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Faculty and administrators' attitudes toward potential conflicts of interest, commitment, and equity in university-industry relationships.

In the 1940s the federal government began awarding grants and contracts for significant amounts of money to academic researchers who pursued paths of national as well as scholarly interest (Smith, 1990). During the post-World War II years, the conduct of research through federal sponsorship became a source of prestige and autonomy within the academic profession. In the mid-1970s the federal share of academic research funding began to decrease, and faculty and administrators began to look for other sources of funding. At the same time, business leaders voiced concern that governmental regulations, restrictions, and processes were impending their ability to compete in the global marketplace. In the 1980s the U.S. government responded by encouraging increased cooperation between universities and firms, allowing universities to hold patents on federally sponsored research and financing research projects in which universities and firms were both active participants (Campbell, 1995, 1997; Campbell & Slaughter, 1999; Slaughter & Rhoades, 1996). Although the academic and industrial sectors had worked together on a limited basis before 1980, over the past fifteen years, collaborative relationships have intensified, and increasing numbers of academics are seeking ways to position themselves close to the commercial marketplace.

Ample literature has tracked this activity between academics and industry, particularly since the late 1970s (Blumenthal, Campbell, Anderson, Causino, & Louis, 1997; Blumenthal, Campbell, Causino, & Louis, 1996a, 1996b; Blumenthal, Epstein, & Maxwell, 1986; Blumenthal, Gluck, Louis, & Wise, 1986a, 1986b; Bowie, 1994; Braxton & Bayer, 1996; Dooris & Fairweather, 1994; Etzkowitz, 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993; Fairweather, 1988, 1989, 1993; Fassin, 1991; Feller, 1992; Hackett, 1990; Lambright & Rahm, 1992; Lee, 1994, 1995; Louis, Anderson, & Rosenberg, 1995; Louis, Blumenthal, Gluck, & Stoto, 1989; Rahm, 1994a, 1994b; Wood, 1992; Zuckerman, 1993). Those in favor of increased interaction suggest that, for the most part, faculty and administrators(1) approach industry-sponsored research as professionals who strive to maintain Mertonian norms such as rationality, impartiality, and objectivity rather than allow themselves to be influenced by the potential financial gains that might arise from their research. Their discussions focus on the benefits that arise out of university-industry relationships and suggest that most adverse impacts on institutions are anomalous and readily remedied (Bok, 1982; Geisler & Rubenstein, 1989; Peters & Fusfeld, 1982). Those more skeptical of this movement toward the market warn that the potential to generate revenue at personal and institutional levels has had a multifaceted, not always positive, impact on academe. For example, administrators are increasingly treating faculty in the same manner that industrial managers treat their employees and, as a result, faculty are losing ownership of their discoveries and autonomy over their professional lives (Dickson, 1984; Florig, 1986; Luton & Zinke, 1989; Rhoades & Slaughter, 1991a, 1991b; Slaughter, 1990; Slaughter & Rhoades, 1990). Although faculty involvement in collaborative activity is encouraged by federal sponsors and university leaders (Campbell, 1995, 1997), thus far there is neither a large body of university policy nor professional customs and norms that guide and shape entrepreneurial faculty behavior. Administrators, faculty, and business persons are in the process of establishing new entrepreneurial norms, and this provides a unique opportunity to study the reshaping of professional roles as well as the tensions and conflicts that surround such changes.

Some tension between faculty and administrators has been accepted as an enduring part of academic life, but few studies have explored empirically the possibility that differences between the two groups may be amplified when industry enters into the picture. Further, new tensions may arise out of the unique considerations related to universities' ties with for-profit, competitive firms. This study explores areas of possible tension between faculty and administrators engaged in university-industry activity by investigating the key sources from which tensions are most likely to emerge: issues related to potential conflicts of interest (conflict over financial issues, e.g., revenue-generating opportunities through patents and licensing), conflict of commitment (conflict over competing faculty responsibilities, e.g., whether faculty allocate more time to their traditional academic duties or to their industrial sponsor), and conflict over internal equity (conflict over the university's internal distribution of rewards and workload, e.g., whether faculty involved in university-industry activity should spend less time on teaching than those who are not) (Campbell, 1995, 1997). This study looked at the views of academics and administrators not involved in university-industry collaborative activity as well as of those who are, to compare the two groups and place conflict topics in a context that speaks to the university community as a whole. In addition, taking into consideration the research that suggests that disciplinary differences can account for variation in attitudinal response (Braxton & Hagens, 1996), we conducted secondary analyses to explore connections between involvement with a for-profit firm and academic discipline. These analyses provided further insight into differences in perspectives by illuminating similarities and differences in responses based on involvement compared with academic field group.

Research Questions and Theory

The research questions that informed this study were: Do faculty involved in university-industry activity hold views toward topics related to potential conflicts that differ from the views of university administrators similarly involved? If so, in what areas do the two groups disagree and what are the areas of consensus? Are the views of academics not involved in university-industry relations different from the views of those who are? If so, in what areas do academics' perspectives converge and diverge?

A fundamental premise of this study was that universities are seeking resources from industry, at the same time firms are seeking knowledge, know-how, and people from universities. Dollars and knowledge, know-how and people are the resources being exchanged in university-industry connections. Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer, 1994; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), suggests that organizations, and the units within them, are engaged in an enduring competition over scarce resources. Conflicts and struggles to obtain these resources are an ongoing part of organizational life. Institutions, agencies, or groups that control and allocate these resources have the power to decide who will prosper and who will not. Individuals and organizations contending for resources build coalitions and shape their actions and reactions in an effort to increase their share of the resources or to sustain organizational activity (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). Since the 1980s the decline in federal and state share of funds for universities has intensified faculty's and administrators's quest for resources. Universities are seeking to maintain and increase external funding, especially revenue streams (e.g., research dollars) that maximize prestige(2) (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). As the proportion of federal funds for basic research decreased relative to the total support a university received for research and development (R&D), sponsorship from industry became more important. University-industry partnerships often center on research that involves cutting-edge work in high technology fields deemed essential to global competition (Campbell, 1995; Campbell & Slaughter, 1995; Slaughter & Rhoades, 1996). Thus, monies for research connected to highly valued market areas are substituted for dollars lost from support for basic R&D.(3) Industry sponsorship becomes, in Pfeffer & Salancik's terms, a critical resource necessary to sustain the external revenues and prestige of research universities.

Whereas resource dependency theory was used to understand the incentive to enter into relationships, professionalization theories were utilized to hypothesize a difference between the perspectives of administrators and faculty. Theories of professionalization examine "monopolies obtained through various forms of licensure and accreditation and the effects these have on control over expert knowledge, focusing on professions as a whole (Slaughter & Leslie 1997)." These theories involve several interconnected ideas (Abbott, 1990; Bok, 1993; Brint, 1994; Friedson, 1986; Starr, 1982). University relationships with industry are valorized through federal policy efforts to improve the global competitiveness of the United States through economic development and precompetitive research. Although initially met with resistance, academic affiliation with high technology commercial markets are increasingly becoming a source of academic resources and prestige (Lee, 1994; Lee & Gaertner, 1994; Rahm, 1994a, 1994b). Simultaneously and paradoxically, many professions are being destabilized by market encroachment. Profit and competition are increasingly entering occupations and fields historically controlled by professions, challenging their monopolies of practice and their authority as experts. The tension in medicine between physicians and HMOs is a case in point. A similar dynamic is operation in academe, where corporations are increasingly interested in intellectual property and close involvement with university researchers, often precipitating conflict between business and academic values. Biotechnology is another case in point (Kenney, 1986; Kevles & Hood, 1992; Krimsky, 1991). With the commercial marketplace becoming a vehicle to increase prestige, professionalization theory suggests that academics engaged in relations with industry will utilize their specialization and expertise to develop commercial activity as a resource and power base to increase autonomy and control over their professional lives, even as markets generally serve to destabilize professions.

Using this framework, the hypotheses were: (1) faculty's and administrators' views toward potential conflicts topics will differ on issues related to control over their relationships with industry, such that faculty will seek ways to control their relationships with industry, at the same time administrators will try to maintain control over faculty's participation; (2) administrators and faculty involved in university-industry activity will respond to potential conflicts topics in a manner that suggests they are more willing to expand the activity than those not involved; and (3) faculty not involved in university-industry activity will be less supportive than involved faculty of inequities across disciplines that might arise out of collaborative activity.

In other words, faculty and administrators will compete to control resources and relationships generated by university-industry activity. Administrators will want to control resources that they define as critical to institutional well-being. Faculty, as professionals whose expertise is critical to bring in these external revenues, whether in the form of patents or partnerships, will claim they should control the resources and relationships surrounding university-industry activity, thereby increasing their professional autonomy. Thus, faculty's and administrators' perspectives regarding potentially divisive topics are likely to be somewhat different, with each favoring activities that provided their respective group with the greatest authority over university-industry relationships. Although we expect faculty to be unified in their desire for control over professional activities, at the same time we anticipate that academics who are involved in activities related to the commercial marketplace will differ in their perspective toward issues related to equity and traditional academic norms from those who are not involved, suggesting a movement toward bifurcation among academics based on relationships with the private sector.

The difficulty is determining whether distinct perspectives are explained by involvement with firms or by the respondent's academic discipline. Previous research has shown that academic discipline affects views toward some of the issues discussed in this study, including faculty teaching loads, salaries, commitment to the institution, and teaching role performance (Braxton & Hargens, 1996; Hayward, 1986; Lodahl & Gordon, 1973). This literature suggests that faculty from fields such as fine arts and humanities (often called low-consensus fields or soft disciplines), hold perspectives that contrast with the views expressed by faculty from fields such as science and engineering (also called high-consensus or hard disciplines). Because fine arts and social sciences are generally considered to be limited in their ability to interact with the commercial marketplace, the prevailing assumption is that they represent the majority of respondents categorized as not-involved. This supposition is not completely true for this study, given that 30% of the non-involved respondents were from the fields of science/engineering and 13% of faculty from social science/fine arts were involved in relationships with firms (Table 4), suggesting that caution should be exercised when characterizing any particular academic field as being involved or not.

Although the primary focus of this study was to better understand whether involvement with for-profit firms shapes perspectives toward topics related to potential conflicts, we included an investigation of disciplinary differences that may exist. The distinctive cultures of the disciplines may be in the process of being eroded by market opportunities. Faculty relations to markets, independent of field or discipline may have to be incorporated into explanations of difference. We expect differences in attitudinal responses to potential conflicts topics to cut across fields, such that involvement with the private sector increasingly will provide a salient explanation of divergent views, particularly for topics related to commercialization of academic knowledge.

Design and Method

This study draws from a database containing the perspectives of university and industry respondents toward a diverse array of issues related to university-industry relationships. Here we focus solely on the responses from academe, including faculty and administrators. Questionnaires were mailed to representatives of the 12 largest public(4) institutions in each of the Carnegie classifications.(5) Thus, a total of 86 colleges and universities were targeted for participation. Despite these efforts to solicit input from all types of colleges and universities, more than three quarters of the participants represented research-intensive, doctorate granting universities; 21% of the responses were from individuals in institutions classified as Comprehensive I/II and Liberal Arts I/II. Given this limited response by representatives of schools that are not research intensive, we were unable to conduct meaningful analyses of connections between institutional type and attitudinal response.

The survey instrument was comprised of questions in a Likert-scale format(6) that asked participants to indicate the degree to which they agree with a statement or the extent to which specific issues should be considered a conflict of interest (see Tables 5-7 for samples of the survey questions). Statements were coded to create a consistent direction and range of Likert-scale responses, with 6 signifying the strongest support for the stated activity and 1 indicating the least support for the item in question. Survey questions utilized in this study focused on topics that were consistently raised in the literature, with particular emphasis on thorny issues. The survey questions were designed to tap complex areas of value convergence in order to detect whether or not participants had reached a consensus in their views toward these issues. To investigate the possibility that academics involved in university-industry partnerships were developing perspectives that may be distinct from perspectives of those not participating in university-industry relations, the survey solicited participation from individuals who fall into both categories. The study included faculty from typically collaborative fields, such as science and engineering, as well as those from a variety of other fields, including in the social sciences, fine arts, and business. Respondents for this study included 127 university administrators and 280 faculty members who reported that they represented the fields of social science and fine arts (28%), science and engineering (43%), and business (29%).

Calculation of the survey response rate was a challenge, because targeted respondents were asked to distribute questionnaires to individuals within their department; it was impossible to determine whether these unknown potential respondents actually received a survey instrument. Although it is conceivable that many of these anonymous respondents never had an opportunity to participate, particularly in cases where the known and targeted respondent chose not to reply, in a deliberate effort to follow the most conservative course, it was assumed that the additional surveys were distributed. Using this assumption, the response rate for eligible(7) survey participants was 34%. These respondents represented 76% of the targeted organizations.(8)

To analyze the data based on involvement, all academic respondents were grouped based on their involvement with the for-profit sector.(9) Not everyone clearly identified themselves as being administrators or faculty, nor did they clearly identify their title or discipline. Individuals who could clearly be distinguished as either an administrator or a faculty member were extracted, yielding a sample of 407 respondents (see Table 1).

For analysis based on discipline, participants were asked to select from several choices that characterized the area of their position within the organization. Due to a small sample size for each of the academic disciplines, related fields were grouped in accordance with the "hard-soft" dimension of Biglan's (1973) model. Those specifying the College of Fine Arts and College of Social Sciences were combined into one academic field grouping, and those specifying College of Science and College of Engineering were combined into another field group. Although some scholars might suggest Engineering should be combined with Business because both are professional schools (Stokes, 1997), this initial investigation follows the empirically validated Biglan model. Participants selecting the College of Business remained in a separate category. Deans of these colleges were categorized as administrators, department heads as faculty. It is important to note that the academic field groupings do not differentiate between those involved in relationships with firms due to limited data in each of the possible breakdown groups.

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyze respondents' views toward scaled measures of potential conflicts as well as toward each of the individual statements with the scales.(10) The scaled measures for each of the conflicts topics were developed in a previous study (Campbell, 1995, 1997) using factor analysis to summarize the variety and complexity of issues falling within each of the three potential conflict areas. The factor analysis utilized an oblique rotation,(11) acknowledging the possibility that the constructs were somewhat related. The correlations were not strong, indicating that distinct concepts had been identified. Scales for each of the three types of conflicts were developed, and the reliabilities of each of these groupings ranged from a standardized alpha of 0.64 to 0.75. Nunnally (1978) supports the acceptability of these alphas. ANOVAs were conducted to identify pairs significantly different at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (see Tables 2, 3, 5-10 for specific p values for the scaled measures and individual statements).

Findings and Results

Conflicts Topics - In Aggregate

To obtain an overall understanding of possible differences in perspectives toward topics related to potential conflicts, respondents' views toward the scaled measures of potential conflicts of interest, commitment, [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 1 OMITTED] and internal equity were analyzed (see Tables 2 & 3). Potential conflict of interest issues center on opportunities for financial gain and revenue-generating activities. Potential conflict of commitment refers to issues related to academics' allocation of time and effort to their various roles: teaching, research, and service. Potential conflict over internal equity refers to topics related to the distribution of resources and responsibilities within an organization, including access to departmental resources and responsibilities as a teacher and mentor to students (Campbell, 1995, 1997). It should be understood that the data do not report actual behaviors but capture perspectives toward topics related to potential conflicts. For clarity in reading, from this point forward, the word "potential" is implied but not explicitly stated.

Conflict of interest scale. When responses to the conflict of interest scale were examined, the data suggested that strains might exist between involved and non-involved faculty (Table 2). In the aggregate, faculty involved with industry and faculty not involved are the two groups with significantly different perspectives; there were no differences in the views of faculty and administrators for the conflict of interest scale. Generally, faculty involved with industry were more positive toward conflict of interest topics, which focus on opportunities to generate revenue through their interaction, than were faculty who did not collaborate with industry. The analyses by academic field revealed social science/fine arts faculty held significantly different views toward conflicts of interest topics compared with administrators, scientists/engineers, and business faculty (Table 3). This suggests faculty who are not close to the market (e.g., those not involved with firms and those from social science/fine arts) are less supportive of revenue-generating activities than faculty who have greater opportunity to interact with industry (e.g., involved faculty, administrators, and those from science/engineering and business).

Conflict of commitment scale. Conflict of commitment was the only scale on which faculty and administrators' views were significantly different (Table 2). Administrators involved in university-industry activity and faculty members not involved held views that were similar to each other, and the views of faculty who participated in university-industry relations were distinct from all other groups. Interestingly, academics from all academic field groups held similar views, with the only significant difference occurring between administrators and business faculty (Table 3). These findings for the scaled measure indicate that involved faculty appear willing to relinquish their responsibilities for traditional academic duties such as teaching and public service, creating tensions between involved faculty and administrators. Administrators expect faculty [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 2 OMITTED] [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 3 OMITTED] [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 4 OMITTED] to remain loyal to their institutions and to sustain their traditional obligations (e.g., teaching), even as they pursue opportunities with the private sector. This difference in perspective is hidden when responses are aggregated by academic field. Business faculty are the most willing to minimize academic duties, perhaps reflecting the culture of industry that also shapes the perspective of involved faculty toward academic duties and institutional commitment.

Conflict over internal equity scale. An examination of conflict over internal equity issues revealed that faculty and administrators shared similar views, whether they were involved in collaborative activity or not (Table 2). This finding held true when faculty views based on discipline were examined; individuals from social sciences/fine arts agreed with administrators and faculty in science/engineering (Table 3). The pattern of response by business faculty toward issues related to conflict of commitment is repeated for conflict over internal equity, with business faculty being the most approving of inequities within the organization. Although this view is significantly different than the perspective of social science/fine arts faculty, the difference is not sufficiently strong to claim striking distinctions. Contrary to the conflict of interest and conflict of commitment scales, the conflict over internal equity scale suggests a consensus among academics that work with the private sector should have little effect on the distribution of workload within an institution. Respondents think that access to internal resources and faculty's responsibilities to students should be similar across all disciplines, whether faculty are working with industry or not.

Discussion of scaled measures. Analysis of the scaled measures provided important insights about areas in which faculty and administrators converge and diverge in their perspectives toward conflicts topics. Involved administrators took the strongest dissenting position of any group against suggestions that loyalty to a sponsoring company might supplant loyalty to academe and adherence to its values and norms. Yet they were also the most willing to expand opportunities to generate revenue through university-industry collaboration, opening the door for increased occasions in which conflict of commitment is likely to occur. Because business faculty and academics who interact with firms are more familiar with, and deeply entrenched in, the culture and ideology of industry, these findings suggest that individuals who are involved with for-profit firms share a perspective toward academic duties and commitment to their institution that accommodates and favors the interests of the commercial marketplace.

Because involved administrators were much more supportive of expanding revenue-generating opportunities through university-industry activity than were non-involved faculty, the indication is that this is an area of tension between the two groups. Faculty in the social sciences/fine arts are keenly aware of this tension, and they are the least supportive of financial gain through interaction with industry. Compared to both involved administrators and non-involved faculty, involved faculty were the most supportive toward adjusting their allocation of time and balancing their academic role in a manner that makes room for interaction with firms. Even though all faculty grapple with the numerous demands of their academic roles, involved faculty indicate they are more willing to relinquish their teaching and service duties than are their non-involved colleagues. On the one hand, this may indicate that increased time and effort are needed to sustain relationships with firms; on the other hand, it may reveal the increased ability of involved faculty to reduce less desirable academic efforts in favor of increased time and attention to more interesting, rewarding, and prestigious pursuits.

Although all faculty generally share similar views toward internal equity issues, these perspectives seem to be at odds with faculty views toward conflicts of commitment. The scaled measure on conflict of commitment suggests that faculty who participate in university-industry activities might prefer to teach less, whereas all faculty responding to conflict over internal equity issues indicate that university-industry activity should not substitute for teaching. These contradictions suggest that entrepreneurship norms are in flux, and the tensions over workload are as yet unresolved.

Though these scaled measures provide important insights into respondents' perspectives because they simplify and summarize complex constructs, the scaled measures do not shed light on particular areas where these tensions might emerge. Because we wanted to identify specific pressures that may be caused by university-industry collaboration, each individual statement was examined in an effort to identify concrete issues that may be the source of these tensions. By exploring the individual statements, we risk the possibility of calling a difference significant when further refinement of the statements and scaled measures used in this study may indicate that the difference is not really significant.(12) Given the dearth of information regarding the possible impact of university-industry collaboration on relationships between faculty and administrators within academe, we believe further probing of the individual statements may illuminate specific areas needing attention in future studies to better understand the ambiguities surrounding university-industry relationships.

Conflicts Topics - Individual Statements

Conflict of interest. An examination of differences in views toward the individual statements related to potential conflict of interest indicated that areas of contention center on intellectual property issues and market encroachment on the institution as a whole (Tables 5 & 6). Whereas tensions between faculty and administrators centered on intellectual property, tensions between involved and non-involved faculty emerged around several issues related to academics' involvement in activities associated with the commercial marketplace that are summarized as entrepreneurship. The potential struggles related to intellectual property and entrepreneurship are discussed in turn.

Intellectual property. The statements related to exclusive licenses and patents illuminated specific areas of tension between faculty and administrators (Table 5). All faculty, both involved and not, and across academic field groups, were less positive toward the notion that public institutions should grant exclusive licenses than were involved administrators (Tables 5 & 6, #6). Unlike faculty, involved administrators supported the statement that "exclusive licenses should be viewed as promoting mutual interest for both universities and industry to maximize the chance of making the discovery available to the public (see Table 5, item 7)."

In essence, the patents from which exclusive licenses are granted draw boundaries around certain bodies of knowledge and grant a single individual or organization the exclusive right to practice (i.e., to make, use or sell [Lechter & Lang, 1991]) that invention. This is usually done in exchange for royalties or regular payments to the discoverer and her or his institution, depending on the institution's policy and how the arrangement is negotiated. (In contrast, non-exclusive licenses are used to grant several individuals or organizations the right to practice the invention, usually for free or for smaller royalty sums). Faculty responses suggested that they approach licensing from a fairly traditional academic viewpoint, one which holds that information and knowledge created by faculty when using federal research funds should be placed in public domain, rather than be apportioned to particular individuals or companies (Bowie, 1994; Fairweather, 1988; Peters & Fusfeld, 1982). For faculty, it appears that the availability of information to numerous parties is critical and, in comparison, that returns on investment for specific pieces of intellectual property are less important. Public access to knowledge facilitates the creation of still more knowledge, thus it is valued more highly by faculty than are earnings. This view is distinct from that professed by involved administrators.

The implications of this perspective are unclear. It may be that administrators are seeking the higher revenue streams that may stem from exclusive licenses. Perhaps academic administrators believe corporations will not invest in innovations that are licensed non-exclusively, because firms are unlikely to recoup the related development costs through profits from product sales in areas where several firms are competing. Corporate and university CEOs often make the case that exclusive licenses create the competitive advantage needed to increase the likelihood that a product will reach the market and generate sufficient income to justify any investment in product development. Unlike faculty, who value knowledge that moves freely in professional and scientific circuits, involved administrators value knowledge-in-use and the products and profits that flow from such use.

However, the responses of involved faculty and those in science and engineering to the statement "Academics should hold patents" (Tables 5 & 6, #4) suggested that they, too, are interested in the revenue-generating potential of knowledge. Their agreement with this statement was much stronger than that of involved administrators, who held the least supportive view of any group toward academics owning patents. As stated previously, patents draw boundaries around knowledge. Patents assign ownership of knowledge to those who discover it for a period of seventeen years (Lechter & Lang, 1991). If the discovery is made by a faculty member, he or she may be named on the patent, but the university is likely to own it (Chew, 1992).

Again, the implications of this positive response from involved faculty are ambiguous. It may reflect the belief that patents are an alternative to faculty that fulfills both personal and academic objectives: the knowledge is placed in the public domain; at the same time, opportunities to generate revenue through licensing remain open (Campbell, 1995, 1997).

[TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 5 OMITTED]

[TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 6 OMITTED]

Faculty may see this as a viable mechanism to fulfill their academic obligation without giving up revenue-generating opportunities. Perhaps the pattern of response indicates that faculty who hold patents believe that they play a critical role in creating marketable discoveries owned by the university; without them, there would be no stream of external revenues from licenses and royalties to the university (Rhoades & Slaughter, 1991a, 1991b). In this case, the faculty member's contributions are viewed as being more substantial than the subsidies of the university, suggesting academics, not universities, are the rightful owners of patents. The non-supportive response of involved administrators suggested that they believe institutions provide substantial support - whether through equipment and laboratories, support services (e.g., procurement and travel related to grants/contracts), release time, legal assistance in patenting, or other technology transfer services that - enable faculty to make patentable discoveries, and, therefore, the institution should have the greatest claim on patents.

Despite court cases and state and federal statutes that confer ownership of faculty inventions to universities, tensions related to intellectual property are not simple and clear. Faculty are professionals whose discretionary time is usually dedicated to research. They may use their research time to work on commercial research, basic research, or scholarship that does not generate external revenues from grants and contracts. In other words, faculty have a good deal of control over whether their discretionary time is devoted to work on patentable discoveries. Faculty may also use their discretionary time for consulting. Traditionally, faculty are allowed one day a week, or approximately 20% of their time, to consult. As consultants, faculty can engage in commercial research activity that by-passes the university altogether. Conceivably, they could use their expertise in such a way that intellectual property could be claimed by the corporation for which they consult (or by the individual inventor) rather than by the university that employs them.

Professionals' control over discretionary time gives faculty some leverage in dealing with university administrators regarding patent ownership. Even though universities own the patents awarded to faculty, faculty are usually able to negotiate with administrators for a percentage of the returns from royalties or licenses. The contradictory views expressed by faculty and administrators with regard to the statement "Academics should hold patents" underlines the struggle for control over this aspect of professional life.

Although involved faculty and administrators disagree on whether or not faculty should hold patents, both groups believe that universities should hold patents and that financial gains should be made from these discoveries. Unlike non-involved administrators and faculty, those actively engaged in university-industry relations support academe's integration with the market. What they disagree on is which group - faculty or administrators - should have the determining voice in shaping relations with external organizations and control over revenues from discovery.

Entrepreneurship. Responses to four additional items related to conflicts of interest, dealing with faculty's efforts to expand university activities to include some that were previously limited to the commercial nexus, suggested that involved and non-involved faculty held significantly different views toward rewards within the university and public service. The deepest chasm between involved and non-involved faculty was evident in responses to the statement "Academic salaries should be market driven, even if science and engineering professors are paid more than liberal and fine arts professors" (Table 5, #8). This rift is strongly emphasized by social sciences/fine arts faculty (Table 6, #8). Non-involved faculty and social sciences/fine arts faculty were significantly less supportive of market-driven salaries than were the other groups. Substantively, responses were more disparate than for any other question, with high F values and average responses separated by more than 1.5 points on the Likert scale. In other words, faculty who are able to move closer to the market believe they should receive higher remuneration, as do administrators, whereas faculty who are less able to connect with the market do not share this belief. It is clear that non-involved and social sciences/fine arts faculty do not believe market-related factors are relevant to notions of equity in salary, and this will continue to be a source of tension between those who interact with the for-profit sector and those who do not.

In terms of public service, non-involved administrators joined with non-involved faculty in showing less support for the notion that university-industry collaborative activity should be considered part of the public service aspect of academics' responsibilities compared with involved academics (Table 5, #1). Non-involved faculty, who are presumed to hold views more closely tied to traditional academic conventions and norms, were much less likely to characterize market dynamics as serving the public interest than their involved colleagues. This was evident in perspectives toward the statements "Industry profit from collaborative research in the public's interest" (Table 5, #2) and "University income from collaborative research is in the public's interest" (Table 5, #3), neither of which they strongly supported. Again, social sciences/fine arts faculty emphatically reiterated this perspective (Table 6, #2). In contrast, involved administrators and involved faculty were like-minded in characterization of the public interest. The implications of this response may be twofold: first, involved academics may be revising their definition of "the public" to focus primarily on industry (as opposed to the community as a whole), and second, they may be conceptualizing public service to include collaborative relationships with industry that generate income (as opposed to traditional notions of sharing one's expertise with the university or community for free).

Generally, non-involved academics' responses reveal a pattern that resists commercial encroachment. Non-involved academics do not want salaries to be market driven, nor do they want public service to be redefined so that university-industry activity is included. Similarly, non-involved faculty are suspicious of statements that proclaim that the public interest is served by market activity, such as university or industrial profits from collaborative activity. The responses of social sciences/fine arts faculty indicate they recognize that increasing encroachment of the market has the potential to divide faculty and fields into haves and have-nots, with faculty farthest from the market receiving the least remuneration in terms of both salary and outside activities at the same time that they are expected to carry the majority of the service workload, within both the institution and the community.

Conflict of commitment. Conflict of commitment differs from conflict of interest in that the point of tension on these items is over loyalty to the institution rather than over financial gain (Table 7 & 8). In a time when faculty are increasing ties to business and industry, the question of primary allegiance gains salience. For these statements it is important to note that none of the respondents, whether involved or non-involved, faculty or administrators, science/engineering, business, or social science/fine arts faculty, were supportive of academics strengthening their ties to business and industry at the expense of their commitment to the university. However, telling differences were found in the degree to which faculty and administrators were disturbed by diminished faculty commitment to their institution.

Faculty and administrators held significantly different views toward a statement about possible financial conflicts that is fairly standard in conflict of interest/commitment policy documents,(13) which are crafted by administrators, executives and bureaucrats, rather than faculty: "An academic fails to disclose to the university a substantial interest in any decision, contract, sale, purchase, or service related to her/his professional activities" (Table 7, #14). Although all groups view this activity as a potential conflict of commitment, involved faculty indicated that they are much more supportive of an individual who fails to disclose financial interests than are their administrative and non-involved colleagues (Table 7, #1). Faculty in all three academic field groups do not want to disclose their financial interests in external entities to administrators, whereas administrators want faculty to do so (Table 8, #1). On the one hand, faculty may generally be resistant to increased administrative efforts to pry into matters that are seen as personal and private; on the other hand, their reluctance to disclose financial interest in external organizations may reflect a widespread faculty belief in their right to profit from their expertise, free from administrative intervention. Financial disclosure may be viewed as another bureaucratic effort to extract intellectual capital from professional employees; thus it is met with resistance. Faculty across field groups, perhaps spurred by broad social trends toward marketization, may recognize, and seek to protect, the commercial potential of their expertise across an array of increasingly knowledge intensive products (e.g., books, consulting, software, and course materials).

Involved faculty responded similarly to the statement "An academic prioritizes her/his obligations to a for-profit organization above her/his university-related activities" (Table 7, #20). Involved faculty were much more supportive of individuals who engage in this behavior than administrators and non-involved faculty. However, this is not a belief shared by faculty across all disciplines (Table 8, #20), suggesting that faculty involved in relationships with industry hold a unique view of commitment to the institution, one that may favor the interests of the commercial marketplace over those of academe.

It is important to point out that the disapproval rating for these two statements (Tables 7 & 8, #14, #20) was among the strongest for all statements in the survey. This indicates there is a solid consensus that profit motives should not displace established professional norms. However, for statements #14 and #20, involved faculty did not object to these activities as strongly as did involved administrators. This pattern repeats itself again for the statement "An academic fails to disclose patentable information to the university" (Table 7, #17). The indication is that faculty involved with industry have a tendency to differ from other faculty and administrators. They believe they owe the institution less than do other respondents, not an unexpected finding, given their involvement with industry and potential financial gains at stake.

When responding to items that did not couch conflict of commitment in the either-or terms that were used in items #14, #17, and #20 above, involved faculty's response is more ambiguous. Again, there were significant differences in the views of involved faculty and administrators when responding to the statement "An academic holds a management position in a company that is related to the academic's area of expertise in the university" (Table 7, #18). As is readily apparent from Table 7, the average responses of involved faculty fell toward the side of slight support (3.79), whereas involved administrators' responses were the least supportive of [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 7 OMITTED] [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 8 OMITTED] this activity (2.95). This notion is also supported by business faculty (4.05), who held perspectives that were significantly different than those of administrators (Table 8, #18). Involved faculty and business faculty are more supportive of faculty participation in private sector work than others.

A similar pattern occurs with regard to the statement "An academic engages in outside activities that require more than the usual university allotment of one day per week" (Table 7, #19). Involved faculty are the most supportive of extending their relationships with industry to exceed the one day per week limitation. Faculty in business also favor more time for consulting, whereas administrators and scientists/engineers did not. These data may reflect the differences in opportunity structures for external activities across academic fields. Scientists and engineers frequently work on industry-related projects in the university setting, rather than through consulting arrangements, receiving research funds rather than consulting fees. In contrast, faculty in business are more likely to consult and, hence, push to extend their own flexibility.

The pattern of response to the statement "A company representative influences a cooperative university researcher to give primary attention to the industry-sponsored research and to reduce teaching and other university obligations" (Table 7, #22) provides further evidence that faculty are seeking ways to preserve autonomy and control over their professional activities. Involved faculty are more willing than non-involved faculty and administrators to prioritize industry-sponsored research over academic duties. Again, this view is not shared by faculty across all field groups, suggesting that faculty involved in close research partnerships with firms are unique in their willingness to sustain the relationship by diminishing university obligations.

When the responses of involved faculty to items in Tables 7 & 8 (conflict of commitment) are contrasted with those of administrators in Tables 5 & 6 (conflict of interest), an overall pattern emerges in which faculty are more supportive of statements that increase individual professors' opportunities to interact with the private sector and take profits based on their research, whereas administrators are more supportive of those external activities about which they are more likely to make decisions (e.g., granting exclusive licenses and investing university funds in spin-offs, Table 5, #6, #9). These variations in responses suggest that university-industry activity is contested terrain, where faculty and administrators are jostling for power and jurisdiction.

In differing from administrators and non-involved faculty in their attitudes toward the behaviors suggested by potential conflict of commitment statements, involved faculty may be trying to protect their intellectual property and consulting rights, not only for financial reasons, as discussed in the conflict of interest section, but as professional rights that sustain their autonomy. The obligation to disclose interests (Table 7, #14) and patentable information (Table 7, #17), significantly curtails faculty's ability to operate outside the purview of the employing institution. Generally, putting the employing institution first (Table 7, #20) constrains faculty opportunities in the private sector. Further, specifically prohibiting time spent on outside activity (Table 7, #19) and the holding of management positions in firms (Table 7, #18) limits faculty's opportunity to participate fully in start-up and spin-off companies. Although faculty, by definition, are not independent professionals, they have always struggled to be more than "mere employees." In a very real sense, faculty who are unable to exercise these right are more like professional employees than independent professionals.

Administrators are very likely to see faculty attempts to exercise autonomy from a different perspective. Whereas faculty see themselves as seeking to redefine academic responsibilities in a manner that provides flexibility and autonomy when working with an industrial sponsor, administrators see themselves as compelled to enact policies that require academics to recognize their institution as a player and partner in collaborative activities (e.g., disclosure of financial interests and patentable discoveries, Tables 7 & 8, #14 & #17). Increased university-industry activity may push administrators toward regarding faculty as professional employees whose autonomy should be controlled so that their first loyalty is to the university. The actions of both groups signify efforts to control and shape university-industry relationships in a manner that provides each group with increased authority, prestige, and resources.

Although there are significant differences by academic field group, the distinctive cultures of field groups are possibly being undermined by market opportunities. Faculty across all field groups do not want to disclose information about their financial involvement. Faculty in fields with market opportunities are less likely to adhere to traditional norms around conflict of commitment than others and are supportive of changes in practice that benefit opportunity structures in their specific field group. And, as the scaled measures suggest, involvement in relationships with firms emerges as an important characteristic that offers insight not evident in responses aggregated by academic field groups. Overall, responses point to tension between involved faculty and administrators around issues of autonomy and resources.

Conflict over internal equity. Questions that dealt with conflict over internal equity addressed issues about internal work load policies, such as whether non-involved faculty should absorb the teaching and public service responsibilities of involved faculty (see Tables 9 & 10). No [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 9 OMITTED] [TABULAR DATA FOR TABLE 10 OMITTED] substantively significant differences were found among any of the groups of faculty and administrators, involved or not involved, for the individual statements falling under conflict over internal equity (Table 9). It is interesting to note that the statement "Academics should be able to reduce their course loads as a result of high productivity" (Table 9, #31) received the strongest support from involved faculty and involved administrators of any statement in the conflict over internal equity category, with responses averaging 4.06. Business faculty were also the most supportive of reduced course loads (Table 10, #31), however, it is unclear how the respondents conceptualized "high productivity." In addition, business faculty were more willing to decrease their interaction with students who are not involved in their industry-related projects (Table 10, #30) than science/engineering faculty and administrators. If business faculty perspectives reflect the culture of industry, their responses may suggest an increased tendency for those who interact with the for-profit sector to seek ways to reduce their course loads and interact with students only within the context of their industry-related projects. Although our data cannot confirm the possible emergence of this trend, it is an area worthy of investigation in the future. As noted in the aggregate treatment of conflict over internal equity, for the most part, all groups in this study affirm that work with the private sector should have little effect on the distribution of work within an institution, on access to internal resources, or on faculty responsibility to students.

This pattern of response indicates that all respondents believe students should be treated the same across departments, whether the faculty member is involved in collaborative activity or not. If involved faculty reduce their teaching and service responsibilities, the pattern of response suggests that no one believes the additional workload should be absorbed by non-involved faculty in the same department. The implication is striking, and, given responses to other questions, probably unrealistic: Work with private firms should not interfere with traditional academic duties. Given that relationships with industry representatives take substantial amounts of time to establish and nurture, it hardly seems feasible that involved academics can sustain the same level of commitment to academe as those not involved with industry. The pattern of response to the items in Table 9, when contrasted to the responses to items in Tables 5 and 7, highlights the unresolved contradictions that permeate university-industry relations. Even as groups begin to differentiate themselves on the basis of involvement or non-involvement, they simultaneously adhere to beliefs about academic workloads that ignore the commitments made by faculty engaged with the private sector.

Implications and Conclusion

Overall, analysis of the several groups' responses to the survey points to two sets of tensions that stem from increased university-industry activity primarily centering on autonomy, resources, and flexibility to capture financial gain. The first is between involved faculty and involved administrators, the second between involved faculty and non-involved faculty. The manner in which these tensions are resolved will have important implications for the organization of faculty work, students' experience with the educational system, and administrators' efforts to respond to pressures from federal and state regulators. The numerous ambiguities discovered suggest that these issues are unresolved and perhaps volatile.

The three hypotheses were confirmed, although to different degrees. The hypothesis that faculty and administrators will hold different views toward potential conflicts, particularly on issues related to control over relationships with industry, was confirmed. The aggregate measures for conflict of interest and commitment, as well as several individual statements, provided strong evidence to support the assertion that faculty are seeking control over their collaborative activity. Involved faculty departed from administrators with regard to intellectual property issues and loyalty to the institution. Faculty favored ways to retain their autonomy, whereas administrators were supportive of greater oversight. Involved faculty also differed from non-involved faculty in their notions about public service and activity that is in the public's interest. Faculty who work with industry are increasingly seeking ways to couch these efforts within existing academic duties. They also seem to be moving toward an ideology that sees anything that is beneficial to industry as beneficial to society as a whole. In other words, involved faculty are likely to agree with "Engine" Charlie Wilson that "what is good for General Motors is good for America."

Similarly, the data provide evidence that administrators are seeking ways to maintain control over faculty's participation in university-industry relationships. Administrators are less supportive of academics holding patents than are involved faculty. Involved administrators are the most disapproving toward statements representing a failure to follow standard conflict of interest/commitment policies and failure to disclose discoveries that might be patentable. This suggests that they view policies as one of the ways in which they can influence faculty to keep the interests of the institution in mind. By setting limits on what faculty can and cannot do, by monitoring faculty's financial dealings, and by specifying disclosure and patent procedures, administrators are curtailing faculty autonomy and controlling faculty's interaction with industry.

The second hypothesis was that faculty and administrators involved in university-industry relationships would be more willing to expand that activity than those not involved. The scaled measure for conflict of interest provided evidence that involved faculty are more enthusiastic about engaging in revenue-generating opportunities than are non-involved faculty. Social science/fine arts faculty are the least supportive of financial gains related to the market. When examining the individual statements, although no survey items directly endorsed expansion, several statements implied support for expansion. Involved faculty and administrators differed from those not involved with regard to intellectual property, with administrators supporting the granting of exclusive licenses and university ownership of patents, whereas science/engineering faculty believe academics should hold patents. Involved faculty saw universities and industry benefiting from collaborative work, a perception that lays the groundwork for expansion, whereas non-involved faculty held significantly less supportive views toward this activity.

The last hypothesis stated that faculty not involved in university-industry activity would be less supportive of inequities across disciplines that might arise out of collaborative activity than would their involved peers. Although non-involved faculty support collaboration with industry, our findings indicate that they are less supportive of the specific repercussions that might arise from these relationships. Non-involved faculty were the least supportive of academic salaries being market driven, a belief that was emphatically confirmed by social science/fine arts faculty. Those who were not close to the marketplace held to traditional academic ideals, such as involvement in public service activities that benefit more than one firm or industry; they were the least supportive of university investment in entrepreneurial activities, particularly the funding of spin-off firms. Responses to these individual statements suggest that non-involved faculty are less supportive of collaboration with industry than any other group. They seem to recognize that university resources are becoming increasingly scarce, and they may not support the distribution of funds to anything other that the three traditional academic activities: teaching, research, and service.

Heightened resource dependence creates conditions of increased organizational turbulence that destabilize patterns of organizational work. Given the institutions' need to maintain revenues, greater emphasis is placed on university-industry activity. As process and market theories of professionalization predict, commercial markets come to be viewed as prestigious avenues by which involved faculty can gain autonomy and control over expanded professional rights and privileges. Specifically, faculty try to retain and expand control over allocation of discretionary time, income streams, and intellectual property. Because these areas are central to relations with external entities and new revenues, administrators also seek greater control over these areas of faculty work. These industry relationships introduce unique considerations and differences in perspective that are not readily apparent when the distinctive academic disciplines are the sole consideration. As the commercialization of academic knowledge becomes more prevalent, involvement with the for-profit sector provides increasingly salient insight into academics' perspectives.

The greatest discord between faculty and administrators was found in the issues surrounding conflict of commitment. The underlying theme is that faculty want to keep their options open and resist affirming loyalty to the institution at the expense of autonomy. Administrators, as suggested by their response to items of interest, seek to expand the purview of the institution with regard to negotiations over faculty's external involvement. Involved faculty seem to value their ties with industry and to want to use them to increase their autonomy, income, and prestige. Their efforts are aimed at being more like independent professionals and less like mere employees. In contrast, involved administrators seem to want to treat involved faculty more like scientists, engineers, and other professionals employed in industry. These administrators seem to want greater control over faculty discretionary time, over income from external activity, and over institutional ownership of faculty discoveries. When scientists, engineers, and other professionals work for businesses, they lose control over these areas of work, which belong to, or are at the disposal of, the company.

Because faculty became involved in graduate education in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, they have struggled to establish their professional status and to be more than employees. The struggle was prolonged and bitter and required intensive organizational efforts from faculty through their learned associations and organizations, such as the American Association of University Professors (Larson, 1977; Metzger, 1987; Silva & Slaughter, 1984). Faculty rights to such activities as consulting, ownership of intellectual property, as well as the right to conduct any research they choose, were never formally recognized by the courts and remain tenuous. Increased university-industry activity brings the struggle to retain these rights and privileges to the fore once again. Given that the stakes are raised as academic knowledge becomes fungible, there are no guarantees that faculty will be able to expand professional claims with regard to these activities.

The scholarly literature that addresses academic administrators centers on leadership, which invariably treats these institutional managers as individuals. There is a paucity of theory and data on academic administrators as a collectivity, so little is known about how their interest will play out across institutions on issues such as university-industry activity. Some evidence suggests that, in the 1980s, academic administrators' careers diverged from faculty's. After holding a deanship, academic administrators rarely returned to faculty ranks. Instead, they made horizontal moves to deanships at other institutions or vertical moves toward presidencies (Cohen & March, 1986; Slaughter, 1990). Again in the 1980s, prestigious heads of research institutions ceased to refer to themselves as presidents of educational institutions and instead saw themselves as CEOs of knowledge-based enterprises (Slaughter, 1993). Although much more work on the careers and collective conscious of academic administrators needs to be done, it is possible that they are increasingly following career paths that are very different than those of faculty. In addition, the more administrators are pressured from external constituents to control the actions of their organizational members (e.g., U.S. Public Health Service's 1996 report, Integrity and Misconduct in Research) and the more federal court decisions begin to reflect an ideology that views universities as organizations in which administrators, like managers, are accountable for their employees' actions, then the more likely it is that administrators will view business executives as their appropriate reference group. If so, they may seek, or be required, to treat their professional employees more like business leaders treat members of their organizations.

The data consistently indicated that involvement with industry calls for a re-examination of areas of professional activity, such as consulting with for-profit firms, pursuit of intellectual property, and time spent on traditional academic duties. Even though non-involved faculty do not engage in industry-related activities, they too will be subject to closer scrutiny and increased regulation (Slaughter & Rhoades, 1993). They are, perhaps understandably, suspicious of involved faculty's and administrators' claims that university-industry activity should be increased. For example, copyrights on books that serve an instructional purpose might be defined as intellectual property and become subject to the university's ownership agreements, causing non-involved faculty to lose one of the few external revenue streams available to them.

Although the attitudes of involved and non-involved faculty toward university-industry partnerships are somewhat contradictory, tensions between the two groups seem to be highest around salary, work-load, and public service. If university industry activity is strongly promoted, disparities between involved and non-involved faculty salaries are likely to continue to grow, involved faculty are likely to devote more time to university-industry activity, perhaps reluctantly leaving a greater and greater share of teaching to temporary faculty or lectures. This may create a cycle in which involved faculty continue to augment their publication volume, autonomy, income, and prestige, whereas non-involved faculty become occupied with traditional academic duties (e.g., teaching and attention to students) that reduce the time available for research and publication. Once begun, this cycle will serve to reproduce and reinforce non-involved faculty's diminished status by progressively reducing their opportunities to gain autonomy, income, and prestige. Increased interaction with industry may also contribute to a trend in which public service becomes service for fee rather than for free, and only the service that generates external revenue may be encouraged. If such differentiation between involved and non-involved faculty continues, faculty members are likely to lose their identity as a collegium, undermining collective strength and further eroding their professional status.

Although the hypotheses were partially confirmed, respondents' views were often contradictory. The relatively high degree of ambiguity captured in the various groups' responses probably indicates that attitudes toward the behavior items described in the survey are in a state of flux and change, making it ripe for policy intervention that may determine the shape and form that higher education may take in the future.

Notes

1 For this study, administrators included provosts, vice presidents for research, directors of offices of technology transfer, and deans; department heads were considered faculty members.

2 Not all commercial dollars are valued as highly as research dollars. For example, funding for applied work and fee for service monies are not as prestigious as is money received for new high technology.

3 It is important to point out that, although the prevailing belief is that industry funding will fill the void left by a decline in federal support, many academics, including the authors, believe that this will never actually take place. History has shown that the flow of funds from industry to universities has remained at a fairly constant, relatively low level. Also, industry would have to more than double its current contribution if it were to completely fill the gap left by federal agencies; this is a highly unlikely probability.

4 It should be noted that private universities, proprietary schools, and community colleges were not included in this study. Private universities are often established for an expressed purpose (e. g., interaction with firms and economic development as explicit goals, religious purposes, or to support the causes of particular benefactors), thus complicating the potential responses of individuals from these institutions. To keep the focus on universities supported by taxpayer dollars expected to uphold the public's trust and to be very clear in this initial exploration of potential conflicts issues, only public institutions were included in this study.

5 Classifications issued by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1987) were utilized. These Categories range from Research I Universities to Liberal Arts Colleges. We were able to select twelve public institutions from all categories except two. Only three (3) public institutions were categorized as Liberal Arts I & II. All three of these institutions were targeted for participation.

6 Some fill-in-the-blank and open-ended questions were also employed, but these questions were not discussed in this article.

7 As is customary with mailed surveys, some questionnaires were returned due to insufficient addresses, retirement, death, or elimination of the position due to reorganization. These organizations were contacted in an effort to learn the new address or to identify the person currently holding the position. However, in a surprisingly large number of cases, the person had left the organization and the position had been subsequently eliminated. Every effort was made to find appropriate substitute representatives, but a replacement could not be identified in some cases. Because these targeted respondents never had an opportunity to participate in the study, they were designated as ineligible to respond.

8 Evaluating responses at one point in time compared with responses received at a later point in time is a widely utilized method to check for potential errors in measurement (Rossi, Wright, & Anderson, 1989). To ensure that the results were reliable, wave one and wave two respondents were compared using cross tabulation and chi-squared statistics for a number of key characteristics, including involvement in collaborative activity income level, age range, position in the organization, and field of specialization. No substantive differences were found, thus verifying that the resulting sample was representative of the targeted population and was reliable. These analyses also demonstrated that further solicitation of responses would not yield a different set of responses.

9 Academics were identified as being "involved" in collaborative relationships, called "collaborators," or considered interacting with firms if they checked one or more of the following choices:

How Collaboration Was Defined

I am currently involved in activities related to the following (please check all that apply):

Consulting with a company.

Contractual activities with a company.

Collaborative research activity with a company.

Negotiations regarding the licensing of university discoveries.

Economic development.

Industrial advisory board(s).

Industrial affiliates program(s).

University-Industry research center(s).

Incubator(s).

Industrial park(s).

University-based institutes(s).

Joint ownership of facilities with a university.

Researcher exchange programs between universities and industry.

10 All assumptions for using ANOVA were met. To verify homogeneity of variance, The Levine Test was used.

11 Because the previous study represented the first attempt to develop scales for potential conflicts and the literature frequently addressed a diverse array of potential conflicts issues in tandem, it was most appropriate to allow the statements to be somewhat correlated, rather than requiring them to be independent (in which case they would have been rotated orthogonally).

12 The probability of committing Type I errors increases with each statistical test made. For this reason, scaled measures may provide a more accurate measure of the construct.

13 This statement was taken from The University of Arizona's Interim Conflict of Interest/Commitment Policy (04/16/93). Similar notions are expressed in the conflict of interest/commitment policies of many institutions and are outlined in The Association of American Medical Colleges' Guidelines for Dealing with Faculty Conflicts of Commitment and Conflicts of Interest in Research (1990).

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Teresa Isabelle Daza Campbell is assistant research professor, Department of Management and Policy, and Sheila Slaughter is professor and director, Science and Technology Policy Initiative, The University of Arizona.
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Author:Campbell, Teresa Isabelle Daza; Slaughter, Sheila
Publication:Journal of Higher Education
Date:May 1, 1999
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