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What Is Contemplation? STEPHEN CALOGERO

The argument is developed by drawing on the thought of S0ren Kierkegaard, Eric Voegelin, and Bernard Lonergan. Contemplation is possible because the self is constituted by self-presence in its engagement with being. Self-presence does not precede one's engagement with being and is not an alternative to this engagement, but is the unique mode of human participation in being. Immersed in the frenetic give and take of the world, one is present to oneself. Self-presence also includes the unique quality of human existence in tension between the immanent and transcendent. The contemplative experience is characterized by awe, humility, joy, and mystery. In contemplation, one cedes for a time the practical preoccupations evoked by the pull of immanence and gives way to the questing disposition--what the Greeks called wonder--toward transcendence. Contemplation is the questing disposition of self-presence toward being.

Divine Hiddenness and the Concept of God, ROBERT DI CEGLIE

John Schellenberg's version of the divine hiddenness argument is based on a concept of God as an omnipotent, morally perfect, and ontologically perfect being. The author shows that Schellenberg develops his argument in a way that is inconsistent with each of these aspects, from which it follows that the argument in question proves to be unsustainable.

No God, No Powers: Classical Theism andPandispositionalistLaws, JAMES ORR

One common feature of debates about the best metaphysical analysis of putatively lawful phenomena is the suspicion that nomic realists who locate the modal force of such phenomena in quasi-causal necessitation relations between universals are working with a model of law that cannot convincingly erase its theological pedigree. Nancy Cartwright distills this criticism into slogan form: no God, no laws. Some have argued that a more plausible alternative for nomic realists who reject theism is to ground laws of nature in the fundamental dispositional properties or "pure powers" of physical objects. This article argues that for all its advantages over deflationary and rival realist accounts, a pandispositionalist account of law cuts against the commitment to metaphysical naturalism that its supporters almost always presuppose. It then examines and rejects a Platonic version of this account before elaborating and advancing a theistic alternative that is more theoretically powerful and more metatheoretically parsimonious. In slogan form: no God, no powers.

A Contemporary Metaphysical Proof for the Existence of God, ROBERT J. SPITZER

This five-step metaphysical proof borrows from the metaphysical thought of Aquinas as well as from Bernard Lonergan's proof of God in Insight. It makes several advances to proofs of God. Most importantly, by showing that an unconditioned (uncaused) reality must be unrestrictedly intelligible, the second step of the proof is original and lays a stronger foundation than previous proofs for the uniqueness of an unconditioned reality as well as its identification with an unrestricted act of thinking. This point strengthens the argument that this unique reality is a creator of everything else in reality. In so doing, it responds to contemporary criticisms of proofs of God by Richard Dawkins and others. This proof also adapts metaphysical ideas and terms to those arising out of the contemporary scientific worldview, so that it is relevant and applicable to quantum and relativity theory, quantum cosmology, and other contemporary cosmological ideas, such as a multiverse and multidimensional physical realities.

Can Thomism and Pragmatism Cooperate? MARCO STANGO

The paper explores the possibility of philosophical cooperation between Thomism and American pragmatism by resurrecting a largely forgotten debate between Wilmon Henry Sheldon and Jacques Maritain. The discussion focuses primarily on two topics: the compatibility between a substance ontology and a pragmatist-evolutionary ontology, and the compatibility between the scholastic and the pragmatist theories of truth. The paper claims that, if we bring Peirce's version of pragmatism into the picture, cooperation is not only possible but likely to be fruitful.

Holism, Realism, Error, JOHN PETERSON

Holism in metaphysics can be defended because it can solve a dilemma about error: that the object of one's wrong judgment is either inside or outside one's mind and that neither alternative can be the case. Among holists the American philosopher Josiah Royce provides the best account of both the dilemma and its holist answer. The latter consists in steering between the hard and fast difference of being inside and outside the mind that sparks the dilemma. Royce does this by identifying a unity in the difference, which then ceases to be a stark division and becomes instead a unity-in-difference. The author then shows how a related dilemma is susceptible to this sort of holist solution. Yet the holist answer to these dilemmas invites all the stock objections to holism. These include the obliteration of finite selves and the distinction between such selves and their experiences. Answering these objections calls for an alternative that uses Royce's ploy of synthesizing the extremes of being inside and being outside the mind. This sort of realism gets between the horns of the dilemmas via the real and intentional modes of forms.
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Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Date:Dec 1, 2019
Previous Article:AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY: Vol. 56, No. 4, October 2019.
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