Hybrid Peace Operations: Rationale and Challenges.
PEACE OPERATIONS HAVE EVOLVED OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES IN A WAY that has fundamentally changed their structure. Not only are they multidimensional in the sense that they imply a wide range of military and civilian activities across the conflict management spectrum, but they also increasingly bring together various institutions in parallel, support, or even joint peacekeeping and peacebuilding programs. From Darfur to Kosovo, Somalia, and Mali, international organizations have cooperated in peace operations on the basis of their respective comparative advantages or agendas to the extent that it is difficult today to imagine a single-institution response to fragile states' instability.
Hybridity has appeared as the new term to depict these modular, multi-actor operations. This concept has been used in two different, but related, contexts in the peace operations arena over the past decade. First, hybridity refers to the UN--African Union (AU) joint peace operation established in Darfur in 2007-2008. More broadly, hybrid peace operations bring together several institutions that to an extent cooperate in a joint endeavor, as in Kosovo and Somalia. Second, the concept of hybrid peace has been introduced to describe the kind of peace that is established in postconflict settings as a result of the interplay between external and local actors. It aims at reconciling two visions of postconflict peacebuilding: one that sees peace as being solely imposed by external actors and one that envisages it mainly as a purely homegrown process.
This article deals with the former sense of hybridity; that is, the idea that contemporary peace operations are evolving toward integration of their main institutional stakeholders. I aim at unpacking the concept of hybridity by looking at its rationale and challenges. What does hybridity mean in practice and what distinguishes it from multidimensional peace operations? What explains that international organizations have hybridized their conflict management policies and what purpose does hybridity serve? Furthermore, what challenges are posed by the evolution toward hybrid operations? These are the questions that are explored here.
The article first examines the typology of peace operations and analyzes the meaning of hybridity. Then it questions the rationale for the process of hybridization and contends that further integration of peace operations is the way forward for legitimacy and efficacy reasons, despite the difficulties encountered by existing hybrid missions. Finally, the article looks at some of the challenges of an increasing integration of institutional actors within peace operations. While integration is a response to the evolution of conflict management needs, it also carries some risks ranging from interinstitutional competition to issues of accountability and ownership as well as impact on the overall coherence of the global maintenance of international peace and security.
Hybrid Operations: The New Typology of Peace Missions
Observers of peace operations have well captured their evolution toward modularity, multidimensionality, and integration of different peacekeeping actors. In line with the literature on the regionalization of peace operations, (1) several studies in the mid-2000s noted the move toward some form of hybrid operations as a response to parallel evolving models of cooperation among conflict management institutions. Bruce Jones presents hybrid operations as a "prevalent" phenomenon that deserves attention, but that are also sui generis by nature and, therefore, difficult to categorize. (2) While he acknowledges that the phenomenon is not entirely new as "variants of hybrid operations" existed in the 1990s, he also observed a steady evolution toward integration of peacekeeping actors. Along the same lines, a Challenges Forum background paper found in 2007 that "40 out of a total of 54 recent missions were operated in some form of joint, coordinated, or sequenced operation by more than one institution--what has been referred to as 'hybrid' operations." (3) The same year, a Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) report noted that the African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was the first mission to be "officially labeled as a hybrid operation," although operations predating UNAMID had been characterized by their hybrid nature; for instance, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS II) with cooperation between the AU, European Union (EU), NATO, and UN. (4)
These various documents offered elements of definition of hybridity, yet no generic definition has emerged. In substance, hybrid peace operations are operations that bring together two or more international actors that operate simultaneously or sequentially and the activities of which imply a certain degree of interinstitutional cooperation. They are hybrid in the sense that they are not run by one single institution and, therefore, are not the exclusive product of any actor involved. Rather, they are the result of the interaction of at least two different conflict management policies or cultures, as much as a hybrid species is the product of the interaction between two different breeds or varieties. What distinguishes hybrid operations from traditional (nonhy-brid) peace operations is the level of integration among the actors. Presumably, it takes more than mere interaction to get a hybrid. In reality though, the interplay between several institutions that cooperate at different levels directly impacts the nature of the operation as it shapes to a degree decision-making processes, financing procedures, command and control arrangements, operational practices, and accountability and reporting mechanisms. With the increasing prevalence of multiactor peace operations, hybrid has now entered the peacekeeping lexicon as a generic term to reflect the evolution toward both the plurality of actors and a certain level of integration among them.
- As of 2013; there are many examples of hybrid peace operations. The main ones are:
* Kosovo: NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), and UN Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) presence;
* Darfur: African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID);
* Somalia: AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), with the support of the UN--logistics capacity support package (UN Support Office for AMI-SOM [UNSOAD financed with the UN budget, and UN Political Office for Somalia [UNPOS] and then UN Assistance Mission in Somalia [UNSOMD--the EU (financial through the African Peace Facility and training with the EU Training Mission [EUTM] (5)), and some neighboring countries (Ethiopia);
* Cote d'Ivoire: UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) with the support of the French-led Operation Licome;
* Mali: UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) that took over the African-led mission (composed mainly of ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] contingents with the support of the AU), operating in parallel with an EU training mission and the French Operation Serval, which acts in part in support of MINUS MA.
These definitions and examples should inform the establishment of typologies of hybrid missions. The existing ones mix categories based on the relationship among the main institutions with a functional approach that draws on the various types of organizations' activities (e.g., military/civilian, peacekeeping/peacebuilding). (6) For example, the Center on International Cooperation in New York distinguishes between three types of multiactor operations: sequential, parallel, and integrated. (7) Sequential operations involve several organizations that intervene at different stages of the international response. Examples include the ECOWAS missions in West Africa that were taken over by the UN in the 1990s and 2000s, NATO missions handed over to the EU in Macedonia (2003) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004), the EU mission taken over by the UN in Chad and Central African Republic (20082009), and the African-led operation taken over by the UN operation in Mali (2013). In parallel missions, several organizations operate simultaneously on the same theater and deal with a particular aspect of the mandate. Such was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina (in the post Dayton accords phase) and in Kosovo (as of June 1999); in Somalia with the simultaneous involvement of the AU, UN, and EU; and in Mali with the UN, EU, and French presence. In many of these cases, some institutions come in support--in the military, logistical, financial fields--of others. Finally, integrated operations are missions where two institutions "share command or where one organization subordinates its command to another." (8) The UN-AU operation in Darfur is the best example of this model.
The functional approach looks at the issue of cooperation from a different angle as it distinguishes between different types of contribution. Hybridity would then result from the interaction between the military component provided by one institution and the civilian assets provided by another one (as in Kosovo between NATO and the EU), or between a traditional peacekeeping mission and its rapid reaction force (as in Cote d'Ivoire between UNOCI and Operation Licome and in Democratic Republic of Congo between the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [MONUSCO] and the Intervention Brigade), or in the civilian sphere among various institutions fulfilling different tasks within the same mission (as in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s when the EU, OSCE, and UN were all implementing different aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement). The Somalia case, where different institutions contribute at various levels of support to the AMISOM, provides another example of the functional categorization.
Although typologies are difficult to build, one common feature of most hybrid operations is the legal authorization of the mission given by the UN Security Council resolution. This is not per se an indispensable feature of hybridity, yet it does characterize the great majority of them,9 which is the sign of the attachment of most peacekeeping actors--be they states or international organizations--to the legal centrality of the Security Council. This is all the more notable as another feature of hybrid missions is a certain distrust vis-a-vis the UN as a peacekeeping operator, which encouraged other actors such as regional organizations to fill the gap and subsequently challenge the UN preeminence in conflict management.
Interestingly enough, the term hybrid peace is also being used in the context of peace operations to refer to the peace that is established as a result of the activities of both external and internal actors. According to Roger Mac Ginty, the type of peace that international operations are supposed to promote is hybrid in the sense that it is a "composite of exogenous and indigenous forces"; it is the result of the interplay of international (top-down) and local (bottom-up) activities (10)where, as Keith Krause puts it, "the goals and intentions of external actors are bent and fused with the interests and power of local actors into new forms of governance. (10) For Oliver Richmond, what he calls a "liberal-local hybrid form of peace" should enable peace actors to "bring back the local voices which are supposed to be a part of the social contract upon which the liberal state is built." (12) hi this article, I do not deal with this aspect of hybridity, which looks at the interplay of conflict management actors from a different angle. Yet the two approaches are conceptually close and the use of the term hybrid in both cases reflects the same kind of evolution; that is, the fact that engineering peace in fragile states implies or results from a mix of policy responses from different actors. In other words, hybridization takes place both horizontally within peace operations (hybrid peace operations) and vertically between external actors and recipient states and societies (hybrid peace). Ultimately, the peace that is established is the outcome of these two processes of hybridization, an area that would require further research but that goes beyond the remit of this article.
Rationale for the Hybridization Process
Why do international actors come together to create new species of peace operations? What is the added value of hybrid operations? Is hybridization the result of strategic thinking about how to best respond to crises or is it an ad hoc reaction to crisis management needs? Three main reasons seem to explain why international actors have hybridized their conflict management responses. They can be summarized as follows: hybridity as burden sharing, hybridity as strategy, and hybridity as flexibility and selectivity.
Hybridity as Burden Sharing
Multidimensional peace operations require a large scale of human, financial, and operational capacities. Their purpose is to establish sustainable or positive peace through a series of short- and long-term activities that range from security to economic recovery and development, institution building, the promotion of good governance and the rule of law, justice, and reconciliation. International actors have developed important capacities and know-how over the past two decades in order to face these needs. Some of them, like the UN and EU, are even mandated to provide the most holistic response possible, with the aspiration to play a role at all stages of the conflict cycle (conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, postconflict peacebuilding) and with the largest range of tools (e.g., military and civilian, security and development).
However, the nature of conflict management is such that no single actor can pretend to be positioned or equipped to respond to all needs. As a consequence, burden sharing among various peace operations actors has become indispensable. As the 2009 UN report on peacebuilding noted, "Partnerships and coordination among the main regional and international actors is essential since no single actor has the capacity to meet the needs in any of the priority areas of peacebuilding." (13) Burden sharing has been one driver of the regionalization of security governance with the development of regional organizations such as the EU and AU as conflict management actors. Although theoretically, burden sharing does not necessarily imply a process of hybridization; in practice, it has meant the development of more or less institutionalized partnerships among international organizations that have found themselves increasingly involved simultaneously in peace operations. (14)
Institutions develop capacities and comparative advantages that are sought by others and that may induce cooperation. Through cooperation, international organizations have been able to get access to resources, information, or legitimacy that they were short of. (15) By making available resources that would otherwise be missing, or by creating new institutional structures, cooperation among these institutions alters the nature of peace operations. De facto, they are no longer single-actor endeavors, but ones that bring together a variety of players that in the end contribute to their hybridization.
A quick look at operations in the Balkans and Africa shows how cooperation has developed partly on the basis of comparative advantages and the respective mandates and capabilities of the actors in presence. In most cases, the UN is part of the hybridization since it provides an overarching legitimacy to the operations together with a long-term commitment and a genuine know-how on a wide range of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. In the postconflict phases in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, burden sharing among the UN, NATO, the OSCE, and the EU has given birth to hybrid forms of conflict management where the respective capacities and institutional cultures of the organizations have shaped the nature of the response. In Africa, the EU has also been able to provide some robust military capacity in support of the UN (Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 and 2006, Chad and Central African Republic in 2008-2009) and plays a key role--albeit still limited in scope--in the civilian sphere (e.g., training, security sector reform, elections). Most importantly, it is one of the largest funders of peace operations, most notably of the AU's as well as subregional organizations' (Economic Community of Central African States [ECCAS] and ECOWAS) operations.I6 The AU is more on the receiving end. However, the Darfur case also showed how the AU can bring legitimacy to a UN-only operation that was not accepted by the host state. With the UN-AU hybrid operation coming as a response to the Sudanese president's opposition to the UN mission, the political burden was shared by the UN and the AU that both brought something to the table to make the operation possible. Furthermore, the AU has demonstrated in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia a propensity to deploy troops in nonpermissive environments that the UN does not necessarily display. Finally, NATO has developed robust peacekeeping capacities over the past two decades, which led it to contribute to stabilization efforts in areas such as the Balkans (together with the UN, EU, and OSCE), Afghanistan (together with the UN and EU), and Africa (with the provision of logistical support to the AU in Darfur, for example). For these organizations, hybridity is partly a response to a credibility deficit, financial, or capability gaps at a time when all institutions face such shortages. (17) More precisely, peace actors enter into more or less institutionalized partnerships to address a material or legitimacy deficit, which in turn creates hybridity.
Hybridity as Strategy
Beyond the necessity to share the burden of security governance, hybridity brings a strategic dimension to conflict management that traditional peace operations do not necessarily carry. In many ways, hybridity is a tool of the holistic or comprehensive approach that is supposed to provide both effectiveness and coherence to conflict management policies. It is by bringing together several actors and ensuring their coordination that these policies can get to the strategic level. The 2011 UN Secretary-General's report on UN-AU cooperation noted that "the Security Council has enhanced collaboration with [the AU Peace and Security Council], with a view to ensuring rapid and appropriate responses to emerging situations and developing effective strategies for conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the continent." (18) In response, the 2012 AU report on the UN-AU partnership was titled "Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence." (19) The same imperative imposes itself on the EU and NATO, whose efforts to define a comprehensive approach stern from the need to think and act strategically with actors that are simultaneously operating in the same theaters. (20) The 2010 NATO Strategic Concept stressed the desire of the alliance "to engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximize coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort." (21) The UN effort to integrate its peacekeeping missions with other actors (UN country team, UN agencies) and the EU will to bring together its economic and development arm and its more security-focused activities fall within the same logic of maximizing effectiveness.
In any given situation, the presence of only one institution may prove insufficient to address the diversity and complexity of strategic issues that are posed. Any strategic vision combining all aspects--for example, political, economic, security--of conflict management policies would suffer as a consequence.
Through hybrid responses international actors diversify the sources of strategic input, which must theoretically facilitate the design of comprehensive and adapted crisis management policies. Beyond the burden-sharing dimension is also the idea that a collective and well-coordinated effort partly drives coherence and impact. If well designed, hybridity is thus a framework that must inform and reflect strategy. Whether it actually does, and to what extent, is another issue (see below), but at least it should be recognized that hybridity can serve strategy in a way that nonhybrid operations cannot.
Another area where hybridity may enhance the coherence of multilateral conflict management policies is that of exit strategies. Richard Caplan defines "exit strategy" as a "transitional plan for the disengagement and ultimate withdrawal of external parties from a state or territory." (22) In many instances though, transitions have taken the form of operations being transferred from one organization to another. These successor peace operations were experimented in the following cases:
* three ECOWAS operations in Sierra Leone (handover in 1999), Liberia (2003), and Cote d'Ivoire (2004) handed over to the UN;
* AU missions in Burundi (2004) and Darfur (2008) handed over to the UN (jointly with the AU in the Darfur case);
* Africa-led mission in Mali handed over to the UN;
* NATO missions in Macedonia (2003) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004) handed over to the EU;
* EU missions in Democratic Republic of Congo (2003) and Chad and Central African Republic (2009) handed over to the UN;
* UN peacekeeping missions handed over to a peacebuilding office (as was the case in Sierra Leone in 2005 and in Burundi in 2006).
Although it has not happened yet, AMISOM in Somalia was also designed for an initial stabilization phase that would then lead to the deployment of a UN mission.23 These successions may be necessary because of the withdrawal of an institution that terrninates its commitment to a given mission yet needs to be replaced, but they can also be guided by the evolution in the assets required of a particular mission (e.g., from a peacekeeping force to a postconflict peacebuilding office or from a robust posture to a less robust one). In these cases, withdrawal is made possible by the ability and willingness of another institution to take over. As examples, in Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 and Chad in 2009, the UN operations had become part of the EU exit strategy and it would have been difficult for the EU to pull out had the UN not been in a position to take over. In the same vein, the UN is in principle part of the AU exit strategy, as was clearly established in the cases of Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia as well as in Mali. (24) Such transition is even smoother when some of the leaving units can be rehatted in the takeover force.
Although in those cases the level of interaction between the two organizations is not as deep as in parallel missions, sequential operations provide a specific form of hybridity. Interestingly enough, in Darfur in 2007-2008, hybridity was illustrated at two different levels: first through the succession of the AMIS operation and the handover to the UN-AU mission; and, second, with the hybrid nature of this very operation. Most importantly, it was the hybridity of the latter (with the AU attached to the UN) that enabled the succession of the former. Hybridity through support operations also facilitates mission successions, when the institution that is in support then takes over, as happened in West Africa with the UN being in support of ECOWAS before it took over (although, in this particular case, the UN faced serious challenges as it took over from an organization whose peacekeeping standards were different from the UN's (25)). In the same vein, the drawdown of an operation may require the deployment by another organization of some rapid reaction capacity that temporarily comes in support of the withdrawal. Finally, the operation that comes first is part of the entry strategy of the organization that will then take over insofar as it is supposed to prepare the ground for the successor operation. For the EU, the establishment of its police mission (EU Police Mission) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003 was facilitated by the presence of the UN police mission (International Police Task Force) that ensured a seamless transition with the EU.
Hybridity as Flexibility and Selectivity
A third element that explains the trend toward hybridity is the flexibility that it offers. In a way, hybrid missions are Meccano constructions composed of blocks coming from different institutions or states. For any of these actors, it is theoretically possible to think of its participation in a broader conflict management policy through one component that would plug into an existing framework. For example, the EU contributes to the financing of AMISOM and, in parallel, has deployed three operations around Somalia; the UN also contributes to the financing of AMISOM through the logistical package; and, in the Balkans, various institutions have been involved in conflict management at different levels depending on the period and type of needs.
Partnerships are constrained in many ways by legal, political, or operational issues, yet they aim at allowing the establishment of operations that would not be possible without interinstitutional cooperation. In other words, hybridization is also what makes multidimensional operations possible (if operations could be only nonhybrid, there are many activities that simply could not take place). In Darfur, it is the flexibility offered by hybridization that allowed UNAMID to see light. The Secretary-General's report on UN-AU cooperation noted that "the United Nations light and heavy support packages for AMIS and the hybrid operation (UNAMID) were the only options available for UN intervention with host country consent." (26) In the same vein. the feasibility of operations like the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT II), UNOCI in Cote d'Ivoire, and MINUSMA in Mali would have been very different in the absence of the EU operation in the case of Chad, Operation Licorne in the case of Cote d'Ivoire, and Operation Serval in the case of Mali. In a different context, institutional flexibility has been illustrated in Mali with the UN operation, MINUSMA, coming partly as a response to the operational and financial difficulties encountered by the African organizations.
In the meantime, the move toward hybridization reflects the selectivity that characterizes peace operations actors' policies when it comes to deciding where to intervene and how. Over the past two decades, the conflict management environment and states' policies have evolved in a way conducive to hybridization. More specifically, Western states' reluctance to commit troops to UN operations and a parallel distrust in the UN as an operational peacekeeping actor have led them to develop other tools of conflict management such as NATO, the EU, and coalitions of states. (27) For those states, hybridization has provided a response to the necessity to participate in conflict management--most notably in Africa. In Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 and 2006, the possibility to deploy EU operations as an alternative to a direct contribution to the existing UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) was welcomed by European states. Such an option was even what made their involvement politically and technically acceptable. Similarly, although the United Kingdom was willing to contribute to the stabilization efforts in Sierra Leone (in 2000) (28) and France for Cote d'Ivoire (as of 2002) (29) and Mali (as of 2013), these countries preferred a national commitment rather than a presence in the UN mission, thus establishing a form of hybrid mission better suited to their institutional requirements. Indeed, the scenario where a rapid reaction force comes in support of a UN operation but is operationally distinct is a model that has received attention in some Western capitals. Through operations that can be nationally led, NATO-led, or EU-led, or run by coalitions, states can simultaneously contribute to the stabilization of a place to an extent under their own conditions while supporting broader multilateral frameworks. Here, the challenge is to strike a balance between keeping some control over the use of national assets and making sure that hybridity does not lead to the dilution of ownership (see below).
In a similar way, selectivity is illustrated by African states that are reluctant to participate in AU missions because of the financial arrangements and risks implied, but less so in the UN-AU operation in Darfur that conforms to UN rules. This was exemplified by the shift from the AU-led AMIS in Darfur to the UN-AU hybrid mission, in which African states proved to be more eager to contribute. (30) Mali is revealing of a form of institutional shopping that sometimes takes place with states pushing for one institution (or framework) or the other depending on the respective comparative advantages of the various options, the types of mandate, and the states' degree of commitment.
Finally, in the Somalia case, a contribution to AMISOM through UN support packages and EU parallel missions has also been an answer to the call for a UN takeover. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) has, since the deployment of AMISOM, appealed for a transition to a UN operation. However, both the Secretary-General and the Security Council have resisted this option, mainly because of the absence in Somalia of the preconditions for the deployment of a UN operation (a peace to keep and a fair chance to implement a mandate in a relatively secure environment). (31) Some Security Council resolutions mentioned the "willingness [of the Council] to consider, at an appropriate time, a peacekeeping operation to take over from AlvIISOM, subject to progress in the political process and improvement in the security situation on the ground" (32) and asked for some contingency planning for such an operation. The Security Council even expressed "its intent to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia as a follow-on force to AMISOM." (33) The idea of an "international stabilization force" in lieu of a UN operation was also discussed, to no avail. (34) In the end, the UN opted for logistical, political, and technical support for AMISOM, which marked the limits of what the UN and its member states were ready to do in Somalia. In many ways, the EU policy that takes the form of financial support through the African Peace Facility (European Development Fund) and missions falling within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) (with the EU training mission, the maritime capacity-building mission, and the antipiracy mission) reflects the same logic. In both cases, hybridity is a way to respond to the pressure to do something while limiting the risks, or at least intervening on one's own terms.
What this shows is that hybridity is also the result of a policy of intervention a la carte. As far as Western states are concerned, it mirrors their positioning and allows them to pick and choose at a time when they are reluctant to commit to the UN. In other words, hybridity reveals divergences in conceptions of what peace operations are about as well as in institutional preferences. It follows that it can be seen as a form of renewed engagement of (Western) conflict management actors as much as the sign of their disengagement, especially when one looks at the African continent. This also means that the above-described burden sharing does not necessarily mean that the burden is being shared on the basis of comparative advantages of the institutions involved. Recent examples in Darfur and Somalia, and older ones in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Liberia have shown that the "highest risks and costs of peace operations are [sometimes] left to actors with the fewest resources to manage them." (35) This is especially the case with non-UN operations carried out by weak institutions in places where no other conflict management actor is willing to go. In the long run, such a trend would undermine both the idea of institutional burden sharing and that of the UN responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. (36)
In many cases, these three sets of rationales are present simultaneously. Furthermore, hybridity as burden sharing or selectivity is empirically evidenced while hybridity as strategy is more of an aspiration. That being said, the above-described evolution toward hybridity has by and large been more ad hoc than strategic. It has mirrored a great amount of caution on the part of security actors rather than their will to embrace conflict management in a comprehensive manner and with a needs-driven approach. Also, the question is raised as to whether a strategic approach is ever possible if selectivity prevails and, therefore, whether the various rationales presented in this article are indeed mutually compatible.
Challenges to the Hybridization Process
If hybridity is the new form of peace operations, then one must look into the type of challenges that it poses to conflict management policies. In this section, I examine three sets of challenges. First, I look at the potential for and obstacles to the institutionalization of partnerships. Second, I address the extent to which the political agendas of states and institutions shape hybrid operations. Finally, I question the impact that hybridity may have on the coherence of peace operations.
How Much Can Hybrid Operations Be Institutionalized?
The debate on the degree of institutionalization of partnerships or hybrid forms of conflict management reveals both a relatively high degree of formalized rapprochement among the main institutions and the limits of such a process. To an extent, institutionalization of hybridity has indeed taken place. Looking at the three levels of interinstitutional relationship between the UN, EU, and AU (UN-EU, UN-AU, and EU-AU), a lot has been achieved over the past decade with, among others, the following advances: (37)
* adoption of joint declarations on conflict management: UN-EU Joint Declarations in 2003 and 2007, UN-AU Joint Declaration ("Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the AU") in 2006, and Joint EU-Africa Strategy in 2007;
* creation of interinstitutional steering committees that meet regularly to review present and future activities: UN-EU Steering Committee created in 2003, UN-AU Joint Task Force on peace and security created in 2010, and Joint Africa-EU Expert Groups and Joint Task Force created in 2007;
* desk-to-desk dialogue;
* establishment of liaisons offices: UN office to the AU (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa since 2010, EU office to the AU since 2004 (changed to EU delegation in 2010), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) office to the EU in Brussels since 2011; EU office to the UN in New York since 1992, AU representation to the UN;
* regular meetings at different levels, including those of decisionmaking bodies: meetings between members of the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council since 2007 joint consultative meetings between the EU Peace and Security Committee and AU Peace and Security Council, regular senior-level political dialogue between the UN Secretariat and the EU External Action Service;
* creation by the UN and the EU of ad hoc support mechanisms (e.g., logistical, planning, financial) to the AU;
* cases of practical cooperation in peace operations at different levels (logistics, planning, information, and finance in the Balkans, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Darfur, Somalia, and Mali), with the establishment in some of these cases of joint planning mechanisms or joint assessment missions.
This institutionalization reflects the progress made and it also establishes the framework for further hybrid operations. In the meantime, as mentioned before, one key characteristic of hybrid operations is their flexibility and ad hoc nature. They may become prominent as tools of conflict management, yet in most cases they are responses to specific circumstances. According to a report of the UN Secretary-General, "While the United Nations has undertaken various types of peacekeeping partnerships with the African Union and its sub-regional organizations, the form of this partnership has always come as a result of the specific political and security circumstances of a given conflict." (38) Indeed, although hybridity should induce more strategic coherence, hybridization has developed on a reactive mode rather than in a strategic manner. Hence, the difficulty to draw typologies or identify templates for hybrid operations. Overall, the emerging system remains very much ad hoc and deregulated.
One ensuing challenge is the balance to strike between institutionalization and flexibility. Partnerships need to be further institutionalized to minimize the effect of improvisation or institutional redundancy, yet flexibility is seen as an asset, particularly by institutions that are on the supply side. Interestingly enough, it is in most cases the dominated organization (see below on the dominant-dominated relationship) that tends to favor institutionalization while the dominant one opts for a more ad hoc response. This is clear between the AU and UN on the issue of finance where the AU pushes for a more predictable mechanism and the financing of UN-authorized, but AU-led peace operations, by UN assessed contributions while the UN resists any systematic financial commitment and instead advocates a case-by-case approach. (39) In the same vein, the UN tends to push for some degree of commitment by the EU on certain strategic enablers that the EU resists. If progress is possible on this front, it is unlikely that support in the field of finance, rapid reaction capacity, or intelligence can ever be guaranteed in principle.
Furthermore, competition dynamics that inherently characterize interinstitutional relations is an important impediment to progress toward further integration. Institutions are eager to preserve their autonomy and ensure their visibility as security actors. It follows that, while burden sharing and hybrid operations are presented as responses to the multiplicity of needs and complexity of conflict management, the development of multiactor operations may also expose these institutions to the logic of power politics and market conquest at a time when all security actors struggle to assert their relevance and demonstrate their impact.
Partnerships are a lot about hierarchical and asymmetrical relations between institutions that have different capacities, institutional weight, and political clout. Alan Henrikson points to the issues of primacy, rank, and ascendancy of one institution vis-a-vis the other, (40) which may lead to a principal-agent or dominant-dominated relationship with one institution in a position of supply and the other in a position of demand. Examples are many, especially in the African context with organizations that are confronted with a serious capacity deficit. The EU-AU relation has often been presented as a "donor-recipient relationship" (41) where capacity building prevails over any kind of reciprocal exchange. Similarly, Timothy Murithi describes the interaction between the UN and the AU as vacillating "between paternalism and partnership." (42) While "partnership" is defined as a "mutually enriching relationship based on respect and collaboration established through dialogue," "paternalism" is characterized as a "top-down unidirectional relationship where one party establishes the framework and issues strictures for the development of a second party." (43) This finds an illustration in the AU Peace and Security Council's frustration about the lack of responsiveness of the UN Security Council on several requests in relation to the respective roles of the two organizations in conflict management in Africa. (44) For example, while the AU is asking for a broader interpretation of Chapter VIII (on "Regional Arrangements") of the UN Charter (see below), the UN Security Council has been anxious to reaffirm its primacy as the organ in charge of the maintenance of international peace and security and is therefore reluctant to defer to the PSC on African security-related issues.
The UN-EU partnership is similarly characterized by the asymmetry and diffuse reciprocity between two institutions that have different resources or political leverage to draw on, thus making the institutionalization of their relationship difficult. Since the early 2000s when the partnership started to be elaborated, the EU has tended to set the agenda and define the terms of the UN-EU cooperation, which still reflects a divide between what the UN wants and what the EU is willing to offer. (45) In the meantime, the UN Security Council's insistence on its centrality is difficult to reconcile with the EU's autonomy of decision and action. In the end, while the UN and EU are often presented as "natural partners" (46) because of the alleged convergence of their activities and methods, an increased role for the EU in conflict management may also take place at the expense of the UN with the idea that regional and global multilateral ism are not necessarily mutually reinforcing,.
This leads to the issue of political divergences among institutions. Hybridity implies coordination of organizations at different levels of their activities. But it also brings together actors whose positions, constraints, and strategic visions are inevitably different. In the best case, such differences are complementary and enhance the policy response. In other cases though, organizations have diverged on their respective strategic analysis of a given situation and consequently on how to handle it, thus undermining the hybrid nature of the operation. These political divergences may emanate from the organizations' secretariats or political decisionmaking bodies--they have been observed in many instances of hybrid operations, from the UN-EU partnership in Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 and Chad in 2008-2009 to the UN-AU relationship in Darfur, Somalia, and Mali, or more broadly on the very meaning of partnership.
Political divergences may mean different risk assessment or strategic priorities, and therefore may have an impact on the mandate of the operation, its format, or area of deployment as well as on the nature of guidance provided. According to a report of the UN Secretary-General, in Sudan "the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council have not always had the same position with respect to the situation, which has resulted in the fact that the Secretariat and the Commission can provide ... two sets of strategic guidance as to implementation of the mission's mandate." (47) The AU makes similar observations when stating that, "while consultations [between the UN and the AU] represent a significant step in the right direction, they are yet to translate into a common understanding of the foundation of the cooperation between these two organs." (48) Indeed divergences on Darfur," on Somalia and the prospect of a UN takeover of AMISOM, on the financing of AU operations, and on the interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, let alone the International Criminal Court and the Libya issue, have been prominent. As far as the AU prerogatives are concerned, calls have been made for a "flexible and creative interpretation of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter."" The AU PSC contends that, "as the [AU and the UN] continue to work together to deepen their partnership, it is important, in light of the fact that the African continent dominates the agenda of the UNSC [UN Security Council]. that the latter should give due consideration to the decisions of the AU and its PSC in arriving at its own decisions." (51) While the AU PSC recognizes that "the UNSC cannot be expected to be bound by the decisions of the PSC on matters pertaining to Africa," it also points out that "the AU nonetheless is of the view that its requests should, at a minimum, be duly considered by the UNSC," adding that "this is crucial given its proximity and familiarity with conflict dynamics in its member states." (52) In return, the UN Security Council has stressed that "common and coordinated efforts undertaken by the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council in matters of peace and security, should be based on their respective authorities, competencies and capacities" (53) in an unambiguous reassertion of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Such a position also explains why it is the member states of the Security Council rather than the Security Council itself that meets with the PSC twice a year. Back in the 1990s, the same debate opposed the UN and ECOWAS, at a time when the UN was running observer missions in parallel with ECOWAS operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. (54) The Somalia case, and to a certain degree the Mali case, also showed significant differences in the UN and AU respective conceptions of peace operations--peacekeeping versus peace enforcement--which further complicates interinstitutional cooperation. (55) In Mali, the tension was clearly expressed by the AU PSC right after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) establishing MINUSMA and therefore de facto dismissing the AU and its wish to have its own mission financed by the UN assessed budget. In its communique issued on 25 April 2013, the PSC noted "with concern" that "Africa [had] not [been] appropriately consulted in the drafting and the consultation process that led to the adoption of the resolution authorizing MINUSMA," and that the resolution did not "take into account the concerns formally expressed by the AU and ECOWAS." (56) The PSC further stressed that "this situation [was] not in consonance with the spirit of partnership that the AU and the UN have been striving to promote for many years, on the basis of the provision of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter." (57)
These divergences also characterize EU-AU relations, with institutions that do not necessarily share the "same understanding of concepts of state sovereignty [or] humanitarian interventionism." (58) Similarly, the UN-EU relationship has revealed discrepancies, including: those on the role of the EU force in Chad and Central African Republic in 2008-2009 in relation to MIN-URCAT I (where the EU operation was initially presented as a protection force for the UN component (59)); those in the Kosovo and Georgia cases with divergences at the highest political level (Security Council); and, more broadly, those on how much can be expected from the EU in supporting UN-led operations. Likewise, the UN and NATO have often diverged both in Kosovo and Afghanistan on how strategic priorities--particularly insofar as coercive action was concerned--could be harmonized. In a different context, EU-NATO relations are undermined by political divergences at the decision-making level on how to best share the burden and through what mechanisms. Although twenty-two states are members of both organizations, disagreements on a series of questions (including Cyprus and the degree of duplication of capacity that is acceptable) hamper political dialogue on broad security issues.
These divergences have to do with the institutions' agendas and mandates, but they also echo the type of above-described hierarchical relations and power politics games. Institutions have more or less political clout and they position themselves accordingly. This was illustrated in both Libya and Cote d'Ivoire where the UN Security Council sided with the Arab League and ECOWAS respectively, in both cases against the AU, when making decisions on coercive policy options. In the same vein, Mali has provided a telling example of the type of game that takes place in multiactor crisis management. In response to the political crisis, secession of the northern part of the country, and threat constituted by various armed groups, the role of the institutions involved--ECOWAS, the AU, the EU, and the UN--has been determined by their respective operational capabilities as much as by their political weight and ability (or will) to impose themselves in the overall crisis management policy. More specifically, the shift from an ECOWAS to an AU and eventually a UN operation--while the EU role was confined to training of the Malian army--has to a large degree mirrored institutions' tactics and relative power.
In this game France, as a prominent political and military actor in the region and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has been able to significantly shape the hybrid nature of the crisis response. Whether the quest for coherence and long-term impact of the designed instruments has prevailed over short-term considerations is not obvious at this stage.
In this context, while harmonization among various institutions' approaches is to be sought in hybrid operations--notably through political dialogue at the highest level, but also through the various steering committees or joint task forces--a shared long-term strategy is likely to remain difficult to achieve. (60)
Hybridity and the Overall Political Coherence
Finally, in this article I have presented hybridity largely as a response to the evolving needs of conflict management. Since no institution can provide on its own all the necessary capabilities of multidimensional peace operations, conflict situations require a multiactor, coordinated, and therefore hybrid response. While hybridity indeed responds to some of the challenges posed by conflict management, it is not yet clear how much it brings political coherence to the international response.
There is first the issue of whether hybridity produces coherence in itself. Interinstitutional coordination is often presented as the solution to overlapping activities or to the lack of effectiveness of conflict management. (61) In reality though, as Roland Paris puts it, coordination understood as an administrative and procedural response is of little help when "statebuilding agencies pursue conflicting or incompatible strategies." (62) Furthermore, hybridity has to a large extent been just a new term for "overlapping forms of international engagement," and the mere rephrasing exercise does not solve "inherent problems of incoherency and contradictory objectives." (63) As Sarjoh Bah and Bruce Jones posit, hybridity does not lead to the creation of a "common political framework for action." (64) It may set the conditions for this, but the overall coherence of the peace operation still needs to be built. In this debate, the UNAMID case does not play in favor of hybridity. Most analyses, including on the UN side, are critical about the UN-AU partnership in Darfur. (65) The AU view differs in the sense that it sees the difficulties encountered by UNAMID more as being inherent to the complex context and mandate of the mission than to its hybrid nature. (66) The Peace and Security Council even sees "the hybrid nature of UNAMID and its African character" as "key to the success of the Mission." (67) Nonetheless, hybridizing the operation has created more administrative and political inertia than it has brought any sort of coherence. A related issue is that of the added value of hybridity for the organizations that benefit from the partnership more than they contribute. For them, while hybridity means the provision of capacities that would otherwise be missing, long-term coherence makes it essential that capacity building prevails over mere capacity substitution.
Second, hybridity poses the problem of the mission's accountability and ownership. Inevitably, an operation's accountability and ownership are all the more difficult to identify as they fall within several institutional frameworks. A diluted accountability is furthermore likely to negatively impact the efficiency of the operation, as the various actors involved might not feel fully in charge. Politically, one can question the kind of ownership that the AU has on UNAMID or AMISOM, given the structural and financial features of these missions. But reciprocally, although the Darfur hybrid mission has largely remained a UN endeavor, the UN de facto relinquished some of its control over the operation (e.g., with the appointment of a joint UN-AU head of mission and the fact that decisions are theoretically taken jointly). Similarly, while the EU covers the allowances of AMISOM troops through its African Peace Facility, the political oversight that it exerts on the AU mission remains limited compared with its financial commitment.
By nature, hybridity creates--or merely reflects--institutional dependency that is difficult to square with the autonomy of organizations. This is of strategic importance for the AU, which aspires to be a fully fledged security actor on the African continent and yet is not able to autonomously run its own peace operations. But ownership is equally important for the EU, which is adamant that it should have full political control over its own units and therefore poses the limits of the modular approach (i.e., the provision of an EU component to a UN operation) as defined in the EU Plan of Action to enhance EU support to UN peacekeeping. (68) In the meantime, a lack of ownership may also suit institutions that want to contribute to an operation without being politically in charge and feel more comfortable in a kind of hands-off position, leading back to the issue of selectivity. Paradoxically, given the centrality of their commitment, there is a sense of declined ownership in the UN and EU support of AMISOM.
As said before, most operations are UN mandated, yet the type of reporting mechanism that is established for UN-mandated operations is so uncon-straining that ownership remains with the implementing organization rather than with the UN.
Overall, the coherence question leads back to the strategy rationale in the sense that coherence is linked to the existence of a strategy more than hybridity which, as such, is unlikely to produce coherence or increase impact.
Hybrid operations are here to stay. Not only do they represent an innovative way to do conflict management based on comparative advantages of security institutions, but they are also responses to some of these institutions' concerns and priorities. More specifically, hybrid operations allow institutions that are short of some key capabilities to benefit from the support of others while Western actors may see in hybridity a way to contribute to conflict management without being on the forefront, particularly in Africa.
How hybrid operations will further develop is unclear, however. For legal as well as legitimacy reasons, operations established or at least endorsed by the UN Security Council are likely to remain the rule. The kinds of hybrid structure that can be put in place under that umbrella are very open and scenarios can evolve in many directions in the coming years. Most likely, as illustrated in Mali in 2012-2013, such evolutions will be event driven rather than the result of any effort to institutionalize partnerships and define scenarios for hybrid operations.
Looking at future scenarios, Richard Gowan and Jake Sherman mention the following: "shared mission support frameworks," where organizations would share logistics; "specialized military support," where some organizations would contribute specialized military missions in support of others; "niche civilian support," where institutions could borrow civilian specialists from other actors; and "common planning frameworks," where organizations would conduct joint planning in order to define a "common strategy for action." (69) Any of these scenarios would bring hybridity forward. Yet these evolutions could also reinforce a divide between the institutions that would provide troops and whose member states would therefore bear the associated risks and the institutions that would contribute through more specialized assets that could be financially costly but politically easier to handle. In the long run, the effectiveness and legitimacy of peace operations would not necessarily benefit from this kind of hybridity. Herein lies one major risk of hybridity: rather than drawing on the comparative advantages of various peacekeeping actors to maximize coherence and impact, hybridity would merely reflect a new form of Northern domination by which Northern states and institutions would by and large dictate the rules of the crisis management game to the rest of the world while subcontracting a large chunk of it to states and institutions of the Global South.
Thierry Tardy is senior analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies. He has researched and published extensively on military and civilian crisis management with a particular focus on the United Nations and the European Union, interinstitutional cooperation in security governance, security regionalism, and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. He is currently coediting the 0.1ford Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (with J. Koops, N. MacQueen, and P. D. Williams). He is a member of the editorial board of International Peacekeeping. He has taught at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva as well as at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques and the War College in Paris.
(1.) See L. Fawcett and A. Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); D. Lake and P. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); M. Pugh and W. P. S. Sidhu, eds., The United Nations and Regional Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003); A. Bellamy and P. Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations," International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 157-195.
(2.) Bruce Jones, "Part 2: Hybrid Operations," in "Evolving Models of Peacekeeping Policy Implications and Responses," External Study (New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, UNDPKO, 2003).
(3.) Challenges Forum, "Looking to the Future: Peace Operations in 2015," Background Paper (Stockholm: Challenges Forum, 2007), par. 23.
(4.) Louise Andersen, "UN Peace Operations in the 21st Century: State-building and Hybridity," DIIS Report No. 11 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2007), p. 26.
(5.) In addition, the EU is involved in the Horn of Africa with the antipiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden (Atalanta) and the EU Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity-Building (EUCAP Nestor).
(6.) See Andersen, "UN Peace Operations in the 21st Century: State-building and Hybridity," p. 28.
(7.) Sarjoh Bah and Bruce Jones, "Peace Operations Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrangements" (New York: Center on International Cooperation, May 2008), P. 2.
(8.) Ibid., p. 3.
(9.) Counterexamples include the ECOWAS missions in Liberia (as of 1990) and Sierra Leone (as of 1997) and the AU missions in Burundi (as of 2003) and Darfur (as of 2004), which were not formally authorized by the UN Security Council.
(10.) Roger Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-down and Bottom-up Peace," Security Dialogue 41, no. 4 (August 2010): 391-412.
(11.) Keith Krause, "Hybrid Violence: Locating the Use of Force in Postconflict Settings," Global Governance 18, no. 3 (2012): 40.
(12.) Oliver Richmond, "Becoming Liberal. Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-local Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding," Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3, no. 3 (November 2009): 333.
(13.) "Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict," UN Doc. A/63/881-S/2009/304 (11 June 2009), par. 5.
(14.) See Pugh and Sidhu, eds., The United Nations and Regional Security; Joachim Koops, ed., "Military Crisis Management: The Challenge of Inter-organizationalism," Studia Diplomatica 62, no. 3 (2009); Matte Brosig, "The Multi-actor Game of Peacekeeping in Africa," International Peacekeeping 17, no. 3 (June 2010); Francesco Mancini and Adam Smith, eds., "Partnerships: A New Horizon for Peacekeeping," International Peacekeeping 18, no. 5 (November 2011).
(15.) See K. Haugevik, "New Partners, New Possibilities: The Evolution of Inter-organi7ational Security Cooperation in International Peace Operations," NUPI Report (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs [NUPI], 2007), p. 8; Thierry Tardy, "Building Peace in Post-conflict Environments: Why and How the UN and the EU Interact," in J. Krause and N. Ronzitti, eds., The EU, the UN and Collective Security: Making Multilateralism Effective (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 197-220.
(16.) The EU member states also finance 36.81 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget.
(17.) See Richard Gowan and Jake Sherman, "Peace Operations Partnerships: Complex but Necessary Cooperation," Policy Briefing (Berlin: ZIF [Center for International Peace Operations], March 2012), p. 3.
(18.) "Report of the Secretary-General on UN-AU Cooperation in Peace and Security," UN Doc. S/2011/805 (29 December 2011), par. 5.
(19.) "Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence," Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership Between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security, Report No. PSC/PR/2.(CCCVII) (Addis Ababa: African Union, 9 January 2012).
(20.) No official or public document exists on the comprehensive approach by the EU. For an analysis of the concept for the EU, see Eva Gross, "EU and the Comprehensive Approach," DHS Report No. 13 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008). For a definition of the comprehensive approach by NATO, see Bucharest Summit Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, sec. 4; for an analysis of what multiactor environments mean for NATO, see M. J. Williams, "(Un)Sustainable Peacebuilding: NATO's Suitability for Postconflict Reconstruction in Multiactor Environments," Global Governance 17, no. 1 (2011): 115-134.
(21.) "Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," NATO New Strategic Concept, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010, par. 21 (emphasis added).
(22.) Richard Caplan, "Devising Exit Strategies," Survival 54, no. 3 (June--July 2012): 113.
(23.) See "Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence," par. 66.
(24.) See El-Ghassim Wane, "L'Union africaine a l'epreuve des operations de soutien a la paix," in D. Morin and L.-A. Theroux-Benoni, eds., Guide du maintien de la paix (Montreal, QC: Athena), pp. 63-69.
(25.) See "Lessons Learned Study on the Start-up Phase of the UN Mission in Liberia," (New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, UNDPKO, April 2004).
(26.) "Report of the Secretary-General on UN-AU Cooperation in Peace and Security," UN Doc. S/2011/805, par. 31.
927.) See Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, "The West and Contemporary Peace Operations," Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 1 (January 2009). See also Paul Williams, "The United Kingdom," in A. Bellamy and P. Williams, eds., Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of UN Peacekeeping Contributions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Thierry Tardy, "France," in A. Bellamy and P. Williams, eds., Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of UN Peacekeeping Contributions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
(28.) Operation Palliser was a British operation deployed in May and June 2000 as a rapid reaction capacity for the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).
(29.) The French-led (and UN-mandated) Operation Licornewas deployed in Cote d'Ivoire in February 2003 to help stabilize the country following the signature of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and to protect French citizens. With the creation of UNOCI in 2004, Operation Licorne also acted as a rapid reaction force to the UN operation.
(30.) See Kwesi Aning and Mustapha Abdallah, "Exploring the Benefits and Disadvantages of Hybrid and Other Support Models for Peace Operations in Africa," in Linnea Gelot, Ludwig Gelot, and Cedric de Coning, Supporting African Peace Operations, Policy Dialogue No. 8 (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2012), pp. 36-37.
(31.) See "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia," UN Doc. S/2007/204 (20 April 2007): "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia," UN Doc. S/2008/709 (17 November 2008).
(32.) UN Security Council Res. 1831 (19 August 2008). See also UN Security Council Res. 1863 (16 January 2009).
(33.) UN Security Council Res. 1863, par. 4.
(34.) See "UN Security Council Presidential Statement," UN Doc. S/PRST/2008/33 (4 September 2008).
(35.) Linnea Gelot, Ludwig Gelot, and Cedric de Coning, "Contextualizing Support Models for African Peace Operations," Supporting African Peace Operations, Policy Dialogue No. 8 (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2012), p. 23.
(36.) See Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, "Who's Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations," International Security 29, no. 4 (1995): 195.
(37.) See Joachim Koops, "Peace Operations Partnerships: Assessing Cooperation Mechanisms Between Secretariats," Policy Briefing (Berlin: ZIF [Center for International Peace Operations], March 2012). See also European External Action Service, "Plan of Action to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping," Doc. 11216/12 (14 June 2012). On EU-UN, EU-NATO, and EU-AU relations, see Sven Biscop and Richard Whitman, eds., The Routledge Handbook of European Security (London: Routledge, 2013), chaps. 22, 23, 25.
(38.) "Report of the Secretary-General on UN-AU Cooperation in Peace and Security," UN Doc. S/2011/805, par. 31.
(39.) See "Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence." See also Wane, "L'Union africaine," p. 73.
(40.) Alan Henrikson, "The Growth of Regional Organizations and the Role of the United Nations," in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 124.
(41.) Malte Brosig, "The African Union: A Partner for Security," in Sven Biscop and Richard Whitman, eds., The Routledge Handbook of European Security (London: Routledge, 2013), P. 42.
(42.) Timothy Murithi, "Between Paternalism and Hybrid Partnership: The Emerging UN and Africa Relationship in Peace Operations," Briefing Paper No. 2 (New York, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, February 2007), p. 2.
(44.) See "Working Together for Peace and Security in Africa: The Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council," Special Research Report (New York: Security Council Report, 10 May 2011), p. 2.
(45.) See Thierry Tardy, "EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping: A Promising Relationship in a Constrained Environment," in Martin Ortega, ed., The EU and the UN: Partners in Effective Multilateralism, Cahiers de Chaillot No. 78 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2005), p. 49. See also Jan Wouters, Franck Hoffmeister, and Tom Ruys. eds., The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. 2006); Bruno Charbonneau, "What Is So Special About the European Union? EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa," International Peacekeeping 16, no. 4 (August 2009).
(46.) "The Partnership Between the UN and the EU: The United Nations and the European Commission Working Together in Development and Humanitarian Cooperation" (New York: UN, 2006), p. 6.
(47.) "Report of the Secretary-General on UN-AU Cooperation in Peace and Security," UN Doc. S/2011/805, par. 40.
(58.) Brosig, "The African Union," p. 300.
(59.) "After Action Review: UN-EU Planning for EUFOR Tchad/RCA," UN (unpublished document, April 2008), P. 2.
(60.) Regarding this, see "Report of the Secretary-General on UN-AU Cooperation in Peace and Security," UN Doc. S/2011/805, par. 40.
(61.) See Roland Paris, "Understanding the 'Coordination Problem' in Postwar Statebuilding," in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds. The Dilemmas of State-building: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 53-78.
(62.) Ibid., p. 59.
(63.) Andersen, "UN Peace Operations in the 21st Century," P. 30.
(64.) Bah and Jones, "Peace Operations Partnerships," p. 7.
(65.) See "Working Together for Peace and Security in Africa," p. 19.
(66.) See "Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence," par. 63.
(67.) AU Peace and Security Council Communique, PSC/PR/COMM./(CCCI) (30 November 2011), par. 4. The reference to the "African character" of the mission is interesting since this was one of the demands made by Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir to initially give his consent to the UN-AU mission.
(68.) "Plan of Action to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping."
(69.) See Gowan and Sherman, "Peace Operations Partnerships," p. 3.
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