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Impacts of Land Development Charges.


A problem of long standing in discussions of land development, namely how government charges affect the land development process, is revisited in this article. The analysis focuses on one particular form of development charge, development contributions (known in the United States as impact fees), but is applicable to any charge, fee, tax, or other exaction associated with land development.

Development contributions were first introduced in the United States in states such as California and Florida (Downing and Frank 1982), and subsequently spread to other states and countries. They are charges levied on developers (or in some cases on landowners) normally for the purpose of funding (if only partially) infrastructure required for new urban development.

The land development process in Australia typically consists of the developer buying raw land (sometimes called broadacre or broadhectare land), which is often agricultural land located on the fringe of urban centres, subdividing it (for which a planning permit is required in most municipalities), constructing roads, footpaths, street-lighting, drainage, and other basic infrastructure specific to the development, and then selling this developed land in the form of housing lots to builders or private individuals who wish to erect buildings on them. Development contributions historically have been levied on the developer at the subdivision stage of the development process.

The burden of development contributions can fall on the purchaser of developed land by being capitalized in the (higher) price of developed land or housing (referred to in this paper as on-passing), on the vendor of raw land by being capitalized in the (lower) price he receives for the land he sells to the developer (referred to in this paper as back-passing), or on the developer by bringing about a fall in his profit margin. In spite of a number of theoretical and empirical studies (Weitz 1985; Nicholas, Nelson, and Juergensmeyer 1991, Ch 6; Singell and Lillydahl 1990; Skaburskis and Qadeer 1992; Delaney and Smith 1989), how this shifting of the burden of development charges occurs and what its impacts are, is not well understood.

It therefore seemed appropriate to re-examine this question, in view of its importance for policymakers. Charges on land development and how they are levied will affect not only land and housing prices and hence housing affordability, but also the demand for developed land, urban growth rates and development patterns, and ultimately, the viability of the development industry and general health of the economy.


The analysis presented here assumes that all land markets are competitive and reach equilibrium, and that there are no barriers to entry for developers, who are assumed to be profit maximizers. We start by assuming that the market for raw land has a supply function of the form,

[S.sub.R] = a + b[P.sub.R], [1]

where [S.sub.R] is the amount of land bought by the developer at a price [P.sub.R] per lot, and a and b are constants describing the way in which the land sold varies with price, b is always positive. The market for developed land has a demand function of the form,

[D.sub.D] = c +d [P.sub.D], [2]

where an amount [D.sub.D] of land is sold by the developer at a price [P.sub.D] per lot, and c and d are constants, and d is always negative.

The developer's cost function associated with the development of the raw land can be represented as

C = [C.sub.o] + f[D.sub.D], [3]

where C is the total cost that the developer incurs in the development process, [D.sub.D] is the amount of developed land produced by the developer, and the constants [C.sub.O] and f are the (fixed) cost faced by the developer (which is independent of the amount of land traded) and the (variable) cost associated with developing each lot, respectively. The profit maximizing developer, faced with such a cost structure, will adjust the amount of land purchased, developed, and sold so as to make his profit as large as possible (see, for example, Jackson et al. 1994, chap. 26).

The profit, [Pi], to the developer from buying the raw land, developing, and then selling it will be given by the difference between the total revenue from selling the land and the total cost of purchasing and developing the land:

[Pi] = [P.sub.D][D.sub.D] - (C + [P.sub.R][S.sub.R]). [4]

In the absence of any development charge, equation [4] can be written in terms of the demand for developed land, [D.sub.D], and the supply of raw land, [S.sub.R], using equations [1] and [2] above.

Since at equilibrium [Mathematical Expression Omitted] (the superscripts indicate equilibrium values of supply and demand), we have

[Mathematical Expression Omitted] [5]

The developer will seek to adjust the amount of land traded to maximize his total profit, [[Pi].sup.o]. If, for example, the quantity of land traded is small, so that the difference between the cost of raw land and the price at which developed land will be sold is large, the developer will be able to increase his total profit by increasing further the amount of land bought or sold. This expansion of output will reduce the difference between the raw land cost and the developed land price, and at some point the total profits of the developer will, instead of increasing, start to fall, as the shrinking profit margins on each lot and the rising development costs outweigh the increased revenue due to the rise in the volume of land traded. The point at which this occurs represents an optimum which the rational developer will strive for, since it maximizes his total profit.

This profit maximization process corresponds to maximizing [[Pi].sup.o] in equation [5]. Differentiating [[Pi].sup.o] with respect to [Mathematical Expression Omitted] and setting this equal to zero, we obtain the amount of developed land demanded which maximizes the developer's profit:

[Mathematical Expression Omitted]. [6]

The equilibrium prices for raw and developed land can be obtained by substituting the demand for land from equation [6] into equations [1] and [2]:

[Mathematical Expression Omitted]. [7]

[Mathematical Expression Omitted]. [8]

When a development contribution or other charge on the developer is levied, the developer can fund this extra impost by increasing the selling price for developed land (on-passing), or by offering a lower purchase price for raw land (back-passing), or by reducing his profit on each lot sold. This will have the effect of shifting the point at which profit is maximized to smaller amounts of land transacted, and the changes in land prices, development costs, and profits will determine the way in which the development charge is absorbed during the development process.

If a charge [T.sub.1] per lot is levied on the developer (in the form of a development contribution or impact fee), it will form part of the developer's costs, which (from equation [31) will become:

C[prime] = [C.sub.o] + ([f.sub.D] + [T.sub.1])[D.sub.D], [9]

since [T.sub.1][D.sub.D], the charge multiplied by the amount of land transacted, represents the total cost of the charge to the developer. The effect of this will be to increase development costs and bring about a fall in the developer's profit per lot. Maximizing the profit as above gives, for the raw and developed land prices:

[P[prime].sub.R] = bd(f + [T.sub.1]) + bc + ad - 2ab/2b(b - d), [10]

[P[prime].sub.D] = bd(f + [T.sub.1]) - bc - ad + 2cd/2d(b - d). [11]

In what follows, it is convenient to replace the coefficients of the equations [1] and [2] by elasticities of supply and demand, which are defined in the usual way (see for example McTaggart, Findlay, and Parkin 1996, chap. 5, or Henderson and Quandt 1971, 27-29). The price elasticity of demand for developed land, in terms of equations [11 and [2], will be:

[Mathematical Expression Omitted], [12]

and the price elasticity of supply of raw land:

[Mathematical Expression Omitted]. [13]

At equilibrium, where [Mathematical Expression Omitted], the elasticity ratio will be given by:

[[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sup.o] = 1/[Gamma] d/b, [14]


[Mathematical Expression Omitted] [15]

is the ratio of raw land price to developed land price at equilibrium before any charge is applied: its value will lie between zero and unity.

We now calculate the extent of on-passing and back-passing, which measures the incidence of the burden of development charges on the vendor of the raw land and on the purchaser of the developed land. On-passing is defined as the difference between the equilibrium price per lot [Mathematical Expression Omitted] for developed land in the absence of any charge, and the equilibrium price per lot [P[prime].sub.D] for developed land when the charge [T.sub.1] is imposed, as a proportion of the charge [T.sub.1]:

[Mathematical Expression Omitted] [16]

Similarly, back-passing is defined as

[Mathematical Expression Omitted]. [17]

Using equations [7], [8], [10], [11], and [14], we obtain the following expressions for on-passing and back-passing:

[Alpha] = 1/2(1 - [Gamma][[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sup.o], [18]

[Beta] = -[Gamma][[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sup.o]/2(1 - [Gamma][[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sub.o]. [19]

The price equations derived above can also be used to obtain the change in demand for developed land. The proportional change in demand on imposing the charge [T.sub.1] per lot is defined as:

[Mathematical Expression Omitted], [20]

where [Mathematical Expression Omitted] and [D[prime].sub.D]) denote the demand for land in the absence and presence of the charge [T.sub.1]. Using equations [2], [8], [11], and [141, this becomes

[Mathematical Expression Omitted]. [21]

Here the quantity

[Mathematical Expression Omitted] [22]

represents the size of the development charge, [T.sub.1], in relation to the equilibrium price of developed land, [Mathematical Expression Omitted], before any charge is levied. Note that, since [[Epsilon].sup.O] is always negative and [Delta] always positive (and [Gamma] always positive and [[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sup.o] always negative), [Delta] will always be negative, that is, the imposition of the development charge will be associated with a fall in demand for developed land.

The change in developer's profit per lot as a proportion of the charge [T.sub.1] per lot levied

[Mathematical Expression Omitted], [23]

can be obtained by writing the maximized profits before and after the charge is levied, in terms of [Mathematical Expression Omitted] and [D[prime].sub.D], the profit maximizing demand for developed land in the absence and presence of a charge (using equations [8] and [11]), and then using

[Mathematical Expression Omitted] [24]

(which is derived from equations [8] and [11]) to transform equation [23] into:

[Pi] = 1/2 - [Theta] [Delta]/1 + [Delta], [25]

where A is the change in demand defined above, and

[Mathematical Expression Omitted] [26]

is the fixed cost per lot in the absence of a charge, as a proportion of the total development charge, [Mathematical Expression Omitted]. The quantity [Pi] provides a measure of the proportion of the charge, [T.sub.1], which is paid for out of a reduction in the developer's profit per lot. The two terms in equation [25] both make a positive contribution (in the second [Theta] is always positive, [Delta] is always negative) and hence represent a drop in the developer's profit per lot.

Finally the change in development cost per lot as a proportion of the development charge, [T.sub.1], can be calculated as

[Mathematical Expression Omitted], [27]

= -[Pi] [Delta]/1 + [Delta], [28]

which was obtained by replacing C[prime] and [C.sup.o] by equation [3], and then writing [D[prime].sub.D] and [Mathematical Expression Omitted] in terms of [Delta], as in the derivation of equation [25]. Since [Psi] will always be negative (refer to the comments following equation [26]), the unit cost of development will rise as a result of imposing the development charge.

The analysis so far has been concerned solely with a development charge levied on the developer. Recently in Victoria, a two-stage development levy was introduced (Department of Planning and Development 1995), in which the first component of the levy, [T.sub.1] per lot, is collected at the planning permit stage (this corresponds to the charge on the developer discussed above), and the second component, [T.sub.2] per lot, is collected at the building permit stage, after the developer has disposed of the developed land to a builder or future owner. There is, thus, some interest in analyzing the case where a charge, [T.sub.2], is levied at the building permit stage rather than at the development stage.

Since the charge is levied on the developed lot, it is the purchaser of the lot who is responsible for paying the charge rather than the developer (Roberts 1985, 1-22). Thus, instead of facing a price [P.sub.D] per lot, the purchaser of developed land is confronted with the new (higher) price [P.sub.D] + [T.sub.2] per lot, while the developer receives [P.sub.D] per lot for the land. The demand function for developed land thus becomes

[D.sub.D] = c + d([P.sub.D] + [T.sub.2]). [29]

The analysis proceeds as before, with the developer's profit being given by equation [5] in the absence and presence of the charge [T.sub.2], and [D.sub.D] being replaced by equation [29]. The developer's cost function will still be equation [3], since the charge [T.sub.2] does not impact on the developer. The equilibrium prices after the charge is levied are

[P[double prime].sub.R] = bd(f + [T.sub.2]) + bc + ad - 2ab/2b(b - d), [30]

[P[double prime].sub.D] = bd(f + [T.sub.2]) - 2d(b - d)[T.sub.2] - bc - ad + 2cd/2d(b - d) [31]

These can be used as before to derive on-passing, back-passing, and change in demand; the results are the same as equations [181, [19], [21], [25] with [T.sub.1] replaced by [T.sub.2]. A third case, the combination of the two charges, [T.sub.1] and [T.sub.2], is effectively a combination of the two cases dealt with above, and can be analyzed in the same way, giving equations for on-passing, back-passing, change in demand, and change in profit which again are the same as equations [18], [19], [21], [25] with [T.sub.1] replaced by [T.sub.1] + [T.sub.2].

Note that the developer bases the decision on whether to enter the land market on a knowledge of the land supply and demand characteristics of the market, and the cost function for the development industry. Thus if the profit that will be made by optimizing the amount of land traded is below normal profit, it will not be worthwhile for the developer to enter the market, and no land development will take place. Profits higher than normal, on the other hand, will attract many developers who will enter the market, in the process bidding up the price of raw land (see, e.g., Hirshleifer 1984, 204-5) and shifting the land supply curve upwards. In a similar way, developers entering the market can underbid the selling price of developed land and shift the demand curve downwards. Either, or both, of these processes will continue until the developer's profit is equal to the normal profit. This entire process enables the land market to equilibrate at a point where each developer, having optimized the amount of land bought, developed, and sold so that it yields the maximum total profit, is earning normal profit.


The widely accepted view of the impact of development contributions is that on-passing occurs when demand for developed land is inelastic, and supply of raw land elastic, and that back-passing occurs when the reverse is true. Equations [18] and [19] or their equivalents confirm this view, but also show that the developer invariably absorbs half of the development charge.

The way in which on-passing and back-passing change with the elasticities of supply and demand, that is, with the elasticity ratio [[Epsilon].sup.O]/[[Eta].sup.o], can be illustrated with an example.

Figure 1 illustrates how on-passing and back-passing vary with the elasticity ratio [[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sup.o], for the case where the fixed cost per lot, [C.sup.o], and the development charge, [T.sub.1], have both been set at $1,000. The behavior of [Alpha] and [Beta] with changing [[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sup.o] is as expected: as the elasticity of demand for developed land increases and the supply of raw land becomes more inelastic (e.g., where legal, environmental, or other constraints make it difficult to bring more raw land on stream), [[[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sup.o] becomes large and negative (move to the right of the figure) so that [Alpha] becomes smaller and [Beta] larger. On the other hand, with increasingly elastic raw land supply (where there are potentially large quantities of raw land available), and more inelastic developed land demand (where no substitutes for the developed land are available), [[[Epsilon].sub.o]/[[Eta].sup.o] becomes small and negative, and [Alpha] now becomes larger and [Beta] smaller.

These changes will be more pronounced with larger values of [Gamma], the ratio of raw land price to developed land price at equilibrium before any charge is applied, and will apply in the same way to a charge at the development stage, a charge levied on the developed lot, or a mixture of the two types of charges. Also, the sum of [Alpha] and [Beta] is always 0.5, regardless of the value of [[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sup.o] or [Gamma]. Thus exactly half of the development charge levied will always be met by the vendor of raw land and the purchaser of developed land, regardless of elasticities, the magnitude of the development charge, or other factors. Both [Alpha] and [Beta] cannot exceed 0.5.

The other half of the development charge (which is invariant) comes out of the developer's profits, and, together with the on-passing and back-passing components, accounts entirely for the development charge, since the magnitudes of the three add to unity. Over and above this fall in profits, however, there is a further fall in profit - [Theta] [Delta]/(1 + [Delta]), due to the fall in demand for land and the resulting higher development costs per lot. The variation of the fall in profit with [[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sup.o] is shown in Figure 2 for the same case as in Figure 1.

With [[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sup.o] becoming more negative, the fall in developer's profits increases to more than half of the development charge, but very slowly - even at quite large (negative) values of [[[Epsilon].sup.o]/[[Eta].sup.o] the impact of rising lot cost is less that 1% of the direct impact of the development charge. This conclusion holds for a wide choice of parameters in equation [25].

An example of a redevelopment site in Melbourne will serve to illustrate the application of this analysis to real-world situations. Data for this development have been provided by one of Melbourne's larger land development companies, and are summarized in Table 1.

The cost per lot of land development and the fixed costs in these tables provide [C.sup.o] and f in equation [3] directly. The parameters a, b, c, and d in equations [1] and [2] are determined by using the data in Table I in conjunction with equations [6], [7], and [8]. In this process there is some flexibility of choice, in that there is a range of combinations of elasticities [[Epsilon].sup.o] and [[Eta].sup.o] in equations [12] and [13] which is consistent with these data. Some guidance in choosing these elasticities is provided by the literature (which deals mainly with demand for housing rather than land): this is reviewed briefly in the Appendix. These studies indicate that the most satisfactory combination of elasticities for this example was [[Epsilon].sup.o] = -0.82 and [[Eta].sup.o] = 0.69. Here land supply for the redevelopment site is less inelastic then would be expected, probably due to surplus government land (former school sites) currently becoming available for residential development in the inner suburbs of Melbourne. The values of on-passing, back-passing, fall in demand for land, and fall in developer's profit for a development charge of $1,000 per lot are shown in Table 2.


Cost Item                                       Site

Cost of raw land (average)                $10,625 per lot

Cost of land development                  $42,895 per lot
Sale price of developed land              $77,000 per lot

Indirect expenses (fixed costs)           $1,560,000 p.a.

Number of lots sold                       80 lots p.a.

Total number of lots                      260

The impact of the $1,000 development charge will be to raise the price of developed land by $430 per lot, reduce the price paid by the developer for raw land by $70, reduce the amount of developed land sold by 0.5%, reduce the developer's profit per lot by $500, and have little or no effect on the development cost per lot. The very similar magnitudes of [[[Epsilon].sup.o] and [[Eta].sup.o] in this example might lead one to expect, on conventional criteria, roughly equal amounts of on-passing and back-passing. In fact, far more of (half of) the development charge is passed on to the purchaser of developed land than is passed back to the vendor of raw land, due to the small value of [Gamma], the ratio of the raw land price to the developed land price.


Parameter                                      Site

On-passing [Alpha]                            0.4296
Back-passing [Beta]                           0.0704
Change in demand for land [Delta]            -0.0046
Change in developer's profit [Pi]            -0.5000
Change in development cost per                0.0000
lot [Psi]

This example illustrates some important points. The developer, regardless of the values of the elasticities or prices or the stage at which the development charge is levied, always pays at least half of the development charge. Also, there is little change in the demand for land when the development charge is levied; this holds true under most situations except those where the development charge is very large. Again, there is a negligible impact of the development charge on the development cost of each lot, reflecting the small change in demand for land which has occurred.


A number of general conclusions follow from the analysis given here. A development charge will always be split, in terms of its impact, fifty-fifty, between the land buyers and sellers on the one hand, and the developer on the other, regardless of the characteristics of the developer or of the land markets. Whether a development charge is levied on the developer, on the developed land, or a combination of both is immaterial in terms of the impact on on- or back-passing, on developer's profits, on development cost, or on the level of demand for developed land. Also, for the usual costs and land seller and buyer characteristics encountered in the real world, development charges have a relatively small impact on land development costs and on demand for developed land - but have a large impact on the developer, whose profits will always be reduced by at least half of the development charge. Generally, the impact of the development charge depends not only on the relative magnitudes of the demand and supply elasticities, but also in a complex way on a variety of other factors - the ratio of the raw land price to the developed land price, the ratio of the development charge to the pre-development charge price of developed land, the absolute magnitude of the elasticity of demand [[Epsilon].sup.o], and the ratio of the fixed development cost per lot to the development charge.

This study thus not only establishes rigorously a theoretical basis for the commonly held views on on-passing and back-passing (Weitz 1985; Huffman et al. 1988; Hodge and Cameron 1989; Skaburskis 1990; Nicholas, Nelson, and Juergensmeyer 1991), but also shows that only half of the development charge is subject to on-passing and back-passing, the remainder being taken up by the developer. It also shows that the impact of development charges on land development is far more complex than previously assumed. Although the analysis presented here is based on the current situation in Victoria, similar treatments can clearly be derived for other types of development charges.

The analysis given above is also useful to the policymaker, who will know, for example, that infrastructure funding policies designed to minimize the impact of the development charge on housing costs (i.e., minimize on-passing) will need to make [Alpha] as small as possible. This can be achieved by applying the charge only to markets which have a highly elastic demand for developed land and a highly inelastic supply of raw land, and where raw and developed land prices are not too dissimilar ([Gamma] close to unity). On the other hand, the analysis also shows that prices and elasticities have relatively little impact on the demand for land and the developer's profitability, so that policies to encourage land development or help the development industry should use policy tools based on approaches other than development charges.

State and local government regulations will have various impacts on the way in which development charges affect the land development process. Obviously, government regulations determine the types of charges that can be levied and the way in which they are collected. But the may also affect development costs, since development-related works to be carried out (or paid for) by the developer are often laid down in regulations. In the state of Victoria, for example, the developer is not only required to provide public open space, but may also be required to provide works related to the development as a condition on the planning permit (this is separate from any development charges that may be levied by local government), which are usually roads, curbing, foot-paths, street lighting, drainage, etc. All of these will have an impact on development costs.

There are also less direct effects flowing from the regulatory framework. For example, if the process of gaining planning permission from the appropriate authorities for the various stages (rezoning, subdivision) of land development is slow and cumbersome, raw land will come only slowly onto the market. The short term elasticity of supply will be lower than it otherwise would be, and half of any development charge will be passed on mainly to the seller of raw land (assuming [Gamma], is not too small), rather than to the buyer of developed land. Similarly, elasticity of demand for developed land may be influenced by the general planning philosophy which operates in a city, since this will affect the urban fabric and the extent to which different areas of the city are differentiated from one another. Urban regions which are highly differentiated will have few substitutes for a particular type of land, and demand for this land will be inelastic, so that half of any development charge will be passed on to a large extent to the purchaser of developed land.

The approach used here has assumed that the purchase of raw land, and its development and subsequent sale as developed land, take place within a short time frame. In practice, these steps may be separated by considerable time intervals (in some cases many years), but taking proper account of this would be a study of considerable complexity which would go beyond the scope of the present work. Further research in this direction should, however, deal explicitly with the net: present values of the financial quantities involved, the change in elasticities on going from the short term to the long term, and above all, with the risk represented by the uncertainty about future land markets and discount rates.


Price elasticities of supply and demand are notoriously difficult to measure, particularly for land and housing. Published estimates of price elasticities tend to concentrate on the housing market rather than the land market, and show (not unusually in empirical economic investigations) a large degree of variability. In addition, no elasticity data are available for these developments, or indeed for any other development in Melbourne. In the following, estimates of price elasticities published in the literature are surveyed briefly to provide estimates for use in this work.

Empirical estimates reported for long-run elasticities of supply of housing range from a relatively high value of 11.8 (Rydell 1982) to values ranging between zero and two for new housing (Bramley 1993, 20-21; Maclennan 1982). Land is a more homogeneous (less possibility of differentiation) good than housing, and on the city fringe there are usually alternative supplies of land which can be brought on stream quickly, so that a rise in price would be expected to be more effective in bringing developed land on stream than increasing the supply of housing, where the choice is narrowed down not only by the land characteristics but also by the dwelling characteristics. For this reason, the supply of housing would be expected to respond less readily to a change in price (be less elastic) than would the supply of land. Bramley regards a value of 1.0 as being reasonably representative of housing markets, and the elasticity of raw land supply would be expected to be equal to, or greater than this. However, this conclusion must be qualified: in settled urban areas, which have had time to develop their own unique characteristics and where there is a relative scarcity of unbuilt land, the possibilities of bringing equivalent additional land on stream in the event of increased demand are severely constrained, and supply will be less elastic. Again, although the long-run supply of land on the city fringe (where there is easy access to undeveloped land) will be more elastic, in the short term, the process of rezoning and applying for subdivision will throttle supply significantly, reducing the elasticity of supply.

Estimates of elasticities of demand for housing are much more numerous, and have been summarized by a number of authors. One review (Follain and Jimenez 1985) of all the empirical studies available at the time of writing, found that most values of price elasticity of demand lay between -2.0 and -0.1, depending on which characteristic of housing (house size, lot size, number of rooms in house, space) were used as variables (although it is noteworthy that there is considerable variability even within any one class of characteristics). Values quoted elsewhere (Maclennan 1982; Bramley 1993) lie between -0.2 and -0.9, while Mayo (Mayo 1981) found price elasticities of demand for housing services in the range 0 to - 1.28.

When purchasing land, there are fewer requirements of the consumer that must be satisfied than for a house and land package, and correspondingly more substitutes which the consumer can turn to. A fall in the price of land, therefore, will have a larger impact on demand than a fall in the price of housing, and demand for land will be more elastic than for house and land. Again, the elasticities will depend on the location of the development. In settled urban areas where land can be expected to have more unique characteristics than on the fringes, demand for land will be much less elastic.


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Weitz, Stevenson. 1985. "Who Pays Infrastructure Benefit Charges-The Builder or the Home Buyer?" In The Changing Structure of Infrastructure Finance (Monograph #85-5), ed. James C. Nicholas. Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Andrew R. Watkins is an economic analyst at the Department of Infrastructure, Melbourne, Australia. The views of this article are the author's, and do not represent the views of the Department of Infrastucture or represent the policy of the government of Victoria, Australia.
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Author:Watkins, Andrew R.
Publication:Land Economics
Article Type:Statistical Data Included
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Aug 1, 1999
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