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In matter of first impression, Second Circuit reviews activities of sovereign wealth fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and ponders whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act immunizes an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign against claims that it violated federal securities laws by making misrepresentations outside the United States concerning the value of securities purchased by investors within the United States.

The following case involves a matter of first impression in the Second Circuit: whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA"), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, immunizes an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign against claims that it violated federal securities laws by making misrepresentations outside the United States concerning the value of securities purchased by investors within the United States.

Plaintiffs-Appellees Atlantica Holdings, Inc. ("Atlantica"); Baltica Investment Holding, Inc. ("Baltica"); Blu Funds, Inc. ("Blu Funds"); Allan and Anthony Kiblisky (the "Kibliskys"); and Jacques Gliksberg ("Gliksberg") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), purchased securities within the United States from Defendant-Appellant Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna JSC ("SK Fund"),"), a sovereign wealth fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan. SK Fund is the majority owner of BTA Bank JSC ("BTA Bank"), a Kazakhstani corporation.

In February 2009, SK Fund made a $1.5 billion investment in the BTA Bank, that way acquiring 75.1% of BTA Bank's common stock. In April 2009, BTA Bank announced that it had ceased principal payments on all of its outstanding financial obligations. Atlantica and Baltica, Panamanian investment funds, were creditors of BTA Bank. Both purchased certain of BTA Bank's outstanding debt securities that could only be held in accounts maintained in specific clearing systems. The access to these accounts is generally limited to large financial institutions ("Direct Participants"), who could hold BTA Bank securities for either their own account or their customers' benefit. Atlantica and Baltica were customers of UBS Financial Services ("UBS").

In 2010, BTA Bank undertook a restructuring (the "2010 Restructuring") of its capital structure, and issued a 600-plus-page information memorandum (the "Information Memorandum") that incorporated by reference a deed of undertaking executed by SK Fund (the "Deed of Undertaking") and described the terms of the 2010 Restructuring. A BTA Bank's existing creditor could access the Information Memorandum on the bank's website if he/she could certify that (1) was located outside the United States and was not a resident of the United States, i.e., not a "U.S. person"; or (2) was an "accredited investor," as defined in Rule 501(a) of SEC Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. [section] 230.501(a), or a "qualified institutional buyer" ("QIB"), as defined in SEC Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. [section] 230.144A. J.A. 161.

According to the terms of the 2010 Restructuring, SK Fund would receive additional equity in BTA Bank, becoming a 80% owner, while preexisting holder of BTA Bank's debt would receive new securities in exchange for their old ones, including the Subordinated Notes. These new securities could also be held only by Direct Participants, and were subject to transfer restrictions. The restrictions were based on the fact that, as not being registered under United States securities laws, they could be transferred only to non-U.S. persons or QIBs in transactions exempt from this country's registration requirements. Moreover, interests in the new securities could be transferred on the books of a Direct Participant, but such transfers were subject to the same restrictions.

Atlantica and Baltica, through their broker in the UBS Miami office, committed to participate in the 2010 Restructuring by accepting Subordinated Notes in exchange for their existing securities. Between September 2010 and October 2012, they acquired additional Subordinated Notes on the secondary market. At the same time, the other Plaintiffs Blu Funds, Kibliskys and Gliksberg, who had not previously been creditors of BTA Bank, acquired Subordinated Notes on the secondary market also through UBS's Miami office. Blu Funds is a Panamanian investment fund; the Kibliskys live in Miami, and Gliksberg lives in Highland Park, Illinois. The UBS's Miami office sent Plaintiffs' orders to its broker-dealer in New York using funds from Plaintiffs' UBS accounts. All orders were filled, and the transactions completed, in New York.

Plaintiffs alleged that BTA Bank and SK Fund marketed the Subordinated Notes extensively in the United States, and directed that marketing to U.S. investors, and that they have made their investments in the Subordinated Notes in reliance on a number of misrepresentations contained in the Information Memorandum and made subsequently by SK Fund and BTA Bank. They alleged that the Information Memorandum contained false representation that BTA Bank would not pay SK Fund any dividends on its equity holdings until the bank's newly issued securities, including the Subordinated Notes, were paid in full. According to Plaintiffs, BTA Bank entered in complex, undisclosed series of transactions with SK Fund (the "Negative Carry Swap") pursuant to which BTA Bank paid interest on SK Fund deposits at a rate significantly higher than BTA Bank was earning on bonds it had purchased from SK Fund. This resulted in SK Fund's effectively "siphon[ing] hundreds of millions of dollars from BTA Bank at the expense of other creditors." This came to light in May 2011, when BTA Bank issued an investor presentation disclosing that it was paying more on its liabilities than it was taking in on its assets, and when the investment bank J.P. Morgan published a research report disclosing additional details of BTA Bank's asset-liability yield mismatch. This resulted in the decrease of the value of the Subordinated Notes to less than 40% of face value by June 2011, and then to less than 10% of face value by January 2012. Following these disclosures regarding the Negative Carry Swap, between July 2011 and December 2011, high-ranking SK Fund officers made a number of public statements to American press outlets seeking to "prop up" the value of BTA Bank's securities by assuring investors that SK Fund would guarantee BTA Bank's ongoing viability. Plaintiffs alleged that these statements were also false or misleading.

Plaintiffs also alleged that BTA Bank made additional false or misleading statements in the PowerPoint presentations prepared in connection with the 2012 Restructuring. In this presentation BTA Bank failed to disclose its liability on instruments called "recovery units," which it had issued to some creditors during the 2010 Restructuring, and which entitled holders to participate pari passu with BTA Bank's senior creditors in the event that the bank defaulted. When the market learned of these previously undisclosed senior liabilities, the value of the Subordinated Note held by Plaintiffs plunged even further.

In December 2012, Plaintiffs commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, and filed an amended complaint (the "complaint") in April 2013. In May 2013, SK Fund moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA"), lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and failure to plead fraud with particularity. In March 2014, the district court denied SK Fund's motion. The district court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction under both the first and third clauses of FSIA's "commercial-activity exception," which provide, respectively, that a foreign state is not immune from suit in actions "based upon" the state's commercial activity in the United States or in actions "based upon" its commercial activity outside the United States that has a "direct effect" in the United States. 28 U.S.C. [section] 1605(a)(2). The district court also concluded in a footnote that because the FSIA authorizes personal jurisdiction over a foreign state whenever it is not immune from suit, see 28 U.S.C. [section] 1330(b), the conclusion that SK Fund was not immune under the FSIA's commercial-activity exception also meant that the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over SK Fund. See Atlantica Holdings, 2 F.Supp.2d at 559 n. 5.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirms district court's decision that SK Fund is not immune from suit under the FSIA because Plaintiffs' claims are "based upon ... an act outside the territory of the United States" that "cause[d] a direct effect in the United States." 28 U.S.C. [section] 1605(a)(2).

The key issue here is whether FSIA immunizes an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign against claims that it violated federal securities laws by making misrepresentations outside the United States concerning the value of securities purchased by investors within the United States.

"The FSIA 'provides the 'sole basis' for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in the United States.' Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 611, 112 S.Ct. 2160, 119 L.Ed.2d 394 (1992) (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434-39, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989)). Under the FSIA, a 'foreign state' is 'immune from the jurisdiction' of state and federal courts in the United States unless one of a number of statutory exceptions applies. 28 U.S.C. [section] 1604; see id. [section][section] 1605-1607 (providing exceptions). Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over an action against a foreign state if, and only if, one of those exceptions applies. Id. [section] 1330(a)."

"'The single most important exception to foreign state immunity under the FSIA,' Hanil Bank v. P.T. Bank Negara Indon. (Persero), 148 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1998), and the only one at issue in this case, is the commercial-activity exception. This exception, which contains three independent clauses, provides that a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction 'in any case' in which: the action is based [1] upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or [2] upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [3] upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.

28 U.S.C. [section] 1605(a)(2)"

"The third clause of the commercial-activity exception is known as the "direct-effect clause." Under the direct-effect clause, a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction if the plaintiff's "lawsuit is (1) 'based upon ... an act outside the territory of the United States'; (2) that was taken 'in connection with a commercial activity' of [the foreign state] outside this country; and (3) that 'cause[d] a direct effect in the United States.'" Weltover, 504 U.S. at 611, 112 S.Ct. 2160 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. [section] 1605(a)(2))."

SK Fund argued (1) that the district court misperceived what Plaintiffs' claims were "based upon," and (2) that the actions upon which Plaintiffs' claims were actually based did not "cause[] a direct effect in the United States." The Court addressed these arguments in a de novo review.

"The Supreme Court has explained that, within the meaning of [section] 1605(a)(2), 'an action is 'based upon' the 'particular conduct' that constitutes the 'gravamen' of the suit.' OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs,--U.S.--, 136 S.Ct. 390, 396, 193 L.Ed.2d 269 (2015) (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 357, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993)). 'Rather than individually analyzing each of the [Plaintiffs'] causes of action, we zero[] in on the core of their suit....' Id. Sachs, handed down just this Term, describes the 'gravamen' as the 'basis' or 'foundation' of a claim, i.e., 'those elements ... that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief.' Id. at 395 (quoting Nelson, 507 U.S. at 357, 113 S.Ct. 1471). Thus, suits for personal injuries sustained at a railway station in Austria, see id. at 396, or in a prison in Saudi Arabia, see Nelson, 507 U.S. at 352-54, 358, 113 S.Ct. 1471, rest on conduct that 'plainly occurred abroad.' Sachs, 136 S.Ct. at 396. In this case, identifying the 'gravamen' of Plaintiffs' complaint is straightforward. Plaintiffs' core claim is that they were misled as to the value of the Subordinated Notes by certain misrepresentations made by SK Fund and BTA Bank. So the gravamen of Plaintiffs' complaint is those misrepresentations. See Black's Law Dictionary 817 (10th ed. 2014) (defining 'gravamen' as '[t]he substantial point or essence of a claim, grievance, or complaint')."

As SK Fund disputed whether statements made by BTA Bank in investor presentations and in the Information Memorandum may properly be attributed to it for jurisdictional purposes, the court states that "[...] Plaintiffs seeking jurisdiction under the FSIA must allege facts sufficient to establish an exception to sovereign immunity under the FSIA. See Robinson, 269 F.3d at 140-41. In this case, however, insofar as BTA Bank's statements constitute part of the 'gravamen' of the complaint, Plaintiffs have advanced a Section 20(a) 'control person' theory which, if proven, 'would entitle [them] to relief' from SK Fund on the basis of BTA Bank's alleged misrepresentations. Sachs, 136 S.Ct. at 395; see 15 U.S.C. [section] 78t(a) (holding liable any person 'who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder'). The district court rejected SK Fund's challenge to the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' Section 20(a) 'control' allegations in a portion of its ruling not before us on appeal."

"Thus, we need not reach the question whether Plaintiffs have shown that BTA Bank is SK Fund's 'alter ego,' see U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., 199 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1999) 108*108 (per curiam). [...] Sachs makes clear that in assessing whether an action is 'based upon' acts outside the United States, for FSIA purposes, we look not to the analysis of each individual claim, but to the overall question where a lawsuit's foundation is geographically based. See Sachs, 136 S.Ct. at 396."

"For these reasons, we conclude that Plaintiffs' claims against SK Fund 'based upon' (at least) the misrepresentations alleged in their complaint. [. ]Accordingly, this action is 'based upon ... an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of [SK Fund] elsewhere,' and the only question remaining is whether 'that act cause[d] a direct effect in the United States.' 28 U.S.C. [section] 1605(a)(2)."

The Court agreed with Plaintiffs and the district court that losses suffered by United States investors in the Subordinated Notes as a result of SK Fund's alleged misrepresentations about those securities' value qualify as a "direct effect" in United States.

"In order to be 'direct,' an effect need not be 'substantial' or 'foreseeable,' but rather must simply 'follow[] 'as an immediate consequence of the defendant's ... activity." Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618, 112 S.Ct. 2160 (second alteration in original) (quoting Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991)). In Weltover, the Supreme Court held that Argentina's nonpayment of funds into a New York bank account that had been designated as the place of payment on certain bonds issued by that country caused a direct effect in the United States because '[m]oney that was supposed to have been delivered to [the] New York bank for deposit was not forthcoming.' 504 U.S. at 619, 112 S.Ct. 2160. Based on Weltover's holding, courts have consistently held that, in contract cases, a breach of a contractual duty causes a direct effect in the United States sufficient to confer FSIA jurisdiction so long as the United 109*109 States is the place of performance for the breached duty. See, e.g., Rogers, 673 F.3d at 139-40; Hanil Bank, 148 F.3d at 132; Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir.1994); see also Odhiambo v. Republic of Kenya, 764 F.3d 31, 40 (D.C.Cir.2014)."

"Here, of course, Plaintiffs are asserting tort claims, not contract claims. 'In tort,' we have reasoned, 'the analog to contract law's place of performance is the locus of the tort.' Antares Aircraft, L.P v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.1993). A tort's locus--also known as the locus delicti, or 'place of wrong'--is the place 'where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.' Restatement of Conflict of Laws [section] 377 (1934) [hereinafter First Restatement]. And, '[s]ince a tort action traditionally has not been viewed as complete until the plaintiff suffers injury or loss,' the cause of action has generally 'been considered to arise at the place where this damage was sustained.' Sack v. Low, 478 F.2d 360, 365 (2d Cir. 1973); see, e.g., Christopher A. Whitlock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 719, 724-25 (2009) ('The First Restatement defines the place of wrong as 'the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.' Usually this is the location where the plaintiff was injured, since liability does not arise without injury.' (footnotes omitted) (quoting First Restatement [section] 377)). Thus, a determination that a tort's locus is the United States is, in effect, often a determination that the plaintiff has been injured in this country by the defendant's tortious actions--meaning that those actions caused a 'direct effect' (the plaintiff's injury) in this country. As a result, such a determination will ordinarily be sufficient, if not invariably necessary, to confer FSIA jurisdiction under our precedents. See Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d at 36 (leaving open the possibility that even 'a foreign tort may have had sufficient contacts with the United States to establish the requisite 'direct effect' in this country'); see also Hanil Bank, 148 F.3d at 133 (noting that the United States 'need not be the location where the most direct effect is felt, simply a direct effect')."

"We have previously held that the locus of an alleged misrepresentation actionable under Section 10(b) is the forum 'where the loss is sustained, not where fraudulent misrepresentations are made.' Sack, 478 F.2d at 366 (quoting First Restatement [section] 377 note 4). [...] The First Restatement provides that the locus of a fraud claim is the place where the plaintiff sustains a loss. Id. at 365-66; accord, e.g., In re Thelen LLP, 736 F.3d 213, 220 (2d Cir.2013). In particular, the First Restatement contains an illustration for securities-fraud claims that Judge Friendly deemed 'quite pertinent':"

"6. A, in state X, owns shares in the M company. B, in state Y, fraudulently persuades A not to sell the shares. The value of the shares falls. The place of wrong is X."

"Sack, 478 F.2d at 366 (quoting First Restatement [section] 377 note 4). On this basis, the Sack Court held that an alleged misrepresentation actionable under Section 10(b)--just like a claim for common-law fraud--arises 'where its economic impact is felt, normally the plaintiffs' residence.' Id.; see also Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344, 349 (2d Cir.1993) (relying on Sack's holding to conclude that a Section 10(b) claim arose in the forum where the plaintiffs resided)."

"If the locus of a Section 10(b) claim is the place where the plaintiff suffers economic loss from reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations, then it follows that in a securities fraud case, an FSIA direct effect may be felt where the plaintiff suffers such loss. See Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d at 36 ('In tort, the analog to contract law's place of performance is the locus of the tort.'). To be sure, locating an economic injury within the United States, without more, will not suffice to bring a foreign sovereign within the 'commercial activities' exception. See id. [...] But here, as the district court correctly determined, Plaintiffs have adequately shown that SK Fund 'contemplated investment by United States persons. and that SK Fund's alleged misrepresentations caused a direct effect in the United States when at least some investors in the Subordinated Notes--including Gliksberg and the Kibliskys--suffered an economic loss in this country as a result of those misrepresentations. [...] On such facts, we have no difficulty concluding that Plaintiffs' loss 'follow[ed] as an immediate consequence' of SK Fund's alleged misrepresentations concerning securities that were marketed in the United States and 111*111 directed toward United States persons. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618, 112 S.Ct. 2160 (internal quotation marks omitted)."

The Court also noted that the Kibliskys, who resided in Miami, and Gliskberg, who resided in Illinois, purchased Subordinated Notes following the 2010 Restructuring in reliance on the Information Memorandum, through their broker in the Miami office of USB. The Subordinated Notes lost substantially all of their value after the falsity of alleged misstatements war revealed. "Nothing in the 4 amended complaint or the parties' other submissions suggests that Gliksberg and the Kibliskys were injured by SK Fund's alleged misstatements anywhere other than their place of residence. The locus of SK Fund's alleged securities fraud, then, was the United States. See Sack, 478 F.2d at 366; First Restatement [section] 377 note 4. And the fact that the locus of the fraud was the United States means (at least in circumstances where the securities were also marketed here and, as the district court noted, the defendant contemplated and acted to encourage investment by United States persons) the direct-effect clause is satisfied. See Antares Aircraft, 999 F.2d at 36."

The Court denies SK Fund argument that the Plaintiffs other than Gliksberg and the Kibliskys are not American, and therefore could not have been injured in the United States by SK Fund's alleged misrepresentations.

"[...] [T]he FSIA requires only that SK Fund's alleged misrepresentations had a direct effect in the United States. In other words, had all of the plaintiffs been foreigners, they could have successfully premised FSIA jurisdiction on the effect that SK Fund's alleged misrepresentations had on non-party United States investors, provided that Plaintiffs could adequately establish the existence of United States investors so affected. Cf. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983) (noting that the FSIA 'allow[s] a foreign plaintiff to sue a foreign sovereign in the courts of the United States, provided the substantive requirements of the Act are satisfied')."

"This conclusion--that an FSIA plaintiff need only show a direct effect on someone in the United States, plaintiff or not--follows directly from the text of the direct-effect clause, which provides that a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction where the 'action is based ... upon an act outside the territory of the United States ... and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.' 28 U.S.C. [section] 1605(a)(2) (emphasis added). Simply put, the statute says that the act on which the plaintiff's claims are based must have had a domestic effect, not that the plaintiff's claims must be based upon the act's domestic effect. [...]. In Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238, [...] [w]e explained that '[t]he focus of [section] 1605(a)(2) is the activity of the sovereign,' not the location of the plaintiff: 'If the sovereign's activity is commercial in nature and has a direct effect in the United States, then the jurisdictional nexus is met, no immunity attaches, and a district court has the authority to adjudicate disputes based on that activity.' Id. at 241. For these reasons, the fact that Plaintiffs here have shown a direct effect on Gliksberg and the Kibliskys in the United States is more than sufficient to satisfy the direct-effect clause with respect to Plaintiffs' entire lawsuit."

The Court also denies SK Fund's argument that a financial loss to American investors cannot qualify as a direct effect for FSIA purposes. "[...] In contract cases, FSIA jurisdiction is often premised on a financial loss, see, e.g., Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619, 112 S.Ct. 2160 ('Money that was supposed to have been delivered to a New York bank for deposit was not forthcoming.'), and tort cases are no different."

"[...] [F]or Gliksberg and the Kibliskys (as well as for other United States investors who bought Subordinated Notes in reliance on SK Fund's misrepresentations), the financial loss suffered when their investments declined in value was their initial injury. In cases where the plaintiff's initial injury occurs in the United States--that is, where this country is the locus of the tort--there is no reason why that initial injury should not count as a direct effect merely because it happens to take the form of a financial loss."

SK Fund argued that the relationship between its alleged misrepresentations and Plaintiffs' financial loss is too attenuated for that loss to qualify as a "direct effect." SK Fund argued that United States investors in the Subordinated Notes could only have obtained the Information Memorandum containing SK Fund's alleged misrepresentations from third-party intermediaries such as UBS, whose conduct in forwarding the document to investors was an intervening act between the commercial activity and any resulting effect in the United States. The Court did not agree.

"The intervening actions of a third party may sometimes break the causal chain between a defendant's allegedly tortious actions and an effect felt in the United States--rendering the effect in this country not 'direct'--where the defendant's actions affect the third party, who in turn takes some independent action that causes a further effect in the United States. See Virtual Countries, 300 F.3d at 237-38. [...]"

"115*115 This case is different. Here, the third-party conduct cited by SK Fund--UBS's distribution of the Information Memorandum-was not in any sense undertaken in reliance on or as a result of SK Fund's alleged misrepresentations specifically. In other words, third-party intermediaries such as UBS would have distributed the Information Memorandum regardless of whether it contained misrepresentations about BTA Bank's financial situation, so that the conduct of such intermediaries cannot have been an effect of any such misrepresentations. Nor was it UBS's distribution of the Information Memorandum (as distinguished from the misrepresentations themselves) that ultimately caused Plaintiffs' injury. Unlike the press release in Virtual Countries, SK Fund's misrepresentations acted directly on those whom they allegedly affected, namely, the investors induced to purchase Subordinated Notes that were worth less than advertised."

"Although it bears reiterating that an effect need not be foreseeable to be direct, see Weltover, 504 U.S. at 618, 112 S.Ct. 2160, we do not intend to--indeed, we have no occasion to--foreclose entirely the possibility that an alleged misstatement by a foreign state may be so far removed from the American investor who eventually relies on it that FSIA jurisdiction will not lie. See, e.g., Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 247 F.Supp.2d 425, 429 (S.D.N.Y.2003). [...] Given that investors 116*116 in securities offerings frequently make their purchases through underwriters who distribute offering documents on behalf of the issuer, adopting SK Fund's argument that UBS's actions broke the causal chain between SK Fund's misrepresentations and the losses suffered by United States investors could effectively result in near blanket immunity for foreign states against securities-fraud claims. We do not believe that such a result would be consistent with, much less required by, our FSIA precedents." "On the facts presented here, the relationship between SK Fund's alleged misrepresentations and the resulting financial loss suffered in this country by United States investors--including Gliksberg and the Kibliskys--is sufficiently direct to overcome FSIA immunity."

The Court affirmed district court's order denying SK Fund's motion to dismiss on FSIA grounds.

CITATION: Atlantica Holdings v. Sovereign Wealth Fund, 813 F.3d 98 (2nd Cir. 2016).
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Title Annotation:Sovereign Immunity
Publication:International Law Update
Date:Jan 1, 2016
Words:4582
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