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Genocide and ethnic cleansing? The fate of Russian "aliens and enemies" in the Finnish Civil War in 1918.

INTRODUCTION: TASK, SOURCES, AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN 1918 THIS STUDY EXAMINES the treatment of Russians and other "Russian" foreigners such as Baltic, Polish, and Ukrainian peoples during the Finnish Civil War. (1) It first provides an analysis of the most noteworthy "ethnic" battlefields--Tampere and Rautu--from this particular point of view, concentrating especially upon the foreign combatant and civilian population. It then considers the Russian prisoners of war (POWs) and their destinies during and after the Finnish Civil War as well as the national and international rules regarding the treatment of civilians under wartime conditions. Those responsible for the treatment of foreign POWs will also receive attention.

The brief but savage war in Finland was a local, ideological outburst at the end of World War I (WWI), which itself opened political possibilities for various small European nations to reach for independence. The Finnish Civil War was caused by three main phenomena. First, Russian Tsarist troops and navy and military officials lost their willingness, motivation, and control in the Grand Duchy of Finland along with the revolutions in March and October 1917.

Consequently, Finnish workers had organized voluntarily, but armed Red Guards to maintain control in industrial towns and southern Finland, while farm owners and the middle class had their White Guards for the same reasons elsewhere. Second, the Senate of Finland voted for and manifested the Declaration of Independence in December 1917, but the political question of power remained open. Third, a Russian military train from St. Petersburg in January 1918 was a final spark to start local and sporadic shooting, which rapidly flamed into warfare. In fact, Lenin had sent weapons only to support the Finnish Red comrades, not to start war. (2)

Given the detailed and already well-researched descriptions of the battles themselves, this study only briefly treats the actual combat in order to concentrate on the topics mentioned. It adds to the history of ethnic minorities and their culture in the broad sense of "everyday" life, and has an obvious and strong thematic connection with the five-year "War Victims in Finland 1914-22" (WVP) research project set up by the Prime Minister's Office in 1998. This contribution thus has its place not only in the history of ideologies and mentalities, but also in the history of the Russian communities bypassed by previous research.

Complementing the WVP material, this study uses earlier and later statistics concerning Russian Orthodox parishioners within the Finnish state. These consist in mainly civil registers but also include the contemporaneous military registers (1910-17) of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). However, the existing archival lacunae and fragments often remain just that. On the other hand, WVP research remarkably has, as a whole, been able to transfer more identified victims to its electronic database, including the location of and reasons for their deaths. (3)

As Geoffrey Hosking put it, Finland had been "an unusual success story" for Russian imperial policy in the nineteenth century. However, the rise of national ideologies changed the political atmosphere. Anti-Russian ethnic and national stereotyping began to increase exponentially in Finland, especially in the Karelian Isthmus, where tens of thousands of Russian summer inhabitants (datchniks) had settled in green and comfortable villa areas close to St. Petersburg. Nationally, a social and ethnic gap based on economics, social status, and education existed. Politically, and like the southern Finnish coast, the Karelian Isthmus was important to Russia for the security of the capital and of the naval base at Kronstadt. The Russian Tsarist forces had played a visible social role during WWI in Finland, the location of several garrisons and military hospitals and 125,000 soldiers and marines in 1917. In spite of their unwillingness to wage war, it was both easy and politically logical to see them as foreign Russian troops who were enemies of the newly independent Finland in 1917, in particular because the military core of the established White ("farmer") Army in January 1918 comprised Finnish jaegers trained by the German Forces, with whom they also served and fought against the Russians in WWI. (4) At the end of January 1918, the Russian Army still had about 22,000 military recruits in Finland. The withdrawal had started in December 1917, but some combat-ready revolutionary units had joined the Finnish Red Guards at the outbreak of the Civil Wat. As was previously mentioned, the Whites controlled most of the country, while southern Finland and industrial towns, in particular, were occupied by the multinational Red Guards. According to the commander of the northern Red frontier, Colonel Svechnikov, the Russians had two important reasons for fighting against the Finnish White Army. First, they had to avoid the fate of the Russian garrisons in Vaasa, Seinajoki, and Oulu, where the White Army disarmed and captured thousands of Russian soldiers against very little resistance and with only minor and accidental shooting. Second, the Russian army had a "moral" duty to join the war of the Finnish workers; otherwise they would have lost their "respected position" in the eyes of their Finnish comrades. (5)

The disarming of the Russian garrisons on the west coast of Finland had been successful for the Whites in spite of their operational inexperience. According to Lars Westerlund's recent studies, the Russian officers cooperated with White troops in many cases. To avoid open hostilities, military commanders, being conscious of the pointlessness of their presence in Finland but also of moral unwillingness to fight in the garrisons, made secret agreements in at least four towns. However, the Whites ignored these immediately after the disarmament of Russians had taken place. Instead of the promised quick transportation to Russia, more than 6,100 soldiers, whose surrender had been negotiated, were sent to several POW camps. (6)

Meanwhile, Colonel Svechnikov did not manage to form a separate voluntary Russian army in the Civil War or to unite harmoniously the Finnish Red Guards and the more-or-less volunteer Russian fighters. Notwithstanding this, he decided to attack the approaching White Army north of Tampere. He had between 800 and 1,000 Russian fighters in his first operations in February 1918, excluding 600 marines who had arrived in Tampere from Helsinki by the end of the month. To sum it up, Svechnikov had quite a lot of professional Russian officers and soldiers. On the other hand, their morale and willingness to fight varied significantly. From the Colonel's point of view, too many disorganized groups of soldiers were just "passing by." The second offensive of the Red forces at the northern frontier faced a counteroffensive by the White Army at the beginning of March. As a result of the first violent encounters, the Reds made what was to some extent a chaotic withdrawal to Tampere. The "real" warfare had thus started north of Tampere in February, while the last combat operations took place in late April and early May 1918. Total Civil War casualties, including all population, nationalities, and postwar losses in "concentration camps," amounted to 38,000-38,400 individuals. (7)

It is more than probable that the casualties were more numerous in many areas, particularly in the Karelian Isthmus. On the other hand, it was apparent that the Whites often did not bother to identify Russians in March-April but shot them "when confronted," thus causing anonymous losses (see Table 1). (8)

THE RUSSIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN CASUALTIES IN TAMPERE AND RAUTU--AND THE QUESTION OF CLEANSING

Tampere was a major city in southern Finland, while Rautu was both a village and a separate railway station in the Karelian Isthmus, relatively close to St. Petersburg. Severe and significant battles and sieges were fought simultaneously at these two places in March 1918.

Judging by the names in the Russian Orthodox congregation books in Tampere, 700 people were of Russian ethnic origin. However, this does not provide an exact indication of the total number of local Russian civilians because there had been "mixed" marriages between Finns, Russians, and other nationalities, resulting in name changes for the spouses. In addition, probably no more than one hundred Russian civilians had not become parishioners because they were either temporary visitors or refugees who stayed in the apartments of their relatives. In either case they could have left Russia because of the two revolutions in 1917. Naturally, there were other foreigners in Tampere as well. (9)

By the end of March 1918, the White Army had besieged Tampere, pursuing both Russian and Finnish Red units and unorganized groups. Approximately 300-500 Russian volunteers fought among the Red Guards during the siege of Tampere, including several officers in responsible posts, such as Roznatovskii, an officer of the Red artillery, Lieutenant-Colonel Bulachel, an overall military expert, and Sokolov, the officer in charge of the defense of the western city area. The medical personnel of the Reds was international and comprised five doctors and some forty male and female assisting doctors or nurses. They were all volunteers of various nationalities.

According to the registers that go up to 30 March 1918, forty-four wounded Russian soldiers from the northern frontier were located in the temporary military hospitals in Tampere, which was captured after heavy fighting on 5 April 1918. The losses were severe on both sides. The casualties of the White Army were 600-680 dead and more wounded. The losses of the Finnish Reds were estimated to be 2,000 dead and more than a hundred wounded. The White Army took 11,000 POWs, who were sent to concentration camps. Additionally, the "cleansing" in the town had been violent; approximately 200 Russian military POWs were executed and 150 Finns were killed by White forces in the space of a few days. The relative rates of wounded and killed also indicate mopping-up tactics because there were normally more wounded than dead, but among the multinational Reds, the ratio was reversed. The unnamed and unranked Russian soldiers were forced into a warehouse and were executed in groups, while the ten captured officers faced the same fate within a few days. The hospitals were also "cleansed" of wounded Russians, 90 percent of the foreign medical volunteers being executed at the same time. Of the more than 8,000 listed treatments in the emergency POW clinic and the 12,000 documented as nursing services at the other camp hospitals, not a single one mentioned wounded Russians. There had been no systematic Red "terror" in Tampere before the conquest, and the violence and the "cleansing" by the White troops were somewhat unexpected, as some Swedish eyewitnesses wrote. (10)

The official number of Russian POWs was sixty at most, including twenty-three women. According to the official lists, the last Russian prisoner, a female, was sent to Russia on 7 June 1918. In statistical terms, only seven or eight Russian men and twenty-three women survived the prisons and concentration camps in Tampere, including some foreign doctors. In spite of this low survival rate, the claim made in 1925 by Svechnikov, who had managed to escape to Russia, that all Russians in Tampere were mercilessly killed after the conquest appears to be an exaggeration. (11)

The Russian civilian population had fled, hidden, or been arrested. Archival sources mention some who met their fate after the conquest of the city. Russians were also hunted from among the thousands of suspected Finnish Reds. According to contemporary accounts, Finns were also occasionally, possibly by mistake, shot dead because they were wearing Russian clothes. In all, the Russian minority lost 15-20 percent of its population. (12)

What about the survivors and the question of "cleansing"? The Russian casualties notwithstanding, individual Russians survived in Tampere and its surroundings, Some avoided the concentration camps, prisons, arrest, and interrogation. The deacon of the Russian Orthodox parish, Fedor Verikov, argued with the White Guards in the demolished interior of the church. He was arrested, but a Finnish merchant soon saved the whole Verikov family, hiding them in his apartment during the critical part of the purge. Some Russian civilians had secretly cooperated with the White troops before and during the siege. The head of the local telegraph office, Nikandr Samsonov, had organized and run a secret telegram unit that sent information to the Whites. He was immediately arrested, but only in order to save him from the uncontrolled violence. Later, he changed both his citizenship and religion and returned to his previous post in the telegraph office, only to die from natural causes soon afterwards in 1920. The destinies of some imprisoned male foreigners were unclear, partly because of uncertain information concerning their national origin. They were probably killed as soldiers. (13)

In all, some 400 Russian fighters and soldiers, as well as dozens of wounded volunteers and their multinational medical staff, were killed in Tampere, and several politically and militarily neutral foreign civilians shared the same fate. In addition, the number of casualties among the civilian and noncombatant Russians was approximately eighty-five to ninety. The total "Russian" casualties thus were 480-500. Irrespective of the losses, over thirty foreign POWs, mostly female, survived. Only a couple of Russian, or indeed any foreign, men were released from the prisons and concentration camps. During the conflict, the Whites did not take prisoners but fired at any sign of movement and at any human shadow in the alleys, windows, and pathways. (14)

Moreover, the purging of the conquered city seems to have been based more on information received about persons suspected than on a systematic, detailed, and organized house-to-house search. While practically any Russian who was found was shot, the White military forces were far too busy with the thousands of suspected Finnish Reds to concentrate on a single or a few Russians. In any case, as Professor Ylikangas has also concluded, not enough Russians were eventually found in Tampere to prove what was claimed in the propaganda, that the Civil War was fought against "Russian" foreigners. Nevertheless, the Russians were increasingly seen as a military, ethnic, racial, and cultural problem for the newly independent state of Finland.

In addition to the contemporary use of the term, there are various later standards existing for "ethnic cleansing." It takes place when there is "a forced removal of an ethnic, religious or national group from a territory without exterminatory intent." This had happened in Tampere--in the context of the killing, the capturing, the wartime anarchy, the propaganda, and the fear. Instead of "ethnic cleansing," it was naturally called a "cleansing of Red Russians" by the contemporary Finns. (15)

As Professor Anthony Upton put it, the White Army practiced genocide as they systematically killed Russians because of their nationality. However, our question remains more complicated, including the "anachronistic factor," Civil War killings, victims, and research ethics. Is it possible to commit genocide before the term existed? Yes and no. Historical justice for contemporary people does not require a researcher to "condemn" them according to later laws, technical terms, or knowledge that did not exist at the time. A historian mainly tries--from a particular point of view and set of questions--to find out what has happened on the basis of sources. Apart from this role and the ethics of historical research, legal penalties and condemnation have been imposed, for example, at Nurnberg and The Hague. The methodological and ethical anachronisms notwithstanding, I consider it acceptable to compare this action and these norms with later actions and norms. This assumes historical continuity and perhaps historical interconnection.

Norman M. Naimark notes that genocide occurs whether the perpetrators target every member or "a substantial portion of a group" for killing. The United Nations (UN) gave it a broader sense in 1948. According to the UN definition, genocide may be affected through emphasis on other means--such as the "causing of serious bodily or mental harm to the members of a group." Accordingly, Tampere was a place not of systematic genocide, meaning "every member," but of genocide in UN terms. In the light of contemporary international agreements concerning the rules of engagement, Tsarist Russia had signed The Hague Treaty concerning civilians and POWs in the war conditions in 1907, but the Finnish Whites had ignored it at the Battle of Tampere and did so afterwards. Finland ratified the new Hague Treaty in 1924, only after the Treaty of Lausanne came into force in the previous year. (16)

Who then was the initiator? And why? The White Army had created propagandistic visions of the war being waged against a Russian enemy of Finnish independence. In addition, the backbone of the White Army, the infantry jaegers, had been ideologically trained by the German Army in anti-Russian attitudes and stereotypes of the eastern, ethnic enemy. As August von Bruck, the German ambassador in Finland, put it in April 1918, they were a "purely German-oriented and very self-assertive" military group. He reported that jaegers formed a "suitable counterforce" for "Russians" in the Finnish White troops where several Finnish officers, including the commander-in-chief, Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (1867-51), a former Russian General, had served in the Tsarist Forces. (17)

Propaganda and rumours of the cruel Red violence also aroused anger among Whites. Moreover, the military casualties on the northern frontier, in which Russian "Black Guard" marines had attacked in force but were beaten at Pekkala, stimulated the atmosphere of ethnic hatred. The siege cost more casualties. The Whites had thus systematically exaggerated the numbers of Russian Red troops and their losses, as well as "numerous escapees." In conquered Tampere, Whites came to see that there were mostly Finnish Reds and fewer Russians, however. In his earlier offer to besieged Reds, General Mannerheim had promised that surrendering Finns, except their leaders, would be treated well, but all Russian Reds were to be executed. In February, Mannerheim had ordered that "any Russian who participated in combat activities," whether in uniform or not, could be "shot right away." This order gave a free hand to field commanders and fighters to decide who had "taken part" in some sense or other. Moreover, General "Toll," being in reality Major General Ernst Lofstrom, a former Tsarist Army officer, later proclaimed the Red commanders and Russians as outlaws. (18)

While the cleansing of the town had been or could easily be explained as less organized, the systematic executions of approximately 200 Russian unranked and unnamed POWs in Tampere were formally carried out under the command of foreign officers. Mannerheim consciously did not involve himself with the POW questions. Eduard Ausfeld, a German colonel who had commanded the important units of the attacking forces, was given the responsibility for POW arrangements. He put Swedish Lieutenant Reichenberg in charge of prisoners as the commandant of the railway station. Ausfeld was actively assisted by the Finnish Captain Kai Donner. Finnish White soldiers then "merely obeyed orders" when they took groups to be shot in front of an audience. Several local inhabitants and Swedish volunteers had gathered at a nearby bridge to watch the executions close to the station. (19)

Political and military internal disagreements also played an important role because low-ranked jaegers wanted to clear the White Army of the former Tsarist "Russian" high officers, including Mannerheim, who were familiar with officers among the remaining or captured Russians. An indication of this silent struggle for power came with the execution of Russian lieutenant-colonel Georgii Bulachel. He had obviously known Mannerheim, but the German-minded commander of Tampere rejected the meeting of these men requested by Bulachel's wife. A priest visited the lieutenant-colonel, who then was executed without an appeal. The jaegers thus tried to at least shake off Mannerheim, who, at the beginning of February, had still allowed captured Russian officers to walk freely in their uniforms and to dine in the restaurants in Vaasa. They had even drawn a small salary, according to The Hague Convention. Mannerheim's previously mentioned order to shoot on sight any "participating" Russian, his or her clothing notwithstanding, was obviously a reaction to increasing political and nationalist pressures among his staff and junior officers.

Finally, the systematic executions of Russian POWs in Tampere, as well as the cleansings of the hospitals and the killing of multinational medical staff, were accepted as a necessary and to some extent normal military action by Finns. As no protests, investigations, or punishments resulted, these acts had opened the doors to further uncontrolled violence on both sides. The contemporary semiofficial history of "the Freedom War in Finland 1918," which was written by White winners, largely determined this national view for seventy years until Professor Heikki Ylikangas reexamined the myth of Tampere in 1993-94. (20)

RUSSIAN TROOPS AND CIVILIANS IN RAUTU AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

Along with the rapidly growing Russian dacha population, which had been settling in the Karelian Isthmus since the 1880s, approximately a thousand Russian civilians lived in Rautu before the Finnish Civil War. Moreover, the Russian revolution had caused an increasing flow of refugees to Finland, about 3,000 coming in 1918. (21)

The military situation of the Karelian frontier was quite stable until the end of February 1918, when the Red Guards and their Russian allies received reinforcements from St. Petersburg and started to attack. Georg Elfvengren, cavalry captain and local White Commander of the volunteer 1st Karelian Regiment, decided to counterattack at the end of March. As a result, the Whites managed to surround and close the railway station, with a total of 2,200 besieged people inside. These included 850 Russian (or other foreign) soldiers, 450 Finnish Red fighters, and 300 armed Red Finns from St. Petersburg, as well as 300 male workers, 50 women, and about 230 other civilians. There were also some volunteer medical personnel from the Proletarian Red Cross of Russia. (22)

Finally, at dawn on 5 April 1918, the Reds left their 150 wounded at the Rautu station and tried to break out eastwards because of the lack of ammunition. The Whites managed to defeat the escaping Reds in the concentrated cross fire. According to contemporary Finnish descriptions, women and children had been in the front line of the attacking Reds, and 1,000-1,200 Russians were killed in the "Valley of Death" near Rautu. Aatos Tanskanen researched the battle of Rautu, concluding that the combined losses of the Russians and the Finnish Reds were 750 killed, 870 POWs, and 200 wounded. Some managed to escape, and about 100-200 finally arrived in St. Petersburg. The total casualties notwithstanding, two interesting phenomena have not been considered carefully enough. (23)

First, there had been 740 Finnish Reds in the besieged station, 584 of whom were captured uninjured. This perhaps portrays a lack of willingness to engage in combat. Second, as was common and indeed happened in the case of the Whites in Tampere and Rautu, the number of wounded should have been noticeably greater than the numbers killed in immediate action. The Whites lost half of their men, with 318 dead and 600 wounded, while the numbers of killed and wounded Reds were the reverse and thus open to doubt. The statistics reveal that the Red Russian casualties were not thousands but approximately 420 dead officers and other combatants (out of 850) and, according to the White Army, only 200 injured, including Finnish Reds. The first numbers--my own estimate--come close to those of Alexandr Chistikov, but the latter rate of wounded is also statistically true, of course. On the same day, the Reds had left 150 injured with some medical personnel at the hospital in the station but took 150 walking wounded with them. Additionally, there were fifty more wounded Reds in the last action, according to some reports. In sum, the number of wounded Red POWs should have been at least 350. It was only 200. Whites had "found" several bodies in quite a well-organized hospital. Apart from this explanation, a Russian report described how Finnish Whites killed wounded Reds in front of the foreign medical staff. (24)

However, compared with the conventional casualty ratio of the Whites, even 750 dead and 350 wounded was by no means normal. My suspicions and Russian archival sources notwithstanding, it was possible that Whites had excellent combat marksmen. Irrespective of this theory, there were still 150 dead whom the statistics had shown as "wounded." In my Finnish article for the WVP, I concluded that the Whites simply either shot the wounded Russians in the hospital and battlefield or left them bleeding and without any medical care. (25)

Finally, 287 Russian military POWs were counted, including several with "minor" and obviously self-inflicted wounds. Not a single Russian was cured or treated medically in any way in the nearby White Military hospital in Kiviniemi or elsewhere later. The treatment of the previously mentioned Russian military POWs from Rantu was ruthless. After being subjected to severe and pointless transportations and several concentration camps, starvation, a lack of medical care, and local executions, only fifty-three returned to Russia. (26)

In sum, 158 Rautu POWs were transported to Iso-Mjolo POW Camp, where 97 died and 53 were mentioned as surviving. They returned to Russia by boat in June-July, while the fates of the remaining eight POWs are obscure. Ninety-nine had previously been executed in Joensuu. The fates of thirty other Rautu POWs are unknown. Five of them disappeared from Joensuu railway coaches or prison, while others were left in Sortavala Camp, obviously dead. If they had been (at least somehow) alive, it would have made no sense to omit them from the quite troublesome Rautu POW transportation. (27)

According to the archives of the Palkeala ROC congregation, the Whites killed fourteen Russian local civilian parishioners who were not in the besieged station or in the escaping squadron. Mr. Intke's family faced particularly tragic circumstances. First, three brothers were executed, and then their father. One male and one female Russian were killed "by accident," and the son of the latter was shot four days later. Some local civilians were sent to concentration camps in Sortavala and Kuopio, and their final destiny remains obscure. However, a young female, Anna Filippova (age twenty-four), was released in May from Sortavala Camp. Her father had been executed by the Whites at the end of March. (28)

Another story concerns the survival of the volunteer Russian (Proletarian) Red Cross medical personnel, comprising at least thirteen nurses, two doctors, and seven assisting doctors. A Finnish source mentioned thirteen female nurses released from Sortavala Camp on 22 May 1918. A Russian report described how the medical unit in Rautu was under the command of comrade Voichehov and described the living conditions in the concentration camp as execrable. There were 82 Russian prisoners in Sortavala on 24 May 1918, while the initial number had been 117. Four assisting doctors returned to Russia with Dr. Baranov, but Voichehov, a senior doctor, and three other assisting doctors disappeared. The number of Orthodox parishioners in Palkeala fell 20 percent between 1910 and 1920. It is likely that many of the relatively wealthy ones escaped the war, both Reds and Whites, fleeing to Russia--or even better, to Estonia and Europe. (29)

Apart from its effect on these Russian civilians, the battle and siege of Rautu also represented an outburst of anti-Russian ideological war propaganda in the Karelian Isthmus. This meant in reality that Russian civilians, as farm owners, had to leave their settlements or houses and escape. The commander of the Karelian Frontier troops, Captain Aarne Sihvo, had decreed in February that all Russian property was to be confiscated by Whites "if needed." (30)

The Civil War turned into an ideological and economic fight against the armed and unarmed Russian population in Rautu and its surroundings; A clear indication of this was the treatment of POWs, injured or wounded Russians, and their medical personnel, not to mention the executions of local civilians beyond the battlefield. Dozens of escaping women and children disappeared at some point during that morning in the "Valley of Death," and another 180-230 civilians went missing at the same time. (31)

In these circumstances, the alternatives for the local Russian population were either to stay and wait to be sent to a concentration camp, or worse, to be shot. As Colonel Susitaival, a combatant in the Civil War operations in the Isthmus, later described it, armed or unarmed Russians "did not live too many hours" when confronted. After the siege and the victory in Rautu, the occasional encounters between Whites and escaping Russian civilians or soldiers resulted in shooting rather than interrogation. Moreover, some Russians who were transferred from other areas also died in the prison camps near Rautu. However, others were released and stayed in their houses under the supervision of the Whites. In other words, following Rautu, the Russian inhabitants of the Isthmus were forced either to leave their homes or to face the threat of the White Army. In particular, the elderly Russian population in Kyyrola (Krasnoe Selo) and Raivola and the younger dacha population in Terijoki faced these problems. Those who could afford it moved abroad to Europe. (32)

Ethnic cleansing and genocide as previously defined were both perpetrated in Rautu and its surroundings. The killings were targeted and systematic at the besieged station and at "the Valley of Death," as was the treatment of wounded POWs and civilians. In February 1918, Captain Aarne Sihvo had started the "evacuation" of Russian property in the Isthmus by force. Georg Elfvengren, a cavalry captain, was responsible for the killings and untreated wounded in Rautu station and "the Valley of Death." However, the White cleansing was more haphazard and less systematic among the local rural Russian population outside the station than in urban Tampere.

The later, exceptionally harsh treatment of foreign Rautu POWs may be explained in several ways. First, an overall trend had developed, seeing Russians as outlaws in accordance with Mannerheim's and Lofstrom's orders. Second, unstable local circumstances in POW camps promoted violence against, and neglect of, Russian prisoners. Third, the Senate of Finland had ordered (15 April 1918) all Russians to leave the country within two weeks. (33) Fourth, the enemy had been both propagandistically and practically more "clearly" Russian in Rautu, irrespective of the fact that many Finnish Reds also wore Russian uniforms. Apart from this treatment, other Russian POWs, for example, those from the western coast, Kuopio and Lahti, were treated in a more humanitarian way, even in the worst camps like Iso-Mjolo Island. In conclusion, the Russian POWs transferred from Rautu and finally to Helsinki received the worst treatment of all foreign Civil War POWs in 1918. This was clearly visible in their high death rates. (34)

The local hatred and cruel attitudes notwithstanding, Major Georg Elfvengren was off-duty during the transportation of the POWs to Joensuu. In addition, he was familiar with the situation in town where White soldiers, often drunk, occasionally acted violently. In May 1918, Elfvengren suddenly appeared there and demanded a villa that was owned by a local foreigner. As a former Tsarist officer, the post-Revolutionary commandant of the small Crimean Independence Army (in 1917-18) but also later General Wrangel's staff officer, his ideological motives originated from anti-Bolshevik attitudes that turned to open hatred of any Russians. Nevertheless, the battle of Rautu was praised as an outstanding victory in the official reports of the Whites, and Mannerheim promoted Elfvengren with no qualms about the matter of missing wounded or POWs. (35)

CONCLUSIONS

Tampere and Rautu were the first outstanding victories for the Finnish White Forces. Military, moral, strategic, and propaganda issues notwithstanding, they also opened up unlimited opportunities to express open hatred of Russians, as the executions and casualties suggest. The cleansing of Russians served as a further opportunity for jaegers to shake General Carl Gustaf Mannerheim in their pursuit for military power and command. They operated according to this concept, first, by stealth on the West Coast, and second, overtly in Tampere. On the other hand, Georg Elfvengren, the local courts martial, and White volunteer perpetrators played the main role in Rautu and the eastern Isthmus. Their barely concealed economic motives and zealous anti-Russian attitudes and actions also served the political aims of the jaegers. Commandants like Elfvengren and Donner constituted both a politically mixed factor and a "solution," being used as a temporary tool of the White Headquarters, field commanders, and jaegars as well.

However, there had been too few Russian soldiers in Tampere to justify promoting the conflict as a "War of Freedom" against the Russian enemy. Nevertheless, approximately 200 captured soldiers were executed, as were their officers and wounded Russians. It was not the foreign enemy, but the 11,000 Finnish POWs who overcrowded the camps. The conquest of Tampere was a case of genocide visited on the foreign wounded and their multinational medical personnel, and a case of urban cleansing of the local Russian population. In this sense, it was the spontaneous wartime action of the tired, frightened, and angry winners rather than a planned operation involving house-to-house searches and forced transportation. It also met the later UN criteria of genocide, although it was not targeted at "every member" of the Russian minority. The question of historical anachronism may be avoided by using the contemporary expression "cleansing" to cover these events, including noncompliance with The Hague Convention of 1907.

Rautu presented a clearer case of eliminating "Russian enemies" of Finnish freedom and, additionally, of rural cleansing. By the same standards, there was genocide at the station and in the "Valley of Death." The captured foreign soldiers and civilians were treated in the same way as those at Tampere were treated, the wounded received no medical care, and the unarmed foreign medical personnel received no respect. Women and children at the besieged station faced the same fate as the soldiers. As is typical of ethnic cleansing, some civilians outside the battlefield were executed, causing more Russians to flee eastwards and southwards. The Whites on the Isthmus had economic motives for the cleansing, as there were thousands of foreign farms. Rautu stood as a moral and ideological starting point for the Finns to confiscate and "buy out" the Russian houses and farms on the Isthmus by force. From Rautu on, foreign POWs were subject to mistreatment, transportation, humiliation, and execution. Only a few of the Rautu POWs survived.

Following the battles of Tampere and Rautu and the beginning of April 1918, any Russian was considered a wartime enemy and practically an outlaw. This hostile status was manifested in two ways: the visible and ruthless treatment of Russians and the tacit approval of White cleansings. Hunger was an effective weapon, in addition to POW camps and executions. Moreover, the White officers in charge, as well as the executors and perpetrators of cleansing, went unpunished. They were, to some extent, replaced by new commandants who played politics with this newly constituted, flexible, and ethically corrupt policy.

Neither General Mannerheim nor any one of his close officers had the ability or, to some extent, the desire to stop the cleansings that were approved, initiated, and perpetrated by domestic or foreign White officers and infantrymen who were trained in the German Army of the First World War. In addition to the clandestine struggle for military power, strong nationalist and ideological anti-Russian outbursts and local economic motives dictated military ethics more than the then-existing moral humanitarian codes or international rules.

(1.) For the purposes of this study, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Ukrainians will be included in the term "Russians."

(2.) See, for example, Anthony Upton, Vallankumous Suomessa 1917-1918 I-II (Jyvaskyla, Finland: Karjayhtyma, 1981), 11, 35-36, 42-73.

(3.) See the WVP database in English, in the "Registry of War Victims 1914-1922 in Finland," 24 January 2007 cited at http://vesta.narc.fi/cgi-bin/db2www/sotasurmaetusivu/main?lang=en. See also the annual reports (Tablica) of Russian Orthodox parishes in the Grand Duchy of Finland (1910) and reports from the Greek Catholic parishes in Finland (1920), the Statistics Center of Finland (SCF); the collection of Metricheskaia Knigas (the Yearbook of births, marriages, and deaths of Russian Orthodox civil and military parishioners 1910-1920), and the National Archives of Finland (NARC). For archival sources, fragments, and resources concerning the WVP, see Harry Halen, Krisriina Kalleinen, Jyrki Loima, and Lars Westerlund, "Suomen venalaissurmien tutkimisen lahdepohja vuosina 1914-22," in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa L, ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004), 11-36. See also Elena Dubrovskaja and Westerlund, "Upseerien uimakoulu," in Venalaisssurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 1., ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004); Westerlund, "Me odotimme teita vapauttajina ja te toitte meille kuolemaa. Viipurin valloituksen yhteydessa kuolleet vealaiset," in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.2, ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004); Aleksandr Chistikov, "The Personnel Losses of the Russian Red Guardists in Rautu in Match 1918," in ibid.; Jyrki Loima,"Kyyrolan, Raivolan ja Kaakkois-Kannaksen venalaiskohtaloita 1918," in ibid.; "Tampereen valtaus--taisteluja ja teloituksia," in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.1, ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004), 191-206; "Raudun taistelu ja venalaiset vuonna 1918," in ibid.; Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.2, ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004). See also Loima,"Muukalaisina Suomessa. Kaakkois-Kannaksen kreikkalaiskatoliset venalaissettrakunnat kansallisena ongelmana 1889-1939," (Ph.D. diss., Joensuu University, 2001), 130-45.

(4.) Jaegers were combat infantrymen, and they trained the Finnish White soldiers. Geoffrey Hosking, Russia. People and Empire 1552-1917 (London: Fontana Press, 1998), 37-38, 380-82. See also Loima, "Nationalism and Orthodox Church in Finland 1895-1958," in Nationalism and Orthodoxy. Two Thematic Studies on National Ideologies and Their Interaction With the Church, ed. Loima (Helsinki: Renvall Institute Publications 15, 2004), 99-100; cf. Heikki Ylikangas, Kaannekohdat Suomen historiassa (Helsinki: WSOY 2002), 125-34. See The Memorandum of the Russian Committee 21.4.1914, KKK 1914, II section, Fb 978.104. NARC. See also Osmo Jussila, Nationalismi ja vallankumous venalaissuomalaisissa suhteissa 1899-1917 (Forssa, Finland: Suomen historiallinen seura, 1979); Outi Karemaa, "Vihollisia, vainoojia, syopalaisia. Venalaisviha Suomessa 1917-1923," Bibliotheca Historica. Ph.D.diss. (Helsinki: SKS, 1998), 10-24, 27, 47, 78-79, 86, 91, 102, 113; Pertti Luntinen, F. A. Seyn 1862-1917. A Political Biography of a Tsarist Imperialist as Administrator of Finland (Helsinki: Historical Society of Finland, 1985), 210-14; Loima, "Muukalaisina," 15, 97-107; "Nationalism," 100-14. For combatant Russians in the Finnish Civil War among both White and Red troops, see Aatos Tanskanen, "Venalaiset Suomen sisallissodassa 1918," Acta Universitas Tamperensiens, Ser. A, 91 (Ph.D. diss., Tampere University, 1978); Ylikangas, Tie Tampereelle (Porvoo, Finland: WSOY, 1994). Professor Upton has also discussed the Russian troops as mental and racial enemies in January 1918 in Upton, 11, 35-36, 42-46, 72-73; see also Dubrovskaja and Westerlund, "Upseerien," 3-5, 38-39; Westerlund, "Pietarsaaren veriloyly 28.1.1918," in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.1, ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita 2004), 83-84. On the contemporary Finnish propaganda against Russians, see, for example, Mikko Uotinen, Valkoisten viirien alla (n.p, 1918), which is a collection of nationalistic speeches; see Karemaa, 10-16.

(5.) M. S. Svechnikov, Vallankumous ja kansalaissota Suomessa 1917-1918. (Helsinki: n.p., 1925), 38-45, 78-106; Tanskanen, "Venalaiset," 20-70, 86-98.

(6.) Sporadic fighting took place in Tornio and Oulu. Russian officers and Finnish Whites negotiated in secret in Vaasa, Kokkola, Kaskinen, and Kristiinankaupunki; see Westerlund, "Vaasan valtauksen venalaissurmat 28.1.1918," in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.1. ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004), 45-80; "Kokkolan kahakka ja suojeluskunnan mitatoima evakuoimissopimus" and "Kristiinankaupungin venalaissurmat 31.1.1918 Kaskisissa ja Kristiinankaupungissa 30.1.1918 solmittujen aseidenluovuttamis- ja rauhoittamissopimusten valossa," 103-155, 172, in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa. 2.1 ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004); Kalleinen, "Tornion tapahtumat ja venalaiset kevattalvella 1918," in ibid. 189-99; "Oulussa vangittujen venalaisten kohtalot," in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.2 ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004), 11-21.

(7.) See the Operative Reports of the Russian Red Army 23.1.-1.2.1918, f. 2262, op. 1, as, 865, 1.300 and 1.1361 in the Russian Military State Archives (RGVA); Report "Rysska Trupper" ("Russian troops") F.O. Number 295, in the Military Archives of Finland (MilA); F.O. Number 295, file 23, Tiedusteluosasto, Archives of the Independence War of Finland (AIW), NARC. See also Jussi T. Lappalainen, Punakaartin sota I (Helsinki: Opetusministerio, 1981), 167-68; Punakaartin sota II (Helsinki: Opetusministerio, 1981), 36-37; Tanskanen, "Venalaiset," 20-67, 86-98. Among the Finns, the Red casualties were 27,000, while the White victors lost 5,200. The losses among the unknown or "neutral" population were 4,400, including more than 420 identified German, 58 Swedish, and 33 other foreigners. See the lists of identified casualties by the WVP in the "Registry of War Victims 1914-1922 in Finland," 24 January 2007 cited at http://vesta.narc.fi/cgi=bin/db2www/sotasurmaemsivu/main? lang=en; or 27 January 2007 cited at http://www.narc.fi, English, etc.; see also Statistical Report in Westerlund, "Vuoden 1918 sodan kokonaisluvut," in Sotaoloissa vuosina 1914-1922 surmansa saaneet, ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita 2004), 53-72.

(8.) Statistics of the WVP in Westerlund and Kalleinen, "Loppuarvio surmansa saaneista venalaisista," in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.2 ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004), 53-72. See also The Statistical Report in Westerlund, "Vuoden 1918 sodan kokonaisluvut," 162-63. PDF in http://www.vnk.fi/> valtioneuvoston kanslian julkaisusarja > sotaoloissa vuosina 1914-1922 surmansa saaneet.

(9.) Metricheskaia Knigas of the Tampere and Hameenlinna ROC parishes (Cards ORT TAM 8201, 8183; ORT HAM 689), NARC. See also Kaarlo Merikoski, Taistelua Karjalasta (Helsinki: Valistus, 1939), 115; Loima, "Nationalism," 115-17. For more on the refugees, see, for example, Pekka Nevalainen, Viskoi kuin Luoja kerjalaista. Venajan pakolaiset Suomessa 1917-1939 (Hameenlinna, Finland: SKS, 1999), 15-16; Loima, "Muukalaisina," 146-47, 156, 159; Marjo Haimila, "Venajan pakolaisten surmat Karjalan Kannaksen rajaseudulla 1918-1921," in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.2 ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004), 239-251; Paul Avrich, Kronstadt 1921 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), e.g., 207-20.

(10.) For the numbers of wounded Russian soldiers at the end of March, see the list of sick, wounded, and dead in "Tampereen punakaarti" Ed 2-3 in file 219b, AIW, NARC; the List of Russian POWs in Tampere 15.4.1918; daily reports from the POWs in Tampere 28.4.1918-29.7.1918 in AIW and MilA; the hospital diaries in files Ka 1-11, Tampere; Ka 1-11, Kbl, Hameenlinna, Archives of the POW Organisation (SVLA), NARC. See also Upton, 330-63; Ylikangas, Tie Tampereelle, 310-13, 436-47, 473-75, 481-83, 506-10; Lappalainen, Punakaartin II; Tanskanen, "Venalaiset," 101, 157-58; Uusi Suomi, 5 April 1928, in Yrjo Raevuori, "Tampereen valloituksen mieshukka." See also Raevuori, Kaupungin kohtalokas kevat (Helsinki: n.p. 1960), 104-9; see Loima, "Tampereen," 213-15.

(11.) See the Archival sources in the list of sick, wounded, and dead in "Tampereen punakaarti, Ed. 2-3 in file 219b AIW, NARC; the list of Russian POWs in Tampere 15.4.1918; daily reports from the POWs in Tampere 28.4.1918-29.7.1918 in AIW and MilA; the hospital diaries in files Ka 1-11, Tampere; Ka 1-11, Kbl, Hameenlinna, Archives of the POW Organisation (SVLA), NARC; also Svechnikov, Vallankumous, 133; Loima, "Tampereen," 215-19.

(12.) See Metricheskaia Knigas of the Tampere and Hameenlinna ROC parishes, 1918, NARC; file Ai 12 (concerning the interrogated Reds), file 219b, AIW; the hospital diaries in Ka 2, Ka7; lists of dead in Kb2, both in SVLA, NARC; Loima, "Tampereen," 215, 221-23.

(13.) Metricheskaia Knigas of Tampere and Hameenlinna ROC parishes, 1918, NARC; the list of sick, wounded, and dead, in "Tampereen punakaart" Ed 2-3, in file 219b, AIW, NARC; the list of Russian POWs 15.4.1918, daily reports from POWs in Tampere 28.4,1918-29.7.1918, AIW, MilA; the hospital diaries in files Ka 1-11, Tampere; Ka 1-11, Kb1, Hameenlinna, the diary of the smallpox hospital in file Ka 11, SVLA, NARC. For Verikov, Samsonov, and the list of identified casualties, see Loima, "Tampereen," 222-29.

(14.) See, for example, Upton, 361-63; see also Ylikangas, Tie Tampereelle, 310-13, 436-83; Loima, "Tampereen," 222-29; see John Eliel, Der Klassenkrieg in Finnland. Die Finnische Sozialdernorkratie im Kampfe gegen die Reaktion (Kopenhavn: n.p., 1918), 51. He came quite close, claiming that 516 Russian officers and soldiers were killed in Tampere. It would he interesting to have a closer look at his unmentioned sources because his publication was printed in the same year, 1918. Moreover, the chaotic situation made it quite difficult to count, or to separate, the victims by rank and ethnicity; see Upton, 361-63; Ylikangas, Tie Tampereelle, 310-13, 436-83, 504-10.

(15.) Raevuori, Kaupungin, 106-10; Karemaa, 10-16; Loima, "Tampereen," 221-23; Ylikangas, Tie Tampereelle, 310-31, 436-83, 504-10; Upton, 72-73.

(16.) This timing of ratification had many reasons because the Treaty of Lausanne did not condemn, for example, the harsh population exchanges by Turks and Greeks in 1922-23. Norman M. Naimark noted that it "retroactively legitimized" it and thus "encouraged" other would-be perpetrators. Meanwhile, Finland was struggling with the rapidly increasing flow of refugees from Russia and had again (1921-23) "smuggled" thousands of refugees eastwards; see Karemaa, 10-16; Loima, "Muukalaisina," 163-66; "Tampereen," 221-23; Ylikangas, Tie Tampereelle, 310-13, 436-83, 504-10; Upton, "Vallankumsus," 72-73; Nevalainen, "Viskoi Kuin," 16-35; Naimark, Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 3-36, 208. See UN Declarations, 24 January 2007 cited at http://untreaty.un,org/. On Resolution 260 (III) of the UN General Assembly (1948) and "genocide," see http://www. preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm, cited 24 January 2007. On the Hague Treaty (1907) and the Finnish White Forces, see Lauri Vihonen, Valtiorikosoikeudet Suomessa 1918, file 153:2, NARC.

(17.) Jaakko Paavolainen, Poliittiset viikivaltaisuudet Suomessa 1918 II. Valkoinen terrori (Helsinki: Tammi, 1967), 137. See also Karemaa, 10-24; Loima, "Venalaistappiot Tampereen pohjoispuolella helmi-maaliskuussa 1918," in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.1, 202-5; Upton, 46-47; Loima, "Tampereen," 222; Westerlund, "Me odotimme," 170-71 in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.1, ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004).

(18.) See in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.1, ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004), for example, Paavolainen, Poliittiset, 137; Karemaa, "Vihollisia", 10-24; Loima, "Venalaistappiot Tampereen pohjoispuolella helmi-maaliskuussa 1918," 202-5; Upton, "Vallankumsus", 46-47; Loima, "Tampereen," 222; Westerlund, "Me odotimme," 170-71.

(19.) Ylikangas, Tie Tampereelle, 310-19, 451-53, 515-20, and passim.; Metricheskaia Knigas of Tampere and Hameenlinna ROC parishes, 1918, NARC.

(20.) Ylikangas, Tie Tampereelle, 310-19, 451-53, 515-520, and passim; Loima, Tampereen, 223-224; Metricheskaia Knigas of Tampere and Hameenlinna ROC parishes, 1918, NARC; Raevuori, Kaupungin, 106-10. See Hannes Ignatius, et al., eds., Suomen vapaussota vuonna 1918. I-VIII (Helsinki: Ahjo, 1921-27). For jaegers, Mannerheim, and other Tsarist officers in the Finnish Army, see Jarl Kronlund, "Puolustuslaitos ja suojeluskunnat," in Raja Railona. Nakokulmia suojeluskuntiin, ed. Risto Alapuro (Porvoo, Finland: WSOY 1998), 84-94.

(21.) For Russians in the Karelian Isthmus, see Vilho Hamalainen, "Karjalen Kannaksen venalainen kesaasutus ja sen vaikutus Suomen ja Venajan suhteiden kehitykseen autonomian ajan lopulla," Acta Universitas Tamperensiensis. Ser. A, Vol 59 (Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto, 1974), 6-13, 103-4, 205.

(22.) For Russian troops in Rautu, see f. 862, as. 278, 1.16; f. 862, as. 278, 1.24, RGVA; Commissar Georgenberg's Report on the Red Army and Its Combat Activities Against Finnish Whites, f. 1, as. 394, 1.1-13, RGVA; Commisar Kozinja's Report on Rautu, f. 25888, op. 3, as. 36, 1:3-4, RGVA. See also Tanskanen, "gautu 1918. Sotatapahtumat ja niiden poliittinen merkitys" (Study for Licenciate degree, Tampere University, 1969), 101. See Tanskanen, "Venalaiset," 170-75; Ignatius and Kaarle Soikkeli, Yleiskuvaus Suornen vapaussodasta (Helsinki: n.p., 1925), 147; Simo Eronen, Raudun taistelu (Helsinki: n.p.,1920), 110-11.

(23.) The interrogation and identity papers of Russian POWs in Rautu, files 61 and 236, MilA; Chistikov, 273-79; Tanskanen, "Rautu 1918," 70-110; cf. Eronen, 102-70; Loima, "Raudun," 249-69.

(24.) Report on the situation of the medical personnel as POWs of the Finnish Whites, The Historical Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), f. 3333, op. 5, as. 278; the interrogation papers of nurse Prigorovskaia 18.4.1918; the interrogation and identity papers of Russian POWs in Rautu, files 61 and 236; the lists of POWs from Rautu transported to Joensuu, file 1, "Karjalan Suojeluskunnat" file, AIW, MilA; the list of Russian POWs sent to Helsinki from Sortavala 27.6.1918, file Eb 11; the list of Russian POWs and the letter written by the commander of Sortavala Camp to Helsinki 10.6.1918; the letter written by the White Commander and the list of POWs sent to Helsinki from Joensuu 29.5.1918, file Bb 36, SVLA, NARC; the lists of dead in Kiviniemi White Military hospital, file 229.2; lists of wounded in Kiviniemi, files 240 and 246, AIW, MilA; Chistikov, 273-79. On the hospitals in the besieged station, see Tanskanen, "Rautu 1918," 96-98; cf. Eronen, 102-70. On the eventual fates of Russian and foreign Red warriors in Rautu, see Loima, "Raudun," 249-69. See again Chistikov, 271-79.

(25.) Tanskanen, "Venalaiset," 101-4, 180; Tanskanen, "Rautu 1918," 96-98; cf. Eronen, 102-70; Loima, "Raudun," 249-69, 250-60; Chistikov, 273-79.

(26.) Report on the situation of the medical personnel as POWs of the Finnish Whites, GARF, f. 3333, op. 5, as. 278; the interrogation papers of nurse Prigorovskaia 18.4.1918; the interrogation and identity papers of Russian POWs in Rautu, files 61 and 236; the lists of POWs from Rauru transported to Joensuu, file 1, "Karjalan Suojeluskunnat" file, AIW, MilA; the list of Russian POWs sent to Helsinki from Sortavala 27.6.1918, file Eb 11; the list of Russian POWs and the letter written by the commander of Sortavala Camp to Helsinki 10.6.1918; the letter written by the White Commander and the list of POWs sent to Helsinki from Joensuu 29.5.1918, file Bb 36, SVLA, NARC; the lists of dead in Kiviniemi White Military hospital, file 229.2; lists of wounded in Kiviniemi, files 240 and 246, AIW, MilA; Chistikov, 271-79; Loima, "Raudun," 249-69.

(27.) The interrogation and identity papers of Russian POWs in Rautu, files 61 and 236; the lists of POWs from Rautu transported to Joensuu, file 1, "Karjalan Suojeluskunnat" file, AIW, MilA; the list of Russian POWs sent to Helsinki from Sortavala 27.6.1918, file Eb 11; the list of Russian POWs and the letter written by the commander of Sortavala Camp to Helsinki 10.6.1918; the letter written by the White Commander and the list of POWs sent to Helsinki from Joensuu 29.5.1918, in file Bb 36; the Diaries of Patients in Iso-Mjolo POW Hospital, file Ka 14; the letter/order of Commander Birger Sourander; Sourander's lists of released Russian POWs from Iso-Mjolo 11.7.1918 and 19.7.1918, the list of dead Russian POWs in Iso-Mjolo, file Bb 36, SVLA, NARC. See also Jukka Partanen, "Joensuussa teloitetut venalaiset," in Venalaissurrnat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.2, 76-83; Loima, "Raudun," 255-60, 263-67. See Tanskanen, "Venalaiset," 101-4, 180.

(28.) The Metriceskaia Knigas of Palkeala ROC Parish, 1918, NARC; the interrogation and identity papers of Russian POWs in Rautu, files 61 and 236; the lists of wounded, dead, and treated in the Kiviniemi Military hospital, file 229.2; the list of wounded, files 240 and 246, AIW, MilA; the list of POWs in Sortavala 26.4.-20.6.1918, file 246.2.AIW, MilA; the list of POWs sent to Helsinki from Sortavala on 27.6.1918, file Eb 11, SVLA, NARC.

(29.) White reports from Rautu and the battles of the 1st Karelian Regiment, file 40; the interrogation and identity papers of Russian POWs in Rautu, files 61 and 236; the lists of wounded, dead, and treated in the Kiviniemi Military hospital, file 229.2; the list of wounded, files 240 and 246, AIW, MilA; the list of POWs in Sortavala 26.4.-20.6.1918, file 246.2.AIW, MilA; the list of POWs sent to Helsinki from Sortavala on 27.6.1918, file Eb 11, SVLA, NARC; the lists of POWs in the Kiviniemi, Rautu, Hiitola, and Kakisalmi Camps 1918-19, file Bb 23, Archives of the Vyborg POW Camp, SVLA, NARC; Report of the situation of the Russian medical personnel as POWs of the Finnish Whites, GARF, f. 3333, op. 5, as. 278; Metricheskaia Knigas of Palkeala ROC Parish, 1918, NARC; Tablica o narodoselenii Palkealskago prihoda 1910, the Statistical Report on Palkeala parishioners 1920, SCF.

(30.) For more on Sihvo's Declaration, see Hamalainen, "Karjalan Kannaksen, 226-38; Paavolainen, Karjalan Kannaksen, 52-53.

(31.) The lists of wounded, dead, and treated in Kiviniemi Military hospital, file 229.2; the list of wounded, files 240 and 246, AIW, MilA; the list of POWs in Sortavala 26.4.-20.6.1918, file 246.2, AIW, MilA; the lists of POWs in the Kiviniemi, Rautu, Hiitola, and Kakisalmi Camps 1918-19, file Bb 23, Archives of Vyborg POW Camp, SVLA, NARC; Report on the situation of the Russian medical personnel as POWs of the Finnish Whites, GARF, f. 3333, op. 5, as 278; Upton, 72-73, 362-69.

(32.) The lists of wounded, dead, and treated in Kiviniemi Military hospital, file 229.2; the list of wounded, files 240 and 246, AIW, MilA; the list of POWs in Sortavala 26.4.-20.6.1918, file 246.2, AIW, MilA; the lists of POWs in the Kiviniemi, Rautu, Hiitola, and Kakisalmi Camps 1918-19, file Bb 23, Archives of Vyborg POW Camp, SVLA, NARC; Report on the situation of the Russian medical personnel as POWs of the Finnish Whites, GARF, f. 3333, op. 5, as 278; Upton, 72-73, 362-69; Loima, "Muukalaisina," 130-46.

(33.) The Order of the Senate of Finland 15.4.1918, file Hg 1, Secret Diary of Ministry of Interior Affairs (also in "Vaasan senaatti. Talousosasto. Poytakirjat 1918"), NARC. For Marmerheim's and Lofstrom's orders, see Paavolainen, Poliittiset, 132; Upton, 440; Karemaa, 84; Westerlund, "Me odotimme," 151. For the unstable situation in these places, see Partanen, "Joensuun," in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.2, ed. Westerlund (Helsinki: Edita, 2004), 213-222; Loima, "Raudun," 260-67; Kalleinen, "Iso-Mjolon venalaisvankien kohtalot seka Helsingissa teloitetut venalaiset," in Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.2, 213-222.

(34.) Report of the situation of the Russian medical personnel as POWs of the Finnish Whites, GARF, f. 3333, op. 5, as. 278; the interrogation and identity papers of Russian POWs in Rautu, files 61 and 236; the lists of POWs from Rautu transported to Joensuu, file 1, "Karjalan Suojeluskunnat" file, AIW, MilA; the list of Russian POWs sent to Helsinki from Sortavala 27.6.1918, file Eb 11; the list of Russian POWs and the letter written by the commander of Sortavala Camp to Helsinki 10.6.1918; the letter written by the White Commander and the list of POWs sent to Helsinki from Joensuu 29.5.1918, file Bb 36; the Diaries of Patients in Iso-Mjolo POW Hospital, file Ka 14; the letter/order of Commander Sourander; Sourander's lists of Russian POWs released from Iso-Mjolo 11.7.1918 and 19.7.1918; the list of dead Russian POWs in Iso-Mjolo, file Bb 36; lists of (Russian and other) POWs in Kuopio, Lahti, Hiitola, Kiviniemi, Rautu, and Kakisalmi Camps 1918-19, Archives of Vyborg POW Camp, file Bb 23; List of shot and dead POWs in all camps, file Bb 59, SVLA, NARC; the commander of the Karelian Army Corps to the commander of the 1st Karelian Regiment, the commander of the 1st Karelian Regiment to the commander of the Karelian Army Corps 21.3.1918; reports from the battle of Rautu and the from battles of the 1st Karelian Regiment, file 40; the commander of the Karelian Military District to Colonel Sihvo 26.5.1918, file 224.b, AIW, MilA; Russkii Vestnik 29.4.1918; Kumous, nos. 17-52, 1918-19. See also Tanskanen, "Rautu 1918," 128-32; "Venalaiset," 101-4, 179-83. See Upton, 368; Eronen, 111; Paavolainen, Suomen kansallinen murhenaytelma. Punainen ja valkoinen terrori ja vankileirit 1918 (Helsinki: Tammi, 1974), 210-11; Vankileirit Suomessa 1918 (Helsinki: Tammi, 1971), 72. See also Partanen, 76-83.

(35.) See, for example, Selostus Raudun taistelusta ja 1. Karjalan Rykmentin taistelusta, file 40, AIW, MilA; Elfvengren's file 855 in the Archives of the State Security Police of Finland (VALPO) I, NARC; also Loima, "Muukalaisina," 136-37.

Jyrki Loima is an adjunct professor/docent in Intellectual History and History of Minorities, Universities of Joensuu and Helsinki.
Table 1. The Russian Casualties in the Finnish Civil War, according
to location

West Coast           Vaasa                           105-110
                     Pietarsaari/Jakobstadt          15
                     Kokkola                         10-15
                     Kristiinankaupunki              7
                     Other Western Finland           18
                     Tornio (northwestern coast)     31-56
                     Oulu (northwestern coast)       10-15
                     Uusikaarlepyy/Nykarleby         About 100

Northern Frontier    (North and) around Tampere      120-190
  and Southern       Tampere (siege and conquest)    480-500
  Finland            Mantyharju                      20
                     Around Hameenlinna              10-20
                     Around Lahti                    30-40
                     Southern Finland and            18
                       Helsinki

Karelian Frontier    Joensuu                         104
  and Eastern        Viipuri/Vyborg                  400-450
  Finland              (siege and conquest)
                     Rautu                           About 420
                     Kyyrola and other eastern       250-over 400
                       Isthmus
                     Kotka                           At least 19

Other                POW camps                       At least several
                                                       dozens
                     Other places, or killed         At least 20
                       by the Reds
                     Total                           At least
                                                       2,300-2,700

Note: These statistics are drawn from the WVP in Westerlund and
Kalleinen, "Loppuarvio surmansa saaneista venalaisista," in
Venalaissurmat Suomessa 1914-1922. Osa 2.2, 267-69.
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Author:Loima, Jyrki
Publication:The Historian
Geographic Code:4EUFI
Date:Jun 22, 2007
Words:9373
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