From accomodation to confrontation: the Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak years.

Introduction

On 23 November 1995, Egypt's Supreme Military Court sentenced 54 leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood to prison terms ranging from 3 to 5 years with hard labor. The trial marked the culmination of a turbulent four-year period which witnessed a deterioration of the state's tolerance for the outlawed Brotherhood -- Egypt's largest political opposition group.

Significantly, the court's verdict, charging the defendants with membership in an illegal organization(1) and ordering the closure of the Brotherhood's headquarters in downtown Cairo, represents the first prosecution of members of the organization by a military court since 1965, when Nasir -- for the second time during his presidency -- sought to crush the Brotherhood by imprisoning its revived leadership. The recent move by the Mubarak regime against the organization's active younger leadership demonstrates a marked departure from the policy of accommodation and tolerance toward the Brotherhood that prevailed for much of the 1980s. This policy, in the past, had afforded the organization wide berth to function as a technically illegal, but widely recognized, political entity, allowing the group's indirect participation in parliamentary elections and the growth of its operations in the field of social services throughout the country.

The November court decision, preceded by arrests of scores of Brotherhood members throughout 1995, raised considerable debate within Egypt about the significance of the crackdown against the organization. Opposition newspapers and political commentators directed attention to the parliamentary elections the same month and a government strategy to prevent prominent Brotherhood candidates, forecasted by many to score substantial victories at the polls, from participating. The strength of such arguments was buttressed by the scope of the 1995 crackdown, during which 81 Muslim Brothers -- all of them former parliamentarians, leading civic activists, or parliamentary candidates -- were prosecuted in 2 trials before the Supreme Military Court. They comprised the organization's younger dynamic leadership within professional associations, university faculty clubs and non-governmental organizations. As for the People's Assembly (majlis al-sha'b) election, it is noteworthy that not one of the approximately 150 Muslim Brotherhood candidates who competed as independents or under the Labor (al-'Amal) Party name won a seat(2) in a contest which local and international human rights groups saw tainted by extraordinary government interference and strong repression against Brotherhood candidates and campaign workers.(3)

While the above hypotheses present a plausible interpretation of events, the behavior of the state over the past four years strongly suggests that the recent crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood goes beyond the 1995 People's Assembly election. Rather, it represents a longer-term strategy -- one which has been in effect for the past four years -- designed to severely curtail the Brotherhood's gains within civil society and weaken its ability to garner increased grassroots support. The state's gradual intensification of its crackdown against the group coincides with several important events during the 1990s which highlight the Mubarak regime's growing concern about the Brotherhood's increasing influence across a broad range of societal levels.

The earliest evidence of the regime's changed attitude toward the group can be traced to the mid-1980s following the Brotherhood's unanticipated success in parliamentary elections (see next section below). However, events of the 1990s, beginning with a parliamentary election boycott by opposition parties -- including the Brotherhood -- and the rising influence of the organization within professional associations and other civil institutions, grasped the state's attention. The regime viewed the group's increasingly visible participation in civil and political life as a formidable threat to its own declining legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Egyptians. Initially, the response was cautious, yet the authorities' more confrontational stance toward the group was evident as early as 1991, when it began to target suspected members for arrest, followed by rigorous legislative initiatives in 1993 aimed at curtailing Brotherhood influence in professional syndicates such as the national medical and engineering associations. At about the same time, state officials and the semi-official press launched an increasingly zealous media campaign which sought to discredit the group by labeling it a "terrorist" organization operating in close coordination with radical segments of the Islamic movement, despite the Brotherhood's publicly expressed commitment to nonviolence in pursuit of its political goals. The harsh military court convictions in November 1995 represent the most serious action to date, and provide the latest evidence of an ongoing strategy to dilute the Muslim Brotherhood's power base in civil society.

This paper examines events over the last decade which precipitated the state's move toward a strategy of confrontation in the 1990s with the Brotherhood. The reasons for such a response, it will be shown, are directly related to the group's demonstrated ability to serve as a potent and growing political movement capable of mobilizing broad-based support. The Brotherhood's increased legitimization, enhanced by its independent stand on major political issues and its demonstrated support within key institutions of civil society, generated a defensive reaction by the state, no doubt conscious of its own vulnerability -- the result of narrowly based support throughout the country. In 1995, by carrying out its comprehensive crackdown against the Muslim Brotherhood's most effective organizers and activists, the Mubarak government displayed its clear intent to disable the group in the years to come.

Cautious Tolerance and Accommodation: 1981 to 1989

Following the assassination of Anwar Sadat by Muslim militants in October 1981, the Mubarak regime embarked on a policy of appeasement toward the Brotherhood, releasing from prison its Supreme Guide, Omar al-Tilmassani, and other members arrested during Sadat's so-called "Autumn of Fury" in September 1981. The state's relationship with the Brotherhood during the early 1980s reflected a delicate balance. The regime sought to use the moderate, non-violent Brotherhood as a political counterweight to what was viewed as the more threatening radical Islamist groups on the rise since Sadat's presidency by permitting the still-outlawed group to resume its political activities through its headquarters in downtown Cairo and once again resume publication of its periodicals.(4) In exchange for this new-found freedom, the group refrained from voicing harsh criticism of the regime, while continuing its grassroots activism through social welfare organizations and expanding its power base throughout the country. According to Gilles Kepel, the regime tacitly supported the Brotherhood along with other conservatively religious segments of society in order to enhance its stability. Their moderate stance in calling for change through peaceful tactics as opposed to violent confrontation with the state as articulated by radical groups, was the main determinant for adopting such a policy. "As long as they did not directly challenge the state in political matters, but saw in the sharia (Islamic law) the opportunity to improve society morally, restraining deviant behavior," says Kepel, "they were welcome."(5)

In the view of the state, the trade-off of this policy was acceptable, since any advantages gained by the group as a result of its increased political freedom would be offset by forcing the Brotherhood to compete openly with secular opposition parties, thus exposing what was perceived as obvious and inherent weaknesses of the movement. The belief was that greater public exposure of the group's ideas would lessen its ability to appeal to citizens on the basis of its "underground" character. Soon, however, this assumption proved incorrect. Egyptian political analyst Diaa Rashwan observes: "[c]onvinced that the Brotherhood posed no real threat, the regime continued to overlook its growing presence till (sic) 1984 when the group scored impressive gains in parliamentary elections through its alliance with the secular Wafd Party."(6)

The results of the 1984 elections, in which the group won 8 seats in the 360-member People's Assembly, came as a surprise to the government and Brotherhood officials alike.(7) It also prompted a subtle change in the state's outlook on the group. As Rashwan notes, this unexpected display of power "alerted the regime to the potential political force of the Brotherhood and prompted it to closely examine the organization's activities."(8) After the election, possible concern was caused by the group's stated intention of stepping-up its criticism of government policy through members in Parliament. The Brotherhood's Supreme Guide, Omar al-Tilmassani, spoke of such plans in a June 1984 interview:

We were completely serious when we joined in the elections. Our aim was to reach Parliament through a legal channel, the Wafd Party, because People's Assembly members enjoy parliamentary immunity. The brothers who will reach the Assembly will speak on behalf of the Brotherhood, will urge enforcement of the Islamic sharia laws, and will embarrass the government on this issue without fear of detention or torture....Now some of them [Muslim Brothers] are People's Assembly members, watching the government and entitled to make it account for its actions.(9)

Despite such bold statements, the state in the ensuing months generally saw the Brotherhood as constituting little in terms of a threat -- particularly as its demands for implementing sharia in Parliament were thwarted. Also, the influence of Islamic radicals at the time was limited to university campuses, with only minor acts of violence noticeable. The regime, overall, enjoyed relative stability.(10)

Three years later, however, in 1987, the Brotherhood's parliamentary success continued as a result of its alliance with both the Liberal and Socialist Labor parties. The tripartite alliance won 36 seats and further demonstrated the Brotherhood's increasing appeal to citizens. At about the same time, new inroads were also being made within the nation's professional associations and other civil institutions. For much of the early 1980s, the Brotherhood had focused its efforts on establishing a presence within professional associations, student unions and university faculty clubs, in order to secure a forum for expressing its ideas to educated Egyptians.(11) Likewise, this strategy also aimed at enhancing the group's credibility and its prospects in parliamentary politics.

Through its superior mobilization of constituents, the Brotherhood scored electoral victories resulting in political control of the medical association in 1986 -- just two years after it had successfully earned nine out twenty-five seats on the board in 1984. By the end of the decade, it had achieved similar success within associations for engineers and pharmacists, and subsequently would exert control over all of the main professional associations (except the journalists association) by 1992, when it captured a majority in the prestigious, and formerly secular-dominated bar association.

These association victories were particularly significant in terms of the group's increasing prominence in civil society. The associations, at this time, represented one of the few avenues for organization independent of the state. The Brotherhood's gradual control of these institutions, at minimum, indicated symbolically that the group had for the first time gained control of "legitimate" channels to further its own political aims, highlighting its viability as a formidable political force. For the regime, this represented a significant challenge, particularly because of the weakness of the existing opposition political parties that enjoyed legal status. Now, the Brotherhood could effectively fill the void in Egypt's stagnant political system, not only through associations, but also through its rapidly growing social services network throughout the country. With its roots firmly planted within important sectors of society, the group was in a position to mobilize broad-based support and offer a potent challenge to the entrenched, National Democratic Party (NDP)-dominated establishment.

Nevertheless, for most of the period from 1984 to 1989, the state pursued a consistent policy of non-confrontation -- save for the occasional arrest and investigation of Brotherhood members by security forces and sporadic, but innocuous, criticism delivered by the semi-official media and government officials. "Deferring confrontation was an instinctual trade-off, not a carefully thought-out state policy," says one academic of the state's attitude at this time. "The government turned a blind eye to Islamist grassroots power. In return, the Islamists did not confront state corruption and inefficiency."(12) 1989, however, subtle changes were detectable. In April 1989, then-Interior Minister Zaki Badr issued a public statement criticizing the non-violent Brotherhood for its alleged links to radical Islamist groups in a foreshadowing of language that would abound in the coming decade: "[T]he extremists are in fact a secret organization of the Muslim Brotherhood for assassinations. There is no conflict between the two tendencies, as some want to believe, and they are in fact a single association."(13) In August of the same year, some 20 Brothers were arrested, along with 80 children, after holding a 4-day recreational camp in Alexandria.(14) According to the Egyptian daily al-Wafd, the camp was held against Interior Ministry warnings.(15) Similar arrests followed until the Interior Minister, who had intensified his repression against all sides of the political spectrum, was sacked in January 1990 by President Mubarak. The flurry of state activity against the group perhaps indicated a nascent polarization between hard-liners, such as Zaki Badr, and other officials supporting a less confrontational stance. This would become more apparent in years to come. After the initial denouement of 1989, there emerged a more determined state effort to confront the organization in response to its noticeably more independent and high-profile opposition to the regime.

Escalation and Confrontation: 1990 to the Present

The Election Boycott, the Madrid Peace Conference and Islamist Violence

In 1990 a more vocal Brotherhood voice emerged in Parliament, highlighted by its decision to boycott parliamentary elections. The opposition Wafd Party was the first to publicly announce the boycott, but prominent Muslim Brotherhood figures also made clear their plan to join the boycott because of concerns that the election would be fundamentally compromised.(16) Maamoun Hudeibi, the spokesman for the group in parliament, said this to explain the boycott:

We wanted a free and fair election. We did not accept the circumstances of this election. Our demands were refused. We asked for judicial supervision; this was refused. We asked that voters prove their identity; this was refused. The Minister of Interior is controlling everything. Everyone is under his orders. There are no guarantees.(17)

In a joint press statement released in October 1990, the leaders of the boycotting parties -- including Maamoun Hudeibi -- said that they refused "to contribute to the creation of a false democratic facade."(18)

To some observers, the boycott was viewed as an instigation aimed at embarrassing the regime domestically and internationally.(19) The Brotherhood also joined opposition parties in sharply criticizing the regime's renewal of the emergency law -- continually in force since the assassination of Sadat in 1981. Maamoun Hudeibi asserted publicly that the "governmental system is based on oppression and dictatorship, which is why it hides behind emergency laws."(20) Such critical language was in marked contrast to the more reserved Brotherhood of the early to mid 1980s.

While the parliamentary boycott and the group's more vocal criticism of state policy were important contributors to strained relations, leaders of the Brotherhood assert that the conflict with the regime had its beginning following the organization's strong opposition to the October 1991 Madrid peace talks between parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict.(21) The highly critical of the talks, and indirectly condemned the Egyptian government's endorsement of and active mediation in the conference. Such criticism was embodied in the strong statement made by the Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Muhammad Hamid Abu-al-Nasr at the time of the Madrid conference:

The eagerness many Arab leaders are showing to attend the conference for the sell-out of Palestine is alarming. It shows the state to which we have descended at the hands of these leaders as a result of their departure from Islam and their attempt to keep it out of the battle. If they take part in this conference and sign its unjust resolutions, they will be held responsible at present and before the coming generations for abandoning the Palestine issue and the al-Aqsa mosque and will bear the guilt of keeping them under occupation.(22)

Of all opposition parties in defiance of the peace talks, the Brotherhood's opposition was most visible.(23) On 25 October, the group convened a "mass meeting" in Helwan under the heading "Islam does not sanction peace with usurpers of Islamic lands and holy places," and Supreme Guide Hamid Abu-al Nasr subsequently published additional critical statements.(24) Also, the Brotherhood-controlled medical association organized a mass rally that was attended by some 20,000 supporters, where several prominent figures delivered speeches.(25) Following these events, 185 persons were reportedly arrested, including 15 known Brotherhood members, on charges of distributing leaflets opposing the Madrid conference.(26) Interior Minister Abdel Halim Musa stated that those arrested were "extremists, terrorists, fanatics and infiltrators."(27)

The arrest and detention of Muslim Brothers at the time of the Madrid protests revealed a coordinated national effort on the part of the Interior Ministry to obtain information about the group and the beliefs of individual members. Significantly, some of the Brothers arrested and interrogated in 1991 were targeted again in 1995 and prosecuted before the military court.(28) Testimony about their experiences during detention in 1991 indicates close coordination between internal security forces and local prosecutors, and attempts to intimidate individual Muslim Brothers into quiescence. Journalist Salah Abdel Maksoud, arrested on 25 October 1991, was interrogated by State Security Investigation (SSI) -- Egypt's powerful internal security apparatus -- for four days. He was subsequently brought to the state security prosecutor who, according to Middle East Watch, "questioned him about his belief in the Muslim Brotherhood and about articles he had written for several newspapers. He was asked why he had opposed foreign intervention in the [1991] Gulf War and why he was opposing the Madrid peace conference."(29) Maksoud also described "conversations" he had with security officers which were aimed to "put pressure on me. They advised me to change my ideas."(30)

Similarly, Muhammad Abdel Moneim, a 60 year-old supervisor in the Ministry of Education and a Muslim Brother leader in Alexandria, was also detained by security forces. On 24 October 1991, "10 state security officers and mukhbireen (informers) came to my house at 1:00 a.m. and created chaos."(31) After six days of detention, he was finally presented to the prosecutor who accused him of "a criminal plan to organize armed demonstrations, using knives and other weapons." He said that the prosecutor told him after producing no evidence "we have nothing to do with your arrest, but we're asking about a criminal case." According to Middle East Watch, the remainder of the meeting was devoted to "questions about the Muslim Brotherhood's goals and membership and Abdel Moneim's own opinions" as well as questions about the Madrid conference.(32)

After 1991, important political changes occurred which strained state-Brotherhood relations even more. By 1992, the Mubarak government found itself embroiled in a bloody conflict with radical Islamists who had taken up arms against the state and carried out bold attacks against security forces in Upper Egypt and against government officials in Cairo. In May 1992, 13 Christians were killed in a village south of Dayrut, in Upper Egypt, by Islamic militants as a way to dramatize the regime's weakness" when militants were unable to attack security forces. In October of the same year, the first of a series of armed attacks against tourists occurred -- one attack fatally wounded a British national and generated international press attention. The Brotherhood's failure to unequivocally condemn such attacks angered the beleaguered regime and it began to press the Brotherhood to take a position, publicly, against such activities.

As a result, the Brotherhood painstakingly took efforts to disassociate itself from violent Islamist groups, condemning attacks against tourists, Christians, and government officials. Nevertheless, the use of less-than-unequivocal language in its public statements persisted, which sent mixed messages to the regime. One example of this way a statement delivered by spokesman Maamoun Hudeibi, condemning the assassination of prominent secular writer Faraj Foda in June 1992 by Islamic militants. Hudeibi, while denouncing the killing, also pointed out that because of Foda's "articles, books and the provocative manner in which he attacked Islam" the killing was "only to be expected... [because] many people could not tolerate this kind of talk and contain their rage."(33)

As armed Islamist attacks persisted with similar reactions from the group, the regime emphasized its anger when on 31 March 1993, according to the official state mouthpiece, the Middle East News Agency (MENA), Interior Minister Muhammad Abdel Halim Musa "urged religious societies and groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to unequivocally announce their stand on terrorism. The Interior Minister said that the situation does not permit partial solutions, hesitant stands, or silence."(34) Other developments at this time -- namely the Brotherhood's successful and high-profile work within professional associations -- triggered a set of repressive actions against the group. These will be discussed in further detail below.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Civil Society: A Challenge to State Legitimacy

The increasing influence of the Brotherhood within professional associations raised considerable alarm for the regime. Since the early 1980s, the group made important inroads within the governing councils of the nation's professional associations in a trend that has continued to the present day. By 1990 it had won electoral victories that resulted in political control of most major professional associations for doctors, engineers, dentists, merchants and pharmacists. In September 1992, it gained a majority of seats (14 out of 25) on the ruling council of the prestigious bar association -- an event which, according to one journalist, sent "shockwaves through liberal and secular circles in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world."(35) The Brotherhood's bar association victory was particularly significant, for it marked the end of a close relationship between the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and the lawyers association, which in the past had served to legitimize government legislation and other policies.(36) Moreover, through its new position of power in the association, the Brotherhood hoped to use its influence with judges and legislators in order to further its aim of implementing Islamic law into the Egyptian constitution. Nabil Abd-al-Fattah of al-Ahram's Center for Political and Strategic Studies credited the Brotherhood's success to a combination of factors, including unemployment and alienation of younger lawyers:

The syndicate [association] and its ruling council have not paid any attention to the problem of unemployment among young lawyers, or to matters such as modern legal training. The psychological state created by unemployment generates a flood of anger, and in the absence of any political role for the syndicate it finds no outlet or anything to channel it in a healthy direction. The young therefore turn to the most potent force in the community, the Islamist tendency, which largely embodies anger against the state and against the forces that made up the council of the bar association. The weakness of other political forces, the sterility of their arguments and their remoteness from the younger generation of lawyers have helped to create fertile ground for effective Islamist activity within the greatest bastion of liberal thought in Egypt.(37)

Increasingly from the late 1980s, the Brotherhood used the forum of professional associations to directly challenge state policy and broadened its social activism previously restricted to its work via charitable societies and other private voluntary organizations. On the professional association level, it expanded its strategy of social welfare, implementing numerous programs for members such as individual and family health insurance programs which it provided to nearly 25,000 members of Cairo's medical association.(38) Similar programs, such as the Social Solidarity Program (an insurance program organized in accordance with Islamic principles) in the bar association, were developed as a way to reach out to the beleaguered middle class that would otherwise be without these support services. Maamoun Hudeibi, spokesman for the Brotherhood, pointed out the impact of the organization's activities in the associations: "[S]ince the Brotherhood began its activities in the associations, things have changed. The union boards are active again, and this has yielded scientific and livelihood benefits for the members, especially now, with the economic crisis suffocating everyone."(39)

The Muslim Brotherhood's dominance of professional associations provided it with a powerful mechanism to dispense a plethora of welfare-type services to sympathizers, members or potential supporters. Projects for the construction of low-income housing for professionals; cash loans to members; health insurance; and educational programs are among the kinds of services Brotherhood-controlled associations have provided to members.(40) According to Rifaat al-Said, the Deputy President of Egypt's secular Tagammu' Party, the bar association is composed of "140,000 lawyers with law degrees, most of them unemployed and unable to pay their association dues. What is a young lawyer likely to think about a group that pays those dues for him and embraces him?"(41)

The Brotherhood's control of associations has also provided the group access to enormous financial resources for mobilizing constituents. The engineers association, Egypt's wealthiest professional association, is composed of some 200,000 dues paying members. According to some estimates in early 1995, total assets (including investments) added up to approximately 60 million Egyptian pounds ($15 million).(42) Recent investigations -- perhaps biased -- surrounding the misuse of funds within the associations may demonstrate the group's autonomy in allocating financial resources for its own political endeavors. The allegations state that loose accounting practices have been exploited by the Brotherhood to provide cash disbursements to members and supporters, to invest money in social service projects outside the association (i.e., housing, health care), and to invest capital in banks and other pro-Brotherhood business ventures, as was the case with the engineers association in recent years.(43) Other money has supposedly been directed at efforts to mobilize association voters; organize religious conferences and pilgrimages; and support humanitarian relief actions in Afghanistan and Bosnia.(44)

The Brotherhood's increased popularity in the eyes of poor and lower-middle-class Egyptians and the impressive resources at its disposal were further displayed in the aftermath of the 1992 earthquake which caused severe devastation and hardship for thousands of Cairo residents. Similarly evident was the government's noticeable sensitivity to the group's greater visibility. Due to the lack of immediate government response (the quake occurred on a Thursday after most state offices had closed for the weekend), Muslim Brothers took initiative in raising money and distributing clothes, food and other provisions on the streets primarily through the work of the Humanitarian Relief Committee -- a group organized by the Brotherhood-controlled medical association. The committee, along with the engineers association, helped set up first-aid centers and emergency shelters for victims, while prominently displaying posters with the inscription "Islam is the Solution," the Brotherhood's most popular slogan.(45) According to one prominent Egyptian political analyst: "By sunset they had two prayers(46) and thousands of people brought money and supplies [to local mosques]. By the time the government got its act together, 36 hours had passed."(47) Soon after the government's incompetence was widely compared unfavorably to the efficiency of the Brotherhood, the government issued a military decree under the emergency law prohibiting the raising of funds or the distribution of goods except through the Ministry of Social Affairs or through the Red Crescent.(48) The government displayed its anger at the Brotherhood when the Ministry of Interior responded to criticism of the state's weak response to the crisis in light of those of other non-governmental groups. He contended sharply that "[s]ome people are trying to use the disaster for their own political ends" -- a clear reference to the Brotherhood.(49)

Against this backdrop of increased Brotherhood activity, other events transpired which provided indicators that the state had decided to send a strong signal that the group had crossed a line. In December 1992, in the aftermath of the earthquake (and the Brotherhood's bar association victory), several of the organization's members were arrested on the vague charges of "holding contacts with foreign elements, giving to foreign news agencies statements and reports designed to create confusion, incite citizens, and to distort Egypt's image abroad."(50) Prior to this, some 50 members were arrested in June 1992 on similarly ambiguous charges of attempting to distribute leaflets "calling for agitation."(51) According to one academic, these arrests were "designed as a warning to the Brotherhood not to take government tolerance for granted."(52) A new campaign to publicly link the group with terrorism was evident by articles appearing in Egypt's semi-official magazines Rose al-Youssef and al-Mussawar, and the daily newspaper Al-Akhbar which falsely (according to Brotherhood spokesman Maamoun Hudeibi) accused the group of having declared its support for terrorist activities.(53)

Earlier in the year, in February 1992, security forces raided the office of the Salsabil computer company -- owned by influential Brotherhood members -- allegedly uncovering detailed plans for classified military projects; disinformation activities with the media; and plans to falsify association elections. Also said to be discovered were documents outlining a Brotherhood plan to overthrow the government.(54) From 1992 onward, the case was used to pressure the group, with members arrested and investigated by prosecutors, and then released without convictions. The arrest of 11 Brothers in December 1992 was, according to the pro-Brotherhood newspaper al-Sha'b, carried out under the pretext of the Salsabil case which "has become the main source of pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood movement."(55) The Salsabil case represented a new tactic of the state in line with its increasingly apparent strategy of confrontation.

In early 1993, numerous articles surfaced in the semi-official press, critically examining the group's so-called "internationalism" and its substantial financial resources.(56) Throughout 1993, much was publicized about the group's alleged contacts with "foreign parties" and the existence of international branches of the organization abroad -- an innocuous contention which the group did not deny.(57) In June 1993, 20 influential members were arrested along with a number of university students for, again according to al-Sha'b, "exploiting the issue of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Muslims to stage anti-government demonstrations"(58) in the wake of pro-Brotherhood student activism on the issue. This last move appeared to underscore the regime's dissatisfaction with the Brotherhood's most recent, high-profile humanitarian aid effort, after previous initiatives for Somalia and Afghanistan.

Beyond the arrests of Brotherhood activists, the state in 1993 also began to place legal restraints on the group's ability to gain access to civil institutions. An associations law (Law 100 of 1993), passed on 16 February 1993 by the People's Assembly and ratified by President Mubarak the next day, sought primarily to disrupt the organization's success in association elections by requiring a 50 percent quorum of registered members in board elections. The Brotherhood's success in past elections can be attributed to its skillful organization of supporters amidst generally low voter turnouts. With Law 100, the government hoped to force a greater participation of voters -- particularly those not supportive of the Brotherhood -- in order to reduce the group's chances for success. Equally important was the law's banning of fundraising, with the apparent aim of impairing the organization's ability to mobilize financial resources within the associations for its social and political activities.

Further amendments to the law in February 1995 called for judicial supervision of elections, thus placing judge-appointed, pro-regime administrators in a position to possibly meddle with votes. It also allowed judges to vet credentials of candidates and lists of eligible voters, providing unprecedented government oversight. In May 1993, the government intensified its attack on associations, placing the powerful engineers association under official custodianship by court order in response to allegations of financial mismanagement of association funds by the Brotherhood-controlled board. The board of directors was subsequently dissolved and replaced with court-appointed administrators. The association's Cairo headquarters remains under military guard as a stark reminder of the government's determination to expunge the group's foothold within associations. Most recently, on 28 January 1995, an Egyptian court placed the bar association under sequestration for similar reasons, furthering the assault on Brotherhood-controlled associations.

Similar to the associations law in purpose was a June 1994 amendment to the Egyptian Universities Act, aimed at weakening the Brotherhood's strong presence in university faculty clubs. Between 1990 and 1993, the group gained majorities in the governing councils of university faculty clubs in Zaqaziq, Assiut and Cairo, which provided it important resources and opportunities for expressing its views to the academic community.(59) The new amendment curtailed such autonomy by repealing the election of faculty deans. Deans are now selected by government-appointed university presidents rather than through elections by faculty members. Furthermore, university councils, which in the past were composed mostly of elected members, are now controlled by government appointees.(60) Through the former system, the Brotherhood was able to endorse and elect candidates sympathetic to its position. The new law has resulted in a more centralized management of universities under pro-government administrators with the intent to subvert Brotherhood influence on campuses across the country.

The Lawyers Association and the Death of Abdel Harith Madani

In May 1994 state relations with the Brotherhood further deteriorated with events involving Egypt's Brotherhood-controlled bar association. On 27 April, 32 year-old Islamist lawyer Abdel Harith Madani died in the custody of state security forces one day after he was arrested at his law office in Giza. Neither his family nor officials of the bar association were informed of his death until 7 May, over one week later. The event caused a powerful reaction among lawyers, who in the past had grown fearful of the security forces' campaign against the legal profession; particularly Islamist defense lawyers, among whom some 30 remained detained without charge. On 17 May, several hundred Egyptian lawyers set out from the association's Cairo headquarters in a march to protest Madani's death. The demonstrators were violently dispersed by state security forces and riot police. Following the ordeal, 33 lawyers were arrested including association council members Mukhtar Noah, Khaled Badawi and Galal Saad -- all members of the Brotherhood. Several other lawyers were subsequently detained, among them secular and human rights activists. A turbulent two month period followed that included the formation of a unified front by lawyers of all political dispositions who called for an investigation of the circumstances of Madani's death and the release of all detained lawyers. During this time, intense international scrutiny remained focused on the events which included relentless criticism from most of the country's main political opposition groups as well as a hunger strike initiated by prominent Wafdist, Abdel Aziz Muhammad, president of Cairo's bar association.

Despite Brotherhood denials of the group's involvement in the events, the group, it was concluded by government officials and the semi-official media, was the primary instigator of the demonstration and the subsequent outcry, as a result of its control of the association. Some political activists and Muslim Brothers, however, viewed the government as having used the association's protest as a pretext for further closing the margin of freedom against political dissent and, specifically, for attacking the Muslim Brotherhood.(61) Regardless of the motive, the state's response in the coming months was one of increased repression against the group.

The period following the 17 May demonstration was marked by an unprecedented media campaign against the organization. In a highly publicized interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, President Mubarak labeled the Brotherhood "an illegal organization that is behind most of the activities of the religious troublemakers."(62) Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi, who earlier in 1994 had characterized the Brotherhood as moderate and nonviolent, publicly accused the group of financing terrorist groups.(63) Throughout the summer, additional arrests of Brotherhood members took place on charges of "financing terrorism."(64) In late 1994 during an interview with The New Yorker, Mubarak indicated that plans for a severe crackdown on the group were imminent: "I must tell you, this whole problem of terrorism throughout the Middle East is a by-product of our own, illegal Muslim Brotherhood -- whether its al-Jihad, Hizb'allah, in Lebanon, or Hamas. They all sprang from underneath the umbrella of the Muslim Brotherhood. They say they have renounced violence, but in reality, they are responsible for all this violence, and the time will come when they will be uncovered."(65) Indeed, shortly afterward, the government would begin an unprecedented campaign of arrests of prominent figures, ultimately referring them to the Supreme Military Court in September 1995.

The Repression of 1995

With the first wave of arrests against prominent Brotherhood figures in early 1995, the government's media campaign resumed its intensity. Director of security operations in al-Minya, Major General Muhammad Abdel al-Fattah, explained in an interview with al-Ahali: "For me, there is no difference between those who call themselves the Islamic Group and those who call themselves the Muslim Brotherhood.(66) Based on this, I worked out my plan for confrontation, which, of course, I cannot make public."(67) Further arrests in March were publicized by MENA, which alleged the group's exploitation of the Humanitarian Relief Committee by using its work in Bosnia and Somalia as a front for military training and the procurement of weapons to use for terrorist acts which first began in Afghanistan.(68) Reports of arrests made casual reference -- and without supporting evidence -- to Brotherhood involvement in terrorism and its use of associations as fronts for terrorism.(69)

As the November 1995 election approached, the state's repression mostly against Brotherhood candidates and supporters intensified. Adding to the fury of the state's crackdown may have been the Brotherhood's pledged effort to resume parliamentary politics since the hiatus of 1990 to 1995. The individual candidate, as opposed to party list, system would allow the Muslim Brotherhood to benefit from the popularity of its members who mounted campaigns. Ahmad Seif al-Islam Hassan al-Banna, president of the national bar association and son of the Brotherhood's founder Hassan al-Banna, described the change in the government's policy toward Brotherhood candidates in past and present elections. He pointed out that "now the situation is worse. The repression was 50 percent then. Now it's 80 percent. In 1987, there was more freedom [in campaigning] but the government falsified the results for many of the [Brotherhood] candidates. There were arrests in 1987 but not at the same level as today. Then the government did not realize how strong we were."(70)

Despite the arrests of prominent Brotherhood parliamentary candidates beginning in January 1995, 100 members of the organization ran as independents in the 29 November election and the 6 December runoffs, but the state's determination to thwart their bids for seats was clear.(71) Between 15 November 1995 and 6 December 1995, authorities arrested 1,392 Islamist campaign workers, supporters and poll-watchers.(72) The detailed election and post-election reporting of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) revealed that security forces systematically targeted Islamist candidates country-wide, using techniques such as intimidation, illegal search and seizure of campaign offices, and arbitrary arrests, which was often based on subterfuge by State Security Investigation (SSI).(73) The Cairo-based Center for Human Rights Legal Aid also meticulously monitored and reported on the elections. It found that:

Restrictive practices against the Muslim Brotherhood and its ally, the Labor Party, reflected an obvious political trend within the government to restrict, if not eliminate, the Brotherhood's representation in the next People's Assembly. This took the form of referring many of the Brotherhood's leaders and members to military courts and sentencing some of them to prison just a few days prior to election day. Furthermore, Muslim Brotherhood candidates were harassed during election campaigns, their banners were torn and they were prevented from organizing marches and conferences. The culmination of these practices was the mass arrest of over 1,000 Muslim Brotherhood candidate representatives during the first and second rounds.(74)

In addition, with 81 Brothers referred to the state military court in September 1995, the government was unrelenting in its pressure on locally based members who attempted to inform the Egyptian public about the 1995 crackdown and, in particular, the trials themselves. Indicators of the state's all-out assault on the Brotherhood's local advocacy concerning the repression were more than evident in the later half of 1995. Cadres that attempted to disseminate protest literature were themselves targeted for arrest. In October 1995, MENA reported the arrest by SSI of six Brotherhood members in Alexandria, who were accused of working "to create public hostility toward the legitimate regime in the country."(75) Citing a security source, MENA said that SSI had found that "Muslim Brotherhood elements are active in Alexandria, trying to create public hostility toward the existing legitimate regime under the pretext that it [the regime] is fighting Islam and Muslims. They used this as a pretext to assail the current trial of a number of the outlawed group's leaders by the military judiciary."(76)

The Brotherhood's then-Deputy Guide, Mustafa Mashhur, accurately assessed the goals of the crackdown:

This attack is intended to disrupt the activity of activist union leaders and public personalities who engage in prominent activity, and to sow fear in the hearts of others. It is part of a well thought out campaign to prevent them from participating in union elections and parliamentary elections this year, which will see elections for 14 unions, the People's Assembly, and the Advisory Council. In other words, this year will be packed with political activity, and the government, because of its weakness, opposes forces that are active in society, foremost of which is the Muslim Brotherhood.(77)

As the November 1995 election approached, court proceedings against the 81 Brothers referred to the military court in September were underway. To independent observers, the two trials failed to meet international fair-trial standards, and the outcome was all but decided beforehand. The court's decision, which doled out prison terms to 54 of the defendants, also ordered the closure of the Brotherhood's unofficial headquarters in the Suq al-Tawfiqiyya section of Cairo.

Context and Implications of the Repression

These actions made clear that an internal consensus had emerged within the government to move decisively against the group with an aim of forcing it underground. The apparent idea is to terminate the group's "unofficial" legitimacy which it had successfully used to its own advantage since the mid- 1980s. The attempts to dismantle Brotherhood control of associations and university faculty clubs, coupled with a continuing media assault against the group, comprise a clear strategic trend to deal with the group as an illegal -- and thus illegitimate -- entity. Journalist Amina al-Naqqash of al-Ahali, highlighted this approach in analysis written in early 1995:

The campaign of arrests against the Muslim Brotherhood's symbols, occurring shortly before the professional associations elections due this spring and the People's Assembly elections due at the end of 1995, strengthen the impression that the government wing that does not distinguish between moderate and extremist Islamists is growing stronger....[T]he government has decided to reduce the Muslim Brothers' influence and deal with them in their official capacity of being an illegal movement, although it had tacitly permitted them to operate in the past few years.(78) (Emphasis added.)

Another aspect of the state's strategy was clear: decapitating the organization's dynamic, younger leadership and demobilizing its best organizers, while leaving most of its membership intact. According to Islamist lawyer Salim al-Awa, the stiff sentences doled out to key leaders -- ranging from three to five years in prison -- effectively removed them from active participation in political life for up to ten years following release from prison. In addition to preventing them from competing as candidates in the next two parliamentary elections, the Law for Practicing Political Rights (No. 73 of 1977) precludes them from serving on the board of directors of organizations and professional associations. According to the law, individuals are barred from such activity for a period of double their sentences after release.(79)

The government's actions against the Brotherhood are consistent with its growing intolerance for other manifestations of political dissent. In July 1992, "anti-terrorism" amendments to the penal code criminalized the publication of articles deemed "harmful to national unity and social peace."(80) In October 1993, the law was used to detain for investigation three journalists from the bi-weekly, pro-Brotherhood al-Sha'b for outspoken criticism of the regime. These were the first of a series of such actions taken against opposition journalists. In May 1995, the People's Assembly hurriedly passed Law No. 93, which became known as "the law that assassinated the freedom of the press." The law imposes stiffer penalties on journalists prosecuted for slandering government officials, and came at a time when press reports increasingly linked President Mubarak and his inner circle to massive corruption. A parallel assault on freedom of expression came in the form of intensified state pressure on independent human rights organizations, which represent one of the few venues in Egypt for independent, non-political criticism of the regime.(81)

The Brotherhood, as the largest and most influential group in Egyptian civil society, represented a threat to the increasingly intolerant and insulated structures of state power and as such was a logical victim in an ever more repressive climate. For its part, the Brotherhood appears determined to ride out the repression while continuing to espouse its goal of an Islamic state in Egypt and maintaining a commitment to non-violence. Newly elected Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashhur affirmed in January 1996 the group's plans to maintain a moderate course and has repeatedly and publicly called for dialogue with the authorities: "[D]ialogue is necessary at this stage. It is better than throwing in our lot with other militant groups."(82) He also specifically ruled out "underground activities" for the Muslim Brotherhood.(83)

Analyst Hala Mustafa believes that the Brotherhood will take a cautious approach and bide its time: "The group is having a crisis in its relationship with the government at present. As in previous crises in the 1950s and 1960s, the Brotherhood will not seek confrontation. Instead, it will act to strengthen its ranks and wait for the right time to stage a comeback."(84) The creative resiliency of the group's younger cadres is already evident by the recently announced plans to seek legalization for a new Center (al-Wasat) Party, whose founding members include leftists and Christians in addition to Muslim Brothers. While this project corresponds with the image of wasatiyya (centrism) that Mashhur himself has pledged to promote as Supreme Guide, he nevertheless is not sanguine about the prospects for the new party's legalization by authorities: "We did not prohibit the youth from movement. They said we want to establish a party because the government will not give us legitimacy and we as elders did not stop them...but the [government Shura Council's] Party Committee will not accept them and will not give them a license for activity."(85) Nevertheless, the Center Party could serve as an interim protective mechanism for Brotherhood members to participate in politics, particularly if the state continues to move against the group as an illegal organization. How the Mubarak government responds to the Brotherhood's approach will be seen throughout the rest of 1996.

(1) According to the Cairo-based Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) which reported on the trials: "The defendants were charged with belonging to a group established in contravention of the law and the Constitution, holding meetings and seminars in different governorates to attract new members to the banned Muslim Brotherhood group, setting up a Consultative Council inside the group, possession and distribution of leaflets against the government and providing financial assistance to the families of people detained in connection with cases of violence and terrorism." The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, "Unfair Trials," 25 November 1995, p. 2.

(2) Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Civil Society and Electoral Politics in Egypt," Civil Society (December 1995) p. 6.

(3) Elections for the 444-seat parliament were held on 29 November 1995 with runoff elections held on 6 December 1995. For more detail on government interference throughout the electoral process see: The Center For Human Rights Legal Aid, "CHRLA's Final Report on the Legislative Elections in Egypt 1995," December 1995, and the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, "Democracy Jeopardized," December 1995.

(4) The Brotherhood applied for official recognition with the government as a political party on several occasions without success after its electoral victories in 1984 and 1987. Brotherhood leaders and lawyers also continued to dispute assertions by authorities that the organization is illegal. In 1992, spokesman Maamoun Hudeibi was asked in an interview about a recent Supreme Administrative Court decision to turn down the group's legal appeal of the January 1954 decision by the Revolutionary Command Council to dissolve the organization. He replied: "[Its] decision has been abrogated and amended. Proof of this is the fact that the Brotherhood's building was given back to the group and the group was allowed to operate and issue its newspaper. The government itself presented a memorandum to the court saying that a decision to this effect was issued on 28 December 1954. Therefore, the initial dissolution decision has been amended, so how could it still be applicable and `fortified?' This is why we filed a motion challenging the court's verdict." See "Muslim Brotherhood Official Views Algeria, `Party,' " al-Shira' (8 June 1992) p. 49, as reported by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 11 June 1992, p. 7. The Brotherhood continues to maintain this legal interpretation, and a key court case was still pending as of late 1995, according to prominent Islamist lawyer Salim al-Awa. (Interview in Cairo, 25 November 1995).

(5) Gilles Kepel, "Islamists versus the State in Egypt and Algeria," Daedalus, 124, no. 3 (Summer 1995) p. 115.

(6) Diaa Rashwan, "A Trial at the Polls," al-Ahram Weekly, 21-27 September 1995, p. 2.

(7) "As you say, we had 22 candidates," said Brotherhood Supreme Guide, Omar al-Tilmassani, in a 1984 interview. "We would have been satisfied if only five of them won." See "Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Elections, Policy." Al-Majallah (9-15 June 1984) pp. 9-10, as reported by FBIS, 13 June 1984, p. D-2.

(8) Rashwan, p. 2.

(9) "Muslim Brotherhood Leader on Elections, Policy," pp. 9-10.

(10) Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) p. 23.

(11) Sana Abed-Kotob, "The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 27, no. 3 (August 1995) p. 329.

(12) Ahmed Abdalla, "Egypt's Islamists and the State: From Complicity to Confrontation," Middle East Report (July-August 1993) p. 29.

(13) "Extremists `Secret' Arm of Muslim Brotherhood," Agence France Presse, 17 April 1989, as reported by FBIS, 18 April 1989, p. 11.

(14) The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, "A New Series of Arbitrary Arrests in Egypt," 26 September 1989, pp. 1-3.

(15) Majdi Hilmi, "Muslim Brotherhood Members Arrested," Al-Wafd, 25 September 1989, p. 2, as reported by FBIS, 27 September 1989, pp. 13-14.

(16) Middle East Watch, "Egypt: Election Concerns," 15 November 1990, p. 8.

(17) ibid.

(18) ibid.

(19) Rashwan, p. 2.

(20) Ami Ayalon, ed., Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XV (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991) pp. 351-52.

(21) Interview with Mukhtar Noah, Cairo, 19 November 1995 and an interview with Ahmed Seif al-Islam Hassan al-Banna, Cairo, 19 November 1995.

(22) Muhammad Hamid Abu-al-Nasr, "Muslim Brotherhood Rejects `Sell-Out' Talks," al-Sha'b, 22 October 1991, pp. 9-10, as reported by FBIS, 29 October 1991, p. 23.

(23) Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. XV, 1991, p. 367.

(24) ibid.

(25) ibid.

(26) ibid.

(27) Interview published in al-Jumhuriyya, as reported by Middle East Watch, "The Power of Arrest and Detention," unpublished (11 November 1991) p. 83.

(28) These included former member of Parliament Hassan al-Gamal and journalist Salah Abdel Maksoud.

(29) Middle East Watch, "The Power of Arrest and Detention," unpublished, p. 85.

(30) ibid.

(31) ibid, p. 84.

(32) ibid.

(33) Interview with Maamou Hedeibi in Ruz al-Yusuf, 29 June 1992, as reported by Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. XVI, 1992, p. 373.

(34) "Muslim Brotherhood Disclaims Links With Terrorism," MENA, 31 March 1993, as reported by FBIS, 1 April 1993, p. 16.

(35) Steve Hubbel, "Fundamentalist Gains," Middle East International (25 September 1992) p. 11.

(36) ibid.

(37) Nabil Abd-al-Fattah, (untitled), Al-Ahram Weekly, 17 September 1992, p. 7, as reported by FBIS, 22 September 1992, p. 10.

(38) Interview with Imani Qandil of the Economic Research Forum, Cairo, 20 August 1995.

(39) Mohammad Salah, "The Showdown with the Brotherhood," Mideast Mirror, 27 January 1995, p. 14.

(40) Majdi Al-Daqqaq, "In Figures: Loose Money in the Brotherhood's Unions," Al-Musawwar, 3 March 1995, pp. 16-17, as reported by FBIS, 3 May 1995, pp. 27-30.

(41) Salah, p. 15.

(42) ibid.

(43) ibid.

(44) ibid.

(45) Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1992, p. 373.

(46) In Islam there are five official prayer times during the day.

(47) Interview with Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Cairo, 21 August 1995.

(48) From unpublished/untitled report by Human Rights Watch, 1993.

(49) Stephen Hubbell, "Tremors After the Earthquake," Middle East International, 23 October 1992, p. 9.

(50) "Authorities Arrest 14 Muslim Brotherhood Members," Al-Ahram Press Agency, 21 December 1992, as reported by FBIS, 21 December 1992, p. 19.

(51) "Police arrest 50 Muslim Brotherhood Members," MENA, 7 June 1992, as reported by FBIS, 8 June 1992, p. 19.

(52) Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1992, p. 374.

(53) "Muslim Brotherhood Denies Allegations on Terrorism," al-Sha'b, 15 December 1992, as reported by FBIS, 21 December 1992, p. 19.

(54) Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1992, p. 374.

(55) Ahmed Musa, "Arrest of 11 Muslim Brotherhood Members reported," al-Sha'b, 22 December 1992, pp. 1 and 10, as reported by FBIS, 5 January 1993, p. 14.

(56) See, for example, "Prosecutors Interrogate Muslim Brotherhood Members," al-Ahram, 1 June 1993, as reported by FBIS, 18 June 1993, p. 13.

(57) Ahmed Musa, "Muslim Brotherhood Contacts With Foreign Parties Revealed," al-Ahram al-Masa'i, 21 December 1992, p. 1, as reported by FBIS, 5 January 1993, p. 14.

(58) "Muslim Brotherhood Members Arrested in Salsabil Case," al-Sha'b, 22 June 1993, pp. 9-10, as reported by FBIS, 28 June 1993, p. 19.

(59) Abed-Kotob, p. 329.

(60) Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, "Escalating Attacks on Human Rights Protection in Egypt," September 1995, pp. 5-6.

(61) In June, Brotherhood Supreme Guide Muhammad Hamid Abul al-Nasr interestingly argued as to the reasons for the clampdown: "[One] interpretation is that fear of the expansion and growth of the Islamic current prompted this campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood to contain or stem this growth. There are those who say that the dialogue and the tendency to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood from it required the creation of reasons or climates to persuade the parties participating in the dialogue to oppose the righteous Islamic current. Others say that the Lawyers Association's events in which the Muslim Brotherhood played no part, have led to the escalation of the campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood. Those holding this view cite the government newspapers' race to attack the Muslim Brotherhood and to accuse it of various charges, including that it was behind the Lawyers Association's events to embarrass the regime.... Those who hold this view say that the campaign has escalated to prepare for an official stand against the various associations and the Islamic presence in them." See "Muslim Brotherhood Leader Interviewed," al-Safir, 28 June 1994, as reported by FBIS, 12 July 1994, p. 16.

(62) "We are Living in a New Era: Interview with President Hosni Mubarak," Der Spiegel (16 May 1994) pp. 142-47, as reported by FBIS, 17 May 1994, p. 11. The linking of the group with terrorism was exploited by the regime partly due to the fact that Madani, whose death the Brotherhood-controlled association had rallied around, was a known lawyer for the radical al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group).

(63) "Muslim Brotherhood Said to Fund Terrorists," MENA, 30 May 1994, as reported by FBIS, 1 June 1994, p. 26.

(64) See, for example, "Prosecutor Detains 8 Muslim Brotherhood Members," Al-Ahali, 8 June 1994, as reported by FBIS, 13 June 1994, p. 15.

(65) Mary Anne Weaver, "The Novelist and the Sheikh," The New Yorker, 30 January 1995, p. 67.

(66) The al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) is one of the primary radical Islamist groups seeking the violent overthrow the present regime.

(67) "Security Chief on `Terrorism,' Muslim Brotherhood," al-Ahali, 22 March 1995, p. 6, as reported by FBIS, 30 March 1995, p. 19.

(68) "Four Muslim Brotherhood Leaders Arrested," MENA, 30 March 1995, as reported by FBIS, 31 March 1995, p. 10.

(69) ibid.

(70) Interview with Seif al-Islam Hassan al-Banna, Cairo, 19 November 1995.

(71) The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, "Democracy Jeopardized: The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights Account of Egyptian Parliamentary Elections 1995," December 1995, p. 14.

(72) ibid, p. 17.

(73) For example, on 5 November 1995 in Port Said, Brotherhood candidate Dr. Akram al-Sha'er was forced to remove campaign signs with the Brotherhood slogan "Islam is the Solution," and replace them with the slogan "Be supporters of God." Sha'er's campaign office was also forcefully entered by security forces two weeks later, who confiscated 8,000 leaflets and numerous placards with "Islam is the Solution" inscribed on them. In Damietta, campaign workers Wa'il al-Abd and Waheed al-Asfouri were arrested and detained for five days by security forces for hanging banners for Brotherhood candidate Abdallah al-Mashad. Ali al-Din Abu al-Fotouh was arrested and detained on 26 November 1995 and held until the elections were over for merely supporting Brotherhood candidate al-Mashad. Finally, on 27 November 1995, in Beni Sweif, police procured from Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Anwar Eddin a list of his elections representatives, who were all subsequently arrested, forcing the candidate to drop out of the election.

(74) The Center for Human Rights Legal Aid, "CHRLA's Final Report on the Legislative Elections in Egypt 1995," December 1995, pp. 2-3.

(75) "Six Members of Muslim Brotherhood Arrested," MENA, 2 October 1995, as reported by FBIS, 3 October 1995.

(76) ibid.

(77) Interview with Mustafa Mashhur, al-Safir, 30 March 1995, p. 10, as reported by FBIS, 5 April 1995, pp. 20-22.

(78) Amina Al-Naqqash, "The Government and the Muslim Brothers," al-Ahali, 1 February 1995, p. 7, as reported by FBIS, 7 February 1995, pp. 32-33.

(79) Interview with Dr. Salim al-Awa, Cairo, 22 November 1995.

(80) Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1994 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994) p. 282.

(81) In 1993, increased harassment and intimidation of local monitors from the EOHR was evidenced by the sporadic detention of representatives in the field and increased surveillance of their activities. By 1994, with the regime under constant pressure from international and local rights groups for mounting abuses -- primarily against radical Islamists -- the state upped the pressure on local NGOs, confiscating EOHR's annual human rights report and preventing its distribution within Egypt in September 1994, while at the same time undertaking a harsh media campaign against rights groups, calling them sympathetic to terrorists and giving hints to their short future in 1995. As of December 1995, many Egyptian human rights advocates anticipated a pending move by the state to eliminate their presence.

(82) Khaled Dawoud and Omayma Abdel-Latif, "Dovish Hawk to Guide Brotherhood," Al-Ahram Weekly, 25-31 January 1996, p. 2.

(83) Excerpt from Al-Hayah (no date) as cited in Mideast Mirror, 24 January 1996.

(84) Dawoud and Abdel-Latif, p. 2.

(85) Fatemah Farag, "New Guide for the Brotherhood," Middle East Times, 28 January - 3 February 1996, p. 20.

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Title Annotation:	Egypt, Hosni Mubarak
Author:	Campagna, Joel
Publication:	Journal of International Affairs
Date:	Jun 22, 1996
Words:	9787
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