Printer Friendly

From Yugoslavia via Germany back to Croatia? The "return-paradigm" in migration policies with regard to labour migration from socialist Yugoslavia/Croatia to the FR Germany and political transition.

Zvonimir Kanjir came to Stuttgart on 5 August 1970 where he was welcomed and celebrated as the "500,000th guestworker of Baden-Wurttemberg" and he was given a portable (!) radio. He would have never thought that 20 years would pass from the day of his arrival to Germany until his return to home.

Probably he also could not have imagined that even 35 years later he would be invited again, this time officially, to come to Germany. This time not as a labourforce, but rather as a "guest of honor". In 2005 the offcials of Stuttgart (1) publicly welcomed Zvonimir Kanjir as a representative of all labour migrants to thank them for their contribution to the "economic miracle" of post-war Germany. Mr. Kanjir seemed to enjoy this late appreciation of his labour migration: "I'm now coming to Germany really as a guest and not as a guestworker. To visit Germany as a guest is a nice feeling", he said in an interview with SWR International. (2)

Zvonimir Kanjir's jubilee stay in 2005 brought back into mind how solemnly the arrivals of "jubilee guestworkers" had been put into limelight as well as the general welcoming atmosphere the labour-migrants had experienced during the recruitment-era from the 1960s until 1973/74 in Germany. However, Mr. Kanjir recalled in an interview that in the course of time he had felt more and more like a citizen of "second-class" while he was living in Germany: "The company was not doing well. Occasionally the staff had hostile attitudes. It was not like it used to be. I could not stand it any longer." Grappling with health problems Zvonimir Kanjir finally returned to his family in 1989 and passed away in 2008 in Croatia.

Nineteen-year old Vera Rimski from Novi Sad was also put in the limelight unexpectedly, when she was welcomed in 1972 on the main train station of Munich as the "two million jubilee-guestworker". The President of the German Federal Labour Office, Josef Stingl, gave her a portable (!) television - with the hope that she will find her way into the secrets of the difficult German language, as he stated publicly. (3) But only a few years later Vera Rimski had turned her back on Germany and returned to the SFR Yugoslavia still in her twenties.

The societies of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Croatia, as well as the other republics of the former socialist Yugoslavia had been experiencing sustained demographic transitions due to the mass movement of people searching labour in the industrial centre of Western Europe since the 1960s. At the beginning of the German-Yugoslav labour migration process, the temporariness of stay in Germany was an assumption the recruiting country Germany and the sending one, Yugoslavia, as well as most labour migrants had been sharing for a while. For decades labour migration was commonly seen as a linear process that was supposed to end with the final return to the one and only "homeland". But in the 1990s the socialist Yugoslav state collapsed; since then the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and later Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo had become independent states. New citizenships were granted and passports issued by the new governments - not only for citizens living within the territorial borders of the new nation-states but also for fellow nationals living abroad. New migration or diaspora policies have been formulated addressing not any more "Yugoslav workers temporarily employed abroad" and their families but rather co-nationals, who since the 1990s have been commonly perceived as national diasporas of the respective nation and nation-state. (4) The fellow citizens abroad have been included in politics and discourse of national belonging and identity in the new origin states in transition. Emigrants became target groups in electoral campaigns of political parties and constituencies and Ministries for Diaspora/Emigration have been established in order to integrate citizens living abroad into the political system of the new nation-state. (5) Also, the political engagement and financial contributions which migrants invested in homeland affairs were distinctive features of emerging nationalism and nation-state building in former Yugoslavia. (6)

This article stresses the significance of the "return-paradigm" of migration policies with regard to the German-Yugoslav labour migration process and political transition focusing on Croatia. From a transnational point of view I will give thought to the notion of "return" as a political and ideological "believe-system" on the macro level, which is, within the framework of the labour migration politics of the respective states, the FR Germany, the SFR Yugoslavia and the successor state Republic of Croatia.

The significance of return in German-Yugoslav labour migration policies

During the recruitment era portable receivers such as the radio and the TV for the jubilees Zvonimir Kanjir and Vera Rimski seemed to be the perfect welcome-presents for labour migrants whose stay was supposed to be limited in time and their willingness to return was taken for granted.

And indeed - both above mentioned jubilee "Gastarbeiter"(7) can be seen as representatives of the first generation of labour migrants from the former Yugoslavia in Germany, who at the beginning of their migration had vastly the intention to return to their homeland, be it next year or one day. Still in 1985 more than 86 % of the migrants from Yugoslavia who had been interviewed had definite plans to return to their country of origin, but without being able to set a time for that. (8)

The described scenes of the guestworkers-jubilees mirror the zeitgeist of the German-Yugoslav recruitment era (1968-1973) when labour migrations for a certain period of time were politically mediated and controlled by officials of the recruiting and sending states. Considering that taking up an employment in Germany became a mass phenomenon in all Yugoslav Republics, particularly in the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the German-Yugoslav labour migration process can be best described as a "labour-force export" on rails and wheels. There were even especially organized trains for labour migrants e. g. from Zagreb and Belgrade to Munich (9), and the prominent "Hellas-" (10) or "Acropolis-" (11) Express that rolled regularly from Greece via Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria to the FR Germany. Also several bus lines and family travels by car made it possible that thousands of Yugoslav citizens holding passports physically crossed the boarders of socialist Yugoslavia to take up employment or to join their family members abroad.

Yugoslav labour migration peaked in 1973, when approximately one million Yugoslavs left the country. (12) Most labour migrants were young people from the agrarian sector; whilst people with higher education emigrated less often. (13) While in 1948, the agricultural population made up 67.2 % of the total Yugoslav population, by 1961 it had decreased to 52.9 % and due to massive labour emigration the agricultural population had dropped to 36.4 % in 1971. (14) Labour migration immensely relieved pressures on the reform-shaken Yugoslav labour market.

Also a few thousand political opponents of the Communist regime, who had fled directly after World War II or later, took refuge in West-Germany. In distinction to the supposed preliminary stay of labour migrants with Yugoslav passports, the stay of "political emigrants" had a permanent or at least longitudinal character, as their returning "home" was forbidden by the Yugoslav authorities or too dangerous because of political persecution.

Employers in the FR Germany had the highest demand for workers from Yugoslavia especially during the period of open boarders when Yugoslav citizens were searching a job in Western European countries. After the recruitment ban the German-Yugoslav migration process still continued and included other social groups apart from labourers, as the immigration to Germany for family reunification during the 1970s and 1980s was allowed to spouses and children who wanted to join their bread-earners' life abroad.

However, before the trains and busses full of labour force from Yugoslavia could roll on rails and highways to the FR Germany, ideological and political bilateral obstacles had to be overcome. To understand the ideological significance and overture of the German-Yugoslav labour migration policies of the 1960s it is important to recall that the Yugoslav communist's attitude towards labour migration as well as the political bilateral relations between the FR Germany and Yugoslavia in the 1950s until 1968 were rather negative. In fact until 1962, the ruling Communist Party under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito condemned labour migration as being illegal. Despite its ideological disapproval unemployment and labour emigration in Yugoslavia after World War II had been rising. People who had left socialist Yugoslavia for economic reasons were treated like enemies of the state, as their departure could not be accepted or justified as it contradicted sociopolitical norms. (15)

After the Yugoslav communists broke with the Soviet Union and thus had been suspended from the Cominform in 1948, they gradually adopted a new, more independent course towards socialism, which would be known as "Titoism". In socialist Yugoslavia this was the time of great changes. Regarding foreign affairs, Yugoslavia became one of the leading powers of the Non-Aligned-Movement. Internally the Yugoslav communists gave increasing powers to the republics and lessened their central control over the economy. By the mid 1960s the Yugoslav regime surprised the world again by opening its borders to unemployed citizens and legalizing migration to western industrial capitalist countries. (16)

Yugoslav sending- and German recruitment policy had interrelated aspects in economic and also political international relations. First of all, German immigration-and Yugoslav emigration-policy reacted to the needs of the international labour market. Since the German labour market had not been able to satisfy the huge demand for labour force, the German employers' recruitment strategy for low-paid employees constantly reached beyond the state border. After recruiting workers from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco, the German government signed its last recruitment agreement with Yugoslavia on 12 October 1968, ensuring that cheap labour from a socialist country would enter the FR Germany in huge numbers with legal status, social insurance and a temporary, non-immigrant status.

Apart from economic reasons, political international relations between Germany and Yugoslavia stimulated the experiment with "temporary" labour transfers from a socialist into a western industrial country. Basically, the German government preferred recruitment agreements with states in amity. When Germany first applied the "Hallstein Doctrine" to Tito's Yugoslavia in 1957, because of Tito's recognition of the German Democratic Republic, all diplomatic relations ceased for the next eleven years until 1968. It was not until 1966 when the new "Ostpolitik" of foreign minister Willy Brandt required an improvement of relations with non-aligned Yugoslavia by negotiating a recruitment agreement which was long desired by the Yugoslav government. (17) Based on the principle of "change through rapprochement", the German government reestablished diplomatic relations with SFR Yugoslavia in January 1968 and signed the recruitment agreement just a few months later in October.

The reinterpretation and liberalization of labour migration by political decision makers enabled the Yugoslav government and administration to organize, control, and legally protect the complete act of migration. Henceforth, labour migration was communicated as a supporting measure of an economic consolidation of the Yugoslav self-managing system. When labour migration became ideologically compatible, the Yugoslav government supported it by signing bilateral agreements, first with France (1965), then with Austria and Sweden (1966), the Federal Republic of Germany (1968), and finally with Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Australia (1970).

The former ideological disapproval of emigration was not seriously called into question by the new liberal labour migration stance of the regime of the Yugoslav "workers-state" due to the adopted return-paradigm of European labour migration policy during the recruitment era that gave labour migration the mark of temporariness. In fact the legalization of labour migration was introduced in 1962 with an amnesty-law that allowed the visits and returns of thousands of economic refugees, who had left Yugoslavia since 1945 apart from political enemies such as "collaborators, spies and war criminals". (18) Until 1973 the Yugoslav state focused on the increase of labor migration, whereas since the recruitment ban of the West European countries in 1973 the focus of Yugoslav labour migration policy started to shift to reintegration measures for returning migrants. Repatriation became a realistic scenario and Yugoslav politicians started to take into consideration the possibility of labour migrants "seriously coming back", as Sara Bernard points out. (19) Since 1973 the Yugoslav state had to deal with an increasing number of returnees, who did not receive a prolongation of their working contracts. Nevertheless the remigration trend was modest and had a downward orientation until the breakup of Yugoslavia, as the Yugoslav labour market had never been able to offer work to those thousands of people "working abroad temporarily".

With the end of the recruitment and sending migration policy, Yugoslav authorities started to consider emigration more critically, and in political discussions negative aspects of enduring emigration were stressed. The League of the Communist Party reassessed labour migration as a problem for national safety and social development. (20) Emigration of qualified workers, disaffection of migrants' children to their homeland, and a rapid drop in available conscripts were mentioned as negative consequences of labour migration, which was increasingly perceived as social loss of human resources. The Yugoslav authorities soon noticed that long-term ties between the Yugoslav state and its emigrants, which should guarantee their willingness to return one day, could be promoted more efficiently with cultivating their cultural and national feelings of belonging rather than to appeal to their class consciousness. The Yugoslav state underlined the responsibility of its political social forces for the return of the migrants by issuing regulations, social agreements and measure catalogues including regional development plans, the possibility of buying a workplace with foreign exchange, tax benefits for self-employed, premiums and tax politics tailored to the particular needs of returnees. (21) Another prominent but unsuccessful initiative of the Yugoslav remigration policy was the formation of "returnee companies" or "foreign-exchange enterprises" that had been founded with the financial aid of labour migrants from abroad in regions usually with a high unemployment and emigration rate. (22)

To keep up or to establish transnational bonds between Yugoslavia and the labour migrants communities, the government passed a series of resolutions to reinforce self-management of Yugoslav social clubs abroad. In addition to that, especially trained teaching staff was sent abroad to give supplementary mother tongue instructions to the labour migrants' children. Often this teaching lessons which were given separately to Slovene-, Albanian-, Macedonian- and Serbo-Croatian or Croatian-Serbian-speaking classes once a week, also included political propaganda. The political goals of this transnational engagement of the Yugoslav state in Germany was to protect and develop the national and cultural identity of Yugoslav citizens abroad in order to prevent them from total assimilation, to keep labour migrants away from the political influence of political exiles and to foster their willingness for repatriation and prepare their reintegration into the Yugoslav society.

Keeping up transnational ties of labour migrants was also financially paying off for Titos Yugoslavia since labour migration as a mass phenomenon had occurred. The economic significance of remittances which helped to alleviate poverty and to pay for imports mostly from Germany was an incentive for both, the Yugoslav and German policymakers, to foster temporary emigration and to promote the attachment of labour migrants to their home country. In this respect, the Yugoslav transfer of workers not only affected the German and Yugoslav domestic economy, but also improved external trade between the two states.

Summing up, Germany as the recruiting and Yugoslavia as the sending state shared the common assumption of the "temporary nature" of labour migration, which justified their workers' transfer in public but lacked a sustainable economic foundation. The short-sighted economic interests that demand and foster labor migration on a temporary basis are obvious: the recruiting country counts on low integration costs and the sending country benefits from the remittances as the materialized form of connections maintained with the homeland.

Furthermore, the political interest of communicating labour migration as a working stay for the time being which will find its end with the "final return", was of high ideological importance which is reflected in the labour migration terminology used by the Yugoslav authorities. The term "Radnik na privremenom radu u inozemstvu" (worker who is temporarily working abroad) was commonly used by Yugoslav officials for labour migrants with the possessive pronoun - "our" workers working abroad temporarily - suggesting that the Yugoslav worker abroad was still an "organic part" of the working class of Yugoslavia. By giving the emigrated population a collective name, the government pressed its claim on the citizens abroad, emphasizing that their labour migration was temporary and that the party attached great importance to their return. The ideological legitimation in stressing labour migrants' belonging to the Yugoslav society implied that their status in the western countries and their final return was not a private matter but one concerning the whole socialist society. (23) It also distinguished labour migrants semantically from political dissidents or exiles.

On the other hand the "return paradigm" of the Yugoslav labour migration policy matched with the guideline of German migration policy that Germany is not an immigration country. Consequently, in public and political discourse the foreign labour migrants were not perceived as permanent settlers in their new homeland Germany, rather, their assumed return to their country of origin was not questioned for decades. Workers from Yugoslavia were functionally labeled as "Yugoslav employees" by German ministerial bureaucracy, whereas in public the term "Gastarbeiter" was common, which emphasized their status as welcomed guests who were expected to work hard and leave when their (wo)manpower was no longer needed. Following this guideline of not being an immigrant country, German policymakers formed a policy for foreigners, which concentrated on the one hand on the integration of migrants and their families but on the other hand supported their willingness and preparedness for repatriation.

Even if the direct repatriation measures, such as repatriation grants (24) for labour migrants were of less benefit, the labour migrants were given clear signals that their return-plans to their homeland was fully supported by the host-country, which cooperated institutionally with the Yugoslav state to foster the migrants repatriation. For example, Yugoslav labour migrants had the possibility to attend professional trainings organized by Yugoslav trade schools in Germany to facilitate their reintegration to the Yugoslav labour market. Furthermore, their children were offered additional or even, as in the Bavarian case, full time national Yugoslav classes to keep them capable for repatriation. In addition to that, migrants could take advantage of official advisory service in case they intended to return to their country of origin. (25)

Apart from direct or legal repatriation facilities, there were also indirect ones such as giving preference to German citizens when filling vacancies, hindering family reunification as well as xenophobic attitudes of some politicians and parts of society. (26) Altogether, as Schmidt-Fink puts it, the German return policy without a coherent integration policy until the end of the 1990s must have created a picture to migrants of not being welcome in Germany in the long run. (27) The political refusal to integrate the foreign workers on a long term basis, worked in favour of the Yugoslav government's aim to keep the labour migrants loyal, be it for economic or political reasons.

In the medium and long run the "temporary labour migration" from Yugoslavia to Germany turned into immigration and the status of labour migrants changed from "temporary foreign labourers" to legal residents with permanent residence permits. Rights and protections for foreigners in Germany which were granted by the German courts counteracted the political aversions to permanent immigration of foreigners. (28) In fact, in the last decades of the 20th century it became apparent that the German economy has become increasingly dependent on the labour of the former and new coming migrants; the new ones being more diverse in culture and social characteristics than the former labour migrants of the 1960s. (29)

Political transition and return policy in Croatia of the 1990s

The temporary character of labour migration turned out to be an illusion for many migrants as well as a political myth for the German and Yugoslav societies. The Yugoslav economy was not able to recover and the debt crisis worsened resulting in the economic collapse in the late 1980s. With the economic downfall and the proceeding political disintegration of the Yugoslav state in the 1980s the return paradigm concerning labour migration was more and more questioned by politicians and Yugoslav migration researchers.

Nevertheless, after the break-up of the League of the Communist Party and the Yugoslav state in 1991, the political reconnection of emigrated citizens and their integration into the concepts of society and nation remained to be distinct features of migration policy in the successor states. While politicians were discussing the new contours of the nation and the borders of the nation-state, new political agendas also implied that the emigrant communities in western countries could be part of that nation, too.

In the Republic of Croatia the first political party that detected the financial potential of the emigrants was the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the first ruling party (April 1990-January 2000) under the leadership of President Franjo Tudjman. Tudjman and other HDZ politicians, such as the later president Stipe Mesic, frequently travelled abroad and gathered supporters along with large financial contributions in Croatian emigrant communities. Party branches in 16 U.S. cities were built overnight, only a few months after the foundation of the party in Croatia in 1989. (30) The first HDZ branch in Germany was founded in September 1989 in Bruchsal, Baden-Wurttemberg; more branches followed in 90 more cities.

The new political interpretation of the history of migration of Croats living abroad gave up the ideological dichotomy of political and labour migrants, subsuming all U origin under the heading "national diaspora" or "iseljenistvo" (emigration). The exiles, who had been stigmatized as class enemies for decades during Yugoslav times, were receiving public attention and were treated as saviors or prophets of the national ???? dream----- of independence and democracy. (31) In general, the new Croatian authorities considered emigration a demographic problem - mainly seen as a source of loss for which the Communist regime and its extensive emigration policy against the Croatian people were made responsible.

Even if the premise of temporariness of the labour migrants stay was revealed to be a political myth of the former regime during the early transformation process in the 1990s, the return paradigm of migration policies was not called into question but rather given priority to national migration policy. As early as 1989, the presidency in Zagreb called for legal and political guarantees and a safe return home for all Croatian emigrants, no matter what their political orientation or belonging was. (32) Moreover, the unification of the home nation with its expatriates was a main electoral issue of Tudjman's party and the HDZ expanded its election campaign to the USA, Canada and other Western European countries. The strategy of political mobilization was tied to the "vision of return", as the new government imagined the Croatian emigrants as a divided part of the nation. (33) After the outbreak of the war in Croatia in 1991, the homeland was calling more frequently and intensely. On 17 May, the committees coordinating the HDZ in Croatia and abroad called on emigrated fellow nationals to inform the worldwide public about what was going on in Croatia and requested, rather solemn in tone, for "moral and material backup and preparation for a return to the homeland to defend it against the Serbian-communist aggressors". (34) The new HDZ government even founded a Department of Emigration where deserving returnees were employed.

In addition, the term "Croatian Diaspora" became increasingly popular in the public discourse. The national-religious label "Diaspora" offers a collective term for the unification of all the Croat emigrants, be they labour migrants, political emigrants, or even their descendents with foreign passports. Sasa Bozic states that even some groups are termed diaspora although they would never use the same description. (35)

On the one hand, in national discourse, the term ????---- connotes ties with the homeland and stresses the victim status of the Croatian emigrants who were "forced" to leave the country during communist rule. On the other hand, the term emphasizes the loss of an integral part of the nation, the dispersion of Croats all over the world, and, consequently, the final "redemption" of their comeback, as the government of independent Croatia in the 1990s held a negative view of the occurred long term emigration.

The existence of a large Croatian "diaspora" appeared as both - a blessing and a curse. While the new government of the Republic of Croatia and the war-torn society benefited from high amounts of remittances and humanitarian aid sent by the migrants, the politicians rhetorically lamented the division of the "national corpus" and the demographic loss. Repatriation of migrants of Croatian origin and their descendents was seen as a national goal to improve the inflow of human and economic capital but concrete measures for fostering and regulating repatriation were missing. (36)

Still, the Department of Emigration listed that during 1991 to 1998, 45 967 persons returned to Croatia peaking in 1992, whereas migration researchers of the Ivo Pilar Institute assume that between 1990-1997, 24 414 persons returned, most of them from Germany. (37)

To recap, the return paradigm of the Yugoslav sending- and the German recruiting labour migration policy even took effect on the new migration policy concerning former labour migrants of the successor states, as the Croatian example shows. In the Yugoslav workers' state the belief system of a "final return" of the labour migrants served to overcome the ideological contradiction of being both - a socialist and an emigration country for labourers. Correspondingly, in Germany the return paradigm served policy makers to keep the myth alive that Germany is not turning into an "immigration-country", because political mainstream parties mentally had been visualizing Germany as a "homeland" - meaning a place to settle down for good - only for ethnic Germans until officially proven otherwise in 2001 by the Sussmuth Commission Report to the German Government that stressed the immigrant character of German society in presence and future. And even the ideology of Croatian nationalism, imagining one "national corpus" of all ethnic Croats, could not abide the division between the "homeland" and "diaspora", without the idea of the final return of its co-ethnics.

The return paradigm in labour migration policies from the guest-workers' programmes soon lacked economic grounding as "temporary workers were being recruited to meet permanent labour demand" (38) and origin states became depended on remittances sent by labour migrants. But the idea of final returns sustained in the political perceptions of labour migration in the first decade after the independence of Croatia, because it still affirmed the assumption of social and national belonging of migrants to the ancestral homeland or nation.

Since the beginning of the new millennium, German politicians have been acknowledging more and more the immigrant character of German society. In Croatia the recurrent dispute of political parties to include or exclude migrants from elections has been accompanied by the migrants' realization that the origin state more and more abdicates its responsibility for their fortune.

The return paradigm specifying the migration policy of the residence- and origin state with regard to the former labour migrants and their descendents of Croatian origin has been given up. Instead, international migration policy guidelines are followed, which emphasize the importance of border-crossing/transnational social networks of migrants.

Anyhow, many of the former labour migrants from Yugoslavia did return, but many more stayed. The German statistical data from 2005 shows that people, who had emigrated from the former Yugoslavia, formed the second largest foreign population in Germany, with 963 000 persons, most of them former labour migrants from the 1950s to the 1970s and their descendents. On average, people from Slovenia have been living in Germany (2005) for 27.7 years, from Croatia 24.7 years, from Macedonia 17.2 years, from Bosnia and Herzegovina 17.1 years and Serbia and Montenegro 14.4 years. (39)

It cannot be dismissed that the even lives of the ones who stayed were structured by the vision of return. The most obvious example is that most of the former Yugoslav labour migrants built their houses in their country of origin to settle down one day. As Jasna Capo Zmegac found out in her longitudanal studies about transnational relations of Croatian labour migrants in Munich, the lifelong return plans fostered transnational practices and even bi-local family constructions. (40)

These days, when a multitude of former labour migrants from Croatia retire, the question of their return to the country of origin is still a current topic. Although the quantity of remigration of labour migrants is difficult to estimate validly on the basis of official statistics of the FR Germany as well as Yugoslav and Croatian statistics (41), empirical studies about migration and remigration of former labour migrants from Germany to Croatia confirm that the question of return still matters and that remigration or commuter migration is often taking place when the retirement age of the former labour migrants is reached.

(1.) Stuttgart is the capital of Baden-Wurttemberg in southern Germany and 40 % of its residents and 64 % of the children below the age of five years have a migrational background.

(2.) 40. Jahrestag. 500.000 "Gastarbeiter", SWR International, see, 12.2.2011

(3.) GroBer Bahnhof fur Vera Rimski aus Novi Sad, Suddeutsche Zeitung, 9.3.1972.

(4.) See Karolina Novinscak, Gekommen, um zu gehen? Transnationale Lebensverlaufe und Grenzen ihrer statistischen Erfassung am Beispiel deutsch-kroatischer (Re)Migration, in: Ulf Brunnbauer, Karolina Novinscak, Christian Voss (Hrsg.): Gesellschaften in Bewegung. Emigration aus und Immigration nach Sudosteuropa in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, SOI Jahrbuch, Munchen 2011, pp. 93-123.

(5.) See Francesco Ragazzi, Kristina Balalovska, Diaspora Politics and Post-Territorial Citizenship in Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia, CITSEE Working Paper Series, 2011/18.

(6.) See Hockenos, Paul: Homeland calling. Exile patriotism and the Balkan wars. New York 2003.

(7.) In the FR Germany using the term "Gastarbeiter" (guestworkers) to denote former labour migrants is no longer accurate, as many former "guests" have become permanent residents. Instead the supposed politically correct term "people with migratory background" is used. Nevertheless the term "Gastarbeiter" is still popular, as it is used to denote labour migrants usually employed on manual labour e.g. in some contemporary English (gastarbeiter), Greek (gastarbajiter / gkastarmpaA iter) and Russian (gastarbajter / TacTapbahTep) texts. It even lives on in the languages of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, where it is spelled "gastarbajteri" or "gastici/gastosi" and mostly refers to former labour migrants and their descendents.

(8.) Ivo Baucic, Bernd Gro[beta], Ruckkehr und Reintegration jugoslawischer Arbeitnehmer aus der Bundesrepublik, Bonn 1987, p. 158.

(9.) See Documentary film of Krsto Papic: Special Trains. Documentary. Zagreb Film, 1971.

(10.) The "Hellas-Express" was the first direct railway connection between the FR Germany and Greece via SFR Yugoslavia from 1963 to 1991.

(11.) The "Acropolis-Express" run daily from Athens to Munich via SFR Yugoslavia and Austria from 1967 to 1991, since 1978/79 passing through Kosovo with a stop in Fushe Kosova (serb.: Kosovo polje)

(12.) See Schierup, Carl-Ulrik: Migration, Socialism, International Division of Labour. Aldershot 1990, p. 102, tab. 5.

(13.) Kunne, Wilfried: Die AuBenwanderung jugoslawischer Arbeitskrafte. Ein Beitrag zur Analyse internationaler Arbeitskraftewanderungen. Konigstein 1979, pp. 136-137, 161-162.

(14.) Baucic, Ivo: Die Auswirkungen der Arbeitskraftewanderung in Jugoslawien, in: Lohrmann, Reinhard/ Manfrass, Klaus: Auslanderbeschaftigung und internationale Politik. Zur Analyse transnationaler Sozialprozesse. Munchen 1974, pp. 171-206, p. 180, tab. 8, p. 181.

(15.) See Baucic, Ivo: Stanje vanjskih migracija iz Jugoslavije krajem sedamdesetih godina. In: Rasprave o migracijama 57 (1979). Zagreb: Centar za istrazivanje migracija, p. 7.

(16.) Karolina Novinscak, The Recruiting and Sending of Yugoslav "Gastarbeiter" to Germany: Between Socialist Demands and Economic Needs, in: Brunnbauer, Ulf (ed.), Transnational Societies, Transterritorial Politics, Munchen, 2009, p. 121-143.

(17.) See Karen Schonwalder, Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralitat. Politische Entscheidungen und offentliche Debatten in Gro[beta]britannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren, Essen 2001, pp. 343f., 365; Monika Mattes, "Gastarbeiterinnen" in der Bundesrepublik. Anwerbepolitik, Migration und Geschlecht in den 50er bis 70er Jahren, Frankfurt a.M. 2005, p. 53; Senad Hadzic, Titos "Gastarbeiter". Hintergrunde und Ursachen des Anwerbeabkommens zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Jugoslawien, in: Dietmar Neutatz/Volker Zimmermann (eds.), Die Deutschen und das ostliche Europa, Essen 2006, pp. 103-114; Heike Knortz, Diplomatische Tauschgeschafte. "Gastarbeiter" in der westdeutschen Diplomatie und Beschaftigungspolitik 1953-1973, Koln 2008, pp. 140-152; Novinscak, The Recruiting and Sending of Yugoslav "Gastarbeiter", pp.129-140.

(18.) Archiv der Gegenwart (ADG) 9738/C, 14.3.1962.

(19.) Bernard, Sara, The return of the Yugoslav Gastarbeiters Home, a chronological division, Paper to the workshop "Labour Migration and Transnationalism in Europe - Contemporary and Historical Perspectives" at the Sudost-Institut, Regensburg, 10-11 December 2010, see Forschungsplattform Sudosteuropa,, Themenportal "Migration und Transnationalismus",

(20.) See Mesic, Milan, Drustveni razvitak i vanjske migracije u posljeratnoj Jugoslaviji. In: Vanjske migracije I drustveni razvitak, Zagreb 1991, p. 25, fn. 17.

(21.) See Baucic / Gro[beta], Ruckkehr und Reintegration jugoslawischer Arbeitnehmer, p. 94f.

(22.) See Jenny Winterhagen, Die Pioniere von Imotski. Die Verwendung von remittances am Beispiel des ehemaligen Jugoslawien, in: Brunnbauer, Novinscak, Voss (eds.): Gesellschaften in Bewegung, pp. 61-92.

(23.) See Mesic, p. 20.

(24.) From 1983 to 1984 every jobless foreigner was given a repatriation grant of 10,500 DM plus 1,500 DM for every repatriating child from the German state. See Martin Frey, Direkte und indirekte Ruckkehrforderung seitens der Aufnahmelander. Uberblick, in: Korner /Mehrlander, Die "neue" Auslanderpolitik, pp. 15-63, p. 19.

(25.) See Ekkehart Schmidt-Fink, Historische Erfahrungen mit Remigration und Ruckkehrpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge (Hg.), Ruckkehr aus Deutschland. Forschungsstudie 2006 im Rahmen des Europaischen Migrationsnetzwerks. Nurnberg 2006, pp. 239-297, p. 261.

(26.) Frey, Direkte und indirekte Ruckkehrforderung, p. 28.

(27.) Ekkehart Schmidt-Fink, Historische Erfahrungen mit Remigration und Ruckkehrpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge (Hg.), Ruckkehr aus Deutschland. Forschungsstudie 2006 im Rahmen des Europaischen Migrationsnetzwerks. Nurnberg 2006, p. 239-297, p. 259.

(28.) See Bade, Klaus J. (ed.) (2007): Enzyklopadie Migration in Europa. Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart. Paderborn, p. 161.

(29.) Stephen Castles, Back to the Future? Can Europe meet its Labour Needs through Temporary Migration? Working Paper No. 1 (2006), p.6.

(30.) See Cizmic, Ivan/Sopta, Marin/Sakic, Vlado: Iseljena Hrvatska, Zagreb 2005, p. 437.

(31.) See Grdesic, Ivan: Building the state: Actors and Agendas. In: Siber, Ivan (ed.): The 1990 and 1992/1993 Sabor Elections in Croatia. Berlin 1997, p. 110.

(32.) See Cizmic, Iseljena Hrvatska, p. 436.

(33.) Novinscak, From "Yugoslav Gastarbeiter" to "Diaspora-Croats", p.141.

(34.) Cizmic, Iseljena Hrvatska, p. 436.

(35.) Bozic, Sasa: From Diaspora to Transnation and back: Croatian migrant institutions and the (re-)making of Croatia. In: Riegler, Henriette (ed.): Beyond the Territory within the Nation. Baden-Baden 2005, p. 36.

(36.) Sasa Bozic, Strengthening cross border cooperation in the Western Balkans regarding migration management. Croatia, in: Vladimir Petronijevic (Hg.), Migration Flows in Southeast Europe. A Compendium of National Perspectives. Belgrad 2007, pp. 11-42, p. 21.

(37.) See Ivan Cizmic, Drazen Zivic, Vanjske migracije stanovnistva Hrvatske - kriticki osvrt, in: Drazen Zivic (Hg.), Stanovnistvo Hrvatske - dosadasnji razvoj i perspective. Zagreb 2005, 57-69, p. 66f.

(38.) Castles, p. 3.

(39.) See Bundesamt fur Migration und Fluchtlinge (ed.): Migration, Asyl und Integration in Zahlen. Nurnberg 2006, p. 83, table 29.

(40.) Capo Zmegac, Trajna privremenost, pp. 255-273.

(41.) Novinscak, Gekommen, um zu gehen? Transnationale Lebensverlaufe und Grenzen ihrer statistischen Erfassung am Beispiel deutsch-kroatischer (Re)Migration pp. 97-121.

Karolina Novinscak, University of Regensburg.
COPYRIGHT 2011 Macedonian Information Centre
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2011 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Title Annotation:Socio-Economic & Demographic Phenomena
Author:Novinscak, Karolina
Publication:Crossroads Foreign Policy Journal
Article Type:Report
Geographic Code:4EXCR
Date:Sep 1, 2011
Previous Article:Humane and well managed migration benefits all.
Next Article:Migration and population decline in post-communist Romania.

Terms of use | Privacy policy | Copyright © 2021 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters |