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A Gathering Tumult

All of history does not appear in action, or in public records. Much of it, and that often the most revealing and significant is not what appears in ... , speeches, reports, and blue books. It is ideas, personal pleas, and visions, unspoken motives, which largely drive the wheels of action; and unless they are duly taken into account the story that results is one-sided and only partly true. [1]

Jan Smuts circa 1914

Violence rarely, if ever, exists in pure form. It always has a narrative dimension: the stories we tell about it-the reports, descriptions and confessions--or keep secretly, inaccessibly even, in the recesses of our mind. There is, we imagine, mastery in the telling of it. We distance ourselves from it. We exorcise it. We impose a grammar on it. We give it structure and shape. We incorporate it in familiar genres ... For the listener and the storyteller the stories and the tales of violence are a kind of rehearsal for stories and tales of the future, which may have to be lived as well as told. They give cover to the terrifying silence of the pure act. [2]

Vincent Crapazano, 1986

The Anglo-Boer or South African War of 1899-1902 remains a formidable arsenal of images and causes for Afrikaans speaking white South Africans. Second, third and fourth-hand accounts of the resilience of bittereinders, the most stubborn component of the Boer Republican army, continue to be recited at family and religious gatherings. [3] Tales of tens of thousands of women and children who died of cruelty and neglect in Lord Kitchener's concentration camps still form the struts of Afrikaner politics. [4] Accounts of land lost, regained and lost again often shape the lens through which some Afrikaners continue to view their relationship to their God and other people. [5]

During the five years that followed the war the political consciousness of white farmers and former Boer republican soldiers in Rustenburg and Marico, two districts of the former western Transvaal, was quickened by a series of violent or near violent incidents. These incidents represented an important challenge to the kind of political order that the victorious British sought to impose on the Transvaal's countryside. White landowners still coveted the kind of domination that they had enjoyed prior to the war, even though the armed intervention of African peasants and laborers during the war had effectively destroyed most of the usual forms of deference to white expectations. Segregation was animated therefore by a broad acceptance of locally derived Herrenvolk conceptions of democracy, while it continued to serve as the postwar state's principal means of opening the more isolated portions of the countryside. [6]

Alfred Lord Milner's Reconstruction administration envisioned segregation as a means to revive South Africa's gold mines and its cities and towns. However, British hegemony as a state sponsored policy depended greatly upon the right of the state to establish political order in the countryside. [7] It also depended upon the state's reassessment of the alienable nature of private property. This reasesssment assumed a most urgent character in rural areas such as Bergvliet in Marico and Pilanesberg in Rustenburg, where, with the tacit or explicit consent of British military officials, African auxiliaries seized considerable amounts of land and moveable property. [8] The prospect of confirming Africans as owners of the land they had seized, insofar as they would be willing to pay taxes, had been entertained by some British civilian and military officials until the collapse of their first negotiations with the Boer military leaders at Middelburg in April 1901. [9]

Saul Dubow, George Fredrickson, Jeremy Krikler, Shula Marks, Stanley Trapido, and Charles van Onselen have given us an excellent picture of the ensuing dilemmas as they were perceived from the lofty heights of Alfred Lord Milner's Reconstruction cabinet and from the boardrooms of the investment groups that controlled South Africa's vast mineral wealth. [10] But a dangerous paradox arose between segregation as a comprehensive state policy of social engineering and its likely executors in the local setting. A similar paradox had also been a distinctive feature of local government in the southern United States from the fall of Reconstruction to the turn of the century. [11] As a result, the coming of segregation in both South Africa and the United States was accompanied by forms of collective violence that have withstood sustained historical examination. [12]

In both South Africa and the United States, segregation's most violent moments came when the state was simultaneously attempting to absorb the most talented members of local agrarian elites and also induce rapid economic change in the countryside. [13] The difficulties arose when the state did not exert its full force in either endeavor. [14] The 1873 Colfax War in Grant Parish, Louisiana, the 1876 Hamburg Riot or War in Edgefield County, South Carolina, the 1899 insurrection in Wilmington, North Carolina in the United States, and also the 1914 Rebellion in South Africa fit this pattern. The state stamped out these fitful and sporadic rebellions with half-hearted measures but failed to punish rebellious white landowners in any meaningful way. [15] As a result, disgruntled whites retained their sense of grievance against the state and, more importantly, their capacity for violence. [16]

As early as 1904 white landowners in Marico and Rustenburg determined to make terror and violence an alternative means of polling the white population and silencing opposition. By January 1905, just prior to the formation of the protonationalist political party Her Volk, Afrikaner farmers participated in an increasing number of opstands or "armed protests" and instances of violent self-presentation. [17] The primary victims of the violence were: 1) rural Africans who no longer felt compelled to shape their own expectations in relation to those of their landlords; 2) state officials who carried out their duties in a fashion that inflamed the passions and grievances of these same landlords; 3) white landowners and merchants who accepted the principle of white supremacy but who, for their own self-preservation or profit, chose to ignore it in ordering their relations with African peasants.

A quorum of the most outspoken former republican generals--C.F. Beyers, Louis Botha and Jan Smuts-formed the inner core of leadership for Het Volk.

Upon its victory at the polls in 1906 and the disbanding of the rural paramilitary police force, the South African Constabulary (SAC), rural violence peaked and then abated. "Progressive" English speaking white farmers also had a hand in the violence and often benefited from its short-term consequences. Thereafter vigilante violence arose when other means of expressing the grievances of rural whites were constrained or ignored by the central state. Such violence expanded or contracted in relation to the general political climate and often coalesced with other statements of grievance.

Landlords who participated in the violence believed that they could minimize the moral and political impasse separating poor and middling Afrikaner farmers from their former political and military leadership. By resurrecting the "commandos", the military formations of the vanquished guerilla army, and then submerging their activities under the innocuous proceedings of the farmers' associations, they sought to efface deep and persisting economic divisions within the white population. Almost a decade before the promulgation of the infamous 1913 Land Act, these men wanted nothing less than a retrograde social revolution--one which would give them the power to coerce African labor and seize land without the intervention of the state's police and magistrates.

The War Within the War

At the outset of 1901 Lord Kitchener and the British general staff sought to isolate the armies of the Orange Free State and South African Republic from the rural population. Concentration camps and small forts or blockhouses, which were strung together by 3,700 square miles of barbed wire fencing, became the chief means of achieving this end. As a result, the civilian governments of the two republics were effectively dissolved over large portions of the western Transvaal and the northern districts of the Orange Free State. [18] These policies, combined with the staggering number of desertions among the Boer forces, engulfed the countryside in a brutal war of attrition. The political loyalties of rural Afrikaners were pulled one way and then another, changing as readily as the prevailing relations of force. [19] The campaigns of terror and counter-terror that followed were more than just a series of military engagements--they were the end of a way of life. [20]

By the end of 1901 the causes of "Empire" and "Boer Republicanism" were bracketed therefore by an undeclared civil war in the countryside--one in which the two official armies served as "technical experts" and negotiators. [21] Less than half of the participants in this undeclared war had their names on recruitment lists or regimental muster rolls. When the rounds of recrimination and terror threatened to spiral out of control, the two officially constituted opposing armies weighed in to interpret, negotiate and claim the results. [22]

The bloodiest of these engagements presaged the essence of postwar relations--particularly in instances where African peasants and laborers were pitted against their putative landlords. [23] Two incidents from the second phase of the war bore this out: In late October or early November 1900, about six months after Pretoria had fallen to British forces, a squadron of British troops discovered the bodies of nine African men near the top of the Magaliesberg mountains. The bodies were lying in a heap. A number had been mutilated. Ears, tongues and genitals had been cut off. Five were identified as Africans who had been in the service of British military intelligence. The other four had been tenants or laborers on Doer farms in British occupied portions of Rustenburg and Marico and had apparently offered information about the wartime activities of their landlords to British authorities.

The nine men had been tried by a hastily convened military tribunal. B.A. Klopper, the president of the Transvaal's Volksraad or parliament, convened the tribunal. Klopper also served as its presiding magistrate. All nine were condemned to death and summary execution followed. Hendrik Schoeman, the son of a Doer general who had defected to the British, and Piet Joubert, the son of the recently deceased General Commander of the republican army, were among those who acted as escorts for the nine.

A month later, some time in December 1900, a convoy of supply wagons, which was making its way to Rustenburg from Pretoria, was waylaid by a group of Doer guerillas under the command of Willem Barnard and Jan van Rensburg. Several of the African drivers escaped, but one named Franz was captured by the guerillas and brutally murdered. After binding Franz with ropes, Barnard and van Rensburg wrapped him in bucksail, stacked bags of oats on top of his body, dowsed him with paraffin, and set him alight. [24]

The African drivers who had escaped described the gruesome incident to British officials. One, who was named Musilo, managed to flee to a small kopje or hillock from which he watched the murder. Another, who called himself Williams, also watched the murder from a safe distance. Williams and Musilo identified Barnard for British authorities among a group of Doer prisoners captured near the Mampas River on 1 July 1901. Two weeks later Barnard was processed and scheduled to be sent to Tucker's Island prison camp in Bermuda. His ship left Cape Town on 17 July 1901. Barnard had his sixteenth birthday shortly before his arrival in Bermuda. [25]

Summary executions and atrocious instances of mutilation and torture cast a long shadow over the next generation of landlords and tenants. Why had the sons of the generals and those of ordinary farmers been equally willing to perform such acts? Were the sites of such executions, among the solitary hills that allegedly mirrored the qualities of Boer men, coincidental--particularly at a time when the formal republican army was retreating and virtually nonexistent in the west? Would such experiences become normative ones for younger soldiers who became active during the guerilla phase of the war?

By 1901 officers on both sides feared the prospect of losing these local contests almost as much as losing the war itself.26 Without convincing victories in the outlying areas, which would translate to a larger pool of willing collaborators, the ability to administer the countryside would be severely constrained. In October 1900, Jan Smuts laid out how the more localized conflicts were prosecuted, once he and General J.H. Delarey had established a base camp at Cyferfontein on Piet Grobler's farm and the British Generals A. H. Paget and Lord Methuen had ensconced themselves in the town of Rustenburg:

We knew what Boers and what Kaffirs appeared nightly at the Rustenburg office to give treasonable information about us; we knew what columns were converging on us and their appointed places in the mechanical arrangement of Lord Kitchener, and we knew the exact moment when it would be necessary for our little band to scatter and to avoid the meshes of the net which was being so laboriously and so uselessly drawn in our sight. [27]

Smuts and Delarey chose to surround themselves with men known for their short tempers and vituperative inclinations during this period. Many of them came from notable prewar clans of regulators such as van Tonder, Fourie, Grobler, Ras, Rieckert and Wolmarans. Upon capture, many men from these extended families were described in subsequent British intelligence reports as "bad characters", "wanted for murder", "will undergo criminal prosecution after war". Virtually all of them were earmarked as potential enemies of the postwar state. [28]

The immediate postwar relations of force were the source of much trepidation and near panic within certain quarters of both the victors and the vanquished. Many of these fears derived from the manner in which the war had been prosecuted in its closing phases. African irregulars did in fact remain uncommonly restrained, even in those areas of the Transvaal where they had won clear-cut victories over republican forces such as Lydenburg and the northern portions of the Rustenburg and Marico districts. But after the war, it remained unclear as to whether relations between African peasants and white landlords in the Transvaal had been "capsized" or "shattered" altogether. [29]

Afrikaner and British leaders drew dire consequences from the ironic situation. [30] Most British troops were posted around the cities and towns. Meanwhile, specially trained anti-guerilla units, cavalry and African scouts and irregulars did much of the actual fighting. By early 1902 Boer generals such Christiaan De Wet and C.F. Beyers were claiming that their commandos were fighting a virtually all black force. [31] In their estimate Great Britain had retreated from the unwritten agreement that the war would remain a "white mans war" Beyers, De Wet, and the other generals were being forced to choose between pursuing a swift peace or redoubling the fighting with the utmost urgency. Such choices became all the more urgent once Boer republicans ran the risk of losing skirmishes to their former servants. [32]

Unseating and Restoring the Landlords

By unseating the landlords and then privileging capacities normally associated with youth such as boldness and aggression, the rigors of war undermined the dominance of white landlords and peasant patriarchs alike. [33] But the greatest loss was clearly sustained by white landlords. Once the British blockhouses made movement through the countryside virtually impossible for Boer commandos, as well as civilian officials such as landdrosts and veldcomets, their hold over their African tenants ceased to exist. Whether it had been "capsized" or "shattered" was largely beside the point. [34]

Prosperity for many white landowners had rested on their African tenants' ability to adapt precolonial relations of production to commercial agriculture. The success translated to a practice popularly known as "Kaffir farming", in which a resident or absentee white landlord skimmed off a healthy portion of what the African peasant produced in either cash or kind. Boer landlords sought to enhance their control over this process while loosening the relationship between Africans and their families. [35] They sought to replace work routines shaped by affection and kinship with their own putative sovereign power. [36]

While the more insightful and intelligent landowners realized that this kind of control over African peasants was illusory, it served nevertheless as a measure of their aspirations. However, the landowners' sense of honor and self-sufficiency, which often shaped the nature and taxonomy of prewar rural violence, proved a poor remedy for many of the ills wrought by economic transformation. Landlord violence was often sustained and impelled by the unpredictable nature and increased pace of the rural economy. Paul Kruger's years as a private citizen and farmer in Rustenburg and those of Abel Erasmus in the Ohrigstad strongly suggest that the search for profitable endeavors in the more removed areas of the Transvaal often aggravated landlord violence. [37]

African peasants persisted in viewing subsistence as their most immediate priority, even though the growth of the mining industry had been the source of dramatic changes in the rural economy. [38] But many African peasants began to reckon "subsistence" in transactional terms in the generation before the war. In April 1881, shortly after the Transvaal Republic's victory over British forces during the first Anglo-Boer War, Montshiwa, the paramount chieftain of the Tshidi Rolong Tswana, attested to the increasing importance of the commercial market for food for the peasantry. Testifying before a British Royal Commission, Montshiwa complained of Boer vrijwilligers or "freebooters" who were reaping the wheat his people had planted the year before: "What am I to do with my corn if I cannot take it to sell. I grow my corn for the markets to get money." [39]

Replacement of a cutting tool or a hoe with a plow might well have been the source of dramatic improvement in a peasant's circumstances. But liabilities such as uneven access to the market, excessive taxation, including forced labor, cattle diseases, and the cavalier use of force by state officials and white landowners could suspend the burgeoning of such improvement. [40] Ownership of a plow served no purpose if one had less than six cattle on less than eight acres of land, or if one lived in area of low rainfall.

Once cattle began to pile up in areas under African control as spoils of war, however, the old reservations about using plows began to disappear. [41] Even the most conservative African peasants of the prewar period were suddenly ready to experiment by borrowing the animals of wealthier peasants or land chiefs. [42] The local agrarian economy appeared to be on the verge of irreversible change. [43]

Many Africans in the Transvaal hoped that they would be granted the political franchise in recognition of their economic potential and for the services they had rendered to the British during and immediately after the war. [44] British officials shrank from such a prospect. Magistrates urged the state to lower artificially prices and wages in certain parts of the Transvaal in order to tip the scales in favor of white landlords. [45] Officers of the SAC readily placed Africans on the docket for failure to pay dog taxes or register cattle, softening them up, in turn, for the increasingly strident and aggressive demands of their landlords. [46] However deluded they were about each other's aspirations, British officials and Afrikaner landlords believed that explicit concessions to African peasants and laborers were dangerous and excessive. [47]

Relaunching South Africa's mining industry and postwar administrative reform turned largely on the continued expansion of markets for food and commerical staples. [48] But such connections were not automatic. [49] Government officials welcomed these changes but discounted their ability to transform the inclinations of Afrikaner farmers. [50] In 1903, the former sub native commissioner of Piet Retief, L.E.N. Tyrell, wrote a revealing letter to the Transvaal Agricultural Journal under the nom de guerre "gentleman farmer":

I see by the papers there is an idea on the part of the Labour Association at the Rand to issue a ration of kaffir beer to labourers as a preventative against scurvy. I am very glad to see this, for it ought to give impetus to the cultivation of this kaffir corn or mabele (Zulu) or non saccarine sorghum, as the Americans call it ... I should think that a 200 lb sack would make 150 gallons of kaffir beer, so that with 100,000 natives on the mines, drawing a ration of, say, half a gallon each daily, would mean a consumption of 333 1/3 bags of grain daily, equal to 121, 667 bags per annum; the cost of production is about 2s 6d per sack of 200 lbs to the farmer, ... I am speaking of production by our primitive South African methods, where the farmer sits on the verandah and sends three boys to plough with six or ten oxen, and an ordinary single furrow plough. Of course, with improved farming the cost would be much less. [51]

Despite Tyrell's disparaging conclusions, Milner's Reconstruction administration was bent on making all whites in the Transvaal loyal subjects of the British Empire.

Peonage or Empire?: Reconstructing White Supremacy in the Countryside

After the war, Afrikaner farmers in Rustenburg and Marico continued to claim that African ownership of small portions of ecologically favored land had "plucked the eyes out of the country", and that the existence of African landowners accentuated the losses they had sustained during the war. [52] Government sponsored fencing of private land for irrigation and rail constuction further aggravated tensions between Boer landlords and African tenants. White farmers attempted to hold the line with outlandish interpretations of existing statutes and occasional opstands or "armed protests".

Such were the circumstances surrounding the locally notable case of the farm Leuuwfontein 126 in Marico. In 1876 the Bahurutshe people purchased the eastern portion of a farm near their location at Linokana from James D. Dodgson for 200 head of cattle in lieu of [pound]1000. The papers bearing on the transfer were in the possession of a lawyer named Naude whose offices were in Zeerust, the district capital.

Before the outbreak of the war Naude died and the papers disappeared. In 1903, however, Ernest Stubbs, one of two Sub-Native Commissioner for Marico and Rustenburg, found an affidavit of one Johannes Beverley, which stated clearly that Beverley had been an official witness of the transaction. Stubbs then requested an official inquiry by the Deeds Office, but held onto Beverley's affidavit for more than a decade. [53] Finally, on 22 October 1919, some 43 years after the original purchase and 6 years after the passage of the Land Act, the Bahurutshe were awarded half of the land in their initial claim. But by 1940, the state and local white farmers were again coveting the Bahurutshe portion of Leuuwfontein 126. [54]

The Leuuwfontein 126 case was especially pointed for white farmers because virtually all the land that formed the "Native Reserve" area in neighboring Rustenburg was the result of African land purchases between 1886 and 1904. [55] Hence the manner in which Africans acquired land, combined with the fact that such land was almost always sandwiched between white-owned farms, made such transactions all the more threatening to white farmers. [56]

Despite similar hamfisted administrative procedures and ceaseless recrimination, Africans retained ownership of the bulk of the livestock in the two districts. Without the deployment of African livestock, most land in Rustenburg and Marico could not have been cultivated during the first two decades of the twentieth century. [57] Depending upon the relations of force during the period between 1902 and 1917, the Africans of these districts could, on occasion, enhance their advantage with cattle, lawyers or guns. [58]

Rumors and Rifles, 1902-05

More than 50,000 Africans were under arms in the Transvaal at the end of the war. British forces, which were composed of just under 200,000 men, were scattered over all four provinces of South Africa. Kitchener and his staff claimed that there were between 14,000 and 21,000 vanquished Boer guerillas under arms. Meanwhile, as a result of Lloyd George's tirades about the potential danger of armed Africans, Milner's government to hastily promulgated Ordinance 13 of 7 August 1902. [59]

Ordinance 13 stipulated that all rifles in the hands of former African irregulars, including those they had purchased, were to be turned over to government officials on pain of fine and a year of imprisonment with hard labor. [60] Chiefs and headmen were exempted. Resident magistrates and native commissioners were charged with confiscating the tens of thousands of rifles in African hands. Most local officials prepared for the worst. [61]

Milner also called for the resuscitation of the former Transvaal Republic's 1895 Squatters' Law, which constrained African ownership of land, but had proven unenforcable under the former republic. [62] Combined with Ordinance 13, the resurrection of this statute threatened to provoke widespread African resistance over large portions of the Transvaal. From the vantage point of local officials, the new policies were nothing short of a recipe for insurrection. [63]

Difficulties associated with the skewed relations of force in the countryside surfaced well before the promulgation of Ordinance Number 13 in Rustenburg and Marico. [64] Magistrates and native commisssioners discussed the African labor question in terms that flucuated between sunny confidence and dark foreboding toward the end of 1902. They were often burdened with the egregious task of informing armed Africans that their condition was to remain essentially the same in spite of the near revolutionary impact of the war. Since the new policies were insufficient inducements for Africans to obey the King's writ, such officials were also encouraged to draw upon the armed power of the military and the SAC in order to subordinate African tenants and laborers to white farmers. [65]

By October 1902, the most seasoned British soldiers were already on their way back to Great Britain or India. [66] By December Afrikaner farmers were attempting to reassert their property rights with the explicit assistance of the SAC. Initially, there were 200 SAC posts in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony (the former Orange Free State) with approximately 10,000 officers, patrolmen, and auxiliaries. [67] The farmers were not entirely satisfied with police assistance. Most believed that pockets of armed Africans continued to exist, and that their presence significantly influenced the tenor of relations between white landlords and black tenants. [68]

More than 40,000 arms had been confiscated--10,000 from the eastern Transvaal and another 30,000 from the northern and western Transvaal by the end of 1902. But even if one accepts the most conservative estimates of the number of rifles distributed to Africans during the war, there remained another 10,000 rifles to account for. [69] Why was the SAC so convinced of the common sense conclusion that all arms held by Africans in the district had been confiscated, except those held by chiefs and headmen? Did the grievances of white farmers amount to a reasonable set of precautions in areas where armed African resistance to the commmandos had been well organized and formidable?

Part of the answer lay with the quirk-laden mind of Brigadier-General R.S.S. Baden-Powell, the founder of the SAC. Baden-Powell molded the SAC into a separate armed force in October 1900, six months after he had botched the job of using moveable columns to guard the rail lines and search out Boer commandos around Rustenburg. Failure proved no obstacle to Baden-Powell. [70]

At the close of the war, once the state's immediate enemies had become its wartime African allies, Baden-Powell speculated on the SAC's future role while touring various districts in the Transvaal:

It is very interesting travelling like this, and seeing my organization ... starting work--It is like starting a big engine that nature made and going about with an oil can and wrench making the various parts work easily and effectively. We are putting the burghers back on the farms and running the postal service, doing customs work, as well as the ordinary police work in town and country, and detective and secret service duty. So there is lots to think about--but I think we are all of us earning our pay. [71]

Pinning down the distribution of firearms in Marico and Rustenburg was also difficult because disgruntled SAC constables sold rifles to Africans and white farmers alike, either because they were strapped for cash or because of lingering morale problems between officers and constables. Both causes reinforced each other in many instances. Constables from Commonwealth countries such as Australia or Canada preferred to be commanded by the officers of their former combat units. When such arrangements did not obtain, minor infractions such as departing from the dress code, failing to turn out on parade or disagreements over grade or pay often cascaded into near mutiny. [72]

Despite their ostensible civilian status, SAC units continued to be supplied with wartime amounts of ordnance. Constables readily exchanged surplus rifles and ammunition for liquor and other items. For their part, even the most loyal and law abiding Afrikaner farmers participated in these transactions, believing themselves to have been egregiously traduced by Milner's Civilian Compensation Boards and in imminent danger of attack from truculent Africans. [73] Many also reasoned that if a constable would sell them a rifle for a jug of mampoer or home made spirits, what would he give for an ox or mule offered by an African peasant. [74]

After some skittish moments, the confiscations went forward. The expected African insurrection never occurred. Donald Rolfe Hunt, the Sub-Native Commissioner at Rustenburg, described such efforts in breezily optimistic terms in October 1902:

Our disarmament of the Transvaal natives is going off very nicely and without trouble or fuss. We have got about 30,000 rifles of all sorts in and expect altogether 42,000. We pay between [pound]3 and [pound]4 per rifle (whatever old gaspipe it may be) but if you think it out you will see it is worth the expenditure. The native loves his old gaspipe as much as a new Mauser or Lee Mitford. If we get 'em all in, the farmers will be easier in mind and altogether everyone will breathe more freely. [75]

The disarming of African irregulars did threaten to precipitate a revolt--but not for the apparent reasons. Hunt stumbled on part of the reason five months later, in March 1903, on a tour of the neighboring district of Lichtenburg, for which he also had some administrative responsibility:

There seems every possibility of a small famine in the Western Transvaal and Bechuanaland this year. The crops have failed owing to no rain and there is precious little water at the best of times. My poor wretched natives will suffer worst of all. The price of Kaffir Corn (sort of millet) has gone to double what it ought to be. I have told every chief and headman to send his young men to earn money and save it to buy food with. The Dutchmen are fed by Repatriation, but it means that Repatriation will have to go on possibly for an extra year at your expense, not Johannesburg's. [76]

After the 1903 drought, cattle diseases such as pleuropneumonia and rinderpest followed behind a disguised increase in tax rates for rural Africans. Predictably, the tax increase came only after officials had confiscated a large number of rifles. As a result, even the most prosperous peasant families were forced to oversell grain that year. All these developments underscored a common belief among the white population that the country's prosperity had been compromised for want of African labor. [77]

Meanwhile native commissioners were ordered to confiscate even more land, moveable property, and rifles from Africans. They were also charged with preventing the subsequent disputes from coming to trial. But in the process of doing their duty, some of these officials had to engage in embarrassing revisitations of the closing phases of the war. Some had been former SAC and Field Intelligence operatives and were, therefore, attempting to limit the scope of potential conflicts between themselves and their former African comrades-in-arms. They also had to deliberate on actual disputes between reinstated Boer landlords and these same Africans. Finally, finding the requisite amount of African labor to restore the gold mines to their immediate prewar levels of production placed an equally heavy burden on such officials. [78]

As the ripples of potential conflict multiplied, many native commissioners balked at the prospect of accelerating or extending confiscation. And it was the reluctance of the native commissioners to carry confiscation forward at crucial points between 1902 and the 1906 elections that further inflamed Afrikaner dissatisfaction with Milner's agrarian policy. Upon his departure from Rustenburg in 1906, for example, Donald Rolfe Hunt travelled throughout the district, urging Africans to buy as much land as they could before a white civilian government was in place. [79]

Numerous government commissions, including the South African Natives Affairs Commission (SANAC) of 1903-05, prepared the ground for the expropriation and enclosure of African land after the promulgation of Ordinance 13 and the hike in the tax rate. [80] Buttressed by the testimony of missionaries, white farmers, former Boer military officers and government officials, African chiefs and headmen, and labor recruiters, government commissions sought to privilege large-scale private property and uphold excesses committed on its behalf. [81]

Only under these circumstances could the state, commercial agriculture, the mining industry and white supremacy be rebuilt from the top down. [82] Put crudely, the problem was how to exploit the African as peasant farmer and wage laborer, govern him largely without his consent, and simultaneously accord him a measure of humanity that would make his exploitation appear tolerable. [83]

Hell in Small Places: Vigilante Activity in Rustenburg and Marico

The loss of nearly a generation of their children in the concentration camps numbed rural Afrikaners into a stolid hatred of British authority. Many men also underwent harrowing experiences in the overseas prison camps, but unlike their women, they rarely witnessed their children dying before them in large numbers. Few male prisoners of war realized that their families might have already died of dysentery, enteritis, smallpox or pneumonia long before they signed a loyalty oath in the offices of a staff officer or imperial commissioner. That their losses were compounded by the deaths of so many of their children only became clear to these men once they returned home. [84]

A disproportionate number of prisoners from Rustenburg and Marico had taken up arms for a second time after the collapse of the Middelburg Peace Conference in April 1901. Some were like Johannes Janse van Rensburg, a farmer from Kafferskraal, Rustenburg. Janse van Rensburg was captured on the slopes of the Magaliesberg Mountains with a cache of British weapons, equipment and preserved enemy body parts. He escaped for a third time some months after his capture. [85]

The majority, however, were like the men under the command of Piet Kruger, President Kruger's son, who realized that the war was over for them, even though they persisted in occasional symbolic protests such as burning the Union Jack or insulting the local provost marshal. Once these men and their former comrades were herded on to ships headed across thousands of miles of ocean, they were compelled to admit defeat. The most radical break with the politics of Kruger's regime therefore was made for many Boer farmers after they had been captured and sent to British prison camps. [86]

Close to 5,000 Boer prisoners were shipped to Bermuda. They were of various ages and social conditions. British military intelligence determined that a large percentage of prisoners were "bad characters" or had taken up arms a second time, after having signed an oath of neutrality. Many of the prisoners so designated from Rustenburg and Marico were under 25 years old and therefore could not have been burghers or eligible voters before the outbreak of the war. Internment proved to be especially destructive of their allegiance to the previous generation of political leadership. But few became loyal subjects of the British Crown as a result of incarceration.

Poor, young, and apparently victimized by the immediate consequences of the war--the bulk of the white population of Marico and Rustenburg hardly fit the description of a ruling class. [87] By 1904 m ore than half of the nearly 20,000 whites in the two districts were under 15 years old. [88] Death and dislocation had made orphans of many of them after the war. An equally large number had fought in the war. If the success of Milner's plan for the economic reconstruction of the Transvaal and the consequent restoration of political order turned on a healthy, aggressive, well-educated and optimistic white population in the countryside, Marico and Rustenburg were incubators of failure. [89]

As a result of the fortunes of war, an increased number of speculative ventures in the mining industry, and multiple claims or "servitudes" on undivided land, a fissioning of landholdings took place in these areas. A growing class of whites who were without land, cattle, or farming instruments served to blur further the official picture of white landlords and dependent black peasants and agricultural laborers in the areas that experienced dramatic flashpoints after the war. By 1904 a little less than 20 percent of Marico and Rustenburg's white population fit this description. They constituted a significant portion of the increase of the white population in wards or sub-districts such as Deerdepoort, Hex River, Zwartruggens, Vlaakplaats 621, Brakloof, Steenbokfontein 570, Kaffirskraal, and Buffelsdrift in Rustenburg, and Linskana or Linokana, Burmansdrift, and Swartfontein in Marico. [90]

Community pressure, which was made all the more compelling by blood ties and common experiences, proved to be a powerful deterrent to shifting poor whites from share to labor tenancy. Women and children from the white tenant's household could not be readily compelled to turn out for work in the fields. [91] The poor white tenant's need to forage for game or graze his scrawny cattle also prevented his landlord, who, more often than not, was his brother, cousin or uncle, from enacting ambitious fencing or irrgation schemes. More prosperous Afrikaners were therefore limited in their ability to intervene in the reinterpretation of prewar statutes governing property ownership, tenancy, and contractual relations. [92]

Poor whites did aggravate the predicament of many large and middling Boer farmers who survived the war and who attempted to weigh in forcefully against the Milner administration's policies. Increasing numbers of the white poor meant that the sharp social distinction between heerenboren and bywoner also grew sharper. [93] Impoverished rural Afrikaners abandoned the western Transvaal and northern Orange Free State for cities and towns of the Witwatersrand in the tens of thousands. [94] As a portion of Boer republicanism's natural constituency underwent devolution, more rural Afrikaners chose to agitate around more discursive issues such as compensation for war losses and placing Afrikaans on an equal footing with English. [95]

Over 600 commandos from Rustenburg and Marico were interned in Bermuda.

An unusually large percentage of the prisoners from these districts were composed of those men who had taken taken up arms for a second time and who were under 20 years old. As early as August 1903 British commandants in the camps for Boer prisoners in Bermuda worried that the rigors of war had "hardened" some of the younger prisoners and had made them indifferent to exercising cruelty and atrocious forms of violence. Ironically Jan Smuts and J.H. Delarey expressed similar concerns, as they went about forming the able-bodied young men of the Moot Valley in Krugersdorp and those of the more rugged areas of Rustenburg such as Hex River and Zwartruggens into death squads after late 1900. [96] The growing impoverishment of young rural Afrikaners therefore was not a sufficient explanation of the widespread nature of violence and the threat of violence. [97]

How did the closing off of economic options in the countryside affect the social and psychological adjustment of former Boer combatants? Though extreme in expression and outcome, the experiences of Carel Gustave Auguste Beling were powerfully illustrative of the state of mind of many Boer veterans. On 17 June 1901 Beling, who had been a farmer in Burmansdrift, Marico, was paroled to Cape Town after signing a loyalty oath before a British staff officer. Two months later he was arrested by the local police for "obtaining money by false pretences and theft". Acquitted by the Supreme Court, Beling was rearrested a short time later and sentenced to six months for highway robbery. On 21 May 1902, upon his release from prison, Beling spent a good portion of the night drinking in the bar of the Albion Hotel. At about 10:30 pm, he declared to anyone who would listen, including a military intelligence officer, that:

It's all very fine Kitchener's coming down now and Peace is declared and every one thinks he is a very fine man, and nearly every one is wearing a Victoria Cross. But there is a big difference between the VC and the Iron Cross of Germany. It takes man to win that. Any favorite can get a V.C. What do you fellows think if Germany had tackled England? [98]

The simultaneous loss of loved ones, property and the habit of commanding Africans was extremely unsettling for many Afrikaner men. Some like Beling were diminished to the point of victimization. Others withstood the lure of depravity and self-pity, but not without making dramatic adjustments in their social outlook and psychological disposition. Prison transformed many of them, but not in the manner that their British captors anticipated. Prison made their hatred for the British or apparent reconciliation understandable. But local British officials never anticipated their continued capacity to engage in certain kinds of collective violence. [99]

What sort of Afrikaner participated in the postwar violence? He was not always a bittereinder, although the more well-off of the latter would have been well represented among the leadership of such groups and, at the very least, would have had an important voice in deciding upon a given course of action. [100] Some Boer landlords who had not been bittereinders might have also taken up arms for a second time after 1901; but instead of fighting in the last ditch skirmishes between February and May of 1902, would have been captured on their farms by British forces. Many such men languished for the rest of the war under provisional oaths of neutrality or made the best of a bad situation by becoming "cattle guards", assisting African auxiliaries fighting on the British side to distribute and dispose of cattle and other moveable property. Such activity fell just short of collaboration, even though half starved Boer combatants who remained in the field thought differently.

Others surrendered, after a short but wrenching assessment of the odds, in order to be near their wives and children who were sequestered in one of the concentration or refugee camps. A considerable number of the men who were captured or surrendered became policemen in the camps or actively went over to the British side by joining the National Scouts, the Imperial Light Horse, or the SAC. [101]

An active role in the British army's attempts to wipe out the last pockets of resistance did not necessarily translate to active support of British rule in the postwar period. Many of the men who were branded hensoppers or collaborators genuinely believed that their actions on the British side would actually limit the number of republican casualties. [102] Even though they fought with the Imperial Army, they hated the British and British rule as intensely as any bittereinder. Anti-British feeling among apparent collaborators ran deep and expressed itself in ways that would not normally or readily catch the eye of English-speaking officials.

Milner and his officials conveniently overstated the degree of connection that rural Afrikaners had with the state. [103] Such overstatement grew out of Milner's tendency to oversimplify the aspirations of Afrikaners in the countryside. [104] The very concept of "Brother Boer" was a crude and cynical expression of officialdom's tendency to underestimate the requirements for administering the countryside. [105] Ultimately, it was an exercise in self-deception on the administration's part, and it began to turn in on itself as early as January 1904, just as the impact of two years of drought and an impending downturn in the mining industry were beginning to be felt in the rural areas. [106] Resident magistrates recorded a flood of complaints from local farmers. [107] The apparent failure of government officials to confiscate all the rifles in African hands also turned the white farmers' demands for compensation into a potentially explosive situation. Afrikaner farmers initially sought the assistance of the resid ent magistrate, Herbert Kemball-Cooke, in order to determine whether their African tenants and laborers did in fact possess large stores of firearms. [108]

Many rural Afrikaners in the two districts perceived Kemball-Cooke as more than a mere magistrate. He had also been the Superintendent of the Refugee Camp at Mafeking and had personally overseen the installation of number of the camp's former inmates on farms in the two districts. A good number of the farmers had served as camp policemen under his direct supervision. Throughout the two districts, among many Afrikaners, he was affectionately known as "Ou Pa Cook". [109]

Just as the farmers' complaints were threatening to coalesce into a minor flashpoint in the Hex River and Zwartruggens wards of Rustenburg, KemballCooke received a letter from Richard Solomon, the Attorney General for the Transvaal Colony, asking for his resignation:

The Government fully recognizes the good work you have done during very abnormal times in setting the people on the land and in dealing with claims for Compensation for war losses but personally 1 feel that your experience as a judicial officer is not sufficient for what in normal times is the most important of the duties of a Magistrate, viz, the administration of justice. [110]

But the times were not normal. And Solomon knew that better than most, since the huge volume of claims and counter-claims of white farmers and African peasants in Marico and Rustenburg were seconded to him. Local farmers allowed their hatred of Milner's administration to smolder until this particular incident compelled them to strip off the mask of compliance. Acceptance of a pax Britannica had been a highly leveraged and personal experience for most rural Afrikaners. It depended upon men who, like Kemball-Cooke, could anticpate the points of disagreement between local whites and Milner's administration. After the announcement of Kemball-Cooke's dismissal, old animosities began to gather strength. Het Volk exploited the bitterness of the farmers to the fullest in the elections two years later. [111]

Nicolaas J. van der Walt, the chairman of the Hoogeveld Farmers' Association and a prominent participant in the 1914 Rebellion, disseminated hundreds of petitions in favor of Kemball-Cooke's retention after the public circulation of Solomon's letter. Between February and May 1904 the farmers held meetings on farms in Kaffirskraal, Nauuwpoort, Vlakplaats 621, Brakloof, Elandsfontein, and Buffelsdrift 780. Protests on farms in the Hex River Ward and Zwartruggens were particularly violent. Guns and sjamboks or rhinoceros hide whips were prominently in evidence. [112] The farmers' belief that they had been deceived, and that most local officials were not pursuing the promulgation of Ordinance 13 with appropriate vigor and speed, drew many formerly indifferent farmers into the protest. [113]

In August 1904, the farmers' belief that the administration was only seizing a perfunctory number of African firearms appeared to be confirmed. Once again drought brought leopards and wild dogs out of the Magaliesberg Mountains. They readily attacked livestock. Africans had to fend for themselves. Rural Afrikaners relied on the SAC to protect their stock, but still appeared to sustain the worst losses. The distribution of losses convinced white farmers that Africans were not only hoarding rifles but stealing livestock as well. [114] The shrill claim of stock theft came trippingly off the tongues of white plaintiffs, many of whom could not have fed themselves or their families were it not for the ingenuity and oxen of their African tenants. [115] Rustenburg and Marico saw many such cases, real and imagined, between 1902 and 1907.

On 5 October 1904, five months after the violent protest over Kemball-Cooke's dismissal and two months before former President Kruger's state funeral, A. H. Malan, the Transvaal Agricultural Union's representative from Rustenburg, showed how helpless many white farmers felt:

To facilitate matters for the Natives as well as for the farming population, I would suggest that every registered farmer be a pass officer. It can so easily be done, ..., and we would find that the pass law would not be contravened half as much as is the case now. [116]

A day earlier G.G. Munnik, a former landrost or magistrate from an area of the Zoutspansberg district, put the grievances of Boer farmers in more pointed if overstated terms:

In the last two or three years, first of all there was the war, when they did not cultivate much, then followed two years of drought; what became of them then?--I will tell you. During the war the Native earned very high wages. Not only did he earn high wages, but he looted and stole everything he could get his hands on; whether it was a bedstead, or whether it was a coffee pot, he stole it and took it home; ... ; and that is really why there has been a scarcity of labour, because he has been looking after all this stolen stuff ... [117]

Boer landlords sought to create a political climate in which violence committed on behalf of private property and white supremacy--the two being readily conflated when convenient--were not only viewed as normal but indispensable. [118] Milner's administration made matters worse while generating a myriad of government reports and commissions that corroborated the growing number of poor whites in the countryside. Meanwhile the counter-accusations of men like Malan and Munnik grew even more shrill.


Milner's administration sought to reconcile such potentially dangerous men to its larger objectives by meeting them halfway on matters of legal procedure and the punishment of rural Africans. Such a meeting of the minds appeared to be easily consummated, once the findings and testimony of the South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC) had been published. [119] The state sought increasingly to absorb white vigilantes by adopting their procedural point of view. Native commissioners and SAC constables believed that they could defuse the passions of Afrikaner farmers by abandoning the exercise of British common law in disputes between white landlords and African peasants. [120] But such conventions also enabled officials to suspend punishment or confiscation if local white farmers were not organized enough to push them forward. [121] Hence the new measures failed to serve the long range interests of rural Afrikaners and seconded their dependence on black tenants. [122]

Boer landlords were in fact no longer a ruling class. The war had stripped them of sovereign power over the state and the African peasantry. Instead they constituted merely a component of a much more complex governing bloc of white property owners. [123] Even this attentuated involvement was more a matter of circumstances than the law, for the political leadership of President Kruger's generation had been thoroughly discredited. The administrative machinery that opened up the countryside was forged without their direct participation. [124]

Meanwhile a growing number of Africans in the Transvaal's countryside would have been able to qualify for the political franchise under the Cape formula. [125] By 1904, for example, the real income of tenant farmers in many of the rural areas of the Transvaal--particularly in the Rustenburg, Zoutspansberg, Krugersdorp, Waterberg, and Piet Retief districts--was perhaps two to five times that of African mineworkers on the Rand. [126] Hence the refusal of a significant portion of the Zulu peasantry in the eastern districts of the Transvaal and Natal to pay the new head or poll tax, combined with the 1905-06 Bambatha or Poll Tax Rebellion in neighboring Natal, further unhinged the political situation in parts of rural Transvaal. [127]

The outbreak of labor riots by thousands of indentured Chinese workers at the deep level gold mines and the state's selective rearming of rural Afrikaners as a means of suppressing the protests gave vigilante groups a broader and more explicit political coherence. Aftikaner farmers no longer felt obliged to hold their peace. [128] Many of them became convinced that their grievances exceeded the proffered solutions. This widespread but inchoate movement became the transitional mass base of support for Ret Volk.

On 23 February 1904,1. A. Kieser, one of the former "hardcore" inmates of the Bermuda prison camps and a confidant of the Boer leaders who would form Het Volk less than a year later, observed:

Chinamen, Chinamen--is the order of the day--and we are going to have their blessings bestowed on us by the most beautiful and uncorrupt British Government. What a fine country this will be in a few years hence. What do think? But all this must and will bring a reaction--and the Boers are nor powerless yet. [129]

The presence of Chinese workers at the deep level gold mines became the focal point of a generalized state of white aggression in the Transvaal's countryside. In July 1905, Petrus Joubert was murdered by escaped Chinese workers on his farm near Pretoria. The "Moab Velden Tragedy", as Joubert's murder was called, bound many previously indifferent white farmers to a violent course of action. The farmers organized themselves into mounted bands and scoured a large area between the foothils of the western Transvaal and the farming towns that surrounded the gold mines of the Far East Rand in search of fugitive Chinese workers. [130]

As early as 23 August1905, an editorial writer for the Pretoria News, a newspaper that generally supported the government's policies, hinted at the potentially adverse effects of selectively deputizing and rearming rural Afrikaners:

To talk of prowling bands of Chinese coming to murder and maltreat the farmer at any unexpected momen [sic] is mischevious nonsense, exactly as it ridiculous to suggest that because one farmer has been murdered by Chinese, the Boers should be armed on easier terms than exist at present. We have had many excuses put forth by thrifty Boers for obtaining arms on "easy terms", but none more painfully flimsy than this last. [131]

Rearming rural Afrikaners compelled Milner's government to initiate a potentially dangerous precedent--one which often had perverse results, as the 1914 rebellion demonstrated. [132]

Riding the crest of the rural opstands, which increased upon the death of the old Rustenburger Paul Kruger, C.F. Beyers and other former Boer generals and stalwarts of Ret Volk threatened to initiate a "second civil war" if the economic circumstances of poorer Afrikaners in the western Transvaal and northern Orange Free State did not improve. More moderate leaders in Het Volk thought the threat was ill-conceived. Louis Botha and Jan Smuts said as much and publicly censured Beyers for his "loose talk". [133]

But Beyers was only saying what was on the minds of a significant portion of the rural white population: that Lord Milner's peace terms had left them nothing to bargain with, and that the social costs of the war and the peace were being shouldered by that portion of the white population least able to bear them. The moral gap between Boer leaders and a portion of their potential constituency appeared to grow wider. [134]

More troubling perhaps was the disaffection that young former soldiers felt for much of the postwar Afrikaner leadership. Many had attended the memorable Volksvergaderings or mass meetings at Ottoshoop and Zwartruggens, which mobilized rural Afrikaner men for war between July and October 1899. Moving cattle, storing grain and weapons on the more removed farms, and catching the stray word or gesture that the elders missed fell largely on the shoulders of adolescents and younger men. [135]

Many were still minors at the end of the war. Yet they had fought in remote places far from their homes during the most thankless and violent moments of the war. Once the war was over, they continued to identify with the most defiant commandants and generals such as Beyers, Delarey and De Wet. These officers had not only been the architects of the guerrilla war but also the surrogate fathers of young men engulfed in what seemed like an endless round of death, isolation and violence. [136]

Many of these same young men found themselves at a decided disadvantage when they competed with African peasants for the purchase or rental of parcels of land.[137] Their skills as farmers might have been limited, but they were not convinced that their capacity for violence was as sharply discounted as the state claimed. The threat of violence was deeply embedded in the general political climate and in everyday relations. [138] Such men believed themselves to be threatened on all sides. [139] They perceived their struggle with accumulating African peasants and Milner's administration as simply another phase of a war that their generation had conceded out of respect for their elders. [140]

The most affluent, younger men in the poorest districts were the most inclined toward "regulator" or vigilante activity, simply because they had the most to lose in the long and short run. They made such a decision for a wide range of reasons. After the Net Volk victory at the polls, the self-sufficiency of important blocks of African peasants such as those who remained on parcels of Leeuwfontein 126 began to collide explosively with their interests. [142] The restoration of white domination was the apparent link, but it did not sufficiently explain their actions.

The war had been the catalyst for the realignment of longstanding groups of regulators and vigilantes-particularly in the upland regions of Marico and Rustenburg such as the Hex River and Zwartruggens wards. The overseas prison camps enhanced the solidarity of such groups by providing a rite of passage for younger members. The humiliations associated with military defeat and the demise of the prewar form of white domination gave them a purpose that smoldered until the eve of the 1906 elections. [143]

Given the relative failure of Milner's compensation scheme, rural Afrikaners viewed the disbanding of the postwar resident magistracies and the SAC with a mixture of relief and trepidation. Once this was effected, younger rural Afrikaners readily led more disinterested whites in acts of vengeance. Collective violence often passed as a rough and ready version of distributive justice during periods of sharp economic fluctuation or conjuncture. [144] The timing of the disbanding was central to the resurgence of violence in the countryside. Though they had been defeated in war, many younger rural Afrikaners in Marico and Rustenburg were determined to win the peace and claim the future for the past.


The author would like to thank Ernest Allen, C.R. Archibald, Rod Aya, Joye Bowman, John Bracey, Barbara Fields, Harold Forsyth, Eugene Genovese, Thavolia Glymph, Janis Grobbelaar, Eric Hobsbawm, Ethel and Robert Kriger, Bruce Laurie, Barry Levy, Bernard Magubane, Michael Mcepthe, Lynda Morgan, Ishmael Moroka, Leo Richards, Julie Saville, Charles Tilly, Charles van Onselen, Michael West, Abebe Zegeye, and two anonymous readers for their insightful observations. I would also like to thank the participants of the Five College Social History Seminar in Amherst, Massachusetts. Finally, I wish to thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa for funding my research. Of course, the remaining flaws are of my own making.

(1.) Quoted in Arthur Davey, The British Pro-Boer, 1877-1902, (Cape Town, 1978), 1.

(2.) See Vincent Crapanzano, Waiting: The Whites of South Africa (New York, 1986), 238.

(3.) See Fransjohan Prerorius, "Life on Commando," in Peter Warwick, (ed.) The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902 (London, 1980), 114-117; see also Albert Grundlingh, "Collaborators in Boer Society," in Peter Warwick (ed.), The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902 (London, 1980), 265; Vincent Crapanzano, Waiting: The Whites of South Africa, 84; T. Dunbar Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion (Berkeley, 1975).

(4.) Vincent Crapanzano, Waiting: The Whites of South Africa, 124; see also June Goodwin and Ben Schiff, The Heart of Whiteness (New York, 1995), 26-31.

(5.) See South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Hearings (henceforth SATRC), Case JB 3618, Louisa M. Malebo, 7 May 1997 Rustenburg; SATRC Case JB 3606, Kevin Dowling, 7 May 1997, Rustenburg; SATRC Case JB 0716, L.S. Makganye, 6 May 1997, Zeerust; see also Bernard Mbenga, "The Flogging of Chief Kgamanyane by Commandant Paul Kruger, Saulspoort, April 1870", Journal of Southern African Studies 23 (1) (1997): 127-40; Andre Du Toit, "No Chosen People," American Historical Review, 88 #4, (October 1983); Charles Hooper, Brief Authority (London, 1960).

(6.) See George Fredrickson, White Supremacy (New York, 1981), xx.

(7.) For example, Lionel Curtis, a member of Lord Milner's staff and Town Clerk of Johannesburg after the war, wrote his mother to this effect five months after the outset of the war: " ... I don't think I should say this war has made men cruel but I do think that 200,000 odd Englishmen will come out of it with a hazier sense of meum and tuum, and that will not help them to govern justly.": See Lionel Curtis, With Milner in South Africa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1951), 80

(8.) In Rusrenburg, as early as June 1900, the recently promoted British General, R.S.S. Baden-Powell, claimed, "The Natives are armed and in many places are active in hostility against, and a standing danger to, the Boers. Last week four Boers were wounded and one killed by Natives at different places about the Pilansberg [northern Rustenburg]; most of the Boers from that neighborhood have come to live under our protection." Quoted in Peter Warwick, Black People and die South African War (London, 1983), 46; see also R.S.S. Baden-Powell Papers ( on microfilm at Murray State University, Paducah, Kentucky, henceforth: RSSBPP), Staff Diary, "Notice to Burghers, Rustenburg", 14-6-1900; the 16 May 1902 statements of Boer military leaders at Pretoria, particularly those of General Christiaan Botha (Swaziland), Commandant Birkenstock (Vryheid), General Kemp (Krugersdorp, Lichtenburg and Rustenburg), and Commandant J.L. Grobler (Carolina) in the appendix of Chistiaan De Wet's, The Three Years War (New York, 1902), 34 3-348; National Archives of South Africa (Pretoria, South Africa henceforth NASA), Central Judicial Committee (CJC) depositions for Marico and Rustenburg, 901-1123.

(9.) See the excerpt of P. Lyttelton Gell's letter of February 1901 to Lord Milner that is quoted by Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido in "Lord Milner and the South African State," History Workshop (Spring 1979): 79; see also Donald Denoon, A Grand Illusion (London, 1973), 24; Kenneth Ingham, Jan Smuts: The Conscience of South Africa (New York, 1986), 43.

(10.) See Saul Dubow, "Colonial Nationalism, The Milner Kindergarten and the rise of 'South Africanism', 1902-10," History Workshop (Spring 1997): 53-86; see also George Fredrickson, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study In American and South African History, xx; Marks and Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State," 50-81; Charles van Onselen, "The world the mine owners made: social themes in the economic transformation of the Witwatersrand," in Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914 volume one (London, 1982), 1-44; see also Jeremy Krikler, Revolution From Above, Rebellion From Below (Oxford, 1992).

(11.) See John Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy (New York, 1982), 17-34.

(12.) John Cell gives a masterly account of once such instance of violence--the 1899 "Revolt of the Red Shirts" in North Carolina. Cell claimed, "If that law [an 1896 statute that abolished county control of voter registration] were to remain on the books, eastern North Carolina Democrats contended with some justification, white supremacy would not be just threatened in their region. It would be dead." What is so striking about Cell's description here is that it flatly contradicts his argument that segregationists were inclined toward more moderate means: see John Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy (New York, 1982), 184-186 and 3-4; for an insightful examination of the link between the ambiguous view that Boer landowners had of the 1913 Land Act and the coming of the 1914 Rebellion in South Africa see A. M. Grundlingh, "Die Rebellie van 1914: historiografiese verkenning," KLEIO (1979) vol. II, 18-30.

(13.) See Donald Denoon, A Grand Illusion (London, 1973), 24-25 ; see also Charles van Onselen, The Seed Is Mine (New York, 1996), 19-26; for insight into the instrumental use of violence by Boer landlords during the prewar period see Bernard K. Mbenga, "The Flogging of Chief Kgamanyane by Commandant Paul Kruger, Saulspoort, April 1870" Journal of Southern African Studies, 23 #1 (March 1997): 127-140.

(14.) See George Fredrickson, White Supremacy, 221-228; see also George Fredrickson, "The South and South Africa: Political Foundations of Segregation," in The Arrogance of Race (Middletown, 1988), 254-55; see also Saul Dubow, Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa (London, 1989).

(15.) See House Report (United States Congress) number 732, June 17, 1874, U.S. Serial 1626; see also Manie Johnson, "The Colfax Riot of April 1873," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, 13 (1930): 391-427; George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction (Athens, Georgia, 1984), 126; for the context of the Hamburg War see Julie Saville, The Work of Reconstruction (New York, 1994), 187-188; see also Anon, "Rendevous of Our Accused Citizens in Aiken," Edgefield Advertiser, August 10, 1876; see also First Session of the Forty-Fourth Congress, 1875-1876, Ex. Doc. no. 85 (Washington D.C., 1876), "Message from the President of the United States, communicating, in answer to a Senate resolution of July 20, 1876, information in relation to the slaughter of American citizens at Hamburgh, S.C."; "They Want McKinley to Act," Atlanta Constitution, November 6,1898 (Reprinted letter [written by R.W. Thompson, C.L. Marshall, Thomas Ware and H.A. Clark] to President McKinley demandin g intervention in the race war in the Carolinas); on the 1914 rebellion in South Africa see T.R.H. Davenport, "The South African Rebellion, 1914," English Historical Review, LXXVII, 306 (1963): 78; A.M. Grundlingh "Die Rebellie van 1914: historiografiese verkenning," 2-308.

(16.) In 1903 Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, hinted at what this retention might mean for South Africa's future: "How can you bring a Central Government into anything like personal touch with isolated farmers hundreds of miles away across tractless veld? ... Their complaints if they have any, their grievances if they exist, can never come under ordinary circumstances to the knowledge of the authorities. There is no close sympathy therefore between the Government and the individual members of the community it has to control.", See British Public Record Office/Colonial Office 526/8 (henceforth: BPRO/CO) 1908, "Extract From A Speech By The Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State For the Colonies, In the House of Commons in 1903" (Appendix 1).

(17.) See JGGP, personal correspondence for 1906 and 1907.

(18.) See the verbatim testimony of General Louis Botha at Pretoria on 2 May 1902 in the appendix of Christiaan De Wet, Three Years War, 355-357; see also British Parliamentary Papers (henceforth: BPP) LXIX Cd 820 (1901), "From Lord Kithchener to the Under Secretary of State for War, War Office, London S.W.," Pretoria, 8th August 1901.

(19.) See for example, the observations of R.A. Brownlea, General Dixon's intelligence officer, after the capture of 500 Boer prisoners on various farms in the Rustenburg district during February--March 1901: Family History Archives of the Church of the Latter Day Saints of Jesus Christ (henceforth: FHACLDS) microfilm J-47878 136782, "List of Farms and Inhabitants West of Pretoria: R.A. Brownlea for 'Daag' Intelligence, General Dixon's Force 10/4/01"; Christiaan De Wet, Three Years War, 234; see also Donald Denoon, A Grand Illusion (London, 1973), 20.

(20.) At the close of the war a vigorous and, occasionally, vituperative debate broke out among the Boer generals about whether the British blockhouses had, in fact, snapped resistance in the countryside. Beneath the apparent terms of the debate was the more volatile issue of whether the defeat of the republican army had been caused by a greater use of African irregulars and Boer National Scouts in the closing months of the war: see De Wet, Three Years War, 261-268; see also BPP LXIX Cd 820 (1901), "From Lord Kitchener to the Secretary of State for War ...".

(21.) For an insightful examination of this dilemma in the northern Cape district see Bill Nasson, Abraham Esau's War (London, 1991); see also Bill Nasson, "The War of Abraham Esau 1899-1901: Matrydom, Myth and Folk Memory in Calvinia, South Africa," African Affairs, 87 #347 (April 1988): 239-241.

(22.) See Dixon and Plumer's provisional prisoner of war lists and the remarks of the accompanying intelligence officers in FHACLDS J-47878 136782, "List of Inhabitants West of Pretoria: R.A. Brownlea for 'Daag' Intelligence, General Dixon's Force 10/4/01."

(23.) See Lionel Curtis, With Milner in South Africa, 185.

(24.) See BPP, CD 822 LXIX (1901) "Case of Burning Native Franz Alive."

(25.) See BPP CD 822 LXIX (1901) "Case of Burning the Native Franz Alive"; see also FHACLDS microfilm 1295430, "Boer Prisoners of War: Index (compiled by British Military Intelligence, 1905); Bermuda Archives (Hamilton, Bermuda: henceforth BA), Government Despatches, 1901-1902, "Political Aspect of Boer Prisoners of War in Bermuda" (memorandum of Lieutenant Colonel M. Quayle Jones: December 1901).

(26.) On 9 June 100, General R.S.S Baden-Powell claimed that Marico was the most difficult area to "settle" or pacify, because of the rugged terrain and an "especially rugged type of Boer inhabiting it": See RSSBPP, Correspondence: "Baden-Powell to Lord Roberts, Lead Mines 40 m. WSW of Rustenburg, 9 June 1900."

(27.) W. Hancock and Jean van der Poel, Selections from the Smuts Papers volume I (London, 1965), 620.

(28.) FCHALDS, "List of Farms and Inhabitants West of Pretoria: R.A. Brownlea for 'Daag' Intelligence, General Dixon's Force 10/4/01.

(29.) See Jeremy Krikler, Revolution from Above, Rebellion from Below, 39; see also Peter Warwick, Black People in the South African War, 45.

(30.) Despite the failure of Boer and British military leaders to forge a lasting peace during the Middelburg Conference of January-March 1901, J.B.M Hertzog and Jan Smuts did get the British to commit to a settlement of the question of the political franchise for adult male Africans after an elected white government was in place rather than before. As a result, the British colluded in effectively denying Africans the political franchise in the Transvaal and Orange Free State for the forseeable future: See Ingham, Jan Smuts: The Conscience of South Africa 37-41; see also Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (New York, 1976), 596-97.

(31.) See De Wet, The Three Years War, 224; see also Pakenham The Boer War, 579.

(32.) See the 16 May 1902 statements of General Christiaan Botha (Swaziland), Commandant Birkenstock (Vryheid), General Kemp (Krugersdorp, Lichtenburg and Rustenburg), and Commandant J.L. Grobler (Carolina) in the appendix of De Wet, Three Years War, 343-348.

(33.) See Peter Warwick, Black People and the South African War, 41-45; see also Charles van Onselen, "The Social and Economic Underpinning of Paternalism and Violence on the Maize Farms of the South-Western Transvaal, 1900-1950," Journal of Historical Sociology, 5 #2 (June 1992): 134-136.

(34.) See the verbatim testimony of General Louis Botha on the impact of the British blockhouses at the gathering of the republican General Staff or War Council at Pretoria in May 1902: De Wet, Three Years War, 355.

(35.) See Charles van Onselen, The Seed Is Mine (New York, 1996), 19-26; see also Timothy J.Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrialising South Africa (London, 1987), 8-14.

(36.) See Belinda Bozzoli with Mmantho Nkotsoe, Women of Phokeng (Johannesburg, 1991), 34 and 40; see also Peter Delius's "Abel Erasmus: Power and Profit in the Eastern Transvaal," in William Beinart, Peter Delius and Stanley Trapido (eds.), Putting a Plough to the Ground (Johannesburg, 1986), 177-217.

(37.) See Mbenga, "The Flogging of Chief Kgamanyane ... ," 131; see also Peter Delius, "Abel Erasmus: Power and Profit in the Eastern Transvaal,"191-94.

(38.) See "Gentleman Farmer", "Notes, Queries and Replies," Transvaal Agricultural Journal, 1 #3, (April 1903): 72-73; see also Tim Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrialising South Africa, 39-40 and 72-83.

(39.) See BPP C 3098 XLVII (1882), 2 November 1881, "Correspondence re. the Affairs of the Transvaal: Montishiwa to Capt. Nourse, Mafekeng," 130.

(40.) See Helen Bradford, "Highways, Byways, and Cul-de-Sacs: The Transition to Agrarian Capitalism in Revisionist South African History," Radical History Review, 46/7 (1990): 84; see also Charles van Onselen, The Seed Is Mine, 21-27.

(41.) See Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State," 79.

(42.) See also Richard Hull, American Enterprise in South Africa (New York, 1990), 48.

(43.) See Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (London, 1989), 53,66,70 and 208-211; see also Tim Keegan, Facing the Storm (London, 1988), 134; Jack Lewis, "The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry: A Critique and Reassessment," Journal of Southern African Studies, 11 #1 (October 1984): 13-15.

(44.) See Sol T. Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa (Athens, Ohio, 1991), 150-151, 293-294 and 308.

(45.) See the entry entitled "Agricultural Reports from Resident Magistrates" in the Transvaal Agricultural Journal from October 1902 to Janaury 1907.

(46.) Anon, "Legislative Council", Pretoria News, Thursday, August 10, 1905, 5.

(47.) See Donald Denoon, A Grand Illusion, 24; see also, K. lngham, Jan Smuts: The Conscience of South Africa, 43.

(48.) See Charles van Onselen, "Race and Class in the South African Countryside: Cultural Osmosis and Social Relations in the Sharecropping Economy of the South-Western Transvaal, 1900-1950," American Historical Review volume 95 (April 1990): 99-123.

(49.) See Martin Chanock, "Writing South African Legal History: A Prospectus," Journal of African History, 30 (1989): 273-277.

(50.) See Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, 584; see also Kenneth Ingham, Jan Smuts: Conscience of South Africa, 34.

(51.) See "Gentleman Farmer", "Notes, Queries and Replies," Transvaal Agricultural Journal, 1 #3, (April 1903): 72-73.

(52.) See F.J. Newnham Papers A1375 (Historical Collections, William Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, henceforth: FJNP), folder one (1904), "The Native Locations in the Transvaal."

(53.) See NASA, files 804/308 through 812/308 of Bantu Affairs Office (henceforth:BAO) 2895 (Marico District).

(54.) See footnote 50.

(55.) See FJNCP A 1375, Newnham, "The Native Locations in the Transvaal," 2-30.

(56.) See FJNCP A 1375 1375 Newnham, "The Native Locations in the Transvaal,"2.

(57.) For an insightful description of the range of peasant-landlord relations in Rustenburg see Belinda Bozzoli with Mmantho Nkotsoe, Women of Phokeng, 40-42; see also Tim Keegan, Facing the Storm, 134-137; Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, 579; "Notes, Queries and Replies," Transvaal Agricultural Journal 1 #3, (April 1903): 72-73.

(58.) In 1917 the prospects for a widespread rebellion of rural Africans--one which would have threatened to stretch from Marico and Rustenburg northward into the Pietersburg and Zoutspansberg districts--were quite real. As early as 3 September 1917 the Transvaal's police commissioner was forwarding confidential memos to the Secretary of Justice about the possession and circulation of arms among Kgatla Tswana at Saulspoort. By 15 September 1917 the Secretary for Native Affairs and the Public Prosecutor at Rustenburg

entertained the possibility of a mass sequestration of Africans under the Moratorium Act: See materials from the archives of the South African Police (henceforth: SAP) that were microfilmed by Robert Edgar. The microfilm is housed at the Center For Research Libraries in Chicago, Illinois. The materials in question are "Confidential: South African Police, Office of the Commissioner to Secretary of Justice, 3rd September 1917 (3/527/17)," Pretoria; "Confidential--Alleged Native Unrest: Rustenburg Di strict," South African Police Commissioner to Secretary for Justice, 13th September 1917 (3/527/17) Pretoria; Kafferskraal, Bus 99, 1 Oktober, 1917, "Unie Verdedigingsmacht, Hoofdkwartier no.9 Militair Distrikt." Pretoria 3/527/17; see also 3/856/18 "Rustenburg": all of the above documents are on Reel Four; See also Ernest Stubbs Papers A954 Historical Collections, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa (henceforth: ESP), no.2/3 Rustenburg 24th August 1924, To Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, "Removal of S.N.C's Office from Rustenburg to Pilansberg."

(59.) See Donald Rolfe Hunt Papers A1655 (Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of the Witwaterstand, Johannesburg, South Africa, henceforth: DRHP), personal correspondence in Ab file; see also Warwick, Black People and the South African War 25-26.

(60.) See DRHP A1655, "Hunt to T.W. Purdy" 15th July 1902 (Department of Native Affairs); see also Krikler, Revolution From Above, Rebellion From Below, 39-41; Warwick, Black People and the South African War, 45-46.

(61.) See DRHP A1655, Ab2 "Hunt to T.W. Purdy, Department of Native Affairs, Oct. 22nd 1902.

(62.) See F.J. Newnham's September 1905 force report, "The Native Locations in the Transvaal" in FJNP A1375, 1-30; see also the testimonies of G.G. Munnik and W. Windham in South African Native Affairs Commission, 1903-1905 (henceforth:SANAC) volume iv (Cape Town: Cape Times, Government Printers, 1906) 477-478 and 431-436.

(63.) See Krikler, Revolution from Above, 30.

(64.) See DRHP A1655, all the personal correspondence in file Ab.

(65.) See DRHP, personal correspondence in file Ab; see also Krikler, Revolution From Above, 42-47.

(66.) See Pakenham, The Boer War, 595.

(67.) The farmers' persisting grievances compelled the Milner administration, through agency of the SAC, to divide the Transvaal and Orange River Colony into a series of military or police precincts by the time of the 1904 census: See R.S. Godley, Khaki and Blue: Thirty Five Years' Service in South Africa (London, 1935), 94-95; see also Results of a Census of the Transvaal Colony and Swaziland taken on the Night of Sunday the 17th April, 1904, presented to his Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor May, 1906 (London, 1906), ii; Krikler, Revolution From Above, Rebellion From Below, 47.

(68.) See discussion in Krikler, Revolution From Above, 42-50; see also also footnote 76.

(69.) See DRHP A1655, personal correspondence in Ab file; see also, Krikler Revolution From Above, 42-50; see also footnote 76.

(70.) In February 1901 Lord Kitchener, then the chief commanding officer of the British forces in South Africa, wrote to his predecessor Lord Roberts that, "Baden-Powell does not appear to do anything with SAC men beyond dressing them up ... I am still in the state of complete disappointment about the work of the constabulary ... If I could only get them to take over and hold areas we clear we should soon have large areas denied to the enemy.": see Michael Rosenthal, The Character Factory (New York, 1986), 44-45; see also BPP LXIX, Cd 820 (1901), "From Lord Kitchener to the Under Secretary of State for War,

(71.) See RSBPP, "R.S.S. Baden-Powell to his mother," 21 June '02.

(72.) See BPRO/CO 526 (1903), "No. Z/1178 Confidential, "From Inspector General, South African Constabulary, to Military Secretary, South Africa, Auckland Park, Johannesburg, 29th July, 1903"; see also BPRO/CO 526 (1903), Correspondence between Captain H.E. Burstall, District Commandant, S.A.C., Rustenburg and Colonel H.B. Steele, Divisional Commandant, S.A.C.

(73.) See the case of Marthiuus Gerhardus Lezar, a farmer and former Boer guerilla from Zeerust. Lezar's farm abutted the lands of Bahurutushe notable Chief Gopani. Lezar claimed that armed African irregulars under Gopani and British troops under the command of General Carrington had looted his farm in June 1900 and again in August of the same year. Upon his release from the prison camp at Green Point near Cape Town, he demanded [pound]260 compensation, which he did not receive. As late as June 1903, Lezar claimed that Gopani's people were threatening his person and his property: CJC 441 (Marico), "M. G. Lezar."

(74.) See BPRO/CO 526 (1907), Copy Confidential 14/38, Application for Promotion in Colonial Service: Lieutenant Ernest James Matthews, 12th September, 1907; see also BPRO/CO (1908), "Certificate of Discharge of W1760, Serg. James Geddes, SAC", Zeerust, 31st December, 1907.

(75.) See DRHP, (Personal Correspondence), "Hunt to T. W. Purdy, Department of Native Affairs,' 22nd October 1902.

(76.) DRHP A1655, Ab2, "Hunt to Purdy," Lichtenburg March 28th 1903.

(77.) See Krikler, Revolution from Above, 39; Colin Bundy, Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, 208.

(78.) See FJNCP A1375, Newnham, "The Native Locations in the Transvaal"; see also NASA, BAG: files 804/308 through 812/308.

(79.) For the actual court cases, official commentaries on the latter cases, and Executive Council determinations of the court cases following "Tsewu versus Registrar of Deeds (4 April 1905)" See FJNP A1375.

(80.) See BPRO/CO 526(1903), "Claims Against Civil Govts." 11 March to 23 July 1903.

(81.) See Bill Nasson, Abraham Esau's War, 34-68; see also Krikler, Revolution From Above, Rebellion From Below, 63-68.

(82.) Jeremy Krikler has succinctly captured the moment," ... The great unspoken fact of Transvaal politics in 1902 was that the peasantry had just witnessed, at close quarters, the pulverization of its exploiters by an army organically linked to an administration now bent upon restoring them ... ", See Krikler, Revolution From Above, Rebellion From Below 63; see also BPP cd 1897, "Reports of the Transvaal Labour Commission, 1904" testimony of J.L. Hulett, 497; see also Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State," 61-68.

(83.) See Charles van Onselen, The Small Matter of A Horse (Johannesburg,1983) 11-27.

(84.) BA, Ana Maria Outerbridge Correspondence: "V.W. Bester to A. Outerbridge, Weismerhoek, Lydenburg District, 15 November 1903."

(85.) See FCHALDS, "List of Farms West of Pretoria ... "; see also FCHALDS, "Comprehensive List of Boer Prisoners of War ..."

(86.) See BA, General Despatches, 1902-1903, No. 105 of 20 November 1902, "Transmitting letters from Generals Botha and de la Rey to Prisoners of War in Bermuda on the subject of their making the necessary oath of allegiance"; see also Colin Benbow, Boer Prisoners of War in Bermuda (Devonshire, Bermuda, 1982), 51-60.

(87.) See statistical materials and tables of Results of a Census of the Transvaal Colony and Swaziland taken on the Night of Sunday the 17th April, 1904, presented to his Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor May, 1906 (London, 1906), 246-260.

(88.) See Results of a Census of the Transvaal Colony ... ,1904

(89.) See 1899-1901 and 1901-1902 death notices (sterfkennise) for the Transvaal and 1900-1902 paroles of prisoners. The original materials are housed in the South African archives depots at Pretoria and Cape Town respectively. However, microfilms of the abovementioned materials are now on file at the FHACLDS R-5 1583 0991008, "Transvaal: New Estates."

(90.) See 1900-1906 estate and death notices for the Transvaal in FHALDCS 0991008.

(91.) See Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrialising South Africa, 119-121 and 188-193.

(92.) See Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrialising South Africa, 145.

(93.) See Charles van Onselen, "The Main Reef Road into the Working Class," in Social and Economic Studies of the Witwatersrand volume 2 (London, 1982), 132-34.

(94.) See Deryck Humphries, David G. Thomas, Audrey Cowley and James Edward Matthewson, Benoni (Benoni, 1968), 145-50; see also W.A. Murray (compiler), The Poor White Problem in South Africa volume IV, Health Report (Stellenbosch, 1932), xxi-6 and 117-19.

(95.) See NASA, CJC 901-928 (Marico); see also Jan Gerit Bantjes Papers A7, Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa (henceforth: JGBP).

(96.) See W. Hancock and J. van der Poel (eds.), Selections from the Smuts Papers volume I, 615-620.

(97.) See Godley, Khaki and Blue, 94-95; see also John Gaspar Gubbins Papers, Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa (henceforth: JGGP), "Stanley Hunt to John Gubbins" Wonderfontein, Marico 16-8-07; JGGP "Gubbins to Bertha Tuffnell" Ottoshoop 27.XI.05.

(98.) FHALCLDS, 1367078 (Provost Marshal: Cape Town), C218/29/10/01 and 25/6102.

(99.) Colonel A. Quayle Jones, the Assistant Adjutant General for the Bermuda prison camps, framed the problem succinctly at the end of 1901, "Any expression by the Prisoners of War favourable to us must be received with caution; ... I am not sanguine about being able to ascertain what their real views are at present, and until they realize that their cause is hopeless, I do not expect to do so.": See BA, Government Despatches, 1901-1902, "Political Aspect of the Boer Prisoners of War in Bermuda."

(100.) See C.L. Andersson, "A Paper on The Defences of South Africa," September 26th, 1907 in Fortnightly Club Papers A 241 (Historical Collections, University of the Wirwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa).

(101.) As of March 1902 the South African Constabulary actively began to recruit Afrikaners in Rustenburg, after sustaining a considerable number of casualties at Vlakfontein: see the estate and death notices for Abel James Hider, Henry Hughes O'Neil (6-3-02), and Samuel Keene (6-3-02). Such notices are permanently housed at the National Archives of South Africa at Weaving Park in Pretoria, South Africa. However, they have also been microfilmed by the FHACLDS. Notices for 1899-1901 and 1901-1902 can be viewed on microfilms 16702-17705 and 17701-18700.

(102.) See H. Kemball Cook Papers A62 f, Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of Witswatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa (henceforth: KCP), Statements of J.W. Meyer, Floris P. Coetzee, Nicolaas J. van der Walt and petitions of farmers from the Ceylon Estate in Rustenburg.

(103.) See Denoon, A Grand Illusion, 61-68.

(104.) See Denoon, A Grand Illusion, 68-71; see also footnote 84.

(105.) Ironically, during the immediate postwar period, the paternalistic impulses of some British administrators toward their former enemies encouraged "Brother Boer" to come into a closer connection with local magistrates and constables, and with English speaking landowners. Their intervention did, in some instances, prevent individual acts of violence against Africans from becoming pogroms: See KCP A62f "Floris P. Coetzee, Govt. School--Wysfontein, to Kemball-Cooke", 1.3.04.

(106.) See footnotes 84 and 85.

(107.) See Denoon, A Grand Illusion, 68.

(108.) See KCP A62 f "Rustenburg Repatriation Commission to Attorney General (Richard Solomon)", Transvaal Colony, Pretoria May 1904.

(109.) See KCP A62 f. "Floris P. Coetzee, Govt. School-Wysfontein, to H. Kemball-Cooke," 1.3.04.

(110.) See KCP "Solomon to Kemball-Cooke," 8th January, 1904.

(111.) See Ingham, Jan Smuts, 43-48.

(112.) Upon his removal from office, Kemball-Cooke bestowed his papers and notes on his successor, but with a bit of a warning: "I have not destroyed these documents because, after 1 have 'shuffled off this mental coil,' I have asked you to use your discretion as to the preservation or destruction of any papers I may have left behind me--I have not looked at them myself for a long time, but I fancy that you may gather from some of them that I tried to do my duty to 'brother Boer,' in the sense that an Englishman looks upon his duty to those under him.": see KCP A62f.

(113.) See SANAC, "testimony of A. H. Malan" 5th October, 1904, 570.

(114.) See DRHP A1655, Ab2 "Hunt to Purdy" Rustenburg and Saulspoort 28th August 1904.

(115.) See KCP Ab 2f, testimonial in the Volkstem of Rustenburg by the Reverend D. Postma; see also Keegan, Facing the Storm, 137.

(116.) See "Testimony of A.H. Malan (Transvaal Agricultural Union: Rustenburg)," SANAC volume IV, 570.

(117.) See "Testimony of G.G. Munnik," SANAC, volume IV, 477; for the official gloss on these deep-seated grievances see "Testimony of W. Windham," SANAC, volume IV, 431-436.

(118.) See Timothy J. Keegan, Rural Transformations, 131-148; Krikler, Revolution From Above, Rebellion From Below, 143-149; T. Dunbar Moodie, The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion, 38; see also the testimonies of John Marcus Carpell and Henry Alexander Hotz in the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Causes of and Circumstances Relating to the Recent Rebellion in South Africa, Minutes of Evidence, U.G. 42-'16, (Cape Town, 1916).

(119.) See Adam Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth Century South Africa (Oxford, 1990), 34-36.

(120.) For an examination of the mercurial attempts of the Hertzog's Nationalist government to impose such terms of African sharecroppers and agricultural laborers in the 1920s: See Helen Bradford, A Taste of Fredom (Johannesburg, 1987), 168 and 172-73.

(121.) See FJNP, "The Native Locations ...," 1.

(122.) See Keegan, Facing the Storm, 137; see also Andre Du Toit, "No Chosen People," 947-50.

(123.) See Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrialising South Africa, 39-40 and 72-83.

(124.) See footnote 78.

(125.) See Keegan, Facing the Storm, 133-137; see also Krikler, Revolution From Above, 64-68.

(126.) See for example, the wage rates and incomes cited in the sections of the Transvaal Agricultural Journal entitled "Rural Notes of the Resident Magistrates" between 1902 and 1907; see also Report of the Crown Land (Zoutspansberg) Commission, 1907-1908 (Pretoria, 1908), 5-49.

(127.) See C.L. Anderssen, "For a Union Defence Force", Fortnightly Club Papers.

(128.) On 5 September 1905 a delegation of white farmers led by Louis Botha and C.F. Beyers met with the Arthur Lyttleton, the Lieutenant Governor, and the appointed Legislative Council to protest the murder of a white farmer at Bronkhorstspruit by escaped Chinese workers. Botha had the final say, "I hope that Your Excellency will never allow the mining magnates, who never had the slightest sympathy for the rest of the population, to come forward as protector of the public ...": See BPP Cd 2786 (in continuation of Cd 2401 April 1905, and Cd 2563, July 1905), "Further Correspondence Relating to Labour in the Transvaal Mines, presented to both Houses of parliament by command of His Majesty December, 1905," enclosure no.2, 21.

(129.) See BA, Ana Maria Outerbridge Correspondence: "I.A. Kieser to A. Outerbridge, 23 February 1904, Jo, burg."

(130.) See various issues of Land en Volk, Pretoria News, and the Sunday Times of Johannesburg between August and November 1905; see also BPP CD 2736 (in continuation of CD 2401, April 1905, and CD 2563, July 1905), "Further Correspondence Relating to Labour in the Transvaal Mines, presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty December 1905," enclosure no. 2, 21.

(131.) See Anon, "A Crime and a Policy", Pretoria News, Wednesday, August 23, 1905; see also Anon, "Murder Near Bronkhorst Spruit," Pretoria News, Thursday, August 17, 1905.

(132.) Many rural Afrikaners who participated in the 1914 Rebellion readily admitted that much of the groundwork for the rebellion was laid when the Union Government had armed them in order to suppress the 1913 strike of the white railway workers: See the testimonies of Daniel Jacobus Elardus Opperman, Johannes Petrus Meyer and Jan Carel Juta in Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Causes and Circumstances relating to the recent Rebellion UG 42-'16 (Cape Town, 1916).

(133.) See editorial, "Exposed," Pretoria News, Tuesday August 15, 1905; see also George Witton, Scapegoats of Empire (London, 1907), 90-91.

(134.) In 1906, a year after its formation, the Het Volk party attempted to foster greater solidarity among Afrikaners across class lines by urging the poorer strata of rural Afrikaners to memorialize en masse family members who had died during the war with detailed death notices. Such attempts often took the form of Sarel Johannes van der Merwe's notice. Sarel's notice stated that he was from Steenbokfontein, Rustenburg, and that he "fell in action" at Zeerust on 11 May 1902, less than three weeks before the formal surrender, at the age of 15. Other notices took the form of Emerensje Prudenella Margresha Cronje's death notice, which stated that she had died "silently for the cause" at the Mafeking Burgher Camp on 18 November 1901. Several hundred such notices were filed in Marico and Rustenburg during Het Volk's political campaign between October 1905 and February 1906: See FHACLDS R-51583 0991008, "Transvaal: New Estates"; see also Denoon, A Grand Illusion, 94-95; for a view of the immediate postwar politic al aspirations of the Boer leadership see: Ingham, Jan Smuts, 43; Pakenham, The Boer War, 534.

(135.) Baden-Powell claimed that war laagers and verkgaderings were regularly taking place at Schoengericht, Kop enkel, Schweizer-Reneke, Ottoshoop, and even in Taung and Vryburg in the Cape Colony by September 1902. Weapons, grain, and cattle were stored on farms and country stores in the vicinity of Ottoshoop. A reserve commando of 500 men was to stand firm at Ottoshoop, once the larger military units began to move: See RSSBPP (R.S.S. Baden-Powell's Staff Diary and Intelligence Notes) 8 August-6 October 1899; see also Denoon, A Grand Illusion, 62-73.

(136.) See the testimony of Jan Carel Juta, Sarel Francois Alberts, Jacobus Elardus Opperman, and Frederick Charles Herman Berthold in Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Causes and Circumstances relating to the recent Rebellion (UG 42-'16), on young white share tenants in Rustenburg who had served for a time as mercenaries for the German colonial government in the suppression of the 1905 Herero uprising. Many such young men had served with Delarey and Smuts during the South African War; see also personal correspondence and court cases in the FJNP, KCP, JGGP, and DRHP.

(137.) For a glimpse at how white farmers agonized over such questions before the war see: BPP C8752 (1898), "Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of Zululand, no. 24 enclosure: Minute of Walter Holey-Hutchinson to the Legislative Assembly, 17th May 1897," 436-437; see also Patrick Harries, Work, Culture, and Identity (Portsmouth, 1994), 24-27; Charles van Onselen, The Seed is Mine, 7.

(138.) See JGGP A1134, "Gubbins to Bertha Tuffnell," 27. III. 1910.

(139.) See DRHP A1655, File Ace, "Confidential Memo to Native Commissioners in Conference at Johannesburg (Lagden), l8June 1902"; see also DRHP A1655, File Ac24, "Memo to the Native Commissioner, Lydenburg, from Hunt concerning land tenure, occupation, rights in the area under his jurisdiction. 19 March 1913."

(140.) See Denoon, A Grand illusion, 108.

(141.) See the testimonies of A. H. Malan of the Farmers' Association of Rustenburg and that of G.G. Munnik before the SANAC; see also Keegan, Rural Transformations in Industrialising South Africa, 130-132 and 190-193.

(142.) See Central Mining Trust Papers (Rhodes House, Oxford University, Oxford, England: henceforth CMTP) Box 19, File 3 (1906-1911 Transvaal) "Director's Quarterly Report to 30/11/08"; see also Stanley Trapido, "A History of Tenant Production on the Vereeniging Estates, 1896-1920," in William Beinart, Peter Delius, and Stanley Trapido (eds.), Putting a Plough to the Ground (Johannesburg, 1986), 337-372.

(143.) FHALCDS, "List of Inhabitants on Farms West of Pretoria ..."

(144.) For a critical dissection of these kind of written sources for the first 70 years of the twentieth century in South Africa see Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth Century South Africa.
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