See Susan Holliday, "Global Entry Takes Off," CBP Frontline, Winter 2011, p. 7.
(199) CBP, "Global Entry Fact Sheet," May 2013, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/travel/ ge_factsheet_update.ctt/ge_factsheet_update.pdf.
(200) CBP, "NEXUS Fact Sheet," May 2013, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/travel/ nexus_facts.ctt/nexus_facts.pdf.
(201) CBP, "SENTRI Fact Sheet," May 2013, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/travel/sentri/ sentri_fact.ctt/sentri_fact.pdf.
(202) See for example, the Jobs Originated through Launching Travel Act of 2013 (H.R. 1354).
(203) Nonimmigrants are aliens admitted to the United States for a designated period of time (i.e., temporarily) and for a specific purpose; see CRS Report RL31381, U.S. Immigration Policy on Temporary Admissions, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
(204) Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56) [section][section]403 and 411. Also see the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA, P.L. 108-458) [section]7208.
(205) See CRS Report RS22446, Nonimmigrant Overstays: Brief Synthesis of the Issue, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
(206) For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report RL32234, U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (USVISIT) Program, by Lisa Seghetti and Stephen R. Vina.
(207) The Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) is a division within DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate. The Administration's FY2014 budget request proposed (for the second year in a row) to eliminate USVISIT/OBIM and to transfer the entry-exit program into CBP and ICE, but both chambers rejected the Administration's proposed realignment during the FY2014 cycle. See CRS Report R43147, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014 Appropriations, coordinated by William L. Painter.
(208) According to a 2009 GAO report, US-VISIT was operational at all 115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 of 170 land ports. US-VISIT was not deployed to the remaining land POE's because most visitors subject to US-VISIT requirements were not authorized to use them or because, in two cases, the ports did not have the necessary transmission lines to operate US-VISIT. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Key USVISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13, November 2009, p. 7, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1013.pdf.
(209) US-VISIT Office of Congressional Affairs January 24, 2013.
(210) The integrated system only reports data relating to third country nationals and U.S. and Canadian permanent residents. The program operated at four ports between September 2012 and January 2013, and expanded to all automated POEs on the Canada-U.S. border beginning June 20, 2013. See Canada Border Services Agency and DHS, "Entry/Exit Information System Phase I Joint Canada-United States Report," May 8, 2013, http://www.cbsa.gc.ca/btbpdf/eeis-ponerep-sdes-rappun-eng.html
(211) GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions Needed to Assess DHS's Data and Improve Planning for a Biometric Air Exit Program, GAO-13-683, July 2013, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/656316.pdf.
(212) U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Comprehensive Immigration Reform, testimony of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, 113th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2013.
(213) See for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Visa Security and Overstays: How Secure is America? 113th Cong., 1st sess., May 21, 2013.
(214) For example, S. 744 would require DHS to place 90% of aliens identified as visa overstays in removal proceedings or otherwise resolve their cases.
(215) For example, the Jobs Originated through Launching Travel Act of 2013 (H.R. 1354) and the Visa Waiver Program Enhanced Security and Reform Act (H.R. 490/S. 223) would require that countries could not participate in the Visa Waiver Program if their visa overstay rate exceeds 3%.
(216) In November 2007, the IDENT database was upgraded from 2 fingerprints to 10 prints, a change that increased its accuracy for identification purposes and that allows IDENT data to be checked against the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). The IAFIS database includes fingerprints, criminal histories, photographs, and biographic information of more than 66 million subjects in its criminal master file along with more than 25 million sets of civil fingerprints; see Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System," http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ iafis/iafis. IDENT/IAFIS interoperability also permits ICE automatically to check the immigration records of people booked into state and local jails through the Secure Communities program; see CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William A. Kandel.
(217) Border crossing cards (BCC, also known as "laser visas") are short-term multiple-entry, 10-year nonimmigrant visas that may be issued to certain citizens of Mexico for business or tourism. BCC holders are permitted to visit the United States for up to 30 days and must remain within a zone up to 25 miles from the border in Texas, New Mexico, and California or within 75 miles of the border in Arizona.
(218) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment Update for the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (U.S.-VISIT) in Conjunction with the Final Rule (73 FR 7743), Enrollment of Additional Alien in US-VISIT," February 10, 2009, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/ privacy_pia_usvisit_addl%20aliens.pdf.
(219) According to DHS data, there were about 165 million nonimmigrant admissions to the United States in FY2012, including about 54 million (33%) I-94 admissions (generally subject to US-VISIT) and about 106 million tourists and business travelers from Canada and Mexicans with BCCs; see Randall Monger, Nonimmigrant Admissions to the United States: 2012, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow Report, August 2103, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_ni_fr_2012.pdf.
(220) US-VISIT tested a pair of pilot programs in 2009 to collect biometric data from departing air passengers and a pilot program in 2009-2010 to collect biometric data from departing temporary workers at a pair of land ports in Arizona, but did not view either program as viable and scalable models for biometric exit data collection. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited Understanding of Air Exit Options, GAO-10-860, August 2010, p. 4, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10860.pdf; and DHS, Comprehensive Biometric Air Exit Plan: Fiscal Year 2012 Report to Congress, May 11, 2012.
(221) For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R43097, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress: Major Provisions in Senate-Passed S. 744, by Marc R. Rosenblum and Ruth Ellen Wasem.
(223) By comparison, the enforcement-related budget of the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service was $380 million in 1986, according to CRS calculations from U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government: Appendix, Washington, DC, 1987 For a fuller discussion of FY2014 appropriations, see CRS Report R43147, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014 Appropriations, coordinated by William L. Painter.
(224) The deployment of these new border assets would be one of several "triggers" for the implementation of legalization provisions in S. 744. For a fuller discussion, see CRS Report R43097, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress: Major Provisions in Senate-Passed S. 744, by Marc R. Rosenblum and Ruth Ellen Wasem.
(225) See for example, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, A Study in Contrasts: House and Senate Approaches to Border Security, 113th Cong., 1st sess., July 23, 2013. The Border Patrol published a national strategy for controlling U.S. borders in May 2012, building on three earlier strategies published between 1994 and 2005. The new strategy describes USBP's approach to risk management and to striking a balance among its traditional emphasis on preventing illegal migration and its post-9/11 priority missions of preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist weapons, along with the recent U.S. focus on combating transnational criminal organizations. But the strategy does not describe operational plans or address the interaction among the Border Patrol and other federal agencies (including other parts of DHS) with responsibilities at the border.
(226) The border patrol reported 327,577 alien apprehensions along the Southwest border in FY2011, the lowest number since FY1972; see U.S. Border Patrol, Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions By Fiscal Year, http://www.cbp.gov/ linkhandler/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/60_10_app_stats.ctt/60_11_app_stats.pdf.
(227) See, e.g., U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Cooridination is Needed for the Northern Border, GAO-11-97, December 2010, http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d1197.pdf. Also see CRS Report R42969, Border Security: Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders, by Marc R. Rosenblum, Jerome P. Bjelopera, and Kristin Finklea.
(228) U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery, Border Corruption: Assessing Customs and Border Protection and the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General's Office Collaboration in the Fight to Prevent Corruption, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 9, 2011.
(229) GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen CBP Efforts to Mitigate Risk of Employee Corruption and Misconduct, GAO-13-59, December 4, 2012.
(230) GAO, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Provides Integrity-Related Training to Its Officers and Agents throughout Their Careers, GAO-13-769R, August 28, 2013.
(231) For further analysis on emergency and major disaster declarations see CRS Report RL34146, FEMA's Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer, by Francis X. McCarthy.
(232) The methodology used to determine the initial request by the Administration for the DRF incorporates four data points. These points include (1) the available appropriation, (2) the DRF monthly average (the amount in the DRF), (3) the monthly cost estimates for catastrophic events, and (4) the estimated monthly recoveries of unobligated funds. Disasters costing $500 million or more have been considered outliers and are not factored in the calculation.
(233) For further analysis on Stafford Act declarations from 1953 to 2011 see CRS Report R42702, Stafford Act Declarations 1953-2011: Trends and Analyses, and Implications for Congress, by Bruce R. Lindsay and Francis X. McCarthy.
(234) For further analysis on disaster assistance under the Budget Control Act see CRS Report R42352, An Examination of Federal Disaster Relief Under the Budget Control Act, by Bruce R. Lindsay, William L. Painter, and Francis X. McCarthy.
(235) The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) manages the sequestration process and the limits on adjustments available to raise the spending cap. The BCA requires OMB to annually calculate the adjusted 10-year rolling average of disaster relief spending that sets the allowable cap adjustment for disaster relief.
(236) The allowable adjustment for disaster assistance for FY2013 was $11.8 billion, $6.4 billion of which was already available to the DRF under the terms of P.L. 112-175. The Administration's request for assistance in the immediate wake of the storm was $60.7 billion.
(237) P.L. 113-2, Title X, Chapter 6.
(238) Roll No.14, January 15, 2013.
(239) Record Vote Number 3, January 28, 2013.
(240) Extensive descriptions of the Hurricane Sandy storm and its impacts can be found in Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: Stronger Communities, a Resilient Region, Washington, DC, August 2013, pp. 18-22, at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=HSRebuildingStrategy.pdf; and at Federal Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Sandy FEMA After-Action Report, Washington, DC, July 1, 2013, p. 7, at http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/33772.
(241) See, for example, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, A Review of the Preparedness, Response to and Recovery from Hurricane Sandy, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., December 4, 2012, and Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security Appropriations, Hurricane Sandy: Response and Recovery Progress and Challenges, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., December 5, 2012.
(242) The Stafford Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq. The major disaster declarations are: New York (DR-4085); New Jersey (DR-4086); Connecticut (DR-4087); Rhode Island (DR-4089); Delaware (DR-4090); Maryland (DR4091); Virginia (DR-4092); West Virginia (DR-4093); New Hampshire (DR-4095); the District of Columbia (DR4096); Massachusetts (DR-4097); Ohio (DR-4098); and Pennsylvania (DR-4099). More information on each declaration is available at http://www.fema.gov/disasters.
(243) On March 1, 2013, as required pursuant to Sec. 251A of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, the Administration ordered an automatic across-the-board cancellation of budget authority, known as sequestration. This resulted in a $2.5 billion reduction in the budget authority provided by the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, leaving $48.0 billion available for use. A full breakdown of the supplemental funding, as enacted by Congress, and how it compares to the Administration's request submitted on December 7, 2012, is available in Table 1 of the CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief, coordinated by William L. Painter and Jared T. Brown.
(244) For a detailed review of SRIA, Division B of P.L. 113-2, please see CRS Report R42991, Analysis of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, by Jared T. Brown, Francis X. McCarthy, and Edward C. Liu.
(245) Executive Order 13632, "Establishing the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force," 77 Federal Register 74341, December 14, 2012.
(246) For membership details, see Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy: Stronger Communities, a Resilient Region, Washington, DC, August 2013, pp. 196-198, at http://portal.hud.gov/ hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=HSRebuildingStrategy.pdf. Henceforth referred to as the HSRS in footnotes.
(247) HSRS, pp. 8-9.
(248) U.S. Department of Homeland Security webpage, at http://www.fema.gov/preparedness-1/national-preparednessgoal, accessed on January 10, 2013.
(249) U.S. Census Bureau, State and Local Government Finance Summary Report, April 2011, p. 7.
(250) The definition of state and local public safety expenditures is based on the U.S Census Bureau's definition of public safety for the annual surveys of state and local government finances.
(251) This amount includes appropriations for the Firefighters Assistance Grants.
(252) P.L. 112-74, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. This amount includes funding for Firefighter Assistance Grants and Emergency Management Performance Grant.
(253) P.L. 113-6. This amount is after the across-the-board cuts but prior to applying sequestration.
(254) P.L. 112-74, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. This amount includes funding for Firefighter Assistance Grants and Emergency Management Performance Grant.
(255) S.Rept. 112-169, p. 113.
(257) H.Rept. 113-91, p. 94. S.Rept. 113-77, p. 117.
(258) P.L. 112-96.
(259) White House, Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, Washington, DC, March 30, 2011, p. 1, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm.
(260) White House, Homeland Security Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness, Washington, DC, December 17, 2003. http://www.dhs.gov/files/publications/gc_1189788256647.shtm.
(261) For the 2012 preparedness report, see Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Report, Washington, DC, March 30, 2012, at http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/26675?id=5914. For the 2013 preparedness report, see Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Report, Washington, DC, March 30, 2012, at http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32509?id=7465.
(262) For copies of the National Prevention Framework, National Mitigation Framework, National Response Framework 2.0, the National Disaster Recovery Framework, and other documents related to the National Preparedness System, see FEMA's "National Preparedness Resource Library" at http://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-resource-library.
(263) For example, PPD-8 calls for a Campaign to Build and Sustain Preparedness, a National Training and Education System, a National Exercise Program, and a Remedial Action Management Program. These components are also mandated, in various formats, in statute.
(264) See for example FDA, "About the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Reauthorization Act of 2013 (PAHPRA)," http://www.fda.gov/emergencypreparedness/medicalcountermeasures/ucm346195.htm.
(265) P.L. 109-417, the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act. Actual appropriations for most of these programs have also decreased since 2006.
(266) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended. See CRS Report RL34724, Would an Influenza Pandemic Qualify as a Major Disaster Under the Stafford Act?, by Edward C. Liu; and CRS Report RL33053, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding, by Francis X. McCarthy.
(267) CRS Report RL33579, The Public Health and Medical Response to Disasters: Federal Authority and Funding, by Sarah A. Lister.
(268) CRS Report RL33927, Selected Federal Compensation Programs for Physical Injury or Death, coordinated by Sarah A. Lister and Charles S. Redhead; GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and Other Health Care Needs, GAO-07-67, February 28, 2007, http://www.gao.gov; CRS Report R40554, The 2009 Influenza Pandemic: An Overview, by Sarah A. Lister and Charles S. Redhead; and CRS Report R41232, FY2010 Supplemental for Wars, Disaster Assistance, Haiti Relief, and Other Programs, coordinated by Amy Belasco.
(269) CRS reports on ACA implementation are available at http://www.crs.gov/pages/subissue.aspx?cliid=3746.
(270) 5 0 U.S.C. Appx. [section]2062(a)(4); [section]2(a)(4) of the DPA.
(271) For the definition of national defense in the DPA, see 50 U.S.C. Appx. [section]2152(14); [section]702(14) of the DPA.
(272) For more examples of how DPA authorities have been and can be used to support homeland security activities, see Department of Homeland Security, The Defense Production Act Committee: Report to Congress, Washington, DC, August 2011, p. 8; or Department of Homeland Security, Use of the Defense Production Act to Reduce Interruptions in Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Operations During Emergencies, April 25, 2008, pp. 18-19; or The National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Framework for Dealing with Disasters and Related Interdependencies: Final Report and Recommendations, Appendix G: The Defense Production Act, Washington, DC, July 14, 2009, p. 48.
(273) 5 0 U.S.C. Appx. [section]2158; [section]708 of the DPA. This provision offers parties to such agreements limited protection from antitrust statutes.
(274) 5 0 U.S.C. Appx. [section]2170, [section]721 of the DPA. For more on CFIUS, see CRS Report RL33388, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), by James K. Jackson.
(275) Executive Order 13603, 77 Fed. Reg. 16651 (Mar. 22, 2012).
(276) See P.L. 111-67 for the last reauthorization of the DPA.
(277) Several reauthorization bills in the past have only extended the sunset date, with no major revisions to the DPA, while others have amended the authorities while also extending the expiration date.
(278) See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade, Reauthorizing the Defense Production Act, 113th Cong., 1st sess., May 8, 2013, H. Hrg. 113-8 (Washington: GPO, 2013); and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Oversight of the Defense Production Act: Issues and Opportunities for Reauthorization, 113th Cong., 1st sess., July 16, 2013 (pre-published).
(279) The Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC) is a new interagency body established by the 2009 reauthorization of the DPA to advise the President regarding the effective use of authorities granted to the President by the DPA and delegated by E.O. 13603. The DPAC website is at http://www.dpacommittee.com/dpac.htm.
(280) P.L. 107-296; 116 Stat. 2135 at 2243.
(281) Implementation of certain provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was interwoven into a January 2007 reorganization under the Secretary's authority.
(282) P.L. 110-28; 121 Stat. 112 at 143.
(283) See, for example, a provision of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008: "None of the funds provided in this Act shall be available to carry out section 872 of Public Law 107-296" (P.L. 110-161, [section]546; 121 Stat. 2080). Similar provisions were included in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 110-329, [section]529; 122 Stat. 3686); the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111- 83, [section]525; 123 Stat. 2173); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74, Division D, [section]523; 125 Stat. 974); and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6, Division D, Sec. 522; 127 Stat.371). The final continuing resolution for FY2011 appears to have carried the FY2010 provision forward for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2011. See P.L. 112-10, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011; 125 Stat. 38. [section]1104 of the act provides that, "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this division, the requirements, authorities, conditions, limitations, and other provisions of the appropriations Acts referred to in section 1101(a) shall continue in effect through the date specified in section 1106 [September 30,2011]" (125 Stat. 103). The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-83), which contains the limitation provision, is among those referred to in [section]1101(a).
(284) U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of Homeland Security--Transfer of Support Function for Principal Federal Officials, B-316533, July 31, 2008, http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/316533.pdf. Hereafter, B 316533.
(285) See Basil J. Mezines, Jacob A. Stein, and Jules Gruff, Administrative Law, vol. 1 (New York: Matthew Bender, 2006), pp. 4-18 to 4-27.
(286) For examples of DHS program management and financial management issues, see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, OIG-13-09, November 2012; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Managing Preparedness Grants and Assessing National Capabilities: Continuing Challenge Impede FEMA's Progress, GAO-12-526T, March 20, 2012; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, FEMA's Efforts to Recoup Improper Payments in Accordance with the Disaster Assistance Recoupment Fairness Act of 2011, OIG-12-127, September 2012.
(287) House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency and Financial Management, "Department of Homeland Security Financial Management," May 13, 2011. Documents available at http://oversight.house.gov/hearing/financial-management-at-the-department-of-homeland-security/.
(288) Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, OIG-13-20, "Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY2012 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting," November 2012, p. 1.
(289) Internal control standards seek to ensure that the use of funds comply with applicable laws, that assets are appropriately protected against waste, fraud, and abuse, and that federal agencies have efficient and effective financial and program administration systems that allow for appropriate accountability of funds. Internal control standards are integrated into program management protocols, including quarterly program and financial monitoring, timely submission of single audit reports and grants closeout, and improper payments testing and reporting.
(290) Office of Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security, OIG-13-09, :"Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security," December 2012, p. 22.
(291) Dodaro, Gene L., Comptroller General of the United States, transmittal letter accompanying GAO-13-271R "Financial Audit: U.S. Government's Fiscal Years 2012 and 2011 Consolidated Financial Statements," January 17, 2013, p. 3.
(292) U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Homeland Security Headquarters Facilities, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 25, 2010 (Washington: GPO, 2010), pp. 335-366.
(293) "St. Elizabeths Development Revised Baseline," document provided by DHS, June 12, 2013.
(294) "Prospectus--Construction: Department of Homeland Security Consolidation at St. Elizabeths, Washington DC," PDC-0002-WA14, p. 14. As downloaded from GSA.gov.
(295) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Strategic Plan FY 2012-2016 (Washington, DC: 2012), pp. 25-26, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-strategic-plan-fy-2012-2016.pdf. Hereafter referred to as DHS, Strategic Plan.
(296) The Homeland Security Academic Advisory Council provides advice and recommendations to DHS on matters related to, among other issues, student and recent graduate recruitment; homeland security academic programs; and cybersecurity. The department is the lead agency for the Cybersecurity Workforce Structure component of the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education whose goal is "to establish an operational, sustainable and continually improving cybersecurity education program for the nation." See, http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-academic-advisorycouncil- hsaac and http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/workforce.htm.
(297) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council, Cyberskills Task Force Report, (Washington: Fall 2012), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ffiles/publications/ HSAC%20CyberSkills%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf.
(298) Nicole Johnson, "DHS to Hire 600 Cyber Professionals," Federal Times, FedLine, October 31, 2012.
(299) Janet Napolitano, "Cyber Education Key to Security," Politico, April 8, 2013, available at http://www.politico.com/ story/2013/04/cyber-education-key-to-security-89715.html. Additional information is provided in Department of Homeland Security, Congressional Budget Justification FY2014 (Washington: DHS, April 2013), references to the cybersecurity workforce are at pp. 34, 2518, 2570, 2629-2630, and 3440 of the electronic document, available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget.
(300) Representative Michael McCaul introduced H.R. 756, the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2013, which passed the House of Representatives on a roll call vote (No. 107) of 402-16 on April 16, 2013. Senator John Rockefeller introduced S. 1353, the Cybersecurity Act of 2013, which was ordered to be reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on July 30, 2013. The provision on Federal Cyber Scholarship for Service is at Section 106(e) of the House bill and Section 302(e) of the Senate bill.
(301) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Secretary Napolitano Announces Employment Honors Program at Academic Advisory Council Meeting," news release, October 24, 2012, available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/10/ 24/secretary-napolitano-announces-employment-honors-program.
(302) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Secretary's Honors Program," available at https://www.dhs.gov/ secretarys-honors-program. In remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on October 25, 2012, Secretary Napolitano said that the program is designed for 50 fellows who "will be given special mentorships, special projects, really see the upper reaches of the department in terms of leadership," available at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1115140892?accountid=12084.
(303) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "DHS Launches National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies," news release, February 21, 2013, available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/02/21/dhs-launches-national- initiativecybersecurity-careers-and-studies. The NICCS website is available at http://niccs.us-cert.gov/.
(304) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "DHS Announces Cyber Student Initiative," news release, April 18, 2013, available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/04/18/dhs-announces-cyber-student-initiative, and "DHS Secretary's Honors Program Cyber Student Initiative," available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ffiles/publications/ SHP_Cyber_Student_Initiative_Bulletin.pdf.
(305) DHS, Strategic Plan, p. 26.
(306) U.S. Office of Personnel Management, FedScope Database, diversity cubes, available at http://www.fedscope.opm.gov/employment.asp. The Office of Personnel Management defines on-board employment as the number of employees in pay status at the end of the quarter (or end of the pay period prior to the end of the quarter). Comparing the March 2013 data with that as of March 2012 shows that total employment decreased by 1,007, or -0.5% and minority employment increased by 959, or 1.2%. Employment of American Indians or Alaskan Natives decreased by 66, or -4.8%; Asians increased by 220, or 2.5%; Blacks/African Americans increased by 207, or 0.7%; Native Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders increased by 64, or 7.9%; and Hispanics decreased by 764, or -3.1%.
(307) Comparing the March 2013 data with that as of March 2012 shows that the number of SL employees increased by 4, or 20% and the number of SES employees increased by 3, or 0.5%. The number of SES employees who were Asian remained the same; Black/African American increased by 2, or 3.5%; and Hispanic/Latino increased by 1, or 3.3%.
(308) Ibid. FedScope database, employment cubes. Comparing the March 2013 data with that as of March 2012 shows that the number of women increased by 129, or 0.2%, women on the SL pay schedule remained the same and women on the SES pay schedule decreased by 7, or -3.9%.
(309) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "EEO and Diversity Reports and Resources," available at http://www.dhs.gov/eeo-and-diversity-reports-and-resources.
(310) Written testimony of DHS Chief Human Capital Officer Catherine Emerson for a House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management hearing titled "Building One DHS: Why is Employee Morale Low?," March 22, 2012, available at http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/03/22/written-testimony-dhschief- human-capital-officer-house-homeland-security.
(311) U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2012 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Results, available at http://www.fedview.opm.gov/2012/. In the Department of Homeland Security, 82,218 employees responded to the survey for a participation rate of 46.5%.
(312) U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2012 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Results, Agency Rankings, available at http://www.fedview.opm.gov/2012/Ranking/. The Leadership and Knowledge Management Index measures the extent to which employees hold their leadership in high regard. The Results-Oriented Performance Culture Index measures the extent to which employees believe their organizational culture promotes improvement in processes, products, and services, and organizational outcomes. The Talent Management Index measures the extent to which employees think their organization has the talent necessary to achieve its organizational goals. The Job Satisfaction Index measures the extent to which employees are satisfied with their jobs and various aspects of their jobs.
(313) Partnership for Public Service, Best Places to Work in the Federal Government Analysis Most Innovative Agencies (Washington: Partnership, May 2013), pp. 1, 5, 9, available at http://ourpublicservice.org/OPS/publications/ viewcontentdetails.php?id=222. The report defines innovation as "the process of improving, adapting or developing a product, system or service to deliver better results and create value for people."
(314) U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 2014, report to accompany H.R. 2217, 113th Congress, 1st sess., H.Rept. 11391 (Washington: GPO, May 29, 2013), p. 14, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113hrpt91/pdf/CRPT113hrpt91.pdf.
(315) A post on the Careers blog of the Wall Street Journal commented on increasing the usefulness of such exit interviews or conversations and stated that, "By finding out what spurred valued staffers to look elsewhere, managers can get to the real reasons employees feel disengaged or unhappy." Lauren Weber, "The One Question to Ask in an Exit Interview," Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2013, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/atwork/2013/02/21/the- onequestion-to-ask-in-an-exit-interview/.
(316) Using data obtained from USASpending.gov, CRS calculated FY2010 constant dollars.
(317) U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of Homeland Security: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Better Ensure the Acquisition Workforce Can Meet Mission Needs, GAO-09-30, November 19, 2008, p. 5, at http://www.gao .gov/new.items/d0930.pdf.
(318) Ibid., p. 2.
(319) Ibid., pp. 27-28.
(320) U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of Homeland Security: Continued Progress Made Improving and Integrating Management Areas, but More Work Remains, GAO-12-1041T, September 20, 2012, p. 6, at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-1041T.
(321) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Chief Procurement Officer, The Chief Procurement Officer's Four Priorities: Strategic Plan, Fiscal Year 2012 to 2014, pp. 15-16, at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ffiles/publications/ 10918-02_OCPO_strategic_plan_508_2.pdf.
(322) U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Overview of the DHS Balanced Workforce Strategy for Federal Contractors," at https://www.dhs.gov/overview-dhs-balanced-workforce-strategy-federal-contractors.
Table 1. Congressional Funding for Transit Security, FY2002-FY2012 Fiscal Appropriation year (millions of dollars) 2002 $63 (a) 2003 65 2004 50 2005 108 2006 131 2007 251 2008 356 2009 498 (b) 2010 253 2011 200 2012 88 (c) 2013 84 Total $2,063 Source: FY2002: Department of Defense FY2002 Appropriations Act, P.L. 107-117; FY2003: FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-11; FY2004: Department of Homeland Security FY2004 Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-90; FY2005-FY201 1: United States Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: DHS Needs Better Project Information and Coordination among Four Overlapping Grant Programs, GAO-12-303, February 2012, Table 1; FY2012: DHS, Transit Security Grant Program FY2012 Funding Opportunity Announcement; FY2013: DHS, FY2013 Transit Security Grant Program FY2013 Funding Opportunity Announcement Notes: The Transit Security Grant Program was formally established in FY2005; in FY2003-FY2004, grants were made through the Urban Areas Security Initiative. Does not include funding provided for security grants for intercity passenger rail (Amtrak), intercity bus service, and commercial trucking. (a.) Appropriated to Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority and the Federal Transit Administration. (b.) Includes $150 million provided in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. (c.) Congress did not specify an amount for transit security grants, leaving funding to the discretion of DHS.
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|Title Annotation:||Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)--Contacts|
|Author:||Painter, William L.|
|Publication:||Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs|
|Date:||Sep 1, 2013|
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