Intelligence suooort in combat aviation brigades.
Army aircraft are the single most expensive piece of Army equipment operating on the battlefield, with the cost of replacing individual airframes ranging from $9.5 million for a UH-60L Blackhawk to $28 million for an AH-64D Apache. Along with personnel and unit impacts, the loss of a single aircraft can have a substantially negative strategic level impact on operations due to loss of life of aircrews and the passengers onboard.
The impact of Army Combat Aviation is critical. During the War on Terrorism U.S. Army aircraft flew the most flight hours in combat zones and had the greatest number of aircraft hit and lost due to enemy action of any U.S. military service. Despite this there have been few institutional efforts made by the U.S. Army to substantially improve intelligence support to Army Aviation. That is not to say that individual aviators and intelligence professionals have not adjusted tactics, techniques, and technology or made, in some cases, impressive efforts to overcome these challenges. Rather the Army, as an institution, has not made the changes needed to enhance intelligence support to Army Aviation in a way that can reduce the risk to this critical capability.
In order to provide effective intelligence support to the combat aviation brigades (CABs) and their battalions that will help mitigate this risk, assigned S2 (Intelligence) sections need:
1. Formal aviation related intelligence training.
2. Qualified and trained dual track aviation and intelligence professionals (Area of Concentration (AOC) 15C, Aviation and 35D, All-Source Intelligence).
3. Adequate manning. We will discuss these shortfalls and propose solutions to fill these gaps in order to substantially reduce the probability of costly aviation losses from enemy activity.1
Why Intelligence Support to Aviation is Different
Inherent to any discussion of intelligence support in Aviation is to briefly compare the significant differences between this support and intelligence support to other types of ground based units. While complex, for the sake of this article, the differences can be separated into conceptual differences and more specific disparities in process and technique.
As any intelligence professional who has ever been assigned to an Aviation S2 section can attest, there are fundamental conceptual differences between intelligence support to Army Aviation versus support to ground based units. These differences are attributable to the complexities of an area of operations (AO) for Army Aviation as well as the requirements for analytical confidence in supporting these operations.
The basic mathematics of the operational capabilities of Army aircraft translate into a fundamental difference between air and ground intelligence support. The speed of Army aircraft (typically 138 mph), the range of Army aircraft (typically over 250 miles), and the altitudes (three-dimensional battlespace) Army aircraft operate at (typically 0-2,000 feet AGL) immediately suggest that the S2 section must assess a large area along three dimensions (the volume of a massive area) vice the comparatively smaller linear AO of their ground counterparts. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, it was not unusual for an Aviation battalion to have aircraft operating in every corner of the country on a daily basis, requiring their S2 sections to have a detailed understanding of the entire theater's threat environment, not just a single localized area.
These conceptual differences create a cascading set of processes and techniques for intelligence support to Aviation that are well understood by the intelligence professionals assigned to these units. These include:
* Understanding the capabilities and vulnerabilities of friendly Aviation assets.
* A detailed understanding of enemy air defense capabilities.
* Adapting collection and targeting processes that account for the speed and range of aircraft.
* Analyzing terrain to support Aviation operations.
The fact that these areas are not covered in any detail in any formal Army intelligence training means that the adjacent and higher echelon ground based S2/G2 sections have little to no understanding of Aviation operations nor the threats to Aviation assets which means that while their products are useful, they do not instantly result in an effective and useful Aviation threat picture.
The existence of AOC 15C/35, which will be covered in greater detail later in this article, indicates that even the institutional Army supports the notion that intelligence support to Aviation is far different than intelligence support to ground units since this formally defined, dual qualified position does not exist in any other Army intelligence section.3 However, despite these differences, the current manning and institutional training emphasizes ground intelligence and reflects a general lack of understanding of intelligence support to Army Aviation.
Aviation S2 Personnel Lack Formal Training
There is currently no formal Army training to teach the basics of intelligence support to Aviation to Military Intelligence (MI) personnel assigned to these units. As such, intelligence soldiers assigned to these S2 sections are left to their own initiative, research, and informal "on the job training" (OJT) to develop an understanding of how to support Aviation units.
All S2 sections must understand BLUE (Friendly) operations to be able to predict RED (Threat) actions and reactions. In addition, for Army Aviation intelligence sections to be successful they must know the different Aviation airframes; the unique aspects of Aviation missions; Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE), and Aviation tactics at a minimum to effectively analyze and predict the threat activity. Due to the complexity of Aviation operations few soldiers assigned to these S2s will be able to quickly and adequately gain this understanding through OJT.
Providing institutional training in these areas will provide soldiers the information and knowledge they require to support complex aviation operations.
The MI branch offers numerous Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), AOC and Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) producing courses across the intelligence disciplines. According to the 2012 Foundry Manual of Training Opportunities there are 103 MI related courses that cover virtually every nuance of intelligence. However, none of the training focuses on, emphasizes, or is even marginally related to Aviation intelligence.
This lack of training is rooted in a belief which assumes that there is no difference between allsource intelligence in a ground unit and all-source intelligence in an Aviation unit. "All-source, is allsource, is all-source" is a common response when discussing the lack of training for Aviation S2 sections. However, the Army is the only service that holds this view. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps all provide additional training on the specifics of Aviation intelligence to personnel assigned to these units.
The Air Force's initial intelligence training (4-6 months) is focused on Aviation intelligence,
after which Airmen attend an additional course (2-4 weeks) for the specific airframe they will be supporting. The Navy offers several different specialized courses for intelligence officers serving in air wing intelligence positions for a total of 7 weeks of training at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC).
Perhaps most noteworthy given the similarity between mission and roles, is the Marine Corps where Aviation intelligence is taught in initial training for all intelligence personnel. In addition, Aviation intelligence is also treated as a separate track or intelligence discipline in the Marines. Officers assigned to Aviation intelligence positions attend the Air Intelligence Officer Course (AIOC) after their initial intelligence training. The AIOC, often referred to as the 0207 course, is a 12 week MOS producing course that covers all the specifics of Aviation intelligence. Enlisted Marine intelligence personnel assigned to aviation units attend the Aviation Specific Intelligence Training Program (ASITP), which is a 4 week course covering topics in Aviation intelligence and information on the specific airframes they are supporting.
The only course the Army has which links specifically to Aviation intelligence is the Tactical Operations (TACOPS) course, a 51/2 week course for Aviation warrant officers at Fort Rucker. However, only the first 15 days (3 weeks) of the course cover applicable Aviation intelligence topics such as threats, weapon systems, aircraft survivability, and tactics.
In order to help bridge the gap in training for the officers assigned to Aviation intelligence sections the TACOPS course has, since 2010, occasionally and selectively allowed Aviation and MI officers to attend this course (enlisted soldiers are not authorized). While this information was not generally known to the CAB S2s and their battalion S2s, the effort has been an informal approach with a relatively small number of intelligence section attendees (approximately 20 in two years). While this is a move in the right direction, a permanent solution to this training shortfall that preferably includes all the personnel assigned to Aviation intelligence sections needs to be developed.
Army MEDEVAC aircrews are in a unique position to judge the effectiveness of formal Aviation intelligence training since many of these units have worked for both the Army and the Marines during the current conflict. Every MEDEVAC pilot interviewed with such experience stated that Marine Aviation intelligence support was vastly superior to that of the Army. Specifically, Marine intelligence sections understood Aviation operations, the threat, and the ASE vastly better than the untrained Army Aviation intelligence sections, which resulted in greater analysis and support from the perspective of the aircrews.4
In summary, the Army, unlike the other service components, offers no formalized Aviation intelligence training other than the TACOPS course. This has meant that these Soldiers, their sections, and their commanders are left to their own devices to "figure out" how to effectively operate. This situation creates a significant risk that a section may not be able to "figure it out" in a timely, efficient, and effective manner. This can result in the S2 section's credibility being undermined in the eyes of its primary customers (the commander, staff, and aircrews) and/or worse, the loss of aircraft and personnel.
Aviation S2s Lack Trained Dual Tracked Professionals
Within the U.S. Army personnel management structure is the rare hybrid AOC 15C/35 Aviation, All Source Intelligence Officer. To receive this AOC an individual must be qualified as both an Aviation officer and an MI officer. Aviation officers must complete the MI Officer Transition Course (MIOTC) and the MI Captains Career Course (MICCC). Reserve Component (RC) Aviation officers are required to complete the MICCC-RC.
By Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) every CAB S2 and subordinate Aviation Battalion S2 should be a 15C/35. These officers also pilot the rotary wing airframes assigned to the CAB. The concept is that Aviation unit S2 sections are led by an Aviation branch officer who also understands MI. Ideally this officer should be an experienced aviator with Pilot-in-Command experience who can translate aviation operations and provide an invaluable perspective to the MI personnel within the sections. Each CAB is required to have five 15C/35s (Brigade S2 and four Battalion S2s). The Army currently has 20 CABs, so this adds up to a total CAB 15C/35 requirement of 100 personnel.
"The dangers posed to Army aircrews by enemy Surface to Air Fires (SAFIRE) are nothing new. During the Vietnam war the U.S. Army lost in excess of 2,000 helicopters to hostile fire; 95% of which where due to small arms fire (14.5mm and below)."
"The mission profile of Army aircraft demands that, just like the soldiers in the HUMVEEs, have to go into harm's way every day."
"The reality of counterinsurgency warfare is that our aircraft fly in contested airspace and remain well within the enemy's Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ) 24 hours a day /7 days a week."
"To optimize our survivability we can study the enemy's patterns and use his tactics, weapons signatures and characteristics against him. To select the optimum counter tactics we must be able to answer two key questions, what weapon is the enemy firing at me and where is he firing from."
SAFIRE's Two Biggest Questions, Tactics Division Newsletter, March 2007.
The AOC 15C/35 Dilemma
The concept of the AOC 15C/35 suggests that within the Army and the MI and Aviation communities the notion that "all-source" intelligence techniques apply across the board to all units is not a universally held construct. Likewise, the combination of having a skilled aviator who also has detailed and extensive intelligence training has, in theory, the possibility of serving as a remedy to many of the Army Aviation intelligence issues. However, in reality, the unique AOC has not meet the CABs' needs for a number of reasons.
15C/35s are so few in number such that positions that are coded for these professionals are being filled by non-15C/35s. Likewise, the priority of filling 15C/35 positions is given to the aerial exploitation battalion (AEBs) over the CABs. Per Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, 15C/35 officers within AEBs are engaged in the employment of Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA) in support of tactical and strategic intelligence information collection. These SEMA aircraft are typically fixed wing intelligence collection platforms. These 15C/35 officers must complete the Fixed Wing Multi-Engine Qualification Course (FWMEQC) and the SEMA course to be qualified in their AEB positions. (5)
The result is that in CABs and their battalions it is common to find no 15C/35 serving as an Aviation S2. In fact, 15C/35 assignments to these billets have been so rare that many CABs and Aviation battalion commanders have given up on ever having a 15C/35. Instead they have formally requested to permanently change their MTOEs to replace the 15C/35 with a 35D so that their manning roster reflects reality. Occasionally an Aviation unit will assign a 15B (Aviation Combined Arms Operations) or 15A (General Aviation) officer as the S2 "out of hide," but these individuals are aviators who are not trained in MI and often have little desire to do the job. Neither the 35D nor the 15B/15A is an adequate interim solution since both are missing a requisite portion of understanding of Aviation operations or MI.
Considering that few of the CAB 15C/35 positions are filled with qualified officers, it would appear that not enough 15C/35s are being produced to meet Army requirements. In curious contradiction, the Army has formally acknowledged the importance of having intelligence trained aviators, but has not made this a priority. Whether this is due to the Aviation branch not identifying enough aviators to attend the MIOTC and MICCC or the MI branch not offering enough slots in these courses to aviators is beyond the scope of this article, but a cursory review suggests that AOC 15C/35 is likely stuck in a seam in the bureaucratic boundaries between Aviation Branch, MI Branch, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the Human Resources Command (HRC) with each entity assessing that this problem is in the bureaucratic battlespace of the others.
Inadequate Manning Levels
Along with the issues of training and the availability of AOC 15/C35 personnel, CAB and Aviation battalion S2 sections suffer from inadequate manning levels. On the 2011 MTOE each CAB S2 section had 14 personnel. On the 2012 and 2013 MTOEs the CAB S2 sections were reduced by three MI personnel (a loss of an MI O-3/CPT, an MI E-6/SSG, and an MI E-4/SPC). (6) While the individual CAB S2 sections are reduced from 14 to 11 personnel, the total strength of the CABs actually grows from 128 personnel on the 2011 MTOE to 139 personnel on the 2012 MTOE and to 144 personnel on the 2013 MTOE
When asked about this reduction, the office of the Department of the Army (DA) G2 stated that the MI branch is responsible for intelligence support to the CABs and provides recommendations to the Aviation branch on the composition of Aviation S2 sections based on mission analysis and functional requirements. However, it is ultimately up to Aviation branch and TRADOC to "make a decision on the size of each staff section taking into account the overall size of the organization and what is affordable and what level of risk they are willing to assume." It appears that the Aviation branch used these three intelligence billets to pay for additions in other
staff sections within the CABs, and felt the risk was acceptable. While developing resource solutions is always an extremely difficult task, given the major issues with a lack of specific training and the lack of 15C/35 officers in the CAB, at a minimum the manning in the CAB S2 sections should return to the 2011 MTOE levels. The decision to reduce the number of intelligence personnel given these functional problems exacerbates an already serious problem internal to the CABs and results in a significant operational risk.
The last decade has clearly demonstrated the ongoing threat to Aviation assets in the current operational environment, the extremely high cost of Aviation losses, the lack of adequate formal training for Aviation S2 sections, and the lack of qualified 15C/35 personnel in the CABs. Therefore, the decision to assume even more risk in the CABs by reducing the number of intelligence personnel is neither logical nor wise, given the possible outcomes.
Improving Intelligence Support to Army Aviation
Given the three key problem areas regarding intelligence support to Army Aviation, we propose a set of suggestions and improvements which will substantially assist the Army in this area. These are separated into three distinct areas: training solutions, improving AOC 15C/35 levels, and overall manning.
Training Solutions (This area should take priority.): A formal Army Aviation intelligence ASI producing course must be developed jointly by the Aviation branch and the MI branch modeled on the TACOPS course and the U.S. Marine Corps aviation courses. At a minimum the course content should address these topics:
* Hybrid threats to Aviation.
* Opposing Forces Air Defense tactics.
* Threat weapon systems.
* Aircraft survivability and ASE equipment.
* Army airframes and capabilities.
* Aviation mission sets (attack, recon, lift, and heavy lift).
* Aviation tactics.
* Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield from an Aviation perspective.
* Electronic warfare.
* Aviation Survivability Development and Tactics team historical aviation combat loss reviews.
* Targeting for attack Aviation.
* Collection planning.
* Intelligence support to Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape, and Personnel Recovery.
* Aircrew briefing techniques.
* Analysis of helicopter landing zones and battle positions/engagement areas.
* Army Aviation Mission Planning System/ Falconview training.
As the parts of the TACOPS course relevant to Aviation intelligence add up to 15 days (3 weeks), this course should be a minimum of 20 days (4 weeks) and would be appropriate for a TRADOC live environment course.
All MTOE Aviation S2 section positions must be coded with this ASI and tracked as a personnel measure in Unit Status Reports. This will ensure units send their personnel to this course. This will also allow a return on investment as HRC will be able to track and identify trained individuals throughout their careers for follow-on assignments.
In the near term, interim solutions which would help alleviate the training problem until such a course could be created include leveraging additional slots in the TACOPS course, securing slots in the Marine AIOC and ASITP courses for Army Aviation intelligence personnel, and seeking slots in the Air Force and Navy Aviation intelligence courses. An informal communication between one of the authors and the Director of the Marine AIOC course indicated that AIOC personnel would be willing to conduct mobile training teams (MTTs) for deploying Army Aviation S2 sections. Potentially the TACOPS course instructors could also be utilized to conduct MTTs to provide a near term solution as well. A potential funding mechanism for these MTTs could be created through the U.S. Army Foundry intelligence training program.
15C/35 Solutions: With an estimated 100 plus 15C/35 positions vacant in the CABs and their battalions there is no doubt that the Aviation and MI branches must recruit and train more aviators for these shortfalls.7 In order to do so, the first thing that must happen is that the CAB S2 and battalion S2 billets should be the highest priority of fill for 15C/35s graduating from the MICCC.
This change would mean that filling AEB positions would need to be lower on the priority of fill. In addition, the requirement that AEB Aviation officers must be Aviation all-source Intelligence officers should be examined for modification.8 For example, since the MICCC is used primarily as a means to familiarize AEB officers with MI and the Intelligence Community (IC), such familiarization could be done in a significantly more cost effective manner by creating a short IC familiarization course and utilizing 15B aviators while maintaining the FWMEQC, SEMA course, and Top Secret clearance requirements.
This would then free up MICCC slots for the AOC 15C/35 officers in the CABs who have a real need to understand the type of tactical intelligence taught in that course. Further, by dropping the AEB/SEMA emphasis on the AOC 15C/35, the focus would return to its Aviation all-source intelligence roots and get the proper "need to have" training to the right aviators, vice "nice to have" training to AEB SEMA aviators.
Manning Solutions: The fix to the CAB S2 manning issue is simple. Return to the 2011 MTOE numbers by restoring the three reduced MI personnel (MI O-3/CPT, an MI E-6/SSG, and an MI E-4/SPC) to future MTOEs. This recommendation will inevitably require an assessment and difficult decision of determining who the "bill payer" will be within the CAB. Given that the 2012 MTOE increased the total number of personnel in the CAB from previous MTOEs, this decision should be less difficult than it could otherwise be.
Worth noting regarding all of the recommendations and solutions above is that in an upcoming era of what is likely stagnant or even shrinking Army budgets, the argument against these types of training and manning changes will be a perceived lack of funds for such initiatives. There is no doubt that the creation of an ASI course and fully training and filling 15C/35 slots will incur additional costs for personnel, temporary duty pay, and instructor pay. However, the case can be made quite easily that the cost of this training has the very real potential of reducing future costs associated with Aviation shoot downs as well as improving the effective use of already purchased and high cost Army Aviation assets. The argument that there are limited funds for new projects such as those described above is an empty one, as an era of stagnant or reduced budgets should lead to an emphasis on spending in areas that allow for reducing risk to existing assets, as well as those that have a high return on investment for future conflicts. These solutions do both.
Despite lacking formal training, qualified personnel, and adequate manning, personnel assigned to Army Aviation intelligence sections have performed superbly during the current conflict. However, they have often had to do so in spite of, and not due to, the institutional Army's support to their efforts. The lack of institutional support has meant that S2s in the CABs seriously lack formal Aviation related intelligence training, lack qualified and trained dual track aviation and intelligence professionals (AOC15C/35), and suffer from inadequate manning levels required to sufficiently provide high quality intelligence support to aviation. While the solutions to these major problems are not without cost, they are certainly manageable from a budgetary and personnel standpoint. (9)
(1.) Three products were drafted by the authors. This article focused on the facts and circumstances of the three main issues. A longer paper goes into greater detail on all the concerns the primary author has with intelligence support to Army Aviation and contains more details, personal opinions, and perspectives within the document. The third product (PowerPoint) supports both papers. These products can be requested from email@example.com.
(2.) It could be argued that the branch detail program of assigning combat arms officers (specifically Infantry and Armor officers) to the MI branch is the ground unit counterpart to the formally defined AOC 15C/35.
(3.) The requirements for IPE and the risk calculus for aviation creates a significant difference because the aviation intelligence section's customer has a greater need for analytical confidence than do most maneuver operations in which more risk can be assumed.
(4.) Marine Air Wing (MAW) intelligence sections are significantly larger (personnel wise) than CAB Intelligence sections and support fixed-wing and rotary-wing operations.
(5.) The DA Pam 600-3 description of the AOC 15C/35 (Chapter 11- 1d(1)(a) 3.) focuses on the AEB/SEMA requirements. This Pam is currently being rewritten with some of the approved changes being the elimination the Aviator and MI officer status which drops the 35D connection, changes 15C/35 to 15C and SEMA positions will no longer be required to serve in MI coded positions or be qualified MI officers. Only the AEB MTOEs currently reflect the 15C change, 2013 CAB MTOEs still show 15C/35. SEMA Aviators will still continue to take the MICCC and SEMA courses but MICCC may become more of an option than a requirement. The CAB 15C/35 positions will still be required to attend MIOTC and MICCC.
(6.) This change resulted in a loss of 60 MI personnel across the 20 AC and RC CABs (760 MI personnel to 700 MI personnel).
(7.) The current regulations do not allow this but 15C/35s should also be recruited from the MI community. If an MI officer has a few years of MI experience and can meet all the physical requirements, this individual should be afforded the opportunity to attend to the Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) course and the Aviation officer Basic Course (AVOBC). This would increase the pool to recruit 15C/35s from and would have the added benefit of having an officer that likes and wants to do intelligence work. Another option for recruiting MI officers for the 15C/35 positions would be to adopt and apply the Medical Service Corps (MSC) process for recruiting Aero-medical Evacuation (67J) officers (MEDEVAC pilots) where officers (if selected) must be branched MSC and attend MSCOBC before attending the IERW course.
(8.) Serious consideration should be given to whether the AEB Aviation officers need to be Aviation all-source intelligence officers. The future changes to DA PAM 600-3 are taking the AEB SEMA positions further away from the Aviation all-source intelligence basics by no longer requiring them to be qualified MI officers. Since AEB SEMA Aviators are not doing Aviation all source intelligence work/production and the MICCC may become more of an option than a requirement there is little difference between them and their Aviation officer peers in the 15A and 15B AOC other than the Top Secret clearance requirements and the ASI/SI producing FWMEQC and SEMA courses.
In contrast, the 15C/35 in the CAB S2 billets are still required to attend the MICCC and must do all source intelligence, thus these 15C/35s have a significantly different skill set from their 15B peers and require a separate AOC designation. Additionally, Aviation flight courses produce ASIs, they do not produce an AOC. The 15B in an Attack Reconnaissance Battalion is the same as a 15B in an Assault Helicopter Battalion, which is the same as a 15B in General Support Aviation Battalion. The difference for these 15Bs is the airframe they fly and that is differentiated by the ASI for the position on the MTOE. For these reasons it would make sense to separate the CAB 15C/35 from the AEB SEMA 15C by either designating the AEB SEMA positions as a new separate AOC or by leveraging 15B Aviation officers (the predominant Aviation officer AOC) while maintaining the FWMEQC, SEMA course, and top secret clearance requirements.
(9.) Estimated cost of a TRADOC Aviation intelligence course is well below that of even a single airframe lost to a shoot-down. Assuming the course would be four weeks in length, require at least two instructors in addition to the TACOPS instructors, and that the training would take place at an Army post with lodging and classrooms available, the rough estimate is that it would cost $1.4 million to train all 700 CAB intelligence personnel. The estimated annual cost after the CAB personnel are trained would be $550,000 with an estimated annual demand of 200 students due to transfers, ETS, and other losses.
CB O. (2007). Modernizing the Army's Rotary-Wing Aviation Fleet, Congressional Budget Office Paper, The Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, Pub. No. 2898, November 2007.
DA Pamphlet 600-3. Personnel-General, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, 1 February 2010.
ALARACT 231-2005. Clarification for Award of the Aviation Badge. Ay lworth, Warren. SAFIRE's Two Biggest Questions, Tactics Division Newsletter, March 2007.
AR 600-8-22. Personnel-General, Military Awards, 11 December 2006 (Rapid Action Revision 15 September 2011).
DA Pamphlet 611-21. Personnel Selection and Classification, Military Occupational Classification and Structure, 22 January 2007.
DA PAM 611-21 Smart Book online.
FM SWeb. Data retrieved from FMSWeb on October 23, 2012 from: https://webtaads.belvoir.army.mil/protected/WebTAADS/tools.asp
Foundry Manual of Training Opportunities, June 2012,
Sloman, Jesse. September 2012. Fixing Intelligence Analysis: From Specialists to Experts. Small Wars Journal, 8, 9. Retrieved from http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fixing-intelligenceanalysis-from-specialists-to-experts.
The views expressed by the authors do not reflect the official policy or position of the departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Major Corby Koehler is currently the ACE Chief for the 34th Infantry Division. He has served as a Deputy G2, 34th Infantry Division; S2, 34th Combat Aviation Brigade, and as the S2, 2-147th Assault Helicopter Battalion deployed under the 12th CAB and Task Force 49 during OIF 07-09. He has experience in the attack, scout, and lift aviation mission sets. He is a qualified 15C/35 Officer and a qualified UH-60 A/L Blackhawk Instructor Pilot. He holds a Master's degree in Police Leadership as well as separate Bachelor's degrees in Criminal Justice, Sociology, and Psychology.
Christopher Tatarka, PhD, currently serves as Supervisory Intelligence Analyst in the U.S. Intelligence Community. A retired Army Lieutenant Colonel with over twenty years of active service, his military assignments included G2, 34th Infantry Division during OIF 09-10, Assistant Professor, Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy, and a variety of intelligence and infantry assignments. He holds Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Psychology, a Master's Degree in Public Administration and a Doctorate in Business Administration.
* Airframe Cost * UH-60A/L Blackhawk $ 9.4-9.5 million * UH-60M Blackhawk $ 15.5 million * CH-47D Chinook $ 10.6 million * CH-47F Chinook $ 24.1 million * OH-58D Kiowa Warrior $ 10.9 million * AH-64A Apache $ 20 million * AH-64D Apache Longbow $ 18-28 million * The aircrew numbers differ for each air frame: -AH-64 & OH-58 (2 pilots), UH-60 (2 pilots and 2 crew chiefs), CH-47 (2 pilots, 1 flight engineer, and 2 crew chiefs). * The majority of the catastrophic shoot downs have had a Chief Warrant Officer 3 (CW3) or CW4 in the aircrew. * The Army has been able to absorb the monetary costs but the Aviation community has struggled to replace the experience lost in the catastrophic shoot downs. Aircrew Experience Cost Flight School (IERW) $ 1.5 million 1000 flight hours for CW3/CW4 $ 6 million * Figured at $6000.00 an hour for a UH-60 Blackhawk ** 1000 hrs estimated as a low minimum for CW3/CW4 with multiple combat tours Total Cost of a Single Pilot $ 7.5 million UNCLASSIFIED Figure 1. Army Aicraft and Aircrew Costs Military Intelligence Specific Aviation Intel Training (in weeks by branch) The Army is he only Service Branch without a course. Air Force * 23 Marine Corps officer 12 Marine corps enlisted 4 Navy 7 Army 0 Type Org 15C/35 Req. Units Total CAB (AC) 5 12 60 100 CAB (AC) 5 8 40 TAB (AC & RC) Varies (7-8) 2 15 TAB (AC & RC) Varies (8-14) 7 69 UNCLASSIFIED 184 Figure 3. Army Aviation AOC 15C/35 Requirements. 2011 Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) UNIT POSITION MOS/AOC GRADE HHC, CAB S2 15 PERSONNEL PLANS OFFICER 15C35 04 ASSISTANT S2 35D 03 ALL SOURCE INTEL TECH 35D 03 AR INTEL SGT 350F W2 INTEL SGT 35F E7 INTEL ANALYST 35F E6 INTEL ANALYST 35F E5 INTEL ANALYST 35F E4 INTEL ANALYST 35F E3 NON-LETHAL ELEC WARFARE SPT OFF NOTEL 1 35G 03 INTEL SGT 35F E6 CP1 TAC TAC INTEL OFFICER 35D 03 INTEL SGT 35F E6 INTEL ANALYST 35F E5 CP2 TOC INTEL ANALYST 35F E4 Total CAB Intelligence personnel 12x Active Duty CABs 456 Ml personnel 8x ARNG CABs304 Ml personnel 20x CABs total 760 Ml personnel (REDUCED TO 700] loss of 60 Ml personnel from CABs with 2012/2013 MTOE 2013 Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) UNIT POSITION MOS/AOC GRADE 2013 MOTE EDATE: 1S EP 13 HHC, CAB S2 15C35 04 11 personnel PLANS OFFICER 35D 03 ASSISTANT S2 35D 03 ALL SOURE INTEL TECH 350F W2 SR INTEL ANALYST 35F E7 INTEL SGT 35F E6 INTEL ANALYST 35F E5 INTEL ANALYST 35F E4 INTEL ANALYST 35F E3 NON-LETHAL INTEL SGT 35F E6 INTEL ANALYST 35F E4 * Reduced by 4 personnel from 2011 MTOE * Reduced by 1 personnel from 2012 MTOE (30A conversion) Note 1: 35G 03 position converted to 30A Note 2: 2012 MTOE identical to 2013 MTOE for the CAB Ml personnel. Unclassified Figure 4. 2011 MTOE vs. 2013 MTOE.
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|Author:||Koehler, Major Corby; Tatarka, Christopher|
|Publication:||Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin|
|Date:||Apr 1, 2013|
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