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Humane modernization as a liberal ideal: late imperial Russia on the pages of the Herald of Europe, 1891-1904.

IN THE LAST decade of the nineteenth century, Russian Finance Minister Sergei Witte (1849-1915; in office 1892-1903) launched an unprecedented industrialization campaign, which became known as the Witte System. It aimed to propel Russia into the modern age through a combination of protectionist measures, a massive railroad construction project, enormous subsidies for heavy industry, acceptance of the gold standard, and a positive trade balance to encourage and pay back foreign investments. In large part, the Russian peasantry ended up defraying the costs of Witte's economic modernization, which inspired a fascinating debate over economic development alternatives between the Russian Marxists and Populists. Marxism entered Russia not in opposition to capitalism, but on its coattails, because the Marxists supported Witte's program believing that it would usher in capitalism, give birth to a conscious proletariat, and thereby expedite a revolution. The Populists, however, opposed the Witte System because it favored industry at the expense of agricultural development and rural welfare.

Although historians have covered this debate, few have paid attention to the views of the Russian liberals who also articulated a development program. (1) This article explores its components and demonstrates that Russian liberalism took an enormous step in the direction of becoming a viable social movement when it acquired its first clear economic program, which was conceived in the process of analyzing the Marxist and Populist positions. The universally acknowledged mouthpiece of Russian liberalism in the late imperial era, the Herald of Europe (Vestnik Evropy), articulated this program on its pages. A close analysis of the Herald challenges three long-held assumptions about liberal economic thought in late imperial Russia. First, the Marxist and Populist programs were not the only alternatives in the development debate: The liberal position was as popular and even more pragmatic. Second, in the absence of a political sphere of activity, extra-parliamentary institutions of local self-government rather than constitutionalism stood at the center of the liberal program. Third, this emphasis on local conditions demonstrates that Russian liberalism became truly indigenous when economic concerns became essential to its worldview.

The Marxist-Populist debate in the 1890s has obscured the liberal point of view on modernization, which was no less detailed than the Marxist position and in many ways more pragmatic than Populist remedies. (2) Through its polemics with the Marxists, contributors to the Herald criticized the state's economic programs and articulated questions that exposed the costs of modernization, of which the costliest was the late imperial agrarian crisis. Although its strain of liberalism shared the Populist concern for the peasantry, the Herald did not treat the rural population as a messiah, but argued instead for direct local economic empowerment. The Herald group accepted capitalism's growing pains, but unlike the Marxists, it refused to see modernization as a Procrustean bed upon which all excess flesh was cut away and shortcomings were corrected at the expense of the victim's life. Although the Herald welcomed capitalism, it did not treat it as a predetermined teleological phase. Unlike Finance Minister Sergei Witte, the Herald liberals refused to treat the economic sphere as a means to achieve long-term foreign policy interests. On the contrary, the idea of self-government and responsibility, as opposed to economic efficiency or raison d'etat, stood at the center of the Herald's economic views. Furthermore, the Journal championed progressive taxation and the redirection of funds away from industrial development back into the provinces.

The Journal evaluated modernization based on the performance of local self-government institutions known as the zemstvos that Alexander II's Great Reforms had created on two levels (province and district) in Russia's European territories in 1864. (3) This administrative reform followed in the wake of the Emancipation Decree (1861), which freed the serfs from their former landlords, but did not allow them to own land individually. (4) The decree kept the traditional peasant commune intact for taxation purposes. The commune was also to prevent poor peasants from becoming rootless proletarians. It owned the land and oversaw the fair distribution of the tax burden. Meanwhile, the peasants were saddled with redemption payments to the government for the next forty-nine years. These remittances were to cover the state's initial compensation of the landlords for the loss of free labor and the value of those parts of their lands that they ceded to the communes. Emancipation was thus a mixed blessing.

Devoid of any political power, the zemstvo was a locally elected board that oversaw basic infrastructural projects, insurance, veterinary care, and other local issues that used to be the landlords' responsibilities. (5) Although peasants and members of professions participated in zemstvo elections, the landed gentry became disproportionately represented. The Herald of Europe consistently argued for fairer representation and the expansion of the zemstvo's tax-collecting privileges. The Journal essentially treated the zemstvos as economic self-help mechanisms and focused on the human beings behind modernization's figures. Even if published in the capital St. Petersburg, and bearing "Europe" in its title, the journal thus functioned more like a mirror of Russian conditions than a window to the West.

The Herald of Europe avoided the usual reference points upon which Russian liberalism focused (as have its historians): western precedents or parallels, natural rights theories, neo-Kantian idealism, Christianity, socialism, and Marxism. (6) The journal's reference frame was neither an estate nor a class, but instead the multitude of local self-government units through which the journal's contributors articulated a form of rural democracy outside the peasant commune.

The binary Slavophile-Westernizer structure, which Theodore von Laue attached to the Populist-Marxist debate of the 1890s, has proved a seductive oversimplification of an entire century's intellectual development. (7) The Herald articles are useful reminders, however, that this debate was only one of several important intellectual developments in the 1890s. Moreover, it was peripheral to the liberal take on modernization, which, as the Herald consistently argued, could only succeed if society participated in it through the zemstvos, which the Populists considered tools of the gentry and the Marxists ignored completely. The Herald liberalism spoke in a special voice, for it evaluated modernization from the local perspective.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, popular thick journals in Russia were more than publications. In the absence of open political debate or deliberative national bodies (political parties became legal only in 1905), journals acted as extra-parliamentary parties with their editorial offices as headquarters, their editors as leaders, their choice of what to publish as a kind of political platform, and their readers as voters. By the 1890s, Mikhail Stasiulevich's Herald of Europe (1866-1918) became the mouthpiece of Russia's liberal movement. At the height of its popularity in the late 1880s and 1890s, the Herald had just over 8,000 subscribers, but this number does not reflect family members who read it or those reading public library copies. (8) For comparison's sake, the most popular thick journal in Russia, Notes of the Fatherland, peaked at around 10,000 subscribers (before it was closed in 1884), while the most popular daily newspaper, Alexei Suvorin's New Time, printed about 50,000 copies in the 1890s.

Part of the Herald's appeal had to do with the remarkable constellation of intellectuals who edited and wrote for the journal. Headed by four Petersburg intellectuals (editor and owner Mikhail Stasiulevich, literary scholar Alexander Pypin, lawyer Konstantin Arsen'ev, and economic analyst Leonid Slonimskii), the journal and its salon constituted a major constellation in St. Petersburg's intellectual firmament. The men who ran the journal befriended regular contributors such as Ivan Turgenev, Aleksei Tolstoy, Ivan Goncharov, Anton Chekhov, Maxim Gorky, and Emile Zola, among many others. The journal and the men around it constituted a social universe all of its own.

By the time the famine of 1891-1892 exposed the risks of heavy dependence on a precarious agricultural base, the journal already had a twenty-year legacy of analyzing agricultural reforms. In the debate about whether Russia was in the midst of an "agrarian crisis," the Herald firmly maintained that it was. Because "crisis" is a relative term, its existence and scope inspired acrimonious debate at the end of the nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century among both Soviet and American specialists. (9) In the present context, however, the reality of the crisis is irrelevant because in the 1890s, the debate in itself became an important social and political catalyst.

The Herald of Europe took three approaches to the debate about the agrarian crisis. First, it used the 1891-1892 famine as an excuse to push for increased local self-government rights and defended the zemstvos as economic flywheel mechanisms that could mitigate economic hardships. Indeed, the zemstvos proved to be the most reliable and responsive administrative units during the famine. (10) Second, the journal examined Russia's agricultural problems in the context of the global agricultural market. And third, it offered a thorough and original analysis of the Finance Ministry's policies in which it detected, of all things, Marxist influences. As a result, the Herald's readers received a consistently balanced treatment of international and domestic conditions that challenged the tendency to treat Russia's socioeconomic development as a freak exception and simultaneously demonstrated that isolating the empire from the world market was unrealistic.

The famine of 1891-1892 in the central European provinces and along the Volga River served as a reminder that the emancipation of the serfs by Tsar Alexander II in 1861 had failed to resolve the Romanov Empire's basic economic problems. As a consequence, the debate about modernization erupted with unprecedented urgency. What began as a crop failure turned into a catastrophe that ravaged the rural population and sparked cholera and typhus epidemics. It also undermined the empire's fiscal surplus, which Witte's predecessor as Finance Minister Ivan Vyshnegradsky (1831-1895; in office 1887-1892) had worked hard to achieve through a combination of rural taxation and fiscal austerity. He believed that a positive trade balance would ensure foreign investments into Russian industry. The famine demonstrated that the Finance Ministry had overtaxed the peasantry and that Russia remained overly reliant on agricultural exports for its solvency. Most important, the famine became a social catalyst that marked the return of the public into the political sphere, which pointed directly to the 1905 Revolution.

The reign of Tsar Alexander III (1881-1894) has become infamous for the so-called counterreforms that attempted to roll back some of the liberal policies of Alexander II's Great Reforms. In Alexander III's mind, the assassination of his father by terrorists in 1881 proved that his liberal experiment had gone too far. As a result, land captains (appointed individuals responsible directly to governors) were introduced in 1889 to oversee the activity of the zemstvos. The state's reaction to the famine was typically paternalistic in its discouragement of spontaneous public relief efforts and its tendency to appoint carefully chosen individuals to oversee the relief effort on the ground. In reality, the state and the numerous ad hoc commissions that it created to deal with the famine became hostages to the situation and slowed down the relief effort. (11) The Herald opposed this top-down approach from the beginning.

Although the Herald had covered the state of Russia's agriculture throughout the 1870s and 1880s, the famine of 1891-1892 inspired an avalanche of articles from Konstantin Arsen'ev, who exposed official abuses and criticized administrative inefficiencies (including those of the zemstvos themselves) during the relief effort. He looked to Russia's experience with local self-government to justify a continuing policy of decentralization, which constituted a form of economic democratization. A brief examination of Arsen'ev's 1882 "liberal program" will demonstrate the profound influence that the famine exerted on the Herald's chief political correspondent. In 1882, after an article in an issue of Ivan Aksakov's conservative newspaper Rus' argued that Russian liberalism had no definition or program, and that there was no such thing as a "liberal party," Arsen'ev published a liberal program in the Herald. (12) Calling for freedom of the press and of conscience, as well as a basic national education system, Arsen'ev also demanded the lowering of property requirements for zemstvo elections and the creation of the all-estate volost', a local administrative unit smaller than the zemstvo that would serve as a grassroots peasant-dominated institution. A year earlier, he had argued that the volost" council should become the local self-government's "center of gravity," that it should answer to the district zemstvo but have a measure of independence. (13) Arsen'ev intended for the all-estate volost' to become an organic link between rural society and the state, and to act as the foundation for a harmonious administrative structure resting on a broad popular base. (14) The 1882 program was well intentioned, but vague. The 1891-1892 famine, however, forced Arsen'ev to clarify his ideas. Under the influence of the rural calamity, his program acquired a remarkably pragmatic economic focus.

As the 1891 harvest failure threatened starvation, the Herald of Europe was the first publication to use the term "famine." (15) Doubting that the land captains could deal with such a widespread calamity, Arsen'ev resurrected his crusade for the creation of the all-estate volost', arguing that such an institution was especially beneficial in times of crisis, when imperial institutions needed to communicate rapidly with rural locales. (16) In his examination of the famine, historian Richard Robbins wrote: "The lack of local personnel made the task of aiding the poor extremely difficult and increased the possibility of error and abuse." (17) Arsen'ev argued that by attempting to coordinate autocratically the distribution of aid, the center stifled local initiative and made the relief measures counterproductive. (18) Extraordinary situations demanded not extraordinary measures but elastic bodies that could rapidly increase their cadres in response to pressing needs, Arsen'ev argued, a capability that only local institutions possessed. Their tradition of glasnost" and proximity to the land guaranteed efficient distribution. (19) Arsen'ev also came out in favor of public works projects, such as road and bridge maintenance, as long as they were voluntary, transparent, and locally based. (20)

Arsen'ev also believed that the state would do better to encourage local networks of relief institutions: "The more varied the sources of relief, the deeper and wider the aid movement, the more chances of its success." (21) His arguments were remarkably similar to those in favor of "spontaneous self-initiative" used by Populists Nikolai Danielson, Vasilii Vorontsov, and Sergei Iuzhakov. (22) This was one of many conceptual overlaps with the Populists, although the crucial difference was, of course, that Arsen'ev addressed educated members of society, not the peasants themselves. (23) The discussion of relief efforts became a conduit for demanding administrative decentralization.

The essential private contributions to famine relief, Arsen'ev argued, were not the small donations, charity balls, or the "annoying solicitation lists," but the quiet, small deeds that demanded personal sacrifices and took place hourly all over the stricken areas. With more than a hint of Populist idealism, Arsen'ev encouraged Russians to abandon the city lifestyle, to move into the rural wilderness, to devote all of their time to learning about the rural situation and the population's needs, to hear the children's cries, to see the mothers' tears, and to live among the gaunt faces. All of these constituted a personal investment in the struggle against the famine. Thousands were doing it quietly, Arsen'ev argued, finding their reward and support in no more than the persistent execution of their moral duty: "Whoever has seen at least one of [these helpers] will have no doubts about our present and future." (24)

In its own way, public participation in the famine relief effort constituted a new "going to the people" movement similar to the one that the Populists had undertaken in the early 1870s, which failed to inspire a peasant revolution. This time, however, the moral responsibility manifested itself in learning about rural conditions and giving material aid, not encouraging a revolt. The office of the Herald of Europe on Galernaia Street in St. Petersburg became a collection center for donations, which Arsen'ev personally redirected into the provinces. As his letters attest, he closely monitored the funds and gathered information from representatives in district capitals and villages. (25) The information that he received often found its way into his monthly "Domestic Surveys."

Arsen'ev had to navigate the censorship waters carefully. Cooperation between state and society was essential, he wrote. One effort had to reinforce the other. State aid was quantitatively indispensable, but private aid was morally necessary. Regardless of how large the scale of private relief, it could never match what the state offered through the zemstvos. Their resources, he argued, needed to increase, to which end the establishment of a progressive income tax was Arsen'ev's optimal solution. (26) He blamed state taxes for the peasantry's chronic insolvency and proposed to exempt low incomes from progressive taxes by taking into consideration family size, constancy of employment, and stable income. As for intellectual labor, a tax would apply for profits above a determined sum. High incomes, Arsen'ev argued, often paid for "needless luxuries, fantasies, and schemes," so a fixed income from capital and property would be taxed higher than wages. (27) In other words, the tax system would reward productive labor. For Arsen'ev, supporting a more just distribution of taxes was proof of Russian liberalism's universal appeal: It did not favor the bourgeoisie at the expense of the peasantry.

With his tax proposals, Arsen'ev restated his 1882 program in richer detail and with a notably greater economic bent. He saw clearly the fundamental paradox in center-local relations: Could local government institutions (either corporate or the all-estate volost') flourish, given both the pressures from the center and the low rural economic and cultural levels that inhibited the growth of an economically educated and socially conscious provincial society? The process would not be easy, but Arsen'ev believed in learning by doing. Although the state created the zemstvos to take care of local needs, it distrusted spontaneous local initiative. Instead, Arsen'ev saw the zemstvos as joint stock companies that protected their members' economic rights and defined their responsibilities. He also believed that the all-estate volost' could act as a natural guarantee that greater local responsibility did not become a breeding ground for radicalism and, more important, for financial irresponsibility. He believed that the peasantry's inherent traditionalism and common sense would not allow that to happen. Essentially, the atomization of socioeconomic responsibility could increase the closer it came to the peasant household, and this meant including more peasants in local self-government.

In response to the famine of 1892, the Herald distinguished itself by evaluating Russia's economic development since the 1860s through the lens of achievements in local self-government, which, Arsen'ev firmly believed, was the crucial component of economic well-being. The all-estate volost' was proposed as a form of economic democratization that could eventually replace the traditional peasant commune, a subject conspicuously absent from Arsen'ev's "Domestic Surveys." The Herald thus advocated a keystone to crown the zemstvo network. It provided readers with a monthly snapshot of its feasibility. Furthermore, the Herald project intended to substitute the central point of view on modernization by many local ones. Empowering the rural population through self-government would allow it to articulate its interests and alleviate modernization's worst side effects. The liberal ideal of humane modernization was a perspective that neither Populists nor Marxists accepted. The liberal point of view was socially and economically inclusive.

The second approach to the agrarian crisis evolved along with Arsen'ev's meticulous analysis of the famine relief effort. He had identified the incomplete nature of the Great Reforms as the main reason for Russia's socioeconomic tensions and proposed carrying the administrative reforms to their logical end. However, Arsen'ev did not situate Russia in a broader global and historical context. Two other regular Herald contributors drew that picture.

In 1891, Prince Dmitrii Drutskoi-Sokolinskii, a landowner from Penza Province and frequent contributor to the Herald, addressed the agricultural crisis in one of his "articles from the countryside." Drutskoi-Sokolninskii's real concern was to explain why the effects of the crop failure were so severe and why the peasants remained so poor. Previous crop failures were insufficient to explain this. It was not the size of land allotments, whose value continued to decline. The landowners were not responsible either, as they were also deeply in debt to the banks. Drutskoi-Sokolninskii suggested that the causes were much broader and therefore not immediately apparent. (28)

Grain was Russia's main export, but its domestic price was low. Drutskoi-Sokolninskii argued that this indicated overproduction. (29) The state had approved the relocation of peasants to Siberia, but while this migration had gathered in force, it showed a paradox in Russia's agricultural economy: Despite the overproduction of goods, peasants still experienced severe deficits in foodstuffs. The situation in the countryside had become so bad by the early 1890s that popular imagination began to idealize the pre-Emancipation era as the Land of Cockaigne. According to official statistics that Drutskoi-Sokolninskii reviewed, the peasantry's overall quality of living declined steadily between 1866 and 1891, while state revenues rose.

The gentry also suffered from the land's depreciation, for which public opinion consistently and unjustly blamed the landed nobility itself. In reality, Drutskoi-Sokolninskii argued, the peasantry and the gentry were companions in misery and the enmity between them resulted from misconceptions. (30) The same held for gentry--zemstvo relations, which many also presumed to be antagonistic. Provincial zemstvos were almost entirely composed of the gentry, and in the district zemstvos, although the nobility was not as prevalent, it, nevertheless, played the leading role in decision making. It was too early to draw a line between the gentry and the zemstvo, argued the author. If the zemstvo's effectiveness had recently decreased, it was for lack of funds, which was apparent across the board. The gentry fared no better than the peasantry and, from Drutskoi-Sokolninskii's personal experience, in order to maintain its solvency, the nobility sold everything it could, including grain on the stalk, as collateral for loans. The rampant growth of rural usury and the emergence of the kulaks were effects rather than causes. (31) Worse, there was no relief on the horizon because falling domestic grain prices precipitated a decline in the rural standard of living.

Drutskoi-Sokolninskii turned to the work of Alexei Ermolov, the former vice president of the Imperial Free Economic Society and a future Minister of State Domains and of Agriculture. (32) In his Organization of the Field Economy (1879), Ermolov had suggested that Russian agriculture was experiencing the effects of the world economy's new phase, wherein the forms of agricultural production and trade were in the process of adapting to different conditions and rules. Abundant harvests no longer provided a way out of rural insolvency, Ermolov argued, because international grain prices were fluctuating too wildly. European producers experienced the same problems, and even American farmers, who were mostly responsible for the overproduction, suffered from its effects. Russia had no international competition in rye production, but plenty in the wheat market, and it was unlikely that world prices would rise in the near future. Russia was trapped in the nineteenth-century version of the resource curse. The state depended on agriculture for its solvency, while the population depended on it for its survival, but the two interests were at odds. Moreover, Russia faced global competition and had to adapt its agricultural methods accordingly. Ermolov argued that, armed with the "light of knowledge," Russians needed to study their natural environment, identify the peculiarities of their economic system, and define their attitude to the western world in order to find a "point of origin and a firm base" from which their agriculture could develop. (33)

Drutskoi-Sokolninskii praised Ermolov's dedication to rational agriculture and proposed his own incentives to increase the production and distribution of Russian grain. The state could encourage foreign governments to lower their tariffs, and it could also lower domestic trade costs by building railroads and selectively decreasing transportation tariffs (something it did only during crop failures). The object, according to Drutskoi-Sokolninskii, was to improve the peasantry's standard of living, which would encourage higher productivity. In the end, Russia's economic success depended on the peasantry's well-being and without its improvement, all other attempts to raise productivity would fail. (34)

The breadth of Drutskoi-Sokolninskii's view constituted a link between Arsen'ev's concentrated examination of local conditions and a broader view of late nineteenth-century economic trends and the macroeconomic patterns that underlay them. Drutskoi-Sokolninskii's suggestion that more than dismal domestic conditions contributed to rural poverty opened new conceptual planes for understanding "Russian backwardness." It was not entirely self-induced, but contingent, and this implied that it was not inevitable, but temporary. Arsen'ev and Drutskoi-Sokolninskii argued that famine relief and general poverty reduction were two sides of the same coin. By the end of 1891, as Arsen'ev urged the devolution of responsibility to local self-government and Drutskoi-Sokolninskii explored Russia's agricultural problems in a broader economic perspective, Leonid Slonimskii took a further step, which constituted the third approach to the agrarian crisis, by examining the Finance Ministry's policies through the combined prism of international markets and the history of economic thought.

The Herald's criticism of Finance Ministry policies was close to the Populist point of view in that the journal defended rural interests. The Herald articles argued that the gentry-peasantry opposition was a false problem. Although agriculture's plight was both the cause and the potential remedy for Russia's relative economic backwardness, this did not necessarily translate into any form of social or cultural retardation, the writers argued. The real problem was the state's failure to coordinate agrarianism and global economic demands. The Finance Ministry, not the liberal intelligentsia, was aping the West in its loyalty to the outdated trade balance theory. Meanwhile, the large merchant conglomerates clothed this outdated policy in the language of patriotism and sold it to the state, thereby forcing it to pursue a colonial policy toward its own population: Protectionism became a cover for a rapacious stripping of domestic resources that were exported with state subsidies at the cost of domestic poverty.

The debate started with a discussion of famine relief efforts (Arsen'ev), proceeded with an analysis of the state of international agriculture (Drutskoi-Sokolninskii), and culminated with Slonimskii's criticism of the economic theories behind the policies that the Finance Ministry pursued. Slonimskii's scrutiny could not have happened at a more auspicious and important moment. The famine precipitated the fall of Ivan Vyshnegradskii and Sergei Witte's appointment as head of the ministry. However, instead of rejecting his predecessor's policies, Witte implemented them with greater resolve and rapidity, producing the industrial boom of the 1890s and further polarizing Russian society.

In response to the Witte System's head-spinning changes, Russian Marxists and Populists faced off in a bitter and fascinating debate about the empire's economic development. In reaction to both, the Herald liberals further developed their own socioeconomic ideas, forging an alternative vision of Russian development. They did not focus exclusively on the peasantry, but agreed on many points with the Populists. They were not bound by Marxist ideology, but recognized the inevitability of industrial development, the social modernization that accompanied it, and the global influences on both. Although the Herald liberals criticized the Finance Ministry's misguided development policies, especially protectionism, the journal did not target capitalism as a whole. The analyses by Drutskoi-Sokolninskii and Slonimskii presented Russia as an integral participant in the world economy.

In February 1892, Slonimskii examined the soundness of pursuing a positive trade balance, which had grown at an encouraging rate in 1891 according to the Finance Ministry. (35) Its annual report boasted that Russia had exported 682 million rubles worth of goods and imported only 342 million. Slonimskii concluded from this that if one were to judge economic welfare by international trade balances, the famine enriched Russia. By the same logic, Russia should have made enormous cumulative profits ever since the 1877 import tariff tipped the balance in favor of exports. Why then, asked Slonimskii, were the results not evident in the villages? Or, were they simply mirages of financial minds? The very fact that famine years were more profitable in terms of a balance of trade should have caused suspicion, he argued. If a negative trade balance implied impoverishment, as protectionists asserted, then England and France had been on the path to insolvency since the 1860s because their annual imports had consistently exceeded their exports. Russia, however, had a positive annual balance throughout the 1880s, yet it suffered the most when foreigners "owed" it money. By the end of the nineteenth century, almost all advanced western nations ran a negative trade balance. Tongue in cheek, Slonimskii asked whether it would have been better to "go poor" with England and France than to maintain the present course. After all, despite its positive trade balances, creditors did not pour their investments into Russia. Was it possible, he asked, that the trade balance theory had outlived its utility? (36)

Playing the devil's advocate, Slonimskii took the protectionist argument to its logical conclusion. (37) A predatory sell-off of Russia's natural resources with no purchases from abroad would create the greatest trade balance in the world. However, he argued, a protectionist would complain of a "very poor" trade balance if the rural population consumed the products of its own labor, bought cheaper domestic and advanced foreign goods, and raised its average standard of living.

The Finance Ministry's obsolete mercantilist belief that national welfare depended on the amount of money in state coffers perpetuated this situation. Although Populist works also used this criticism, they largely focused on moral arguments in defense of the peasantry. For example, Petr Lavrov (1823-1900) emphasized the debt that the educated society owed for its leisure to the toiling rural masses. Slonimskii, however, went straight to European critics of protectionism. Many western writers had already questioned the validity of mercantilist thought, but their criticism had been forgotten or ignored. David Hume had written in the middle of the eighteenth century that the price of goods and labor fluctuated according to market conditions and no country could lose or hoard capital indefinitely, for money was like a liquid that could not accrue above a certain level. Slonimskii quoted Hume: "Nations suffer material losses not from the outflow of capital to foreigners, but from the decline of their productivity, their energy, and entrepreneurship." (38) He also invoked Jeremy Bentham: "[If a] merchant chooses to send money to Paris, it is because he thinks it profitable for himself; but the acute politician finds that one man's profit is a whole nation's loss. To interfere with individual gain is therefore to prevent collective detriment." (39) Inflated fears and illusory alarms were the fabric of protectionism, which treated economics as a zero-sum game. Slonimskii quoted contemporary French politician and economist Yves Guyot:
   The proponents of protectionism periodically predict the complete
   ruin of France caused by imports of American pork, Russian bread,
   or English cotton or metal goods. In the past forty years, the
   entire industry was expected to disappear, wages to decrease to
   zero, and the population to immigrate. Fields would grow fallow and
   all shops would close. However, none of this has happened. (40)


Slonimskii concluded that it was time to abandon the "dangerous siren" that had caused much grief under the harmless and deceptive name of "international trade balance." (41) If logic and common sense were helpless in this case, he concluded, perhaps a more convincing argument could have been that Russia maintained a superb trade balance during the famine of 1891. (42) When the Populist-Marxist debate erupted in its wake, Slonimskii entered the fray eagerly.

Russian Marxism had evolved in a unique way. Marx's works became popular in Russia after Populist Nikolai Danielson's translation of The Capital appeared in 1872, the first into any foreign language. However, the Populists used The Capital as a warning against imitating the western economic path. In other words, Danielson intended the book to be anti-prescriptive. Because Russia lagged behind Western Europe economically, Russian socialists such as Alexander Herzen (1812-1870) and Nikolai Chernyshevskii (1828-1889) believed that it could avoid the initial stages of capitalist accumulation (and all of its horrors) and leap into socialism by emulating the peasant communes with their culture of equality through distribution. In the 1880s, the "grandfather of Russian Marxism," Georgii Plekhanov (1856-1918), was the first to separate proletariat-oriented Marxism from Populist socialism, and in the wake of the 1891-1892 famine and under the pressure of the Witte System, Russian Marxists became independent and opposed to Populism. The "literary Marxism" that emerged in the 1890s followed the western "economist" model of Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932) by shedding altogether the conceptual foundation of class struggle and its revolutionary implications. Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskii (1865-1919), Petr Struve (1870-1944), Sergei Bulgakov (1871-1944), and Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1948), the most prominent representatives of this Marxist strain, welcomed capitalism's progressive role. For this, V. I. Lenin (1870-1924) was subsequently to deride them as "legal Marxists." (43) Because the Bolsheviks did not yet exist in the 1890s, Slonimskii's criticism against Marxist doctrine in Russia targeted this "legal" variety.

In March 1892, Slonimskii approached the issue of protectionism from the domestic angle by criticizing the Finance Ministry's slavish imitation of western practices. (44) Unlike the Marxist writers Tugan-Baranovskii and Struve, however, Slonimskii did not focus on the needs of the proletariat, but of the peasantry, which the Marxists considered a backward class. Like the Marxists, the Finance Ministry bureaucrats were sacrificing the peasantry's essential and life-sustaining economic activities for the sake of secondary industrial gains and illusory financial achievements. The Marxists' basic argument was that Russia needed to industrialize in order to proceed to the socialist stage of development, and they therefore welcomed Witte's crash industrialization. Slonimskii, however, argued that the merchant-industrial class, which "everywhere held positions of prominence and power," had succeeded in presenting its own interests as national ones. (45) They had consistently convinced honest and committed writers to consider it their patriotic goal to support the unfair claims that industry was making upon the state.

However, what was advantageous for the energetic French or English entrepreneur often proved ruinous to a sparsely populated empire such as Russia with acres of empty land on which agriculture had not yet reached the "rudimentary rational stage." (46) The Russian economy, Slonimskii argued, developed rather slowly and faced a large internal demand for industrial products. Yet, the state constantly searched for foreign markets, as if it was as constrained within its borders as English or German merchants were within theirs. Slonimskii concluded that the interests of the major commodities exporters were incompatible with those of the rural population and that the "protection of domestic industry" had become a vague and elastic formula under whose cover the entrepreneurial elite systematically perverted the principles of the Russian economy. (47) Slonimskii had opened a new chapter in the debate over Russia's socioeconomic future. At the root of his argument lay the accusation (never expressed directly) that the Finance Ministry, that is, Sergei Witte, treated the state as a gigantic merchant office wherein only export and import figures determined success.

Behind the agrarian crisis debate loomed broader and deeper questions. The famine thrust the development question back into the center of public attention. The Herald group welcomed modernization and saw the Russian Empire as an integral part of the world economy, but the authors clearly perceived that Russia was not riding the frothy crest of economic development. Instead, a tidal wave was inundating the country's helpless rural population. Slonimskii anticipated the development debates that became prominent in the twentieth century in developing countries. Modernization has always threatened traditional peasant lifestyles, as rural historian-anthropologist Eric R. Wolf argued in his analysis of the peasantry's relations to power holders. (48) The peasantry's central dilemma, according to him, was how to balance the utilitarian and ceremonial needs of their households with the obligations that the external world imposed. (49) Under Witte, these obligations increased exponentially in Russia.

Appearing along with Slonimskii's articles were the polemics written by Alexander Pypin, one of the Herald editors, who debated with prominent Populist Vasilii Vorontsov in the 1890s whether liberalism and Populism were at odds. (50) Pypin criticized Populism for claiming exclusive concern for the peasantry's well-being and emphasized the two movements' common values. (51) Pypin was a literary scholar and his cultural interpretation of Populism demonstrated that the two movements had much more in common than both sides were willing to admit. However, Pypin also uncovered a strong current of elitism in Populist thinking. On the one hand, Populism treated the peasant masses as hopelessly ignorant, inherently apathetic, and in need of leadership. On the other hand, it wavered between distrusting the intelligentsia and treating it as an enemy of the masses. Pypin's central concern was that prominent Populist thinkers had created an artificial distinction between two social theories, rural socialism and liberalism, that had emerged from the same humanistic literary tradition in the 1850s. However, in the process of defining Populism, Pypin uncovered an ideological difference that the liberals could not overlook: The Populists were, in essence, paternalistic in their view of the peasantry, even though they idealized it. This view was incompatible with the Herald program of economic democratization. For Pypin, therefore, Herald liberalism was a mature form of Populism that had shed its most elitist and deterministic components.

For example, Pypin disagreed with Vorontsov's identification of economic interests as "privileges on the one hand and oppression on the other," and exclusive determinants of social problems. (52) He suggested that such a reductionist approach indicated that Vorontsov completely misunderstood the "internal development of [Russia's] social history." (53) Pypin also pointed to contradictions in Vorontsov's treatment of the intelligentsia, which the latter described as serving the interests of a privileged social minority and following narrow bourgeois teachings while expressing lofty humanistic and emancipatory principles. In other words, Pypin believed that the Herald liberalism was an evolved form of Populism, which had left behind its adolescent solipsism by taking into account the immense complexity of Russia's socioeconomic conditions. It also tried to do something about them through the zemstvos. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Herald liberalism anticipated Russian neo-Populism with its emphasis on peasant cooperatives and "social agronomy," which Alexander Chaianov and others would champion in the early twentieth century. (54)

Chaianov's fellow sociologist and historian of the Russian peasantry, Teodor Shanin, was the first to characterize late nineteenth-century Russia as a "developing society" at the end of the nineteenth century. (55) He defined this form of "dependent development" as a "process of social reproduction of extensive and extending inequality both on an international and a local scale." (56) The Herald group anticipated this neo-Populist argument. Slonimskii had written that state supported industrialization facilitated severe agricultural crises, and Shanin later argued that the state increasingly treated rural society "as a milking cow and a dumping place of 'modernization' [while] 'growth' happened elsewhere." (57)

Shanin also believed that "dependent development" accumulated mutually reinforcing weaknesses and produced a "disarticulated society;" in other words, the peasant economy remained outside the capitalist economy. (58) However, Arsen'ev believed that the peasantry was perfectly capable of articulating its interests in the language of socioeconomic needs through the medium of local self-government. Shanin explored ways in which a social group could become a community of its own and part of a society. His definition of peasants reflected this binary function: "[S]mall agricultural producers who, with the help of simple equipment and the help of their families, produce mainly for their own consumption and for the fulfillment of the holders of political and economic power." (59) The peasantry's relation to the land as a specific form of economy and the peasantry's relation to global society through political and economic dependency were equally important elements of Shanin's definition. The Herald group anticipated Shanin's view when it argued in the late nineteenth century that the Russian state consistently failed to coordinate this complex relationship. The journal suggested an alternative, socially responsible, modernization program.

In the 1890s, Leonid Slonimskii argued on the journal's pages that the Marxist-Populist debate was a red herring that distracted attention from the more important issue of taxation. (60) The manner and level of taxation raised by the government obstructed local economic development and prevented popular participation in modernization. He considered the self-proclaimed Marxists, especially Peter Struve and Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskii, to be latecomer idealists whom the Witte System had relegated to the intellectual sidelines as it fulfilled their hopes of an industrialized and urbanized Russia. Reviewing Struve's Critical Notes on the Question of Russia's Economic Development (1894), in which the author welcomed the transition from a natural to an exchange economy and examined the immense cultural changes that this entailed, Slonimskii noticed that Marxist goals were similar to those of the Finance Ministry. (61) For example, Struve wrote that capitalism facilitated the development of agriculture as well as the industry and created an increasingly interconnected market across the empire. These arguments echoed the ideas of both Witte and the famous chemist and economic theoretician Dmitri Mendeleev. To Slonimskii, this made "legal" Marxism synonymous with capitalism. Unlike the Populists, however, against whom he argued in his work, Struve identified the natural rural economy, not nascent capitalism, as the principal cause of poverty in Russia. (62)

Slonimskii found in Struve's work economic gullibility mixed with idealism that ignored the fact that Russian "capitalism" manifested itself in "crude kulachestvo [exploitation]" both in the rural and manufacturing worlds. (63) Despite Struve's attempt to debunk Populist economic theories, Slonimskii argued that the Russian Marxists themselves had insufficiently articulated their worldview: "Does this not demonstrate that we are dealing here not with a scientific debate, but with petty literary sectarianism, which revolves around a teacher's words?" (64) Struve's greatest mistake, according to Slonimskii, was that he first decided that capitalism would triumph in Russia, but promised to prove this factually in his "next brochure." The irony of this reversal was not lost on Slonimskii. Such a "historical" approach to practical subjects was in tune with Marx and Engels, who also developed historical materialism in the 1840s, but published the economic support for it in the 1860s. In the 1890s, the "legal" Marxists were great supporters of the Witte System, and Slonimskii argued that their economic theories defied their ethical aims. He would have agreed with Populist Nikolai Mikhailovskii's (1842-1904) criticism that Marxist actions were not consistent with their moral goals. (65) Much like Marxist ethics, Marxist orthodoxy was also a question of perspective. One of Lenin's colleagues in the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (before it split into the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in 1903), Yuli Martov (1873-1923), wrote of Struve in the 1890s:

"Can't understand him. Is he a German Social Democrat, or is he a liberal from the Herald of Europe?" (66)

In the 1890s, Slonimskii saw Russia's capitalism as "rapacity and speculation, barbarity, intellectual darkness," a description reminiscent of the post-Soviet world of the nouveaux riches. (67) He contended that the achievements of which Witte's Ministry boasted in its annual reports did not grow naturally out of the rural population's development. Meanwhile, "optimists of a new type," which meant Marxists such as Tugan-Baranovskii and Sergei Bulgakov, "console themselves with the thought that out of a national disaster new and more perfected forms of life will arise." (68) Russia, Slonimskii wrote, was becoming an exporter of natural resources and its "role on the world market could not be considered respectable." (69)

Although by the early twentieth century Russian Marxists were rethinking Marx's theories by contextualizing them historically and geographically, Slonimskii did not believe that these revisions produced sufficiently practical economic theories. Tugan-Baranovskii's Sketches of the Most Recent History of Political Economy (1903), a pioneering revisionist work, challenged Marx's assumption of the 1840s that the impoverishment of the working class would increase until a breaking point. (70) The trade unionist movements ended up preventing this Verelendung. Tugan-Baranovskii also argued that Marx explained correctly the concentration of production under capitalism and its sociopolitical effects. However, time proved that this trend was inapplicable to agricultural production. For Slonimskii, this revisionism was nevertheless insufficient. He criticized Tugan-Baranovskii for departing too little from orthodox Marxism; political economy had to go further, abandon its trade-industrial focus, and look beyond "theories of exchange ... [and t]he foundations of national economies have little to do with commodity trade, but lie much deeper; they depend first of all on agricultural relations, which determine a country's economic life and give the national economy a general tone regardless of the industrial system." (71) He feared that political economy textbooks and courses ignored this because Russian economists still followed western (by which he meant Marxist) examples. Were they to explore rural problems, Slonimskii argued, they would be justified in creating "a special path" for economic research. (72) It was no longer a question of "reworking, cleaning, and transforming" Marxism, as Tugan-Baranovskii had argued in his preface. (73) Economic theorists would do better to start with "the groundwork of economic life--the foundations of the agricultural economy and landownership relations." (74) Slonimskii argued for redirecting taxes into small peasant credit institutions and cottage production. His criticism of the Russian Marxists reflected a split within left liberalism. On the one side were Slonimskii's updated "physiocratic" ideas that identified healthy agriculture as the foundation of balanced economic development. On the other side was the "Marxist" inevitability of industrial capitalism and commanding heights-driven development.

Slonimskii treated Russian Marxism in the late 1890s more as the Finance Ministry's handmaid than as a messianic (yet materialistic) call to arms. The Herald group argued for coordinating central modernization projects with local needs and evaluating success from the bottom up. In the process of criticizing Marxist ideology, Slonimskii exposed it as an apologia for forced industrialization and offered a new and practical definition of a moral economy for the twentieth century. (75) However, Slonimskii defined morality not in religious terms, but in terms of an economic democracy rooted in local self-government.

A few years later, Slonimskii suggests anew how the increasing "centralization of revenue [for redirection into industry]" left "the province less civilized and poorer." (76) Slonimskii drew his readers' attention to the local agricultural committees that Finance Minister Sergei Witte had created in 1903 to collect information under the auspices of the committee on the needs of agriculture. They asked for no special privileges, but demanded equal treatment in economic terms from the center: less preference for industry, lower taxes on the peasantry, and a gradual implementation of an income tax. They demanded the creation of a smaller local self-government unit and "the abolition or limitation of the functions" of the land captains. They also demanded that the state grant full civil rights to the peasants because, at the time, they could be incarcerated for nonfulfillment of labor agreements, criminally prosecuted for profligacy and drunkenness, held in jail on a bread-and-water diet, and corporally punished. Last, but not least, the committees demanded a broader and more inclusive basic education system. The Herald had anticipated all of these demands, which necessitated local initiative and participation. Therefore, Slonimskii argued, should the state "open the valves that are repressing local social forces," the Russian "provinces will become transformed within one generation." (77)

The coincidence between the Herald program and the actual zemstvo demands demonstrates that the journal was perfectly in tune with the provinces, something that neither the Populists nor the Marxists were. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the Herald articles were not useless jottings, but both reflected and spread real local demands. Unfortunately, under the leadership of Tsar Nicholas II, the state failed to adopt these demands because the Tsar was afraid that it would undermine his power. In the end, his intransigence played the leading role in dethroning his dynasty and destroying the empire that it had ruled for over three centuries.

Leonid Slonimskii's examination of Marxism restated and supplemented what Konstantin Arsen'ev, Alexander Pypin, and Prince Drutskoi-Sokolninskii had also argued on the pages of the Herald of Europe. A socially stable and economically successful modernization program would produce long-term results only if the state extended the rights and responsibilities of local self-government and made the Russian population a participant in modernization, not a subject of economic experiments. Ideological justifications for top-down reform (Populist, Marxist, or ministerial) were the inventions of the intelligentsia and the bureaucracy, but they had little to do with Russian reality, regardless of the objectivity to which their proponents laid claim. The social stability that would accompany popular participation would compensate for the slower rate of economic development. This would make it less likely that a social backlash would reverse it, or that revolutions would erupt in its wake.

The Herald of Europe treated the agrarian crisis as a direct result of poorly conceived and executed state policies. The journal's readers thus found on its pages an alternative form of modernization that not only appealed to the intellect, but also encouraged broad practical involvement through institutions of local self-government that were already on the ground. The journal articulated an extra-parliamentary form of social activity, which was the only alternative in a country with an autocratic political system and an artificially restrained rural economy full of potential. Witte could not allow such activity because he needed to plough rural profits into industry. Meanwhile, the state refused to allow an imperial zemstvo organization to meet fearing that it would form a protoparliament. Atomized, the provincial zemstvos could not affect state policy.

A pessimist looking at the Herald's strain of liberalism may discern in it a form of "small deeds" escapism into local affairs and accuse it of skirting the crucial political issue by preferring economic over political rights. The achievement of the Herald liberalism was that it concerned itself with finding a common ground in the form of the zemstvo and the plan for the all-estate volost' between the peasantry and the intelligentsia. The Herald liberals chose to focus on local self-government because they believed it to be the most realistic medium for gradual reform. The Revolution of 1905 solved the political side of the problem for the educated classes by forcing the Tsar to legalize political parties and convene the Duma or parliament. Although a step toward constitutionalism, this revolution also became a setback for liberalism's organic development along socioeconomic lines, as the Herald had articulated them. With the creation of the Duma in 1905, the standoff between the state and the intelligentsia, especially on the agrarian question, shifted to the all-Russian political stage upon which both sides proved equally intransigent. With this, the public's attention shifted away from the zemstvos as progressive liberal nerve centers and focused instead on the political passions in the capital. The standoff eventually cost the Russian liberal movement the first two Dumas and resulted in Prime Minister Petr Stolypin (1862-1911) co-opting the rural reform program and implementing it from the top down, against local opposition and radical threats. This was exactly what the Herald liberals had hoped to avoid.

(1.) The most important works on the subject are Arthur Mendel, Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia: Legal Marxism and Legal Populism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1961); Richard Kindersley, The First Russian Revisionists: A Study of Legal Marxism in Russia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Richard Wortman, The Crisis of Russian Populism (London: Cambridge UP, 1967); Andrzej Walicki, The Controversy over Capitalism, Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists (Notre Dame, IN: U. of Notre Dame P., 1969); Richard Pipes, Struve, Liberal on the Left, 1870-1905 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1970); Margaret Canovan, Populism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981); Edward H. Judge and James Y. Simms, Jr., eds., Modernization and Revolution: Dilemmas of Progress in Late Imperial Russia, Essays in Honor of Arthur P. Mendel (New York: Columbia UP, 1992).

(2.) The best-known English-based literature is the following: George Fischer, Russian Liberalism: From Gentry to Intelligentsia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958); Thornton Anderson, Russian Political Thought: An Introduction (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1967); Charles E. Timberlake, ed., Essays on Russian Liberalism (Columbia, MO: U. of Missouri P., 1972); William G. Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution: The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917-1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1974); George F. Putnam, Russian Alternatives to Marxism: Christian Socialism and Idealistic Liberalism in Twentieth-Century Russia (Knoxville, TN: U. of Tennessee P., 1977); Terence Emmons, The Formation of Political Parties and the First National Elections in Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1983); G. M. Hamburg, Politics of the Russian Nobility, 1881-1905 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1984); G. M. Hamburg, Boris Chicherin and Early Russian Liberalism 1828-1866 (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1992); Andrzej Walicki, Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism (Notre Dame, IN: U. of Notre Dame P., 1992); Melissa Kirschke Stockdale, Paul Miliukov and the Quest for a Liberal Russia, 1880-1918 (Ithaca, NY: Cornel[ UP, 1996).

(3.) See, for example, N. V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), 374-76.

(4.) Ibid., 369-74.

(5.) Ibid., 374-76.

(6.) For an excellent discussion of these strains, see George E Putnam, Russian Alternatives to Marxism: Christian Socialism and Idealistic Liberalism in Twentieth-Century Russia (Knoxville, TN: U. of Tennessee P., 1977).

(7.) Theodore H. von Laue, "The Fate of Capitalism in Russia: The Narodnik Version," American Slavic and East European Review 1 (1954): 11-28, 20-21; Andrzej Walicki, "Russian Social Thought: An Introduction to the Intellectual History of Nineteenth-Century Russia," Russian Review 1 (1977): 40.

(8.) V. E. Kelner, Chelovek svoego vremeni (M. M. Stasiulevich: izdatelskoe delo i liberalnaia oppositsiia) (St. Petersburg: Izdatelstvo Rossiiskoi natsionalnoi biblioteki, 1993), 241, 297.

(9.) Among the prerevolutionary proponents of the crisis were M. I. Tugan-Baranovskii, Zemelnaia reforma: ocherk dvizheniia v polzu zemelnoi reformy i prakticheskie vyvody (St. Petersburg: Tip. I. N. Skorokhodova, 1905); V. I. Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967). Among the Soviet historians, supporters of the "agrarian crisis" theory were, among others, I. D. Kovalchenko and L. V. Milov, Vserossiiskii agrarnyi rynok XVIIl-nachalo XX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 1974); B. I. Mironov, Khlebnye tseny v Rossii (Leningrad: Nauka, 1985); I. D. Kovalchenko, Agrarnyi stroi Rossii vtoroi poloviny XIX--nachala XX vv. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004). The western proponents of the agrarian crisis theory were Alexander Gerschenkron, "Agrarian Policies and the Industrialization of Russia, 1861-1917," in Cambridge Economic History, vol. 6, part ii, eds. H. J. Habbakuk and M. M. Postan (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1965), 706-800; Arcadius Kahan, The Plow, the Hammer and the Knout: An Economic History of Eighteenth-Century Russia (Chicago: U. of Chicago P., 1985); Lazar Volin, A Century of Russian Agriculture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1970). For the revisionist take on this issue, see Paul R. Gregory, "The Agrarian Crisis Revisited," in The Soviet Rural Economy, ed. Robert Stuart (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), 00-00; S. G. Wheatcroft, "Crises and the Condition of the Peasantry in Late Imperial Russia," in Peasant Economy, Culture, and the Politics of European Russia, 1800-1921, eds. Esther Kingston Mann and Timothy Mixter (Princeton, N J: Princeton UP, 1991), 128-172; Richard L. Rudolph, "Agricultural Structure and Proto-Industrialization in Russia: Economic Development with Unfree Labor," Journal of Economic History 1 (1985): 47-69; James Y. Simms, Jr., "The Crisis in Russian Agriculture at the End of the Nineteenth Century: A Different View," Slavic Review 3 (1977): 377-98.

(10.) Terence Emmons and Wayne Vucinich, eds., Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982), 67-90.

(11.) For an excellent analysis of the relief effort, see Richard G. Robbins, Jr., Famine in Russia, 1891-1892 (New York: Columbia UP, 1975).

(12.) K. K. Arsen'ev, "Vnutrennee obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy 4 (1882): 800-812, 806.

(13.) K. K. Arsen'ev, "Vnutrennee obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy 8 (1881): 819-28, 825.

(14.) K. K. Arsen'ev, "Vnutrennee obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy 7 (1881): 365-74, 366.

(15.) K. K. Arsen'ev, "Vnutrennee obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy 8 (1891): 859-68, 866.

(16.) K. K. Arsen'ev, "Vnutrennee obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy 9 (1891): 420-31, 426-28.

(17.) Robbins, Famine, 104.

(18.) K. K. Arsen'ev. "Vnutrennee obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy 10 (1891): 797-811, 808.

(19.) K. K. Arsen'ev, "Vnutrennee obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy 7 (1892): 403-11, 405-10.

(20.) K. K. Arsen'ev, "Vnutrennee obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy 1 (1892): 380-90, 383-84.

(21.) K. K. Arsen'ev, "Vnutrennee obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy 11 (1891): 351-62, 354-57.

(22.) Von Laue, "The Fate," 26-28.

(23.) For excellent treatments of Populism, see Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1966); Richard Wortman, The Crisis of Russian Populism (London: Cambridge UP, 1967).

(24.) K. K. Arsen'ev, "Vnutrennee obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy 2 (1892): 915-26, 921-23.

(25.) Institut Russkoi Literatury [Institute of Russian Literature archive, St. Petersburg, Russia; from here on, IRLI], fond (f) 359, no. 184, 19 December 1891; IRLI, f. 359, no. 184, 18 January 1892; IRLI, f. 359, no. 184, 12 January 1892; IRLI, f. 359, no. 184, 18 February 1892; IRLI, f. 359, no. 37, 23 April 1892; IRLI, f. 359, no. 419, 26 February 1892; IRLI, f. 359, no. 152, 1 May 1892.

(26.) K. K. Arsen'ev, "Vnutrennee obnzrenie," Vestnik Evropy 11 (1891): 419-27, 425-26.

(27.) K. K. Arsen'ev, "Vnutrennee obozrenie," Vestnik Evropy 5 (1893): 445-55, 449-50.

(28.) Dmitrii Drutskoi-Sokolninskii, "Nashe selskoe khoziaistvo i ego budushchnost," Vestnik Evropy 10 (1891): 698-734, 699-704.

(29.) Ibid., 704-15.

(30.) Ibid., 715-27.

(31.) Kulak was a pejorative term for a rich peasant who allegedly preyed on the land and property of their poorer neighbors, bought their insolvent farms, and hired them as farmhands after they had gone bankrupt.

(32.) Pavel Kalinnikov, ed., "Ermolov, Aleksei Sergeevich," Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar Project, 10 July 2009, cited at http://www.rulex.ru/01060183.htm.

(33.) A. S. Ermolov, Organizatsiia polevago khoziaistva (St. Petersburg: Izd. A.F. Devriena, 1879), xii-xiv.

(34.) Dmitrii Drutskoi-Sokolninskii, "Nashe selskoe khoziaistvo i ego budushchnost," Vestnik Evropy 10 (1891): 698-734, 727-34.

(35.) Leonid Slonimskii, "Nash torgovyi balans," Vestnik Evropy 2 (1892): 792-815, 792-93.

(36.) Ibid., 794-97.

(37.) Ibid., 802-5.

(38.) Ibid., 808.

(39.) Ibid., 808.

(40.) Ibid., 808.

(41.) Ibid., 808.

(42.) Ibid., 805-9.

(43.) See C. Evtuhov, D. Goldfrank, L. Hughes, and R. Stites, A History of Russia: Peoples, Legends, Events, Forces (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 2004), 481-82, 498.

(44.) Leonid Slonimskii, "Lzheprotektsionizm i ego rezultaty," Vestnik Evropy 3 (1892): 346-70.

(45.) Ibid., 362.

(46.) Leonid Slonimskii, "Lzheprotektsionizm i ego rezultaty," Vestnik Evropy 3 (1892): 346-70; 362-64.

(47.) Ibid.

(48.) Eric R. Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 9-10.

(49.) Ibid., 15.

(50.) A. N. Pypin, "Narodnaia gramotnost'," Vestnik Evropy 1 (1891): 245-60; A. N. Pypin, "Narodniki i narod. Sobranie sochinenii N. Zlatovratskogo," Vestnik Evropy 2 (1891): 665-68; V. P. Vorontsov, "Popytki obosnovaniia narodnichestva," Russkoe bogatstvo 10 (1892): 1-23; A. N. Pypin, "Teorii narodnichestva," Vestnik Evropy 10 (1892): 704-20; A. N. Pypin, "Eshche o teoriiakh narodnichestva," Vestnik Evropy 2 (1893): 760-74; V. P. Vorontsov, "Kritik narodnichestva," Russkoe bogatstvo 4 (1893): 1-30; A. N. Pypin, "Prugavin A.S. Zaprosy naroda i obiazannosti intelligentsii v oblasti prosveshcheniia i vospitaniia. 2-e izd. SPb., 1895," Vestnik Evropy 3 (1895): 385-93.

(51.) On late imperial Populism, see von Laue, "The Fate," 11-28; Allan K. Wildman, "The Russian Intelligentsia of the 1890's," American Slavic and East European Review 19.2 (1960): 157-79; Janko Lavrin, "Populists and Slavophiles," Russian Review 21.4 (1962): 307-17; V. V. Bartenev, "Vospominaniia peterburzhtsa o vtoroi polovine 1880-x godov," in Ot narodnichestva--k marksizmu. Vospominaniia uzhastnikov revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Peterburge (1883-1894 gg.), ed. S. S. Volk (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1987) 185-212; Cathy A. Frierson, Peasant Icons: Representations of Rural People in Late Nineteenth-Century Russia (New York: Oxford UP, 1993); B. P. Baluev, Liberalnoe narodnichestvo na rubezhe XIX-XX vekov (Moscow: Nauka, 1995).

(52.) A. N. Pypin, "Teorii," Vestnik Evropy 10 (1892): 704-5.

(53.) Ibid.

(54.) Teodor Shanin, "Chayanov's Message: Illuminations, Miscomprehensions, and the Contemporary 'Development Theory'," in A. V. Chaianov on the Theory of Peasant Economy, eds. Daniel Thomer, Basile Kerblay, and R. E. F. Smith (Madison, WI: U. of Wisconsin P., 1986), 1-24; N. K. Figurovskaia and A. I. Glagolev, "A. V. Chaianov i ego teoriia semeinogo krestianskogo khoziaistva," in Krestianskoe khoziaistvo, Izbrannye trudy, by A. V. Chaianov, ed. A. A. Nikonov (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1989), 26-52; A. A. Nikonov, "Nauchnoe issledovanie A. V. Chaianova i soveremennost," in Izbrannye proizvedeniia, by A. V. Chaianov (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1989), 5-19; Yanni Kotsonis, Making Peasants Backward, Agricultural Cooperatives and the Agrarian Question in Russia, 1861-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1999), 36-57.

(55.) Teodor Shanin, Russia as a "Developing Society" (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1986), xi.

(56.) Ibid., 185.

(57.) Ibid., 199.

(58.) Ibid., 184-85.

(59.) Teodor Shanin, Defining Peasants: Essays Concerning Rural Societies, Expolary Economies, and Learning from Them in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 23.

(60.) Leonid Slonimskii, "Promyshlennaia ideologiia," Vestnik Evropy 6 (1898): 768-83.

(61.) P. B. Struve, Kriticheskie zametki k voprosu ob ekonomicheskom razvitii Rossii (St. Petersburg: Skorokhodov, 1894); Leonid Slonimskii, "Zametka. Nekulturnost i kapitalizm," Vestnik Evropy 12 (1894): 875-82.

(62.) Struve, Kriticheskie zametki, 282-85.

(63.) Slonimskii, "Zametka," 875-82.

(64.) Ibid.

(65.) Arthur R Mendel, "N.K. Mikhailovskij and His Criticism of Russian Marxism," American Slavic and East European Review 3 (1955): 331-45, 338.

(66.) Quoted from Fischer, Russian Liberalism, 100.

(67.) Leonid Slonimskii, "Ekonomicheskie zametki," Vestnik Evropy 4 (1898): 750-65, 751-59.

(68.) Ibid.

(69.) Ibid.

(70.) M. N. Tugan-Baranovskii, Ocherki iz noveishei istorii politicheskoi ekonomii (St. Petersburg: [no publisher], 1903).

(71.) Slonimskii, "Nauchnye illiuzii," Vestnik Evropy 2 (1903): 750-70, 757.

(72.) Ibid.

(73.) Tugan-Baranovskii, Ocherki, vi.

(74.) Slonimskii, "Nauchnye illiuzii," 769.

(75.) Leonid Slonimskii, "Ekonomicheskie zametki," Vestnik Evropy 4 (1898): 750-55.

(76.) Leonid Slonimskii, "Nashi ekonomicheskie zadachi i krestianskii vopros," Vestnik Evropy 1 (1904): 237-53, 251.

(77.) Ibid.

Anton Fedyashin is an Assistant Professor in the History Department at the American University, Washington, D.C.
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