ISR: a guide for Battalion S2s.
Battalion Sts in fires and effects, operations support, and force sustainment units are often junior officers, ranging from second lieutenants to pre-career course captains who have little to no collection management experience. These junior officers are deploying and have the desire and necessity to effectively answer information requirements (IRs) using systems but have limited training. Although, collection management at the brigade level and higher is a job dedicated to one officer with additional training, battalion Sts are expected to understand and leverage the available resources to support their battalions' mission. This guide is meant to provide junior officers serving as battalion intelligence officers with a baseline knowledge on what assets and resources are available; how to task, request and exploit those assets in a cohesive manner to solve intelligence problems, and effectively translate that into support to targeting.
The basis for all information here is doctrine. But, while doctrine provides a strong framework for all military functions and operations, there is much to be learned from the Soldier's experience. The focus (and most of the experience shared) will be on the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the basics can be applied across a variety of missions. This guide will start with an emphasis on doctrine, both the collection management and targeting cycles, and will conclude with the application of those processes to intelligence synchronization and the solving of the intelligence problem.
In order to effectively target anything (a person, weapon system, or building) you must answer the existing intelligence gaps. In order to answer those intelligence gaps you must employ collection assets or receive information from assets already employed. Note: The term collection assets will be used as an all encompassing term, not limited to intelligence assets. The current operating environment in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom has brought us back to the concept of Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2). This process is collection management. Doctrinally, collection management is "the set of procedures that orchestrate ISOS (intelligence system of systems) organizations and systems to focus the intelligence effort in support of warfighting and operations other than war". (1) As a battalion S2 your job is to leverage the collection assets you have available (and those that are not apparently available to you) in order to support the mission.
To best employ and exploit all collection assets someone within your battalion S2 section must act as collection manager. Arguably, the lack of organic intelligence assets makes the job of your collection manager more difficult and requires a high level of threat knowledge in order to creatively answer the intelligence gaps. Within a typical collection management section in a division Analysis and Control Element, doctrine specifies three separate functions: the Requirements Manager, the Mission Manager and the Asset Manager. Each of the functions is separate, but not mutually exclusive. They must operate with full knowledge of what the other function is planning. This is easily accomplished at the battalion level, as you will most likely have one person handle all three functions. If your section is manned with an assistant S2 or mid-grade noncommissioned officer I would recommend making him or her your collection manager. If not, then you will need to act as the collection manager (this is more likely the case in non-maneuver units). If you, as the battalion S2, are also serving as the collection manager, it is imperative that you work closely with the S3 section to have it actually task and manage the assets on the battlefield. Although you will not have three people carrying out the three functions, you must understand the purpose of each function in order to effectively manage collection.
The Requirements Manager role starts during Step 4 of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process with the creation of the initial collection plan. The requirements manager has three questions to answer:
1. What to collect (priority and specific information requirements (PIRs/SIRS))?
2. Where to collect (named areas of interest (NAIs))?
3. When to collect?
The PIR and SIR are primarily driven from intelligence gaps that the battalion staff has identified during mission analysis. These requirements are pieces of information that the staff (and commander) need to know in order to develop a complete and cohesive plan. PIR and SIR are both linked to places and time. The places are NAIs which are the locations that an event is expected to occur which will answer a PIR or SIR. The time is a start, earliest time information of value (ETIOV) or earliest event information of value (EEIOV) and an end, latest time information of value (LTIOV) or latest event information of value (LEIOV)) time or event during which the event is expected to occur. Both NAIs and ETIOV/LTIOVs are necessary for an effective collection plan, because even with ES2 there is a finite amount of collection assets with finite capabilities. Though the requirements are derived from intelligence gaps, they must support one of three priorities: determine an enemy course of action (ECOA), support the maneuver plan, or identify high payoff targets (HPTs). Support of these three priorities is critical due to the finite amount of collection assets. Most requirements during the initial planning process are from the battalion staff and higher headquarters, but as the planning process matures expect collection requests from subordinate units that you must integrate into the collection plan.
The second function of the collection manager is to manage the actual collection missions. That is, given the what, when, and where from the first step of the collection plan, assign and task or request the asset to collect. Assigning assets requires that an assessment be made of their suitability and availability. There are a few fundamentals that must be understood in order to effectively task and request assets.
First, you must have complete understanding of the capabilities of all available assets (organic, subordinate, higher, and national) and how to exploit those capabilities. When considering the availability of echelon above corps assets, consider how you can benefit from an asset without requesting it. For example, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) often flies set routes that are preplanned far in advance. If you are interested in an area within that coverage, consider requesting a product from that scheduled collection route.
Second, you must have an understanding of the maneuver plan and how that will impact availability of ES2. Third, the maintenance status of subordinate and organic assets is critical to know. For assets in your brigade MI Company (MICO) and other division and theater assets that you request on a regular basis it would behoove you to have an understanding of their maintenance schedule, as well as other constraints (many of these assets are contractor run and therefore constraints which limit the number of available hours, for example, are often in place). Fourth, understand how certain assets work well together. This will allow you to determine which assets can be used in a cueing relationship and which would be better utilized as part of a mix or redundancy package.
In order to task assets, a specific task must be created for them as part of the collection plan. These are specific orders or requests (SORB). This allows the asset that you are tasking or requesting to understand exactly what you are expecting to receive from the collection. During the tasking process you must be cognizant of what you can task and request. For example, you may not be able to request specific assets within the MICO, but only be able to request the MICO itself. When tasking ES2, you may only have the authority to task a specific company, not a specific platoon. If this is the case, the wording of the SORB is vital. SORB can be worded in such a way that they determine which asset that MICO commander must use to collect or which platoon the commander must use based on planned missions. You will receive the information you require and maintain a relationship with the commanders, as well.
The other role of the mission manager is to exploit those requested assets. At the battalion level this will be most critical to answering intelligence gaps. The ability to push and pull information across the battlefield is most vital to all collection management; it eliminates the information stove pipes and creates a more efficient intelligence network by eliminating redundant missions. In the current operating environment almost all reports and products (at the Secret and below level) are transmitted over email. An approach that works is to get onto the distribution list for the asset you require. For example, if coherent change detection from the U2 is vital to a battalion's mission, the battalion S2 must work with the higher echelon's collection manager to get on the distribution list for the products directly from the analysts. Analysts are continually trying to improve their product, and will often ask for feedback. When that battalion S2 is able to provide feedback directly to the analysts (carboncopying the higher collection manager after receiving his permission) they are able to provide more timely information to the end user. Develop an effective way to debrief your patrols, convoys, etc. and push that information to higher. It may not seem to have any value to you, but the presence of a new vehicle, large group of children, or new propaganda poster may fulfill a higher IR.
The final function of the collection management is asset management. This is the execution piece. This function is typically not completed by the collection manager, but the commander who owns the assets actually doing the collecting. The asset manager must execute collection in accordance with the collection plan which is provided by the mission manager. Commanders manage their assets, so you may be working with many asset managers, but it is important that you have oversight. Ensure that the asset manager is executing collection within the collection plan, specifically that requirements are fulfilled. The asset manager will rely mostly on the SORB to conduct the collection, which reinforces the importance of well written SORs.
The second function of the asset manager is to execute exploitation in accordance with the collection plan. For example, ES2 must be exploited, typically in the form of some sort of debrief. The collection manager will create the most effective method for debrief, ideally face to face, but realistically a debrief report can be just as effective. Exploitation of higher collection requests done at the battalion level will most likely be in the form of receiving products from higher. Again, JSTARS can be used as an example; "pulling" the product of the information from JSTARS that was coincidentally collected is exploitation done at the battalion/brigade level.
An effective collection manager must be knowledgeable of the available assets in order to effectively leverage them. Knowledge needs to go beyond understanding how an asset is typically used. You must know all the capabilities of an asset in order to effectively leverage all available assets. For example, non-traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (NTISR) may typically be used for route reconnaissance, but the optics/target pod (Sniper pod) on the aircraft makes it an effective tool to identify ground disturbances. JSTARS, in its typical role, is tasked to collect on an area with an analyst watching the feed on a common ground station monitor identifying changes to moving target indicators. In a non-traditional use of JSTARS an event occurs on the ground, such as an improvised explosive device (IED) explosion; JSTARS feeds from the previous 12 hours can be analyzed to identify any unusual traffic patterns that may be related to the IED attack and the point of origin of that unusual traffic. A second part of asset knowledge is knowing what is in the theatre you are operating in and knowing who to contact to exploit those assets. At this point you must work with your higher echelon collection manager to develop those relationships and have access to all assets.
ES2 is critical enough that it must be discussed as a collection asset. All Soldiers within your unit are sensors, whether they leave the forward operating base or not. Those assets must be exploited. In order to best manage the information received from these assets, create two main categories: tasked collection and walk-in information. Tasked collection is the category for specific information that you had Soldiers collect and walk-in information is all other information that they volunteer. Capturing the information with a method that allows it to be retrieved quickly and orderly is key to the success of ES2. If your collection tasks are recurring, create a report that incorporates all the information you require (each piece is an SOR). This ensures that the information is reported in a format that is consistent and contains all of the data that you need to catalog the information into your database. Walk-in information is usually best captured in a modified form of the SALUTE report. Using all or some of the SALUTE format will ensure that all pieces of the data are cataloged and available.
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is often overlooked by collection managers as a valuable means to collect intelligence. In theater, you are likely to be consumed by the SIPRnet computer that you work on and all of the available information on it, but OSINT often gives a new perspective. Utilizing only classified media is similar to looking at the situation with blinders on; exploring and exploiting open source media, host nation, U.S., and international sources will give you a more complete perspective on the impact of events.
Collection Management Process
According to FM 34-2 the first step to collection management is to develop requirements. That is "the identification, prioritization, and refinement of uncertainties concerning the threat and the battlefield environment that a command must resolve to accomplish its mission". (2) This is conducted throughout the military decision making process (MDMP), beginning during mission analysis and IPB with the creation of the event template and matrix and initial ISR plan which supports the priority of determining threat COAs. Requirements are expanded upon and refined during friendly COA development and primarily support the maneuver plan. The initial set of requirements are finalized during wargaming with the focus on support of the priority identification of HPTs. Note: Requirement development never truly ends since the battlefield is fluid and changing and so are requirements. Once requirements are developed and prioritized they must be linked to time (ETIOV/LTIOV), location (NAI), SIRS, and indicators. This linkage fleshes out the collection plan and allows for SORB to be created and for assets to be tasked and requested.
The next step is development of the actual collection plan. The collection plan is "the integrated and synchronized plan that selects the best collectors to cover each requirement." (3) At this point, units (assets under your headquarter's control) are tasked and higher assets are requested based on SORB. A method that can be used, but may not be possible in a time constrained environment is to evaluate available assets by INT to determine which are capable of collecting on a particular requirement and then assess which would dive the desired results to include those that would lend themselves to one of the four collection relationships (cueing, mix, redundancy, and integration). Items to consider include the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of the asset and any environmental constraints.
[FIGURE 1.a OMITTED]
Collection relationships lead into intelligence synchronization and overall support of the intelligence mission. Specific use of these relationships will be addressed in section three, but it is important to understand them now. Cueing (Figure 1.a) is quite simply the use of one asset to direct another asset. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) sensors are more "valuable" in that they have a smaller collection radius and are the most requested. Instead of "wasting" an IMINT platform to "watch" a specific NAI, use a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) platform to collect on multiple NAIs and then cue the IMINT platform to the NAI where an emission is reported. Mix (Figure 1.b) is the use of multiple INTs at the same time collecting the same information. This increases the likelihood of successful collection. For example, if a SIGINT platform is collecting on an NAI searching for a radar and there are scouts observing the same NAI, the radar can be identified even if it is not emitting. Redundancy (Figure 1.c) is the use of more than one asset of the same INT to collect on the same target. If a radar was an HPT, then dedicating more than one SIGINT platform to collect on that radar increases the likelihood that the radar will be detected.
[FIGURE 1.b OMITTED]
[FIGURE 1.c OMITTED]
Identifying HPTs is the third priority for intelligence requirements. Knowledge of the targeting cycle is needed to ensure that collection is used to influence the cycle and the targeting of HPTs. Doctrinally there are two targeting models used, but the role of intelligence in supporting these models is similar enough to focus on one model for discussion. Model one (and the model that will be used) is decide, detect, deliver and assess (D3A). The other is find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA). Intelligence is used throughout the process, but most heavily during detect (find) and assess.
The role intelligence collection has in detect and assess is larger and more obvious than the role it plays in the other two steps-deliver and decide (intelligence as a whole has the most important role during this step). But it has a role in those as well. The initial process of the targeting cycle is the decision to target a specific person, building, or piece of equipment. In order to target an enemy asset four things must be true:
* It must be valuable to the enemy's COA high value target (HVT).
* It must pose a threat to the friendly COA (HPT).
* It must be detectable using the available assets.
* Available friendly assets (lethal and/or non-lethal depending upon the desired effect) must be able to deliver on it.
As a member of the targeting board the intelligence representative must be able to address all four questions, but as the collection management representative you must be able to identify the assets that are capable of detecting that target. It is important that you engage the collection relationships of cueing and mix to provide fidelity to the targeting board, as well as the commander, regarding the ability of the asset to detect that target.
The detect step of the cycle relies on collection assets and intelligence analysis to identify the targets, most often the HPTs. The collection plan will be heavily focused on identifying targets, but assets will need to be synchronized in order to best fulfill the needs during the different phases of the operation.
The intelligence role during the deliver phase of the targeting cycle may be secondary to that during the detection phase but is typically vital to successful targeting. After a target has been detected it will then be delivered on, which may involve a cue from an intelligence collection asset. When creating a collection plan involving a specific target, assume that the collection asset's mission will continue through the final assessment of the target. A collection asset must be able to cue the delivering asset and provide immediate feedback in the form of a battle damage assessment (BDA) in order to determine whether the target needs to be re-engaged. These are both cueing relationships, although not with a secondary intelligence asset but rather with a fires asset.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Assessment, as the final step of the targeting cycle encompasses battle damage assessment as well as munitions applicability assessment. Collection assets are required for the former, which will aid in the latter. BDA can be done ad hoc, but integration into the collection plan and consideration during intelligence synchronization will ensure a complete assessment is completed for each target. It may not be possible to plan to conduct assessment until the target has been detected, but a place holder can be left in the collection plan based on the phase of the operation where the target is expected to be delivered on. Assessment is often overlooked, but when the cyclical nature of targeting is considered the next step, decide, cannot be conducted unless an assessment is made.
Intelligence support to the targeting cycle is fairly understandable when applied to a lethal operation using an airborne collection asset over a hardened target but intelligence support to a non-lethal targeting engagement is less concrete, yet the same principles do apply. Figure 2 above shows the use of a HCT (HUMINT Collection Team) to support an IO (information operations) engagement as well as unmanned aerial system (UAS) support to a lethal engagement.
Intelligence synchronization is the key to solving the intelligence problem. Intelligence synchronization combines the collection requirements, the assets collecting, and the targets being collected on and ensures that they are interwoven. The collection plan that is created during mission analysis is the first draft of the final intelligence plan. The collection plan is modified during the remaining steps of MDMP to incorporate the identified HPTs and all of the commander's decision points. Once these are incorporated into the plan the collection manager must now assign a specific collector (asset) to a specific place (NAI) at a specific time. The simplest and most effective way to ensure that all assets are synchronized in time and space is to use an intelligence synchronization matrix.
The intelligence synchronization matrix allows visibility of the big picture facilitating the prioritization of resources. The use of the collection relationships of cueing, mix, redundancy and integration are essential for effective prioritization of assets. The ability to have three different collection assets collecting on three NAIs and simultaneously able to cue an additional asset provides greater depth to the collection plan and improves effectiveness.
A significant link between intelligence support to targeting and the intelligence synchronization matrix is planned BDA collection. The initial collection plan will not usually include planned collection after a target has been engaged, but as discussed above BDA is an essential piece to the last step in the targeting cycle and, more critically, is essential to the restart of the cycle for the same target if the previous engagement was unsuccessful. Although specific details for BDA missions may not be known at the creation of the intelligence synchronization matrix, generalities are most likely known for preplanned targets. This allows for place holders to be inserted into the synchronization matrix and assets to be on-call for BDA missions.
An advantage of having these assets on-call is the ability to task them with a different mission at the time of the suspected BDA mission, as long as the BDA mission is given a higher priority. In other words, if a target is to be engaged in NAI 1 at 1000 then you would plan to need an asset to collect in NAI 1 just after 1000, but the engagement mission could occur at 0930 or at 1030 in which case collecting in NAI 1 at 1000 could be ineffective. If the mission occurred early and was not successful, the enemy could have removed the piece of equipment from the area. If the mission had not occurred yet and the asset conducting BDA is identified by the enemy it could prevent the engagement from occurring. Therefore, a place holder in the intelligence synchronization matrix that instructs as asset to be on-call for a BDA mission in NAI 1 from 0900-1100 will prevent the waste of a mission. Also, in order to capitalize on the availability of that asset it could be tasked to collect in NAI 2 from 0900-1100 with the instructions that it will be retasked after the engagement has occurred in NAI 1 to conduct BDA. This use of the integration collection relationship avoids the under tasking of valuable assets through the change of the collection order to a higher priority mission. (Figure 3)
A second example of integration is tasking an asset to conduct collection during transit time. It takes time for an aerial or ground asset to transit to the collection location and begin on-station collection. The intelligence synchronization plan will fail if no consideration is made for transit time. However, this is not necessarily a negative constraint; planned correctly transit time can be used for collection. For example, a manned aerial imagery collection platform has a particular NAI to observe for three hours. It takes thirty minutes to fly from the airfield to the NAI and the route generally follows a secondary linear NAI. The asset is available for a total of five hours. Instead of losing one hour of the available time, task the platform to collect along the secondary linear NAI for an hour both prior to and following the collection at the primary NAI. This scenario accounts for and capitalizes on transit time. Conversely, if transit time is not planned for in the intelligence synchronization matrix it often is over looked and assets are over tasked, resulting in less coverage than expected in certain NAIs. For example, a patrol that is tasked with covering three NAIs for 2 hours each during a 6 hour patrol will not cover each NAI for 2 hours. The intelligence synchronization matrix must account for the transit time even within a single patrol.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Finally, returning to doctrine and applying the concepts discussed above there are five overall goals for collection linked to intelligence synchronization which will lead to the desired end state of intelligence synchronization support to all SORB using a plan that is responsive and flexible enough to adjust during battle. These five goals are tied directly to collection goals discussed in the first section further illustrating the interrelatedness of the entire process:
1. All collection planned in the intelligence synchronization matrix must support PIRs.
2. All SORB given to collectors must support IRs. For example, a SOR to report on the destruction of a particular safe house based on a planned engagement would support an IR related to levels of enemy activity in a particular area, but the destruction of the safe house was not planned during the initial planning phase.
3. Intelligence must be timely. An intelligence synchronization plan that is not tied directly to the maneuver plan is of little to no value to the commander as none of the information received would be timely. Relevance to the current mission facilitates timeliness, therefore the intelligence synchronization matrix must be a fluid product. The intelligence synchronization plan can (and should) include a plan for the exploitation of collection and the analysis of the information received and should plan this to be completed expeditiously and within a timeline that supports the maneuver plan.
4. Intelligence must be disseminated in a timely manner. This is directly related to the timeliness of intelligence. From the collector to the analyst to production, all involved need to understand the dissemination process to include the appropriate recipients and the timeline for their receipt of the intelligence.
5. The intelligence synchronization matrix is only as effective as the execution of the plan. The intelligence synchronization matrix needs to be adhered to strictly, especially the timeline. That is not to say that ad hoc missions will not occur, but overall, the plan must be executed correctly in order for the overall end state to be met.
As there are factors for the success, there are also factors for failure. The first point of failure is poor decision making. The decision to collect at a certain location at a certain time must be linked to known information as well as support the commander's priorities for collection. Uninformed decisions to haphazardly assign assets' tasks without regard for either prioritization or applicability of that asset for that mission will lead to intelligence synchronization failure. Secondly, as important as it is to disseminate and analyze information in a timely manner, none of that matters if the collection itself is not timely. A collection plan may say that information pertaining to a SOR is of value from D-2 to H+12, but the intelligence synchronization plan needs to apply analysis to that period of time and assess when the most probable time is that SOR can be answered. If that analysis is neglected the synchronization plan is worthless. Thirdly, collection must be applicable to the current situation. To use the previous BDA example, collection prior to the engagement of the target for the purpose of doing BDA is not applicable. Finally, one of the easiest ways to fail with intelligence synchronization is the uneven tasking of assets. Collection managers (and commanders) become comfortable with a particular asset and task it for more missions than it can effectively cover or more often the case appropriately cover, while other assets that are less familiar to the collection manager sit dormant, not collecting. The most important lesson here is to become educated on all assets and critically apply assets to the intelligence synchronization plan in order to prevent failure.
An Intelligence Problem
In the COIN environment of both Iraq and Afghanistan most targets are people or groups of people (or related entities). As an S2 at any level, in any type of unit, your goal is to understand and subsequently disrupt their decision cycle. The following is a simplified scenario to target individuals related to the emplacement of an improvised explosive device (IED). The IPB for the scenario has already been completed and all information supports engaging this target during two time frames, one in the morning (0300-0700) and one at night (1600-2000).
Your unit conducts patrols along a route and is routinely involved with an IED in the same location (NAI 1). From previous analysis you know there is an individual responsible for reconnaissance, emplacement, and initiation. You also deduce that there is a command and control element, a logistics cell, and a bomb maker, but you are not targeting them at this point.
Below is your collection plan.
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You decide to target the triggerman as part of step one of the targeting cycle, heavily influenced by the ability to detect the different targets. In order to engage the target the following questions must be answered through collection:
1. Is the device in place?
2. Is surveillance in place?
3. Has the public been signaled?
4. Is the triggerman detected?
The following collection strategy can be used to answer the first question:
* Exploit historical JSTARs feeds to determine normal traffic pattern and changes related to previous IED incidents.
* Request current JSTARs coverage to monitor changes in traffic patterns.
* Request twice daily CCD/2CMV to monitor changes in the earth.
* Request AH-64 reconnaissance of the area.
* Fly Raven mission to detect any foreign objects at location (attempt to identify both the IED and any trigger markers).
* Utilize persistent stare (JLENs RAID Tower) from the FOB.
Given that the above plan confirmed the device, shift focus to surveillance:
* Request the reports from the guard towers near the gate of the FOB related to loitering individuals.
* Request SIGINT assets near the recon site after guard tower reports indicate loitering.
* Request AH-64 reconnaissance to identify any suspicious individuals.
* Task a patrol to question any suspicious individuals.
After confirming that surveillance is in place, determine whether civilians have been notified:
* Request current JSTARS coverage to monitor diversion of traffic away from site.
* Request higher aerial asset (UAS or manned) to further monitor civilian traffic at suspected IED site.
Once you have confirmed the first three questions are answered affirmatively, detect the triggerman:
* Activate an observation post (OP). This will be in place prior to the beginning of the targeting cycle, but will not become active until this point to detect the triggerman.
* Request on-call UAS coverage of the two NAIs linked to the triggerman and cue it using the OP.
* Request AH-64 to surveil possible egress routes for the triggerman.
* Task patrols to conduct route reconnaissance along possible exit routes and be prepared to conduct snap traffic control points once cued from the AH-64.
All four questions are answered, engage the target!
Your intelligence synchronization plan is as follows.
FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, 29 March 1990
Joint Publication 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations, 20 November 1996
JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007
JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, 13 April 2007
by Captain Emily Rentschler
(1.) Field Manual 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning, 8 March 1994, 1-1.
(2.) Ibid., 3-1.
(3.) Ibid., 3-9.
Below is your collection plan. PIR Indicators SIR SOR When Suspicious Is there increased Report time and % of will a vehicle traffic on the increase from normal patrol traffic ingress and traffic patterns next be egress routes? involved with an Are there any Report time and loc. IED in vehicles stopped of stop NAI 1? on the shoulder of the road for long periods of time? Is there Report time and % of decreased decrease from normal civilian traffic patterns traffic? Suspicious Is there Report time, # of people foot increased foot and pattern of traffic traffic traffic near trigger man sites? Is there Report time, # of people increased foot and P pattern of traffic traffic near recon sites? Is there Report time, # of people increased foot and pattern of traffic traffic near IED location? Individuals Are there Report time and # loitering personnel static of people at recon sites for more than 5 min? Are there Report time and # personnel static of people at trigger sites for more than 5 min? Are there Report time and # personnel static of people at IED location? Disturbed Is there Report description earth disturbed earth and time of change at IED location? Unknown Are there unknown Report description objects objects located and time of change at IED location? Increased Is there Report time and communi- increased SIGINT increase from normal cations communication? communication levels PIR Indicators SIR NAI LTIOV When Suspicious Is there increased will a vehicle traffic on the patrol traffic ingress and 7 & 8 D+2 next be egress routes? involved with an Are there any IED in vehicles stopped 1 & 6 D+2 NAI 1? on the shoulder of the road for long periods of time? Is there decreased civilian traffic? 1 & 6 D+2 Suspicious Is there foot increased foot 4 & 5 D+2 traffic traffic near trigger man sites? Is there increased foot 2 & 3 D+2 traffic near recon sites? Is there increased foot 1 & 6 D+2 traffic near IED location? Individuals Are there loitering personnel static 2 & 3 D+2 at recon sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static 4 & 5 D+2 at trigger sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static 1 D+2 at IED location? Disturbed Is there earth disturbed earth 1 D+2 at IED location? Unknown Are there unknown objects objects located 1 D+2 at IED location? Increased Is there communi- increased SIGINT cations communication? 2, 3, 4, 5 D+2 PIR Indicators SIR Patrol 1 Patrol 2 When Suspicious Is there increased will a vehicle traffic on the patrol traffic ingress and 0 0 next be egress routes? involved with an Are there any IED in vehicles stopped 0 0 NAI 1? on the shoulder of the road for long periods of time? Is there decreased civilian traffic? 0 T Suspicious Is there foot increased foot T 0 traffic traffic near trigger man sites? Is there increased foot 0 0 traffic near recon sites? Is there increased foot 0 T traffic near IED location? Individuals Are there loitering personnel static 0 0 at recon sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static T 0 at trigger sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static 0 0 at IED location? Disturbed Is there earth disturbed earth 0 T at IED location? Unknown Are there unknown objects objects located 0 T at IED location? Increased Is there communi- increased SIGINT cations communication? PIR Indicators SIR Patrol 3 Raven When Suspicious Is there increased will a vehicle traffic on the patrol traffic ingress and 0 T next be egress routes? involved with an Are there any IED in vehicles stopped T 0 NAI 1? on the shoulder of the road for long periods of time? Is there decreased civilian traffic? 0 0 Suspicious Is there foot increased foot 0 0 traffic traffic near trigger man sites? Is there increased foot T 0 traffic near recon sites? Is there increased foot 0 0 traffic near IED location? Individuals Are there loitering personnel static 0 T at recon sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static 0 0 at trigger sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static T 0 at IED location? Disturbed Is there earth disturbed earth 0 0 at IED location? Unknown Are there unknown objects objects located 0 0 at IED location? Increased Is there communi- increased SIGINT cations communication? Persistent PIR Indicators SIR Guard Tower Stare When Suspicious Is there increased will a vehicle traffic on the patrol traffic ingress and next be egress routes? involved with an Are there any IED in vehicles stopped 0 NAI 1? on the shoulder of the road for long periods of time? Is there decreased civilian traffic? 0 Suspicious Is there foot increased foot traffic traffic near trigger man sites? Is there increased foot R R traffic near recon sites? Is there increased foot 0 traffic near IED location? Individuals Are there loitering personnel static R R at recon sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static at trigger sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static at IED location? Disturbed Is there earth disturbed earth at IED location? Unknown Are there unknown objects objects located at IED location? Increased Is there communi- increased SIGINT cations communication? PIR Indicators SIR HCT AH-64 When Suspicious Is there increased will a vehicle traffic on the patrol traffic ingress and next be egress routes? involved with an Are there any IED in vehicles stopped NAI 1? on the shoulder of the road for long periods of time? Is there decreased civilian traffic? 0 Suspicious Is there foot increased foot traffic traffic near trigger man sites? Is there increased foot R traffic near recon sites? Is there increased foot traffic near IED location? Individuals Are there loitering personnel static R at recon sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static R at trigger sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static R at IED location? Disturbed Is there earth disturbed earth R at IED location? Unknown Are there unknown objects objects located R at IED location? Increased Is there communi- increased SIGINT cations communication? Other aerial PIR Indicators SIR UAS collector When Suspicious Is there increased will a vehicle traffic on the patrol traffic ingress and 0 0 next be egress routes? involved with an Are there any IED in vehicles stopped R 0 NAI 1? on the shoulder of the road for long periods of time? Is there decreased civilian traffic? 0 0 Suspicious Is there foot increased foot 0 0 traffic traffic near trigger man sites? Is there increased foot 0 0 traffic near recon sites? Is there increased foot 0 0 traffic near IED location? Individuals Are there loitering personnel static at recon sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static at trigger sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static at IED location? Disturbed Is there earth disturbed earth 0 at IED location? Unknown Are there unknown objects objects located 0 at IED location? Increased Is there communi- increased SIGINT cations communication? PIR Indicators SIR JSTARS U2 When Suspicious Is there increased will a vehicle traffic on the patrol traffic ingress and R 0 next be egress routes? involved with an Are there any IED in vehicles stopped 0 0 NAI 1? on the shoulder of the road for long periods of time? Is there decreased civilian traffic? R Suspicious Is there foot increased foot R traffic traffic near trigger man sites? Is there increased foot 0 traffic near recon sites? Is there increased foot 0 traffic near IED location? Individuals Are there loitering personnel static at recon sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static at trigger sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static at IED location? Disturbed Is there earth disturbed earth R at IED location? Unknown Are there unknown objects objects located R at IED location? Increased Is there communi- increased SIGINT cations communication? PIR Indicators SIR SIGINT When Suspicious Is there increased will a vehicle traffic on the patrol traffic ingress and next be egress routes? involved with an Are there any IED in vehicles stopped NAI 1? on the shoulder of the road for long periods of time? Is there decreased civilian traffic? Suspicious Is there foot increased foot traffic traffic near trigger man sites? Is there increased foot traffic near recon sites? Is there increased foot traffic near IED location? Individuals Are there loitering personnel static at recon sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static at trigger sites for more than 5 min? Are there personnel static at IED location? Disturbed Is there earth disturbed earth at IED location? Unknown Are there unknown objects objects located at IED location? Increased Is there communi- increased SIGINT cations communication? R O = Capable R = Requested T = Tasked
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|Publication:||Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin|
|Date:||Apr 1, 2008|
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