INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS, ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, AND THE OUTSOURCING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S MOD DEFENSE ACQUISITION FUNCTION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE.
It has been well said, as it relates to organizational conflicts of interest (OCI), that no one can serve two masters. One might be tempted to view OCI related to the outsourcing of government acquisition in much the same way--simply and in a binary fashion: if an economic entity is awarded government acquisition work, it will be excluded from competitions for future business related to that acquisition work. In short, successfully outsourcing the government acquisition function is not a simple feat, and any government's approach to such outsourcing needs to be treated with great care. Done properly, a government can avoid unnecessary restrictions on, and distortions to, the competitive marketplace, while providing industry the maximum practical opportunity to compete for government work and affording it reasonable certainty as to the potential for exclusion from future business. It is such a situation in which the UK's Ministry of Defence finds itself as it contemplates outsourcing the acquisition function performed by its 16,000-member Defence Equipment and Support function.
Kirkwood, W. T. (2015). Inherently governmental functions, organizational conflicts of interest, and the outsourcing of the United Kingdom's MoD defense acquisition function: Lessons learned from the U.S. experience. Public Contract Law Journal, 44(3), 443-468. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/ docview/1727757062?accountid=40390
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|Author:||Kirkwood, William T.|
|Publication:||Defense A R Journal|
|Article Type:||Brief article|
|Date:||Jan 1, 2018|
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