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Implicit theories of intelligence and creative ability: relationships with academic risk-taking and academic stress.

The impetus for the present study came from the work of Dweck and her colleagues (e.g., Dweck, 1986; Molden & Dweck, 2006) who have provided abundant evidence that motivation to engage in and persist at tasks is related to how students view their own capabilities (e.g., intelligence), that is, whether they view these capabilities as a fixed (entity theory) or malleable (incremental theory) nature. Extant studies, generally using experimental tasks, have shown support for the notion that believing that capabilities are fixed contributes to maladaptive ways of approaching challenging tasks and interpreting success or failures on such tasks. In particular, believing that abilities are fixed predicts a pattern of goal orientation, referred to as "performance orientation," that is associated with choosing achievable but not challenging goals and giving up quickly in the face of failures. In contrast, believing that capabilities are malleable or incremental predicts a pattern of goal orientation, referred to as "learning orientation," that is associated with choosing challenging goals and showing greater persistence in the face of failure.

The present study was designed to extend Dweck's work by investigating whether implicit beliefs about intelligence and creativity were associated with (a) "everyday" academic-risk taking (e.g., choice of courses, asking questions in class), and (b) perceptions of "everyday" academic stress among college students. To the authors' knowledge, while there are studies that examine implicit beliefs about creativity (e.g., Chan & Chan, 1999; Makel, 2009; Wickes & Ward, 2006) none have examined how implicit beliefs about intelligence and creativity relate to "everyday" academic risk-taking. Determining if "everyday" academic risk-taking and academic stress can be predicted by implicit beliefs about intelligence may be valuable to both professor and counselors alike in student advisement. There were two additional purposes of the study: (a) to examine the nature of students' beliefs (endorsement rates of items on the beliefs scales) about the fixedness or malleability of intelligence and creativity and (b) to examine the extent to which implicit beliefs about intelligence and creativity are correlated.

A REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND EXPECTATIONS

The Nature of Implicit Beliefs and Their significance

Philosophers and psychologists alike have stressed that people actively construct theories about how psychological attributes such as intelligence and creativity are acquired and the relevance of such constructions to everyday functioning (Molden & Dweck, 2006). Such construals, referred to as implicit theories or beliefs, influence how individuals view themselves and others with regard to the manifestation and further development of particular traits (Swami et al., 2008). Furthermore, implicit theories play a role in individuals' regulation of their everyday behaviors, educational and career choices, and their behavior toward others. In contrast, explicit theories are scientifically based--"they are tested, presented, or published, and [are] a part of the scientific community" (Runco, 2007, p. 56).

Dweck (1986, 2000) argued that people generally think in two ways about the acquisition and development of such abilities as intelligence and that the view they hold has a profound influence on their motivation to take on less or more challenging tasks in everyday life. She referred to these personal beliefs as implicit theories of intelligence. Entity theorists of intelligence believe that the capacity for intelligence is determined by birth and generally remains stable throughout life. In general, entity theorists assign little role to effort in improving one's abilities while incremental theorists believe that learning and effort can improve one's abilities.

Murray (2007a, b, c; 2008) asserted rather strongly as he had years earlier in The Bell Curve (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994) that general intellectual ability referred to as "g" is programmed at birth and is directly related to academic performance. To Murray, IQ tests measure a person's "g" ability and that education has little impact on improving "g. " He advocated that only people with an IQ higher than 115 should be provided with opportunities for college education because only these individuals have the ability to master materials taught in college. He also believed that those below 115 should receive vocational training. Murray strongly linked low intelligence to educational deficits and the resulting economic and social problems from such deficits.

Murray's views are in stark contrast to Dweck's incremental theories of intelligence because he subscribes to an extreme entity viewpoint--knowing IQ scores can help people choose academic and career goals appropriate for their intellectual ability and little is gained by pushing people to strive for goals that are beyond their natural ability.

Characteristics of the Entity and Malleable Theorists

Dweck (1986, 2000) theorized that the performance orientation of entity theorists leads them to pursue activities they are best at to validate their feelings of competence. They are unlikely to test their skills and abilities at challenging tasks to deliberately avoid failure. They may try harder at some tasks, but only when they are relatively certain that they will succeed. In contrast, incremental theorists pursue flexible learning goals because their primary goal is to extend their understanding and master new knowledge through learning. They show willingness to attempt novel and difficult tasks because they are eager to learn and believe that such efforts will make them more competent.

Most extant work comparing entity and incremental theorists has focused on beliefs about intelligence. Most work has also employed experimental tasks with school children and college students in evaluating differences between the two types of theorists. A goal of this study was to examine whether individual differences in implicit theories of college students would predict "everyday" academic risk-taking in terms of strategies they use in course planning, especially with regard to choosing electives. Dweck's theory would predict that entity theorists are more likely to adhere to their required curriculums and take electives that are closely related to their majors. In contrast, incremental theorists are more likely to take additional courses that they consider interesting but which have little to do with the majors they are pursuing. Dweck's theory would further predict that entity theorists are more likely to select courses that are within their level of competence and background, but incremental theorists would be more likely to try courses that are more challenging and report lower levels of stress related to their academic work.

A second goal of the study was to extend Dweck's notion of implicit theories to creativity. Investigators think of intelligence and creativity as somewhat overlapping but distinct attributes (see Runco, 2007). Some basic level of intelligence is usually regarded as needed for creativity; however, above that basic level, intelligence is regarded as unrelated to creativity (Runco, 2007). Similar to beliefs about intelligence, people may view creativity in terms of entity and incremental theories and that individual differences in such beliefs may be related to academic risk-taking and stress.

Implicit Theories and Academic Risk-Taking

According to Clifford (1991), academic risk-taking studies have typically focused on how students select school achievement tasks of varying difficulty levels in the context of feedback or expectations of feedback. Risk-taking studies have usually utilized suppositional situations, anagrams, or puzzles as their experimental materials. In general, studies have not examined factors associated with risk-taking in "everyday" academic tasks (e.g., taking a more challenging course), nor have they measured the role of interest in risk-taking (see Clifford & Chou, 1991).

Clifford and Chou (1991) noted that studies on risk-taking show that moderate risk-taking, defined as choosing a task with a .50 probability of success, gives people the greatest satisfaction and valuable information about their ability and contributes to the development of their sense of competence and self-efficacy. Clifford (1991) observed that moderate risk-taking is associated with taking an active approach to learning, preferring challenging tasks, persisting, and using strategies when faced with setbacks (see also Meyer & Turner, 2006). Thus, moderate risk-takers tend to show a learning orientation because they tend not merely to look for a solution to the assigned problems but to focus on understanding them and using strategies to enhance their learning. On the other hand, low risk-takers develop negative feelings after facing setbacks, find ways to avoid work, or choose easier tasks so as to keep their perception of competency intact. Although Clifford and her colleagues did not relate risk-taking to students' implicit theories of intelligence, it appears that behaviors of moderate risk-takers are consistent with behaviors of those who subscribe to incremental theory while those of low risk-takers are consistent with those who subscribe to entity theory.

Studies by Dweck and her colleagues (Dweck, 2000; Molden & Dweck, 2006) suggest that obstacles do not hinder incremental theorists; rather, they are more inclined to be persistent and motivated to take action when faced with a challenge. Incremental theorists do not view failure as an indication of personal inadequacy; to them, it means a correct solution is yet to be found. For entity theorists, only flawless performance can reinforce their feelings of competence. Poor performance leads them to doubt their self-efficacy, to worry about their ability to prove their mettle, and to use self-handicapping strategies to preserve their self-esteem. They focus less on personal development because striving for them seems to demonstrate a lack of ability.

Given the aforementioned review of literature, it was hypothesized that college students who subscribe to entity theory would be less likely than those who subscribe to incremental theory to (a) take challenging courses, (b) enrich their curriculum by taking courses outside of their majors, (c) participate more actively in classes by asking questions or making comments, and (d) seek available help when needed with difficult assignments.

Implicit Beliefs and Academic Stress

Students often feel stressed from having to process large amounts of information in short periods of time for examinations and to maintain good grades (Misra & Castillo, 2004). Possible consequences of stress include varied physiological (e.g., stomach pain, decreased appetite, indigestion) and psychological complaints (e.g., anxiety, depression). Thus, thinking negatively about academic stress can impact both academic performance and health (Misra, McKean, West & Russo, 2000).

Entity and incremental theorists differ in their criteria for evaluating excellence in performance. Hong, Chiu, and Dweck (1995) found that although the two types of theorists did not differ in their ratings of test difficulty, the entity theorists set higher criteria for satisfactory performance. The incremental theorists adjusted their criteria of satisfactory performance according to the tests' difficulty level and maintained their levels of self-confidence when solving difficult tasks.

Dweck (2000) observed that incremental theorists were more likely to devise strategies to succeed at failed tasks. In contrast, she found that the response styles of entity theorists and depressed students were similar when they encountered failures. She found the entity theorists to be overly concerned about failure, to forego trying at failed tasks, and to express the belief that they would experience feelings of inferiority upon failing at tasks. Perhaps, failure results in a negative cognitive set more readily in entity theorists that makes them more susceptible to feelings of depression and learned helplessness.

Seligman (1975) observed "What is often passed off as retardation or IQ deficit may be the result of helplessness" (p. 154). Au, Watkins, and Hattie (2010) examined the relationship of academic achievement with a variety of variables including self-efficacy, self-esteem, and belief in entity or incremental theory in a longitudinal study of secondary school students in Hong Kong. Using structural modeling, they concluded (a) learned hopelessness is more a consequence of academic failure than its predictor; (b) declines in academic performance feed into feelings of hopelessness, possibly resulting in disengagement from school work; (c) belief in entity theory of ability was associated with low self-esteem and low self-efficacy; and (d) entity beliefs, easily reinforced in highly competitive and examination oriented classrooms, might serve as a "major barrier" to learning (p. 136).

Although both incremental and entity theorists experience stress in academic environments, it is likely that their perceptions of their own levels of stress differ in significant ways. Thus, a purpose of this study was to examine whether belief in incremental theory correlated inversely with perceived levels of academic stress. Furthermore, assuming academic risk-taking is a characteristic of incremental theorists, we expected that academic risk taking would be negatively correlated with perceived academic stress.

Implicit Beliefs About Creativity

Creative people are similar to incremental theorists of intelligence because both are intrinsically motivated, prone to risk-taking, and concerned about learning and understanding when engaged in problem solving tasks than performing to show their abilities. However, it is possible that people have implicit beliefs about creativity which parallel those of intelligence. Therefore, a purpose of the study was to examine the extent to which individuals' implicit theories of intelligence and creativity are correlated.

METHOD

Participants

Two hundred thirty eight college freshmen through second year graduate students (164 women and 59 men, 15 unidentified, age range 19 to 49, median age = 22) voluntarily participated in this study. The ethnic backgrounds of the participants were 71% Caucasian, 8% African American, 4.6% Hispanic, 4.6 % Asian, 1.7% Native American, and 1.2 % unidentified).

Instruments

All instruments utilized a 5-point Likert scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree). The order of administration of instruments follows their descriptions as noted below.

Dweck's Theory of Intelligence Scale (DTIS). The 4-item DTIS (Dweck, 2000) was used to measure students' beliefs about the malleability of intelligence (examples of items include "You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can't really do much about it" and "You can always substantially change how intelligent you are"). The original instrument by Dweck (2000) used a 6-point Likert scale (Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree). However, a 5-point scale was used in this study for convenience of using scantron sheets. Higher scores on the scale reflect higher belief in incremental or malleability theory. The DTIS has been shown to have excellent psychometric properties with Cronbach alpha values ranging between .94 and .98 and a 2-week testretest reliability of .80 (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995).

Yamazaki-Kumar Theory of Intelligence Scale (YKTIS). Given the high similarity of items in the DTIS, we decided to generate more items to assess implicit beliefs about intelligence somewhat more comprehensively than the DTIS. This scale of 9 items was especially devised for this study (e.g., "There are only a few highly intelligent people in any population"; "Only intelligent people can succeed in school). These items were based on the commonly held views about the nature of intelligence and its significance for everyday success in life (e.g., see Dweck, 2006; Murray, 2007, a, b, c, d; Nisbett, 2009). Higher scores on the scale reflect higher incremental beliefs.

Modified Dweck Yamazaki-Kumar Theory of Creativity Scale (MDYKTC). This 4-item scale was constructed by simply replacing the word intelligence with creativity in the DTIS items to assess people's implicit theory of creativity (entity or incremental). Examples of items are "You have a certain amount of creativity, and you can't really do much about it"; and, "You can always substantially change how creative you are." Higher scores on the scale reflect higher incremental beliefs.

Yamazaki-Kumar Theory of Creativity Scale (YKTC). The 7 items of this scale were constructed by modifying those of YKTIS to assess people's theories of creativity in a more comprehensive way than MDYKTC. Higher scores on the scale reflect higher incremental beliefs.

Yamazaki-Kumar Beliefs about Relatedness of Creativity and Intelligence Scale. The 2 items in this scale were constructed for this study to assess beliefs about the relationship between creativity and intelligence ("People who are creative are also intelligent" and "Intelligent people are also creative"). These items were based on Runco's (2007) discussion on the dependence of creativity on intelligence. Higher scores on the scale reflect greater belief that creativity and intelligence abilities are related.

Academic Risk-Taking Questionnaire (ARTQ). This 19-item scale was developed for this study since none was available that suited its purposes. For this study, academic risk-taking behaviors were restricted to how students behave in classes or choose courses. Examples of items include "I am open to changing my major field of study"; "I usually drop a course, if I do not do well on the very first exam"; "I tend not to ask questions in my classes." The authors generated the items by brainstorming on what constitutes everyday academic risk-taking behaviors. Higher scores on the scale reflect greater risk-taking.

Academic Stress Questionnaire (ASQ). This 14-item questionnaire was developed for this study to measure how stressed students currently feel in their academic work. Examples of items include "I get very stressed when I do not do well on an examination"; "I feel overwhelmed about my studies at this time"; "In general, I find my courses are difficult"; "I feel pressured to obtain good grades." The authors generated the items by brainstorming on types of stresses experienced by students in their everyday academic work. Higher scores on the scale reflect greater reported stress.

Procedure

Students were tested in groups over the entire semester. After receiving an explanation of the study, students completed the informed consent forms and were asked to complete all questionnaires anonymously. Following the completion of the questionnaires, students received a debriefing form that included a reiteration of the purposes of the study and a contact phone number if they wished to receive the results of the study.

RESULTS

Reliability

Cronbach [alpha] values for all scales are reported in Table 1. Three scales had reliability values ranging between .54 and .68; the lower reliability values appear to be related to low variability of responses on these scales. For all other scales reliability values ranged between .70 and .95.

Correlations Among the Intelligence and Creativity Implicit Beliefs' Scales The four implicit scales (see Table 2) were significantly (p < .001) correlated with each other suggesting that they may be measures of one latent belief system. This was further confirmed by a principal components analysis that yielded one factor with relatively high loadings on all four scales and an eigenvalue of 2.51, accounting for 62.75% of the total variance (see Table 2). Further, Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis (Watkins, 2000) provided confirmation that Factor 1 was the only one with an eigenvalue higher than random eigenvalue for approximately 95th percentile. Consequently, a regression based factor score (based on all four scales) was computed to form a new composite score, the General Implicit Beliefs Score (GIBS) about Intelligence and Creativity, for each participant. The alpha reliability of the composite GIBS was .80 estimated by using the procedure recommended by Judd and McClelland (1998) for composite scores based on principal components analysis. These findings suggest that the students have generalized implicit beliefs about the traits of intelligence and creativity.

Correlations of Implicit Beliefs With Academic Risk-Taking and Academic Stress

As expected, Table 3 shows that the composite GIBS and the four implicit beliefs scales were significantly and positive correlated with the Academic Risk-Taking scale and significantly and negatively correlated with Academic Stress scale.

General Implicit Beliefs and Academic Risk-Taking

Since the Academic Risk-Taking questionnaire included a wide range of risk-taking behaviors, we decided to examine if implicit beliefs were associated with some behaviors more than others. The participants were divided into three groups, low, medium, and high believers in incremental theory using cut-off scores as close as possible to quartiles of the distribution of the composite General Implicit Beliefs Score. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) yielded a significant F (2, 234) = 9.30, p = .000, [[eta].sup.2] = .074 (medium effect size) on the total score of the Academic Risk-Taking Questionnaire. Follow-up Scheffs's post-hoc tests showed that the three GIBS-based groups differed significantly (p = .01) from each other (high M/item = 3.43, medium M/item = 3.24, and low M/item = 3.12). A multivariate ANOVA performed to examine difference among these three groups on the items of the Academic Risk-Taking scale yielded a significant overall Mult F [38, 426] = 1.55, p = .022. Further univariate analysis yielded significant differences on 6 out of the 9 items (see Table 4).

Nature of Implicit Beliefs About Intelligence and Creativity

The percentages of participants choosing the five anchor points (strongly agree to strongly disagree) on the Yamazaki-Kumar Theory of Intelligence scale are presented in Table 5. The percentage of students disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the notion that "intelligence is largely inherited or fixed at birth" was 46.7 (26.5% were unsure). By contrast, the percentage of students endorsing the fixed nature of intelligence was 26% (agreed or strongly agreed). A high percentage (71.9% agreed or strongly agreed) of students endorsed the belief that "development of intelligence is largely a matter of opportunities and experience one has in childhood." However, a high percentage of students (84.5% agreed or strongly agreed) also endorsed the opposite viewpoint that "Intelligence can develop all through life" and did not endorse the statement (80.7% disagreed or strongly disagreed) that "As people grow older their level of intelligence becomes lower."

Table 6 summarizes the percentage of participants choosing the five anchor points for the Yamazaki-Kumar Theory of Creativity Scale. The percentage of students disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the notion that "creativity is largely inherited or fixed at birth" was 51.7% (24.4% were unsure). By contrast, the percentage of students endorsing the fixed nature of creativity was 23.1% (agreed or strongly agreed). The percentage endorsing the statement "The development of creativity is largely a matter of opportunities and experience one has in childhood" was 45.8%. A high percentage (87.8%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement "People can do highly creative work even when they are in their older years (i.e., 60 and above)."

The last two items in Table 6 on the relationship between intelligence and creativity were significantly correlated (r = .56, p = 0.00, n = 236). More than half (56.8%) of the participants agreed that creative people are also intelligent, but only 34% agreed that intelligent people are creative.

DISCUSSION

Overlap of Implicit Beliefs About Intelligence and Creativity

The first order correlations (Table 2) among the various implicit beliefs scales and further principal components analysis suggested that students have generalized implicit beliefs about the traits of intelligence and creativity; those who believe in the malleability of intelligence also tend to believe in the malleability of creativity. The significant correlations among the implicit beliefs scales were observed despite the low reliability values of some of the scales which normally would lower the magnitude of correlations between variables. Given these results, a regression based composite General Implicit Beliefs Score (GIBS) was derived from all four measures and used in subsequent analyses. The GIBS showed acceptably high alpha reliability of .80 for research purposes.

Implicit Beliefs, Academic Risk-Taking and Perceived Academic Stress

The prediction derived from Dweck's research that incremental theorists are more likely to take everyday academic risks than entity theorists was supported by significant correlations of the individual implicit beliefs scales and the composite implicit beliefs score with the total score on the Academic Risk-Taking Questionnaire (Table 3). The prediction was also supported by analysis of variance (Table 4) on the comparison of low, medium, and high believers in incremental theory (based on GIBS) on the total score (medium effect size) and on individual items (small to medium effect sizes) of the Academic Risk-Taking questionnaire. Specifically, the results suggest that entity theorists were more likely to report (a) hesitating asking questions in their classes, (b) dropping a course if they did not perform well on their first exam, (c) hesitating to approach their professors for help when they do not understand materials, and (d) having taken a course at another school because the course offered at their school was too challenging. As expected, the pattern of correlations between GIBS, Academic Risk-Taking and Academic Stress suggests that entity theorists not only appear to be less inclined to take everyday academic risks, but they also find it more stressful to take such risks.

The results of the present study have implications for parents, counselors, and instructors inasmuch as they can all contribute to fostering a learning rather than performance environment at home and school. To help counter self-defeating behaviors of entity believers, instructors and counselors may encourage their students to take small risks (e.g., asking questions and making comments in class) and teach them not to view any failures resulting from taking such risks as reflections of their natural abilities.

Dweck (2000; also Dweck & Good, 2006) observed that incremental beliefs can be directly taught to students. Parents, instructors, and counselors can foster incremental beliefs by praising students for their effort in accomplishing tasks. Praising for ability is more likely to foster entity beliefs. Dweck (2000) noted that reinforcing children for their intelligence is likely to promote entity beliefs, whereas reinforcing them for effort or mastery is likely to promote incremental beliefs. It is possible that students who hesitate to ask questions during their classes or hesitate to approach their professors later to ask for clarifications miss out on important opportunities to learn in and outside their classes. Encouraging students to think more flexibly about their capabilities might help students become more assertive in taking small risks such as asking questions in class and approaching their professors during office hours for additional help. Instructors can encourage the risk-averse students to submit their questions in writing anonymously to be addressed at the beginning of the class. They can comment on the significance of the questions submitted rather than simply complementing the student for asking "good" questions. These strategies could possibly help reinforce and shape the entity theorists' risk-taking behaviors. Instructors often play an important role in course selection; they can encourage their students to go beyond degree requirements to take courses in areas that interest them. Guidance counselors and psychologists can share the work of Dweck and others on implicit beliefs with parents and students who come to them for help, thereby encouraging them to think in incremental ways. Concepts from cognitive therapy such as cognitive distortions, automatic thoughts, and core beliefs (Beck, 1995) may be very helpful in steering the entity theorists away from a performance orientation and inculcating a learning orientation when approaching everyday academic tasks. Additionally, teaching relaxation, meditation, and breathing techniques may help entity theorists learn to cope with stress.

Nature of Implicit Beliefs About Intelligence and Creativity

A consideration of responses to the various items of the implicit beliefs scales (see Tables 5 and 6) suggests a mixed pattern of beliefs about the inheritance and development of intelligence and creativity inasmuch as the same students might be expressing belief in the fixed nature of these traits and concomitantly subscribing to the viewpoint that these traits may develop through life and not decline with age. This is perhaps also reflected in the somewhat low reliability values of some implicit beliefs instruments. It is not easy to explain the contradictory nature of beliefs held by the same individual.

The percentages of strong believers in the inheritance of intelligence and creativity were very similar (about 26% for intelligence and 23% for creativity). About a third of the students endorsed a connection between intelligence and academic success, but only 3.7% endorsed a link between creativity and success in school. This interesting result might be related to the nature of most academic examinations and assignments which emphasize factual aspects of course materials and not creative expression.

Interestingly, 39.9% students agreed or strongly agreed that the bell curve shape is an accurate description of the distribution of intelligence. By contrast, only 17.2% of the students agreed or strongly agreed with the same statement for creativity. A question worth examining in a future study is to ask students about the nature of distributions of intelligence and creativity. Many (71.9%) expressed a belief in the importance of childhood experiences to the development of intelligence, but the percentage for the same statement for creativity was much lower (45.8%). The reasons for these differences are not clear and perhaps worth exploring in a future study. Interestingly, 56.8% of the participants agreed that creative people are also intelligent, but only 34% of them agreed that intelligent people are creative, a result that appears consistent with the general view that intelligence is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for creativity (see Runco, 2007).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The results of the study lend support to and extend the work by Dweck and her colleagues on the importance of implicit beliefs in academic risk-taking. Specifically, the results showed that students' views about the heritability of intelligence and creativity were highly correlated. Consistent with Dweck's theorization that holding entity beliefs can provide a sense of security about what to expect from oneself and others in regards to the limits of one's potential for achievement. The results of this study showed that the entity theorists were less likely to report taking everyday academic risks such as asking questions in class or approaching their professors for help when they do not understand covered subject matter. These results also support Dweck's argument that incremental beliefs need to be fostered for promoting a learning or growth orientation among students, particularly those who hold entity beliefs.

Parents, instructors, and counselors can play a major role in fostering incremental beliefs on an everyday basis by encouraging students to ask questions and make comments in their classes, take courses outside their curricula, not regard failure as a reflection of their true ability, and to take increasingly challenging tasks with a view to developing their abilities. Perhaps, on a broader scale, popular textbooks and media may emphasize the significance of learning orientation and not portray intelligence as the most critical limiting factor in one's professional achievement and growth for the purposes of influencing educational and social policies (see e.g., Murray, 2007a, b, c; 2008; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994). Portraying intelligence as the most limiting factor in achievement may contribute to creating widespread inflexible mindsets that discourage academic risk-taking and creativity while perpetuating feelings of helplessness when faced with failures, and even promoting discriminatory attitudes characteristic of social and economic classes.

Seiko Yamazaki and V. K. Kumar

West Chester University of Pennsylvania, USA

The article is based on the first author's Master's thesis. Address correspondence to Seiko Yamazaki Department of Psychology, West Chester University of Pennsylvania, West Chester, PA 19383, USA. Email: sy663065@wcupa.edu or V. K. Kumar, E-mail: kkumar@wcupa.edu

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Table 1
Means, SDs, and Cronbach [alpha] Values of Instruments
Used in the Study

                                 #      M/    SD/    Cronbach
Scale                     N    Items   Item   Item   [alpha]

Dweck Theory             239     4     3.57   0.98     .93
  of Intelligence
Yamazaki-Kumar Theory    237     9     3.39   0.57     .68
  of Intelligence
Modified Dweck-          239     4     3.28   1.04     .95
  Yamazaki-Kumar
Theory of Creativity
Yamazaki-Kumar Theory    238     7     3.39   0.54     .54
  of Creativity
Yamazaki-Kumar
  Beliefs About
Relatedness of           239     2     2.72   0.86     .70
  Creativity and
  Intelligence
Academic Risk-           233    19     3.25   0.41     .58
  Taking
  Questionnaire
Academic Stress          235    14     3.37   0.54     .78
  Questionnaire

Table 2
Correlations Among the Implicit Intelligence and Creativity Scales

                    DTIS         MDYKTC       YKTIS

          Factor
Measure   Loading    r     p      r     p      r     p

DTIS        .78
MDYKTC      .78     .56   .000
YKTIS       .85     .47   .000   .47   .000
YKTC        .80     .34   .000   .46   .000   .71   .000

DTIS = Dweck's Theory of Intelligence Scale;
MDYKTC = Modified Dweck Yamazaki-Kumar Theory of Creativity;
YKTIS = Yamazaki-Kumar Theory of Intelligence;
YKTC = Yamazaki-Kumar Theory of Creativity

Table 3
Correlations of Implicit Belief Scale With Academic
Risk-Taking and Academic Stress Scales

                         Academic           Academic
Measure                Risk-Taking          Stress

                         r        p        r        p

General Implicit        .35      .000     -.23     .000
Beliefs Score

Dweck Implicit          .14      .030     -.15     .030
Theories of
Intelligence

Modified                .21      .000     -.15     .020
Dweck-Yamazaki-Kumar
Theories of
Creativity

Yamazaki-Kumar          .37      .000     -.21     .000
Theories of
Intelligence

Yamazaki-Kumar          .38      .000     -.23     .000
Theories of
Creativity

Academic                                  -.27     .000
Risk-Taking

Table 4
Differences Among Low, Medium, and High Incremental Belief
Groups on the Academic Risk-Taking Questionnaire

                    Low     Medium     High
                    (1)       (2)       (3)        F         p

I tend not to      2.85      3.35      3.66      6.43      .002
ask questions
in my classes

I plan to take     2.98      2.52      2.95      4.19      .016
a course at
another college
or university
that is of
interest to me.

Before             2.80      2.73      3.27      4.23      .016
enrolling in a
class, I
consult other
students first
to find out if
the professor
is an easy
grader.

I usually drop     3.85      4.16      4.34      4.32      .014
a course if I
do not do well
on the first
exam.

I am often         3.13      3.41      3.71      3.81      .024
hesitant about
consulting with
my professors
about materials
that I do not
understand.

I have taken a     3.67      4.16      4.38      7.75      .001
course at
another college
or university
since the
course offered
at WCU was very
challenging.

                     Scheffe's
                     post-hoc
                        test              [eta]2

I tend not to          1 [not              .053
ask questions       equal to] 2,
in my classes          1 [not
                    equal to] 3

I plan to take         1 [not              .035
a course at         equal to] 2
another college
or university
that is of
interest to me.

Before                 1 [not              .035
enrolling in a      equal to] 2
class, I
consult other
students first
to find out if
the professor
is an easy
grader.

I usually drop         1 [not              .036
a course if I       equal to] 2
do not do well
on the first
exam.

I am often             1 [not              .032
hesitant about      equal to] 3
consulting with
my professors
about materials
that I do not
understand.

I have taken a         1 [not              .063
course at           equal to] 2,
another college        1 [not
or university       equal to] 3
since the
course offered
at WCU was very
challenging.

1 = strongly agree to 5= strongly disagree

Table 5
Percentages of Participants Choosing the Five Anchor Points
on the Items of Yamazaki-Kumar Theory of Intelligence Scale

Item                         SA       A      UN       D      SD

Intelligence is              4.2    21.8    26.5    37.0     9.7
largely inherited
or fixed by birth

The development of          13.9    58.0    14.7    10.9     1.3
intelligence is
largely a matter of
opportunities and
experiences one has
in childhood

I believe bell curve         7.1    32.8    37.8    17.2     4.6
shape is an accurate
depiction of
Intelligence

There are only a few         6.7    23.1    14.3    42.4    12.6
highly intelligent
people in any
population

Hard work can only           3.4    13.0    11.3    45.8    25.6
go so far; one must
be intelligent to
really succeed in
life

As people grow               2.1     5.5    10.5    59.7     2.1
older, their level
of intelligence
becomes lower

Only those who are           1.3     8.8    11.3    54.2    23.5
intelligent can
succeed in school

Some people simply           2.9    29.0    16.8    38.2    12.2
do not have the
intelligence to
succeed in college

Intelligence can            37.4    47.1     6.7     6.7     1.3
develop all through
life

1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree

Table 6
Percentages of Participants Choosing the Five Anchor Points
on the Items of Yamazaki-Kumar Creativity and the Relatedness
of Intelligence and Creativity Scales

Item                         SA       A      UN       D      SD

Creativity is largely        2.5    20.6    24.4    42.0     9.7
inherited or fixed by
birth

The development of
creativity is largely a      8.0    37.8    23.5    25.6     4.2
matter of opportunities
and experiences one has
in childhood

I believe the bell curve     3.8    13.4    49.2    25.6     7.1
shape is an accurate
depiction of creativity

There are only a few         4.6    19.7    15.1    43.7     16
highly creative people in
any population

Only those who are           0.8     2.9     6.3    55.9    33.2
creative can succeed in
school

Some people are simply      14.7    47.9    10.5    19.3     6.7
uncreative

People can do highly        46.6    41.2     5.9     4.6     0.8
creative work even when
they are in their older
years (i.e., 60 and
above)

People who are creative     12.7    44.1    27.1    14.8     1.3
are also intelligent

Intelligent people are       8.4    25.6    29.0    34.0     2.1
also creative

1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree
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Author:Yamazaki, Seiko; Kumar, V.K.
Publication:The International Journal of Creativity and Problem Solving
Date:Oct 1, 2013
Words:6711
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