Germany's new "security architecture"? Long-term unemployed and rent-a-cops.
In Germany, this "extended family" (1) also includes municipal public-order forces that have been growing significantly since the early 1990s, but are not yet part of the new security architecture. This lack of integration is perceived as an "open flank" in the security architecture and has been sharply criticized by the German public service's largest monthly newspaper (Lehmann, 2011: 7). Compared to those of the state police, the salaries offered by private firms are distinctively poorer. The reach of the latter now includes the control of stationary and moving traffic, and command over the parks and public squares frequented by marginalized groups. Recently, larger public fire brigades, the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), and the Federal Agency for Digital Radio of Security Authorities and Organizations (BDBOS) have been integrated into the "policing family" and the new security architecture. Thousands of long-term unemployed are currently being appointed as safety and security guards in German cities under the guidance of nonprofits through work (re)integration measures based on workfare (Eick, 2011a). In these parapolicing deployments, the long-term unemployed become involuntary involved through "Hartz IV," a labor-market integration scheme. They are "activated" as neighborhood runners, square masters, area watch, urban ambassadors, or residential supervisors (Eick, 2008a; 2011 a). When a recently established "activation" project equipped its personnel with red jackets and black berets, some media (unjustifiably) spoke of a recurrence of the Guardian Angels (Le Ker, 2011), which had been a short-lived phenomenon in Germany (Beck, 2004). (2)
More likely, ordinary citizens will staff volunteer (unsalaried) militias, police forces, Security Partnerships, Volunteering Police Services, Security and Order Partnerships, or Neighborhood Watch Committees (Putter and Kant, 2000; Eick, 2008a). With or without police guidance, parts of the populace assume security tasks and patrol villages, towns, and cities in the name of security and in support of "neat" neighborhoods. With 165,000 employees in 3,500 companies, private security companies constitute the second-largest force after the state police (Eick, 2008b). This article analyzes Germany's allegedly new security architecture and its respective "cornerstones": a commercial element, private security officers, and the workfare parapolice of "activated," long-term unemployed. Together, they form an extremely dangerous "critical infrastructure."
First, rent-a-cops and the workfare parapolice represent the lowest end of a highly profitable security market. Their wages and qualification levels are extremely low, and the legal justification for their deployment is very thin. Second, this merging of two previously distinct spheres, labor-market (re)integration and internal security, is a neoliberal response to the economic crisis. Third, at stake are concerns over transparency, democratic control, and civil and human rights. Fourth, the underlying neocommunitarian ideologies that come with the deployment of such forces could be characterized as a "caretakerization" of the urban populace.
Since the mid-1970s, private security companies have successively penetrated public space in Germany and started to connect with state police (Hoffmann-Riem, 1977; Beste, 2000; Olschok, 2002; Eick, 2006a, 2007; Briken, 2011b). In German cities, these "family members" are now ubiquitous. For most residents, they are indistinguishable from one another and from the police, which do not necessarily oversee their private-sector counterparts. A common feature of their duties is that of providing Sauberkeit, Ordnung, and Sicherheit, or cleanliness, order, and security (SOS services) to their customers.
The Diffusion of Workfare and Policing
A May 2009 New Left Review article on the neoliberal politics of the Red-Green coalition rightly states that "German Social Democracy had finally steeled itself to the social retrenchment and deregulation of the labor market from which Christian Democracy, throughout its long years in power, had flinched" (Anderson, 2009: 8). And the conservative daily, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, stressed that the "German low-wage sector has been rapidly growing during bygone years.... This development was politically intended and has been initiated by the Red-Green federal government with its Agenda politics" (Astheimer, 2010:12). By autumn 2003, the Red-Green federal coalition had passed a package of measures, dubbed Agenda 2010. The Agenda comprised the standard ingredients that Jessop (2002) and others (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Brenner et al., 2003; Leitner et al., 2007) characterize as "actually existing neoliberalism": cutting the dole, raising the retirement age, outsourcing health insurance, reducing subsidies, abolishing craft requirements, extending shopping hours, and extending the low-wage sector (cf. Anderson, 2009; Eick, 2011a). This has been camouflaged by the notion that "there is no alternative" (TINA) to these decisions if the country is to cope with, overcome, and/or prevent an economic crisis.
These politics continue today and have been intensified by the Black-Yellow coalition (the Christian Democrats, or CDU, and the Free Democrats, or FDP), whose credo remains a neoliberal austerity strategy. The persistent and increasing commodification of society is enforced by privatization, deregulation, and liberalization (Jessop, 2002). Nation-states compete socioeconomically with each other, as well as with regions, cities, and even districts. Within these processes, all political fields of action, including criminal and security policies, have been subsumed under the logic of manageralism and are subject to the primacy of economic indices. Management methods have been developed for the police (Shearing, 1992; Gaston and King, 1995; Magers, 2004; Barthel and Schmitt, 2008), whose concerns encompass everything from criminal prosecution and protection against threats to public safety to local crime prevention, the latter dealing with "subjective feelings of insecurity," and controlling the "deteriorating" neighborhoods of the urban poor (Kury, 1997; Hughes, 1998; Crawford, 2009). In addition, the urban quarter and the street take center stage in criminal prosecution and security politics, with the claim that space has criminalizing effects (Belina, 2007; in this volume).
Attempts to tackle long-term unemployment also attacked the long-term unemployed by characterizing them as unwilling to work and in need of being "activated." Thus, justifications for workfare and labor-market policies matched those for security politics. The linked programs that were initiated thus intermingled security and order politics with workfare in urban spaces (Eick, 2011 a). Within this process, workfare and security provision have become increasingly indistinguishable, framed by the ineluctable logic according to which the social and security must be commodified, or converted into a "product."
Despite significantly different backgrounds in terms of qualifications, legal authorization, wages, and status, a particular division of labor has evolved among the police, rent-a-cops, and the long-term unemployed in One-Euro-Jobs (Briken, 2011b). Indeed, they perform very similar tasks. It is not accurate, though, to qualify that division of labor as a "withdrawal of the police" from "ordinary surveillance and attendance occupations," or even as "a retreat from enforcing particular norms" (Behr, 2008: 59). The opposite is true, for instance, in the federal German program, the Socially Integrated City, with its 570 program areas (BMVBS, 2008; Eick, 2011a), and in the less-standardized Crime Prevention program, with its over 2,000 officially recognized crime prevention committees (BKA, 2006; Eick, 2011b). In each of these programs, the police are perceived as the partner (Putter, 2006: 203, 321-330). Following Osborne und Gaebler's (1992: 25) adage, the police are "steering rather than rowing," without pulling back forces from public urban spaces. However, they must work with different and comparably new stakeholders who provide the same product, "security," with the proviso that it is either possible to make money or reduce expenses with this product. The management of private security businesses and those in the employment industry focus on this market.
Diffusion of the New Security Architecture
In official readings, any work is better than no work (Blair and Schroder, 2000: 13). And, to paraphrase Franz von Liszt, the best criminal policy is a "sagacious" social policy, in which a peripheral labor market has emerged that provides cleanliness, order, and security in public space. The Hartz IV laws ended the insurance-type principles of social protection and introduced the obligation to take any job regardless of the wage level or one's qualifications. Thus, the long-term unemployed must accept any workfare offers. According to the new law, one cannot reject a new job because it is inferior in terms of formal qualifications or previously occupied positions. Wage levels can also be below local standards or collective bargaining agreements. These changes in legal entitlements and sanctioning are the second push factor to activate jobseekers (see Knuth, 2009, for a detailed, if somewhat idealistic, overview of Hartz IV; see Peck, 2001, on workfare). Just as Giddens (1998: 65) formulated the motto for the "Third Way" in the United Kingdom--"no rights without responsibilities"--the key principle of the new approach to labor market (re)integration in the German workfare system is encapsulated in its slogan Fordern und Fordern (support and stipulate). In this market, hundreds of thousands of male and female workers "commute" between Mini Jobs (400 [euro] to 800 [euro] per month), unemployment, temporary employment, One-Euro-Jobs (which amount to an allowance), and renewed unemployment (see Krinsky and Simonet, in this volume). New "family members" accrue to the established actors in security, and cooperate with, are co-opted by, or compete with the police and each other.
Institutions that primarily insure what the ruling elites demand and perceive as "internal security" are now subject to changes best captured by the term "the new security architecture" (Eick, 2008b; McGauran, 2008). They would better be described as "tumors" on the periphery, beyond democracy and the Rechtsstaat--the legal state under the rule of law. Since the 1970s, significant trends in the evolution of the German state police have been evident: an intensified orientation toward crime prevention and the primacy of the executive (over the legislative and judicial pillars of law enforcement), the centralization of all security agencies, and a Federal Police that integrates police and intelligence services (Kommission, 2010). Such developments further augment the intelligence functions of the police and the policing functions of intelligence services (Putter, 2008; Brown, 2009; Brodeur, 2010).
In Europe, the growth of quasi- or parapolicing organizations (3) was initially observed in the United Kingdom and is associated with the danger of "Balkanization" (Blair, 2002:31). (4) As part of the "extended policing family" (Crawford and Lister, 2004), the phenomenon has been discussed within the social sciences as "nodal policing" (Shearing, 2005) or "third-party policing" (Buerger and Mazerolle, 1998; Eick, 2008a: 82). Since the 1990s in Germany, the evolving security structure encompasses more heterogeneous stakeholders who are cognizant of the (re) production of "security." There are some 265,000 state and federal police, 40,000 customs officials, (5) about 30,000 officers in 22 intelligence services (Paffgen and Grathwohl, 2009), tens of thousands of operatives within municipal public-order offices working in public spaces (Lehmann, 2011), and militia-like organizations that are sometimes guided by the police, and sometimes not (Putter and Kant, 2000; Eick, 2008a). Examples include the Burgerhelfer (citizen aides), Sicherheitspartner (security partners), Freiwillige Polizeidienste (voluntary police services), or Kriminalpraventive Rate (crime prevention committees). (6)
A profit-oriented, private security industry has significantly expanded since the 1990s (Olschok, 2004; Eick, 2006a). For the first time, the status of rent-a-cops was heightened by their inclusion in the updated "Internal Security Program." About 170,000 employees within the private security business are now officially a "component of the security architecture" (Standige Konferenz, 2009: 25; Olschok, 2010: 57-58). Within the framework of the Red-Green coalition's Agenda 2010 (Anderson, 2009; Knuth, 2009; Eick, 2011a), nonprofits concentrating on labor market integration of long-term unemployed became involved in workfare schemes financed by the federal Public Employment Service, the states, municipalities, and even the European Union (Eick et al., 2004). As noted, the Hartz IV law created workfare schemes that include deploying the long-term unemployed as "Nonprofit-Cops," especially in disadvantaged areas (Eick, 2011b; Lehmann, 2011) to assure cleanliness, order, and security, or SOS services (Eick, 2011a).
The profit-oriented security industry and the "employment industry" compete for market share in the arena of SOS services. Due to institutional changes in the state and the outsourcing of former state responsibilities in security and welfare provision, external provisions are in high demand. Personnel in a post-industrial economy experience persistently increasing flexibility requirements, low wages in the service industry, and workfare. (7) In the private security industry (Briken, 2011a, b) and the "charitable employment industry" (Eick et al., 2004; Eick, 2011a), labor-market integration for most workers does not translate into safe or secure employment, but rather into a worsening of their already unstable and insecure situations.
Police Fantasies and Commercial Security
In Germany, the demand for security soared throughout the last three decades (Olschok, 2004; Eick, 2006a; Briken, 2011b cf. Jones and Newburn, 2006). At the beginning of the 1990s, about 900 private security companies shared this market and employed 56,000 security guards (Olschok, 2004: 16). By 2009, 3,600 companies and about 170,000 employees generated an annual turnover of 4.5 billion euros (Briken, 2011b; cf. Eick 2008b). The outsourcing of the in-house activities of private companies and state administrations may perhaps explain the bulk of this growth. Moreover, the annexation of the former German Democratic Republic in the early 1990s opened new markets for private security companies, since private policing was permitted there only after the Wall came down (Niggl, 2010). The events of September 11 further extended the market (Olschok, 2004). Less visible is the qualitative change within the sector, with the opening up of new business portfolios in fields such as crime prevention, inspired by urban politics, prison management, surveillance and control of housing estates and rural regions, as well as the management of maritime security. Further, the panoply extends to police-private partnerships, in which the state police and rent-a-cops jointly patrol airports, rail way stations, shopping malls, sports facilities, and pedestrian zones, i.e., mass private property and public spaces alike (Stober, 2000; Kirsch, 2003; Kempa et al., 2004; Eick, 2006a; Braun, 2007; BDWS, 2010: 4). From a different angle, Rigakos (2005: 272-303) developed a labor-based typology of the overlapping tasks of public and private police activity "to categorize the wide breadth of human labor involved in policing" (Ibid.: 303). (8) His approach has merit, especially because it "becomes increasingly difficult to maintain old divisions between public and private" policing (Ibid.). In this article, however, to better understand current trends in German policing I show that it is critically important who is policing whom and where they do so.
The Deterioration of Rights and Responsibilities
Based on Rigakos' (2005; cf. Belina, in this volume) findings, and given the extensive increase in profit-oriented security companies by late 2009, it would be consistent for this sector to be defined as part of the "security architecture" (Standige Konferenz, 2009: 6). Examining this "pillar" in terms of its constitutional, juridical, political, and socioeconomic dimensions, however, shows that it rests on shaky foundations.
From a juridical standpoint, among the countries of the European Union, Germany, Austria, and Cyprus lack legislation to regulate the private security industry. Prerequisites for issuing concessions find legal expression in the German Trade Act, or Gewerbeordnung ([section] 34a, GewO), and in the Security Services Act, or Bewachungsverordnung ([section][section] 8-15). The trade law was adjusted at the operational level in 2002 through a mandatory, general competency exam (Sachkundeprufung) for control functions in public space, but the deployment of rent-a-cops in public spaces has not been meaningfully critiqued. Nowhere is it explicitly stated which tasks private security companies may carry out in private and public spaces, which tasks they must refrain from, or under which conditions they can be deployed. (9)
The last attempt at legislative regulation was in 1995, when the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) was an opposition party. Immediately after their electoral victory, however, the Social Democrats shelved the draft bill and it has not been reintroduced (Deutscher Bundestag, 1996). As a result, no legislative framework exists to establish deployment areas for rent-a-cops, or any other needed clarifications. The debate over the state's "core tasks" and what can and should be handed over to the security industry remains "contested terrain" (Eick, 2008b: 60; cf. Buhl, 2009). This legal twilight zone is elastic enough for rent-a-cop firms to expand their activities, notably within public space.
Given the often criticized tendency to reduce all possible societal issues to juridical ones (Teubner, 1987; Garland, 2000; Frankenberg, 2010), it is astonishing that the law is silent on the working conditions of employed stakeholders and the fundamental principles for deploying non-state security forces. Some scholars do disagree with Hoffmann-Riem's (2000:134) contention that the "mostly practiced appeal to the private use of every [wo]man's and emergency rights ... or to so-called domiciliary rights are not suitable for professional self-defense." Yet, as profit-oriented security businesses continually expand their scope of action, it becomes increasingly difficult to pass article 33, paragraph 4 of the Grundgesetz (the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, or Constitution), which states that "the exercise of sovereign authority on a regular basis shall, as a rule, be entrusted to members of the public service who stand in a relationship of service and loyalty defined by public law." It is highly contested whether the tasks of private security guards can be judged as the "exercise of sovereign authority" (Gusy, 1994; Stober, 1997). Nevertheless, state authorities have included private security companies in their security architecture. Narr (1992:11) correctly argues that "the state's monopoly over the use of force never meant a statist totality of all force," but it is also true that the marketization of security requires further juridical and political debate.
In the private security industry, the workforce experiences substantial socioeconomic insecurities. German labor unions therefore talk about "modern slave labor" (Strecker, 2006: 2; Bremme et al., 2007; Dribbusch, 2008; cf. Milkman and Voss, 2004). Wage levels in the industry display the typical characteristics of a low-wage sector; in the East German states, in particular, wages for security workers at "events" are frequently below 5 [euro] per hour, before taxes (Briken, 2011b). The term "slave labor" also covers working conditions, since many rent-a-cops must work over 200 hours per month, at constantly shifting workplaces, during the night, and on holidays and weekends (DGB, 2009; Der Paritatische Gesamtverband, 2010; Briken, in this volume). For many private security employees, even these workloads are insufficient for making a living; they are compelled to apply for additional social benefits. (10)
Much of the security industry is seasonal, characterized by part-time and temporary work. Often, jobs are linked to the "festivalization" of the "entrepreneurial city" (Harvey, 1989; Haussermann and Siebel, 1993). Events such as the Olympic Games, football's World Cups, a Pope's visit, or the Oktoberfest (as well as surveillance of sports venues only on weekends, traffic control during demonstrations, etc.) demand a highly flexible workforce. In 2003, the German legislature crafted Mini Jobs (400 [euro] to 800 [euro] per month, with a 50-day limit per year) as part of Agenda 2010. This created a lucrative contractual framework for the security industry and provided it with a flexible workforce under financially favorable conditions. Accordingly, one-third of all registered employees in the security industry (approximately 50,000 persons) are remunerated via MiniJobs; moreover, they predominantly constitute the sector that needs to "bulk up" their incomes with Hartz IV allowances; (11) among the whole German workforce of roughly 41 million, the income of 1.4 million people--among them 350,000 in full-time jobs--is so low that they depend on "benefit boosters" (Schulten, 2011: 78). Finally, most work in the private security industry is low skilled. The industry introduced education and advanced training measures, but the demand for qualified personnel (those having completed two- or three-year dual vocational education and trainings) remains low because their wages are correspondingly higher (Briken, 2011b). Customers requiring guards perceive it as a simple, semiskilled occupation and generally are unwilling to pay wages commensurate with actual qualifications. Finally, security guards have attained a bad image, in their own and others' external perceptions (Obergfell-Fuchs, 2000; Braun, 2007). Although the police exploit them as their "eyes and ears," they do not value their information-gathering capabilities or their sheer existence (Briken, 2011a). Unlike their superiors and managers, most ordinary security guards share the humble opinion of being too poorly paid and too badly equipped to nurture fantasies of being police.
From the political and employment perspectives, the "extended security term," or erweiterter Sicherheitsbegriff (Bundesakademie, 2001), significantly expanded job opportunities for low-skilled workers. Nevertheless, most of the workforce will not enjoy stable or comfortable employment, let alone possibilities for promotion within the industry (Briken, 2011a). Turnover rates are high within the private security industry (Lebeer and Suard, 2003). Very few employees move into more stable, better-paid jobs. Rather, they experience unemployment and reentry into private security. Because of the high demand for security guards, Public Employment Services and Job Centers find it an attractive option to swiftly place the unemployed in private security jobs. Hence, affected people stumble into what the German labor unions call an "endless negative spiral due to low-wage employment" (DGB, 2010). (12)
German federal and state ministers of the interior and senators thus constructed a fairly ramshackle "pillar" when building their new security infrastructure. Private security companies are now incorporated into a new internal security structure. Before their integration, its representatives had much to narrate and nothing to say (Eick, 2008b: 68). But as part of a state-built infrastructure, they will now demand direct participation. Stakeholders who participate for profit-oriented motives will, within this logic and not unreasonably, claim their share with respect to profit-generating opportunities. More existentially than the state, the security branch lives off the dramatization of allegedly high levels of crime. Today, the private security industry has already redefined sociopolitical problems into problems of crime (Voss, 1997; Beste, 2000). This is not necessarily in conflict with the state apparatus, but it certainly has changed the basis for negotiation.
Fantasy Police and Nonprofit Security
Due to hardening long-term structural unemployment, a labor market has emerged with 700,000 positions that are neither salaried work nor welfare benefits. Instead, they are allowances based on the Hartz IV workfare scheme. Conceptions of a "poverty industry," or Armutsindustrie (Muller, 2009), and "employment industry," or Beschaftigungsindustrie (Briken and Eick, 2011), indicate the need to go beyond an "institutionalized dualism" of the labor market (Palier and Thelen, 2010) and to consider a "tri(vi)alization" of the labor market. (13)
Nonprofits working in the field of labor-market integration, and organized as charitable limited liability companies or associations, (14) made it their business to (re)integrate the (long-term) unemployed. Their work measures, according to the letter of law, are "in the public interest" and "additional," i.e., they do not replace regular jobs (Bundesrechnungshof, 2010). With financing from the Public Employment Service (Job Centers), for every subsidized job nonprofits gain up to 500 [euro] per month for each long-term unemployed placed through measures that do not create real jobs (Eick et al., 2004; Muller, 2009; Eick, 2011a). Given the vast scale, it is highly remunerative.
Nonprofits and Job Centers have established Nonprofit- or One-Euro-Cops that are staffed by long-term unemployed and deployed mostly in disadvantaged areas. Reliable data on the ratio of "One-Euro-Cops" to all One-Euro-Jobs are not available. An unrepresentative sample in German cities and medium-sized towns (Eick, 2009; 2011b), however, reveals that 270,000 long-term unemployed were distributed for three- to six-month periods. Given the figure of about 700,000 jobs, on any given day there are about 30,000 "One-Euro-Cops." Hence, up to 10% of all One-Euro-Jobs are located within the area of SOS services (Eick, 2011b).
Employment measures such as these pertain to crime prevention activity outside the criminal law. Those working there, including rent-a-cops, are not vested with sovereign powers. SOS services seek to address new standards of order that focus on the cleanliness of public spaces, incivilities, disorder, "undesirables," and/or spaces judged as "deviant." That is, they refer to a particular understanding of quality-of-life issues in urban space. The resulting policing strategies dissolve the boundaries between cleanliness and order and security and crime fighting. Moreover, the causes of deviance are dismissed and social conflicts are depoliticized or made profitable for sustaining class rule (Spitzer, 1975; Lehne, 1996). With respect to vested powers, duties, and task descriptions, such measures entirely lack juridical regulation and fail to meet mandatory criteria of "additionality" and "fair competition," which nonprofits offering jobs must comply with. In over 60% of the cases examined by the Federal Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof, 2010), these criteria were not met. The response of a manager working for a nonprofit may serve as an instructive example of how Hartz IV workfare measures abolish wage labor. Concerning her 350 long-term unemployed "playground attendants," or Spielplatzkummerer, she said: "The easiest way to describe their duties is to clarify what [the One-Euro-Jobbers] are not--namely police officers, trash collectors, or swing repairmen. Instead, their task, besides their presence, is to bar potential 'playground disturbers' from drinking alcohol, throwing garbage in the sandbox, and rampaging" (cited in Leber, 2005: 9).
Conclusions: The Deterioration of Constitutional Certainty
The proliferation of fantasy police is observable in metropolises, remote areas, and flatlands on a global scale (Rigakos, 2002; Eick, 2006a). In Germany, this has taken place without meaningful political debate or discussion in society. A market in its own right has emerged under the legitimizing cloak of intensified labor requirements and security measures. Such measures generate profits and well-paid jobs for the German version of the WASPs (managers of the "Social City" program, case workers in Job Centers, in short, the "managers of misery"). Over 35 years ago, Steven Spitzer referred to similar measures already underway in the 1970s.
To a certain extent, the expenses created by problem and deviant populations can be offset by encouraging their direct participation in the process of control. Potential troublemakers can be recruited as policemen, social workers, and attendants. Confirmed deviants can be "rehabilitated" by becoming counselors, psychiatric aides, and parole officers. Thus, if a large number of the controlled can be converted into a first line of defense, threats to the system of class rule can be transformed into resources for its support (Spitzer, 1975: 649).
"Nonprofit-Cops" imply that one section of the (urban) poor is forced to police the other (Eick, 2003); thus, the nonprofit police differ little, if at all, from for-profit parapolice (Rigakos, 2002). Although One-Euro-Jobbers lack employment contracts (Eick, 2011a), employees of both entities are wedged into a comparable socioeconomic exclusion. This is not a strategic outcome, but rather flows from the workfare model. Nevertheless, those who profit financially from these policies understand the perfidy of the model very well. This explains the silence of the managers of misery and the political class, to the extent that reliable data are not available. To argue that the state's legitimacy is being eroding due to private security provision is an ambivalent endeavor, especially because such an argument would base the state's legitimacy not on democratic grounds, but primarily on violence, that is, the state's immediate claim of power. From a different angle, several authors have highlighted pivotal constitutional, (15) juridical, and welfare state concerns.
Wacquant (2009, and in this volume) characterizes the criminal justice system as the "iron fist" and the welfare state as the "helping hand." The latter is apparently transformed into a workfare state, or, more broadly, into a "Schumpeterian Post-National Workfare Regime" (Jessop, 2003: 43). As a system for punishing the poor, current workfare states include an "iron fist" not only in Germany, but also beyond (Peck, 2001; Eick et al., 2004).
The private security industry is under the regulatory control of understaffed state inspectors and the two lobbying associations, the BDWS and the Association of German Cash Service Industry (BDWG). That this is insufficient became clear in the multiyear fraud in the cash-in-transit business in 2006 (Glitza, 2006; Eick, 2006b) and, more recently, during the "Love Parade" disaster in Duisburg (Jaeger, 2010). For decades, "undesirables" such as the homeless, beggars, or prostitutes have daily experienced commercially executed and orchestrated social and spatial exclusion (Eick, 2003; Belina, 2007; Kunkel, in this volume). Given the array of coercive mechanisms available to the state apparatus and the state-accompanied or state-guided degradation of democratic, social, and human rights, it is difficult to compel legislators to legally substantiate the public welfare obligation (Gemeinwohlverpflichtung) of companies operating in the field of "security." Morever, given the fact that rent-a-cops are hardly deteriorating the state's monopoly over the use of force, but are instead lengthening the arm of the state apparatus, one might even be skeptical about, if not reluctant over, such an endeavor. The current balance of power renders even public recognition of such demands a challenge. In a time of crisis, the German government has adopted a "new security architecture" for policing and criminal justice that is even less reliable.
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(1.) The term "family" recently became popular in areas as diverse as sports ("the football family" and "the Olympic family"), international development (the World Bank's "social development family"), and policing ("the extended family"). Disbelievers characterized it as psychobabble, especially in football or soccer (Forsyth, 2008). Initially invented in the social sciences, the police asked with a similar connotation: "Do we want these people in or outside our tent?" (Blair, 2002:31). The term thus reflects the neocommunitarian paternalism of those stakeholders.
(2.) After reaching about 400 members in the early 1990s, the Angels declined quickly. In the German context, they oscillated between a volunteer militia, a crime prevention tool, and an antiracist youth initiative, which diverged from the history in the United States (Klein et al., 1989; Pennell et al., 1989; Cave, 2004; Roman, 2011).
(3.) On a global scale and under international law, aspects of private military companies should be included; cf. Duffield (2001), Singer (2003), and, apologetically, Patterson (2009).
(4.) Ian Blair (2002: 31), the former commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police Service, hoped with this term to preserve or restore the primacy of the state police by claiming that policing in London otherwise could "return to the situation before 1839."
(5.) About 6,600 of them are fighting "clandestine employment" (BMF, 2009: 5, 17).
(6.) Cf. Burgerrechte & Polizei/CILIP 64 (3/1999) on "Community Policing"; Burgerrechte & Polizei/CILlP 66 (2/2000) on "Burger--Nachbarn--Kontrolleure" [citizens--neighbors---inspectors].
(7.) In Germany, the term workfare describes a labor market-oriented concept that connects state subsidies for long-term unemployed with the obligation to work ("no rights without responsibilities"; "support and stipulate"). In addition, the Agenda 2010 pushed for a dual labor market approach and the massive transformation of the welfare regime, as "labor market reforms have generally promoted developments in which the status and privileges of labor market insiders remain relatively well protected, with the flexibility necessary to stabilize the core being achieved at the expense of a growing number of workers in 'atypical' or 'nonstandard' employment relationships" (Palier and Thelen 2010: 139).
(8.) He calls these policing activities polemic, sentry-dataveillant, investigative, patrol, and civic-sumptuary (Rigakos, 2005: 272).
(9.) Three special legal regulations constitute exceptions: those for the protection of military compounds (UZwGBw), atomic plants (AtG), and airports (LuftSiG, [section][section] 5, 8, 9).
(10.) Admittedly, the German Service Union (ver.di) and the German Association of Private Security Companies (BDWS) achieved an agreement oil a minimum wage in April 2010, but the Black-Yellow government only signed the juridically binding declaration (Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklarung) on June 1,2011; that declaration alone makes it a law for all companies, including the ones in Eastern Europe wishing to work in the European Union, to follow the minimum-wage regulation. Whether it will be enforced on the ground has yet to be seen, though.
(11.) A new German word, Aufstocker (benefit booster), emerged from this situation. It covers those who must apply for additional state subsidies, because their wages are not high enough to make a living.
(12.) In November 2010, the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) cautioned against the fact that the increasing numbers of people being integrated into the labor market via low-wage jobs are not able to escape this low-paying sector (DGB, 2010).
(13.) The term "'Third Sector" is an established concept that discriminates between the socioeconomic spheres of the state, private companies, and nonprofit organizations (Anheier and Seibel, 1990).
(14.) Commercial companies are allowed to hire the long-term unemployed as One-Euro-Jobbers so long as those jobs can be understood as serving a "commonweal."
(15.) With regard to constitutional challenges, one might, inter alia, refer to Karl Lewenstein (1951: 403-404, 431), who distinguished between constitutions that are "normative" (a custom-made suit that is worn), "nominal" (ready-made clothes hanging in the wardrobe), and "semantic" (not a suit that is worn, but a masquerade or cape that disguises sheer force). Yet, "the point is that as yet the constitution has turned out to be incapable of doing justice," providing the necessities of life and a modicum of economic security and social justice on which the "man on Main Street considers himself to be entitled, at least, to raise a claim."
Volker Eick *
* VOLKER EICK is affiliated with Freie Universiteit Berlin, John F. Kennedy-Institute, Department of Politics (e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org).
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