From black magic to heresy: a doctrinal leap in the pontificate of John XXII.
As Boureau sees it, Enrico's contribution goes hand in hand with his development of a new theory of sacramental causality that originated around the 1240s, based on the notion of "pact" between humans and God. (4) Enrico articulates the doctrinal preoccupation with the devil on the theme of "pact," which encouraged the parallel between daemonic practices and sacramental efficacity. In sharp contrast with the ancient tradition that saw the power of the devil restricted to natural parameters, the notion of pact assumed a doctrinal content that accorded a universal and supernatural dimension to the devil's power, far beyond the actions of foolhardy individuals. This new theory established the grounds for a crucial revision of the concept of heresy, which extended its meaning to cover cases of erroneous religious practice, a development that naturally contributed to the pope's agenda of assimilating black magic into heresy and punishing it accordingly.
In Boureau's analysis, therefore, new developments in doctrine underpinned the pope's doctrinal innovation of the "heretical fact," specifically the contractual theory of sacramental causality, and the new value accorded to the will, away from more classical conceptions that placed the accent on the intellect as the controlling faculty. (5) Although we know of notable exceptions, (6) Boureau presents both aspects as predominantly Franciscan theological features. Indeed, much of the value of Boureau's analysis depends on the validity we are prepared to accord to the contrast he draws between Franciscan doctrinal innovations--as exemplified in Enrico's account, in tune with the times and certainly with the pope's aims--and more backward, mainly Aristotelico-Thomistic, theories of sacramental causality, and of the relation between intellect and will. Enrico's conception of sacramental causality is thus set positively against the predominantly Dominican view of physical or instrumental causality, just as the pope's innovation of the "heretical fact" is presented as an inversion of Aquinas's view on the relation between intellect and will, which rather yields a restricted view of heresy as an intellectual assent to a false opinion. (7) In this spirit, Boureau will advance the suggestion that the fifty-year lapse that separated the composition of John XXII's resulting bull Super illius specula in 1326 and its first publication in Nicholas Eymeric's Directorium inquisitorum of 1376 might partly reflect "the lack of Dominican enthusiasm for the contractual structure developed by the rival order of friars." (8)
In what follows, I would like to challenge Boureau's thesis. That is, I shall challenge the centrality of specifically Franciscan doctrinal developments as explanation for the significance of the 1320 consultation, and in doing so revive the question of what was really at issue in the pope's consultation. Without questioning the great value of the doctrinal connection that Boureau draws between the new theory of sacramental causality and the emergence of a true demonology in the medieval West, I shall argue that the crucial factor guiding the pope's initiative, and what was really at issue in the 1320 consultation, was an ecclesiological--rather than purely doctrinal--concern for the devising of truly effective means for conquering heresy, whether this appeared in the form of religious dissidence or as secular opposition.
In order to make this challenge, I shall concentrate on the response of another member of the commission, not Enrico del Carretto, but Guido Terreni, general of the Carmelite order. In 1318 the pope had appointed Guido, together with Pierre de la Palud, to examine a Catalan adaptation of Peter John Olivi's commentary on the Apocalypse. In 1323, again, he wrote an extensive treatise on evangelical perfection dedicated to John XXII, which probably influenced the composition of the bull Cum inter nonnullos--a treatise that includes the canonical claim that John's decrees on poverty could not be heretical because he had consulted his cardinals. (9) We are thus in the presence of a staunch defender of papal sovereignty, whose opinion was in all likelihood going to strike the right chord with the pope. Indicative of this fact are John's numerous annotations on the margins of Guido's response--annotations conspicuously missing from Enrico's text. If not necessarily an indicator of the pope's opinion, these annotations point at least to what he considered important concepts or ideas. They also go to show the importance that the pope attached to Guido's judgment, and the careful attention with which he examined it. Before we embark on Guido's contribution, however, it would be worth saying a few words about the background and broad implications of the pope's consultation in the shift that our theologians endeavoured to justify. I shall then devote a section to Enrico, to look more closely at his doctrinal innovation. Quite apart from what this will teach us about fourteenth-century doctrinal developments, this section will enable us to disengage the pope's agenda from distinctly Franciscan theological traits by revealing the common ground shared by Enrico's and Guido's solutions.
I. THE POPE'S CONSULTATION: BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The 1320 text (10) contains John's consultation of a commission of ten reputed theologians and canonists who were to state their view on whether certain practices of black magic and invocation of spirits should be qualified as heretical, or as mere superstition. A single manuscript, Vatican Borghese 348 (fos. 1r-60v), discovered in 1952 by Anneliese Maier and recently published in a critical edition by Alain Boureau preserves the experts' responses. (11) The choice of experts, all prelates or masters of high standing, appears to have been dictated partly by their effective presence in Avignon. The majority were members of regular orders, mostly theologians, but they also included experts in canon law. (12) Most of them had already some experience in the repression of heresy, and a good number had taken active part in the preparation of the controversial bull Cum inter nonnullos, issued during the pope's conflict with the Spiritual Franciscans. (13)
The aim of such consultations remains uncertain. Do they represent genuine hesitation on the part of the pope? Was he trying to build up a reserve of arguments? Did he consider them as contributions to a doctrinal laboratory to be used for strategic purposes? Whatever we think of these suggestions, it seems clear that the pope's keenness for theological inquiries had little to do with any collegiate feeling or wish to be conciliatory. More probably, the pope's aim with these consultations was to gather solid arguments and authorities that might serve the detailed and precise composition of bulls, as is shown in the case of the various bulls issued in condemnation of Franciscan dissidence. (14) This scrupulous way of proceeding seems confirmed by the number of annotations from the pope's hand that appear in manuscripts containing the works of Thomas Aquinas, or, as we shall see, in the margin of the expert advice of theologians such as Guido Terreni. (15) John's practice of appointing commissions of experts otherwise presented certain institutional constraints to the discussion. The recruitment was arbitrary, which sometimes entailed half-hearted consultations, as was the case with Jacques Fournier's unenthusiastic examination of Durandus of St. Pourcain's treatise on the beatific vision. The commissions also involved a career hazard: sometimes they entailed promotions, as is the case with most of the members of the 1320 consultation, sometimes ostracism, as the cases of William of Ockham and Thomas Waleys testify. The pope's consultations also constituted constant threats of repression in case of open divergence, an aspect that questions the purpose of the experts' work as a "service" to the pope rather than a genuine intellectual exercise. (16)
The questions John put to his commission of experts were five. (1) Whether those who baptize images with harmful purposes (maleficium) incur a "heretical fact" (factum haereticale) or should simply be judged as the authors of black magic (sortilegium), and how they should be punished. (2) Whether a priest who superstitiously and sacrilegiously re-baptizes people believing that such a practice has medicinal powers is to be considered a heretic or punished simply as practicing sortilege. In this connection, (3) how to proceed with those who are not themselves the authors of such practices but who approve and make use of them. (4) Whether those who receive the body of Christ with harmful purposes (maleficium) should be punished as heretics. Finally, (5) whether those who invoke and offer sacrifices to demons with the intention of compelling another to act according to their wishes are to be considered as heretics or simply as authors of sortilege. (17) The inquiry is thus fairly coherent. The five kinds of crime involve the practice of magic either for harmful purposes (questions 1 and 4), medicinal purposes (questions 2 and 3), or towards the manipulation or extortion of another person (question 5). What they all have in common is the misuse of Christian sacraments or rituals-baptism, the consecrated host, adoration, or invocation. It appears to have been on this ground, and supported by the authority of Innocent III's 1199 decree Vergentis (drawing a parallel with antique imperial legislation, this decree justified the righteousness of imposing confiscation of goods to those who incurred heresy, on the analogy of lese majeste), that the qualification of these acts as heretical was being sought: as forms of sacrilege, practices of black magic injured the majesty of Christ, thus joining with traditional heresies in the offense of lese majeste.
There were antecedents to the pope's consultation. A few months before, on August 22, 1320, Cardinal Guillaume de Peyre Godin (18) had sent a letter, in John XXII's name, to the inquisitors of Carcassonne and Toulouse, Jean de Beaune and Bernard Gui respectively. In that letter, the pope urged the recipients to devote themselves with zeal to the persecution of those who practice black magic, and to fulfill their task according to the modes of procedure established in cases of heresy. The pope goes on to mention those crimes that will later constitute the object of his consultation, placing particular emphasis on those persons who, by virtue of a "pact with the devil" and by means of wax figures or by invocation, abuse the sacrament of baptism or misuse the host for harmful purposes (maleficium). In a final clause betraying a note of papal absolutism, the pope "ex certa scientia extends to the cases mentioned above the power and privileges rightfully granted to the inquisitors in the exercise of their functions against heretics, until the time comes when the pope judges it fit to revoke such an extension." (19) There is no sign that this letter took effect, and it may indeed have been its cool reception that encouraged further action on a doctrinal level. Hence the pope's subsequent consultation. (20)
John's proposal of establishing magical acts as heretical signified a rupture with centuries of Christian tradition whereby heresy, as an error in the faith, was a matter of intellectual choice (haeresis) with no immediate relation to practice. Black magic and the performance of pagan rituals, on the other hand, were normally divorced from their religious context and did not necessarily result in doctrinal error. Indeed, the ancient Church had sought to minimize the importance of such practices. Thus the canon Episcopi (datable probably to the tenth century) specifically denounced some folk beliefs related to magic and sorcery as illusory and without real efficacity. (21) In 1258, in his bull Accusatus, (22) Alexander IV could still forbid the inquisition to deal with cases of witchcraft "unless," he added, "they have a manifest taste of heresy" (nisi manifeste haeresim saperent). John XXII took Alexander's qualification a step further by using, in the questionnaire he addressed to his experts, the term "heretical fact" (factum haereticale). This term would have late but decisive consequences not only for inquisitorial tribunals, but also for the general medieval perception of the devil and related practices. Revealing in this respect is the fact that the 1484 Malleus Maleficiarum--the zealous work of the German inquisitors Heinrich Kramer and Jacob Sprenger, generally perceived to mark the beginnings of large-scale witch-hunts in Europe--incorporated some of the arguments developed in the text of John's 1320 consultation, in particular the notion, advanced by Guido Terreni, and which I will examine later, that witches are heretical by virtue of "presumption of law." Thus, although the contrast I attempt to present between Enrico and Guido could appear on the face of it as rather nuanced, it ultimately bears broad and important implications that go well beyond new developments in scholastic doctrine or papal policy, to have its full impact in the historiography of witchcraft. Indeed, the establishment of black magic as indicative of heretical beliefs laid the groundwork for the major witch-hunts of Europe that followed in the succeeding centuries. From this perspective, John's doctrinal stigmatization of deviant practices as "heresy" in the fourteenth century could well be seen as the turning point that ultimately led to the "witch-craze" that developed in Europe in the late fifteenth all throughout the mid-seventeenth century. (23)
II. THE PACT WITH THE DEVIL
Enrico's analysis (24) mostly concentrates on the first of John's questions, specifically one aspect of it, namely the source of efficacity of the baptized image. Enrico rejects the possibility that the devil "instrumentally" (ministerialiter) could cause the maleficium, on the Aristotelian principle that an agent must be present in the movement it causes. (25) But like all angels, the devil is necessarily limited by natural laws, whereby he cannot operate an effect on a distant object (as the wax image would be required to do on its victim). (26) Guiding Enrico's view is the theory that the sacraments cause grace not on the basis of some inherent virtue or property but rather on the basis of an ordination or pact whereby the sacraments, if validly administered, will produce grace in the recipient. Theologians in this period normally defined ex pacto causality as sine qua non causality, that is, a kind of causality that is not simply within the power of God, but which is the way God operates de facto or de potentia ordinata. (27) In order to illustrate their view, most proponents of ex pacto causality drew the classic example of the king and the leaden coin. A king might decree that any person possessing a certain leaden coin would receive royal alms. In such a case, it would not be the leaden coin that causes the reception of alms, but rather the acceptance of the token by the king. (28) In an analogous way to the king's leaden coin, the covenantal theory of sacramental causality was based on a belief that certain causal relationships do not need to depend for their efficacity on anything more than a contract or a more general ordination, agreement, or understanding that is accepted by all the persons concerned. Such contractual agreements could be effective apart from any inherent value residing in the items used.
Despite Thomas Aquinas's strong opposition, the theory of ex pacto causality enjoyed great success until the end of the Middle Ages. According to Aquinas, the sacraments are instrumental causes of grace by virtue of the character or ornament imprinted in the soul, whereby they "dispose" the soul to receiving grace. (29) Aquinas's heavy reliance on Aristotle's view of causality and inherent value prevented him from being able to conceive of a sign that is effective rather than merely declarative and representative, and which does not possess an infused, inherent virtue. This is the key idea that separates Aquinas's position from the opposite views of upholders of sine qua non causality. The hub of the debate lies in the question of what is added to the sacrament that makes it efficacious. Aquinas criticizes the contractual theory on the ground that the relation of pact based on God's will does not add anything to the sacrament that could justify its definition as "cause of grace." For this reason, he tends to reduce covenantal causality to accidental causality and dismiss it as occasionalism--that is, the notion that the cause is simply the occasion or sine qua non for the effect, normally present but not directly active. Thus, in Aquinas's view, the theory of sacramental pact is tantamount to denying true causality to the sacraments and to reducing their status to that of mere signs. (30)
Enrico's implicit criticism of Aquinas is unmistakable. As he reasons, instrumental causality is at best superstitious, in that it wrongly accords supernatural power to natural agents as instruments of divine grace. At worst, "it is heretical to believe that, as in divine sacraments, there could be any efficient power in the image by virtue of the consecration of its natural form (figure)." (31) The devil cannot produce such efficient power for the simple reason that natural things cannot have, without divine intervention, the supernatural power that the devil wants us to believe (supponit) they have. (32) The only way in which the devil could cause a supernatural effect is by way of consecration of the image. According to Enrico, therefore, the image produces its effect by virtue of the devil, who "efficaciously institutes in the image a relation of sign with respect to the maleficium." Thus, in the same way as the image (ymago) is pierced, so is the represented being (ymaginatum) pierced. (33) Enrico s vocabulary corresponds very precisely to that employed by theologians describing ex pacto causality in the sacrament. In both cases we are dealing with an efficacious institution. Just as with the host and the body of Christ, so with the wax image; it is not the resemblance to the victim that matters, but the baptismal attribution of a name. (34) According to Enrico, therefore, the true efficacity of this kind of maleficium lies in the devil's institution of a sacrament as an efficacious sign, that is, a sign that brings about what it represents.
But what makes the use of such a sacrament heretical? Enrico's contractual understanding of sacramental causality governs his response to this question: the heresy lies in offering reverence, faith, and covenant to the devil by virtue of the Christian consecration. (35) Enrico thus places the sacrilege not in the ritual itself, but in the efficacious sign that "separates" the consecrated image from profane, nonconsecrated images. (36) The sole act of external consecration, whatever the intention of the person involved, implies an erroneous belief and is thereby tantamount to heresy:
Since such images acquire a relation of sign towards the devil by virtue of their consecration according to the divine mode, there is heresy [in such practices]. The heresy arises not because it is necessarily believed that there is some supernatural power in the image or in the devil, but because the sign of the devil is revered at the moment of consecration, because God or the presence of God is there [that is, in the act of consecration] as in a sign. (37)
Underlying Enrico's view of the "heretical fact" is an implicit criticism of a certain current of moral philosophy predominant among some thirteenth-century theologians, notably Aquinas, which placed the moral value of an act on the agent's intention. Actual facts are otherwise morally neutral and devoid of intrinsic meaning. Later in the century, however, reactions against this kind of ethics took place in favor of an "objectification" of the moral value, now determined by the person's action or external signs rather than by his intention. Following this view, Enrico reasons that just as a bad intention does not change the nature of an act and as, for example, the alms given by vainglory remains a good act, in the same way the pact granted in good faith to someone who is not capable of observing a contract remains a heretical act. (38)
Enrico completes his response in the light of an examination of the notion of "faith." According to the traditional sense of the word, faith is an intellectual assent to revealed truth. According to another sense, which will prove more useful for Enrico's purposes here, faith is the trust (fidencia) placed in a promise, with its feudal undertones of loyalty (fidelitas) to a moral commitment. Likewise, Enrico will accept two corresponding senses of heresy. While the other experts restricted their analysis to the traditional definition of heresy as an erroneous opinion maintained pertinaciously (a definition that rendered it more difficult to make the connection with practices of black magic), Enrico takes another path, more accommodating of the notion of pact with the devil. For this purpose, he distinguishes two features of the divine nature, to which correspond two different kinds of cult. The cult rendered to the divine intellect is expressed through faith, while human reverence is directed to God's will. In a narrow sense, heresy refers to a fault in the faith. But the Franciscan conviction of the equal dignity of the faculties of intellect and will leads Enrico to maintain that a failure in the reverence owed to God sufficiently qualifies as a form of heresy. (39) Thus, any form of pact with the devil is heretical because it presupposes that there could be truth, or a commitment to truth, on the part of an evil creature. To believe that the devil is capable of loyalty to a pact is heretical because it presupposes the false belief that the devil, by virtue of such an obligation, enjoys rightful choice. (40)
We encounter here two major themes of Franciscan theology: the first one, derived from Anselm, is the notion of freedom of choice as the freedom to choose rightfully, and as such a divine gift accorded to all creatures and withdrawn from the bad ones. Anselm's whole concept of sin meant that sin could neither create nor convey rights, least of all for the devil. (41) Enrico follows the same insight, allowing him to remove the rights of the devil from the cosmic scene, thus effectively neutralizing the risk of incurring some sort of manicheistic dualism, which the parallel between the sacramental and the diabolic pact had threatened to establish. Another Franciscan topos that informs Enrico's analysis is the equal dignity accorded to the will with respect to the intellect. This ultimately enables him to accommodate the notion of heresy as false reverence and its correlate notion of faith as a contractual commitment--a development that contributed to give meaning to the concept of "heretical fact." As Boureau put it, "it is rather piquant to see a typically Franciscan theological trait come to the rescue of the theoretical demands of the pope who was persecuting the order." (42) Admittedly, Enrico's notion of faith as fidencia bears recognizable affinity with the attitude guiding John XXII's reaction in the beatific vision controversy, as he is keen to establish the "evangelical fact" away from the plethora of scholastic opinions. Like Enrico, John maintains that faith rests on the trust accorded to the whole of the Christian tradition and confirmed by the Scriptures. The pope thus acts on the epistemological conviction that facts suffice in signaling heresy, where the search for an explicit declaration of error is not only vain but also dangerous.
A central aspect of Boureau's analysis is the connection he makes between the theory of "heretical fact" and the development, on a legal and institutional level, of a new principle of legal procedure whereby the "factual evidence," rather than the individual's intention, becomes the defining factor in judging the truth of a case. This connection had important consequences for the conduct of the inquisition, as the prioritization of the fact over the individual's intention fed into the Church's reaction against heretical movements, informed as they were by a practice of secrecy and subterfuge. (43) As I hope to show in what follows, however, the pope's harvest was gathered, not by Enrico, but by a more upfront defender of papal absolutism. It is in Guido Terreni's development of the notion of "presumption of law" that the old ethics of intention will be effectively challenged and that the pope's moral and legal "positivism" (44) will find true resonance. As the opinion of a Carmelite, Guido's contribution has the additional value of offering a view of the consultation and the pope's motives that is free from the potential dialectical trap of Franciscan versus Dominican doctrinal priorities. Indeed, and as will become apparent, Guido manages to produce a theory of "heretical fact" as robust as that of Enrico, on the basis of the most conventional--some might call it "Thomistic"--understanding of sacramental causality and the priority of the intellect over the will. The real issue might therefore lie elsewhere, not in theological but in ecclesiological terrain.
III. THE FACT OF HERESY
The paradoxical originality of Guido's response will consist not in developing an innovative doctrine of sacramental causality, but precisely in relying on traditional teaching and on a classical definition of heresy as an intellectual error (45) in order to distinguish between the internal assent that only God can judge and the external sign left for Church jurisdiction. The force of Guido's argument is canonical, not doctrinal, and his strategy is simple: by separating the external, visible feature of heresy from the person's intention, he is able to surrender the heretic to the Church while safely leaving the mysteries of the suspect's conscience to God's better judgment. As we shall see, Guido effectively develops his argument on the notion of "presumption of law" (46): the truth of a suspect fact like "Beatrice de Planissoles is a heretic" is inferred or presumed from other facts proved, admitted, or judicially noticed, such as "Beatrice practices black magic, or performs incantations, or has been seen invoking the devil."
Guido's guiding principle in constructing the notion of "heretical fact" is that "human judgement understands the internal act on the basis of the external act, for the internal act is related to the external act as its essential cause (causa per se et ex natura), and not as its accidental cause, as is the case rather with the intention of the agent." (47) Revealingly, the pope's hand annotates this passage verbatim, and, as will become apparent, it would become pivotal for the pope's ecclesiological agenda. Guido offers further comment:
That someone is judged heretical on the basis of (ex) a heretical act should not be understood in the sense that the external act itself is heretical, as if heresy formally lay in the external act. That is impossible, for heresy is formally in the intellect. Rather, the external act is called heretical because it signifies heresy in the agent (operante), just as the effect signifies its cause and the sign its signification; likewise, the external word is said to be heretical not because heresy is formally in the vocal sign (voce), but because it signifies heresy in the speaker, and the one who thus speaks contains in the intellect an error against faith. (48)
Thus, although on a traditional understanding of heresy, Guido appeals to the same semiotics as Enrico in explaining the heretical fact; and just like the Franciscan, he will find the determining feature of heresy not in the person's intention but in the external sign. Unlike Enrico, however, the relevant sign for Guido is not the sacramental one, ultimately instituted by God, but the conventional sign open to human--that is, Church--judgment. This is crucial for reasons of an ecclesiological kind to which I will return later. The judgment of a particular act should then be based not on what relates to it accidentally, as the person's myriad possible intentions, but should rather be articulated according to the relation between a sign and the thing signified, where the latter is assumed to be suitably expressed in the former. Thus, appealing to the classic example of almsgiving, Guido will say that a man who gives alms to the poor is conventionally judged to be acting out of compassion, even if in his conscience he could well be moved by vainglory. (49) Whether this is so, it is for God to settle; for human judgment can only be made on the basis of the conventional relation between the sign and the thing signified, which tells us that almsgiving signifies compassion. Likewise, the heretical fact essentially points to heresy, even if the person's intention could accidentally suggest otherwise. (50)
We should note that by claiming that the intention is only an "accidental" cause, Guido is not purporting to disengage the moral value of an act from the person's intention. Rather, he is alluding to a classical distinction, made usually in the context of discussions over the binding value of vows, between two ways of conceiving the role of intention in a moral act. One view, which corresponds to the Augustinian line, tends to privilege the intention of the person, so that the truth or moral value of the action is understood to depend on the adequacy between that person's intention and his action or words. Another view, more popular among canon lawyers, focuses rather on the recipient community or institution. The moral value lies in the action itself or the uttered words because it is these external signs that are received by the community and are thereby accessible for interpretation and judgment. Accordingly, in examining the truth of a statement or the moral value of an action, authors would focus either on the relation between the person's intention and its expression in words or acts, or on the relation between the person's action and its recipient. (51) Bonaventure articulated this distinction in terms of the intentio iurantis and the intentio recipientis, privileging, like Augustine, the value of the person's intention: thus, he would say for example that a vow is not binding unless it is an act of will freely consented by the person making the vow. (52) By contrast, Guido tends to privilege the intentio recipientis. He thus accepts two dimensions in heresy: one that has to do with a person's conscience and is only accessible to God's infallible judgment; and another that the person's acts or words express, and that pertains to the fallible judgment of the Church. (53) Guido will trust the moral judgment of an action to its visible signs, thereby opening the way to Church jurisdiction. In this spirit, he will even say that if it were not for the external signs, such that we were abandoned to mere conjectures on the culprit's intentions, it would be impossible to punish a person for heresy. (54) Canon law retained this solution since it seemed particularly suitable for ecclesiastical judgment. In Bonaventure's terms: the person's intention gains relevance when it comes to the forum divinum, whereas the recipient's interpretation is what determines the moral value for the forum ecclesiasticum.(55)
Another passage in Guido's response reveals that he is indeed prioritizing the ecclesiastical dimension of heresy. In this passage, Guido claims that in order to constitute heresy, an opinion has to contradict not only the truth of faith but also the determination of the Church on matters of faith and good morals. Guido goes on to say that the truth of the divinely instituted sacraments rests on the Church and that it is the pope's role to settle all doubts related to matters of faith. (56) From this passage, Thomas Turley has inferred that according to Guido the faith of the universal Church, represented in the pope's teaching, can never fail. (57) This seems an extrapolated interpretation probably motivated by knowledge of later disputes over irreformability initiated by the Franciscans and Guido's active involvement in the preparation of papal bulls. Contrary to Turley's accepted view that in this text Guido is formulating a hard-line theory of papal infallibility, it seems to me that the crucial claim Guido wants to make here is one of Church sovereignty and not infallibility. A highly persuasive indication of this claim is Guido's statement that since, in judging suspect heresy, the Church relies on the person's action and words only, and is not privy to their conscience, it could well be the case that the same person who is damned by the Church as heretical might be saved on God's wiser judgment. (58) Guido certainly makes strong claims about the Church's supreme judicial role, as we would expect from a fourteenth-century curialist working for the pope's cause against the Spiritual Franciscans. He does not however go on to claim, at least not from what can be gathered from his 1320 report, that the faith of the universal Church is unerring, let alone that the head of the Church is infallible. (59) Rather, it seems clear that in the cited passage Guido is making a claim not about the teaching of the universal Church, but on its jurisdiction concerning cases of heresy. This seems further confirmed by Guido's comment on the relation between the Church and the sacraments. Consonant with his explanation of the heretical fact, Guido affirms that whatever pertains to visible signs of divine power is subject to Church jurisdiction. Furthermore, Guido's pivotal construct of the "presumption of law" would lose all significance on a claim of infallibility. Presumption has its place in canon law only when positive proofs are wanting and yet formulation of some judgment is necessary; it is never an absolute proof but is only accepted as such by the force of circumstances. By contrast, the very notion of infallibility implies the weight of an unquestionable proof that automatically excludes the possibility--or the point--of presumption. Other passages consistently support this interpretation: while Guido would be prepared to accept the fallibility of the Church in judging a person's orthodoxy, he would categorically maintain that denying the pope s sovereignty and canonical authority constitutes heresy. (60) The point of contention, at least in this text, lies therefore in the key of jurisdiction and not in the key of knowledge: the Church can err in determining the truth of a case, but its power of jurisdiction is unquestionable. Thus, whereas for Enrico the dubious practices of Beatrice de Planissoles would constitute the real danger, what is more likely to preoccupy Guido are the claims of dissident Franciscans and their Ghibelline allies.
This bring us to another important question: what does Guido make of the devil? Guido believes that, as all expressions of undue religious cult, on a first instance, acts of reverence, pact, or sacrifice made to the devil constitute superstitious idolatry. Proper religious cult is owed to God only. (61) Guido subscribes to a traditional conception of sacramental causality, according to which the sacraments are instrumental causes of grace by virtue of a character inherent in the soul, which dispose it to receive God's supernatural gift. Thus, the belief that a natural thing could effectively cause a supernatural effect without God's special intervention is superstitious because it is based on a misconception of sacramental causality. (62) This applies not only to undue reverence to the devil, but also to the baptizing of wax images for harmful purposes: both cases involve a misuse of the sacraments, guided by the same superstitious belief that natural things could cause a supernatural effect without divine intervention. Therefore, like Enrico, but on a more traditional doctrinal platform, Guido qualifies as superstitious any belief in the supernatural power of natural things that do not have it. So what could make these practices heretical? Where lies the fact that points to heresy? As with his previous analysis, what is valuable in Guido's response is not the doctrinal insight but its ecclesiological implications.
What makes prima facie superstitious practices potentially heretical is the underlying belief that God could be the cause of maleficium by means of sacramental consecration. For just as in true baptism the external sign signifies the supernatural gift of grace caused by divine power, so in the sacrilegious act of baptizing the image, the latter is taken as a sign of the harm purported to be effectively caused by its consecration. In other words, to believe that the sacramental form instituted by God and the Church for man's salvation could be an efficacious sign of maleficium is heretical because it plainly contradicts the truth of faith and the Church. Thus, the fact of heresy lies in the sacrilegious manipulation of sacramental signs for purposes other than those intended by divine institution and established by the Church. (63) Again, Guido articulates his explanation of the heretical fact in terms of the relation between the sign and the thing signified. If the baptizing of images for harmful purposes is taken as a sign of the belief that natural things could contain supernatural power without God's intervention, the practice is superstitious. But if it is taken as a sign of the belief that God's sacraments can effectively cause harm, then it is heretical because it contradicts the truth of faith and the Church, according to which the sacraments are visible signs of God's grace, not of harm. Likewise, showing reverence to the devil in the belief that he could be the instrumental cause of harm is idolatrous because it involves the superstitious belief that a mere creature could be deserving of an honor only due to God. But if reverence to the devil is a sign of the erroneous belief that the devil is in a state of grace or could be deserving of grace, the practice is plainly heretical because it contradicts the truth of faith and the Church, which affirms that an evil creature cannot merit grace. (64)
Guido's analysis so far is not dissimilar to the Franciscan line informing Enrico's view. Both would agree that establishing a pact with the devil is heretical because it presupposes the erroneous belief that the devil could enjoy rightful choice by truthfully committing himself to effecting something. (65) The crucial idea is that of "covenant," which in Enrico ties in with a whole doctrine of sacramental causality and the efficacious sign. This is the point where Guido parts company with him. For in Guido, "covenant" has distinct ecclesiological connotations. Thus, what prevents Guido from making the demonological leap is not his traditional understanding of sacramental causality, but his ecclesiological concerns. While for Enrico the pact with the devil is tantamount to an ill-founded form of manicheistic dualism, for Guido it is no more than sacrilegious reverence to a creature, and as such evidence of a false belief in the truth of the sacraments instituted by Christ and safeguarded by the Church. Guido leaves the devil tightly restricted to his natural limitations, where any sign of reverence is at best idolatrous and at worst a heretical belief in the rightfulness of the one creature who irredeemably lacks it. (66) What is strictly at issue for Guido is therefore not the devil but sacrilege, because the latter and not the former can be subject to Church jurisdiction.
But how is the Church, which relies solely on external signs, supposed to discern between superstition and heresy? It cannot. And here is the point where Guido's construct of the presumption of law has its full impact: "even if the baptizing of images with harmful purposes is patently superstitious sorcery (sortilegium), it must nevertheless be judged by the Church as incurring heresy. Whereby [this act] is not reduced to simple superstition but to a kind of superstition that manifestly tastes of heresy." (67) Guido thus completes Alexander IV's bull Accusatus with John XXII's notion of the heretical fact. This is a very skilful canonical maneuver on the part of Guido, because by connecting John's doctrinal program to Alexander's canonical caveat on the inquisition, he is not only providing legal justification for John's extension of inquisitional jurisdiction; he is at the same time subjecting the inquisition to papal power on the construct of "presumption of law." I will try to make this clearer.
The balance of relations between the pope and the inquisitors changed with the pontificate of John XXII, as he started to favor summary procedures in the pursuit of heresy at the expense of more elaborate procedural practices. Indeed, the pope's extension of the inquisition's jurisdiction to cases of black magic came accompanied by a certain distrust towards its standard procedure, (68) as its keenness for theological and legal nuance tended to render it blind to political tensions, thereby making it more liable to manipulation by the secular powers. (69) In order to correct this manipulation, pope John initiated a practice of adjudicating cases of heresy to special commissions of inquiry rather than to the inquisitional tribunals--a preference that offers an interesting comment on papal absolutism. The papal commissions, of which the 1320 consultation on black magic is one example, would proceed, as we have seen, without the legal formalities of a standard inquisitorial tribunal, and according to a factual understanding of faith and heresy that would privilege the principle of presumption of law. In this state of affairs, a man like Guido Terreni was an asset.
I therefore cannot subscribe without reserve to Boureau's thesis that it was "the pope's concern about demonic power that led him to suspend legal guarantees and trust cases of conspiracy involving demonic practices to pontifical commissions." (70) True, neither witchcraft nor the sacrilegious use of sacraments was precisely a novelty, and some feeling of imminent danger probably motivated the pope's action. At the beginning of the fourteenth century, we find several legal cases concerning the baptism of images for harmful purposes, where association with the devil appears as a central feature. Examples are the cases of Hugh Geraud, bishop of Cahors, who in 1317 made an attempt on the life of the recently elected pope, and that of Guichard, bishop of Troyes, who directed an attack against the queen Jeanne of Navarre. (71) Furthermore, the pope's fear of conspiracies against his life was probably mixed with a growing mistrust towards new developments in astrology and alchemy, and the diffusion of these practices in the lower strata of the clergy. (72)
Although a real interest, or concern, on the part of the pope for the doctrinal implications and circumstances involved in witchcraft might certainly have contributed to the eventual extension of the definition of heresy, this interest should not lead to discard other factors, of a more ecclesiological nature, to do with the defense of the Church against those who challenged its sovereignty. In this respect, it is hard to overlook the fact that the 1320 consultation takes place at a time when the conflict with the Spiritual Franciscans was gaining momentum. It is no coincidence that most of the members of the commission had been actively involved--and will be again--in repressing the first shoots of Franciscan dissidence. More importantly, unlike other heterodox groups at the time, such as the fraticelli and the beguines, the Spiritual Franciscans had wide impact, in that they gave doctrinal respectability to the beliefs espoused by the Ghibellines in challenging papal authority. Denial of papal authority was one of the keynotes of Franciscan-Ghibelline resistance, which goes some way towards explaining the assertive nature of the papal monarchy in this period and the radicalism of curialist thought, as evinced in the writings of Guido Terreni and Pierre de la Palud. (73) In this light, Guido's analysis appears more pertinent to papal concerns than does Enrico's, driven as Enrico's analysis was by the purely doctrinal repercussions of witchcraft, important, no doubt, for later demonological theories, but of less immediate utility in the context of the 1320 consultation.
The ecclesiological concern was very possibly the driving motive of John's 1326 bull Super illius specula, (74) the tardy but important result of the 1320 consultation. This long disregarded document rectifies Alexander IV's bull Accusatus in effectively extending the jurisdiction of the inquisition to cases of black magic. The bull qualifies practices of black magic and invocation of the devil as "perverse dogmas" and as serious threats "infecting" the Church, where the persons involved "make a pact with hell." As forms of heresy, these practices must be penalized "with all the punishments (poenas) which heretics deserve by law." The text is addressed to all Christians, inciting the culprits to surrender all books or treatises on magic within eight days on pain of excommunication. (75) Although keywords such as "pact" and "dogma" appear in the pope's bull, it seems unlikely that with this document John was trying to make a doctrinal point. Rather, the bull was probably drafted in order to enforce discipline in response to concerns of an ecclesiological kind to do with the buttressing of the papal office and Church authority.
There are plenty of motives that could have prompted the pope to canonical action against ritual magic, and a doctrinal concern with demonology should certainly be taken into account. (76) But other textual evidence considered, the 1320 consultation seems to take us to an ecclesiastical tribunal sitting Guido Terreni against Matteo Visconti, not the shepherds of the Ariege.
(1.) Alain Boureau, Satan heretique: Naissance de la demonologie dans l'occident medieval (1280-1330) (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2004), chap. 1. Also Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers: Une consultation de Jean XXII sur la magie en 1320 (Manuscrit BAV Borghese 348), Sources et documents d'histoire du Moyen Age 6 (Rome: Ecole Francaise de Rome, 2004), xi.
(2.) Enrico del Carretto came from an important Genoese family, related and allied to the Fieschi. Bachelor in theology at Paris, he then became lector at the Franciscan studium in Bologna. Pope Boniface VIII appointed him bishop of Lucca in 1300 against the canons' choice. On account of political troubles in Lucca, he left the city for Avignon at the beginning of John XXII's pontificate. In 1308, Enrico had been in charge of composing the synodal statutes of his city. Interesting for our purposes is the fact that one of its chapters concerns the prohibition of incantations and divination, which strongly suggests that Enrico was convinced of the effective power of such practices. He died in 1324. See Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, xii-xiii.
(3.) Boureau, Satan heretique, 12.
(4). The doctrinal tradition that views the sacrament as a contractual relation with God can be traced back to Augustine, especially his theory of relation as a noninherent accident, combined with his idea that the signification of signs depends on a freely willed convention between men, independently of the natural properties of the sign. Notable proponents of this view were William of Auvergne, bishop of Paris between 1228 and 1249, the Oxford theologian Richard Fishacre, Robert Grosseteste, and later followers include the Dominican Robert Kilwardby, Bonaventure, and Peter John Olivi. For Augustine, see De Trinitate 5.16.17, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina (hereafter CCL) 50A, ed. W. J. Mountain and F. Glorie (Turnhout: Brepols, 1968), 226.38-54; De doctrina christiana 2.2.30, CCL 32, ed. K. D. Daur and J. Martin (Turnhout: Brepols, 1962), pars. 4, 1, p. 54; 23.36, CCL 32, pars. 4, 1, p. 58; 24.37, CCL 34, pars. 4, 1, pp. 59-60; 25.38, CCL 34, pars. 4, 1, p. 60; 25.39, CCL 32, pars. 4, 1, p. 60. For William of Auvergne, see De legibus 27, in Guillelmi Alverni Episcopi parisiensis Opera Omnia (Venice, 1591: Paris, 1674; reprint Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), 88b-89b; De universo 3.26, in Guillelmi Alverni, 795a; De Trinitate 30, ed. B. Switalski (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediavel Studies, 1976). For Richard Fishacre, see In IV Senteniarum 4.1, ed. J. Goering (forthcoming). For Robert Grosseteste, see De cessatione legalium, ed. R. C. Dales and E. B. King, Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi (London: British Academy, 1986). For Robert Kilwardby, see Quaestiones in librum quartum Sententiarum 1.74, ed. R. Schenk (Munich: Bayersichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1993), 232-36. For Bonaventure, see Commentarii in quatuor Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, Opera Omnia 1-4, 184.108.40.206 (Quaracchi, 1: 1882; 2: 1885; 3: 1887; 4: 1889); For Olivi, see Quid ponat ius vel dominum, ed. F. M. Delorme (n.p.: n.p., 1945), 316-17, 320-24, 328; Summa 4.4, Vat. Lat. 4986, f. 132r; also Boureau, Satan heretique, 113-23; S. Piron, "Marchands et confesseurs: Le Traite des contrats d'Olivi dans son contexte (Narbonne, fin XIIIe-debut XIVe siecle)," in L'Argent au Moyen Age, Societe des historiens medievistes de l'enseignement superieur public (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1998), 289-308. For an exhaustive study of the different theories of sacramental causality, see I. Rosier-Catach, La parole efficace: Signe, rituel, sacre (Paris: Seuil, 2004), esp. 99-172.
(5.) Boureau, Satan heretique, 113-23.
(6.) See for example the contractual theory of sacramental causality developed by the Dominican Durandus of St. Pourcain: Durandi a Sancto Porciano: In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentarium libri IIII, 2 vols. (Venice, 1579; reprint Ridgewood, N.J.: Gregg, 1964), 4.1.4. As we learn from Hester Gelber, It Could Have Been Otherwise: Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300-1350 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 191-222, covenantal theology was well known among Oxford Dominican circles in the 1320s and 1330s. Robert Holcot (inc. 1335-36) was a notable upholder of this theory.
(7.) See Aquinas ST 1a2ae.12.1 ad 4, 12. 4 ad 3, 14.4; 2a2ae.11.1.
(8.) Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, li-lii.
(9.) Guido Terreni was of Catalan origin and had been the pupil of Godfrey of Fontaines at Paris. He was regent master there around 1312-16, when he taught John Baconthorpe and Sigebert of Bekke. He was regent at the Carmelite studium in Avignon, lector at the sacred palace in 1317-18, provincial prior of Provence (before its division between the provinces of Provence, Narbonne, and Catalonia), and general prior of the order in 1318-21. Shortly after the 1320 commission on witchcraft he was appointed bishop and inquisitor of Majorca (1321-32), and then of Elne from 1322 until his death in 1342. On Guido's participation in the poverty controversy, see P. Nold, John XXII and his Franciscan Cardinal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 30, 139, n. 74; 175, n. 101. For a full account of Guido's life and career, see B. M. Xiberta, Guiu Terrena: Carmelita de Perpinya, Estudis Universitaris Catalans, Serie monografia 2 (Barcelona: Institucio Paxtot, 1932); P. Fournier, "Gui Terre (Guido Terreni), Theologien," in Histoire litteraire de la France 36 (Paris: Academie des inscriptions et belles-lettres, 1927), 432-73. Also Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, xiv.
(10.) For the dating of John's consultation in the autumn of 1320, see Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, xvi-xxii.
(11.) For Anneliese Maier's report on the manuscript text, see "Eine Verfugung Johanns XXII: uber die Zustandigkeit der Inquisition fur Zaubereiprozesse," in Ausgehendes Mittelalter: Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts (Rome: Edizioni de storia e letteratura, 1967), 2:59-80. Boureau's edition is contained in its entirety in Le pape et les sorciers.
(12.) As Alexander Murray has kindly made me aware, the practice of consulting canon lawyers grew considerably in the fourteenth century. Baldus de' Ubaldi (d. 1400) left over 2500 consilia, much studied by later lawyers. Clement V had consulted Oldradus de Ponte regarding the war of Robert of Naples and Henry VII. John's practice seems to echo this. See P. Riesenberg, "The Consilia Literature: A Prospectus," Manuscripta 6 (1962): 3-22; I. Baumgartner, ed., Consilia im spaten Mittelalter: Zum historischer Aussagewert einer Quellengattung (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1995). I am very grateful to Mr. Murray for his attentive reading and valuable comments on this paper. We later find the same Oldradus involved in the defense of one John of Partimach, accused of heresy by two Dominican inquisitors on account of his practicing sortilege. Oldradus's defense has come to us in the form of a small treatise on the question whether sortilege can be qualified as heresy. This treatise, which enjoyed great authority in later literature, explores the legal side of the relation between man and the devil, and the inquisition's judgment of practices associated with it. Oldradus bases his argument on the traditional definition of heresy as an intellectual error and concludes that simple sortilege, as the one involved in this case, is not tantamount to heresy but is only superstitious. Association with the devil is not considered heretical unless it involves reverence. For Oldradus's text, see J. Hansen, Quellen und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Hexenwahns und der Hexenverfolgung im Mittelalter (Bonn: C. Georgi, 1901), 55-59. For its significance, see J. Hansen, Zauberwahn, Inquisition und Hexenprozess im Mittelalter und die Entstchung der grossen Hexenverfolgung (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1900), 263-67.
(13.) In the order in which they appear in the text, the members of the papal commission were: the Dominican Augustin Kazotic, bishop of Zagreb since 1303; John Wulfing von Guttingen, bishop of Brixen since 1306; the Franciscan Enrico del Carretto, bishop of Lucca; the Dominican James of Concotz, papal confessor and bishop of Lodeve since 1318; Guido Terreni, general of the Carmelites; Alexander Fassitelli of St. Elpidio, general of the Augustinians since 1312; the Franciscan Arnaud Royard, master of theology in Paris; the Augustinian John of Rome, master of theology in Paris since 1319; the Augustinian Gregory of Lucca, master of theology in Paris until 1322, then bishop of Sorra in Sardinia; and finally, the Cistercian Jacques Fournier, bishop of Pamiers since 1317 and future pope Benedict XII. For the biographical details of each member, see Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, xii-xiv. See also Boureau, Satan heretique, 64-69.
(14.) The practice of consulting a body of experts was a feature of John XXII's pontificate and was to be repeatedly employed by him, notably on the question of apostolic poverty during the conflict with the Franciscans (1322-24), and later during the beatific vision controversy (1330s), although in this case the consultation was a result, rather than the occasion, of John's doctrinal blunder. Another case in which John consulted experts took place in early 1318, when he inquired whether a series of statements made by some Franciscan Spirituals about the relation between Church authority and the Franciscan vows were tantamount to heresy. The doctrine involved was derived from Peter John Olivi's teaching. Among the members of the commission were the Carmelite Guido Terreni and the Dominican Durandus of St. Pourcain. See H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, ed., Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 4 vols. (Paris: Delalain, 1889-97), 2:215-18, n. 760 ii.
(15.) See Maier, "Annotazioni autografe di Giovanni XXII in codici Vaticani," in Ausgehendes Mittelalter, 81-96.
(16.) On the issue of what was really behind John's consultations, I have greatly benefited from Alain Boureau's enlightening comments during seminars or conversation.
(17.) See Maier, "Eine Verfugung," 64: (1) Utrum baptizantes imagines aqua in forma eccelsiae vel quamcumque rem irrationalem ad maleficium perpetrandum, committant factum hereticale, et utrum velut haeretici sint puniendi an solum sicut sortilegi iudicandi et qualiter isto vel illo modo sint puniendi. Et iuxta hoc, quid faciendum sit de illis, qui imagines tales receperunt quibus fuit dictum quod essent rebaptizatae. Item de illis quibus non fuit dictum, quod huiusmodi imagines baptizatae essent, tamen eis dictum fuit, quod talem vel talem dictae imagines virtutem haberent, et ad illum finem receperunt eas. (2) An sacerdos hominem rebaptizans modo superstitioso et sacrilego credens quod talis baptizatus virtutem habeat curandi a morbo caduco sit velut haereticus habendus vel solum ut sacrilegus puniendus et qualiter. (3) Quid faciendum sit de illis, qui faciebant aliquos rebaptizare et praesentes et consentientes erant. (4) An accipientes corpus Christi pro maleficiis vel sortilegiis faciendis sint velut haeretici puniendi. (5) An sacrificantes daemoniis intendentes sacrificare eisdem, ut per sacrificium illecti daemones cogant aliquam personam ad faciendum illud quod sacrificans cupiebat, et an daemones invocantes sint velut haeretici habendi vel solum ut sortilegi.
(18). It is not surprising that Guillaume should have been assigned as spokesman of the pope in front of the inquisitors. Guillaume was born in Bayonne in 1260 and joined the Dominican house of Beziers fairly early, in 1279, before studying in several convents of the southwest and undertaking studies in theology at Montpellier. His university career began proper in 1306, after a period of teaching in Toulouse, when Clement V appointed Guillaume lector at the sacred palace. Clement then made him cardinal in 1312, at the same promotion that included Jacques Dueze, future John XXII. Guillaume enjoyed a good reputation and a rather broad experience, for he was at once a well-known theologian (his commentary on the Sentences, written towards 1300, was known as the "Lectura Thomasiana"), an active member of the Dominican order (general preacher of Narbonne in 1289, definitor of Cahors in 1298, provincial prior of Provence in 1301), and a curialist (appointed in 1309 by Clement V to look after the posthumous process against Boniface VIII). John XXII appreciated his merits, for he promoted Guillaume as cardinal-bishop of Sabina in 1317, and later appointed him as pontifical legate in Spain from 1320 to 1324. Guillaume's departure for Spain probably explains why he was absent at the consultation on witchcraft. Otherwise, it is unlikely that the pope would have overlooked his participation. See Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, xvii-xviii.
(19.) "Sanctissimus pater noster et dominus ... optans ferventer maleficos infectores gregis dominici effugare de medio domus Dei, vult ordinat vobisque committit, quod auctoritate sua contra eos, qui demonibus immolant vel ipsos adorant aut homagium ipsis faciunt, dando eis in signum cartam scriptam seu aliud quodcumque, vel qui expressa pacta obligatoria faciunt cum eisdem aut qui operantur vel operari procurant quamcumque ymaginem vel quodcumque aliud ad daemonem alligandum seu cure daemonum invocatione ad quodcumque maleficium perpetrandum aut qui sacramento baptismatis abutendo ymaginem de cera seu de re alia factam baptizant sive faciunt baptizari seu alias cum invocatione daemonum ipsam fabricant quomodolibet aut faciunt fabricari, aut si scienter baptismus seu ordo vel confirmatio iterantur; item de sortilegis et maleficis, qui sacramento eucharistie seu ostia consecrata necnon et aliis sacramentis ecclesiae seu ipsorum aliquo quoad eorum formam vel materiam utendo eis in suis sortilegiis seu maleficiis abutuntur, possitis inquirere et alias procedere contra ipsos, modis tamen servatis, qui de procedendo cure prelatis in facto haeresis vobis a canonibus sunt praefixi. Ipse namque dominus noster praefatus potestatem inquisitoribus datam a iure quoad inquisitionis officium contra hereticos necnon privilegia ad pretactos casus omnes et singulos ex certa scientia ampliat et extendit, quoadusque duxerit revocandum." For an edition of this letter, see J. Hansen, Quellen, 4-5. A previous case, known from a letter that the pope addressed in July 1319 to Jacques Fournier, bishop of Pamiers and future member of the 1320 commission, assimilates invocations of the devil to heresy. The pope commands the bishop to persecute the three persons involved--a cleric, a Carmelite, and a woman, whom he accused of fabricating wax images and consulting with the demons with harmful purposes (maleficium). See J.-M. Vidal, Bullaire de l'Inquisition francaise (Paris: Librarie Letouzey et Ane, 1913), 53-54, n. 24.
(20.) Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, xvi-xviii.
(21.) The canon Episcopi has been edited by J. Hansen: Quellen, 38-39. The canon, dealing with "De mulieribus, quae cum daemonibus se dicunt nocturnis horis equitare," probably originated in some Carolingian synodal statute. For an illustrative passage: "quaedam sceleratae mulieres retro post Satanam conversae daemonum illusionibus et phantasmatibus seductae, credunt se et profitentur nocturnis horis cum Diana paganorum dea.... Nam innumera multitudo hac falsa opinione decepta haec vera esse credit, et credendo a recta fide deviat et in errorem paganorum revolvitur, cum aliquid divinitatis aut numinis extra unum deum esse arbitratur. Quapropter sacerdotes per ecclesias sibi commissas populo omni instantia praedicare debent, ut noverint, haec omnimodis falsa esse, et non a divino sed a maligno spiritu talia phantasmata mentibus infidelium irrogari" (my emphasis).
(22.) This bull was republished in 1260 and integrated into the sixth book (the Sextus) of the Corpus of canon law issued by Boniface VIII. See Sextus, 5.2.8, Corpus iuris canonici (hereafter CIC), ed. E. Friedberg (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1879-81), 2: col. 1071-72. For an edition of the bull, see J. Hansen, Quellen, 1.
(23.) For a more in-depth study of the historical development of witchcraft and its persecution in Europe, see N. Cohn, Europe's Inner Demons: An Enquiry Inspired by the Great Witch-Hunt (London: Sussex University Press, 1975).
(24.) Enrico's text was first edited by R. Manselli, "Enrico del Carretto e la consultazione sulla magia di Giovanni XXII," in Miscellanea in onore di Monsignor Martino Giusti 2, Collectanea archivi Vaticani 5 (Vatican City: Archivo vaticano, 1978), 97-129. For this study, I will however follow Alain Boureau's more recent edition in Le pape et les sorciers, 12-34 (BAV Borghese 348, fos. 5r-14r). See also Boureau's own account of Enrico's view in ibid., xxviii-xlvi. Cf. Boureau, Satan heretique, 75-91.
(25.) It was a standard principle of Aristotelian physics, widely accepted by the scholastics, that natural action can only take place by contact. See Aristotle Physics 7.3.244a-b.
(26.) "Non potest dici talis virtus esse in ymagine a demone ministerialiter, quia angelus nihil potest immediate nisi movere res naturales que a sua forma habent virtutem, et ideo per motum lapidis posset hominem interficere.... Item mediantibus virtutibus naturalibus rerum, multa operatur secundum motum ad formam.... Talis autem est modus agendi non est dyaboli mediante ymagine, que multum distat a maleficiato. Oportet autem semper agens esse presens virtute pacienti: credere igitur aliquam virtutem respectu maleficii esse in ymagine ratione consecrationis figure ejus est hereticum, sicut habet sacramenta Dei": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 27 (f. 11r-11v).
(27.) See W. J. Courtenay, "The Critique on Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun and Nominalism," The Harvard Theological Review 66:1 (1973): 77-94, esp. 90-92. For proponents of this type of causality, see Bonaventure, Sent. 220.127.116.11; Peter John Olivi, Summa 4.4, Vat. Lat. 4986, 135r-137v; Durandus of St. Pourcain C Sent., 18.104.22.1680rb, n. 19; William of Ockham, Sent. 4.45.1. (See also the bibliography provided in n. 4.) The distinction between the absolute and ordained power of God rested on the fundamental perception that what God created or established did not exhaust divine capacity or the potentialities open to God. The twin formula de potentia absoluta and de potentia ordinata was introduced in the early thirteenth century and became commonplace scholastic terminology by midcentury. In its classic shape, the formula signified two ways of speaking about divine power. One way of speaking is to discuss power in the abstract, without regard for God's will and actions as revealed in the present order. The other way is to view divine power in terms of what God has in fact chosen to do. Thus, certain things that are theoretically possible to God de potentia absoluta are impossible to God in light of the chosen order, de potentia ordinata. For a thorough study of this distinction, see W. J. Courtenay, "The Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence," in Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought: Studies in Philosophy, Theology and Economic Practice (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), 1-37.
(28.) See, for example Durandus of St. Pourcain C Sent. 22.214.171.124.290rb.; Peter John Olivi Summa 4.4, Vat. Lat. 4986, f. 133r; 6, Vat. Lat. 4986, f. 138r. For a study of this analogy, see W. J. Courtenay, "The King and the Leaden Coin: The Economic Background of sine qua non Causality," Traditio 28 (1972): 185-209.
(29.) Aquinas's theory of sacramental causality undergoes some changes between his early commentary on the Sentences and the later Summa. In his commentary he maintained that the sacrament is an "instrumental dispositive" cause of grace, in that it "disposes" the soul to receive grace by impressing the character in it. See Sent. 126.96.36.199. In the Summa he abandons the notion of dispositive cause in order to consider the sacrament simply as an instrumental cause of grace. God is the ultimate cause of both grace and the character, but by means of the action of the sacrament. See ST 3.62.1; also 3.62.4 and 6. See Rosier-Catach, Parole efficace, 135-39.
(30.) See Aquinas, Sent 188.8.131.52; ST 3.62.1. On the same grounds, Aquinas will dismiss the example of the leaden coin as a valid illustration of sacramental causality: In Ethic. 5.9.978-91; in Polit. 1.7.111-21; ST 2a2ae.78.
(31.) "Credere igitur aliquam virtutem respectu maleficii esse in ymagine ratione consecrationis figure ejus est hereticum, sicut habent sacramenta Dei": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 27 (f. 11v).
(32.) "Demon non possit dare virtutem talem, eo quod res non possunt habere, nisi a Deo, virtutes naturales et supernaturales quas dyabolus supponit rebus inesse": Ibid.
(33.) "[Demon] potest tamen esse in rebus, sicut motor in mobili et ut signatum in signo, licet posset per earn loqui sicut per ydolum; sed de natura predicte questionis non est necesse hoc dicere. Instituit tamen efficienter in ymaginem rationem signi ipsius maleficii: sicut enim pungitur ymago, ita pungitur ymaginatum. Videmus enim quod homo dat circulo rationem signi respectu vini": Ibid.
(34.) In this respect, Alain Boureau has suggested that Enrico could have probably derived his explanation of themode of presence of the devil from Olivi's commentary on the Apocalypse. Examining the possibility of making an image of the Antichrist talk (13, 15), Olivi reports on two interpretations, that of Joachim de Fiore and that of Richard of St. Victor. He rejects Joachim's and espouses Richard's opinion that the diabolic spirit "assists" the imitators of the Antichrist. Olivi adds to Richard's interpretation the verb assistere (to be present, to assist, to help), which for the advocates of contractual causality denotes precisely the mode of God's presence in the sacrament. Boureau speculates that Enrico could have become familiar with Olivi's terminology in the curia, where a number of theologians were working since 1318 on the censure against Olivi's commentary. Among the theologians commissioned with this work were Guido Terreni, also a member of the 1320 commission, and Pierre de la Palud. See Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, xxxv-xxxvii; Satan heretique, 88-99.
(35.) "Est autem notandum quod dupliciter fit dyabolica ymago: uno modo ut adoretur secundum actum cultus, et hoc modo dicitur ydolum vel ymago dyabolici sacrificii. Alio modo fit ymago, non ut adoretur per actum cultus expressum, sed solum fit reverentia, ex modo que dicitur ymago maleficii; que non fit ut adoretur, sed magis pungitur et male tractatur, ut vere paciatur maleficiatus. Fit vero ei reverencia ex modo sue consecrationis, que est separatio et distinctio cum solempnitate a re non sacrata. Sacerdos enim ipsam consecrat cum invocatione trinitatis in aqua consacrata; que omnia divina sunt ordinata ad honorem instituentis rationem signi in ymagine.... Sicut enim Deus cum solempnitate consecrationis separat res divinas ab humanis, ita dyabolus res dyabolicas, quod est respectu hujusmodi consimilitudinis honorabile modo divino. Dicendum igitur quod fides sepius est in istis actibus demonum et milibus, propter astuciam demonis, que hoc summe intendit, et propter ruditatem humani intellectus, et propter ipsam facti naturam que valde disponit ad errorem. Reverencia semper est ex modo consecrationis. Unde si esset aliqua ymago facta per artem humanam solum, non consacrata, sed solum esset ymago pura ex natura materie seu et modo sue factionis, et pungeretur sicut ymago sacrata ab aliquo, qui non crederet aliquam virtutem in ymaginis esse respectu maleficii quod intendit, sed credit dyabolum hoc posse vere et ad hoc pungit ymaginem, ut dyabolus pungat maleficiatum, sine omni pacto et fide et reverencia, tunc esset supersticiosum solum et non hereticum. Ad primum impositum dicendum quod talis consecratio non potest fieri sine reverencia" (my emphasis): Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 28-29 (f. 11v-12r).
(36.) "Omnis enim res consecrata videtur importare specialem separationem aliis rebus non sacratis": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 27-28 (f. 11v).
(37.) "Et quia ratio talis signi diabolici datur per consecrationem ymaginis modo divino, ideo est hereticum non quia necessario credatur aliqua virtus esse in ymagine vel in demone nisi naturalis, sed quia est reverencia facta signo dyaboli in sua consecratione, quia ibi Deus vel sua presentia est sicut in signo": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 27 (f. 11v).
(38.) "Dato etiam quod ipse credat demonem nihil facere propter pacta, eo quod cognitio vel intentio eius non immutat naturam actus ex genere, sicut dare elemosynam ex vana gloria est semper bonum ex genere actus; quicumque igitur paciscitur cum quocumque fidit ex pacto. Sed nulla fidencia potest de eo haberi, nisi congrueret perfecte malicie eius, quia perfectissimus inimicus hominis est.... Fides autem non stat cum credulitate perfecte inimicicie et universalis et immutabilis, quam qui non credit aut facto aut verbo contrarium potestatur hereticus est": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 18 (f. 7v).
(39.) "Quia igitur in Deo est intellectus et voluntas, que habent duo propria scilicet veritatem et scientiam, cui debetur fides, et bonitatem et divinum, cui debetur honor et reverencia propria, duo etiam sint modi quibus intellectus errare potest, scilicet absolute, ex natura intellectus, et tails error contra Deum dicitur heresis non credendo in fide expresse, vel negando que tenetur expresse scire, vel quoad ea que non tenetur expresse scire, non credere que credit Romana Ecclesia. Hec enim est heresis absolute dicta. Alio modo errare potest intellectus respectu eorum que in voluntate sunt: sunt enim necessario ex natura sui connexa cum errore et ipsum supponunt modo intraneo. Ideo sunt duo modi heresis proprie dicte, scilicet tides et reverencia dyabolo exhibita": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 17-18 (f. 7v).
(40.) "Est autem notando quod tides dupliciter accipitur: uno modo ut opponitur infidelitati promissionis ... Quocumque igitur modo accipiatur fides, nullo modo demoni est exhibenda, quia non debet credi in eo esse veritas divina, quia mendax est et pater eius. Iterum quia nec fidelitatem habet, in quibuscumque pactis vel promissis vel iuramentis, que fiunt propter firmatem paciscentium: credere autem dyabolum propter talia aliquam firmitatem facere est hereticale, quia tunc habere crederetur ex natura talis obligationis bonum recte electionis; quamquam enim servet aliquando pacta, hoc non est propter pactum. Requirere igitur pacta a demone ex natura actus est credere demonem aliquid facere propter pacta ... Sed nulla fidencia potest de eo haberi, nisi congrueret perfecte malicie eius, quia perfectissimus inimicus hominis est ... Fides autem non stat cum credulitate perfecte inimicicie et universalis et immutabilis, quam qui non credit aut facto aut verbo contrarium potestatur hereticus est" (my emphasis): Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 18 (f. 7v-8r).
(41.) See Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, chap. 7.
(42.) Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, xlii.
(43.) Bernard Gui's Manuel de l'Inquisiteur offers numerous examples of the techniques used in order to extract confessions. See for example the case of the suspect Cathar reproduced in H. C. Lea, A History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages (New York: Harper, 1887), 1:411-14. For similar cases, see also J. Duvernoy, ed., Le registre de l'Inquisition de Jacques Fournier, 3 vols. (Paris: Mouton, 1978). Jacques Fournier was another member of the 1320 commission, and it is interesting to see the number of cases dealing with witchcraft and black magic that are recorded in his register around the same year. See 280-84, 309, 322, 350, 597, 675 (magic and superstition); 283 (witchcraft); 448, 987, 1251 (sortilege).
(44.) I borrow Alain Boureau's term: Satan heretique, 45-46.
(45.) "[Heresis] sit falsa et erronea opinio in intellectu, ut videlicet falso opinetur et contra veritatem senciat de aliquo. Et ratio huius est quia heresis est quedam species infidelitatis et ideo opponitur fidei. Fides autem est verus assensus in intellectu. Ergo, heresis erit assensus falsus contra veritatem fidei": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 43 (f. 18v). The entirety of Guido's opinion covers 43-85 (BAV Borghese 348, ff. 18v-37r).
(46.) The term "presumption of law" (praesumptio juris) generally signifies a reasonable conjecture concerning something doubtful, drawn from arguments and appearances, which by the force of circumstances can be accepted as a proof. Presumption has its place in canon law only when positive proofs are wanting, and yet the formulation of some judgment is necessary. It is never in itself an absolute proof, as it only presumes that something is true. See E. L. Taunton, The Law of the Church (New York: n.p., 1906), s. v. "Presumption"; L. Ferraris, Bibliotheca canonica, juridica, moralis, theologica, ed. J.-P, Migne (Paris: Petit-Montrouge, 1861-65), s. v. "Praesumptio."
(47.) "Cum judicium de re accipitur quoad illa et respectu illorum que per se et ex natura sui conveniunt et non respectu eorum que per accidens, ex actu exteriori sumetur judicium de interiori quem significat ut causam per se et ex natura sui ipsum respicit, non interiori intentione operantis. Quod probo: nam si ex actu exteriori deberet sumi judicum de interiori secundum intentionem operantis, nunquam de actu interiori posset haberi judicium humanum.... Dico igitur quod judicium humanum accipitur ex actu exteriori de interiori quem rescipit actus exterior ex sui natura tamquam causam et non de illo quem respicit ut causam non per se nec ex natura sui, sed per accidens ex relatione et intentione operantis": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 62-63 (f. 26v-27r).
(48.) "Quod aliquis ex actu hereticali judicetur hereticus, non intelligitur quod actus exterior dicatur hereticale sic quod heresis formaliter sit in actu exteriori. Hoc enim est impossibile cure formaliter heresis sit in intellectu, sed pro tanto dicitur actus exterior hereticalis quia significat in operante heresim, sicut effectus significat causam et signum suum significatum; et similiter verbum exterius dicitur hereticale non quod heresis sit formaliter in voce, sed quia significat in loquente heresim et quod habeat sic dicens errorem contra fidem in intellectu": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 64 (f. 27r-v).
(49.) In an interesting allusion to Lateran IV's decree Excommunicamus against rulers who aided heretics, Guido admits the possibility that the ruler could be prompted in his action not by a desire to encourage the heretic in his error, but by a compassionate intention. But whatever the case, Guido says that what is evident (constat) to the Church is the heretical act of perpetrating heresy. As such, the ruler should be judged heretical and excommunicated according to the Lateran decree: see Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 70 (f. 30r).
(50.) "Constat quod intentio qua operans operatur, puta qua intentione dat elemosinam non potest ab homine sciri quia nemo novit que sunt hominis nisi spiritus hominis qui est in eo, ut Apostolus dicit [I Cor. 2, 11].... Unde dans elemosinam inopi judicabitur compatiens et nisi ex actu intentionis qua dat nec etiam intentio illa per actum exteriorem pateret": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 63 (f. 26v-27r). Also 73-74 (f. 31v-32r): "Unde dicendum quod factum hereticale ex natura sui arguit per se causam heresim, quamvis per accidens ex intentione agentis possit ab alia causa fieri sicut ex natura sua dare indigenti arguit in dante compassionem tanquam per se causam, potest tamen ex intentione facientis in relatione ad aliam causam, puta inanem gloria fieri et quia judicium debet sumi ex hiis que per se, nisi aliud appareat, et non ex hiis que per accidens ut, nisi aliud appareat ex actu exteriori dandi elemosinam indigenti debet tanquam ex per se effectu judicari dans elemosinam habere compasionem et non id quod secundum intentionem dantis potest intendi."
(51.) For an exhaustive study of the role of "intention" in creating obligation in sacraments and vows, see Rosier-Catach, La parole efficace, 295-345.
(52.) See Bonaventure, Sent. 3.39.3, p. 875. Also Olivi Quodl. 4.7, p. 228.
(53.) "Et confirmatur quia certum est quod de verbo exteriori confitens et negans trinitatem personarum in divinis judicatur hereticus quia judicium sumitur quod male sentiat de fide trinitatis ex verbo quod ex natura sui est expressivum talis erroris et proprium signum ejus.... Et similiter adorans hereticum judicatur hereticus quia talis adoratio signum est quod placeat sibi heretica doctrina quam in heretico veneratur et tamen certum est quod sic adorans potest alia intendere ut quod hoc faciat timore aut favore alicuius tyranni heretici magni. Ergo, judicium ecclesie erit ex actu exteriori de acti interiori quem de se respicit et ex sui natura tanquam per se causam, et non judicabitur per actum istum exteriorem de actu intentionis operantis.... Judicum autem ex signo fallibili non est omnino infallibile. Igitur judicium de actu interiori per actum exteriorem, puta ex facto hereticali accipitur iudicium quod aliquis est hereticus, tale judicium non est omnino infallibile": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 63-64 (f. 27r-v).
(54.) "Igitur, cum non dicatur factum hereticale nisi quia est effectus heresis et signum quo in faciente probatur heresis, dicere quod aliquis operetur factum hereticale et per hoc non judiceretur hereticus est se interimere ... tunc cum actus exterior denominetur ab actu interiori sicut a sua causa, si non patet quod sit ab heresi, non debet dici actus hereticalis.... Item si sic, scilicet quia tale factum potest fieri absque heresi et absque hoc quod male sentiat baptizans de baptismo et potest in utramque causa reduci, non potest judicari ex hoc hereticus ... et sic non poterit aliquis de heresi puniri, quod est inconveniens valde": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 73 (f. 31v).
(55.) See Bonaventure, Sent. 4.39.2, resp.
(56.) "Secundo requiritur ad hereticum ut falsam et erroneam habeat opinionem contra ea que fidei sunt et contra veritatem et determinationem ecclesie in hiis que pertinet ad fidem aut bonos mores ac ad ea que sint necessaria ad consecutionem vite eterne.... Ecclesia autem catholica credit et tenet veritatem sacramentorum ecclesie in quibus divina virtus secretius operator.... Determinatio etiam dubiorum emergentium circa fidem maxime pertinet ad Christi vicarium summum pontificem Petri successorem": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 45-46 (f. 19r-v).
(57.) I make reference to T. Turley, "Infallibilists in the Curia of Pope John XXII," Journal of Medieval History 1:1 (1975): 71-101, esp. 79-80. For a similar view, see B. Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibility, 1150-1350: A Study on the Concepts of Infallibility, Sovereignty and Tradition in the Middle Ages, Studies in the History of Christian Thought 6 (Leiden: Brill, 1972).
(58.) "Secundum judicium ecclesie judicabitur aliquis hereticus ex verbo vel facto hereticali quod verbum vel factum arguit heresim in intellectu quantum est in se, nisi ibi sit mendacium verbi vel facti aut aliter excusetur per evidenciam. Unde oportet quod dicens vel faciens contra fidem probet facto evidenter quod mentiebatur aut quod ex ignorantia hoc fecit; aliter, nisi constet de opposito ecclesia judicabit eum hereticum. Et est simile: aliquis est manifestus peccator; moritur absque confessione et sacramento penitentie in puncto morris, amissa loquela et omni expressione qua possit exterius confiteri aut ostendere se dolere de peccato; nichilominus interius conteritur; iste per ecclesiam judicabitur damnatus et secundum Deum erit salvus" (my emphasis): Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 65 (f. 27v-28r).
(59.) This is not to deny that Guido might have later developed his view along hard infallibility lines, especially in the context of later 1320s disputes over irreformability initiated by the Franciscans. See particularly De perfectione vitae of 1323, MS 299, ff. 3r-77v, Bibliotheque municipale, Avignon; also the 1328 Quaestio de magisterio infallibili romani pontificis. See Turley, Origins, 80-83.
(60.) "Unde ad hoc quod aliquis sit hereticus, requiritur falsa opinio et erronea credulitas. ... Hanc sententiam nota glossa XIX D., c. Nulli fas [Decretum Gratiani, in Corpus iuris canonici 1, ed. E. Friedberg (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1879), D. 19 q.5; CIC 1: col. 61], ubi dicitur: sed intelligas quod hic dicitur quod qui dicit romanam ecclesiam non esse caput nec posse condere canones, ille est hereticus" (my emphasis): Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 44 (f. 18v).
(61.) "Ille qui intendens Deo sacrificare, si in alia materia quam in pane et vino et sub verbis debitis, et alius quam sacerdos sacrificaret, talis esset superstitiosus et qui in exhibitione divini cultus ageret omnino contra universalem ecclesie consuetudinem.... Potest tamen exhiberi cultus divinus cui non debet, puta quia exhibetur creature.... Unde superstitiosus est qui hunc honorem et reverenciam exhibet creature, et vocatur hec species superstitionis ydolatria.... Unde qui honorem istum creature, puta demoni aut alteri exhibet ut ab eo ostendat noticiam futurorum et divinorum secretorum superstitiosus est": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 51-52 (f. 21v-22r).
(62.) "Quod enim punctio ymaginis artificialis queratur in me punctio non potest hoc queri ut causa talis effectus.... Talis punctio non habet causalitatem naturalem ad efficiendum punctionem vel dolorem in me, et ideo istud est superstitiosum et similiter in aliis que in talibus rebus observantur que non habent causalitatem ad illos effectus ad quos querentur nec ex vi sue nature nec institutione divina, quod dico propter sacramenta que, quamvis ex vi nature non habeant causalitatem in anima, tamen habent respectu caracteris vel ornatus et respectu gratie": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 52 (f. 22r).
(63.) "Sic baptizans, quantum ex facto proponitur, intendit et credit quod ymago ex tali baptismo haberet virtutem talem et ad hoc eam baptizat, quod per baptismum in ea efficiatur talis virtus malefica. Et hoc videtur ex natura baptismi talis, tanquam ex proprio signo signati. Sicut enim verum baptisma exterius signum est quod interius in baptizato aliquid per baptismum causatur, sic tale falsum et pemiciosum baptisma videtur adhiberi ad talem imaginem ut in ea per baptismum talem aliquid efficiatur ut habeat efficaciam ad maleficium; sic rationabili judicio humano, tanquam ex proprio signo, judicabitur quod baptizans credat talem baptismum causare virtutem maleficam in ymagine baptizata.... Quicumque de sacramentis et verbis sacramentalibus sentiti contra Christi institutionem et contra quod ecclesia sentiti catholica, est hereticus. Sed baptizans ymaginem ad causandum maleficium sentit de verbis Christi et baptismo contra Christi institutionem et aliud quam ecclesia.... Ergo, est hereticus judicandus. ... Hoc est manifeste hereticum quia hoc est extimare quod Deus sit causa culpe et maleficii.... Aliter sentire de verbis sacramentalibus quam ex scriptura habetur et quam ecclesia sentit est hereticus": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 70-72 (f. 30r-31r).
(64.) "Honor dulie non debetur dyabolo, immo contemptus et irreverencia ratione obstinate malicie et culpe, et oppositum credens est hereticus, sicut credens dyabolum esse in gratia aut in via ad gratiam. Unde cum dyabolus sit omnino adversus a Deo absque spe conversionis et dulie honor non debeat exhiberi nisi habentibus communicationem ad Deum per gratiam aliquo modo sive quia formaliter habeant gratiam aut possunt habere vel agunt ad gratiam vel subministrant. Ideo, credens quod dyabolo vel eis qui subserviunt sue maleficie operationi debeatur honor dulie, est hereticus quia hoc est credere quod dyabolo et sue male operationi debeatur honor. Ergo, credens quod ex virtute dyaboli verba Christi habeant efficaciam ad maleficium est male sentire de verbis Christi quod eis debeatur honor et non debeatur, quod est hereticum": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 72-73 (f. 31r). Curiously, in his famous Summa de haeresibus, composed around 1340 after he had been inquisitor of Majorca, Guido does not mention idolaters of the devil or authors of black magic within his catalog of heretics. Could this be understood as an implicit, posthumous criticism of the pope's doctrinal program of extending the meaning of heresy to include these practices?
(65.) Thus Guido: "Debitum autem non est respectu impossibilium cum ad impossibile nulla sit obligatio. Ergo non potuerunt verba Christi sacramentalia esse misteria dyaboli, et oppositum sentiens irreverenter sentit et male de verbis sacramentalibus Christi": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 73 (f. 31v).
(66.) "Invocatio cum adoratione qua invocatur demon est protestatio false fidei; hoc enim patet de invocatione cum adoratione latrie quia sic invocans ut sacrificans vel alio exteriori cultu latrie exhibens honorem divinum demoni protstatur se credere demonem esse a quo credit regi et salvari; protestatur etiam se credere in demonem tanquam Deum et ideo ex hoc actu exterioris latrie judicabitur se credere alium Deum quam verum et a demone consequi regimen et salutem, quod est contra fidem": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 83 (f. 36r). Also ibid: "Nihil enim adoratione dulie adoratur nisi propter ordinem quem habet ad Deum a quo ordine recessit et omnmo aversus dyabolus propter maliciam obstinatam.... Ergo sic adorans hereticum judicatur hereticus, multo magis invocando adorans demonem debet judicari hereticus": 84 (f. 36v): "unde et sic invocantes demonem ad effectus proprios Dei judicandi sunt heretici, quasi credant demonem posse sicut Deus... Si invocans crederet quod demon illa que subsunt sue virtuti naturali demonis posset facere non permissus a Deo, talis invocans esset hereticus, male sentiens de Dei potentia contra scripturam."
(67.) "Baptizare ymagines ad maleficium, etsi patenter sit sortilegium, nihilominus habet judicari per ecclesiam committere heresim. Unde non reducitur ad sortilegia quecumque sed ad sortilegia que manifeste sapiunt heresim, ut expresse notatur Extra, de hereticis, Libro Sexto, cap. Accusatus et Sane [Sexto, 5.2.8, CIC 2: col. 1071-1072]": Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, 74 (f. 32r).
(68.) In November 1330, John XXII sent two letters, one addressed to the archbishop of Narbonne and the inquisitor of Carcassonne, the other to the archbishop of Toulouse and his inquisitor, containing a copy of a letter sent in 1320 by Guillaume de Peyre Godin to the inquisitors of Carcassonne and Toulouse, ordering its recipients to devote themselves with particular zeal to the persecution of cases of satanic invocations. The new letter included however an important corrective, whereby the inquisitors must seek to complete their task and assist the bishops, but abstain from opening new procedures without previous pontifical commission. For an edition of this letter, see J. Hansen, Quellen, 6-7. For John XXII's legal innovations and distrust of the inquisition, see Boureau, Satan heretique, 41-60.
(69.) A prime example of this is the trial of the Templars, in which the inquisition became subordinate to the royal power. See Cohn, Europe's Inner Demons, 90-94. For other vivid examples, see also A. Murray, "The Inquisition and the Renaissance," Raleigh Lecture on History, Proceedings of the British Academy 131 (2005): 91-126, esp. 109-10, 112-14, 124-25; and "Beware of the Universities: A Cautionary Tale from Paris, 1380-1381," in Medieval Paradigms: Essays in Honor of Jeremy Duquesnay Adams, ed. S. Hayes-Healy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1:29-54, esp. 48-49. Also H. Maisonneuve, Etudes sur l'origine de l'lnquisition, 2nd ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1960). Indeed, after ca. 1300, the inquisition underwent new developments. It had the most streamlined, up-to-date procedure of any court, and one supremely open to use by authority. Hence the tendency to enlarge the concept of "heresy." That the notion of heresy extended under John XXII to black magic is just one instance of this general expansion, occasioned by the configuration of pressures created by the new court. I thank Alexander Murray for his enlightening comments on this issue.
(70.) Boureau, Satan heretique, 51. Boureau's demonological bias informs his argument throughout the whole of chap. 1, on the legal innovations of John XXII.
(71.) For a vivid account of these episodes, see G. Mollat, Les papes d'Avignon (1305-1378), 9th ed. (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1949), 42-44; also Cohn, Europe's Inner Demons, 185-93; E. Albe, Autour de Jean XXII: Hugues Geraud, eveque de Cahors: l'affaire des poisons et envoutements en 1317 (Cahors: J. Girma, 1904); Abel Rigault, Le proces de Guichard eveque de Troyes, 1308-1313 (Paris: A. Picard, 1896).
(72.) The Church's attitude towards these practices was ambivalent until well into the 1270s, since, as we know, popes in search of the elixir of life tended to protect the study of alchemy. See A. Paravicini Bagliani, Il corpo del papa (Turin: Einaudi, 1994). After the condemnations, however, this science began to be regarded with more suspicion. Indeed, bishop Tempier's syllabus of 1277 was preceded by a prologue that condemned those "books which either dealt with black magic or registered cases of witchcraft, invocations of the devil, or other practices which could put the soul in danger." In response, we see Cardinal Francesco Orsini ordering, in his will of 1304, the burning of all his books of alchemy. See Boureau, Le pape et les sorciers, xx-xxii. Cf. Satan heretique, 31-38.
(73.) For the connection between Ghibellinism and practices of black magic and astrology, see N. Housley, The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades against Christian Lay Powers, 1254-1343 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 25-30, 53-70, 117.
(74.) For an edition of John's bull, see J. Hansen, Quellen, 5-6. John's bull does not appear in the two canonical collections that completed the Corpus iuris canonici and that included John's Extravagantes. The first collection of John XXII's bulls was composed in 1325 by Jesselin de Cassagnes, who did not have the time to complete it before his death. A second collection had to wait until the beginning of the sixteenth century, at a time when John's doctrine on witchcraft had become banal. The only mentions of the bull are found in the manual of Nicholas Eymerich in 1376, in Rinaldi's Annales ecclesiastiques, and in a Roman eighteenth-century collection of bulls. It is in fact remarkable that there should be no traces of John's bull in the papal registers: see Boureau, Satan heretique, 20-25.
(75.) "Dolenter advertiumus ... quamplures esse solo nomine christianos, qui ... cum morte foedus ineunt et pactum faciunt cum inferno, daemonibus namque immolant, hos adorant, fabricant ac fabricari procurant imagines, annulum vel speculum vel phialam vel rein quamcunque aliam magice ad daemones inibi allagendos ab his petunt, responsa ab his recipiunt et pro implendis pravis suis desideriis auxilia postulant, pro re foetidissima foetidam exhibent servitutem.... Hoc edicto in perpetuum valituro de consilio fraturm nostrorum monemus omnes et singulos renatos fonte baptismatis in virtute sanctae obedientiae et sub interminatione anathematis praecipientes eisdem, quod nullus ipsorum aliquid de perversis dictis dogmatibus docere ac addiscere audeat vel, quod execrabilius est, quomodolibet alio in aliquo illis uti.... Nos in omnes et singulos, qui contra nostra saluberrima monita et mandata facere de predictis quicquam praesumpserint, excommunicationis sententiam promulgamus, quam ipsos incurrere volumus ipso facto, statuentes firmiter, quod preter poenas predictas contra tales, qui admoniti de praedictis seu praedictorum aliquo infra octo dies a monitione computandos praefata a praefatis non se correxerint, ad infligendas poenas omnes et singulas, preter bonorum confiscationem dumtaxat, quas de iure merentur heretici, per suos competentes iudices procedatur": Quellen, 5-6.
(76.) Thus, an anonymous commentary of about 1330 on John XXII's constitution draws precisely on the idea of "pact" in order to prove the "heretical fact" in black magic: "Adorare daemonem, baptizare imagines et talia sunt valde gravia peccata et modernis temporibus multum incipiunt pullulare. Valde rartionabiliter posset ecclesia statuere, quod talia facientes, etsi non haberent errorem fidei in intellectu, si facerent hoc praecise propter aliquid pactum demone habitum, velut heretici punirentur, et forsitan expediret, ut propter gravitatem pene homines a talibus arcerentur. Utrum autem hoc sit iam statutum per aliqua iura, plenius noverint iuriste": Vat. Lat. MS 4869, f. 79. See J. Hansen, Zauberwahn, 267-68. Likewise, Zanchinus Ugolini's treatise De hereticis, composed around 1330, mentions the central importance of a "pact" with the devil in the definition of heresy. The author belonged to the circle of inquisitors of the Romagna of around 1302-40. The treatise, highly influential in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, was written as a manual for the inquisitor Donatus St. Agatha O.F.M. See J. Hansen, Zauberwahn, 268-70.
Isabel Iribarren is lecturer in Medieval Church History at the Universite Marc Bloch-Strasbourg II.
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|Date:||Mar 1, 2007|
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