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Funding support: capabilities-based programming.

Introduction

If you are short of everything but the enemy, you are in the combat zone.

--Anonymous

Logistics leaders are charged with organizing, training, and equipping units under their command. Of these three duties, organizing is the only one without a recurring price tag. Training and equipping are, by definition, a cost-dependent activity. There is no great secret to securing funding, merely the investment of time and analysis to capture what logistics requirements (combat capability) support peacetime training, wartime deployment, prosecution of targets, and redeployment of forces. Clear, concise justifications need to be written to restate those requirements in budgeting language. This justification conveys how to quantify logistics requirements, evaluate levels of mission supportability, report mission capability, and compete more effectively for scarce non-noncost-per-flying hour funding resources at the squadron and group level.

Quantifying logistics requirements is the key to raising the pursuit of funding from the gray zone to a meaningful discussion of capability. Too often, base-level fund review boards roll critical repair, replacement, or new construction of logistics facilities into head-to-head competitions with services, security forces, and communications objectives without objective data on combat capability. Likewise, elements of capability already identified in maintenance units typically are rolled up into flying squadrons' Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) reports, subjecting their combat status to watering down shortfall impacts on combat capability. These are the product of information voids affecting funding decisions. It falls on the maintenance group and subordinate squadrons to identify what the unit's mission is, what requirements support the mission, and how the existing shortfalls impact the mission. These data must be packaged in the form that wing, numbered air force, and major command (MAJCOM) leadership recognizes as significant: mission capability. The current discussion needs to change from "how much money do you (maintenance group) want" to "what capability can you (wing commander) afford." For wartime taskings, the conversation needs to follow a structure of goals and cost: if the SORTS readiness goal is full wartime mission capable (C-1), (1) the price is $$$$; if the readiness goal is many, but not all, portions of the wartime mission (C-3), (2) then the price is $$ and so on. The effect is electrifying when reflecting on the age-old question, "What happens if I cut your funding 10 percent," and the reply is in terms of capability, not some subjective discourse on workarounds.

Can a method be developed to assist squadron and group logistics commanders to secure required mission funding? The answer lies in taking a general to specific approach, starting with an understanding of budget language as a first step. (4) As seen in Figure 1, the sample program objective memorandum (POM) summary slide lists approved funding levels, proposed budget amendments, and the associated revised totals out to fiscal year (FY) 2011 for a particular change control number action. The slide also identifies any supporting equipment purchases and adjustments in manning authorizations. In this sample RAPIDS slide, the proposed action is to plus-up FY10 and FY11 $50.8M and $51.3M respectively with a purchase of two additional engines in the same year groups. (5)

Within the RAPIDS are additional slides that identify program element codes targeted for modification. The slides detail the affected appropriations and cost codes for just the future years' defense programs (FYDP) (Figure 2). (6)

Both Figures 1 and 2 represent the method by which the Air Force decides which program will receive funding in the outyears. The program element code used in this sample impacts the F-16 fighter program (PEC 27133F) with proposed funding changes in the Advance Missile Procurement (cost code 20021), Munitions and Associated Equipment (cost code 81000), Depot-Level Repair (cost code 64560), and Aircraft Purchase (cost code 10001) programs. However, why this program was funded over others cannot be identified. That is the dilemma. (7) The day-to-day concerns at the group and squadron level can be lost in the funding process. Units' individual shortfalls and their impacts simply are not described at this high level. To succeed in securing funds, logistics requirements must be translated into language meaningful to the budget leadership.

The key to translating requirements into effective budget requests is the Resource Allocation Model (RAM). (8) RAM can be used at the MAJCOM level as a means of collecting wing, numbered air force, and staff inputs; sorting and establishing the priorities; and then deciding which shortfalls are funded from the limited MAJCOM budget. The RAM process is built on a fundamental value of capability. As seen in Figure 3, capability is described in a range less than or equal to 0.7 and up to a value of 1.1. (9)

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

Each measurement of capability is then applied to the item of interest. At the MAJCOM level, this building block is organized around the program element code. As seen in Figure 4, the program element code is broken down into the main funding elements resident within the PEC's scope, and the representative performance measures (PM) are combined to determine the overall health of the program element code. Performance measures are key measures that capture contributing capabilities within a program element code and provide clear visibility as to where funding can impact a PEC's capability. In a car, for instance, the performance measures could be the drive train, suspension, fuel system, electronic system, hydraulic system, body, and interior. The weight of each performance measure would be determined by its contribution to the overall capability of the program element code, independent of the financial value. For instance, in the car example, the weight of the drive train would exceed the weight of the interior relative to the car's capability. In Figure 4, there are seven different program managers who are contributing to the capability of the program element code, but as in the case of the car, the overall capability of 0.67 for the program element code is based on its characteristics. There are cases where a PEC's capability might be determined by averaging PM capabilities, but the impact of funding tends to be less clear than a weighted approach. (10) In this case, the majority of performance measures are 0.7 or greater; however, PM 7 is so critical to the program that the program element code is valued as not mission capable.

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

In the next step, the overall impact of each performance measure to the program element code is determined and displayed in the form of financial impact (Figure 5). In this example, the current budget buys an overall capability of 0.67, and if PM 7 is increased by $1.2K, then the capability rises to 0.7. The program element monitor (PEM) has responsibility for managing the program element code and will attempt first to reflow funds within the program element code to raise all performance measures to 0.7 (minimum acceptable capability to perform the function or mission). Using Figure 5, the reflow could pull $225K from PM 1, $75K from PM 2, $300K from PM 3, $25K from PM 5, and $175K from PM 6 for a total of $800K to flow to PM 7, while lowering the donating performance measures to a capability level of 0.7 (minimum acceptable). In this case, however, PM 7 still needs $400K to achieve the minimum 0.7 capability. Given the capability shortfall, the program element monitor will need to compete for additional funds within the MAJCOM's budget decision process to fill the requirement. (11)

[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]

When the program element monitor presents the request to the MAJCOM for additional funding, the MAJCOM leadership needs more information from the RAM process to determine the best budgeting course of action. Specifically, leadership needs to understand what needs to be funded, when the funding should be available, and where the funding should be applied to get the best performance value. To answer these questions, the RAM process uses performance value as a means of communicating the price of capability. Figure 6 quantifies the performance value of the program through key variables. (12) Top Line Performance (the star) is the value of the current funding level of $25.6M and its relative capability. Minimally Acceptable identifies the minimum amount of funding required to achieve 0.7 capability ($30M), and a fully capable program is achieved at Maximum Usable or $60M. Breakpoints (1, 2, 3) represent funding opportunities (possibly equipment purchases, building updates, and so on), clearly identifying the capability purchased with each increment of funding. Performance value captures the impact of funding for a single fiscal year, so six performance value charts are required to represent the program's performance in the RAM over the FYDP.

[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]

The RAM process provides key attributes that MAJCOMs can rely on for well-informed financial decisions. (13) RAM provides MAJCOM budget leadership answers to critical questions based on the PEC's value to the MAJCOM mission, PEC viability, PM support to the program element code, and required cost to fill the shortfall. The desired outcome is a MAJCOM decision to reflow funds within its own budget to meet the need. If the means to fund the shortfall exceed the MAJCOM's budget, then the request goes to Air Force-level as an unfunded requirement.

The keen environment for competing for limited funds is common to both Air Force and MAJCOM levels. The Air Force has a set budget to meet its assigned tasks. Subsequently, the budgets provided to the MAJCOMs are likewise limited. Lead commands (Air Combat Command [ACC] and Air Mobility Command) tend to receive the majority of funding (and bills) while operational commands (United States Air Forces in Europe [USAFE], Pacific Air Forces, and so on) are more limited. Effectively competing for these scarce funds requires objective arguments establishing who needs the funding; what is needed; why it is important to the mission; where the capability will be used; and finally, when the funds are required? The logic summary using both RAM and RAPIDS capturing these arguments and translating them into budgeting language is illustrated in Figure 7. Therefore, capturing the capability of performance measures; combining performance measures to identify PEC viability; detailing the support funding across the FYDP; and finally, proposing a budget change through the RAPIDS process completes the submission.

[FIGURE 7 OMITTED]

The opportunity for wings to submit funding shortfall requests is part of the annual budget request process. It is critical for groups (and sometimes squadrons) to establish an open dialog with the MAJCOM program element monitor responsible for managing the affected program element code throughout the year. Effective PEC management begins when the program element monitor understands what the "PEC does for [the MAJCOM] and for the combat air forces." (14) The exact timing for this process varies by MAJCOM, but a sample schedule is provided in Table 1. (15) The cycle is dependent on Air Force funding schedules, but typically, the MAJCOMs will conduct their PEM Parade in the November timeframe. This is the first level of competition for funds at the MAJCOM and the acid test for the affected PEC's capability argument. MAJCOMs collect available information on the program element codes; then process all budget requests through the remainder of the process; and finally, translate the budget decisions into RAPIDS slides for submission to the Air Force-level process. (16)

Developing Logistics Requirements

Two categories of logistics requirements were considered when researching for this article: wartime and peacetime. Wartime requirements include capabilities necessary to deploy, prosecute the conflict (conduct hostile operations), and redeploy or reconstitute. Peacetime requirements are focused on training the rated and nonrated force by providing enough mission-capable aircraft, equipment, and support structure to meet the ready aircrew program (18) requirements and produce a qualified maintenance workforce. Financial support justification for both categories can come through three different requirements processes: local flying programs, SORTS, and the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) Unit Type Code (UTC) Reporting Tool (ART).

The process for deriving fundable logistics requirements is illustrated in Figure 8--there is nothing new needed to determine requirements in terms of organization or personnel. Leadership needs to establish a goal for performing the analysis using the maintenance group analysis section in quantifying logistics requirements. The fundamental approach is to establish requirements agreed upon by both the operations group and maintenance group leadership and then have the requirements approved by the wing commander. Once established, these requirements serve as the basis by which capability is measured.

[FIGURE 8 OMITTED]

Peacetime Training Requirements

Establishing peacetime training requirements suitable for determining the capability of the group or squadron is driven by the flying and personnel training program. Training in this case is defined as day-to-day flying and related maintenance support required to meet the ready aircrew program and maintenance training (19) programs. Given the variances in primary aircraft assigned (PAA) across the different mission design series aircraft and wings, settling on a standard mission capability (MC) rate as a common basis for discussion, is the most desirable approach.

Evaluating the level of training capability contributed by or subtracted from the required MC rate is a function of not mission capable (NMC) levels. For instance, standardized levels for NMC maintenance, not mission capable-supply, and not mission capable-both (NMCB) are set values within each MAJCOM, (20) and exceeding those values impacts the scheduled flying-hour program that supports the training mission. As a matter of logistics purview, the discussion centers on NMC and NMCB. As seen in Figure 9, a sample 24-PAA squadron has standardized the number of aircraft available for the flying schedule (18) and the number set aside for maintenance activities. As in this example, the maintenance activities may include aircraft set aside for programmed depot maintenance (one), wash (one), paint (one), phase (one), cannibalized aircraft (one), and weapons load training (one). A violation of this standard is depicted as the cross-hatched area starting in February, with a variable pattern extending through June where too many aircraft are inducted into maintenance and not enough are available for the flying schedule.

[FIGURE 9 OMITTED]

Translating these violations to a RAM-capability scale requires an objective selection of criteria to consider and establish what capability the maintenance unit is providing to the flying unit. The sample criteria in Table 2 categorize very simple logistics-related violation criteria into subject-matter areas. These are weighted in terms of their immediate or long-term effect on aircraft availability for application to the capability definition scale (Figure 10). Further refinement of these criteria allows for selecting specific work unit codes out of each area and assists in assigning various capability impact values for more realistic capability measurement. For the purposes of this article, greater levels of detail fall to the reader for further exploration.

[FIGURE 10 OMITTED]

Once senior leadership agrees to the capabilities list and assigned weights, the next step entails breaking down capability to squadron, shop, and section levels. Examining the equipment maintenance squadron (EMS) may reveal critical capability failure points as illustrated in Figure 11. In this case, the fabrication flight has a capability shortfall (Figure 12), within which the aircraft structural maintenance section shows the corrosion control function (or performance measure) as the driver (Figure 13). The causes could be a paint barn in need of upgrades (military construction funding), an environmental compliance assessment and management program equipment shortfall (operation and maintenance [O&M] funding), or a shortage of computer printers (O&M funding). Budget increases are then sought for application at this level of resolution to ensure mission capability.

[FIGURES 11-13 OMITTED]

Peeling the capability levels back to this level does four key things for the funding decision process. First, the fundamental cause of significant drops in capability is identified down to an actionable level. Second, based on its impact, the shortfall can be assigned an objective priority in the funding decision process. Third, the method used to identify the shortfall fits precisely into the RAM budget management methodology. Finally, filling the shortfall is fully retraceable. This means the money allocated to the effort can be traced readily in terms of its effects. An objective analysis of the shortfall example reveals the best points to apply funding and the impact to capability as shown in Figure 14. In these terms, traceability of financial impact is clear.

[FIGURE 14 OMITTED]

The importance of traceability cannot be overemphasized. Traceability serves as a measure of credibility used by MAJCOM and Air Force-level budget program authorities to evaluate their decisions. Further, the return on investment illustrated by traceability in each program action serves as lessons learned to either follow a specific funding opportunity or reduce or cease funding altogether. Finally, effective traceability benefits the requesting unit by helping ensure funds are not redirected when they arrive on base but instead are applied to the problem identified to the budget process.

However, analysis of funding effects must consider how the context has changed between the time funds were originally requested and when they were applied. For example, additional equipment issues may have developed during the interim; the operations tempo may have changed, either worsening or easing the shortfall; aircraft may have deployed and increased or lessened the criticality; and finally, more critical shortfalls may have developed and eclipsed the current funding efforts. These possibilities do not usurp funding traceability but do emphasize the importance of accounting for all critical contributors and detractors from mission capability.

Wartime Requirements--SORTS Methodology

General SORTS Process. The formal SORTS process directly establishes and supports wartime readiness-reporting requirements. As described in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-201:
 SORTS has a threefold purpose: it provides data critical to crisis
 planning, provides for the deliberate or peacetime planning process,
 and is used by the Chief of Staff United States Air Force (CSAF)
 and subordinate commanders in assessing their effectiveness in
 meeting Title 10, "United States Code," responsibilities to
 organize, train, and equip forces for combatant commands. All
 units with an Air Force Personnel Accounting Symbol (PAS) code
 will be registered in SORTS. (21)


"Regardless of the source of a unit's tasking or the extent of unit capability tasked in operational plans (OPLANS), and so forth, SORTS measurement is based on the unit's full wartime requirement for which it was organized or designed. This baseline is reflected in the definition of [the status rating] C-1" (ready for full wartime mission), and SORTS reports are focused on four key baselines of personnel; equipment and supplies on hand; equipment condition; and finally, training. (22) SORTS reports are prepared at the wing, submitted to the MAJCOM reporting organization, and monitored by Headquarters Air Force Operational Readiness, who "acts as liaison with the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and Air Staff functional area manager for SORTS and related issues." (23) This highlights the direct role SORTS plays in gaining the attention of the budget leadership. Air Force Operational Readiness collects the SORTS reports and compiles them into the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) for submission to the Joint Staff on a monthly and quarterly basis. (24) This provides a direct link to Congress, reflecting where shortfalls exist and where funding may be needed. In this process, SORTS captures unit wartime mission readiness; reports readiness status to the MAJCOM, Air Staff, and Joint Staff; and finally, goes to Congress for their consideration in the legislative (and budgeting) process. (25)

The basis for SORTS reporting and the key document holding direct meaning for group and squadron level commanders is the Designed Operational Capability (DOC) statement. As a function of wartime missions, the DOC is quite clear in capturing the requirements:
 The purpose for a SORTS Doe statement is to provide units with
 a single-source document of the information necessary and the
 location of the references specifying resources to measure and
 report in SORTS. They also provide a narrative description of
 the unit's wartime mission. All SORTS Doe statements will be
 completed on a standard or computer-generated AFF [Air Force
 Form] 723 or an XOOA approved facsimile. (26) (Figure 15)


[FIGURE 15 OMITTED]

Establishing logistics DOCs within each MAJCOM and wing can be achieved through procedures established in Air Force and MAJCOM instructions. As witnessed in USAFE, the preponderance of Doe statements are written for operational, not logistics squadrons. USAFE/LGW* recently changed this absence of logistics DOCs when it submitted DOC statements for the USAFE Logistics Commander's approval describing the wartime mission of war reserve materiel conventional munitions in support of the command's assigned OPLANs. In accordance with AFI 10-201, USAFE Sup 1, (27) The USAFE Logistics Commander approved the DOC statements, providing clear insight into the readiness of command conventional munitions to support assigned OPLAN operations. USAFE munitions readiness is now part of the SORTS process with readiness visibility being reported to both the Joint Staff and Congress. AFI 10-201, ACC Sup 1, (28) likewise provides authority to the logistics commander (or appropriate director) for DOC approval. The key is to determine the required personnel; equipment condition; equipment and supplies on hand; and finally, the training requirements to establish an effective baseline for adequate mission support. Once this baseline is established, readiness reporting is simply a function of how well each of these baselines is supported. In this same vein, shortfalls are identified, presenting a sound opportunity for funding to play a role.

SORTS and the RAM Process. SORTS provides a clear opportunity to establish meaningful performance measures and convey where the funding opportunities lie to improve capability. Starting with Figure 16, set values can be assigned to each capability measure on a one-to-one basis with the C-ratings. Similar to the peacetime requirements, specific program element code and PM-based capability profiles can be developed to highlight which squadron, flight, or section is driving the lowered rating (Figures 11 through 13), ending with submission through the RAPIDS process to fill capability and funding shortfalls (Figure 17).

[FIGURES 16-17 OMITTED]

SORTS provides visibility of capability shortfalls across a spectrum of funding sources. First, SORTS highlights the wartime readiness issues throughout the Air Force, starting at the unit level and progressing up to the Chief of Staff. Second, through the QRRC process, component commanders and the Joint Staff are informed of capability shortfalls. In fact, these shortfalls can be reflected on a component commander's integrated priority list as a means of emphasizing the importance of the issue to Joint Staff oversight. Third, the MAJCOM's QRRC submission will go before Congress, whether or not the issue is included in the integrated priority list. The end result is the SORTS process raises capability shortfall issues into the joint and congressional arenas for full consideration of the implications for future and current combat operations.

Wartime Requirements--ART Methodology

General ART Process. The system to organize the Air Force into an expeditionary force is already fully in place.
 The expeditionary aerospace force concept is how the Air Force
 organizes, trains, equips, and sustains itself by creating a mindset
 and cultural state that embraces the unique characteristics of
 aerospace power--range, speed, flexibility, and precision--to meet
 the national security challenges of the 21st century. The concept
 has two fundamental principles: first, to provide trained and ready
 aerospace forces for national defense and, second, to meet national
 commitments through a structured approach which enhances Total
 Force readiness and sustainment. (29)


The EAF is organized into:
 ... aerospace expeditionary forces; dedicated on-call aerospace
 expeditionary wings (AEW); lead mobility wings (LMW); and
 required air operations center (AOC) and Air Force Forces
 (AFFOR) command and control (C2) elements. Available Air Force
 UTCs have been aligned equitably across ten AEF libraries so each
 possesses roughly equal capabilities. These libraries provide a
 composite of capabilities from which force packages are developed
 and tailored to meet mission requirements. (30)


As mission requirements dictate, "specifically tailored forces are presented to theater commanders as aerospace expeditionary task forces (AETF)." (31)

The ART has been developed and implemented to capture the readiness of units to support the EAF and the underlying AEF construct. In accordance with AFI 10-244, the ART reports the health of the ten AEFs, LMWs, and enablers. ART uses the UTCs as building blocks to provide Headquarters Air Force, Air Force component commanders, MAJCOMs, and the AEF Center readiness information to employ, manage, and sustain EAF operations. It also "provides units a mechanism to report a UTC's ability or inability and associated deficiencies in fulfilling its mission capability statement across the full spectrum of operations, to include contingency and steady-state operations." (32) Finally, it "provides information to aid resource allocation and tasking decisions during steady-state and crisis actions." (33) This reporting system takes advantage of existing capability reporting:
 ART complements readiness data reported in Status of Resources
 and Training Systems (SORTS). ART focuses reporting on the
 modular scalable, capability-based UTCs designed to meet the needs
 of the 21st century force while SORTS is unit-centric with reporting
 based on major war (MW) commitments. The basis for both systems
 is the Air Force-Wide UTC Availability and Tasking Summary
 (AFWUS). The tasking baseline contained in ART is derived from
 the AEF time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) library,
 which supports the full spectrum of operations. Readiness
 assessments for MW and AEF taskings must be considered
 together; however, the reporting guidelines for each may be
 independent. A unit's C-level, as reported in SORTS, may not
 directly correlate to its ability to support a specific UTC tasking
 as indicated in ART. (34)


ART and SORTS share some common justification through the DOC process. As described in AFI 10-244, the "UTC readiness assessment is based on resources that are expected to be mission ready within their [assigned] DOC response time." (35) Since the DOC is key to both SORTS and ART, the importance of developing logistics DOCs is a common goal for establishing a solid foundation for future funding efforts. The key difference between ART and SORTS, with respect to financial potential, is the size of the budget audience. ART is strictly an Air Force tool and is not used in the joint world. ART reports are not submitted to component commanders, the Joint Staff, or Congress.

Since the audience is limited, so too are the potential sources of funding. ART reports are submitted monthly and follow the chain of command through the wing, numbered air force, MAJCOM, and up to the Chief of Staff. This means ART can be used to highlight issues and possibly make the case for scarce funding support (36) within the Air Force budgeting system with no consideration from component commander, Joint Staff, or congressional budget leadership.

Reporting UTC viability within ART is accomplished through color-coded reports. As defined in Table 3, the green/yellow/red system quickly conveys UTC readiness to meet the mission. The bottom line is ART can be an effective means for capturing capability and identifying funding shortfalls with the understading that it can be used only within Air Force confines.

ART and the RAM Process. ART also provides a clear opportunity to extablish meaningful performance measures and where to improve capability. Starting with Figure 18, set values can be assigned to each capability measure on a one-to-one basis with the reported color-coded assessment. Similar to the peacetime requirements, specific program element code and PM-based capability profiles can be developed to highlight which squadron, flight, or section is driving the lowered rating (Figures 11 through 13) ending with submission through the RAPIDS process to fill capability and funding shortfalls (Figure 19).

[FIGURE 19 OMITTED]

Conclusions

The answer to the question "Can a method be developed to assist squadron and group logistics commanders to secure required mission funding" is an emphatic yes. Squadrons and groups must invest time and thought to compete effectively for funding resources at the MAJCOM, Air Force, and DoD levels. In other words, they spend the time to determine the requirements necessary to support the peacetime and wartime missions as well as the thought in applying the financial resources in a traceable manner. The key is to establish the fundamental requirements supporting the peacetime and wartime missions. When established, the requirements clarify not only the shortfalls identified from the logistics perspective but also mission impact to senior leadership. Once leadership understands the implications to the mission, more effective prioritization of resources throughout the unit is achieved more easily.

All the resources and processes for determining requirements, shortfalls, and a way ahead are available. DOCs (or the means to create them), analysis (from the Analysis section), readiness reporting (through SORTS or ART), funding requests (through the POM or other means), and traceability (to track effectiveness and seek further funding) combine to form an effective budget justification system. This is available to any commander who is ready to take resource management to a higher level and fund the first priority of the position: organize, train, and equip.

Article Highlights

Logistics leaders are charged with the duty to organize, train and equip the units under their command

Squadrons and groups must invest time and thought to compete effectively for funding resources at the MAJCOM, Air Force, and DoD levels. In other words, they spend the time to determine the requirements necessary to support the peacetime and wartime missions, as well as the thought in applying the financial resources in a traceable manner. The key is to establish the fundamental requirements supporting the peacetime and wartime missions. When established, the requirements clarify not only the shortfalls identified from the logistics perspective but also mission impact to senior leadership. Once leadership understands the implications to the mission, more effective prioritization of resources through the unit is achieved more easily.

Major Dane P. West, USAF

Major Douglas W. Pohlman, USAF

Notes

(1.) AFI 10-244, Reporting Status of Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, 19 Feb 02, 16

(2.) AFI 10-244, 16.

(3.) Michael A. Greiner, Kevin J. Dooley, Dan L. Shunk, Ross T. McNutt, "An Assessment of Air Force Development Portfolio Management Practices," Defense Acquisition University, Acquisition Review Quarterly, Spring 2002, 127 [Online] Available: http://www.dau.mil/pubs/arq/2002arq/DoolySP2.pdf.

(4.) DoD Directive 7045.14, The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, 22 May 84.

(5.) "06 POM JIT Master Briefing," AF/XPPE, 15 Jan 04 [Online] Available: http://www.xp.hq.af.mil/XPP/XPPTraining/XPP_Training_Page.htm.

(6.) Ibid.

(7.) Greiner, et al, 127.

(8.) HQ USAFE/XPP, USAFE POM Handbook, Jun 01, 35.

(9.) USAFE POM Handbook. 35.

(10.) USAFE POM Handbook, 37.

(11.) USAFE POM Handbook, 41.

(12.) USAFE POM Handbook, 36.

(13.) USAFE POM Handbook, 35-39.

(14.) USAFE POM Handbook, 41.

(15.) USAFE POM Handbook, 26-27.

(16.) USAFE POM Handbook, 4-42.

(17.) USAFE POM Handbook, 26-27.

(18.) AFI 11-102, Flying Hour Program Management, 5 Apt 02, 5.

(19.) AFI 21-101, Aerospace Equipment Maintenance Management, 1 Oct 02, 24.

(20.) ACC Instruction 21-118, Logistics Maintenance Performance Indicator Reporting Procedures, 10 Feb 03, 15

(21.) AFI 10-201, Status of Resources and Training System, 12 Dec 03, 8.

(22.) AFI 10-201, 9-10.

(23.) AFI 10-201, 20.

(24.) AFI 10-201, 20.

(25.) AFI 10-201, 8.

(26.) AFI 10-201, 13.

(27.) AFI 10-201, USAFE Sup 1, Status of Resources and Training System, 23 Mar 01, 2.

(28.) AFI 10-201, ACC Sup 1, Status of Resources and Training System, 12 Jun 01, 4.

(29.) AFI 10-244, Reporting Status of Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, 19 Feb 02, 4.

(30.) AFI 10-244, 4.

(31.) Ibid.

(32.) AFI 10-244, 5.

(33.) Ibid.

(34.) AFI 10-244, 6.

(35.) AFI 10-244, 13.

(36.) Ibid.

Major West is Commander, 1 CMS, Langley AFB, Virginia. At the time of the writing of this article, he was a student at the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC), Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Major Pohlman is an ACSC faculty member.
Table 1. MAJCOM Abridged POM Time Line (17)

DATE ACTION REMARKS

Sep POM Kickoff Chaired By MAJCOM
 Directorate

Sep Brief MAJCOM/CC on POM Strategy
 to Obtain Guidance

Nov MAJCOM Dir. Brief Programs to PEM
 Lead/Other Directorates Parade
 (Part 1)

Dec MAJCOM Dir Brief Budget Programs PEM
 to MAJCOM/CC Parade
 (Part II)

Jan MAJCOM Lead Briefs CSAF and
 Other MAJCOMs

Jan MAJCOM Lead Briefs Air Force
 Board

Feb Air Force Panels Analyze and
 Integrate MAJCOM Submissions

Mar Air Force Board POM Review

Apr Air Force Council POM Review

May Air Force Delivers POM to OSD

Table 2. Logistics Capability Violation Criteria

Violation Type Short- Long- Weight
 # Maintenance Term Term
 Issue Impact? Impact?

 1 Delayed Discrepancies No Yes 0.1
 2 Aircraft Wash No Yes 0.1
 3 Aircraft Paint No Yes 0.2
 4 WLT No Yes 0.2
 5 Phase and Isochronal
 Inspections Yes Yes 0.3
 6 Time Change Items Yes Yes 0.4
 8 Mission Essential
 List Items Yes Yes 0.4

Table 3. Logistics Capability Violation Criteria

Color Description Definition

Green Go All MEFPAK (MANFOR, LOGFOR)
 identified personnel, equipment,
 and training for the AEF allocated
 UTC are available for deployment
 within 72 hours of notification or
 sooner if subject to more stringent
 criteria.

Yellow Caution The UTC has a missing or deficient
 capability, but that missing or
 deficient capability does not prevent
 the UTC from being tasked and
 accomplishing its mission in a
 contingency or AEF rotation.

Red No Go The UTC has a missing or deficient
 capability that prevents the UTC
 from being tasked and
 accomplishing its mission in a
 contingency or AEF rotation.

Unclassified

FY06 POM Baseline Est

BACKGROUND:

(U) The purpose of the FY06 POM Round 1 Baseline Extension is
to extend all approved AF programs in the F&FP ABIDES Database for
FY10 and FY11 using the current approved inflation factors.

ADJUSTMENT:

(U) The FY06 POM Baseline Extension, Rd 1, will extend approved
programs through FY10 and FY11. All ZBTs, disconnects,
initiatives, and offsets will be addressed in Round 2.

$M:06R1T101AN FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11

CURRENT PRG 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0
ADJUSTMENT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.8 51.3
REV PGM TOTAL 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.8 51.3

PROCUREMENT FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11

Engines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

MPWR FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11

OFF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ENL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CIV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

IMPACTS

(U)--All requirements for baseline extension will be
presented to the AFG, but only programs greater
than $100M annually will be briefed

(U)--Panels are responsible for extending all investment
appns (3010, 3011, 3020 30817, and 3600, except
cost-categories 39*** and 595**) and new mission MILCON
All other MILCON will be extended by ILEP.

(U)--FMB will extend O&M Appn 02 Buy Quantity, inflate
all O&M based on MDS/PDS DB and include it in the
FY06 POM Baseline for Rd 1 start position

(U)--Panels will be required to submit a separate
RAPIDS CCN to change O&M, coordinate change with
PDS/MD'S DB POCs and brief to the AFG for approval

Figure 2. PEC Summary Slide

Unclassified

06R1T101AN FY06 POM Baseline Ext

ADJUSTMENT: (U) The FY06 POM Baseline Extension, Rd 1,
will extend approved programs through
FY10 and FY11. All ZBTs, disconnects, initiatives, and
offsets will be addressed in Round 2.

Funding Lines Total $ 0.000
 APPN WSC/
PE COST PROG OAC BPAC FY2006

27133f3020 20021 ag1000 78 0 0.000
27133f3080 81000 ag1000 78 0 0.000
27133f3600 64560 ag1000 78 0 0.000
27133f3010 10001 ag1000 78 0 0.000

Funding $ 0.000 $ 0.000 $ 0.000 $50.800 $51.300
Lines Total

PE FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011

27133f3020 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.200 15.400
27133f3080 0.000 0.000 0.000 14.000 14.100
27133f3600 0.000 0.000 0.000 9.000 9.100
27133f3010 0.000 0.000 0.000 12.600 12.700

 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008

Procurement

Engines 0 0 0 0 0

 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011

Procurement

Engines 0 2 2

Coordination

Panel Chair:
Panel POC:
CONOP Champion:
Crosscut Panel:
IPT Chief:
ANG/AFR:
Program Element Mtr:
3080 FM Appn Manager
3600 FM Appn Manager
3010 FM Apn Manager
3080 ILPY Manager
XPPE DB Manager:
ZBT Manager:
COPYRIGHT 2005 U.S. Air Force, Logistics Management Agency
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2005 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
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Author:West, Dane P.; Pohlman, Douglas W.
Publication:Air Force Journal of Logistics
Article Type:Cover Story
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Mar 22, 2005
Words:6010
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