G2 Operations in Peace Operations.
The G2 operations section mission was not significantly different from a typical brigade S2 shop. The section's roles and players evolved over time as the MNB-E headquarters took form. In the end, our mission was to provide real-time intelligence support to the TF Falcon commander and staff. The section performed several important tasks:
* Conducting daily intelligence briefs to the TF Falcon Commander on current operations within MNB-E.
* Providing current intelligence support, through first-line analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), to G3 operations and MNB-E battle staff sections.
* Coordinating intelligence flow from the various U.S. and multinational battalions that comprised MNB-E, ensuring a timely flow of intelligence information from the TF analysis and control element (ACE) to MNB-E members and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) headquarters.
* Supplying current intelligence support to daily targeting meetings.
* Providing intelligence support to the Information Operations (IO) Working Group.
While a table of distribution and allowances (TDA) that the Division staff developed before deployment covered the section, the initial G2 operations section structure paralleled that of the Brigade S2 shop. We took advantage of early-established organizational and working relationships and began to forge new roles in an atypical environment.
The Brigade S2 became the G2 Operations Chief; therefore, the Brigade's Senior Intelligence Officer was no longer responsible solely to the brigade commander. The G2 Operations Chief worked in a division-like staff organization supporting the G2, a lieutenant colonel who answered directly to the TF Commander (a brigadier general). The G2 Operations Chief was responsible for the overall functioning of the section, ensuring that we processed and disseminated daily intelligence across MNB-E. In addition, he was the G2's representative for the daily close battle targeting meetings, and he provided intelligence support to the targeting process for the IO Working Group.
The Section noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) became the G2 Operations NCOIC, responsible for ensuring the well being of the section. He also interacted with the G3 Battle NCOs, G2 Sergeants Major, and ACE NCOIC to ensure that the task force was coordinating the current intelligence at the NCO level. The assistant brigade S2s became day and night "battle captains," whose primary role was disseminating the daily flow of intelligence information to the proper end users. They conducted daily battlefield update briefs, and kept the battle staff informed of current intelligence situations.
In addition, the G2 operations section also coordinated open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection and dissemination throughout MNB-E The section added an OSINT chief to over-see these duties, augmenting its traditional modified table of organization and Equipment (MTOE). The OSINT chief was a First Lieutenant (35D All-Source Intelligence Officer) assisted by one primary Category II (cleared for U.S. Secret level) translator and a pool of local national translators.
The greatest challenge came at the intelligence analyst level. Our 96Bs (Intelligence Analysts) had to learn and assist in developing an order of battle in an environment where there was no intelligence baseline. They had to draw analytical connections between emerging indicators and events that they did not normally track in a high-intensity threat environment. House fires, theft, drive-by shootings, ambushes of farmers, and random mortar attacks were regular threat events during TF Falcon's early months.
While the G2 section had to adapt its organizational duties to fulfill several additional roles, we were able to draw upon our fundamental wartime mission skills to forge an effective team. The principles of IPB did not change, only the operational environment did.
In completing these tasks, the G2 Operations section had to overcome several obstacles that were unique to its position in MNB-E. First, the section had to define its role concerning the division's ACE. As a brigade S2 section, we did not usually have the luxury of operating so close to the ACE. A mechanized brigade will normally deploy with its organic analysis and control team (ACT), which provides connectivity to the division ACE. The formation of a MNB headquarters with its own ACE ended the requirement for the ACT and allowed the 101st Military Intelligence (Ml) Battalion to deploy several ACTs throughout the MNB-E area of operations (AO). This facilitated intelligence flow and analysis across the brigade area.
Without the need for an ACT, the G2 operations section had to develop its own immediate relationship with the ACE. Frequent daily meetings with the All-Source Intelligence (ASI) section, collection management and dissemination, and G2X were critical to ensure we had a current picture of all the intelligence available within the TF.
As the G2 operations section, we had to avoid building a two-tiered knowledge system. We could not let the ACE become the "green door," holding critical pieces of information that other operation sections required. The multinational nature of MNB-E operations lent itself to the segregation of information.
The MNB-E tactical operations center (TOC) had liaison soldiers from Russia, Poland, and Greece, as well as other international organizations, forcing the operations sections to work only with information releasable to other nations, classified as "Releasable KFOR." Consequently, there was a low probability that all operations sections were fully knowledgeable of the complete intelligence picture. It was G2 Operations' role to ensure that all intelligence information was available (to cleared parties) for making daily operational decisions.
The sheer size and span of control of the MNB-E provided another unique challenge to the G2 operations section. While a typical mechanized infantry brigade is comprised of one armor and two infantry battalions, MNB-E was composed of one mechanized infantry battalion and one armor battalion that were organic to the BCT. In addition, a light infantry battalion from the 82d Airborne-with whom the brigade had not previously operated, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, a Polish battalion, a Russian tactical group, and a Greek battalion rounded out the early structure of MNB-E. This enlarged multinational brigade had intelligence officers and staffs who had not previously worked together. Each unit brought different standing operating procedures (SOPs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) with them as they assumed their missions in Kosovo.
To overcome these differences, it was important that intelligence officers from these various elements develop close working relationships. Monthly G2/S2 conferences, in which the various intelligence officers could exchange ideas and perspectives, were helpful in overcoming some of these differences. Developing a close working relationship with liaison officers from our multinational contributing nations also assisted in easing the flow of intelligence information from these nations.
The decision to employ ACTs throughout the MNB-E sector was also critical to assisting in the control of intelligence information across the brigade. Using the ACTs, the G2 operations section and the TF ACE were able to establish Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) connectivity with the contributing nations. The result was comprehensive Internet information flow to and from U.S. intelligence soldiers who were working with the Russian, Polish, and Greek intelligence sections.
The G2 operations section, however, could not rely solely on information from the ACTs and battalion S2 sections. It was important that all G2 operations section members made frequent trips into the sector to see first-hand how the situation was developing on the ground. It was too easy for the intelligence section to bury itself, reading intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) and daily situation reports (SITREPs), losing perspective on what was really happening. We could not provide quality first-line analysis to the battle staff if we had not frequently left the confines of TF Falcon Headquarters to visit the different MNB-E sectors.
Interaction with the KFOR G2 brought its own unique set of challenges. Communications and connectivity was the first problem. While MNB-E relied on SIPRNET, secure frequency modulation (FM), and Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) communications for the passing of intelligence information, KFOR worked with its own independent system. We initially passed INTSUMs and intelligence reports using systems we were not familiar with like Ptarmigan, Crisis Response Operations in NATO Operating Systems (CRONOS), and Linked Operational Intelligence Center, Europe (LOCE) computer systems.
While these systems were not complex, they did offer challenges in maintenance, upkeep, and compatibility with U.S. systems. The systems also came with their own classification concerns that allowed us to pass only information classified "Release KEOR" and "NATO Secret" levels. It was difficult to ensure that we passed only the appropriate level of information on each system, while continually providing timely and accurate information flow to KFOR headquarters. We were unable to create the most efficient information flow until we established secure connectivity with the KFOR main headquarters and a connection to U.S. elements using the Defense Secure Network (DSN) over MSE.
It was also important that we quickly learned the NATO report and INTSUM formats used by the KFOR headquarters and the other contributing members. Similarly, it was important that we understood the methods that other organizations used to move their intelligence information throughout the province of Kosovo.
The asymmetric nature of the Kosovo AO made it critical that we knew what was happening with the other brigades. We needed to have direct contact with other contributing nations in order to provide accurate intelligence support to current operations. While English is the official language of NATO, language skills often served as an impediment to information sharing. Fortunately, our immediate boundary was with the British in Multinational Brigade--Central (MNB-C), with whom we share a common language. The free flow of people across brigade sectors, the sharing of a common former Kosovo Liberation Army (UcK) operating zone, and the shared use of the primary main supply route from Skopje to Pristina made the open flow of communications with the British headquarters essential.
Regardless of the nation, the G2 operations sections from each MNB needed to feel free to talk directly to each other without the need to go through KFOR headquarters. Dependence on KFOR headquarters for information from our flanks meant a dramatic slow down and possible loss of critical information. Effective crosstalk between MNBs greatly enhanced overall situational awareness. We achieved this crosstalk not only through daily interaction but also through formal conferences sponsored by the KFOR G2.
During its six months as MNB-E G2 Operations, the 2d Brigade, 1St Infantry Division, S2 section fell back on several fundamental principles to perform its role. Good crosstalk, development of common SOPs, reliance on the basic IPB tenets, and a strong desire to develop a common picture of the battlefield allowed us to reorganize, refocus, and complete our mission.
Captain Greg Lisi is currently the Commander of B Company 101st Military Intelligence Battalion, 1st Infantry Division. He served as G2 Operations Officer, Task Force Falcon, from June to December 1999. His previous assignments include S2, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division; S2, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment; Assistant S3, Scout Platoon leader, and Assistant S2 for 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, at Fort Hood, Texas. CPT Lisi is a graduate of the Armor Officer's Basic Course, the Military Intelligence Imagery Officers Course, the Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and the Military Intelligence Officers Advance Course. CPT Lisi holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Government from Harvard University.
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|Author:||Lisi, Gregory P.|
|Publication:||Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin|
|Date:||Jan 1, 2001|
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