International Norms and Japanese Foreign Aid.
From the 1960s to the 1990s, most observers asserted that Japan's aid program was designed to promote its commercial self-interest (Arase 1995; Shimamura 2016). But with the publication of Japan's first Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter in 1992, the discourse around foreign aid in Japan began to change and increasingly reflects humanitarian and democratic norms in addition to a focus on commercial benefits (Hirata 2002a; Kamidohzono, Gomez, and Mine 2016). The purpose of this article is to shed light on the two big trends in Japan's aid policy: (1) increasing concern with humanitarian and democratic norms at the societal level, and (2) increasing concern with national security at the state level. How do Japan's national interests and norms influence foreign aid allocations, and how can we understand the dichotomy between the expectations of IR scholars that aid is self-interested and aid specialists who assert that aid is primarily for the benefit of the recipient country?
The Purpose of Foreign Aid
Most IR scholars are convinced that foreign aid is allocated to promote the political, security, and economic interests of the donor. Realists (Liska 1960; Morgenthau 1962; Walt 1985) argue that foreign aid is essentially bribery meant to solidify alliances and buy policy concessions. Liberals/neoliberals emphasize the use of aid to enhance the donor's international prestige (Nye and Welch 2013), the commercial benefits to the donor (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998), and the development of international institutions (Takamine 2006). Some IR scholars from the constructivist camp attribute foreign aid to moral values (Lancaster 2007; Lumsdaine 1993).
The fact that most IR scholars believe that foreign aid is primarily to promote the national interests of the donor is puzzling to many people directly involved in foreign aid. Aid specialists usually focus on the benefits to the recipients and only rarely discuss aid in terms of donor interests. Aid policymakers and those directly involved in aid project development and implementation generally believe that they are working to improve the lives of those living in the recipient states. The OECD Development Assistance Committee claims, "The overarching objective of the DAC is ... to contribute to sustainable development, including pro-poor economic growth, poverty reduction, improvement of living standards in developing countries, and to a future in which no country will depend on aid" (OECD 2010a, 3).
Aid practitioners and agencies use the language of moral values to justify their programs and tend to be reticent about explicitly claiming that aid is self-interested. For example, the USAID statement on Mission, Vision, and Values begins,
USAID's mission statement highlights two complementary and intrinsically linked goals: ending extreme poverty and promoting the development of resilient, democratic societies that are able to realize their potential. We fundamentally believe that ending extreme poverty requires enabling inclusive, sustainable growth; promoting free, peaceful, and self-reliant societies with effective, legitimate governments; building human capital and creating social safety nets that reach the poorest and most vulnerable. (USAID 2016)
Within IR, scholars from the constructivist tradition have argued that aid reflects the altruism of donors (Lumsdaine 1993) while others emphasize aid as an expression of national identity where foreign aid is an established international norm (Watson 2014). Much of the constructivist reasoning on foreign aid is a reaction to the near universal dismissal of ethical justifications for foreign aid within mainstream IR. Lumsdaine (1993) asserts that (1) international relations are governed by the principles and moral outlook of the actors in the international system, (2) states are influenced by domestic political institutions and the state's role in international society, and (3) international relations have "inherent social meaning" so that changes in international practices tend to be based on moral norms that are ongoing and changing (Lumsdaine 1993, 228).
Motivations Behind Japan's ODA
After World War II, Japan was initially an aid recipient rather than a donor and was once one of the World Bank's largest borrowers. While an aid recipient itself, Japan began to offer official aid as war reparations in 1954. In the same year, Japan joined the Colombo Plan and commenced providing technical cooperation to its Asian neighbors in addition to reparations payments. Japan's first nonreparations-related aid was in the form of soft loans to India in 1958. Japan was the first major emerging donor and explicitly integrated its foreign aid program with its economic interests. Yasutomo argues that Japan's aid in the 1960s and early 1970s was overwhelmingly given over to commercial interests (Yasutomo 1989/1990, 492). Japan also initiated the idea of omiyage gaiko or souvenir diplomacy (Rix 1993). Prime ministerial visits were coordinated with foreign aid packages that were usually announced with some fanfare during the visit, garnering positive publicity for Japan's largesse.
In addition to commercial goals and public diplomacy, aid was first explicitly tied to Japanese national security in the late 1970s. An advisory group to Prime Minister Ohira first coined the term comprehensive national security and saw a place for foreign aid to support that goal. The policy of comprehensive national security was formally introduced by Prime Minister Suzuki in 1980 (Chan 1992). The policy began to articulate how strategically oriented aid would be combined with defense and diplomacy as an integrated approach to national security (Orr 1990).
By the late 1970s, Japan increasingly considered foreign aid as part of its contribution to the US-Japan Security Alliance (Orr 1990). At the time, many in the United States saw Japan as a security free-rider. In response, the Japanese government argued that its foreign aid contributions complemented US security priorities and would lessen trade frictions between the United States and Japan. As a state with exceptional limits on its military, Japan could use its burgeoning aid budget to play a role in international affairs in partnership with the United States. In this sense, Japan's aid program took on an increasing role as a strategic tool while still supportive of Japan's commercial interests (Koppel and Orr 1993). The 1970s and 1980s were a period of rapidly growing foreign aid budgets culminating in Japan's becoming the largest provider of aid by 1989.
The overall purpose of Japan's foreign aid became harder to understand in the aftermath of the Cold War. The conventional wisdom has been that Japan provides aid as a supplement to its economic policies to promote its own export sector and secure resources for itself (Arase 1995; Berthelemy 2006). Orr (1989/1990) has argued that the commercial orientation of Japanese aid had significantly lessened over time. Throughout the 1980s, Japan reduced the amount of aid that was tied to Japanese contractors, which reduced the commercial benefits to Japan of its aid program. By the early 1990s, most of Japan's ODA was untied and the Japanese business community began to disengage from aid policy debates. Japanese businesses won fewer and fewer contracts and, by the late 1990s, had largely lost interest in aid policy (Hirata 2002a).
In the early 1990s, Japan began to argue that its ODA was intended to promote humanitarian and democratic values. Even before the 1992 ODA Charter, Japan cut ODA to Myanmar in 1988 in response to the military coup (Steinberg 1993) and cut aid to China after the Tiananmen Square Massacre (Miyashita 2001). From 1991 to 2000, the Japanese government reported that it applied negative sanctions using ODA eighteen times (Shimamura 2016). When Japan restarted aid to Myanmar in 1995 after Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest, ODA focused heavily on meeting basic human needs (Tsunekawa and Murotani 2014). Japan also utilized ODA to address post conflict humanitarian disasters in Sri Lanka (2004), Timor-Leste (1999), and Afghanistan (2003). According to Kamidohzono, Gomez, and Mine (2016), Japanese ODA has increasingly followed the international norms of poverty reduction and disaster response.
Values and Norms in Japanese Foreign Aid Discourse
In this study, norms are defined as established standards of behavior that influence state action. Norms are expressed both in policy discourse and in the design and implementation of state policy. The normative discourse around ODA in Japan has undergone a marked change. In this article, I seek to determine if that change in discourse is reflected in state action. There are four main categories of norms that have been applied to Japanese foreign policy: (1) Japan as a pacifist state, (2) Japan as a developmental state, (3) Japan as a reactive state (under US hegemony), and (4) Japan as a globalized state reflecting international humanitarian and democratic values. Foreign aid may reflect one or more of these norms at any given time. If norms influence Japan's foreign policy in predictable ways, Japan's foreign aid should reflect the norms dominant at the time aid commitments are made.
Many scholars have specifically looked at Japan's norms in the conduct of foreign policy. Katzenstein (2008) and Berger (2003) highlight Japan's norm of being a pacifist state to explain its lack of pursuit of military power to match its economic power. The reactive state hypothesis holds that Japan is not normally an active participant in world politics but tends to be reactive to external pressure, particularly from the United States on which its security depends (Calder 1988). Berger (2003) also highlights the single-minded focus on economic development as a unique norm in East Asia that may explain why changing power dynamics and the rise of China had not resulted in balance of power rivalries as realists expected. The notion that commercial success is a national norm is like Hirata's assessment of Japan as a "developmental state." She claims the developmental state persisted as a norm until the late 1990s, when Japan's economy stagnated and cooperation and collusion between the bureaucracy and big business were discredited (Hirata 2002a). Assuming the developmental state norm dominated Japanese aid policy decisionmaking until the end of the 1990s, what norm replaced it? Hirata claims that humanitarian norms in line with those promoted by the OECD DAC began to emerge in Japanese society and began to be reflected in Japanese aid policy. This marks the emergence of Japan as a globalized state adopting humanitarian and democratic norms at both the societal level and within the aid bureaucracy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (Hirata 2002a).
Japan, perhaps more than any other DAC member, has transformed its own discourse around aid. Stung by criticisms of its past aid practices, Japan issued its first ODA Charter in 1992 to explain its rationale for providing aid and ground it in Japan's respect for international norms and values. Subsequent revisions have further sharpened the focus on promoting democratic norms, peace, humanitarian assistance, environmental benefits, and economic development while acknowledging the potential for mutual benefits for Japan. At its Houston Summit in 1990, the G-7 policy statement adopted democracy promotion as an international norm, which was quickly reflected in Japan's 1992 ODA Charter. Table 1 highlights the key elements of the 1992 and 2003 ODA Charters.
The ODA Charters do not emphasize commercial benefits directly. Hirata points to the discrediting of the developmental state as the key to understanding the shift away from commercially oriented foreign aid (Hirata 2002b). Corruption scandals and economic mismanagement led to a lack of confidence in existing government institutions and the big business sector among the Japanese public and led to demands that Japan change its ODA policies to reflect the norms and values becoming more prevalent among the public. Hirata claims that Japanese citizens and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become more socially active and have adopted the international norms and values of humanitarianism. The result, she says, has been increasing pressure on the government to reflect these values in its ODA (Hirata 2002b).
In addition to Japan's policy statements in the charters, Japan's ODA/development cooperation white papers have increasingly emphasized the promotion of universal values and norms as a major purpose for Japanese ODA. For instance, the White Paper on Development Cooperation 2015 begins with a detailed explanation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 and details Japan's specific contributions to achieving the MDGs through its ODA (MOFA 2015a). These goals have little relation to what is normally considered national interests. They include eradicating extreme poverty, universal primary education, gender equality, reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, combating infectious diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing global partnerships for development.
Human security emerged as a key theme in Japan's foreign aid discourse in the late 1990s. In 1998, the Japanese government first adopted the idea of human security, defined as "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear," as a motivation for ODA (Takemi 2002). Former foreign minister and prime minister Keizo Obuchi is often credited with internalizing and promoting the human security norm as a major focus of Japan's foreign policy. He expounded on it in his speech to Asian leaders at the Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow in Tokyo in 1998:
It is my deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened nor their dignity impaired. While the phrase "human security" is a relatively new one, I understand that it is the key which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to confront those threats. (Japan Center for International Exchange 1998)
This humanitarian-oriented discourse surrounding human security soon found its way into Japan's foreign policy statements and, notably, the 2003 ODA Charter where human security was included as a priority for its ODA. At the same time, a specific program called the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects was established under the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA; Kurusu and Kersten 2011, 127). At the International Symposium on Human Security in Tokyo in February 2003, Japan's foreign minister Yoriko Kawaguchi stated, "Japan's ODA has been playing an effective and important role in promoting human security. The Government has decided to greatly expand its conventional grant assistance for grassroots projects by offering 'grassroots/human security grant aid,' in keeping with the human security concept" (MOFA 2003 a Transcribed speech, no page number given).
The appointment of Sadako Ogata, the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, as the head of JICA in 2003 was a watershed in the incorporation of humanitarian norms in Japan's aid discourse and policy. At that time, Ogata and Amartya Sen cochaired a commission on human security that asserted that ODA should fund "human-centered development, peace building, and human security" (Tsunekawa and Murotani 2014, 178). Ogata was widely respected in Japan and around the world and was able to quickly solidify Japan's ODA policy direction to emphasize human security. Kurusu and Kersten quote a JICA official as saying, "the Ogata shock was considerable, and I felt that I had been slapped with the reality that the way we had been doing things so far was no longer acceptable" (Kurusu and Kersten 2011, 130).
The 2005 ODA medium-term policy review completed under Ogata used human security as the organizing principle for Japan's ODA policy: "Japan will address the four priority issues of 'poverty reduction,' 'sustainable growth,' 'addressing global issues' and 'peace-building' described in the ODA Charter bearing in mind the perspective of 'human security,' in order to reduce the vulnerabilities faced by people, communities and countries" (Government of Japan, 2005, 2).
Many scholars of Japanese ODA have noted the shift in Japanese discourse and policy statements away from narrow national interest toward an emphasis on humanitarian values (Jain 2016, 102). The human security discourse has become so ingrained that JICA's mission statement has been condensed into just two priorities: human security and quality growth (JICA 2017). Based on these policy statements and the discourse on ODA, many observers presume that human security, as an organizing principle reflecting altruistic intent, has been institutionalized in Japanese ODA policy (Kurusu and Kersten 2011, 116). In fact, Kurusu and Kersten assert that Japan not only has assimilated the human security norm in its foreign policy but has been instrumental in refining and promoting human security as a norm in the international community (Kurusu and Kersten 2011).
The international aid community perceives Japan's ODA policies to be, while not entirely consistent, increasingly reflective of DAC norms. Japan joined the DAC in 1961 but was an outlier in aid practice and policy within the DAC due to its much higher percentage of loans compared to grants and less concessional terms than most other DAC member countries (Lancaster 2007). Over time, Japan's ODA has become more concessional, the percent tied to Japanese suppliers has markedly declined, and the policy framework has become more aligned with humanitarian values shared across the DAC. The 2010 OECD/DAC Peer Review states that Japan has made substantial progress in addressing the recommendations of prior peer reviews (OECD 2010b, 13). The 2014 OECD/DAC Peer Review commends Japan for its increasing ODA commitments and exerting "global development leadership" in areas such as health and disaster reduction (OECD 2014, 14) while still questioning the policy coherence of Japan's overall aid program. Jain (2016, 102) claims that "Japan ... is sensitive to international norms and principles and has demonstrably tried to accommodate those principles within its aid policy."
Recent Changes in Japan's ODA Policies
The changing discourse surrounding aid and aid policymaking in Japan suggests major changes in Japan's ODA practices. Fukushima (2000) states that the 1990s were a time of rethinking the purpose of Japanese ODA due to the lack of a communist threat and the criticism leveled at Japan for its "checkbook" diplomacy during the first war in Iraq. She states that Japan has indeed shifted its ODA toward promoting peace and stability, freedom, and human rights and to prevent militarization (Fukushima 2000, 163-164).
Japan's policy statements with respect to its ODA have come to emphasize international norms and values broadly consistent with Japan's fellow DAC members. Soderberg claims that after a long focus on infrastructure, Japan began shifting to "softer" aid in the environmental and human security areas in its 1999 medium-term ODA policy statement. It was then that Japan began incorporating the DAC's "development partnership strategy" to guide aid allocations in areas such as poverty reduction, universal primary education, and reduction of gender disparities (Soderberg 2002). However, Scheyvens argues that although Japan has increasingly stated that it will emphasize poverty reduction, social development, and other "soft" sectors, MOFA is skilled at incorporating international normative themes in its aid discourse without much change in actual aid practices (Scheyvens 2005, 98).
A relatively recent body of literature on Japanese ODA claims that there has been a shift in Japan's ODA toward financing human security projects based on case studies of specific aid projects. Japan has explicitly begun funding projects in conflict regions, such as Cambodia (1992 and 1998), Timor-Leste (1999), Afghanistan and Iraq (2003 and ongoing), and Mindanao in the Philippines (2002) for recovery and reconstruction (Kamidohzono, Gomez, and Mine 2016; Tsunekawa and Murotani 2014). Otopalik (2010) also finds that Japan's ODA increasingly funds governance, civil society, and human development projects. JICA publishes many project examples that purport to demonstrate its commitment to human security (JICA 2010).
Other scholars claim that Japan's aid program is becoming "securitized," meaning that ODA increasingly serves Japan's national security interests rather than promoting humanitarian values or its commercial interests. Carvalho and Potter (2016) claim that the notion of human security was repurposed by Prime Minister Koizumi away from its original altruistic meaning toward traditional "hard" security interests as Japan's contribution to the "War on Terror" (Carvalho and Potter 2016, 90). Yoshimatsu and Trinidad (2010) find that Japan's ODA policy toward the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries increasingly reflects a mixed strategic approach of balancing and accommodation of China. The authors claim that Japan's ODA seeks to finance an East-West "arc of freedom" across Southeast Asia to counter Chinese influence. Japan promotes human rights and democratic values, but only as a way to enhance Japan's image and strategically pull like-minded countries away from China (Yoshimatsu and Trinidad 2010, 215). Jain (2016) also claims that Japan perceives a significant threat from China and its growing aid program. He says that the reduction in Japan's aid to China in the mid-2000s and its recent growth in aid to countries that share concerns about China's growing power such as India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia indicate a growing emphasis on security interests in Japan's ODA (Jain 2016, 105-106).
Most of the recent literature on Japan's ODA, whether emphasizing normative values or security interests, utilizes specific cases and policy statements to support its findings. While case studies can illuminate specific instances of normative aid practices, it is unclear from specific cases whether normative factors influence Japan's overall aid commitments. In addition to case studies, there is a substantial body of quantitative literature comparing the motivations of various DAC donors, including Japan, but most do not attempt to discern changes in Japan's ODA policy over time or they ignore some key explanatory variables. For example, Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that Japan's aid allocations are highly correlated with UN voting affinity, but they did not specifically test for commercial factors. Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998) find that Japan's aid in the 1980s favored capitalist regimes and countries that were relatively better off but did not test for changes over time. Hook and Zhang (1998) look specifically at whether the changing discourse around ODA associated with the 1992 ODA Charter was accompanied by changes in Japan's aid practice. The authors found that Japan's aid policy did not change during this period and continued to emphasize commercial factors. Overall, quantitative research has found little if any shift away from promoting Japan's national interests (Chan 1992; Tuman and Strand 2006). Sato and Asano (2008) discern a shift from commercial values in the 1990s to an increasing emphasis on security factors after 2001, but no change in the importance of normative factors; their data ended in 2004.
Issues with Previous Quantitative Research on Japan's ODA
Most prior studies have weaknesses that may have limited their explanatory power. Chan's study looks only at a single year, failing to capture variations in Japanese ODA policy over time. Chan (1992), Tuman and Strand (2006), and Sato and Asano (2008) also all use ODA disbursements as the dependent variable. This is problematic because most aid projects are prepared and implemented well after an aid package is offered and accepted. Infrastructure projects often have construction periods that extend over many years so the disbursement of the ODA is increasingly disconnected from the political and security environment in which the decisions were made. When attempting to understand the aid decisionmaking process and the determining factors that drive aid allocations, ODA commitments are much preferred as the dependent variable. Berthelemy (2006) and McGillivray and White (1993) use aid commitments as the dependent variable. However, McGillivray and White test only a limited set of explanatory variables over only three years (1978-1980). Berthelemy finds that Japanese aid was moderately "egoistic" and responsive to trade variables but did not publish his modeling results, making it difficult to assess the findings on the specific factors that drive Japan's ODA commitments. Berthelemy bases his model on 1980 to 1999 data but does not test for changes over time.
Tuman and Strand (2006) as well as Sato and Asano (2008) further confuse the dependent variable by using net disbursements rather than gross disbursements. Net disbursements consider repayments of ODA loans as backward aid flows from the recipient to the donor. In fact, states that have graduated from receiving new ODA loans, but are still in repayment, appear as "donors" back to Japan in the net disbursements data. It is incorrect to use data that incorporate repayments when the research question focuses on Japanese aid decisionmaking. In the case of Japan, which utilizes a high proportion of loans in its ODA portfolio, using net disbursements will distort the effect of current political and security conditions on current foreign aid commitments.
Further, many quantitative studies of Japanese ODA express the dependent variable (DV) in US dollars (USD), particularly when comparing the aid policies of several countries (e.g., Berthelemy 2006; Tuman and Strand 2006). However, expressing Japan's aid in USD adds exchange rate variation, which is not relevant to the research question. The decisions of policymakers in Japan are based on assessments of their own financial resources in Japanese yen (JPY). If Japan increases its ODA budget in JPY by 2 percent, but the JPY depreciates 10 percent against the dollar, ODA allocations measured in USD decline by 8 percent even though policymakers increased their aid commitment. Models trying to explain Japanese aid decisions should measure Japan's ODA in JPY.
Lastly, most studies find that Japanese ODA allocations decline with GDP per capita (e.g., Chan 1992; McGillivray and White 1993; Sato and Asano 2008). This suggests poorer countries receive more ODA than richer countries, all else being equal. This finding is reasonably robust across studies, but the interpretation of the finding as evidence of altruistic intent is suspect because Japan utilized a strict graduation policy in its ODA until the recent revision of the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter. When countries achieve the status of "high income countries" per the World Bank definition for three consecutive years, those countries "graduate" from receiving new Japanese ODA commitments (MOFA 2012, XI). Adherence to this policy will result in countries' receiving small or zero ODA as their incomes pass the threshold, which will yield a negative correlation between income and ODA in most regression models. Researchers have interpreted this negative correlation to be evidence of altruistic intent. However, in the case of Japan, which provides mostly ODA loans, these countries may simply transition to standard export-import bank financing at somewhat higher interest rates. Per capita income is a reasonable basis on which to assess the creditworthiness of the borrower, which can be used to give preferential pricing to countries that may not be able to repay at market rates. For this reason, a negative correlation between income and aid could reflect Japanese export promotion policy as much as altruism. There may be altruistic intent, but that is a generous interpretation. Buena de Mesquita and Smith (2009) observe the difficulty in assessing the impact of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) on aid allocations as humanitarian intent or simply policy concessions. For this reason, definitive statements about the degree of humanitarian intent in Japanese ODA based solely on the negative correlation between income and ODA are best avoided. One way to avoid this difficulty is to include a non-income variable such as life expectancy to indicate poverty.
Approach and Methodology
The main hypothesis of this study is that Japan's foreign aid increasingly reflects humanitarian and democratic norms. If this hypothesis is true, Japan will allocate more aid to countries with higher levels of poverty, countries that have experienced humanitarian crises, and those states with more democratic governance and respect for human rights, all else being equal. I expect the strength of normative factors to increase over time as Japan internalizes international norms. This study seeks to improve on previous studies of Japan's ODA allocations with a more robust data set over a longer period, more appropriate specification of the dependent variable, and a study design that illuminates the changes in Japan's aid policy over time.
To test the factors that influence Japan's ODA commitment decisions, I develop a regression model using pooled time series data to determine if normative factors are becoming more important as commercial and security factors become less important. The regressions are run for three periods that can reasonably be expected to represent three different sets of motivations for Japanese foreign aid: (1) the Cold War era (1966-1991), (2) the post-Cold War/1992 ODA Charter (1992-2001) period, and (3) the increasing threats/2003 ODA Charter (2002-2014) period. The Cold War era was the period when Japan became one of the largest foreign aid donors in the world. Aid during this period was widely considered to reflect Japan as a developmental state (commercial orientation) or as a reactive state under the US security umbrella. The post-Cold War/1992 ODA Charter brought reduced security threats and increasing emphasis on humanitarian and democratic norms in ODA discourse and the gradual discrediting of the developmental state norm. The increasing threats/2003 ODA Charter period saw a continued emphasis on humanitarian and democratic values in the ODA Charter but also emphasized Japan's national interests and cooperation with the US-led antiterrorism policies after the 2001 terrorist attacks. In addition, relations with China deteriorated in 2004 after a series of incidents perceived as threatening to Japan's security, including escalation of the Senkaku dispute, China's drilling in an area where Japan's and China's declared Exclusive Economic Zones overlap, and the intrusion of a Chinese nuclear submarine in Japanese territorial waters in southern Okinawa.
I also test this hypothesis: Japan increased the share of its ODA provided for projects that promote humanitarian values. The panel regressions analyze the factors that decisionmakers used to decide to commit aid at the state level. Japan may also have changed the type of project it funds to promote democratic values, health, education, or human security. If this hypothesis is true, Japan will have increasingly emphasized "soft" sector projects and disaster relief rather than "hard" sector projects as international values and norms became internalized. I will compare the project types funded by Japanese ODA to determine if the share of soft sector projects and disaster relief is significantly greater in the later periods.
This study utilizes the OECD DAC data on aid commitments from Japan as the dependent variable (DV). (1) Japan's ODA allocations are expressed in constant 2013 Japanese yen (JPY). Aid commitments are defined by the OECD as written obligations by the donor to provide the stated funds under specific terms and conditions for the benefit of the recipient. The OECD also provides aid project-level data under its Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which allows a much finer-grained analysis of the type of aid activities conducted using ODA. These data are used to analyze whether Japan has changed its ODA project selection over time to emphasize particular sectors or activities. Project-level data also allow a more detailed analysis of humanitarian assistance than is possible from aggregate annual ODA commitment data.
The independent variables measure specific factors that are likely to influence Japan's ODA commitments. These variables are grouped into commercial, normative, and security factors. The commercial importance of the recipient is primarily measured by trade (2) and investment (3) indicators including Japan's exports to the recipient, imports from the recipient, and foreign direct investment (FDI) from Japan to the recipient. Socioeconomic variables (GDP, population, life expectancy) and resource indicators are from the World Bank. (4) Oil rent as a percent of GDP is used to indicate the degree to which the recipient country depends on extraction of fossil fuels. I expect that countries that have high oil production relative to their economy should receive more ODA if Japan uses ODA to ensure access to energy resources.
Two variables, GDP and population, measure the size of the economy of the recipient country. I expect larger economies to receive more ODA if Japan is prioritizing commercial factors. However, we should be cautious attributing statistical significance of GDP and population to commercial intent because larger and richer countries are not only more commercially important but also more strategically important as allies to balance against common threats.
Normative factors include indicators of recipient need such as GDP per capita and life expectancy, violence, (5) regime type, (6) humanitarian crises, and UN voting ideology. (7) Violence is measured utilizing the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) data set (Marshall 2016). I expect that higher levels of violence should result in less ODA from Japan if Japan actively utilizes ODA to promote peace and avoid international conflicts. Regime type is based on the combined polity score from the Polity IV data set, which places states on a -10 to +10 scale with -10 being the most autocratic and +10 being the most democratic (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). I expect Japan's ODA commitments to be higher for states with a higher democracy score. Humanitarian crises are indicated by the level of humanitarian aid given by other DAC donors. I expect that states that receive a larger amount of humanitarian aid from other DAC members will also receive more ODA from Japan. Because these data are only available from 1990 onward, this variable can only be included in the two periods after 1990.
The model also included a measure (Ideal Points) of the degree to which the recipient state's UN votes conform to the general parameters of a "liberal world order" (Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). Using these Ideal Points estimates, it is possible to determine whether foreign aid from Japan rewards or punishes states for their ideological voting profiles in the UN rather than simply whether they vote with Japan. I expect Japan to reward states that support the liberal democratic values in their UN votes with more ODA.
Japan's security interests are measured by UN voting affinity measures, geographical indicators such as location along sea-lanes of communication, states that border or have conflicts with China, alliance groupings, US military personnel, (8) and US ODA allocations. UN voting affinity measures the alignment of the recipient state with Japan and the United States. Countries allocating aid for security purposes may compel aid recipient states to vote together on issues before the United Nations (Voeten 2000). I expect Japan to provide more aid to states that vote with it or the United States in the UN (Alesina and Dollar 2000). Countries that border important sea-lanes of communication are indicated by a 1. Important sea-lanes are countries along the Red Sea Passage, the Persian Gulf, the Panama Canal, and the Strait of Malacca while other countries take the value 0. Countries that share a land border with China are indicated with a 1, other countries are 0. Japan may try to influence countries along China's borders if Japan feels threatened by China. This would be consistent with a "soft containment" strategy. The literature on "securitization" of Japanese ODA often points to Japan's perception of a threat from China (Jain 2016; Yoshimatsu and Trinidad 2010) as a driver of Japan's policy changes. Indicator variables were constructed to indicate territorial disputes with China. States with an ongoing dispute are coded 1 while all other states are coded 0. Maritime disputes have tended to linger, while the land border disputes have largely been settled over the past thirty years (Fravel 2005). I expect Japan to provide more ODA to states in a border or maritime dispute with China if Japan is using ODA to balance against China.
The other security variables measure the degree to which Japan's ODA commitments are responsive to US security interests. Countries with a security treaty with the United States (including those states with implicit security guarantees in US law such as Taiwan and Israel) are coded as 1 while all other states are 0. US ODA commitments to the recipient state are included as a security indicator because US aid policy is generally accepted to be security oriented (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000; Lewis-Workman 2017; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). I expect Japan to allocate more aid to states that also receive higher levels of aid from the United States, indicating explicit support for US security goals through Japan's ODA. US military personnel stationed in the recipient country is included as a measure of the importance of the country to US security interests. I expect Japan to provide more ODA to countries with higher numbers of US military personnel.
Deflators and Exchange Rates
ODA commitments from Japan are converted to constant 2013 JPY (9) to remove the impact of inflation and currency fluctuation. All variables expressed in USD are adjusted to 2013 constant dollars using the US GDP implicit price deflator (10) while all variables expressed in constant 2013 JPY are adjusted using the Japanese GDP deflator. (11)
The Model and Results
This research develops a panel regression model to simultaneously estimate the impact of commercial, security, and humanitarian factors in Japan's ODA allocations in three different time periods. The structure of the model is as follows:
ODACommitted = [[beta].sub.-0] + [[beta].sub.-1] (commercial factors) + [[beta].sub.-2] (values) + [[beta].sub.-3] (security factors) + [epsilon]
The same model is applied in the three separate time periods except for the Human Crisis variable. This variable is omitted from the 1966-1991 period because the OECD did not specifically report ODA for humanitarian purposes in the ODA commitment data set until 1990.
The models are estimated using random effects generalized least squares (GLS) with robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. (12) A lagged dependent variable is included as an explanatory variable for two reasons. First and most important is that there are good reasons to expect that ODA allocations have some degree of path dependency. ODA commitments must be agreed by both the donor and the recipient, and successful ODA projects in particular countries tend to make aid bureaucrats more comfortable preparing new projects. It is, therefore, reasonable to expect that past ODA commitments would have a positive effect on commitments in the current period, all else being equal. The second benefit of a lagged dependent variable model is to correct for correlation of the error terms over time (serial correlation). The models were estimated with and without the lagged dependent variable, which confirmed that the signs and overall magnitude of the coefficients are consistent between both specifications. Therefore, the reported results include the lagged dependent variable for the reasons stated above. The estimation results are provided in Table 2.
Cold War (1966-1991)
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, commercial factors are weak determinants of Japan's aid commitments during this period. The signs on the commercial variables are as expected but the only statistically significant commercial predictor of ODA is population, and this factor could also indicate security considerations. This finding seems contrary to much of the literature on Japanese ODA, which identifies commercial interests as Japan's primary motivation. However, we must account for the fact that during the Cold War period, Japan's ODA was mostly tied to Japanese contractors and only became predominantly untied during the 1990s. Tied aid benefits Japan commercially no matter which country receives its ODA. Paradoxically, tied aid frees the government to allocate its ODA to specific countries that serve Japan's security interests, serving both purposes simultaneously. The results of this study demonstrate that Japan only began to align its ODA allocations with commercial factors once tied aid was phased out. The strongest predictors of ODA commitments during the Cold War period are security variables. Japanese ODA is strongly predicted by US ODA, maritime disputes with China, and UN voting affinity with Japan. Interestingly, Japan gives more ODA to countries that vote against the United States in the UN and less to states that host more US military personnel, which suggests that Japan was not acting in lockstep with the United States but prioritized its own security interests. Variables that represent humanitarian or democratic values are not significant. The findings of this regression are not entirely unique in the literature. Chan (1992) ran a single-year regression (1987) on Japan's ODA allocations and found that commercial variables were insignificant.
Post-Cold War/1992 ODA Charter (1992-2001)
It is only with the end of the Cold War that commercial variables become significant determinants of Japanese ODA commitments. In addition to population, FDI and Japan's imports from the aid recipient become major factors determining Japan's ODA commitments. During this period, GDP per capita becomes a significant determinant consistent with other quantitative studies, lending some support for the idea that altruistic values influence aid decisions. However, the difficulty with interpreting this variable has been highlighted previously. During the 1990s, several fast-growing states, including South Korea, Singapore, Brunei, Kuwait, and the quasi-states of Hong Kong and Macau, China graduated from receiving ODA from Japan. These higher-income recipients' no longer receiving ODA likely explains the negative relationship between per capita income and Japanese ODA commitments. Whether this is a sign of altruistic intent is not clear. The coefficient on life expectancy (Life_Expectancy) indicates that countries with better socioeconomic conditions receive significantly more aid, contrary to expectations based on altruism. Variables reflecting democratic values are either not significant (Regime Type) or significant but in the opposite direction from the expected (UN_IdealPoints), implying Japan provides more aid to less democratic regimes, all else being equal.
Security variables are mixed during this period. Voting with Japan in the UN is strongly rewarded with ODA commitments, which is unsurprising as Japan was pushing hard for membership on the UN Security Council during this period. States in a maritime dispute with China and states that share a border with China are given more aid. US Treaty allies (US Treaty Ally) receive more aid but countries with larger contingents of US military personnel are given less aid. In contrast to the Cold War period, US ODA allocations are not significant predictors of Japanese aid commitments. It appears the coordination of ODA between the United States and Japan was much less during the 1992-2001 period than the Cold War period. Overall, Japan's ODA was determined by a mix of commercial and security interests during the 1992-2001 period. Humanitarian and democratic values did not have a significant effect on ODA commitments.
Increased Threats/2003 ODA Charter Period
This period saw a serious escalation in terrorist threats around the world, substantial deterioration in relations with China, and increasing perceived security threats from both North Korea and China. It is also the period when humanitarian values and democratic norms were more clearly articulated in the ODA Charter, which emphasized (1) poverty reduction; (2) sustainable growth; (3) global problems such as global warming, environment, health, terrorism, crime, natural disasters; and (4) peace building as the priority areas for Japan's ODA. The model results suggest, however, that Japan emphasized security over all other considerations during this period. Commercial factors returned to being weak predictors of ODA commitments. Japan gave less ODA to states that imported more from Japan. Exports to Japan and FDI were insignificant. GDP was also negatively associated with ODA, which likely reflects the fact that Japan stopped ODA loans to China in 2007 as China was growing rapidly.
Humanitarian and democratic values had little to no impact during this period and none of the normative variables are significant. The sign on Human Crisis is negative, implying that states undergoing a humanitarian crisis received less ODA from Japan. The variable is not statistically significant, however. The most striking finding from this period is the strength of the security variables in explaining ODA commitments and the degree of coordination with US security interests. States with larger US ODA allocations, US treaty allies, and those with more US military personnel received higher aid commitments from Japan. States in maritime disputes with China also received much more ODA. Interestingly, the UN voting affinity variables were insignificant during this period. Overall, Japan's behavior vis-a-vis ODA commitments is much closer to the reactive state hypothesis after 2001 than at any time before.
Analysis of Aid Project Types
The analysis of ODA commitment data failed to uncover any significant impact of normative factors on the allocation of Japan's ODA. However, it is possible that humanitarian and democratic values affect ODA policy in a different manner. If Japan is more concerned about humanitarian values, it may change the way it allocates ODA away from its traditional focus on infrastructure toward projects that focus on improving health, welfare, education, and other soft sectors more aligned with humanitarian values. A second hypothesis, then, is that Japan increased the share of its ODA provided for projects that promote humanitarian values. If this hypothesis is true, the share of ODA projects for soft sectors and disaster relief will be lowest in the Cold War period, higher in the 1992-2001 period, and higher still in the post-2001 period.
The hypothesis will be tested quantitatively using data from the Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database provided by the OECD, (13) which includes data on every ODA project implemented by members of the DAC since 1973. For Japan, the database includes 799,479 projects and specifies the project type, sector, recipient, cost, financial terms, and a wealth of other information. For this research, I have categorized each project into four types: soft sector, hard sector, disaster relief, and debt/other. Soft sector aid includes health, welfare, education, governance, and food aid. Hard sectors include infrastructure, business services, and industrial development. Disaster relief could be in any of these sectors but is meant to recover from a specific event or prevent a recurrence and would reflect humanitarian values. Debt/other includes debt forgiveness and renegotiation as well as the administrative cost of the donor for implementing ODA. The share of ODA provided for each sector by year is given in Figure 1.
The first observation is that the share of Japan's ODA to soft sectors has not changed much over time. Hard sector aid does appear to have declined and disaster relief is slightly higher in recent years. The biggest change is the share given over to debt relief, which is substantial particularly after 2001. The average shares for the three time periods are given in Table 3.
The soft sector allocation has barely changed. Hard sector allocations are much lower in the 2002-2014 period and largely offset by debt relief. Disaster relief remains extremely small in the most recent period, but is over four times previous commitments. None of the changes between the 1973-1991 period and the 1992-2001 period are statistically significant (95 percent level). The changes between the 1992-2001 period and the 2002-2014 period are significant (95 percent level) for the change in hard sector aid (lower), disaster relief (higher), and debt/other (higher). I conclude that Japan shifted the composition of its aid after 2001. The shift is almost entirely from reducing the percentage of aid in the infrastructure sector and shifting it to debt relief. Debt relief is highly beneficial to the recipient, but it does not directly support any specific activity and is essentially values neutral.
However, debt relief for the poorest countries is a key international norm initially promoted by several countries within the G-7 at the instigation of the United Kingdom, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (Momani 2010). The Japanese government only reluctantly adopted this norm after initially opposing it. Japan traditionally emphasized the importance of self-help, budget discipline, and country ownership of ODA and believed debt cancellation would encourage irresponsible spending and a lack of accountability (Castellano 2000). Japanese aid is also more heavily oriented toward loans, so debt cancellation has a relatively large impact on Japan's ODA budget compared to its DAC counterparts. In the mid-1990s, Japan rejected the norm of debt relief for highly indebted poor countries (Momani 2010). However, at the G-7 finance ministers' meeting in Fukuoka (Japan), the Japanese government, perhaps wanting to avoid being seen as an obstacle to an emerging international norm, announced its debt relief efforts (MOFA 2000), which included full debt cancellation for the poorest countries and a substantial increase in Japan's contribution to multilateral debt cancellation efforts (Castellano 2000).
The increase in disaster relief aid could represent an expression of humanitarian values, and the increase is statistically significant. However, disaster relief is exceptionally small for Japan.
To compare Japan to its peers, the United States has increased its disaster relief aid from 1 percent of all ODA in the 1973-1991 period to nearly 18 percent in the 2002-2014 period. Sweden, a country widely respected for its supposedly humanitarian aid policy, increased disaster aid from 7 percent to over 26 percent over the same period. Japan at just over 3 percent lags far behind its DAC peers in explicitly humanitarian assistance. While there is a statistically meaningful increase in humanitarian aid, Japan's aid allocated to disaster relief remains exceptionally small and cannot be reasonably attributed to a widespread adoption of humanitarian norms in Japanese ODA policy.
This research sought to uncover the degree to which Japan's ODA commitments have come to reflect humanitarian and democratic norms and values. Japan was expected to have increasingly committed its ODA to countries that share Japan's democratic values or have humanitarian needs in line with the changing discourse in Japan regarding ODA. The evidence suggests that Japan instead prioritized its own commercial and national security interests in its decisions to allocate ODA to specific countries. The findings demonstrate that, while aid commitments from Japan have increasingly been allocated to enhance its security, the content of Japan's ODA has changed in one meaningful way: Japan has substantially adopted the international norm of debt relief for the poorest countries, and debt cancellation has become a major part of Japan's ODA practices.
While the results of this analysis show that Japan's overall ODA practices continue to reflect Japan's national interests over normative factors, I do not claim that Japanese ODA never seeks to promote human security, democracy, or humanitarian values. Examples of Japanese ODA projects in all of these areas are easy to find and many scholars have highlighted these types of projects in case studies (e.g., Kamidohzono, Gomez, and Mine 2016; Tsunekawa and Murotani 2014). This analysis shows, however, that such human security-oriented projects are not a large enough portion of Japan's ODA commitments to be clearly discernible in the overall ODA program data.
Aid conditionality is another means of expressing normative values through aid policy, and there are many examples of Japan's using aid policy to punish countries for actions that violate Japan's values. For example, Japan suspended ODA to China after the Tiananmen Square Massacre, suspended grants to China in 1995 to protest nuclear testing, and suspended new loans to Vietnam in 2008 due to corruption related to Japanese ODA projects (Japan Times 2014). However, the quantitative analysis conducted in this study indicates that Japanese aid conditionality is not related to overall measures of democratic governance, political violence, or support for liberal values in the UN. The isolated incidents of Japanese aid conditionality suggest that Japan picks specific incidents over which to express its displeasure with aid, but these incidents do not have enough impact on Japan's overall aid allocations to be useful predictors of its aid commitments.
The findings of this study lend quantitative support to the recent literature on the "securitization" of Japan's ODA (Carvalho and Potter 2016; Jain 2016; Yoshimatsu and Trinidad 2010). Confirming and building on the findings of Sato and Asano (2008), this research demonstrates that security factors have become increasingly important determinants of Japan's ODA commitments after 2001. This trend in ODA securitization is likely to continue. Japan made major changes to its approach to national security in 2013, which was further elaborated and codified in the 2015 Development Cooperation Charter (MOFA 2015b). The National Security Strategy published in 2013 refers to ODA as a "fundamental policy pertaining to national security" (Cabinet Office 2013, 2) and part of the government's policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace." While explicitly stating that Japan will not provide aid for military purposes, the 2015 Charter now allows Japan to provide aid to the armed forces of recipient countries for nonmilitary activities such as peacekeeping and disaster response (MOFA 2015b, 11). These policy changes, combined with Japan's recent practice of providing quasi-military equipment in the form of coast guard patrol ships for the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam (Jain 2016), imply that the securitization of Japan's ODA is likely to continue.
Steven Lewis-Workman is senior transport economist in the East Asia Department at the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and a PhD candidate in International Studies at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. He has over twenty-three years of experience in international development, economic and financial analysis, and transportation project planning and implementation. As a project manager, he has designed and delivered capacity-building and training programs and assisted in the development of country strategies and programs with the ADB's developing member countries, having worked in the Philippines, Mongolia, the People's Republic of China, Brazil, Ghana, Japan, Canada, and the United States. He can be reached at email@example.com.
(1.) Aid commitments are provided by the OECD and are available from OECD Stats at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?ThemeTreeId=3 (November 2016). Aid commitments are expressed in constant 2013 currency units.
(2.) Import and export data are from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) data set. See IMF data website for access: http://data.imf.org /?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85 (December 2016).
(3.) FDI data are based on the OECD international direct investment database, which reports inward and outward FDI as reported by the OECD member states, and are available from 1985 to 2013. The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) publishes data on FDI based on Japan's Ministry of Finance (MOF) statistics for inward and outward FDI and covers 1965 to 2004. These two data sets are combined using the JETRO data as the base and OECD data to fill in missing values and all years after 2004. All FDI figures are converted to constant 2013 JPY.
(4.) Socioeconomic data (GDP, Pop, Life Expectancy, Oil Rents, etc.) for aid recipient countries are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) data set, which is available for download at http://data.worldbank .org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (July 2016). Data on fossil fuel rents are incomplete early in the analysis period, and including this variable restricts the size of the sample. This variable was tested but not utilized in the final regression because it was not significant.
(5.) Data on violence are from the Major Episodes of Political Violence data set. The full data set can be downloaded from the Center for Systemic Peace website: www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (November 2016).
(6.) Data on regime type are from the Polity IV data set, which categorizes the authority characteristics of countries around the world. The full data set can be downloaded from the Center for Systemic Peace website: www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (November 2016).
(7.) The data set for UN General Assembly Voting is available from the Harvard University Dataverse website: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset .xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/12379 (January 2017). The UN voting affinity scores and Ideal Point estimates are available from the Harvard University Dataverse website: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtmWpersistentId =hdl:1902.1/12379 (January 2017). For a detailed discussion on the use of UN affinity data and Ideal Points estimates, see Voeten (2012).
(8.) The data on US military personnel for 1950 to 2005 were compiled by the Heritage Foundation, and data to complete the data set to 2014 were based on the 309A reports from the US Department of Defense. See Kane (2006).
(9.) The JPY/USD exchange rate data are provided by the OECD.
(10.) The US GDP deflator is prepared by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and available at www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm (December 2016).
(11.) The Japanese GDP deflator (1966-1998) is provided by Statistics Japan, while recent deflators (1999-2015) can be accessed through the Cabinet Office's Economic and Social Research Institute's website: www.esri .cao.go.jp/en/sna/data/kakuhou/files/2014/28annual_report_e.html (accessed October 2016).
(12.) Generalized least squares (GLS) is used to estimate a linear regression on pooled cross-sectional time series (panel) data. The correlation of the error terms across countries (heteroscedasticity) is corrected by using panel corrected (robust) standard errors in the estimation procedure. Correlation of the error terms across time (serial correlation) was corrected using the dependent variable (ODA commitments in this case) lagged one year as a regressor.
(13.) Data on aid-financed projects are from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) data set. Data can be downloaded at http://stats .oecd.org (November 2016). The entire data set is available upon request from the author.
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Caption: Figure 1 Share of Japan's ODA Commitments by Sector and Year
Table 1 Japanese Aid Charters 1992 ODA Charter 2003 ODA Charter (MOFA 1992) (MOFA 2003b) Overall Promote world peace and Contribute to peace and objective global prosperity. Promote development of friendly relations between international community Japan and other countries thereby helping to ensure Japan's security and prosperity Principles 1. Recipient request (based 1. Recipient need (based on on self-help considering self-help taking into socioeconomic conditions account socioeconomic and bilateral relations) conditions and bilateral 2. Nonintervention in relations) domestic affairs 2. Nonintervention in 3. Avoid use of ODA for domestic affairs military purpose or 3. Avoid use of ODA for aggravation of conflicts military purpose or 4. Take account of military aggravation of conflicts spending, development of 4. Take account of military weapons of mass destruction spending, development of (WMDs), and arms exports WMD, and arms exports 5. Promote democracy, 5. Promote democracy, market economy, and human market economy, and rights human rights Geographic Focus on East Asia in Focus on East Asia focus general, ASEAN in including ASEAN, due particular consideration to poverty in South Asia, and democracy Extend to rest of world and market economy based on poverty status transition in Central Asia Prioritize assistance to other regions based on needs and Japan's ODA priorities Priority 1. Global problems such as 1. Poverty reduction issues environment and population 2. Sustainable growth 2. Basic human needs and 3. Global problems such as humanitarian crisis global warming, response environment, health, 3. HR and technology terrorism, crime, disasters 4. Infrastructure 4. Peace building 5. Structural adjustment Sources: Summarized by the author based on ODA Charters (MOFA 1992; MOFA 2003b). Table 2 Regression Results for Dependent Variable: Total ODA Commitments Independent 1966-1991 Var Type Var Expected Coeff/sig Com GDP +/- -0.0025 Com Pop + 28.668 *** Com FDI + 0.022 Com Exports + 0.005 Com Imports + 0.004 Value UN_IdealPoints + -1,173.523 Value HumanCrisis + No Data Value GDP/Cap - -0.665 Value Life Expectancy - 48.662 Value Violence - 230.569 Value RegimeType + -21.439 Sec UN_pctwUS + -6,725.806 *** Sec UN_pctwJP + 7,053.254 *** Sec ChinaBorder + 2,209.120 Sec Sealanes + -2,092.807 Sec ChinaMar Dis + 17,743.400 *** Sec ChinaBorder Dis + -9,641.392 ** Sec USTreatyAlly + 8,245.205 Sec USODA + 6.503 *** Sec USMil_Pers + -0.311 ** NA Lagged_dep(-1) + 0.633 *** NA Constant 0 -6,557.659 *** [R.sup.2] (total) 0.7252 Obs 2,141 1992-2001 2002-2014 Var Type Coeff/sig Coeff/sig Com -0.046 ** -0.022 *** Com 89.998 *** 194.174 *** Com 0.270 *** 0.047 Com -0.017 -0.012 ** Com 0.026 *** 0.001 Value -7,968.312 *** -516.027 Value 13.397 -10.912 Value -2.026 *** -0.352 Value 387.447 *** 149.929 Value 281.798 -1,577.243 Value 47.769 -0.011 Sec -976.185 -6,856.778 Sec 32,383.410 *** 8,360.559 Sec 9,567.888 ** 2,835.545 Sec -6,065.935 5,993.721 Sec 69,567.750 ** 40,200.750 Sec -6,528.245 -19,750.960 Sec 48,363.690 *** 18,511.540 Sec 23.326 21.926 *** Sec -2.683 *** 0.454 ** NA 0.0308244 0.0933078 NA -49,117.02 *** -13,701.38 0.6568 0.5369 1,065 1,225 Notes: Variable descriptions in text. **: significant at the 95% level. ***: significant at the 99% level. Table 3 Sector Allocation of Japan's ODA Commitments by Period (percentage) Sector Allocation 1973-1991 1992-2001 2002-2014 Soft sectors 29.3 28.1 29.1 Hard sectors 64.0 59.7 45.8 Disaster relief 0.6 0.7 3.2 Debt and other 6.2 11.4 21.9 Source: OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System Database. Note: Changes between periods in bold italics are statistically significant at the 95% level.
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|Date:||Jan 1, 2018|
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