Iran's Shi'ite Theocracy Now Has A Shorter Shelf-Life Than Its Leaders Think.
The regime already has been taken over by the IRGC's "collective command", whose leading officers are the ones calling the shots. There are rumours, strongly denied by the command's minders under Maj-Gen Muhammad Ali Ja'fari, that Khamenei and his close associates have become "hostages by the IRGC's extremist leaders.
The situation is partly similar to the one of the 16th century AD. That was when red-turbaned Kizilbash (pronounced Qizilbash) guarded the monarchy of the first Safawi dynasty in Persia. Qizilbash is the Turkoman name of Shah Izma'il-I's well-armed guards. The name, or word, meant red-turbaned.
The Safawid empire had reached its zenith by 1510 in both geo-political and theocratic terms. By 1522, two years before Shah Isma'il-I died, there occurred a forced separation between the religious establishment and the state which became noticeable to the public.
The Qizilbash, who had seen in Isma'il the manifestation of God, began to show clearly that, although they preserved the outward forms, they considered the concept of their leader as an immortal and infallible person to be a fiction. From then on, the decline was steady.
Gradually the Qizilbash held their rulers hostage. Critics of Khamenei's theocracy today say this is exactly what has been happening since it was first revealed to the ruling elite that Khamenei suffered from leukemia several years ago.
The dynasty of Isma'il-1 faded away in the 18th century. By then the rulers' and their children had ended up being blonde with blue eyes.
That was because their mothers and wives were of Georgian origin; and in religious terms they had distanced themselves far from Ja'fari Shi'ite piousness. The latter then were described as being as bad as atheists.
They had adopted Western styles of living and had become excessively corrupt and negligent - hence exceptionally weak. As a result, Persia fell into chaos, until a nationalist and mostly secular form of government emerged.
Isma'il-I died in 1524. He was succeeded by his son Tahmasp, then aged less than 11. There followed ten years of civil war among rival Qizilbash factions, as one chief tried to usurp the shah's authority from another. With doctrinal unity imposed throughout the Safawid dominions, the influence of the sadr (religious leader of guide) who was a political appointee decreased.
In 1534, Tahmasp insisted he wanted to rule in fact, not only in name. But for most of his 52-year reign, he had a precarious relationship with the turbulent Qizilbash. He was a miser, melancholy recluse who swung between extremes of abstinence and intemperance, and was capable of great cruelty.
But Tahmasp held the Safawi state together in the face of the most determined Ottoman onslaughts under their greatest conqueror, Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent.
It was also noticed by Uzbeks under one of their greatest leaders, Ubaidallah Khan (see rim6IranSafawidsHistoryJun28-04).
To pre-empt a description of the IRGC as being a modern version of the Qizilbash, the current commanders of the guards who are excessively ambitious and corrupt, any mention of the latter is summarily quashed.
This is not only in Iran but also in its four Arab satellite-countries - Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen - by the commanding Safawi officers and their units in these four Arab countries, such as the leading Hizbullah officers both in Iraq and in Lebanon, as well as the local IRGC units in Syria and the Houthis in Yemen.
Those who presently accept the above-mentioned revelations liken Iran to a glass-house. The same is true in the case of each satellite country: Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and/or Yemen. So, in conclusion, it is only a matter of time for Iran to publicly appear as a glass-house. The four Arab satellites will then become glass-houses.