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HAZING, BLACK SORORITIES, AND ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.

Abstract: Hazing is a legal problem that is seemingly intractable. In this article, the authors consider this problem in the context of black sororities. We explore the ways in which a set of organizational dynamics help perpetuate hazing within these groups. Specifically, we explore three things. First, we investigate why leaders matter to organizations and what a certain type of leader could offer black sororities as they seek to address hazing. Second, we explore why black sororities, by way of example, may fail to elect leaders who can move the needle on organizational hazing. Third, we investigate the factors that undermine black sorority leaders' ability to make the most rational and informed decisions about how to address hazing. We hope that the insights in this article provide food for thought for other organizations that are grappling with hazing.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION
I. BLACK SORORITY HAZING INCIDENTS
       A. Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority
       B. Delta Sigma Theta Sorority
       C. Zeta Phi Beta Sorority
       D. Sigma Gamma Rho Sorority
II. WHY LEADERS MATTER
       A. Transformational Leaders
       B. Leadership and Complexity
       C. Leadership and Innovation
       D. Leadership and the Cassandra Complex
       E. Hypothetical
III. LEADERSHIP SELECTION
       A. Greedy Institutions and the Peter Principle
       B. Leadership Filtration
       C. The Role of Emotions and Information in Member Voting
       D. Hypothetical
IV. LEADERS AND DECISION-MAKING
       A. A Broad Context: Allison's Model of Decision-Making
       B. Cognitive Biases and Fact Selection
                  1. Bias Blind-Spot
                  2. Dunning-Kruger Effect
                  3. Hindsight Bias
                  4. Optimism Bias
                  5. Outcome Bias
                  6. Overconfidence Bias
                  7. Hypothetical
       C. Cognitive Biases and Commitment to a Course of Action
                  1. Egocentric Bias
                  2. Hyperbolic Discounting and Present Bias
                  3. Learned Helplessness
                  4. Loss Aversion
                  5. Threat Rigidity
                  6. Hypothetical
       D. Leaders and Their Advisors
                  1. Law of the Instrument and Functional Fixedness
                  2. Negative Selection
                  3. Mere Exposure Effect
                  4. Not Invented Here
                  5. Reactive Devaluation
                  6. Rejection of Expertise
                  7. Hypothetical
V. CONCLUSION


INTRODUCTION

"Where this is no vision, the people perish." (1)

In recent years, considerable attention has been paid to the issue of hazing within white college fraternities. (2) While hazing deaths within their ranks provide just cause for this scrutiny, (3) a closer look at analogous organizations may provide insight into why hazing exists and persists. Such analysis may even provide solutions. Over the past several decades, de minimis research exists on hazing within Greek-letter organizations separate and apart from white fraternities. (4) In one study, my colleagues and I investigated how race and sex intersect in the context of fraternity and sorority hazing. (5) To get a sense of the differences at the intersection of race and gender, we analyzed (1) published and unpublished state and federal court cases on Westlaw and (2) media hits in news periodicals between 1980 and 2009. (6)

The results from this study suggest that, overall, violent hazing is more prevalent within black and male organizations than it is within those that are white and female. (7) Fraternities employed calisthenics more frequently than sororities, and among the latter, only black sororities employed calisthenics. (8) With regard to mental hazing practices, fraternities employed them more often, and black sororities did so slightly more than their white counterparts. (9) While fraternities engaged in more pranks than sororities, this practice was disproportionately engaged in by white organizations. (10) Sex-related hazing practices were also disproportionately employed by white organizations. (11) Alcohol use, however, was the greatest distinguishing factor between black and white groups, with the latter employing it more frequently than the former. (12) White sororities had about a third as many incidents involving alcohol as white fraternities, and white fraternities had sixteen times as many alcohol incidents as black fraternities. (13) Black sororities had no hazing incidents involving alcohol. (14) In sum, there are drastic distinctions in how hazing is conducted depending on the race and gender of the Greek-letter organizations. (15)

In 1874, the United States Congress passed the first hazing statute to prevent hazing at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. (16) Since then, forty-four states have passed anti-hazing laws. (17) While scholars and commentators have analyzed laws with regard to hazing, what may yield more fruit--at least with respect to finding workable solutions to address hazing--would be to discern not simply the law on books, but rather, the law in action. (18) If, for example, the goal of the law is "to regulate behavior by threatening unpleasant consequences should an individual commit a harmful act[,]" (19) it makes sense to understand what actually influences that behavior. In short, court opinions or statutes that tackle hazing may be nothing more than mere bundles of words. The heart of the matter, instead, includes those factors that underscore, amplify, and propel hazing. For example, in his work on how law affects human behavior, Lawrence Friedman explained the effect, or impact, of law on human behavior in society. (20) In his discussion of the relationship between law and society, Friedman began his discourse by defining the term impact as casually tied behavior to a particular law, rule, doctrine or institution. (21) Crucial to this understanding is the notion that a message has impact only when it reaches an audience, in this case, emanating through the legal system. (22) Once it reaches an audience, the force of impact will be influenced by rewards and punishments; immediate social context; or the inner sense, conscience, and related psychological motives. (23)

Accordingly, in this article, the authors do two things. First, they depart from the conventional approach to analyzing hazing through the lens of the law. This article is not another attempt to make sense of a variety of court cases and statutes that address hazing. Rather, the authors explore a subset of factors that influence hazing's persistence. In part, the authors' analysis is predicated on Urie Bronfenbrenner's social-ecological approach to understanding human behavior. (24) According to Bronfenbrenner's research, social interactions are a key component of the ecological systems theory. (25) Bronfenbrenner described the topology of the ecological environments as "a nested arrangement of structures, each contained within the next, which must be examined as an interdependent whole to fully understand the forces surrounding a developing individual." (26) The Centers for Disease Control adapted Bronfenbrenner's model to address health-related issues; it focuses on individual, interpersonal, organizational, community, and policy-level dynamics. (27) While much of the research on hazing has focused on individual-level factors, (28) we focus our level of analysis on organizational dynamics, specifically in regards to high-level leaders.

Second, the authors investigate hazing within black sororities. As such, this article should augment and enhance the developing literature on hazing in black sororities. Other researchers have found that black sorority hazing is characterized by a secretive "underground" culture, where women undergo an unofficial process to gain full membership into the sorority. (29) Hazing is an addition to the official process sanctioned by the national organization. (30) Some black sorority chapters continue the traditional, old-school pledge process, now synonymous with hazing, irrespective of the National Pan-Hellenic Council's ("NPHC") 1990 ban on pledging in black sororities. (31) Arguably, the NPHC organizations' pledging ban created the secretive, underground nature of hazing within black sororities. (32) Hazing incidents have increased in severity in black sororities since the ban has taken effect. (33) Pledging has been a historic part of the black sorority experience for at least a couple of generations, and hazing is seen as a way to continue that tradition. (34) Black sorority hazing activities are more chapter-related than sorority-related. (35) Hazing is a means of gaining credibility and admission in sorority chapters. (36) Women who choose to go through the Membership Intake Process ("MIP")--the non-hazing process adopted by the nine major black Greek-letter organizations in 1990--often retain a lower status among their own sorority members as well as sometimes among other black Greek-letter organization ("BGLO") members, as opposed to those who "consent" to be hazed. (37)

The negative aspects of hazing, however, must be considered in light of the benefits that hazing confers on members of black sororities. After pledging, many women report a greater sense of self-determination and believing themselves to be more capable of completing goals. (38) Women report feeling pride and honor about belonging to the sorority. (39) Women also acknowledge feeling that hazing instills a sense of Active kinship and communal bonding as sisters in the organization. (40) Therefore, they experience joy and excitement in meeting other members of the same sorority over their lifetimes (41) Women interested in membership and members of black sororities participate in hazing activities to protect two interests: the betterment of the sorority as a whole and the member's own image and reputation. (42)

First, sorority members are concerned about the betterment of the sorority. (43) Members contend that hazing has organizational utility; it preserves organizational commitment and ensures that the organization's mission will be carried out. (44). Also, members are concerned with creating bonds between the old members and the new members within the sorority. (45) Members say that hazing helps foster the necessary legitimate bonds. (46) Additionally, sorority members are concerned about maintaining the exclusivity and integrity of the organization. (47) Sorority women articulated that hazing is "critical to the continuation of the values and mission of their organizations." (48) These arguments support the theory that hazing in black sororities is done to preserve the organization's identification (49)

Second, participants are also concerned about their individual image and the reputations of those who will belong to the organization. (50) Members do not want to be disrespected or be given line names that insinuate that they did not have to work or earn admission into the sorority. (51) Women who do not pledge are called derogatory terms like "paper," "skater," and "slider." (52) Sorority members haze the incoming women because they want them to have the reputation that they were "made right." (53) Those already initiated may see "hazing [as] a form of discipline ... to shape those whom [the sorority members] care for or wish to succeed." (54)

With these considerations in mind, in Section I, the authors highlight some of the major hazing incidents that have roiled black sororities. In Section II, the authors investigate why organizational leaders matter, particularly with regards to problem-solving. In Section III, the authors investigate problematic ways in which leaders ascend to positions of power and influence in organizations and what that means for problem-solving. In Section IV, the authors investigate three dynamics in leadership decision-making. First, we explore why leaders make poor decisions in the absence of clear information about the right course of action. Second, we explore why, once a better course of action is presented to leaders, they persist on a course that is not likely to yield them the results they profess to seek. Third, we explore why leaders fail to receive or utilize expert advice.

I. BLACK SORORITY HAZING INCIDENTS

To provide context for this article, in this section, the authors summarize a sampling of hazing incidents that occurred within the four major, black sororities: Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, Inc. ("AKA"), Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Inc. ("Delta"), Zeta Phi Beta Sorority, Inc. ("Zeta"), and Sigma Gamma Rho Sorority, Inc. ("SGRho"). These accounts do not reflect the totality of black sorority hazing incidents, not even those that resulted in civil or criminal litigation. However, they do highlight some of the dynamics that take place within these incidents. (55)

A. Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority

Sherdene Brown (1991): Sherdene Brown was a twenty-six-year-old black woman who was a graduate student at Kent State University. (56) Brown agreed to assist in pledging a new line of candidates for AKA in 1991. (57) Brown inflicted or assisted in the abuse of these pledges, the bulk of which took place during the final stage of initiation known as "the Goddess stage." (58) The pledges were slapped on the face and hands, punched, pushed, and paddled. (59) The paddling involved anywhere from a dozen to more than a hundred blows with "the enforcer," a special paddle wrapped in silver duct tape. (60) Past and present pledges testified to the severity of Brown's abuse. (61) Girls were given black eyes, suffered nosebleeds after coerced headstands, and passed out after being struck on the temple. (62) Some pledges suffered bruised and bleeding buttocks from the paddling, and two of the girls received permanent scars, which could not be surgically repaired. (63) Brown testified that she did not want to hurt anyone. (64) Rather, she claimed that she was told that this process was the only way a black woman could gain respect in her community. (65) Brown was convicted at trial on one count of complicity to hazing and one count of complicity to assault, both misdemeanors. (66)

Takiyah Starks and Keita White (1998): Takiyah Starks and Keita White were members of the Zeta Xi Chapter of AKA at Bennett College, located in Greensboro, North Carolina. (67) Three new sorority members complained that Starks and White subjected the pledges to harsh treatment, including, "snapping fingers against pledges' heads, throwing a pillow at pledges and using abusive language." (68) The full extent of the allegations was never made public. (69) A five-member judiciary board at Bennett College found Starks and White guilty of hazing, and "willful or negligent actions endangering the health and safety of others" (70) One of the girls admitted to talking harshly but denied threatening anyone. (71) The college informed the women on May 11, 1998, that Starks, who was allegedly the harsher of the two, would have her diploma withheld for one year, and that they both would be barred from taking part in commencement ceremonies. (72) Additionally, the college attempted "to strip Starks of her student-elected, role-model title of 'Ms. Bennett.'" (73) She was also not allowed to attend the ceremonial graduates' breakfast, where she was scheduled to speak. (74) Starks and White both filed suit against the college, alleging that they would suffer "emotional distress" and "damage to their reputation" if they were prevented from marching with their class. (75) A Guilford County Superior Court Judge agreed and handed the college a restraining order preventing them from prohibiting Starks and White to participate in the ceremonies. (76) The college disbanded the fifteen-member Zeta Xi Chapter until 2002. (77)

Kristin High and Kenitha Saafir (2003): On September 9, 2003, Kristin High and Kenitha Saafir, pledges to the Sigma Chapter of AKA at California State University at Los Angeles, drowned when they were overcome by high tides during a hazing incident at Dockweiler State Beach in Playa Del Rey, California. (78) At the time of the incident, the Sigma Chapter was affiliated with several colleges and universities in southern California, but not directly with California State University, Los Angeles, where High and Saafir were students. (79) According to AKA, at the time of the incident, this chapter was suspended from the national organization, and thus the national organization was not involved in the activities. (80)

At Dockweiler State Beach, High, Saafir, and two other pledges--Jennifer Sinigal and Wykida Casey (81)--were dressed in black running shoes, black sweat-shirts, and black jogging pants. (82) They were blindfolded, forced to do calisthenics, and instructed to walk toward the shoreline, where the surf included riptides and waves as high as ten feet. (83) The Los Angeles Police Department could not determine conclusively how the women got into the water. (84) According to one account, a large wave crashed on the shore and pulled Saafir into the water, High rushed in after her because she knew that Saafir could not swim. (85) What is clear, however, is that a 911 call was made at 11:22 p.m. from the beach reporting a loud commotion, and one minute later, another 911 call reported a woman screaming for help. (86) When police officers Robert Espinoza and Charles Rodriguez arrived at 11:25 p.m., they saw two bodies about fifty yards from the shore, and they dove into the water and attempted to save them. (87) Despite their efforts, both High and Saafir were past the point of aid and could not be revived. (88)

Patricia Strong-Fargas, the mother of Kristin High, subsequently established Mothers Against Hazing (MAH), a non-profit group dedicated to eliminating hazing and other life-endangering aspects of the Greek system. (89) The group proposed a new law, termed "Kristin's Law," which would make it a felony to participate in harmful hazing activities. (90) In November of 2002, the High family (Kristin's parents and her fiance, Holman Arthurs, on behalf of himself and their son Skyler) filed a $100 million wrongful death lawsuit against the AKA organization, alleging that the organization was aware of the hazing that occurred at the college, the seven sorority sisters responsible for the pledging and hazing activities, and the involvement of two other pledges. (91) The High family also filed a notice of claim with the Los Angeles Police Department and the Department of Parks and Recreation, claiming that a police officer saw the women on the beach and did not ask them to leave. (92) Karim Saafir, Kenitha Saafir's husband, hired former O.J. Simpson attorney, Carl Douglas, and filed a wrongful death and reckless conduct lawsuit against AKA and the Sigma Chapter. (93)

In the lawsuit filed by the High family, they alleged that prior to the fatal incident, Kristin High had been a "slave" for her sorority sisters-forced to paint fingernails, buy and cook food, run errands, chauffeur, and braid hair for sorority members. (94) During prior hazing incidents, she was covered with green paint and had her face and hair smeared with mayonnaise. (95) She rapidly lost thirty pounds, and she was severely sleep deprived. (96) High's mother described the toll that the sorority rituals took on her daughter by stating, "[t]hey had been keeping her out at all hours of the night. She was always drained and her weight loss was extremely noticeable. She wasn't the daughter I was used to seeing." (97) Following the fatal incident, the sorority sisters returned High's car to her family (which had been used to drive to the beach). (98) However, all of her AKA paraphernalia and her mandatory pledge journal had been removed from her car, and phone numbers of AKA members that had been programmed into her cell phone and two-way pager were deleted. (99)

The sorority sisters claimed that the deaths of High and Saafir were accidental and unrelated to any pledge activity by the sorority. (100) This claim was rejected by High's fiance, Holman Arthurs, who said: "[t]heir story wasn't viable ... black people don't go swimming at midnight in the ocean." (101) According to Patricia Strong-Fargas, her daughter's sorority sisters--who she had previously had at her home as guests--were now refusing to talk. (102) She stated, "I'm not angry at them ... I'm just disappointed. They're hiding behind this code of silence, and they're victims too." (103) The Los Angeles Police Department were told by survivors that the women were at the beach to exercise. (104) However, veterans of black fraternities and sororities stated that forced calisthenics and the practice of sending pledges blindfolded into the ocean is a common occurrence during the hazing of West Coast Greek organization members. (105)

B. Delta Sigma Theta Sorority

Latoya Jones (1983): Latoya Jones, Paula Thomas, and Tracy Barker were active members in the Delta Sigma Theta Sorority at Northern Illinois University. (106) On about January 22, 1995, the sorority members sponsored an informational meeting for prospective members, and scheduled interviews with attendees "to become more familiar with them." (107) One of the participants, Rodgers, alleged that Jones, Thomas, and Barker hazed her by verbally and physically abusing her. (108) Additionally, Rodgers claimed that the members directed her to purchase merchandise for their benefit. (109) A university hearing board found the women guilty, expelled them from the school, and placed a two year hold on use of their transcripts. (110)

Jones, Thomas, and Barker filed a [section] 1983 suit against Northern Illinois, the state of Illinois, and other individuals alleging they were denied "a liberty and property interest without due process of law." (111) In consideration of the motion to dismiss, the court focused on due process as the dispositive issue. (112) First, the court held that failure by the school to follow the student judicial code in the plaintiffs' hearings did not constitute a denial of due process. (113) Second, the court followed the Seventh Circuit by holding that due process does not require counsel's presence during a disciplinary hearing of a student. (114) Third, the court held that there was no evidence of bias or prejudice of the board members against the plaintiffs at the hearing. (115) Fourth, the court determined that the student disciplinary proceeding's procedures did not deprive the plaintiffs of due process. (116) As a result, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the suit. (117)

University of Tampa (2011): Three University of Tampa students, identified only as M.B., S.C., and L.P, were sisters in Delta, and were suspended from the university after allegations surfaced that they hazed pledges. (118) The allegations included that the pledges were "yelled at, made to run, do pushups, squats, eat garlic wrapped in Big Red gum and drink hot sauce, hold a match between their fingers while reciting a pledge, had rocks and grass thrown at them and that they were paddled." (119) The women, who had no history of trouble, admitted, "that the running, pushups and squats took place, but denied the other allegations." (120) The three women were made aware of their suspensions on April 5, 2010 and were told that they were suspended until August of 2011. (121) This sanction meant that the students were not allowed on campus, could not meet with professors, and could not take final exams, which resulted in failing grades in those classes. (122) Two of the three women were scheduled to graduate in May of 2010. (123) The students claimed to have a witness that would prove that the major violations never took place, but the university did not allow this person to testify in administrative proceedings. (124)

In May of 2010, the three sued the university and asked a judge for an emergency hearing to lift the suspension and allow the students to graduate on time. (125) The suit alleged that "white students accused of similar actions at the school received less-severe sanctions and that the women's race may have influenced [their] unfair punishment." (126) The judge denied the request declaring the case to be "too complex to be decided in just a couple of hours," and gave the parties time to prepare and present their information (127)

C. Zeta Phi Beta Sorority

Colorado State University (2009): Several pledges to the Omicron Omicron Chapter of Zeta Phi Beta (Zeta) at Colorado State University were deprived of sleep or food for days at a time, forced to eat cat food and raw onions, and made to perform strenuous physical activity, including running, pushups, wall-sits, and other calisthenics. (128) Pledges were forced to wear black jump suits while performing the physical tasks which included "Zeta TV," an exercise where participants "were forced to horizontally support themselves with only one arm and their toes while they counted to" 1920, the year of the sorority's founding. (129) Pledges were threatened that if they put their feet down, complained, or did not count, they would have to start all over, which they were forced to do numerous times. (130) As a result, the pledges suffered swollen shoulder blades, wrists, and arms. (131) When these activities led one pledge to throw up, they were threatened that if anyone else threw up they would all be forced to lick it up, and as a result several pledges threw up inside of their jump suits. (132)

Although most of the alleged hazing was physical, one pledge was forced to write academic papers for Adesuwa Elaiho, the chapter president. (133) This violation of the university honor code subjected both parties to potential disciplinary action, including expulsion. (134) The four members accused of hazing were Adesuwa "Elaiho, 22; Antoinette Hill, 24; Erika Green, 21;" and Ysaye Zamore, 22. (135) Each of these members admitted to the hazing incidents, yet they denied that they physically harmed the pledges and were subsequently punished with disciplinary action by Colorado State University. (136) The local District Attorney, Larry Abrahamson, reviewed a 54-page police incident report detailing the alleged hazing incidents but declined to file charges. (137) Colorado State University deprived the sorority of its charter on April 10, 2009, and officially disaffiliated from the sorority on August 5, 2009. (138)

Virginia Union University (2003): "Kimberly Daniels, a Virginia Union University ("VUU") student and pledge to the school's Zeta chapter, alleges that she was paddled on the buttocks and badly bruised during a sorority hazing event on February 23, 2003." (139) Daniels was taken to the emergency room by her mother after she was struck approximately thirty-five times with a paddle. (140) Four of those members, Rikita Deans, Angela Mitchell, Shyron Bryant, and Tamika Murrell, were criminally charged with misdemeanor hazing, and each was fined $750. (141) Because of this incident, VUU and the national Zeta Phi Beta organization suspended the campus chapter. (142)

University of Maryland (2010): Lavisha McClarin, a Zeta pledge at the University of Maryland, was beaten with an oak paddle during a hazing incident in 2010, which led to "severe bruising on the arms and chest." (143) Because of this incident, which also involved McClarin being choked and shoved into a wall, seven members of the sorority were charged in March of 2011 with assault and hazing. (144) The accused were Amber Bijou, 22; Bridget Blount, 24; Montressa Hammond, 24; Tymesha Pendleton, 26; Zakiya Shivers, 26; Monika Young, 23; and Kandyce Jackson, 32. (145) The incidents took place in October of 2010 at an apartment complex in Adelphi, Maryland, and at the home of Kandyce Jackson in Bladensburg, Maryland. (146) Pendleton is identified as one of the people who wielded an oak paddle and choked McClarin. (147) However, her attorney claims that she was not responsible for the hazing and objects that this charge has the potential to ruin her career (she had been admitted into several Ph.D. programs). (148) The University of Maryland suspended Zeta Phi Beta. (149)

D. Sigma Gamma Rho Sorority

Courtney Howard (2008): Courtney Howard, a former student at San Jose State University, filed a civil suit in September of 2008 alleging that she was subjected to progressively violent hazing by Sigma Gamma Rho Sorority members over a period of time. (150) Howard alleges that she was beaten with wooden paddles, slapped with wooden spoons, and shoved against walls. (151) Sorority members would threaten the pledges by saying that "snitches get stitches." (152) One active member explained to a pledge that the hazing process was supposed to mirror the suffering of slavery, so that the members could better relate to their ancestors. (153) On September 13, 2008, Howard was injured to the point that she sought medical treatment. (154) On September 18, 2008, a pledge was knocked unconscious during the hazing. (155) The paddling, which began on September 19, 2006, lasted for ten days. (156) Pledges were told they would be hit seven times with a wooden paddle each night, once for each of Sigma Gamma Rho's founders. (157) Howard was also warned not to drop out of the sorority and was allegedly told that she would be "jumped out" with a beating if she tried to quit. (158) Ironically, many of the beatings took place during AURORA Week, which was supposed to reflect "Sigma's unity of purpose and action, support of programs and projects and full cooperation in human concern and commitment." (159) The incident resulted in the suspension of the sorority until 2016 by San Jose State. (160) The same chapter was also previously suspended in 2003 for hazing activities. (161) Four of the members were convicted of misdemeanor hazing and sentenced to 90 days in jail with two years of probation. (162)

Gerri Barker (2010): Gerri Barker sought to join the local chapter of the Sigma Gamma Rho Sorority at Rutgers University in 2010. (163) Between January 18 and 25, 2010, Barker alleged that she and several other pledges were struck on the buttocks with paddles. (164) She stated that she personally was struck over 300 times in a neighboring county and was struck seven times in New Brunswick County at Rockoff Hall on Rutgers campus. (165) Barker said that the pledges were told to bow after every hit, but she forgot to do it once or twice due to the pain. (166) She identified Shawna Ebanks as the woman who administered the blows. (167) Barker stated that there were other parts to the initiation rituals, such as the pledges "having their rooms 'trashed' and being forced to remain in squatting positions and other difficult stances that ... caused her pain." (168) Barker also alleged that pledges were restricted from eating over a period of several days. (169) On January 26, 2010, Barker went to the hospital with her mother for treatment of the injuries caused by the alleged beatings, and she then reported the incident to university officials. (170) Six sorority members--Shawna Ebanks, Vanessa Adegbite, Kesha Cheron, Liana Warner, Joana Bernard, and Marie Charles--were charged in the hazing incident. (171) They were initially charged with aggravated hazing in January of 2010, but those charges were downgraded to hazing, a disorderly person offense. (172) With these lower charges, evidence was introduced about that hazing incident that was alleged to have occurred in New Brunswick County but not the other ones that occurred outside the jurisdiction. (173) All six of the women charged in the criminal proceedings were exonerated of separate university disciplinary charges. (174) The sorority was suspended when the incident arose and remained suspended pending the completion of an investigation. (175)

II. WHY LEADERS MATTER

Black sororities are like benevolent dictatorships. (176) They are governed by quasi-authoritarian leaders who exercise disproportionate political power over their respective organizations but who do so for the benefit of the membership and organization. (177) That is why it is critical, in addressing an issue like hazing, under the current structure that black sororities have, that members elect national heads with (1) a depth of knowledge about hazing and a desire to address it; (2) a willingness and ability to galvanize and employ the best minds on the matter; or (3) both. To accomplish such a feat, black sororities need leaders who are transformational, appreciate the complex nature of hazing, and have the capacity to unleash innovative potential within their organization to tackle hazing. Without these qualities and characteristics, black sorority leaders run the risk of attempting to lead a membership that refuses to follow them in executing the leaders' vision.

A. Transformational Leaders

There are two types of change strategies that individuals and leaders can adopt. (178) These strategies are incremental and transformational. (179) Incremental change involves slow progress. (180) By contrast, transformational change has a higher risk and vulnerability than incremental change but also can yield a higher reward when enacted correctly by transformational leaders. (181) Transformational leadership involves enacting this high-risk/high-reward strategy when incremental strategies have failed to work or the problem at hand is so complex and important that both strategies must be explored. (182) Transformational leadership extends beyond the practice of transactional leadership in that it motivates followers to identify and support the leader's vision and sacrifice their own self-interest for the advancement of the group. (183) Transactional leadership simply involves leaders rewarding subordinates for their performance. (184) Transformational leadership also requires intellectual stimulation, individualized consideration when delegating assignments, and charisma so that followers emotionally identify with the leader. (185)

Transformational leadership can be defined by observing how transformational leaders influence organizational change. (186) Transformational leaders enact such change by reconstructing the attitudes, values, and beliefs of members of their organization. (187) Effective transformational leaders exhibit a number of effective behaviors in order to induce change. (188) These behaviors customarily consist of "articulating a vision of the future, fostering the acceptance of group goals, communicating high performance expectations, providing intellectual stimulation, modeling appropriate behavior, and displaying supportive leader behavior." (189) In other words, transformational leaders use " 'softer' influence tactics," as opposed to unconvincing data, in order to acclimate organization members to new ideas and to persuade individuals to adopt changes. (190) "Softer" tactics are required where many organization members would view change as disruptive of the status quo. (191) Leaders may view change as an opportunity to fortify and better the organization, while members may view change as a hindrance. (192) Therefore, transformational leaders must develop tactics that align the views adopted by the two parties. (193) Using these tactics to create change means that leaders should seek to lessen rather than amplify their organizational control (194) while also focusing on forming relationships with members. (195)

Research has indicated that transformational leadership is not represented by the practice of dissociated actions. (196) Rather, a marked correlation between the actions which characterize transformational leaders both exists and helps define the practice. (197) The practice of transformational change enacted by these leaders involves diverging from the initial system set in place and reconceptualizing this system in order to create a new strategy. (198) Transformational leadership is not an innate trait, but it is a skill that can be expanded through intentional learning, acquisition, and practice. (199) These leaders must attempt to work beyond immediate self-interest and avoid selfish, "leader-centric" behaviors in order to successfully achieve full transformation and organizational change. (200)

Transformational leadership is inextricably intertwined with organizational change. (201) Many organizations feel the pressure to implement change in governance, design, and delivery of services to stay competitive in a growing and fast-paced market. (202) Despite the change's importance, it is poorly studied, making its enactment difficult for many organizations. (203) Most theories and research on organizational change focus on end-product rather than the process by which the results occur. (204) Transformational leadership differs from other theories in that it focuses not on the outcome and extent of success of change, but instead on how that change was actually brought about. (205) As a whole, transformational leadership can be defined as leader-driven vision fostering productivity through change among an organization's participants by altering the organization's culture and values through common goals and individualized support. (206) This strategy of creating a more accepting and work-conducive environment as opposed to simply trying to increase results allows for individuals to become more willing and open to change, thus increasing the likelihood of not only the change occurring but also the change becoming permanent and lasting. (207)

Transformational leaders can be individuals of high authority in an organization as well as a select group of people involved in the organization, whose jobs are to facilitate change smoothly and effectively. (208) In reality, change is most effectively brought about when the two parties work in tandem. (209)

Transformational change exists on the extreme end of the spectrum of levels of change. (210) The Ackerman Anderson model places developmental or process change at the beginning of the spectrum, given that developmental changes are less disruptive and usually include improving a process. (211) Transitional change entails designing and implementing a different system than what currently exists and follows developmental change on the spectrum with the inclusion of loss mitigation measures. (212) Of all types of change, transformational change is the most disruptive to systems in place as it promotes a shift to a new state through a cultural shift and a significant change in previous behaviors, processes, and mindsets. (213) Transformational change requires leadership commitment from both supervisors and managers, in addition to "vision, clearly defined roles, and an effective communication plan." (214)

What may undermine such change is when leaders become trapped by a of failure to challenge the systemic patterns in "which they are working, or to which they are blind." (215) "Stuckness" results when organizations expend resources and efforts without achieving their intended goals for change. (216) Higgs suggests that a comprehensive understanding of the underlying systems at work in an organization can help alleviate this tendency to get "stuck." (217) Leaders must understand how they, as individuals, exhibit behaviors which contribute to the "stuckness" through practicing reflection and self-awareness. (218) Successful understanding of the underlying systems at work requires an understanding of both the formal and informal systems. (219) Additionally, research indicates that the ego of the individual leader may limit the organization to "stuckness" if the leader consistently needs to be affirmed by others to take responsibility. (220) Without a comprehensive understanding of the underpinnings of formal and informal systems, leaders fall into traps that impair their ability to break with repeating patterns and thus adhere to the demands of the current system. (221) By contrast, examining repeating patterns of these systems allows leaders to disturb "stuckness" and aide in progress. (222) Research indicates that leaders' self-awareness provides the ability to understand systemic challenges and avoid such traps. (223)

B. Leadership and Complexity

With a new era of technology and information, society demands an inherent change in leadership perspective. (224) To respond to these new and complex challenges, leadership is forced to react, learn, and approach work in innovative ways. (225) Throughout the literature, complexity is described as a "state [in] which [a] system occupies and which lies between order and chaos" and must embrace both simultaneously. (226) Complexity "conveys a sense of rich interconnectedness and dynamic interaction that is generative" in and among systems; (227) it "occurs in a variety of organizing systems, including bureaucracy," network structures, open source systems, and markets. (228) Complex adaptive systems are those systems which occupy this state of complexity. (229)

Within this domain, Complexity Leadership Theory "is a contextual theory of leadership [that] describes leadership as necessarily embedded in context and socially constructed in and from a context." (230) This theory "seeks to take advantage of the dynamic capabilities of [complex adaptive systems] [by focusing on the identification and exploration of] strategies and behaviors that foster organizational and subunit creativity, learning, and adaptability." (231) Further, this theory uses insights from complexity science in order to demonstrate leadership as a property of a social system. (232) It "enables an organization to deal more successfully with dynamic environments" than traditional leadership theories. (233) Complexity Leadership Theory rests on important premises about the complexity of the situations and environments in which organizations now operate. (234) Open systems, such as organizations, are far too unpredictable and dynamic to be defined by simple, traditional models. (235) Further, "organizations are seen as complex adaptive systems ... that cannot be understood by simply breaking down its constituent components." (236) As such, complexity theory focuses on capitalizing on interactive dynamics and fostering interactive conditions in order to create a higher likelihood of productive outcomes. (237) Complexity theory opposes traditional theory by asserting that leadership transcends the individual and occurs at the system level rather than as a product of individual actions. (238) Further, by observing leadership at the system level, complexity theory creates a form of social mind that solves the problems that occur within a complex organization. (239) In these systems, a great leader makes "it easier for people to ... connect, have different ideas, and have disagreements" by focusing on enabling the people and agents of a system rather than attempting to control them. (240)

C. Leadership and Innovation

Organizational innovation is the factor that is responsible for both organizational efficiency (being able to produce more than is being consumed) as well as organizational effectiveness (the ability to stay in business and survive over time). (241) Innovation differs from invention in that invention involves the creation or discovery of a new idea whereas innovation involves the exploitation of these ideas and putting them into practice in an organization. (242) Invention and innovation have a "basic continuum" between them and relate to each other. (243)

Competitive forces within and across organizations are the motivation behind organizational innovation. (244) The marketplace is extremely competitive, and for an organization to stay competitive or to maintain a dominant position, they must innovate more effectively and efficiently perform to differentiate themselves from the competition. (245) Innovation, resulting from competition, is a process in which there is "a design change from one state to another." (246) Innovation involves bringing about multiple "social and behavioral processes] [including] surprise, disruption," and confrontation of the unforeseen or unknown. (247) The most important factor in the effectiveness of an organization's innovation is the quality of its leadership (248) Charles McMillan describes effective leaders as having five factors that must be fulfilled. These include:

1. core organizational skills and competencies;

2. institutional capacity to listen, via institutional study and analysis of decision alternatives;

3. capacity to learn from history of former decisions, alternative practices, and multiple sources of ideas and outcome analysis;

4. capacity to mobilize the organization, not only from motivating people with clever incentives, but projecting a clear picture or vision of the organization; and

5. the capacity for organizational innovation, which is impacted by the previous four drivers. (249)

As such, for a leader to facilitate innovation, she must first effectively perform these five characteristics. (250) These general leadership skills, play a significant role in organizational success, as all facets and characteristics of an organization stem from not only what the leadership of the organization says, but also from how these leaders perform. (251)

Innovation is most likely to occur in organizations that have a culture, created by the leadership, in which "adaptive processes are built into the role sets, authority systems, and decision processes." (252) Organizations with this culture encourage experimentation and playfulness, which are instrumental aspects for innovation. (253) Innovation will further thrive in a culture that provides "reinforcing drivers," such as "strategies, structures, decision processes, and incentives." (254) Organizations with extensive and consistent innovation have managers and leaders who "collectively and individually combine a skills set widely accepted by organizational members" because they understand that the competitiveness of an organization is dependent upon the extensive network of relationships that exist within the organization. (255) Quality relationships stem from leadership behavior as well as a leader's relationships with others involved in the organization. (256)

Stealth leadership is another theory of innovation-conducive management strategy. (257) In describing stealth leadership, Louise Underdahl explains that "[l]eaders must inspire a capacity to embrace innovation." (258) That is, stealth leadership requires that leaders of organizations explain their ideas and goals and invite their subordinates to share in said ideas and goals instead of demanding attention and displaying control. (259) The collaboration that this strategy brings and the atmosphere it fosters cultivates innovation within an organization, which is a requirement in order for organizations to maintain or grow their position in the globalized world today. (260) By abandoning authoritative and controlling behavior, and instead practicing transparency with subordinates, leaders can better achieve their goals. (261) Furthermore, innovation-inspiring stealth leadership can successfully enhance an organization's convenience, accessibility, simplicity, and affordability. (262) Felice William and Roseanne Fori recognize that creative leadership is essential to organizational innovation. (263) They explain:
   Because creativity is an important process that precedes
   innovation, organizations can directly stimulate innovation through
   the formal development of creative leaders.... By training leaders
   in creative problem solving and related thinking skills, as well as
   creating an environment conducive to developing creative leaders,
   organizations can better equip themselves to develop and sustain
   innovation. (264)


Developing creative leaders is imperative, given that the creativity of leaders directly impacts the creativity and innovation of their organizations at large. (265) In order to develop such creative leaders, organizations can encourage both prospective and current employees to follow the ten guidelines to creative leadership. (266) According to the article, creative leadership requires the following skills: (1) "Redefining the problem," (2) "Analyzing the problem and the idea," (3) "Solution telling," (4) "Recognizing the Value/Limitations of Knowledge on Creativity Thinking," (5) "Willingness to Engage in Sensible Risk Taking," (6) "Willingness to Overcome Obstacles," (7) "Self-efficacy related to Task Accomplishment," (8) "Tolerance for Ambiguity," (9) "Willing[ness] to use Extrinsic Rewards to Support Intrinsic Motivation," and (10) "Commitment to Continued Intellectual Growth Rather Than Stagnation." (267) Growing an organizational members' thinking skills and problem-solving skills is also critical to developing creative leaders. (268)

Organizational rigidities are a threat to innovation. (269) Organizational rigidity results in lack of change occurring in an organization and can stem from a "yes man" mentality as well as cognitive simplicity and indecision performed by management. (270) When these rigidities occur within an organization, leadership must act to change the culture of the organization so that the environment is one conducive of change and therefore, innovation. (271) Leadership methods include changing the decision model, creating institutional conflict, and as a drastic measure, changing leadership itself. (272) By eliminating rigidities, leadership can bring about organizational change and kickstart innovation. (273) In sum, organizational innovation is spurred by both transformational and complexity leadership. (274)

D. Leadership and the Cassandra Complex

When the leaders of an organization can create a viable plan for the future, but they lack the credibility needed within the organization to make the vision reality, they are said to be suffering from the Cassandra Complex. (275) As posited by Phillip Davies, in order for an organization to succeed, the corporate vision must first be a feasible plan, i.e., "customers and other stakeholders need to feel that the organization has a clear view of where it is going and why it is going there." (276) Second, the vision needs to be understood by the people within the organization to promote buy-in. (277) No vision can be successful if those implementing it do not believe in it. (278) So, if an organization is suffering from the Cassandra Complex, the leader's vision for the future is accurate, but no one believes that she is correct, so her point of view is disregarded. (279) In order to avoid becoming an organizational Cassandra, top management has to be able to deliver the vision which "concerns the extent to which the executive ha[s] the confidence and respect of those within the organization. This perception will be based on past experience but may also be affected by whether or not the organization is in crisis." (280) Thus, if employees do not have confidence or respect for their leaders, the Cassandra Complex might affect the organization.

In order to avert the Cassandra Complex, the leader must build a shared vision with organization members. (281) To build a shared vision a leader must encourage personal vision, communicate and ask for support, represent the vision as an ongoing process, distinguish between positive and negative visions, and blend extrinsic and intrinsic values. (282) Secondly, leaders should establish and maintain a balanced network of people. (283) A leader needs strong ties to people that the leader works for and with so that everyone is inclined to trust her. These people will help to implement a plan since they have ties to the person with the vision. (284)

E. Hypothetical

Natasha Higgins is the National Head of Black Sorority, an organization with long-standing hazing issues, dating back to the 1970s. When running for the high office she holds, she campaigned on addressing hazing. Once elected, she urged the other national board members to help her push for incremental change (incremental, not transformational leadership). To a large extent, her incremental approach reflected her inability to fully make sense of all the interconnected dynamics that undergirded hazing (lack of leadership complexity). Higgins found it difficult to get Black Sorority's other national leadership on board because she never articulated to them the vision she was trying to bring to fruition. Certainly, she never did this with any specificity. Rather, she simply told them, "we must change the culture of hazing in our sorority," (lack of transformational leadership). Moreover, even though Black Sorority had a national anti-hazing taskforce, Higgins did not communicate her vision to its members, nor did she support it with a budget or even encouragement (lack of transformational leadership). In fact, her incremental approach and heavy reliance on the sorority's General Counsel led Higgins to ignore the ideas from Black Sorority members who were economists, social psychologists, or organizational behaviorists--some who were on the taskforce, most who were not. As such, Higgins consistently relied on conventional ideas--largely enhanced sanctions and some remedial education and training for members (lack of innovation). Higgins also failed to do anything to convince the broader membership as to why the sorority should move toward a no-hazing policy, what the alternative was, and how it would get there (lack of transformational leadership). Consequently, given Higgins failure to build a shared vision and one that was well-articulated to Black Sorority members, her vision lacked credibility (the Cassandra Complex). Therefore, the vision failed.

III. LEADERSHIP SELECTION

The way in which black sororities' national heads are elected almost ensures that they will not be able to tackle a long-standing issue like hazing. First, black sororities are greedy institutions; they consume a significant amount of their members' and leaders' time. (285) This time is infrequently spent stepping back and contemplating the big picture--e.g., the root causes and potential solutions to address hazing. (286) As such, individuals who remain in leadership positions and work their way up the leadership ladder are unlikely to have a deep understanding of why hazing exists and persists within their organization. Even more, these individuals, if elected to their organization's highest office, are likely to be ill-equipped to address hazing. In part, this is because many organizational members tend to prefer candidates who move them emotionally. (287) While this premise probably does not hold for those members who are deeply informed on the issues facing their organization, especially hazing, most members do not have that depth of knowledge. (288) Accordingly, if given the choice between a candidate who has held many of the obligatory organizational offices and one who has not, most members vote for the more traditional candidate. (289) That trend is still likely the case where the probability of real change is higher with the less traditional candidate. (290)

A. Greedy Institutions and the Peter Principle

Within organizations, two dynamics may intersect to undermine a leader's ability to be an effective problem-solver. First, the leader, on their way up the leadership ladder, may find the work of the organization particularly demanding. (291) Because of this demand, she may have little time to engage with the external world to learn new insights that may be beneficial to addressing some organizational problem. (292) Second, the leader may move up the organizational leadership structure, demonstrating success all along the way; but once she reaches a certain leadership threshold in the organization, she may lack the skillset to perform that job well. (293) The intersection between these two dynamics may lie where demands of the leader's organizational work may not impair their duties at lower levels of leadership. However, it may undermine the insights they need to perform effectively at higher levels of leadership.

Organized groups must face "the problem of how best to harness [member] energies to their [greatest] purposes. (294) People have limited time and energy to give, so groups must fight for these scarce resources. (295) This struggle is particularly so, given that people live at the intersection of many different social circles, and thus, are pulled in many directions. (296) However, there are organizations that go against prevailing principles and "make total claims on their members." (297) These greedy institutions "seek exclusive and undivided loyalty and they attempt to reduce the claims of competing roles and status positions on those they wish to encompass within their boundaries." (298) These types of institutions are distinguished from total institutions, which are typified "by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often built right into the physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water, forests, or moors." (299) Where greedy institutions sometimes employ physical isolation, they mainly rely "on non-physical mechanisms to separate the insider from the outsider and to erect symbolic boundaries between them." (300) Greedy institutions also rely on voluntary compliance to activate participant commitment and loyalty; they aim to appear highly desirable and exercise pressure on participants to lessen their ties to other commitments. (301) For members of greedy institutions, conflicts that result from contradictory expectations are minimized because outside role-partners are either non-existent or very limited. (302) By being isolated from other relationships and anchors for social identity, a greedy institution member's identity is solely tied to the greedy institution. (303)

Relatedly, the Peter Principle reflects people's desire to use what has worked before, even when this might not be appropriate for the current situation. (304) In an organization, assessing an individual's potential for a promotion is often based on her performance in her current or prior job. (305) As a result, if she performed well previously, she eventually gets promoted to a role in which she is incompetent. (306) The organizational member's incompetence may stem from any number of factors. Maybe the needed new skills are more difficult or maybe the skillset is just different. (307) Paradoxically, within some organizations, highly competent organization members may be set-up to fail or are dismissed because they shift the organization away from its norm of incompetent leadership. (308)

B. Leadership Filtration

Gautam Mukunda put forth the "Leadership Filtration Theory" ("LFT") and its companion "Leader Filtration Process" ("LFP"). (309) These delineate whether a candidate in an organization or institution that allows a candidate to ascend the ranks in order to reach an anticipated leadership role will be an indispensable leader. (310) This theory operates on a bell curve; in the middle are the filtered leaders. (311) These leaders have worked their way up within the organization and have been groomed for fulfilling the leadership position. (312) On either end of the curve are the unfiltered leaders which are either exceptional or deplorable outsiders. These outsiders either excel in the head position or are destructive to the organization. (313)

A LFP is a process by which leaders gain power, whether this be from trudging through a bureaucratic succession or an election coup. (314) The LFP filters out candidates so that when it comes time to elect a new leader, there are only a few candidates left for the position. (315) Candidates that are not weeded out through the LFP share certain characteristics. (316) These Modal candidates are easily replaceable by other Modals due to the homogeneity of these candidates. (317) Outliers are candidates who are unlikely to gain the leadership position because they have nothing significant in common with one another and tend to be weeded out by the LFP. (318)

A filtered leader has been trained by his or her roles in the organization, starting from a rank below the desired leadership position, then working upwards. (319) This strategy is advantageous for preparing "filtered leaders" for an organization. The person in question understands the inner mechanisms of the organization, knows the organization's history of success from firsthand experience, and has ties within the organization. (320) These "insider leaders" are easier to control, and their actions are easier to predict because they are well-groomed for the position. (321)

On the other hand, an outsider is a candidate who has come from an unconventional source or who is not a product of the organization's LFP. (322) This person is brought into the organization with a direct path to leadership, so there is no level of filtration through the organization. (323) This person is not easily controlled by the organization nor is this person predictable. (324) Outsiders become influential leaders because they deviate from the norm and take risks that filtered leaders do not. (325) This influence can be either good or bad with potential for creating a big impact on the organization. (326) The more relevant experience a leader has, the less chance the leader has of creating such a monumental impact. (327)

C. The Role of Emotions and Information in Member Voting

Imagine getting to choose between two candidates for a leadership position in an organization or institution. One candidate offers a robust vision and platform that seeks to tackle the major issues confronting the organization or institution. The other candidate offers a limited vision and platform but presents with great optics and emotional appeal. One might presume that the former would handily beat the latter especially given that candidates, once elected, seek to and usually fulfill roughly seventy-five percent of campaign promises. (328) However, members do not always make the most rational choices in selecting leaders. (329) In fact, quite often, people make deeply partisan choices even when the facts suggest that their electoral choices would undermine the ends they seek. (330)

Emotions play a significant role in voting. (331) For example, William Christ found that emotional responses to candidates accurately predicted voter preferences for more than ninety percent of decided voters and eighty percent of undecided voters. (332) Not surprisingly, most political advertisements are designed to either inspire voter enthusiasm by motivating their political engagement and loyalty, or induce fear by stimulating vigilance against the risks some candidates supposedly pose. (333) In other words, advertisements of this type can induce crossover voting. (334) Likeability also affects voting. (335) One study demonstrated that disengaged voters who watched entertainment-oriented talk show interviews of Al Gore and George W. Bush were more likely to vote against their party loyalties when they found the crossover candidate likeable. (336) Occupational titles also move votes, as voters "appear to use candidate occupational labels as information shortcuts--inferring from them the potential competence or qualifications of candidates for office." (337) The risk to any candidate is that when emotions are at play, and voters are swayed by their feelings, other voters may simply follow the herd. (338)

Such emotion-based leadership selection is also influenced by the extent to which voters make such decisions based on high or low information. (339) For example, candidate attractiveness serves as a proxy for competence: i.e., "more attractive candidates are perceived as more competent and therefore receive more votes." (340) Not surprisingly, the voting behavior of uninformed citizens is determined by the candidates' physical appearance, shown by voters' tendency to "favor attractive candidates when they possess little information on the competence and qualification of candidates." (341) Informed voters, on the other hand, utilize "their actual knowledge about candidates to elective office in determining their vote choices, and decide to vote in the overall majority of cases for the candidate who is more qualified." (342) Even a candidate's ordinal place on a ballot predicts voter decision-making, with low-information voters being more significantly influenced by the candidate's ballot position than high-information voters. (343)

D. Hypothetical

Members and leaders within Black Sorority know that the organization has a hazing problem. For decades, Black Sorority leaders have informed the membership that hazing will be the end of the sorority someday. Most of the members have waited for a National Head to lead the organization in tackling this issue. Natalie Hughes hopes to be the National Head of Black Sorority someday. She started her leadership journey as an alumnae chapter president and then became an Area Head, managing a small group of college and alumnae chapters. After a few years as an Area Head, she ran and was elected to be a State Head, managing the chapters in the state where she lived. She found modest success in these offices by raising slightly more money for philanthropy and having a higher percentage of chapters in compliance than her predecessors (beginning of the Peter Principle). However, she found that with each successive leadership position, the amount of time she spent responding to emails and phone calls, filling out paperwork, and attending meetings significantly increased (greedy institutions). Respectively, in each of the three leadership positions, she moved to working ten, then fifteen, then twenty hours a week. Ultimately, Hughes ran an uncontested race for Regional Head. She logged thirty hours and found modest success in this office by raising slightly more money for philanthropy and having a higher percentage of chapters in compliance than her predecessors (the Peter Principle). However, in the Regional Head position, she served on Black Sorority's national board, where she was supposed to work with other board members in providing a strategic vision for addressing the sorority's most pressing issues, hazing being one of them. In her region, Hughes was also responsible for regional hazing issues. She struggled to address this issue.

Ultimately, Hughes ran to become National Head of Black Sorority. Despite having a mere shell of a campaign, she played up her high-status job (i.e., physician), and the fact that she was well-known and liked within the sorority. Additionally, she reiterated during her campaign that she had the leadership experience to address Black Sorority's most pressing issues (leadership filtration, highly-filtered, modal leader). Five less popular candidates with similar sorority leadership pedigrees as Hughes also ran. Olivia Carson was the seventh candidate. Carson had a PhD in organizational behavior, a Master's in behavioral economics, and an MBA. She was head of a Fortune 500 Company's research and development department. As a hobby, she stayed current on research about hazing and attended conferences on the issue with regularity. However, she had never held a leadership position in Black Sorority. Nonetheless, she ran for National Head out of frustration that the sorority never seemed to be able to make headway on its most pressing issues. Carson's platform was sweeping in scope and provided depth and nuance as to how the sorority could and would tackle its biggest issues, especially hazing. Most of Black Sorority's members had not studied the issues facing the organization and had little insight into their dimensions. As such, the few with those insights voted for Carson, as they thought she was their best hope for addressing hazing and other issues (informed voting). Most of the membership voted for the most popular candidate that had also accumulated the appropriate type and number of sorority leadership positions (uninformed and emotion-based voting).

During her ascension to National Head, Hughes never had time to even consider how to address hazing (greedy institutions). Also, having ascended to National Head by the most conventional means, she never had the experiences that would push her to think outside the box (highly-filtered leadership). Consequently, Hughes failed to lead Black Sorority to address hazing (Peter Principle).

IV. LEADERS AND DECISION-MAKING

Once elected to high-office, a host of factors undermine a black sorority leader's judgment and decision-making when it comes to tackling an issue like hazing. In this section, the authors discuss such decision-making within the broader research on leadership decision-making. Second, the authors investigate how cognitive biases undermine a leader's ability to adequately select appropriate facts for decision-making. Thereafter, the authors investigate why it is difficult for leaders to choose a different course of action when the one already chosen has proven to be flawed. Lastly, the authors investigate why expert information is difficult to penetrate and influence leader decision-making.

A. A Broad Context: Allison's Model of Decision-Making

Graham Allison proposes three models for understanding governmental, leadership decision-making: the Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Process Model, and the Governmental Politics Model. (344) Under the first model, Allison assumed something fairly simple: that when confronted with a challenge, governments examine a set of goals, evaluate those goals according to their alternatives, and then pick the one that has the highest reward or the lowest consequences. (345) At its core, this model assumed that the main actor in governmental decision-making is rational and can be relied on to make informed, calculated decisions that maximize value to the state. (346) However, this model failed to account for instances in which complete information on alternatives is not available and was founded on the dubious notion that people are always rational actors. (347)

In contrast, in Allison's Organizational Process Model, existing governmental bureaucracy, where actions may be taken only with proper authorization and adherence to the chain of command by respecting established processes and standard operating procedures, places limits on a nation's actions and often dictates the final outcome. (348) When faced with a crisis, governmental leaders cannot grapple with it in its entirety, so they deconstruct and assign it according to pre-established organizational lines. (349) The government must be diligent in its decision-making by searching through the available options until an acceptable, though not perfect, one is found. (350) Because of the large resources and time necessary to fully plan and mobilize actions within governments, leaders are therefore limited to pre-existing plans. (351)

The Governmental Politics Model proposes that a country's actions reflect politicking and negotiations by its top leaders. (352) Even if those leaders share a goal, they may differ in how they wish to achieve it because of their personal interests and the like. (353) Where a leader holds absolute power, she runs the risk of having her order misunderstood or outright ignored; as such, she must gain a consensus with her underlings. (354) Moreover, given that leadership decision-making may be a group effort, the make-up of a leader's advisors significantly impacts her final decision. (355) For example, yes-men will likely produce a different outcome than advisors who are willing to dissent. Leaders also have different levels of power depending on their charisma, personality, skills of persuasion, and personal ties to other key decision-makers. (356) Unless the leader is a complete autocrat, she may need to gain some level of consensus, lest opponents take advantage of such fissures. (357) In other instances, leaders may take actions that the group as a whole would not approve of. (358)

B. Cognitive Biases and Fact Selection

Cognitive biases are systematic deviations from rational judgment, whereby inferences about other people and situations may be illogically drawn. (359) Such biases may influence the course of action that black sorority leaders initially choose to take in addressing hazing. In this subsection, the authors explore how the bias blind-spot, Dunning-Kruger effect, hindsight bias, optimism bias, outcome bias, and overconfidence bias all impair leaders' abilities to adequately select from the facts before them to make the best decisions about how to address hazing within their ranks.

1. Bias Blind-spot

The bias blind-spot is the tendency for people to think that "biases are more prevalent in others than in themselves." (360) Research shows that overreliance on introspective evidence nurtures the bias blind spot because individuals falsely believe that introspection can detect biasing processes. (361) In one study, researchers "assessed whether participants displayed a bias blind-spot with respect to the classic cognitive biases: outcome bias, baserate neglect, framing bias, conjunction fallacy, anchoring bias, and my side bias." (362) This study explored whether those who claimed to be unaffected by biases were more unbiased in their performance compared to their peers. (363) For each of the biases previously listed, participants rated the others as more likely to be biased than themselves. (364) The study showed that more cognitively sophisticated individuals displayed larger bias blind-spots and that metacognitive biases extended to biases in the cognitive domain. (365) Moreover, people who were aware of their own biases were not better able to overcome them. (366) Another study replicated the findings from the first study with a more heterogeneous sample to determine whether the findings could be generalized to a broader population. (367) The second study's results indicate a bias blind spot in the cognitive domain, but there was no relationship found between cognitive ability and metacognitive bias or between people's awareness of their biases and their ability to overcome them. (368)

2. Dunning-Kruger Effect

The Dunning-Kruger effect is the idea that the very lack of ability that causes a person to perform poorly blocks them from being able to see the faults in their performance. (369) The four studies within David Dunning and Justin Kruger's Nobel Prize-winning paper sought to test the idea that the skills that an individual requires to demonstrate competence in a certain domain are the same skills necessary to evaluate competence in the same domain. (370) More specifically, they predicted incompetent people tend to overestimate their performance of a task. (371) For example, for a person to make a grammatical statement, she must have knowledge of grammar. If she lacks this knowledge, however, it would be impossible for her to recognize if she made a mistake. Dunning and Kruger confirmed their predictions. (372) People who performed in the bottom quartile of the experiment (the incompetent) greatly overestimated their performance by up to forty-six percentile points. (373) Those in the upper quartiles of performance tended to slightly underestimate their performance. (374) Incompetent people did not revise their own perception of performance, even after seeing that their peers had performed better. (375) After training and improvement of skill, incompetent individuals are more likely to recognize their deficits; and these conclusions were found to be stable over time. (376)

To test the Dunning-Kruger effect in a different domain, Daniel Ames and Lara Kammrath conducted a study that tested the relationship between interpersonal abilities and estimated interpersonal competence. (377) In line with the previously studied achievement models, Ames and Kammrath found that people who scored the lowest on their ability to read others' intentions and emotions greatly overestimated their abilities. (378) They guessed that they ranked in the sixtieth percentile when they were in the twelfth. (379) Conversely, participants in the top quartile assumed they would be in the sixty-fourth percentile when they were really in the eighty-eighth. (380) Ames and Kammrath concluded that people, in general, tend to be "poor judges of their own interpersonal sensitivity," especially those who score in the bottom percentile or who are inherently narcissistic. (381)

3. Hindsight Bias

When predicting possible outcomes before they occur, people are equally likely to say one outcome is more probable than the other. (382) From this experience comes the popular phrase "hindsight is 20/20;" after an outcome occurs it appears it was the only probable conclusion to an event or series of events. (383) As such, hindsight bias is when people judge outcomes as more probable from a hindsight perspective after being presented with the factual outcomes, as compared to judging the same outcomes as possibilities in foresight. (384)

Among the factors that influence hindsight bias is the surprise factor because it influences how the mind reconstructs pre-outcome predictions in three ways. (385) First, surprise is a direct metacognitive mental shortcut that is used to estimate the distance between an actual outcome and a predicted outcome. (386) Second, "surprise will trigger the deliberate process of sense making when it reaches a certain threshold." (387) Third, surprise "biases this process by enhancing the retrieval of surprise-congruent information and expectancy-based hypothesis testing." (388) Hindsight bias is not only affected by whether an outcome is favorable or unfavorable; it is also affected by the negative outcome's severity. (389) For example, in malpractice lawsuits, the more severe the negative outcome the more dramatic the juror's hindsight bias. (390) Susan and Gary LaBine proposed a scenario where a psychiatric patient told a therapist that she was contemplating harming another individual whom the therapist did not warn of possible danger. (391) Participants were given three possible outcomes where the threatened individual received no injuries, minor injuries, and serious injuries. (392) Participants were then asked to determine if they considered the doctor's actions negligent. (393) Participants in the serious injuries category not only rated the therapist as negligent but also rated the attack as more foreseeable. (394) Participants in the no injuries and minor injuries categories were more likely to see the therapist's actions as reasonable. (395) Additionally, hindsight bias is affected by the familiarity a person has with the task. (396) Specifically, consistent with the "expertise effect," the more comprehensive people's knowledge is in foresight, the less they are subject to hindsight bias. (397)

4. Optimism Bias

Optimism bias is the tendency for individuals to believe negative events are less likely to happen to them than to others and that they are more likely to experience good things than others. (398) Optimism bias has wide-ranging effects on behavior, decision-making, and, particularly, risk assessment. (399) While the aspects that produce or influence optimism bias are not known for certain, one 2009 study explored the basic function and conditions under which optimism and pessimism biases occur in social comparisons. (400) Optimism bias could be due to a desire to feel happy or maintain/enhance self-esteem, the "need to reduce anxiety associated with uncertain outcomes," the effects of egocentrism, or focalism. (401) However, these aspects have garnered less support than the role of controllability. (402) The widely-held hypothesis is that optimism bias is likely to occur when one perceives more control over the outcome. (403)

Optimism bias influences decision-making in many contexts, including when decisions are made "under risk and uncertainty." (404) This process, called affective decision making, involves rational and emotional processes which interact simultaneously to make decisions. (405) The rational process controls action while the emotional process perceives risk and is inherently optimistically biased." (406) The emotional process balances "a taste for accuracy" (modeled by a mental cost) and affective motivation, "the desire to hold a favorable personal risk perception." (407) For example, considering the demand for insurance, the probability distribution is based on an assessment of personal risk, so "the demand for insurance may depend on optimism bias." (408) Optimism bias is most likely to be present in decision making "when the issue at stake is personal future outcome" (success, financial gain, etc.), ability, or skill, and "when the mental cost function allows it." (409) Familiarity or competency with the "subject matter pertaining to risky or uncertain outcomes" makes it "easier to rationalize optimistic views," lowers "the mental cost of supporting [those views]," and makes optimism bias more likely. (410) In situations regarding skill or ability, information about the self is accessible, making the mental cost of holding a biased belief low. (411) The effect is the same in situations regarding risking personal outcomes when the subject matter is familiar (412) Further, individuals have the tendency to believe that they are able and have the skill required to control the outcome of events, and familiarity compounds that effect. (413) Thus, optimism bias's effects can be seen across various aspects of life involving assessments and choices (414)

5. Outcome Bias

Decisions should be based on possible outcomes of each result, the outcome probabilities, and the chooser's function. (415) If factors outside the chooser's control determine the decision's outcome, the outcome fails to follow the decision's quality. (416) The error occurs in evaluating the quality of the decision when that decision's outcome is already known (417) Such an outcome bias occurs in situations where people focus on outcomes when judging the decision rather than the decision-making process. (418) Thus, decisions that result in a good outcome are evaluated as "better" than decisions that result in bad outcomes. (419) Hindsight bias and outcome bias are distinct concepts: hindsight bias focuses on memory distortion to favor the actor. (420) Outcome bias focuses almost solely on outcome in deciding if a past decision was correct. (421)

To demonstrate outcome bias, Baron and Hershey tested whether knowledge of a decision's outcome affects evaluation of the decision itself. (422) To test their central question, they conducted five experiments. (423) In each experiment, participants were asked to rate fifteen medical decisions. (424) Specifically, they were asked "to evaluate the decision itself' (whether to perform surgery), and not the quality of the outcome produced by the decision. (425) In general, the researchers found consistent outcome bias across the five experiments. (426) In other words, decisions that resulted in favorable outcomes were rated as "better" than decisions that resulted in unfavorable outcomes. (427) The application of this rule in other fields such as business, law and medicine (428) has potentially immense implications.

Krishna Savani and Dan King theorized that another factor that undergirds outcome bias is people's tendency to under-emphasize the role of external factors outside the individual's control in causing outcomes. (429) Across three experiments, Savani and King demonstrated that construing "person-environment interactions as events (rather than as actions or choices) significantly" reduces the effects of outcome bias (430)

6. Overconfidence Bias

Overconfidence bias is an illogical belief in one's ability to perform a task derived from seemingly logical goals and desires. (431) This distorted overly-positive self-image leads people to make irrational errors in their decision-making processes. (432) These overconfident beliefs are subdivided into three different categories: (1) overestimation of one's actual performance, (2) overplacement of one's performance relative to others, and (3) excessive precision in one's beliefs (433) Generally, theorists believe that people derive these beliefs from wired optimism, blissful ignorance, or by engaging in selective memory (434) Pursuant to signaling theory, irrational overconfidence may serve to convince other people of the overconfident person's ability (435) Under the motivation theory, the focus is on what overconfident beliefs can convince the person holding the beliefs that they can successfully take on more ambitious goals (436)

The self-deception theory sometimes referred to as a selective memory theory, speculates that people have selective memories and can increase or decrease the likelihood of remembering an event correctly based on the utility of that belief. (437) The theory is based on two assumptions: (1) individuals, at a cost, can increase or decrease the probability of remembering an event or its interpretation; and (2) while individuals can manipulate their conscious self-knowledge, they are aware that incentives exist that result in selective memory. (438) Several features of human memory and error play into these assumptions. First, only part of individual information is readily available for processing, so no matter how much negative or positive information we may intake, not all of it is readily available to be used. (439) Second, information that is rehearsed is more easily remembered, so people who linger on praise and ignore criticism are more likely to remember the praise. (440) Finally, individuals can immediately discount information that threatens their self-esteem by seeking out evidence that deteriorates the negative nature (441) While it appears easy to deceive oneself, the second assumption of the theory is that this self-deception has limits. (442) Essentially, individuals will begin to realize that they are distorting their memory or misremembering facts. (443)

7. Hypothetical

Nicole Hamilton is the National Head of Black Sorority. She is well-educated and astute. Her goal in office is to move the needle on the sorority's hazing problem. She heard Hillary Clinton talk about implicit bias during her presidential campaign debate against Donald Trump. As such, she assumes that various forms of cognitive biases influence how members of her sorority approach hazing. However, she does not believe that such biases influence how she approaches hazing (bias blind-spot). Rather, she sees herself as reasonably well-versed in hazing, what underlies it, and how to address it. This knowledge stems from her prior experience of handling hazing incidents in her various leadership positions in Black Sorority. The problem is that Hamilton is wholly unaware of the research on hazing, and as such, is unaware of the universe of ideas about the issue beyond her personal experiences, leaving her overly-confident in her insights (Dunning-Kruger effect). Her confidence, nonetheless, leaves her with the belief that she will help eradicate hazing (overconfidence bias, and that under her administration, there will be fewer hazing incidents than in the past (optimism bias). After the sorority's first hazing death during her administration, Hamilton highlighted that there were telltale signs that it would have happened at that particular time, though there were no indicia of such (hindsight bias). One of the things that frustrated Hamilton was that she had eliminated harsh sanctions for hazing. This decision was based on the advice of a sorority member who was a researcher on zero-tolerance policies and found that such approaches exacerbate the problems that they seek to address. After the hazing-related death, and despite the research, she believed that the new policy played a major role in this incident (outcome bias).

C. Cognitive Biases and Commitment to a Course of Action

Scare tactics and zero tolerance policies--e.g., suspensions, expulsions, chapter dechartering--may frequently be used by black sororities to address hazing even though such policies are likely counter-productive. For example, there is growing evidence that preventative measures based on inducing fear or scare tactics may actually increase adolescents' desire to partake in risky behaviors. (444) For instance, preventative strategies targeting sexual behavior among adolescents have often focused on vivid and graphic fear appeals to discourage adolescents from having sexual intercourse, having multiple sex partners, and unprotected sex. (445) Researchers found that the use of persuasive message strategies indeed induces the perception of threat, but that these perceived threats are not significant enough to motivate and sustain behavioral change. (446) This failure is evident particularly in the United States, where the teen pregnancy rate is twenty pregnancies per 1,000 teenage girls (447)

Similarly, preventative measures that expose the dangers of smoking often spark motivation in cigarette smokers to stop smoking, but they do not necessarily activate the actual process of cessation. (448) Although there is open knowledge of the health impairments caused by cigarette smoking, it is still a significant cause of preventable death and disability in the United States. (449) While healthcare providers are often presented with the opportunity to educate and assist patients with smoking cessation, many report not adhering to guidelines due to lack of time, uncertainty of counseling effects, and fear of damaging rapport with patients. (450)

Zero-tolerance policies have been applied to a range of issues, including school discipline, illegal drugs, and violence. (451) While zero tolerance varies in definition, it is generally intended to express the unacceptance of targeted behaviors that, if committed, will be severely punished no matter how minor (452) Research suggests that zero tolerance is ineffective at reducing or deterring violence, classroom disruptions, or maintaining classroom safety. (453) Additionally, expulsion and suspension have shown to be counterproductive punitive actions associated with zero tolerance policies. (454) Students' likelihood to drop out of school and repeat offenses increased following suspension or expulsion. (455) Developmental psychopathologists concur that during adolescence, students are most susceptible to developing antisocial behaviors, displaying disruptive behaviors, and experiencing social and academic deficits. (456) Seclusion from teachers and peers is detrimental to students' social and academic success; a lack of social bonds is a critical augur in adolescents' delinquent behavior. (457) As such, a balance between positive reinforcers and negative consequences, effective classroom management plans, and individual programming is a more effective strategy in creating safer schools than removing students from their safety net of school. (458)

Over-regulative and authoritarian parents exhibit similar characteristics to zero-tolerance policies. (459) Highly restrictive parents who rely on punishment and threats, or are more demanding and directive, may harm social competence and inflict high psychological distress upon their children. (460) Longitudinal research results revealed that parental prohibition and disapproval of friendships lead to a greater predicted involvement with deviant peers and higher delinquency. (461)

In the context of hazing, zero-tolerance policies may simply exacerbate the problem, but black sororities use them regularly to address hazing either at the acquiescence or direction of their leaders (462) A host of cognitive biases may impair black sorority leaders' ability to adequately shift course. The reluctance to curb the zero-tolerance approach may stem from cognitive biases such as egocentric bias, hyperbolic discounting and present bias, learned helplessness, loss aversion, and threat-rigidity. These biases are discussed in the next section.

1. Egocentric Bias

Egocentric bias is the tendency to rely too heavily on one's own perspective and/or to have a higher opinion of oneself than reality. (463) Studies seeking to identify egocentric bias have demonstrated the wide "variety of ways in which people distort past recollections in order to enhance the present self." (464) The manifestation of the egocentric bias highlights the importance of the self in the processes of encoding and retrieving memories. (465) This strong role of self in these processes is referred to as the "self-reference effect," which emphasizes that "the self serves as a potent knowledge structure with a powerful influence on what we retain and later recall." (466) Joachim Krueger provided a theoretical framework for egocentric bias. (467) The author argues that "[t]he ego is as totalitarian as ever;" (468) it "shape[s] perception in such a way that it protects a sense of its own good will, its central place in the social world, and its control over relevant outcomes." (469) This bias allows for "significant adaptive benefits in people's sensitivity to their own experiences and attributes." (470) Further, the researcher claims that the basis of the egocentrism paradigm, the one that supports the egocentric bias, is that "people often make judgments under uncertainty." (471) This uncertainty, thus, makes people project their own ideas, especially when the opinions of others are not known. (472)

Schacter and his colleagues suggest that egocentric bias is closely related to consistency bias, "[the] tendency to reshape the past to make it consistent with present knowledge and beliefs." (473) Consistency bias is often used to help maintain self-stability, emphasizing once again the strength of the relationship between these two forms of bias (474) The consistency bias is illustrated by a 1986 study testing political attitudes in 1973 and then again in 1982 using a repeated measures design. (475) The results of this study show that individuals tend to misjudge their past attitudes as much more aligned with their current attitudes. (476) Another psychological construct strongly associated with egocentric and consistency bias is cognitive dissonance, "the psychological discomfort that results from conflicting thoughts and feelings." (477) Similar to consistency bias, cognitive dissonance provides individuals with self-stability and internal consistency. (478)

In elucidating how egocentric bias works, Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly studied it in the context of groups and teamwork. (479) They found that people's own contributions to a joint product were more frequently and easily recalled (480) They also found that people accept more responsibility for a group product than other group members attribute to them. (481) In addition, statements attributed to the self were recalled more accurately. (482) Further, when another group member's contributions were made more available to a participant, only then does that participate allocate "correspondingly more responsibility for the group decisions to the coparticipant." (483)

2. Hyperbolic Discounting and Present Bias

Hyperbolic discounting has been described as "a functional form of discounting that generates present bias." (484) Similarly, present-biased preferences are those that "give stronger relative weight to the earlier moment as it gets closer" when considering trade-offs between two future moments. (485) As such, psychologists and behavioral economists interpret "a person's loss of self-control or impulsive behavior as being related to a tendency to value immediate rewards over delayed future rewards." (486) Jin Pyone and Alice Isen suggest that present-biased preferences are closely related to the way that people think about self-control requiring situations:
   [P]eople behave impulsively when they are narrowly focused
   on only an immediate gain, neglecting the implications
   that their impulsive action has for the future. For example,
   according to action identification theory (citation
   omitted) and construal-level theory (citation omitted), a person
   thinking about his or her actions, along with their larger
   meanings, motives, and implications (high-level thinking),
   leads to engaging in planned behavior, whereas low-level
   thinking (not thinking in perspective) leads to responding
   thoughtlessly only to salient cues in the situation and thus to
   relatively greater impulsiveness. Consequently, when people
   are confronted with a situation in which delay of gratification
   is desirable, thinking of the situation at a high level can
   be helpful. (487)


For example, Charles Courtemanche and colleagues explored how present bias affects obesity. (488) They found that impatient individuals, those who place "relatively more emphasis on present costs such as food prices, as opposed to future costs such as health consequences of overeating," respond more strongly than do patient individuals to changes in food prices. (489) Consequently, they gain more weight when food prices fall (490) Greater impatience correlates with greater body mass index even when controlling for demographic characteristics such as "IQ, education, work hours, occupation type, income, and risk preference." (491) In another study, Tobias Kalenscher investigated the role of present bias in a person's decision to buy health insurance in developing countries (492) Specifically, he looked at why "take-up of affordable health insurance products in developing countries" is low despite their obvious benefits for the insurant. (493) He found that long-term interests in health insurance may be undermined by the annoyance of paying regular premiums without being ill. (494)

3. Learned Helplessness

Learned helplessness is a state in which a person experiences a sense of inability due to a persistent failure in similar contexts. (495) The seminal study in this area was conducted by Martin Seligman and Steven Maier. (496) In Part One of the study, three groups of dogs were placed in harnesses. (497) Group 1 dogs were briefly put in a harness and later released. (498) Groups 2 and 3 consisted of "yoked pairs" where each Group 2 dog was paired with a Group 3 dog. (499) Group 2 dogs were given electric shocks at random times, which the dog could end by pressing a lever. (500) Whenever a Group 2 dog was shocked, its paired dog in Group 3 was shocked for the same intensity and duration, but its lever could not stop the shock. (501) To a Group 3 dog, it seemed that the shock ended at random, because its paired dog in Group 2 caused the shock to stop. (502) As such, for Group 3 dogs, the shock was "inescapable." (503) In Part Two of the study, the same three groups of dogs were tested in a shuttle-box apparatus. (504) All the dogs could escape shocks on one side of the box by jumping over a low partition to the other side. (505) The Groups 1 and 2 dogs quickly learned this task and escaped the shock. (506) Most of the Group 3 dogs, which had previously learned that nothing they did had any effect on shocks, simply laid down and whined when they were shocked. (507)

While learned helplessness was originally studied in dogs, the theory quickly expanded to include people and their organizations. (508) With regard to the latter, for an organization to thrive, it must effectively use its resources. (509) This goal may be particularly challenging when the resource is people. (510) To maximize human resources, an organization must make its members aware that there is a direct link between their efforts and organizational outcomes. (511) However, where members see their efforts as unfruitful, learned helplessness may set in. (512) Even more, if failure is seen as an "internal/stable" by an organization member, low productivity, withdrawal, and job dissatisfaction may result. (513)

4. Loss Aversion

Rational choice theory states that humans make choices based on what is likely to provide the greatest amount of utility. (514) However, Prospect Theory approaches this issue in a radically different way. (515) Rather than humans making decisions on what is likely to provide the most utility, Prospect Theory states that, instead, humans make decisions regarding reference points. (516) The most common reference point, although not universally true, is the status quo. (517) Prospect Theory suggests that when humans make decisions, they focus on determining if that decision will likely result in a loss from the reference point or a gain from the reference point. (518) In light of this dynamic, loss aversion exists when people expect to feel a greater dissatisfaction from losing something that they already possess as opposed to gaining a similar item that they do not possess. (519) For example, Kahneman and Tversky estimated that monetary losses are perceived to have 2.25 times the effect that similar monetary gains would have. (520) Due to this, the way in which people frame the question will often times drastically affect how they answer it. (521) If people perceive the situation as a loss as compared to the reference point, they will likely avoid the situation and keep the status quo. (522) If, however, the same situation is seen as a gain from the reference point, humans are more likely to deviate from the status quo. (523)

5. Threat Rigidity

When an organization experiences a threat or crisis, threat rigidity occurs because the organization is more inclined to firmly focus on the one thing that it does well. (524) Dean Ramirez defines threat rigidity by explaining, "when faced with significant threat, organizations (like individuals), may close down, reduce information flow, engage in poor decision making, and limit divergent views." (525) Brad Olsen and Dena Sexton similarly define it as "the theory that an organization, when perceiving itself under siege ... responds in identifiable ways: Structures tighten; centralized control increases; conformity is stressed; accountability and efficiency measures are emphasized; and alternative or innovative thinking is discouraged." (526)

School systems are among the types of organizations that have been studied in the context of threat rigidity. (527) Ramirez identified several variables that may lead to threat-rigidity in school systems: (1) common core state standards, (2) gap elimination adjustment, (3) annual professional performance review, (4) high stakes assessments, (5) opt-out movement, (6) decreasing student enrollment, and (7) making annual yearly progress. (528) He explored threat-rigidity theory to explain why you have "moving teachers" versus "stuck teachers." (529) The fundamental distinction is in how one handles the challenges associated with those variables--i.e., the extent to which one retreats, closes down, and reduces information flow. (530) Importantly, Ramirez also found that the two most common catalysts of threat-rigidity were "when principals challenge the status quo" and then "when district offices introduces best practices." (531)

6. Hypothetical

Nova Helms is the National Head of Black Sorority. She seeks to substantially address the organization's long-standing hazing problem. Hazing expert and Black Sorority member, Holly Everest, reached out to Helms to recommend that the sorority embrace a research-based approach to addressing hazing. In fact, Everest indicated that research demonstrated that zero-tolerance policies exacerbate the issues that they are deployed to remedy. Given her background as a lawyer and former General Counsel of Black Sorority, Helms placed a lot of faith in zero-tolerance policies because her gut told her that they were effective (egocentric bias). She also had concerns about cutting any potential losses with the zero-tolerance policy in favor of the more distant potential rewards of investing in research-based solutions (loss aversion, present bias). After Black Sorority suffered its first hazing death under Helms's leadership, she told the other national board members that the sorority could not afford to invest in long-term hazing solutions. Instead, it needed to double-down on its zero-tolerance policy (threat rigidity). Given the sense that nothing would work, Helms and the national board were resigned to use the same methods that they had always used--zero-tolerance policies (learned helplessness).

D. Leaders and Their Advisors

To make the best decision possible, people often ask for the advice of others. (532) Individuals naturally want to seek advice to improve accuracy. (533) Despite the effort to seek out advice, many individuals often take their opinions more seriously than the opinions of the advisor due to the inherent informational asymmetry in access to evidence underlying each opinion. (534) Individuals are also more likely to listen to advice when they are less knowledgeable on the topic. (535) This trend is due to the fact that those with less knowledge have fewer pieces of evidence to use in support of their original opinion. (536) And decision-makers tend to listen to advice when they pay for it, as opposed to when it is free. (537)

Advice distance also plays a major role in whether an individual will take advice. The further away the advice is from an individual's initial estimate, the less likely the individual is to listen to the advice. (538) One of the main motivations behind seeking advice is to affirm and resolve discrepancies in an individual's beliefs. (539) Therefore, extremely discrepant opinions may fall outside an individual's latitude of acceptance and go unheeded. (540) Similarly, decision-makers take advice when it affirms their belief, because it is rewarding. (541) If the advice is an outlier from the average or from their belief, the receivers may underestimate the advice's value (542) This strategy allows the decision-maker to accept his or her opinion and cease exerting further cognitive effort on the subject. (543) Decision-makers are also more likely to be confident in advice if it is the consensus opinion. (544) Thus, if the majority of advisors deliver similar advice, the advice is more likely to be followed. (545) "[S]eeking and maintaining consistency" is a general "adaptive rule of behavior." (546) Last, merely repeating assertions and statements, individuals were more likely to believe they were valid. (547)

As in any organization, black sorority leaders need to turn to advisors to help them solve problems, including hazing. However, an advisor's advice is probably not always considered or implemented. (548) In this section, the authors explore why it is so difficult for black sorority leaders to get the best possible advice on how to address hazing. First, they rely on General Counsel, who may give effective advice on the state of the law but also may be clueless about how to address hazing as a human behavior. (549) Second, black sorority leaders may seek advisors who are more loyal to them than they are competent to the task at hand. (550) Third, the leaders may seek advisors who they merely happen to know or, fourth, who so happen to be a member of their sorority. (551) Fifth, black sorority leaders may reject the advice of individuals who they simply dislike. (552) Lastly, they may wholly reject expert advice because they do not believe that one could have expertise in this area. (553)

1. Law of the Instrument and Functional Fixedness

The key advisor who a black sorority national leader likely turns to discuss hazing is her organization's General Counsel. (554) The problem is that General Counsel are lawyers and likely see their role and the tool they employ--i.e., the law--in a unidimensional way. (555) As such, the way in which most lawyers address hazing could likely to exclude a universe of ideas, research, data, and best-practices that would prove helpful in addressing the problem. (556) The Legal Realist critiques the legal approach of contemplating the law only in books as opposed to the law in action. (557) As such, it is axiomatic that everything to a hammer looks like a nail. (558) This concept, known as the law of the instrument, is a cognitive bias where there is an over-reliance on a familiar tool. (559)

Also, the problem-solving experience of individuals in such a context may be constrained by their perception of the decision environment and the nature of the problem. (560) Social scientists call this constant functional fixedness: fixating on the former use of an object which inhibits considering the object's alternative functions for a new problem. (561) Functional fixedness is related to the "trial and error" learning process. (562) When decision-makers are challenged to find creative solutions to problems, functional fixedness places implicit constraints, established from prior learning, on their ability to generate creative alternatives. (563) In this model of decision-making, decision strategies result from rearrangement and reinforcement of successful responses from previous problem situations. (564) In other words, a decision maker is influenced by previously successful learned responses, called "sets," when she encounters future problems. (565) In general, the decisionmaker's success depends on the applicability of a set to a new problem. (566) If the new problem differs from the old, functional fixedness constrains the individual to recent uses that are not relevant to the new problem's solution. (567)

Functional fixedness is overcome with innovative solutions. (568) Finding an innovative solution requires noticing a new or obscure feature of the problem and constructing a solution that exploits that feature. (569) By identifying features that are often overlooked, the problem can be reinterpreted and object functions can be re-encoded. (570) For instance, repeatedly presenting a stimulus and requiring a different association for each new presentation can prompt original thinking. (571) Other basic tactics include brainstorming and synectics. (572)

Rachel Arnon and Shulamith Kreitler's study demonstrates that "meaning training" can help subjects overcome functional fixedness and solve problems faster. (573) Meaning training is a systematic way to restructure people's abstractions of a problem scenario. (574) Strategies for meaning training can be unspecific, assigning meaning values on a broad range of dimensions, or specific, focusing on dimensions of meaning that are relevant to the solution. (575) Arnon and Kreitler's study required subjects to fix an incomplete circuit using a screwdriver as an electrical conductor, a function a screwdriver does not typically do. (576) Subjects completed meaning training by providing three different answers to a list of questions about referents (577) in the task (light bulb, screwdriver, wire). (578) The questions during meaning training targeted various dimensions of object meaning such as purpose, potentialities for action, domain of application, material, similarity relationships, etc. (579) Meaning training expanded the potential for multidimensionality of the referents by targeting dimensions that were subject to fixedness. (580)

2. Negative Selection

Some leaders who wish to maintain as much power as possible for as long as possible, choose subordinates who are incapable of challenging authority. (581) Such negative selection exists in strict hierarchies, where dictators will do anything to stay in power; and as such, they purposefully assign ill-suited candidates to positions beneath them. (582) Further, the leader that negatively selects her underlings hopes that they will be so incompetent that they will be unable to judge if it is in their interest to betray their leader. (583)

Nepotism can play a role in negative selection as well. (584) Hiring family members or friends puts leaders at ease because they feel that they can trust close ones to not betray them. (585) Negatively selecting subordinates might allow leaders to keep their position in the short-term, but it typically does not work out well in the long-term. (586) If no one is competent enough to do her job, the organization will fall apart (587) because the effects of negative selection can be amplified due to the behavior of the incompetent subordinates. (588) Loyal middle-managers or committee chairs usually try to emulate the actions of their leader. (589) Therefore, they may also hire or select incompetent subordinates to work for them. Eventually the entire organization will be a hierarchy of incompetence. (590)

3. Mere Exposure Effect

The mere exposure effect is people's tendency to develop a preference for things merely because they are familiar with them. (591) In his early research on the subject, Robert Zajonc demonstrated that simply exposing people to a familiar stimulus (i.e., words) leads them to rate it more positively than other, similar stimuli which had not been presented. (592) In subsequent research, Shelia Murphy and Zajonc proposed "that affective reactions [i.e. liking] can be elicited with minimal stimulus input." (593) They tested this hypothesis by comparing the effects of affective and cognitive priming under "extremely brief (suboptimal) and longer (optimal) exposure durations." (594) During brief exposures, "only affective primes produced significant shifts in [participants'] judgments of novel stimuli." (595) Their findings "suggest that when affect is elicited outside of conscious awareness, it is diffuse nonspecific, and its origin and address are not accessible." (596) During longer exposure, "this pattern of results was reversed such that only cognitive primes produced significant shifts in judgments." (597)

These findings are unsurprising. After all, advertisers utilize mere exposure effect by regularly displaying their ads. (598) This repeated exposure increases consumers' familiarity with, and thus their affinity toward, the advertised product. (599) Basically, people are more likely to try something that they are familiar with than taking the risk of trying something that they know nothing about. For example, in his study, Marc Vanhuele found that if an advertised brand "is encountered at a later point in time, the original presentation[s] to and evaluation of the advertisement--if ever formed--may not be retrievable from memory." (600) However, that did not mean that the brand itself did not still look familiar, "which may lead to recognition and liking." (601)

4. Not Invented Here

The not-invented-here ("NIH") syndrome is the "tendency of a ... group of stable composition to believe it possesses a monopoly of knowledge of its field." (602) NIH leads a group to "reject new ideas from outsiders to the likely detriment of its performance." (603) Jens Leker and Philipp Herzog suggest that the problem within an organizational system is highlighted by the cultural dimensions and synergies around the NIH syndrome, risk taking, and management support of innovators. (604) An open innovation system is made to use the "external and internal knowledge sources to accelerate internal innovation and, on the other hand, the use of external paths to markets for internal knowledge." (605) As such, open innovation cultures are less affected by NIH than inward looking cultures. (606) But for companies who are afraid of failure, which is a possibility when creating new innovations, (607) companies use NIH as a crutch to refuse to adopt outside innovative technology. (608) Even more, the use of NIH also may serve as an ego defense against the fear of looking incompetent to others or other organizations. (609)

5. Reactive Devaluation

Reactive devaluation is a cognitive bias that occurs when a compromise is suddenly desired less "after its offered than before it was offered. (610) Conceptually, it is often applied in the context of negotiations. (611) Several motivations explain this occurrence. (612) Among them is the "fear of private information," which suggests that "a negotiator might devalue an adversary's offer on the assumption that, if one's adversary is proposing a particular set of agreement terms, there is a good chance that those terms are good for the proposer and bad for the recipient." (613) Trust is an important factor in negotiations and, as the potential for deception comes into play, adversaries begin to question whether they can "trust the other side to continue moving toward the agreed upon endpoint." (614) Another is "spite," which occurs when a negotiator "might devalue an offer made by that adversary because the proposal's implicit acceptability to the proposer reduces its value to the recipient." (615)

6. Rejection of Expertise

Despite expertise in society and in organizations, there seems to be a growing tide of expertise rejection. (616) While expertise can be defined in general or complex terms, Nichols finds expertise to be those professionals and intellectuals, "who have mastered particular skills ... and who practice those skills ... as their main occupation in life." (617) Further, these individuals' understandings of a subject is considerably more in depth than the average person. (618) For this reason, the public turns to experts for advice, education, or solutions in particular areas of knowledge. (619) Naturally, such knowledge lends experts a degree of authority over their designated fields. (620) While there have been cases in which laypeople have outsmarted the expert (i.e. a patient corrects a doctor's misdiagnosis), generally, experts are more likely to be correct and less likely to make mistakes in their areas of expertise. (621) This means that while a patient may diagnose himself from WebMD, a doctor, on the other hand, has formal training and credentials which signal his or her quality. (622) True expertise is not only a kind of knowledge that the public relies on, but is also a knowledge that has been culminated through a combination of education, talent, experience, and peer affirmation. (623)

Harry Collins and Robert Evans define three areas that are used to judge experts: their credentials, their track record, and their experience. (624) These "meta-criteria" serve as the external indicators outsiders use to judge between experts. (625) Credentials are used to verify the expert's qualifications; they often include certificates, which serve as evidence of previous achievement of proficiency. (626) However, while credentials are a necessary indicator of expertise, they are not alone sufficient measures of expertise because they prescribe no way to measure for ubiquitous discrimination, political judgment, moral judgment, or other individual qualities. (627) In fact, none of the proposed measurements of expertise can be used in and of themselves. (628) For instance, while an expert's track record might serve as additional proof of expertise, a track record alone excludes too many experts (e.g. the ubiquitous discrimination of the public or fields where track records take an extensive amount of time to establish). (629) A third measure of expertise is the expert's experience. (630) While having a lot of experience does not necessarily guarantee an individual's competence in a specific area, it does serve as a way to gauge the boundary between expert and layperson. (631) Thus, experience, track records, and credentials combine to help individuals form a general impression of the expert in question; a decision is then reached via "a build-up of small cues" based on the judge's previous experience with the expert. (632)

As noted, the difficulty that comes with defining expertise is often due to human biases. (633) One source of disagreement when classifying expertise comes from first impressions about experts that have deep influences on one's beliefs about the expert personally and the expert's work product. (634) This initial impression results in over-trust or skepticism when considering the expert's future credibility. (635) Ing-Haw Cheng and Alice Hsiaw find that disagreement about expert credibility and substance is caused by an imbalance of trust in the expert's credibility. (636) When lacking trust in an expert's credibility, individuals view his research as poor which further feeds the notion that the expert is unqualified. (637) When individuals receive conflicting outside information about an expert, they make errors when forming beliefs about the value of the expert's advice. (638) If the information confirms an individual's belief, she will overreact if she had a good first impression of the expert and underreact if she had a bad first impression. (639)

Nichols begins his book by referencing a quote from Isaac Asimov, which states: "The strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way through our political and cultural life, nurtured by the false notion that democracy means that 'my ignorance is just as good as your knowledge.'" (640) This quote captures the tone of Nichol's argument, which finds that the American public's idealism and egotism are two main contributors to the fall of expertise in America. (641) Most of the population has access to an abundant source of knowledge (i.e. the Internet), yet these same individuals often criticize intellectual achievement and logic. (642) By undermining the practice of knowledge and rejecting the basic rules of evidence, our society is creating a "collapse of ... division between professionals and laypeople." (643)

Part of the challenge to expertise, Nichols believes, is American culture and its egoistic tendencies. (644) Our increasingly narcissistic culture encourages an "irrational conviction" that everyone is as smart as everyone else. (645) Ignorance is partly to blame, but individuals also rely on celebrities and public figures to provide information on vaccines, mental disorders, and other serious health issues, which are all areas in which these individuals have no qualifications, training, or experience. (646) Despite technological advances and the potential new sources of knowledge that the public could garner from these devices, the public space is increasingly dominated by an "assortment of poorly informed people, many of them 'autodidacts' who are disdainful of formal education and dismissive of experience." (647) This hostility toward knowledge (i.e. that there is a hierarchy of knowledge) is not only a significant threat to expertise, but to democracy and civic well-being. (648)

Another challenge to expertise comes from Internet culture. (649) With the Internet comes a collapse in communication between experts and laypeople due to the "illusion of expertise" provided by the Internet's limitless supply of facts. (650) Having such an immense form of instantaneous communication erodes the use of reflection. (651) People then act on instinct; they become argumentative, narrow minded, and careless with conversation. (652) However, the greatest threat the Internet has to expertise is that it can make people dumber by fooling individuals into thinking they have learned something when they are in fact "immersed in [ ] more data they do not understand." (653) Not only are people swimming in information, but they are also often unwilling to hear out the opinions of others, reducing their ability to argue persuasively and accept correction when wrong. (654) Technology and capitalism take advantage of this tendency. (655) For example, Facebook gathers information through what an individual "likes" and then gives the individual new information from only those limited sources. (656) This practice reaffirms confirmation bias (i.e. the tendency to look for information that only confirms what you believe, to accept only facts that strengthen preferred explanations, and to dismiss data that challenge what we already accept as truth). (657) Beyond biases lies the even greater danger of just plain inaccurate information. (658) For example, the Internet, through sites like Wikipedia, makes no distinction between the layperson and the professional. (659) But, while a volunteer may write on whatever interests her at any given moment, an expert employs her expertise every day. (660)

The beginning of the public's mistrust of experts took root in the mid-1950s. At this time, an "overwhelming complexity produced feelings of helplessness and anger among a citizenry that knew itself increasingly to be at the mercy of smarter elites." (661) This feeling resulted in an extreme resentment toward experts because they were needed too much. (662) One way these frustrations were relieved is through a campaign of intellectual equality. This campaign was first ignited by low-information voters' (i.e., people who may vote, yet are generally poorly informed about issues) insistence that every opinion be treated as truth; moreover, to "disagree [with a person] is to disrespect [that person]." (663) The public's disgruntlement with intellectual hierarchy has caused a "national bout of ill temper, a childish rejection of authority in all its forms coupled to an insistence that strongly held opinions are indistinguishable from facts." (664) The equality bias present in the American public is based on a human need to be accepted as part of a group. (665) For example, people tend to believe that everyone deserves equal say in a debate. (666) This belief can be damaging during group decision-making, because in order to make optimal decisions, group members should weigh their respective opinions according to their relative competence. (667) Equality bias is exacerbated when less competent group members advocate for their views, and the more competent member of the conversation defers to those points of view despite these points being demonstrably wrong. (668) When experts' knowledge is used like an "off-the-shelf convenience as needed and only so far as desired," the value of their opinion and the public's overall respect for their advice is lower. (669)

7. Hypothetical

Nicolette Hayes is the National Head of Black Sorority. She believes that she needs help in addressing the sorority's hazing problem. She made her mentee, Hillary Anderson, national Hazing Advisor. Anderson has no hazing expertise, but Hayes trusted her immensely because Anderson was fiercely loyal to Hayes (negative selection). Olivia Ellison, an outside expert on hazing, but not a Black Sorority member, is known as a leading expert on hazing. She heard that Black Sorority was undertaking the task of addressing hazing. As such, she wrote Hayes a letter detailing some research-based approaches that Black Sorority could take to address hazing. Hayes rejected those suggestions because Ellison was not a Black Sorority member (not invented here). Candace Marshall, a Black Sorority member who critiqued Hayes's leadership, wrote Hayes to inform her of research-based approaches to addressing hazing. These approaches were based on Marshall's twenty years of hazing research. Given Hayes's distaste for Marshall, due to Marshall's past critiques of Hayes, she rejected those recommendations (reactive devaluation). Several members of Black Sorority: a behavioral economist, an organizational behaviorist, and a social psychologist, wrote Hayes and shared their research-based recommendations for addressing hazing. They each spent roughly ten years studying hazing as part of their research agendas. Hayes rejected their ideas. In part, she trusted Anderson's perspective more because she knew Anderson (mere exposure effect). She also had her own perspective based on personal experience and information she "Googled" about hazing. To Hayes, experts likely knew no more than her on the topic of hazing (rejection of expertise). She also had faith in the General Counsel's ideas, though they were simply rooted in the law and narrowly focused on ways to investigate and sanction (mere exposure, functional fixedness).

V. CONCLUSION

Hazing has been around for centuries. (670) Victims, parents, school and university officials, military leadership, the fraternity and sorority community, as well as legislators have struggled--for generations--to discern what lies at the root of this issue. (671) In that grouping, these individuals, and the institutions they represent, have searched for a set of solutions that will move the proverbial needle on hazing. (672) One of the challenges to finding workable solutions to address hazing has likely been that the problem has been too narrowly defined. It has been convenient to solely look to the perpetrators as the only actors in this dynamic. However, as seen in this article, the direct perpetrators of hazing are likely only one of many actors and dimensions that perpetuate hazing. The authors focus their attention on black sororities and underscore the role that leadership plays in supporting and propelling hazing, even if unwittingly. In sum, while law is a salient constraint placed on human behavior, if legislators and judges, and other concerned individuals, seek to address hazing, they must consider the broad spectrum of human behavior to make these goals a reality.

Gregory S. Parks * and E. Bahati Mutisya *

* Associate Dean of Research, Public Engagement, & Faculty Development and Professor of Law at Wake Forest University School of Law.

** Associate, Parker Poe Adams & Burnstein LLP.

(1) Proverbs 29:18 (King James Version).

(2) See generally Caitlin Flanagan, Death at a Penn State Fraternity, THE ATLANTIC, NOV. 2017; John Hechinger, Get the Keg Out of the Frat House, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2017.; Cf Walter M. Kimbrough, The Hazing Problem at Black Fraternities, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 17, 2014.

(3) See Kate Reilly, 'Those Families Are Changed Forever.' A Deadly Year in Fraternity Hazing Comes to a Close, TIME, Dec. 21, 2017.

(4) See Paul Ruffins, Frat-ricide: Are African American Fraternities Beating Themselves to Death?,(Feb. 19, 2019) DIVERSEEDUCATION.COM, https://diverseeducation.com/article/8216/.

(5) Gregory S. Parks et al., White Boys Drink, Black Girls Yell ...: A Racialized and Gendered Analysis of Violent Hazing and the Law, 18 J. GENDER, RACE, & JUST. 93 (2015).

(6) Id. at 145-46.

(7) Id. at 147.

(8) Id.

(9) Id.

(10) Id.

(11) Parks, supra note 5, at 147.

(12) Id.

(13) Id.

(14) Id.

(15) These findings are bolstered by Deborah Whaley's and Eugena Lee-Olukoya's research. See generally DEBORAH ELIZABETH WHALEY, DISCIPLINING WOMEN: ALPHA KAPPA ALPHA, BLACK COUNTERPUBLICS, AND THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF BLACK SORORITIES 1 (2010); Eugena Lee-Olukoya, Sisterhood: Hazing and Other Membership Experiences of Women Belonging to Historically African American Sororities (Dec. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Illinois State University) (on file with author).

(16) Hazing at Naval Academy, ch. 453, 18 Stat. 203 (1874); see also A. Catherine Kendrick, Note, Ex Parte Barran: In Search of Standard Legislation for Fraternity Hazing Liability, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 407, 409 (2000).

(17) See GREGORY S. PARKS, MAKING SENSE OF UNITED STATES ANTI-HAZING STATUTES STATE BY STATE 2-3 (2018) (noting that the only states that do not have an anti-hazing law are Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming).

(18) Gregory Scott Parks, Note, Toward a Critical Race Realism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 683, 692 (2008) (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism: Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1222-24 (1931)).

(19) United States v. Safarini, 257 F. Supp. 2d 191, 200 (D. D.C. 2003) ("[T]he core purpose of the criminal law [is] to regulate behavior by threatening unpleasant consequences should an individual commit a harmful act.") (quoting Warren v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 659 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

(20) LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, IMPACT: HOW LAW AFFECTS BEHAVIOR 250 (2016).

(21) Id. at 2.

(22) Id. at 3.

(23) Id. at 5.

(24) Michael Ungar et al., Annual Research Review: What is Resilience within the Social Ecology of Human Development, 54 J. OF CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 348 (2013).

(25) Id. at 354; Jennifer Watling Neal & Zachary P. Neal, Nested or Networked? Future Directions for Ecological Systems Theory, 22 SOC. Dev. 722, 722-26 (2013).

(26) Id. at 726 (inner quotations omitted).

(27) Social Ecological Model, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, (https://www.cdc.gov/cancer/crccp/sem.htm (last updated Oct. 27, 2015).

(28) See Jenna Strawhun, Psychological Factors That Underline Hazing Perceptions: A Mixed Methods Study 7 (May 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska) (on file with author).

(29) WHALEY, supra note 15, at 96.

(30) See id.at 94-96.

(31) See Lee-Olukoya, supra note 15, at 47-48, 139-40.

(32) Id. at 139; Antonio Dewan Jenkins, On Line: The Pledging Experiences [of Members] of Black Greek-Lettered Organizations from 1970 to 1990 8, 10 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Memphis) (on file with author); Shawn D. Peoples, Tragedy or Tradition: The Prevalence of Hazing in African American Fraternities and Sororities 46 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University) (on file with author).

(33) See WHALEY, supra note 15, at 95-96.

(34) See Lee-Olukoya, supra note 15, at 107-08.

(35) Id. at 108.

(36) Id. at 152-53.

(37) Id. at 109-10; WHALEY, supra note 15, at 95-96.

(38) WHALEY, supra note 15, at 110-11.

(39) Lee-Olukoya, supra note 15, at 93.

(40) Id.

(41) Id.

(42) Cf. id. at 162.

(43) See id.

(44) Id. at 165.

(45) See Lee-Olukoya, supra note 15, at 35.

(46) Id. at 160.

(47) Id. at 127-29.

(48) Id. at 165.

(49) Id. at 162.

(50) See id. at 165-66.

(51) Lee-Olukoya, supra note 15, at 115.

(52) Id.

(53) Id! at 117.

(54) Id. at 165.

(55) In our discussion of various hazing incidents, the headings reflect the names of the victims. Where the victim's name is not known, the place of the incident is used in the header.

(56) Ohio v. Brown, 630 N.E.2d 397, 399 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).

(57) Id.

(58) Mat 399-400.

(59) Id. at 400.

(60) Id.

(61) Id.

(62) Brown, 630 N.E.2d at 400.

(63) Id.

(64) Id.

(65) Id.

(66) Id.

(67) Women in Hazing Case Allowed to Graduate, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 18, 1998, at 5c.

(68) Id.

(69) Id.

(70) Id. (inner quotations omitted).

(71) Id.

(72) Id.

(73) Women in Hazing Case Allowed to Graduate, supra note 67, at 5C.

(74) Id.

(75) Id.

(76) Id.

(77) Id.

(78) Cheo Hodari Coker, A Pledge to Die, SAVOY, May 2003, at 90.

(79) Id.

(80) Id.', Linda Deutsch, Sorority Sued in Drowning, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 26, 2003, at 17A.

(81) Coker, supra note 78.

(82) Kristal Brent Zook, Swept Away, ESSENCE, Sept. 2003, at 180.

(83) Id.

(84) Jose Cardenas, Drowning Victim Remembered, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at B3.

(85) Zook, supra note 82, at 180.

(86) Sandra Banks & Jill Leovy, Drownings Raise Hazing Questions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2002, at B1.

(87) Id.

(88) Id.

(89) Erika Hayasaki, Victim's Mother Starts Anti-Hazing Group, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at B3.

(90) Id.; Lanea Austin, Drowning Victim's Mother Forms Anti-Hazing Group, L.A. SENTINEL, Oct. 17, 2002, at Al.

(91) Depositions Begin in AKA S100MLawsuit, JACKSONVILLE FREE PRESS, June 18, 2003, at 5.

(92) Lanea Austin, Family of Woman Who Died Pledging AKA Files $100 Mil. Lawsuit, L.A. SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 2002, at A1.

(93) Coker, supra note 78.

(94) Zook, supra note 82.

(95) Id.

(96) Id.

(97) Lanea Austin, Dying to Belong, Los Angeles Sentinel, Sept. 19, 2002, at A1 (internal quotations omitted).

(98) Id.

(99) Zook, supra note 82.

(100) Austin, supra note 97.

(101) Id. (internal quotations omitted).

(102) Daniel Hernandez, Suit Alleges Hazing in Death, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at B3.

(103) Id.

(104) Banks & Leovy, supra note 86.

(105) Id.

(106) Jones v.N. Ill. Univ., No. 95 C 50162, 1996 WL 19453, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 2, 1996).

(107) Id.

(108) Id.

(109) Id.

(110) Id. at *2.

(111) Id. at *1.

(112) See Jones, 1996 WL 19453, at *2.

(113) Id. at *3.

(114) Id.

(115) Id. at *4.

(116) Id.

(117) Id. at *5.

(118) Shelley Rossetter, Bid to End UT Penalty Delayed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 8, 2010, at IB.

(119) Id. (internal citations omitted).

(120) Id.

(121) Howard Altman, Hazing Allegations Send Sorority Sisters to Court, TAMPA TRIB., May 8, 2010, at 6.

(122) Id.

(123) Rossetter, supra note 118.

(124) Altman, supra note 121.

(125) Rossetter, supra note 118.

(126) Id.

(127) Id.

(128) J. David McSwane, Sorority Booted for Hazing: Campus Police Reports Unveil Culture of Malicious Harassment in Zeta Phi Beta, TENN. TRIB., Sept. 3, 2009, at 13 A.

(129) Id.

(130) Id

(131) Id.

(132) Id.

(133) Id.

(134) McSwane, supra note 128.

(135) Id.

(136) Id.

(137) Id.

(138) Id.

(139) Gregory S. Parks, INVICTUS: HAZING AND THE FUTURE OF BLACK GREEK-LETTER ORGANIZATIONS 86 (2015)

(140) Id.

(141) Id.

(142) Id.

(143) Lawrence C. Ross, Hazing Hurts Black Greek Life, THE MIAMI TIMES, Mar. 16, 2011 at 2A (internal citations omitted).

(144) Zeta Phi Beta Sorority Sisters Charged with Assault, Hazing, SPEAKIN' OUT NEWS, Mar. 16, 2011, at 2.

(145) Id.

(146) Id.

(147) Id.

(148) Id.

(149) Id.

(150) Lisa M. Krieger, Former SJ State University Student Sues School and Sorority for Hazing, THE MERCURY NEWS Sep. 3, 2010, https://www.mercurynews.eom/2010/09/03/ former-sj-state-university-student-sues-schooland-sorority-for-hazing/.

(151) Id.

(152) Tamar Lewin, Hazing Accusations Against a Sorority, N. Y. TIMES Oct. 5, 2010, (internal citations omitted).

(153) Id.

(154) Id.

(155) Id

(156) Id.

(157) Id.

(158) Krieger, supra note 150.

(159) The Aurora, Sigma Rho Gamma Sorority, Inc. (Sept. 30, 2018) https://www.sgrhol922.org/SGRho/About_Us/The_AURORA/SGRho/SHRho_About_Co py_of_The_AURORA.aspx?hkey=7aee6a97-2318-4d31-be60-17017853bf99.

(160) Lewin, supra note 152.

(161) Krieger, supra note 150.

(162) Lewin, supra note 152.

(163) Former Rutgers Student Testifies About Paddling by Sorority Members, HOME NEWS TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 2011.

(164) Id.

(165) Id.

(166) Id.

(167) Id.

(168) Id.

(169) Update: Rutgers Sorority Suspended in Wake of Hazing Investigation, HOME NEWS TRIBUNE, Jan. 27, 2010.

(170) Sorority Hazing Charges Moved to Municipal Court, Star-Ledger, Apr. 13, 2010, at 19.

(171) Tom Haydon, Six Sorority Sisters Battling on Paddlings Rutgers Doesn't Punish Them, but Trial Set, STAR-LEDGER, May 11, 2010, at 18.

(172) Id.

(173) See Rutgers Sorority Hazing Charges Reduced, ASBURY Park Press, Apr. 12, 2010.

(174) Id.

(175) Id.

(176) This assessment is not confined to black sororities; rather, it is a dynamic seen across black Greek-letter organizations. See Lewin, supra note 152.

(177) See Lee-Olukoya, supra note 15, at 42-45 ("As a means to transmit culture and traditions, as well as build a lifelong commitment to the organizational ideals, pledging and the hazing that follow is a valued means of articulation.") Additionally, many Greek-letter organizations have pages on their websites where the international president shares a message to the community on behalf of the organization.

(178) Herbert S. Kindler, Two Planning Strategies: Incremental Change and Transformational Change, 4 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 476, 476 (1979).

(179) Id.

(180) Nick De La Mare, Organization Transformation by Design: Prototyping the Future, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 9, 2011).

(181) Kindler, supra note 178, at 477-78.

(182) Id.

(183) Regina Eisenbach et al., Transformational Leadership in the Context of Organizational Change, 12 J. ORG. CHANGE MGMT. 80, 83 (1999).

(184) Id.

(185) Id.

(186) William H. Bommer et al., Changing Attitudes About Change: Longitudinal Effects of Transformational Leader Behavior on Employee Cynicism About Organizational Change, 26 J. OF ORG. BEHAV. 733, 733-34 (2005).

(187) Id.

(188) See id. at 735-736.

(189) Id. at 735 (alteration to the original).

(190) Mat 738.

(191) Tom Karp & Thomas I.T. Helgo, From Change Management to Change Leadership: Embracing Chaotic Change in Public Service Organizations, 8 J. CHANGE MGMT. 85, 88 (2008).

(192) Id.

(193) See id. at 90-91.

(194) Id. at 91.

(195) Id. at 92-94.

(196) Bommer, supra note 191, at 735-36.

(197) Id. at 735-36.

(198) Kindler, supra note 178, at 481.

(199) Cf. William Brown & Douglas May, Organizational Change and Development: The Efficacy of Transformational Leadership Training, 31 J. MGMT. DEV. 520, 533 (2012) (finding that "intensive year long [sic] transformational leadership development and training" was needed to increase productivity and that transformational leadership can be developed and increased).

(200) Malcolm Higgs & Deborah Rowland, What Does It Take to Implement Change Successfully? A Study of the Behaviors of Successful Change Leaders, 47 J. OF APPLIED BEHAV. Sci. 309, 328-29 (2011).

(201) Id. at 311-12.

(202) See Joris Van der Voet et al., Implementing Change in Public Organizations: The Relationship Between Leadership and Affective Commitment to Change in a Public Sector Context, 18 PUB. MGMT. REV. 842, 843(2016).

(203) Id.

(204) See id. at 843-45.

(205) Id. at 844-45.

(206) Id. at 845.

(207) Id. at 845-46.

(208) See Van der Voet et al.. supra note 202, at 846.

(209) See id. at 856.

(210) Barber Griffith-Cooper & Karyl King, The Partnership Between Project Management and Organizational Change: Integrating Change Management with Change Leadership, 46 PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT 14, 15 (2007).

(211) Id. at 17-18.

(212) Id.

(213) Id.

(214) Id. at 20.

(215) Malcolm Higgs & Deborah Rowland, Emperors with Clothes On: The Role of Self-Awareness in Developing Effective Change Leadership, 10 J. OF CHANGE MGMT. 369, 37071 (2010).

(216) Id. at 371.

(217) Id.

(218) Id.

(219) Id. at 373.

(220) Id. at 377.

(221) Higgs & Rowland, supra note 200, at 382-83.

(222) Id. at 382.

(223) Id. at 382.

(224) Andre Martin & Christopher Ernst, Exploring Leadership in Times of Paradox and Complexity, 5 INT'L J. OF BUS. SOC'Y 82, 83-84 (2005).

(225) See id.

(226) Angelique Keene, Complexity Theory: The Changing Role of Leadership, 32 Indus. & Com. Training 15, 16(2000).

(227) Mary Uhl-Bien & Russ Marion, Complexity Leadership in Bureaucratic Forms of Organizing: A Meso Model, 20 Leadership Q. 631, 632 (2009) (alteration to original).

(228) Id.

(229) Mike Kitson, Leadership and Complexity, integral leadership Rev. (April 1, 2014),http://integralleadershipreview.com/11308-41-leadership-complexity/.

(230) Uhl-Bien & Marion, supra note 227, at 632 (inner quotations omitted).

(231) Mary Uhl-Bien et al., Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting Leadership from the Industrial Age to the Knowledge Era, 18 LEADERSHIP Q. 298, 299 (2007).

(232) Nicholas Clarke, Model of Complexity Leadership Development, 16 HUM. RESOURCES DEV. INT'L 135,137(2013).

(233) Id.

(234) Id.

(235) Id.

(236) Id.

(237) Id. at 138

(238) Benyamin B. Lichtenstein et. al., Complexity Leadership Theory: An Interactive Perspective on Leading in Complex Adaptive Systems, 8 EMERGENCE: COMPLEXITY & ORG. 2, 3 (2006).

(239) Brenda Geer-Frazier, Complexity Leadership Generates Innovation, Learning, and Adaptation of the Organization, 16 EMERGENCE: COMPLEXITY & ORG. 105, 112 (2014).

(240) Id. at 112-13.

(241) Charles McMillan, Five Competitive Forces of Effective Leadership and Innovation, 31 J. BUS. STRATEGY 11,11 (2010).

(242) See id. at 11-12.

(243) Id. at 11.

(244) See id. at 11-12.

(245) Cf. id. at 13 ("[Organization's competitive position centers on a configuration of unique competences and relationships. The task of top management is to adjust and reconfigure resources and relationships as external conditions change or erode competitive positioning.").

(246) Id. at 12.

(247) McMillan, supra note 241, at 12.

(248) See id. (stating that low innovation organizations are caused by management).

(249) Id.

(250) See id.

(251) See id. at 13-14.

(252) Id. at 13.

(253) McMillan, supra note 241, at 12.

(254) Id.

(255) Id. at 13.

(256) See id.

(257) Louise Underdahl, Stealth Leadership Influences the Culture of Innovation, 10 J. LEADERSHIP STUD. 70, 70 (2016).

(258) Id. at 71.

(259) See id. at 70-71.

(260) See id. at 71 (stating that leaders must inspire workers to embrace innovation because "fostering a culture of innovation is vital in a fiercly competitive global economy").

(261) See id. at 70.

(262) Id. at 70.

(263) Felice Williams & Roseanne J. Foti, Formally Developing Creative Leadership as a Driver of Organizational Innovation, 13 ADVANTAGES IN DEV. HUM. RES. 279, 279 (2011).

(264) Id.

(265) Id. at 279-80.

(266) Id. at 286-87.

(267) Id. at 288-89.

(268) Id. at 283-87.

(269) McMillan, supra note 241, at 20.

(270) Id.

(271) See id.

(272) See id.

(273) Id. at 20-21.

(274) M. Mendes et al., Promoting Learning and Innovation in Organizations Through Complexity Leadership Theory, 22 J. TEAM PERFORMANCE MGMT. 301, 302 (2016); Bhaskar Prasad & Paulina Junni, CEO Transformational and Transactional Leadership and Organizational Innovation: The Moderating Role of Environmental Dynamism, 54 MGMT. DECISION 1542, 1543 (2014).

(275) Phillip Davies, The Cassandra Complex: How to Avoid Generating a Corporate Vision That No One Buys Into, in SUCCESS IN SIGHT 103, 104 (Andrew Kakbadse et al., eds. 1998).

(276) Id.

(277) Id. at 104.

(278) Id. at 103.

(279) Id.

(280) Id. at 117.

(281) Id. at 104.

(282) Peter M. Senge, The Leader's New Work: Building Learning Organizations, 32 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 7, 13-14 (Oct. 15, 1990), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/ the-leaders-new-work-building-learningorganizations/.

(283) Davies, supra note 275, at 273.

(284) Id.

(285) See e.g., LEWIS A. COSER, GREEDY INSTITUTIONS: PATTERNS OF UNDIVIDED COMMITMENT 4 (1974).

(286) Id. at 5.

(287) See e.g., Ted Brader, Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 388, 388 (2005).

(288) See id.

(289) Cf. Austin Belcak, Employers are Overlooking Non-Traditional Candidates and It's Costing Them, FORBES, Apr. 13, 2017,(finding that traditional candidates are usually preferred in the job market).

(290) See id.

(291) See e.g., Dawn S. Carlson & K. Michele Kacmar, Learned Helplessness as a Predictor of Employee Outcomes: An Applied Model, 4 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 235, 236 (1994).

(292) Id.

(293) LAURENCE F. PETER & RAYMOND HULL, THE PETER PRINCIPLE: WHY THINGS ALWAYS GO WRONG 26-27 (William Morrow & Company, Inc. eds., 1969).

(294) COSER, supra note 285, at 1.

(295) Id.

(296) Id. at 3.

(297) Id. at 4.

(298) Id.

(299) Id. at 5. Examples consist of prisons, psychiatric hospitals, boarding schools, etc. (quoting ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 4 (1961)).

(300) COSER, supra note 285, at 6 (interal citations omitted).

(301) Id.

(302) Id. at 7.

(303) Id. at 7-8.

(304) PETER & HULL, supra note 293, at 27.

(305) Id. at 26-27.

(306) Id. at 27.

(307) Id. at 29.

(308) Id. at 44-45.

(309) GAUTAM MUKUNDA, INDISPENSABLE: WHEN LEADERS REALLY MATTER 10, 30 (2012).

(310) See id.

(311) Id. at 8.

(312) Id. at 13-14.

(313) Id. at 17.

(314) Id. at 10-11.

(315) See MUKUNDA, supra note 309, at 12-13.

(316) Id.

(317) Id. at 10, 12-13.

(318) Id. at 12.

(319) Id.

(320) Id. at 10-11.

(321) MUKUNDA, supra note 309, at 18.

(322) Kim Girard, Why Most Leaders (Even Thomas Jefferson) Are Replaceable, HARV. BUS. SCH. WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Sept. 2012), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/why-most-leaderseven-thomas-jefferson-are-replaceable.

(323) See id.

(324) See id.

(325) Id.

(326) Id.

(327) See id.

(328) Max Ufberg, Do Presidents Usually Follow Through on Promises?, PACIFIC STANDARD (Jan. 21, 2015). https://psmag.com/news/presidents-usually-follow-promises-98726. In Ufberg's article, he references a 1984 study, completed by Bellarmine College Political Science Professor Michael Krukones, which found that seventy-five percent of presidential campaign promises are actually kept. Krukones expressed these findings in his book. Promises to Performance, which examined the presidencies from Woodrow Wilson to Jimmy Carter. In addition, the article also contains information gathered by American University Political Scientist, Jeff Fishel, who investigated the John F. Kennedy years through Ronald Reagan. The overall conclusion of both these studies was that presidents usually do try to fulfill their campaign promises, and when they are unable to, it is mainly because of congressional interference; see also Brian Goldsmith, It Turns Out That Politicians Keep Their Word, THE ATLANTIC (June 11, 2016) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/promises-promises/485981/. In his article, Goldsmith references the Fishel and Krukones studies, but also adds one by Gerald Pomper of Rutgers University who "tracked party platforms from 1944-1976 [sic] and found that two-thirds of the winning candidate's policy pledges were at least partly fulfilled after four years." Id.

(329) See DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION 125 (2007).

(330) CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 283-91 (2016).

(331) See WESTEN, supra note 329, at xiii-xv.

(332) William G. Christ, Voter Preference and Emotion: Using Emotional Response to Classify Decided and Undecided Voters, 15 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 249 (1985).

(333) Ted Brader, Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions, 49 Am. J. OF POL. SCI. 388, 390 (2005).

(334) George E. Marcus & Michael B. Mackuen, Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 672, 677-78 (1993).

(335) Matthew A. Baum, Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk Show Circuit, 49 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 213, 216 (2005).

(336) Id. at 213.

(337) Monika L. McDermott, Candidate Occupations and Voter Information Shortcuts, 67 THE J. OF POL. 201,217 (2005).

(338) Cf. Ivo Bischoff & Henrik Egbert, Social Information and Bandwagon Behavior in Voting: An Economic Experiment, 34 J. OF ECON. PSYCHOL. 270, 278 (2013) (finding that voters' preconceived expectations about how other voters in the same elections will vote "shapes individuals' decisions to approve or reject policy proposals.").

(339) See McDermott, supra note 337, at 201.

(340) Lasse Laustsen, Decomposing the Relationship Between Candidates' Facial Appearance and Electoral Success, 36 POL. BEHAV. Ill, 789 (2014).

(341) Daniel Stockemer & Rodrigo Praino, Blinded by Beauty? Physical Attractiveness and Candidate Selection in the U.S. House of Representatives, 96 SOC. SCI. Q. 430, 440 (2015).

(342) Id.

(343) David Brockington, A Low Information Theory of Ballot Position Effect, 25 POL. BEHAV. 1,20 (2003).

(344) GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 4-7(1971).

(345) See id. at 29-30.

(346) Id.

(347) See id. at 30-32.

(348) See id. at 67-68.

(349) See id. at 72, 80.

(350) See Allison, supra note 344, at 77.

(351) Cf. id. at 79 ("To one who understands the structure of the situation and the face of the issue-both determined by the organizational outputs-the formal choice of the leaders is frequently [limited].").

(352) See id. at 6.

(353) Id. at 144-45.

(354) Cf. id. at 148-49 (stating the President should use his power of persuasion to convince others it is in their best interest to "climb aboard").

(355) See id.

(356) See ALLISON, supra note 344, at 148-49, 168.

(357) See id. at 148-49, 171.

(358) Cf. id. at 168 (stating that when an issue arises, there are many faces of an issue that advisors can take a stand on, but the President has the final decision).

(359) See Martie G. Haselton et al., The Evolution of Cognitive Bias, in THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOL. 724, 725 (David M. Buss ed., 2005).

(360) Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 369 (2002); Richard F. West et al., Cognitive Sophistication Does Not Attenuate the Bias Blind Spot, 103 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 506, 506 (2012).

(361) West et al., supra note 360, at 507.

(362) Id. at 508.

(363) Id.

(364) Id. at 510.

(365) Id. at 511, 513.

(366) Id. at 513.

(367) West et al., supra note 360, at 513.

(368) Id. at 514.

(369) See Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1121-22 (1999).

(370) Id. at 1122-23.

(371) Id.

(372) See id. at 1123-30.

(373) Id. at 1124.

(374) Id.

(375) Kruger & Dunning, supra note 369, at 1125.

(376) Id. at 1129.

(377) See Daniel R. Ames & Lara K. Kammrath, Mind-Reading and Metacognition: Narcissism, Not Actual Competence, Predicts Self-Estimated Ability, 28 J. OF NONVERBAL BEHAV. 187 (2004).

(378) Id. at 200.

(379) Id.

(380) Id.

(381) Id. at 200, 205.

(382) Cf. Rudiger F. Pohl, Ways to Assess Hindsight Bias, 25 Soc. COGNITION 14, 14 (2007) (stating that "people tend to exaggerate what they had known in foresight")..

(383) See id. at 15; Twenty-Twenty Hindsight, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/twentytwenty%20hindsight (last visited Jan. 28, 2019.

(384) See Pohl, supra note 382, at 14-15.

(385) Patrick A. Muller & Dagmar Stahlberg, The Role of Surprise in Hindsight Bias: A Metacognitive Model of Reduced and Reversed Hindsight Bias, 25 SOC. COGNITION 165, 172 (2007).

(386) Id. at 165.

(387) Id. at 172 (alteration in original).

(388) Id. at 165.

(389) Susan J. Labine & Gary Labine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 512 (1996).

(390) Id.

(391) See id. at 501.

(392) Id. at 504.

(393) Id.

(394) Mat 509-510.

(395) Labine & Labine, supra note 389, at 510.

(396) Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A MetaAnalysis, 48 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147,147 (1991).

(397) Id. at 162; Ralph Hertwig et al., Hindsight Bias: How Knowledge and Heuristics Affect Our Reconstruction of the Past, 11 MEMORY 357, 366 (2003).

(398) Geeta Menon, Ellie J. Kyung & Nidhi Agrawal, Biases in Social Comparisons: Optimism or Pessimism? 108 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 39,39 (2009).

(399) See id. at 39-40.

(400) Id.

(401) Id. at 40.

(402) Id.

(403) Id. At 40-41.

(404) Anat Bracha & Donald J. Brown, Affective Decision Making: A Theory of Optimism Bias, 75 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 67,68 (2012).

(405) Id. at 67.

(406) Id. at 68.

(407) Id.

(408) Id.

(409) Id.

(410) Bracha & Brown, supra note 404, at 68.

(411) Id. at 77.

(412) Id

(413) Id.

(414) See id.

(415) Krishna Savani & Dan King, Perceiving Outcomes as Determined by External Forces: The Role of Event Construal in Attenuating the Outcome BiasI, 130 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 136, 136 (2015).

(416) Id.

(417) Id.

(418) See Jonathen Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569. 569-70 (1988).

(419) Larry D. Gruppen et al.. Outcome Bias and Cognitive Dissonance in Evaluating Treatment Decisions, 69 ACAD. MED. S57, S57 (1994).

(420) See Pohl, supra note 382, at 14-15.

(421) See Gruppen et al., supra note 419, at 557.

(422) Baron & Hershey, supra note 418, at 570-71.

(423) Id. at 569.

(424) Id. at 571.

(425) Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).

(426) Id. at 578.

(427) Id.

(428) Savani & King, supra note 415, at 136.

(429) Id. at 137.

(430) Id. at 143.

(431) See Ronald Benabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation, 117 THE Q. J. OF ECON. 871, 872 (2002); Don A. Moore & Paul J. Healey, The Trouble with Overconfidence, 115 PSYCHOL. REV. 502, 502 (2007).

(432) See Moore & Healey, supra note 431, at 502.

(433) Id.

(434) Benabou & Tirole, supra note 431, at 884-85.

(435) Id. at 877.

(436) Id. at 877-78.

(437) Id. at 886.

(438) Id. at 886-89.

(439) Id. at 886-87.

(440) Benabou & Tirole, supra note 431, at 887.

(441) Id. at 887-88.

(442) See id. at 888.

(443) Id.

(444) Kim Witteitte & Kelly Morrison, Using Scare Tactics to Promote Safer Sex Among Juvenile Detention and High School Youth, 23 J. OF APPLIED COMM. RES. 128, 140 (1995).

(445) Id. at 130.

(446) Mary O'Grady, Just Inducing Fear of HIV/AIDS Is Not Just, 11 J. OF HEALTH COMM. 261,261 (2006).

(447) Trends in Teen Pregnancy and Childbearing, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., https://www.hhs.gov/ash/oah/adolescent-development/reproductive-health-and-teen-pregnancy/ teen-pregnancy-andchildbearing/trends/index.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).

(448) See Deborah M. Scharf & William G. Shadel, Graphic Warning Labels on Cigarettes Are Scary, but Do They Work? THE RAND BLOG, (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.rand.org/blog/2014/09/graphic-warning-labels-on-cigarettes-are-scarybut.html.

(449) See, e.g. Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data statistics/fact sheets/health effects cig smoking/index.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).

(450) Sofie L. Champassak et al., A Qualitative Assessment of Provider Perspectives on Smoking Cessation Counseling, 20 J. OF EVALUATION IN CLINICAL PRAC. 281, 284 (2014).

(451) Lynne Magor-Blatch, Beyond Zero Tolerance: Providing a Framework to Promote Social Justice and Healthy Adolescent Development, 28 AUSTRALIAN EDU. & DEV. PSYCHOLOGIST 61, 61-62, 70 (2011).

(452) Russell J. Skiba & Kimberly Knesting Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence: An Analysis Of School Disciplinaty Practice, 92 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUTH DEV. 17,20 (2001).

(453) Russell J. Skiba & Reece L. Peterson, School Discipline at a Crossroads: From Zero Tolerance to Early Response, 66 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 335, 337 (2000).

(454) Skiba & Knesting, supra note 452, at 32.

(455) Id. at 32-33.

(456) Magor-Blatch, supra note 451, at 65.

(457) Id. at 65, 69.

(458) See Skiba & Knesting, supra note 452, at 36-38.

(459) Magor-Blatch, supra note 451, at 65.

(460) Ronnie Janoff-Bulman & Sana Sheikh, Unintended Consequences of Moral "Over-Regulation," 3 EMOTION REV. 325, 325-26 (2011).

(461) Loes Keijsers et al., Forbidden Friends as Forbidden Fruit: Parental Supervision of Friendships, Contact with Deviant Peers, and Adolescent Delinquency, 83 CHILD DEV. 651, 651 (2012).

(462) See e.g., Kyle Swenson & Amber Ferguson, AKA Chapter at Small Georgia College Embroiled in Sexual Misconduct Investigation, WASH. POST (May 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/05/01/ aka-sorority-chapterat-small-georgia-college-embroiledin-sexual-misconduct- investigation/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.65b6cacaa206.

(463) Daniel L. Schacter et al., The Seven Sins of Memory: Implications for Self, 1001 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 226,233 (2003).

(464) Id.

(465) Id.

(466) Id. at 233-34.

(467) See Joachim I. Krueger, Return of the Ego--Self-Referent Information as a Filter for Social Prediction: Comment on Karniol, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 585 (2003).

(468) Id. at 589.

(469) Id. at 585.

(470) Id. at 589.

(471) Id.

(472) Id.

(473) Schacter et al., supra note 463, at 234.

(474) Id.

(475) Id.

(476) Id.

(477) Id. at 235.

(478) Id. at 235-36.

(479) See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322 (1979).

(480) Id. at 322.

(481) Id.

(482) Id.

(483) Id.

(484) Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Present Bias: Lessons Learned and To Be Learned, 105 THE AM. ECON. REV. 273,273 (2015).

(485) Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 THE AM. ECON. REV. 103, 103 (1999).

(486) Jin Seok Pyone & Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect, Intertemporal Choice, and Levels of Thinking: Increasing Consumers' Willingness to Wait, 48 J. OF MARKETING RES. 532, 533 (2011).

(487) Id. at 533.

(488) Charles Courtemanche et al., Impatience, Incentives and Obesity, 125 THE ECON. J. 1 (2015).

(489) Id. at 2.

(490) Id.

(491) Id. at 4.

(492) Tobias Kalenscher, Attitude Toward Health Insurance in Developing Countries from a Decision-Making Perspective, 7 J. OF NEUROSCIENCE PSYCHOL. & ECON. 174 (2014).

(493) Id.

(494) Cf. id. at 179 (looking at a premium payer's annoyance to pay regular premiums).

(495) Kendra Cherry, What is Learned Helplessness and Why Does It Happen?, VERYWELL MIND (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-learned-helplessness2795326.

(496) See Martin E. P. Seligman & Steven F. Maier, Failure to Escape Traumatic Shock, 74 J. of EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1 (1967).

(497) Id at 2-3.

(498) Id.

(499) Id.

(500) Id. at 2.

(501) Id. at 2-3.

(502) Seligman & Maier, supra note 496, at 2-3..

(503) Id. at 2-5.

(504) Id. at 5.

(505) Id.

(506) Id. at 5-7.

(507) Id.

(508) See Carlson & Kacmar, supra note 291, at 235.

(509) Id.

(510) See id.

(511) Id.

(512) Id. at 235-36.

(513) See id. at 239.

(514) Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 830, 830 (2012).

(515) See id

(516) Id.

(517) Id.

(518) Id.

(519) Id. at 836. Loss aversion was first proposed as an explanation for the endowment effect-the fact that people place a higher value on a good that they own than on an identical good that they do not own. See Daniel Kahnmen et al., Experimental Test of the endowment effect and the Coase Theorem. 98 J. OF POL. ECON. 1325, 1338-39 (1990).

(520) Zamir, supra note 514, at 836.

(521) Id.

(522) Id. at 836-37.

(523) Id.

(524) Buzz Word: Threat-rigidity Effect, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (June 26, 2009), https://economictimes. Indiatimes.com/ buzz-word-threat-rigidity-effect/articleshow/4704294.cms.

(525) Alan J. Daly, Rigid Response in an Age of Accountability: The Potential of Leadership and Trust, 45 EDUC. ADMIN. Q., 168, 173 (2009).

(526) Brad Olson & Dena Sexton, Threat Rigidity, School Reform, and How Teachers View Their Work Inside Current Education Policy Contexts, 46 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 9, 15 (2009).

(527) See id. at 13.

(528) Dean L. Ramirez, The Most Important "Audit:" Reviewing Trust Leadership and Threat-Rigidity Within Your School District, NYSCOSS FALL LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, (Sept. 29, 2015).

(529) Id.

(530) Daly, supra note 525, at 173.

(531) Ramirez supra note 528.

(532) Ilan Yaniv & Shoham Choshen-Hillel, Exploiting the Wisdom of Others to Make Better Decisions: Suspending Judgment Reduces Egocentrism and Increases Accuracy, 25 J. of BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 427,427 (2011).

(533) Id.; Ilan Yaniv & Maxim Milyavsky, Using Advice from Multiple Sources to Revise and Improve Judgments, 103 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 104, 104 (2007).

(534) Ilan Yaniv, Receiving Other People's Advice: Influence and Benefit, 93 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1,6 (2004).

(535) Id. at 6.

(536) Id.

(537) Francesca Gino, Do We Listen to Advice Just Because We Paid for It? The Impact of Advice Cost on Its Use, 107 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 234, 234 (2008).

(538) Yaniv, supra note 534, at 3.

(539) Id.

(540) Id.

(541) Ilan Yaniv et al., Spurious Consensus and Opinion Revision: Why Might People Be More Confident in Their Less Accurate Judgments'? 35 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 558, 558 (2009).

(542) Id.

(543) Id.

(544) Id.

(545) Id.

(546) Id at 561.

(547) Yaniv, supra note 541, at 562.

(548) See generally id.

(549) Cf. John Amer, The General Counsel as Senior Leader: More Than "Just a Lawyer," KOM FERRY INSTITUTE (June 10, 2015), https://www.kornferry.com/institute/general-counsel-senior-leader-more-justlawyer, ("[Attorneys are trained and valued for their technical skills and expertise," but can distinguish themselves only by knowing more than legal knowledge.).

(550) Cf. Donald P. Moynihan & Alasdair S. Roberts, The Triumph of Loyalty Over Competence: The Bush Administration and the Exhaustion of the Politicized Presidency, 70 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 572, 573-74 (July 2010) (finding that techniques to tighten control of the government include prizing loyalty over merit).

(551) Cf. id. (finding that leaders appoint those who are known personally or have the same credentials as the leader).

(552) See Susan Heitler, Why Doesn't She/He Listen to Me? 10 Possibilities, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (July 2, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/resolution-not-conflict/201407/ why-doesnt-shehe-listenme-10-possibilities.

(553) See Kevin Daum, 17 Reasons People Aren't Listening to You, Inc. (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.inc.com/kevin-daum/17-reasons-people-aren-t-listening-to-you.html, (finding that people may ignore your advice if they can tell you are talking outside of your expertise).

(554) Cf. Alan Henry, How to Talk to a Lawyer (and When You Need One), LIFE HACKER (June 18, 2014), https://lifehacker.com/how-to-talk-to-a-lawyer-and-when-you-need-one1592509960 (finding that the sooner one turns to a lawyer with a potential problem, the better).

(555) See John Nivala, Zen and the Art of Becoming (and Being a Lawyer), 15 UNIV. OF PUGENT SOUND L. REV. 387, 398-99 (1992).

(556) Cf. id. (stating that legal reasoning fails to consider the world outside).

(557) Karl N. Llewelln, Some Realism About Realism--Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 12439-40 (1931).

(558) Law of the Instrument, THE DECISION LAB, https://thedecisionlab.com/bias/law-of-theinstrument/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2019).

(559) Id.

(560) Ronald N. Taylor, Perception of Problem Constraints, 22 MGMT. Sci. 22, 22 (1975).

(561) Robert E. Adamson, Functional Fixedness as Related to Problem Solving: A Repetition of Three Experiments, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288,288 (1952).

(562) Taylor, supra note 560, at 23-24.

(563) Id.

(564) Id. at 23.

(565) Id.

(566) Id. at 23-24.

(567) Id. at 23-26.

(568) Taylor, supra note 560, at 27; see Tony McCaffrey, Innovation Relies on the Obscure: A Key to Overcoming the Classic Problem of Functional Fixedness, 23 PSYCHOL. SCI. 215, 215-16 (2012).

(569) McCaffrey, supra note 568, at 16.

(570) Id. at 15-16.

(571) Taylor, supra note 560, at 27.

(572) Id.

(573) Rachel Arnon & Shulamith Kreitler, Effects of Meaning Training on Overcoming Functional Fixedness, 3 CURRENT PSYCHOL. RES. & REVIEWS, 11 (1984).

(574) See id. at 12.

(575) See id at 11.

(576) Id. at 14.

(577) Id. at 12 (defining referent as an object that carries meaning because of a prior physical or psychological event)..

(578) Id. at 16.

(579) Arnon & Kreitler, supra note 573, at 14-15.

(580) Id. at 20-21.

(581) Cf. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, Dictators and their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off 9 J. OF EUR. ECON. ASS'N 903, 903 (2011). at 915 (finding a less competent lieutenant is chosen when a dictator is weak).

(582) Id. at 903.

(583) See id. at 914.

(584) See id. at 909.

(585) See id ("The ultimate manifestation of emphasis on loyalty at the expense of competence is the appointment of close relatives to government positions.").

(586) See id. at 21.

(587) Cf. Egorov & Sonin, supra note 581, at 908 (remarking that Hitler used negative selection to promote incompetent close subordinates even when the stakes were rising).

(588) See id., at 915-16.

(589) See Karen Higginbottom, The Dangers of Contagious Leadership Behaviors, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/karenhigginbottom/2017/10/03/ the-dangersof-contagious-leadershipbehaviors/#2b262de23d1 f.

(590) Cf. Egorov & Sonin, supra note 581, at 921-22 (stating that a dictator's refusal to choose competent subordinates leads to incompetence throughout the policies, economic performance, welfare of the dictatorship, and leads to poor performance long term).

(591) Robert B. Zajonc, Mere Exposure: A Gateway to the Subliminal, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 224, 225 (2001).

(592) Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPH SUPPLEMENT 1,21 (1968).

(593) Shelia T. Murphy & Robert B. Zajonc, Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective Priming with Optimal and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposures, 64 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 723,723 (1993).

(594) Id.

(595) Id.

(596) Id.

(597) Id.

(598) See Marc Vanhuele, Why Familiar Stimuli Are Better Liked. A Study on the Cognitive Dynamics Linking Recognition and the Mere Exposure Effect, 22 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 171,171 (1995).

(599) See id, at 171-72.

(600) Id. at 171.

(601) Id.

(602) Nobuo Takahashi & Nobuyuki Inamizu, Mysteries of NIH Syndrome, 11 ANNALS OF BUS. ADMIN. SCI. 1, 3 (2012) (internal citations omitted).

(603) Id. (internal citations omitted).

(604) See generally PHILLIP HERZOG, OPEN AND CLOSED INNOVATION: DIFFERENT CULTURES FOR DIFFERENT STRATEGIES 100-200 (2d ed. 2011).

(605) Id. at 2.

(606) Id. at 188.

(607) Id. at 113.

(608) See id. at 101.

(609) See David Antons & Frank T. Piller, Opening the Black Box of "Not Invented Here ": Attitudes, Decision Biases, and Behavioral Consequences, 29 ACAD. OF MGMT. PERSP. 193, 197 (2015).

(610) Russell Korobkin, How Neutrals Can Overcome the Psychology of Disputing: The Effect of Framing and Reactive Devaluation in Mediation, 24 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 83,84 (2006).

(611) See id.

(612) See id.

(613) Id. (internal citations omitted).

(614) Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 389, 391 (1991).

(615) Korobkin, supra note 610, at 84.

(616) Cf. Tom Nichols, How America Lost Faith in Expertise: And Why That's a Giant Problem, Foreign Affairs, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (March, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/ 2017-02-13/howamerica-lost-faith-expertise, ("I feel we are moving beyond a natural skepticism to the death of the ideal of expertise itself.").

(617) TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT MATTERS 29 (2017).

(618) See id.

(619) Id.

(620) Id. at 29-30.

(621) Id. at 36.

(622) Id. at 31, 36.

(623) SEE NICHOLS, supra note 617, at 29-35.

(624) HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE 67-68 (2007).

(625) Id.

(626) Id. at 67.

(627) Id.

(628) See id. at 67-68.

(629) Id. at 68.

(630) COLLINS & EVANS, supra note 624, at 68.

(631) Id.

(632) Id. at 101.

(633) Ing-Haw Cheng & Alice Hsiaw, Distrust in Experts and the Origins of Disagreement 1 (Brandeis U. Dep't of Econ. and Int'l Bus. School, Working Paper No. 110R2, updated June 2017), available at https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:brd:wpaper: 110r2.

(634) Id. at 17.

(635) Id. at 17-18.

(636) See generally id. at 33-34.

(637) See id. at 23-26.

(638) See id. at 23.

(639) Cheng & Hsiaw, supra note 633, at 23.

(640) NICHOLS, supra note 617, at 1.

(641) See generally id.

(642) See id. at 2-3.

(643) Id. at 3.

(644) See id. at 4.

(645) See id. at 4, 7.

(646) NICHOLS, supra note 617, at 3-4.

(647) Id. at 14.

(648) See id.at 20, 21.

(649) See id. at 107-13.

(650) Id. at 106.

(651) Id. at 111-112.

(652) See NICHOLS, supra note 617, at 45.

(653) Id. at 119 (finding that the least competent people who surf the web are the least likely to realize they are not learning anything; these individuals mistake outsourced knowledge for internal knowledge).

(654) See id. at 224-25.

(655) Id. at 138-139.

(656) Id.

(657) See id. at 47-48; Cheng & Hsiaw, supra note 633, at 23 (addressing the issue of confirmation bias).

(658) See NICHOLS, supra note 617, at 118.

(659) See id. at 125.

(660) Id. at 125.

(661) Id. at 18.

(662) Id. at 18-19.The reliance of expertise referred to here is regarding the expert's role in complex government decisions at the time (i.e., World Wars, Cold War, etc.). The public's frustration with experts grew because they could not understand the intricacies and logic used to make or explain current political decisions.

(663) Id. at 25. (stating how the author is concerned that low-information voters, despite their ignorance, still have a strong influence on national debates).

(664) Nichols, supra note 617, at 28.

(665) See id. at 65.

(666) Ali Mahmoodi et al., Equality Bias Impairs Collective Decision-Making Across Cultures, 112 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD, OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 3835, 3835 (2015).

(667) Id.

(668) Id. at 3838-39.

(669) NICHOLS, supra note 617, at 4.

(670) See Kendrick, supra note 16, at 407.

(671) See id.; Sean Rossman, Parents of Dead Hazing Victims Have Never Gathered Like This. Here's What They Want, USA TODAY (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.usato day.com/story/news/nation-now/2018/02/22/ parents-dead-hazing-victims-have-nevergathered-like-this-heres-what-theywant/360731002/.

(672) See Rossman, supra note 671.
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