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Factionalism and state power in the Flemish Revolt (1482-1492).

"It was a damned plague that caused great sadness in Bniges, because the citizens were divided into two factions. Brothers were separated. Even husbands and wives quarrelled about the factions" (1)

The factional struggle between Monetans and Philippins held Flanders firmly in its grip during the Flemish Revolt. This was the battle for the regency during the minority of the count of Flanders, Philip the Fair, between 1482 and 1492. The faction of the Monetans supported the regency of Philip's father Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, while the faction of the Philippins defended the existence of a regency council that would govern the county in Philip the Fairs name. (2) As the quotation above states, this factional struggle not only separated social entities, such as families and married couples, it also spread a "plague" of violence in the city of Bruges. Several historians (including Jacques Heers and Wim Blockmans) have already shown that factional struggle made medieval and Renaissance politics more violent. (3) They argue that there was no central control mechanism that could stop one faction from using brute force against the other because state power was weak. In a more recent article William Beik states that factional splits were endemic during periods of weakness of the central state because of the nature of the social system. According to Beik, an aristocratic society required effective sharing of resources through taxation, venality, and clientage. When the system of financial and economic redistribution faltered because of the inadequacy of central authority in times of political weakness, "it produced instead popular unrest, jurisdictional blockage, and factional conflicts." (4) This article, however argues, that weak state power did not cause factional struggle, because it assesses periods of weakness of central power only as an opportunity to grab power that a political alternative to central authority could seize upon. While weakness of the central government does explain why the state could not pacify factional violence in the city, it does not clarify the origins of the conflict. Without the existence of powerful political challengers to the regime factional conflict would not have taken place in periods of weak state power, and therefore, I would argue, we must consider additional social factors in order to understand factional struggle. Challenging factions are powerful when they have at their disposal important economic resources, an alternative political program, and a cohesive social body. These aspects cannot be ignored when studying factional conflicts.

The goal of the present article is to explore a medieval case in which an urban faction evicted the faction that was supported by central authority: namely, the case of Bruges during the period of the Flemish Revolt. The political position of the state was fundamentally weakened because its sympathizing faction in town did not have a comparable power basis as its opposing faction. The lack of financial and economic means on the state level not only deprived the state elite of the use of force against its adversaries, it also weakened the social networks of its faction in town. By using the opportunity presented by the temporary weakness of central authority, a forceful challenging faction could gain power in town if it felt the need to. In such a case the social support, strong ideas, and sufficient resources enabled the opposing faction to succeed in its mission. In moments power shifted from faction to faction, vengeance reigned over the city, and a spiral of violence held urban society in its grasp. Factional struggle was like a "damned plague" of which the citizens could not rid themselves.

In my examination of this case, social theory, especially that of Pierre Bourdieu, will help to formulate my argument, for I define a faction as a "cluster of social capital." At the same time, historical research can help to concretize sociological terminology. Firstly, because this article also aims to make a contribution to the discussion on state building, I will explain what is meant by "state power" as used above. Secondly, the term "social capital" and a general analysis of historical samples will give new insights into the social history of factions. Thirdly, a sketch of the Flemish Revolt will consider the political struggle of the factions in Bruges and how they tried (or failed) to grab power in the city. Fourthly, the political, social and economic background of the two fighting factions will be examined, combining prosopographical research and social network analysis (SNA). (5) As John Padgett and Christopher Ansell concluded in their sociological analysis of the Medici faction, a study of the so-called "social embeddedness" of factions is indispensable to understand their history and the process of state building. We therefore need to penetrate beneath the veneer of formal institutions, down to the relational substratum of people's actual and often contradictory lives. The heterogeneity of localized actions, networks, and identities of these people explains both why aggregation is predictable only in hindsight and how political power is born. (6)

The medieval state and its capital

According to Max Weber's famous formula, an "ideal" state successfully claims the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory and the totality of the corresponding population. (7) Norbert Elias, Charles Tilly, Richard Bonncy, Wim Blockmans, Jean-Philippe Genet, and others have treated the historical state in the same way, namely as a point of concentration of physical and mental coercion. (8) The French sociologist Pierre Bour-dieu in his "Rethinking the State" (1994) elaborated on these research results by introducing a new term to social and political science, namely "state capital" ("capital etatique"). In his view, the state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital (this is the accumulated labour of a person or a group which can be converted into other kinds of labour or energy), such as capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic capital (money, economic resources), cultural or (better) informational capital (competencies, the right to determine norms, national culture), and symbolic capital (prestige, honour, authority). (9) All these species of capital correspond to a different field. This is a social arena of struggle over the appropriation of certain species of capital, capital being whatever is taken as significant for social agents. It is the concentration of different species of capital which constitutes the state as the holder of a sort of meta-capital granting power over other species of capital and over their holders. Concentration of the different species of capital leads to the emergence of a specific, properly "state capital", which enables the state elite to exercise power over the territory and its inhabitants.

Curiously enough, Pierre Bourdieu did not elaborate on "social capital" when "rethinking the state", although he did innovative research on the concept. It refers to the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition. Through the application of economic capital, an individual or a group can invest in its social capital. (10) This facilitates cooperative action among individuals and therefore social capital is indispensable for individuals to function in society in general, and for rulers to administer the state in particular. Jan Dumolyn has recently pointed this out for the medieval county of Flanders which is the case I discuss in this article. According to Dumolyn, following Blockmans, Genet, and others, the most appropriate concept for a definition of the medieval state is "state feudalism". (11) State feudalism is a specific set of political relations within a developed and a more or less centralised feudal society. Using the resources from fiscal revenues the prince could distribute money and other goods among his vassals, who, in turn, remained loyal to the prince. Through redistribution of economic capital the prince accumulated social capital. Moreover, all kinds of state capital could be allocated to the local officers and loyal social networks. The symbolic capital of the state, for example, legitimated the appointment of local officers by members of court. Through this redistribution of state capital, a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual trust originated between the sovereign and his officers, and among the court members themselves. As a result, state officers and princely confidants had social networks in town, which facilitated political collaboration between the state and local elites in the cities. (12) This "urban" social capital was a necessary, but not a sufficient, basis for the political support for the central state, because other kinds of state capital were also needed to govern subordinated cities. (13)

Evidence suggests however that the political influence of the central state in fifteenth-century Flanders was limited. Historians and sociologists have already-warned of the "tyranny of the concept of the modern state." Contrary to implicit assumptions which could be found in the use of the term state, medieval states were not ideal states in Weber's sense. Historians, of course, have to be aware that the coercion "monopoly" of medieval states was not as developed as in present-day states. (14) Although the dukes of Burgundy, who were counts of Flanders, had accumulated significant power in the county during the fifteenth century, the urban elites still could rule their cities quite autonomously. Studies of conflict management in late medieval and early modern cities of the Low Countries, for example, demonstrate that the number of vendettas in late medieval cities declined without any interference from the state apparatus. In the course of the fifteenth century the Ghent elite increasingly succeeded in controlling conflicts among members of the elite inside its own milieu. By controlling and solving internal conflicts by themselves, the Ghent elite tried to consolidate their dominant political position in town. The internal pacification of these conflicts hindered subordinated groups in town, but also state officials, from interfering in elite affairs. (15) This article will show that the Burgundian court had accumulated certain means of coercion in fifteenth-century Flanders, but it also argues that elite factions in the Flemish town concentrated sufficient power to act independently from the court.

Medieval factions

The term "social capital" can also help to identify factions. In his study of medieval factions and their role in the political life of the medieval West, the French historian Jacques Heers defined factions as "mysterious societies," informal institutions without formal statutes. In Heers' view, they are spontaneous and dynamic formations with a certain coherence, but without a durable organisation, comparable to modern influence and pressure groups. (16) Following Heers, but adding social theory, we can describe the "mysterious" faction as a "cluster Of social capital." A cluster is a segment of a (in this case, urban) society with a relatively high (social) density. (17) Members of the faction accumulated a large amount of social capital, which created trust between them. (18) Research on factions in medieval Italy and sixteenth-century England and France, for example, shows a faction consisted of an amalgam of familial relations, pre-existing social networks, economic partnerships, and durable friendships. (19) Jeremy Boissevain and others describe factions as not having clear-cut recruitment rules, nor demarcated boundaries, but that the mutual affection among members was general in factions. (20) Factions by their very nature are dynamic, for they are built up out of personal relations and informal ties, which are highly fluid. In short, an amorphous cluster of social capital united the members of the faction, which created mutual trust among themselves. This social trust facilitated the transaction of economic goods within a faction. Social capital channelled information, it was crucial to keep political secrets in the faction, it excluded non-members, and it generated social connections such as marriages between the members. In short, the social capital a faction assembled through its members was essential for its existence.

The city was the pre-eminent power basis of the medieval faction. Moreover, the political power of medieval factions depended on their power in towns. (21) Factions of different cities could join, however, and form leagues that could compete with factions of neighbouring regions or with state power. But the main political goat of medieval factions remained the growth of their power within a city, and when factions took office in towns, they always tried to monopolize power and to keep it as long as possible. Although they had no fixed political program, as present-day political parties do, factions were driven by political and economic interests on the one hand, and ideology and religion on the other. For historical research has pointed out that not only money, power, and status, but also ideological and religious ideas were the motivating forces for political involvement by factions. (22) Those interests, ideas, and wishes could inspire factions to prefer a certain political organisation of urban institutions or even of the state apparatus, as would be the case in fifteenth-century Bruges. Because of different interests and diverging ideas on the manner of the government of a city, violent and long-standing political struggles could take place in cities among several factions. Quarrels about honour and prestige were often at the very beginning of factional struggle, and they regularly reignited violence among factions, but factions always had a common goal: the gaining of power to the detriment of (one or more) rival factions. Factional struggle mostly was fed by vengeance between both parties, but it always crystallised a violent confrontation of political and economic interests, and a struggle about valued and scarce resources. (23)

Because a faction is a very dynamic and mobile organisation, its boundaries are vague, and therefore difficult to reconstruct. But this does not mean that factions are a construct of the historian. In the case of the struggle between the so-called Hocken and the Kabeljauwen in fifteenth-century Holland, for example, factions had a definite identity, and contemporaries were very aware of the presence of factions and their struggle for power. (24) Intense factional struggles also appeared in the county of Flanders. In 1297-1304 the supporters of the count, the so-called Leliaerts, were opposed to the Clauwaerts, supporters of the French king. (25) In fourteenth-century Ghent, allies and rivals of the Arteveldes struggled for power in the city and the county. (26) In 1446, a quarrel between Duke Philip the Good, on the one side, and the Ghent politician Daneel Sersanders and the allies "of bis party" (van sijnder partye), on the other, ended up in a county-wide war. (27) Dividing the citizens of Bruges in "sections" (secten) and "gangs" (benden) during the Flemish Revolt, the anonymous chronicler quoted above described the ongoing factional struggle even as a social phenomenon. It is appropriate here to explain what this struggle was about.

The Flemish Revolt: the battle over the regency of Philip the Fair (1482-1492)

On 27 March 1482 the Burgundian duchess Mary of Burgundy died from injuries she had sustained falling off her horse some weeks before. (28) In the turbulent decade that followed her death the regency of Philip the Fair (1478-1506), the minor son of Mary and her husband Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, was at stake. After the death of his wife, Maximilian strove to rule over the Low Countries in the name of his son, because the marriage with Mary had to expand the Hausmacht of the Habsburg dynasty. The leading politicians in the county of Flanders, however, determined to exercise power themselves in the name of Philip the Fair through a "regency council". The urban elite of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres (the so-called Members of Flanders) considered the policy of Maximilian to be autocratic. In the years preceding Mary of Burgundy's death, Maximilian had implemented policies that increased the revenues of the ducal treasure-chest. These monetary and fiscal reforms, in collaboration with the belligerent policies of the court, had harmed the economy of the Flemish cities, whose wealth mainly depended on profits from international trade. The urban elite wanted to govern the county according to a federal state model, administered by the regency council, based on the principles of medieval constitutionalism and corporatism. The cities did not dismiss the central state, but reinterpreted it as a federation, a political union comprising a number of partially self-governing cities united by a central ("federal") government, the regency council.

With the inauguration of the "regency council" in June 1483, the urban elite of Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres ruled as regents over Flanders with the help of several nobles, but without interference from Maximilian. Together with a political faction in Ghent and Ypres, the Bruges faction of Willcm Moreel became known as the Philippines, which governed the county for two years. As will be further elaborated later on, Willem Moreel was an important Bruges merchant who had been in Maximilian's service as "superintendent of finances," together with the Bruges merchant Maarten Lem. But after Moreel had criticized the policies of the Archduke, Maximilian had imprisoned his former officer in December 1481. Thereupon, Willem Moreel's political adversaries had taken over power in Bruges, which was the international gateway of the Flemish economy and the most important port and trading centre in northern Europe at this time. (29) Moreel's opponents were also united in a faction, which I will henceforth call the faction of Maximilian because the Archduke supported the rule of this faction in Bruges. Maximilian's loss of authority after the death of Mary of Burgundy in March 1482, however, provided an excellent opportunity for Moreel's faction to return to power in Bruges. It successfully expelled Maximilian's faction from the town. In short, the death of Mary launched Moreel's faction on the county level into power. Moreel himself represented the city of Bruges at the county level in the regency council, while other members of the faction assumed political offices in the city itself. Maarten Lem, a close friend of Willem Moreel, became sheriff of Bruges in 1483 and held that post until his death in March 1485. Jan van Nieuwenhove (son of Klaas), a relative of Maarten Lem, became burgomaster in 1482, and Moreel himself succeeded him in 1483. Jan de Keyt, Moreel's brother-in-law was responsible for city financing and the finances of the regency council.

But Maximilian and his Bruges confidants did not accept the governance by the regency council and, after negotiations failed, the Archduke took up arms against the county in the autumn of 1484- Several military victories of Maximilian and an economic blockade of Bruges forced the city to surrender in June 1485. On the county level, Maximilian suppressed the regency council, and he installed an autocratic rule that deprived the cities of their political autonomy. After his faction (the so-called "Monetans") had taken over power in Bruges in June 1485, Willem Moreel and Jan van Nieuwenhove (son of Klaas) fled to Tournai and Arras. Jan de Keyt was arrested and decapitated in April 1486. Pieter Lanchals, Maximilian's principal financial councillor, became sheriff of Bruges, and another loyalist of the Archduke, Joost van Varsenare, was appointed burgomasrer. A violent repression by the sheriff and the Bruges city council secured the political position of Maximilian and his loyalists. The city was ruled with an "authority of violence", a notion elaborated on by Lauro Martines. This special kind of government action spreads fear or even terror in urban society in order to obtain obedience and to silence internal opponents. Archduke Maximilian provided his network in town with the legitimacy and the financial resources for this repression. When they came to power in 1485, Lanchals and his factional partners believed that they had to destroy their internal opponents if they were to survive and lead. Government was the rule of those who had triumphed, and physical brutality was the carrier of authority. As Martines summarizes it, might made right. Through trials and executions, the new urban government of Bruges tried to strengthen its political position, as Marc Boone has shown. (30)

However, in 1488 Maximilian's faction became itself a victim of a violent repression. (31) After the Archduke had suffered several defeats in the war against France, the Ghent faction which had supported the regency council in 1483-85 succeeded in seizing power in Ghent. Meanwhile, the Bruges guilds, which had supported the faction of Willem Mot-eel during the reign of the regency council, rebelled in January 1488. On 31 January, they prevented Maximilian from leaving town at the moment he wanted to join his army to occupy the city. The Habshurg prince lacked the means to counteract the overwhelming political opposition in the town. He remained imprisoned in Bruges for three and a half months. Willem Moreel returned to town, as his faction returned to power. Again, Bruges became a city of violence. The victorious rebels beheaded the leaders of Maximilian's faction, namely Pieter Lanchals and his brother-in-law Jan van Nieuwenhove (son of Michiel). Lanchals' head was hung on the city-gate to show the reign of terror was over. Moreel's faction ruled again over town and it took up its position in the regency council that was re-instated in May 1488.

After Maximilian was released from captivity in Bruges in May 1488, however, he gathered troops in Brabant to attack the county of Flanders. In spite of the military support of Philip of Cleves (a nobleman who had joined the opposition (32)), the regency council could not defend its position. After several months of warfare, the council was suppressed in October 1489. Maximilian again took over the regency of his son, and he restored the central authority of the state apparatus. But Ghent and Bruges soon took up arms again. In December 1490 Maximilian's forces managed to conquer Bruges after an economic blockade, and in July 1492 Ghent surrendered definitively. On the 12th of October 1492 Philip of Cleves, who had made Sluis into a base that could not be captured, accepted a favourable treaty (the "treaty of Sluis") to lay down his arms. Like the Flemish cities, Philip of Cleves accepted the regency of Philip by Maximilian, who, from then on, fully ruled over the patrimony of Mary of Burgundy. On the 12th of October, the day that Christopher Columbus first set foot on American soil, the Flemish Revolt came to an end. In contrast to its actions in 1485, however, Maximilian's faction did not organise a severe repression after retaking Bruges in December 1490. War continued in the county, and the emperor needed the support of Bruges to attack Sluis, so it focused on pacifying factional conflict in the town. Willem Moreel, who had been appointed sheriff of the city in 1489, was banished again, hut no members of his faction were decapitated. Maximilian pardoned Moreel in 1493, when he returned to the city. Willem Moreel was allowed to move freely in the town, but he was not returned to power again. Probably the members of Maximilian's faction had learned from its failure to pacify Bruges in 1485. Because repression would presumably cause a new round of violence, the faction of Willem Moreel was not punished collectively. Nevertheless, any movement against the new regime was severely suppressed, and those who had supported the faction of Willem Moreel were barred from participation in city politics.

Two conclusions can be drawn from the story of the Flemish Revolt concerning state power, factional struggle, and the theoretical framework of this article. Firstly, Bourdieu's work clearly can be put to excellent use in analysing Maximilian of Austria's loss of power in the county of Flanders during the Flemish Revolt, for we are able to say the Archduke lacked sufficient state capital to impose his authority firmly in Bruges after the death of Duchess Mary. For example, Maximilian had lost symbolic capital to the regency council in 1483 after the council successfully claimed the regency over his son. Acting as regent, the council possessed the authority to implement a legitimate policy in the county, while Maximilian was seen as an usurper. Nor did the Archduke have the coercive means at crucial moments during his reign (for example, at the moment of his capture in Bruges) to suppress a grab for power by political adversaries. In February 1488 he lacked the money to mobilize troops to hinder his imprisonment by the Bruges craft guilds. (33) Because he had needed the political support of one faction in Bruges to rule the city in previous years, Maximilian had not been able to surpass local rivalries in the town. Moreover, he had to join a faction in Bruges to strengthen his political power in the city. But if this faction was chased out of Bruges, he lacked the social capital in town--the social networks and the mutual trust--to execute his policy. In short, to stay in power the state had to assemble a sufficient combination of symbolic, social, and economic capital.

Secondly, it is clear that Bourdieu's terminology is too vague to explain factional struggle. The use of these theoretical tools can help to describe Maximilian's loss of power, but they do not reveal the fundamental causes of the Archduke's political defeat. Because state capital is impossible to quantify, a historian can not indicate how much state capital is needed for a ruler to stay in power. The story of the Flemish Revolt makes clear Maximilian's political position was weakened because a political alternative had succeeded in obtaining a more powerful position in the different fields Bourdieu distinguished, but a historian still has to outline the reasons why this happened. A detailed study on the political legitimacy and the ideological background of the regency council, for example, can explain why it succeeded in claiming the right to appoint officers in the name of the count, and why Maximilian's nominations were not accepted by the inhabitants of the Flemish cities. In what follows, however, I will concentrate on the social capital of Maximilian. Detailed research on the social composition of both factions in Bruges will concretize Bourdieu's terminology, and it can uncover why Maximilian's faction lost power in Bruges, because, as I argue, the social background of a faction is also responsible for its political victory or defeat.

The nucleus of the faction of Willem Moreel

The structural characteristics of factions differ. According to Jeremy Boisse-vain, there may be variations in the multiplexity and density of the network of relations within the factions. (34) Generally speaking, a faction consists of a core or nucleus and a periphery; factions display a concentric pattern. The core of the Maltese factions Boissevain studied, and of the faction of the Medici in medieval Florence, for example, consist of a leader who is tied to a number of persons by multiplex ties. The leader and these persons form the core of the faction. But factions in fifteenth-century Flanders differed slightly from this pattern. They did not have a clear central focus consisting of a single person. The term "faction of Willem Moreel" is actually misleading, because Moreel's faction was not his property. Granted, Willem Moreel was one of the leading figures of the faction, but he could not direct it exclusively, as Lorenzo or Cosimo de' Medici governed his faction in contemporary Italy. (35) The "godfather" of the Medici faction, the pater familias, held all power over the members or the family and their clients. Willem Moreel did not. The core of the faction Moreel consisted rather of several cliques and social networks which had multiple ties among them--there was little centrality in the nucleus of the faction. Willem Moreel was a member of one clique, while the nucleus of the faction consisted of more equivalent social networks. Willem Moreel was linked to all members of his clique, but not to all members within the nucleus of the faction. This can explain why he was not the leader of the faction, although he held the most political power in the city of Bruges during the reign of the regency council in the Flemish Revolt. A closer look at the Moreel faction concretizes these generalizations, and demonstrates why one person could not dominate the faction.

The daily economic and social activities of Willem Moreel formed a social network among the Bruges merchants which had the characteristics of a clique. This kind of social network is a collection of actors with direct relations to every other actor in the group and these overlaps are regarded as structural cohesion. (36) Willem Moreel was born around 1425 and he inherited a successful trade business from his father. (37) The wealth Willem accumulated can still be admired because he ordered two portraits by Hans Memling. (38) His fortune was based on trade in spices as part of a family business. Like many tradesmen in fifteenth-century Bruges, he was in business with his relatives. His wife, Barbara van Hertsvelde, alias van Vlaenderenberch, was the daughter of Jan van Hertsvelde, the head of an important company which traded with Venetian merchants and the Holy See. (39) A record from 1488 states that Willem's brother Lieven and Lieven's brother-in-law Jan de Keyt, Willem's son-in-law Boudewijn van Heidinghe, and Willem's brother-in-law Denijs van Hertsvelde were business partners of Jan van Hertsvelde, then recently deceased. (40) The houses, the fiefs, and the immovable goods Willem Moreel and Jan de Keyt had in Bruges and in the countryside are a sign of the wealth of the business partners. (41) The socioeconomic network of Willem Moreel was an exponent of the trade endogamy common in the Low Countries, because late medieval Bruges merchants and tradesmen married within their social class, and even within their trade. As Martha Howell has described it for late medieval Douai, this nucleus of relatives generated trust between trade partners, it protected the company from the risks of highly internationalised commerce, and as a consequence it lowered transaction costs in trade. (42) In the Flemish Revolt the nucleus of the faction would also protect Willem Moreel in times of political crisis. In February 1482, for example, Jan de Keyt was one of Willem's sureties when he was released from Maximilian's prison. (43)

A second social network in the nucleus of the Willem Moreel faction was the network of Maarten Lem, the second surety of Willem in February 1482 and his "political twin brothet." This network was not a clique, but a centralised network with Maarten Lem and Klaas van Nieuwenhove as key actors, connected to the other members without ties between the latter. Like Willem Moreel, Maarten Lem was a wealthy merchant. Both were members of the exclusive crossbow-men's guild of Saint George of Bruges. (44) Maarten Lem imported sugar from the Portuguese island of Madeira and sold it on the international market of Bruges, thereby becoming a sugar baron. (45) Maarten Lem was also a beneficiary of trade endogamy. He was married to Adriana van Nieuwenhove, the daughter of Klaas. This was a lucrative marriage for both parties. Maarten had a considerable fortune, and Adriana came from a wealthy family of Bruges merchants, brokers and politicians. By marrying his children to rich merchants and influential brokers, Klaas van Nieuwenhove had built up a huge socio-economic network. His daughter Margaret married Cornells Breydel, the dean of the butcher's guild in 1479 and 1483. He originated from a wealthy family which had several fiefs in the countryside of Bruges. (46) In 1484, the Moreel faction made him burgomaster of the Bruges councillors. (47) Another son-in-law of Klaas van Nieuwenhove, Arnoud Adornes, was councillor of Bruges on the 1477 board of magistrates headed by Maarten Lem. (48) Arnoud Adornes originated from a family of foreign merchants who traded in exotic fruit and spices, among other goods. Klaas's sons also belonged to the Moreel faction. His son Jan was kept under house arrest by Maximilian's faction when Willem Moreel was arrested in December 1481, because he also was accused of treason. Maarten Lem was Jan's surety when he was allowed to move freely in town again in February 1482. (49) The faction elected Jan as burgomaster of Bruges after the death of Duchess Mary and he was sheriff of Bruges during the period of the first regency council. Jan was a powerful broker who lived in the house Casselberg in the centre of the city--a house that is known as one of the "seven miracles" of Bruges. (50) A brother of Jan van Nieuwenhove, Antoon, was appointed captain of the castle of Sluis and bailiff for the countryside surrounding Bruges (the Houtsche) in 1483. (51) He was dean of the guild of the soap makers in 1480, a craft business which had provided him with the means to afford a fief in Adegem. (52) A cousin of the van Nieuwenhove brothers, Cornelis Metteneye, was burgomaster and military captain of the Franc of Bruges in 1484, the surrounding countryside around the city. He also originated from a broker's family. (53)

Briefly, two conclusions can be drawn from this short overview of the two networks that made up the core of the faction of Willem Moreel. Firstly, in contrast to generalising statements of modernists about medieval factions, the basic cement of the Moreel faction was not retainership. (54) Because marriage patterns and kinship relations were the most important social structures in late medieval towns, one should not be surprised that relational ties hound the Moreel faction together. (55) As in early modern factions, pre-existing bonds between members of the nucleus seem to have determined which faction an individual would join in the first place. Ties of kinship and comradeship therefore exerted a centripetal pressure. Secondly, the faction also concentrated economic wealth. The political power of the faction reflected a considerable fortune and economic capital. This wealth could be used in times of political need. Several members of the faction had lent money to the financial administration of Maximilian in Novemher 1477 when it urgently needed liquidity to wage the war against France. Jan de Keyt (a member of the Moreel network), Jan de Boot (another surety of Willem Moreel after his release in 1482), his brother Cornelis de Boot, and the already mentioned Klaas van Nieuwenhove (of the Maarten Lem network), for example, lent 750 lb. par. on crown jewels to the Archduke. Willem Moreel lent 658 lb. par., Maarten Lem 1200 lb. par. on that occasion. (56) The social networks of Maarten Lem and Willem Moreel supported Maximilian's war in 1477 because the invasion of French troops in the Low Countries damaged international trade. But when the Archduke's defensive war changed into offensive strikes against France in 1481, he lost his support among the Bruges elite because these costly wars would harm its economic interests again. At that moment dynastic politics served only to knit the social networks of the Bruges merchants even more closely together.

For the members o( the nucleus of the Moreel faction, the faction acted as a kind of political and social security. It guaranteed its members protection during risky business ventures, it guarded them from political attacks, and, collectively, it defended their common interests. Because the nucleus of the faction consisted of several dense social networks and cliques, and not of one family alone, as with the Medici in Florence, the faction could not be dominated by a pater familias. But its composite character did not prevent a high degree of solidarity among the different networks of the nucleus. As a result of marriages, kinship ties, business contacts, and political activities, the faction seems to have been a cohesive cluster of social capital. Through these means the network consisted of actors connected through many direct, reciprocal relations that enabled them to share information, create solidarity, and act collectively. Numerous direct contacts among all network members dispose a group toward homogeneity of thought, identity, and behaviour." (57) As in the case for example o( seventeenth-century La Rochelle, the highly internationalised commerce of Bruges also provided leading urban networks with economic resources, which could be applied in wartime or in a period of political struggle. The socio-economic connections of the leaders of factions consequently were logistically vital for the maintenance of position. (58) The analysis of the social background of the nucleus of the faction of Willem Moreel shows it disposed of considerable economic and social capital that could be used to wield power in the city. But this does not explain the social support the faction had in Bruges during the Flemish Revolt.

The periphery of the faction of Willem Moreel: from coalition to faction

A closer look at the periphery of the faction of Willem Moreel demonstrates that its social capital crossed the boundaries of the nucleus, In 1477 political allies who initially were not linked to the social networks of the faction had entered into a political coalition with its nucleus out of political interests and ideological motives, most of them originating from the urban craft guilds. In a second phase these allies were connected with the core of the faction by social (and maybe economic) ties, forming the periphery of the faction. Or, one can say, the political and ideological factors that were at the basis of the political coalition between the nucleus and the future periphery of the faction in 1477 were replaced by multiple social ties during the following years. These ties connected the nucleus of the faction with its periphery, a connection that was even strengthened during the Flemish Revolt.

The public support and the political authority of the Moreel faction started in 1477. As in 1482, the unexpected death of the head of the Burgundian dynasty in January 1477 had also altered the political history of the county of Flanders. The father of Duchess Mary, Charles the Bold, died in battle before Nancy in an attempt to conquer the Duchy of Lorraine. The Estates-General of the Low Countries required the observance of political privileges at that moment, and in several cities opponents of the dynasty took power from ducal loyalists who had been appointed by Charles the Bold. In early spring 1477, Willem Moreel emerged as the spokesman of a coalition of Bruges merchants and the craft guilds who wanted to obtain privileges from the court. (59) The spice-trader only had a little political experience The had served as alderman in 1472), and therefore he was not hampered by association with the regime of Charles the Bold. In the new city council that was elected in April 1477 by representatives of the craft guilds and rebelling merchant networks, Moreel was appointed as "principal committee of the urban treasury;" his brother-in-law Jan de Key t became burgomaster. (60) With his appointment as burgomaster of the aldermen on 2 September 1478, Moreel reached the top of the political ladder within city government. (61) As a result, Willem Moreel and his social network filled the political vacuum in Bruges after the revolt of 1477. One could say that the revolt made Willem a rising star in Bruges politics. The same can be said of the other members within the nucleus of his faction: Maarten Lem, Jan van Nieuwenhove, Jan van Riebeke, and Jan de Keyt. Except for September 1481, when Maximilian took over power in the city, in every year during the reign of Mary of Burgundy a member of the Moreel faction was appointed burgomaster of the city. (62) After the revolt of 1477, the rebelling social networks of Bruges merchants had become the nucleus of a political faction whose social interdependence and political authority would grow through the years, and would rise to a climax during the Flemish Revolt.

But Willem Moreel and his companions did not rule the city alone during the reign of Mary of Burgundy. For in 1477 representatives and leaders of the urban craft guilds had formed a political coalition with the nucleus of the Moreel faction--a coalition that would govern the city in the following years. Thanks to the coalition with the nucleus of the Moreel faction, the guilds returned to power in 1477 and regained the political position they had lost after the repression of the Bruges revolt of 1438. (63) In April 1477 representatives of the urban craft guilds were elected to the city boards of Bruges. The different parts of the coalition were independent in organisation, but dependent on each other for the fulfilment of their common political goal, namely the gaining of power to the detriment of the supporters of Charles the Bold. Political interests, economic goals, and ideological factors bound the alliance together. Because the common basis of the wealth of the Moreel faction and of the craft guilds was the international economy, it is not surprising the faction had a forceful economic policy in mind. They tried to maintain a stable monetary climate, without the manipulation of the currency. Craft guilds and merchant networks intensely denounced both the warlike policy of Charles (and later on, of Maximilian) and autocratic fiscal policies. In exchange for the maintenance of their economic and social rights, the craft guilds accepted the supremacy in Bruges politics of the social networks around Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem. (64)

Ideological motives, too, united both coalition partners, for the coalition ruled the city in accordance with the principles of corporatism. This was a social system that predicated respect for privileges, the right of self-government of corporations (as the craft guilds), and the political participation of these privileged groups in urban society. (65) During the Flemish Revolt both craft guilds and merchants heavily defended the political autonomy of the city of Bruges and its corporations, and consequently the coalition entered into a conflict when Maximilian tried to impose an autocratic rule in the city. Moreover, the cities in the county of Flanders had a long tradition of defending a political program of self-governance of corporate bodies in society vis-a-vis the centralised mode of government adhered to by the dukes of Burgundy. (66) In Bruges of the 1480s the powerful ideas of corporatism and urban autonomy were defended by a coalition, evolving into a faction, which could mobilise considerable economic resources to resist an unwanted kind of politics.

Through the reign of Mary of Burgundy the initial temporary alliance between merchant networks and the urban craft guilds shifted to a permanent unit of nucleus and periphery of the same faction. Both parts of the coalition, of course, had political reasons for cohesion but slowly, and surely, the political coalition melted together to become a faction because several ties between core and periphery were created. The ties by which the nucleus 'recruited' its followers were diverse: as there were daily contacts, economic partnerships, friendships, etc. These ties increasingly grew in density and in multiplicity between 1477 and 1482, but they are difficult to reconstruct. One can presume economic contacts between the representatives of the craft guilds and the merchant networks of Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem were manifold, but this is impossible to verify because the personal bookkeeping of these persons has not been preserved. The historian unfortunately lacks information about all social ties in the faction, because the sources are very fragmentary. Furthermore we cannot reconstruct daily contacts between the members of the faction, although they certainly must have taken place.

However, a remarkable marriage pattern does appear in the (scarce) sources. I have already mentioned that some members of the social network of Maarten Lem occupied important political functions in the Bruges craft guilds. His brother-in-law Antoon van Nieuwenhove was dean of the soap makers; another brother-in-law, Cornelis Breydel, was dean of the butchers. But matrimonial bonds also crossed boundaries between the periphery and the nucleus, by which the faction received a high kinship density. Several members of the social networks of Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem were related to the tepresentatives of the guilds that were appointed to the city council of April 1477, of which Jan de Keyt was burgomaster and Willem Moreel principal treasurer. Councillor Boudin Petyt, for example, the chief of the guild of the cap makers, was married to Katrien Losschaert, the sister of Jan Losschaert, the burgomaster of the board of the councillors (called the courpse). (67) Jan Losschaert was married to a niece of Marc van den Velde, the first aldermen in April 1477. He was the brother-in-law of Jan de Keyt, who was married to his sister Catherine. (68) A second brother-in-law of Marc van den Velde was Cornelis de Boot, the brother of Jan who had been a surety of Willem Moreel in February 1482. (69) Two other brothers-in-law of Marc, Steven van den Gheinste and Colard de Labye, who were members of the mercers' guild (Colard was dean of this guild in 1477), were also appointed aldermen on the city board of April 1477. The daughter of Frans Ridsaert (alderman for the butcher's guild in 1477) married the son of Maarten Lem; another daughter of Frans married the already-mentioned Boudin Petyt. (70) Another son of Maarten Lem married the daughter of Jan Dhamere, an influential member of the cooper's guild. (71) All of the above-mentioned relatives exercised political power in the city boards composed by the faction of Willem Moreel during the Flemish Revolt. (72) In short, the single-stranded political tie between rebelling social networks and the political allies of the coalition of 1477 had expanded to many-stranded transactional and social ties between nucleus and periphery of one and the same faction in 1482. Social networks henceforth crossed the boundaries of the periphery and nucleus.

What about the economic position of the members of the craft guilds that were linked to the faction? Unfortunately their persona! wealth cannot he analysed because personal archives are not preserved. Yet if the sale of public annuities by the city of Bruges is taken into account, we can catch a glimpse of their economic and financial background. In cases of acute financial shortage the city of Bruges sold annuities (renten) on the urban domain to raise the urban income. Citizens therefore could invest in the public debt of the city by buying annuities, which were paid off with a yearly interest of 6 to 7 %. An in-depth analysis of the social and economic background of the annuity purchases of the period this article deals with has shown that not only wealthy members of the urban elite but also broad middle classes could afford these renten. (73) The concern of supporting urban politics certainly was a motivation for an annuity buyer to invest in the public debt of the city. But a purchaser needed financial reserves in the first place to buy an annuity. The purchase of an annuity therefore can provide information about the financial background of the annuity buyer. As expected, Willem Moreel held many annuities from Bruges. Fourteen annuities bought during the reign of Mary of Burgundy provided him with an annual income of 1302 lb. 10 s. par. (74) The above-mentioned members of the craft guilds however could not afford such a high number of annuities. Nevertheless they also invested personal finances in the public debt of the city. During the reign of Mary of Burgundy Steven van der Gheinste, Boudin Petyt, jan Dhamere, Frans Ridsaert, and Colard de Labye bought a total of nine annuities, providing them with a total annual income of 348 lb. par. (75) The purchase of these annuities demonstrates that these five persons did not belong to the financial nor to the economic elite of town. But nevertheless, their economic activities as craftsmen provided them with a certain wealth that allowed them to invest in the public debt of the city. The relatives of the nucleus of the faction therefore did not belong to the "popular crowd" of Bruges, but probably to what can be called the middle class of the town. As in medieval Ghent, the Bruges middle class therefore appeared to be a fierce advocate of urban autonomy and the corporate model of urban government. (76)

In times of need the faction members invested their financial reserves in politics. One of these public investments can even help us to say more about the extent of the political support of the Moreel faction in town. After Maximilian of Austria was released from the city, the urban government organised two voluntary loans by citizens to pay the wages of soldiers who fought German troops in Brabant under the leadership of Philip of Cleves. (77) We can presume that the creditors who subscribed to the loan, supported the Philippin regime because the loans were voluntary and the city did not pay off its debt with an interest (in contrast to public annuities). In May and July 1488, 494 citizens and 47 craft guilds lent a total sum of 58,937 lb. 4 S- par. (78) With this sum 1,000 unskilled labourers could be paid for 25 days' work. (79) The citizens lent 49,021 lb. 4 s. par. (83.2 % of the total amount of the two loans). 189 of the 494 citizens lent twice.

We were able to find a social tie between 54 persons of those who lent twice and the nucleus of the faction of Willem Moreel. The 54 faction members (11 % of the total number of creditors) lent for a total sum of 10,075 In. 12 s. par. (20.6 % of the total loan of the 494 citizens).

Three other observations can be made regarding these figures. First, the archival sources of the city of Bruges are inadequate to reconstruct the political support of the Moreel faction. Possibly all creditors were linked socially with the nucleus of the faction, but information about the social ties of most creditors is absent. Second, what does this voluntary loan tell us about the number of supporters of the faction? About 1% of the population of Bruges supported the regime financially. (80) Of course, only wealthy political supporters with a lot of cash available could lend to the city. The figures mentioned above therefore only reflect the political support of the economic elite and the (upper) middle class of the town and not the popular support of the faction. Logically, several members of the nucleus of the faction lent giant sums of money, such as the mother of Jan van Nieuwenhove (son of Klaas), who lent a total sum of 240 lb. par. to the city in both loans--Jan van Nieuwenhove himself and Willem Moreel had not yet returned to the city in May 1488. Also the members of the craft guilds who had married relatives of the members of the nucleus of the faction, such as Steven van der Gheinste, Colard de Labye, Boudin Petyt, Frans Ridsaert, and Jan Dhamere, contributed to the loan (for a total sum of 1488 lb. par.). (81)

Third, faction members, who formed one tenth of the creditors, therefore provided one fifth of the total loan. This observation can confirm the presumption that at least this group of creditors were political supporters of the Philippin regime. The political sympathies of all moneylenders are difficult to reconstruct, but we can presume the financial efforts o( the above-mentioned members are a sign of their political loyalty to the nucleus of the faction. The social capital of the faction therefore was a handy tool for the mobilisation of logistically vital resources for the political and military actions of the leaders of the faction. It made economic resources available for the leaders of the faction, which defended intensively common interests and ideas. The voluntary loan of 1488 and the presence of the social networks described above demonstrate that the political programme promulgated by Moreei's faction enjoyed the support of a powerful segment of Bruges society. Although it is difficult to prove due to the lack of sources allowing us to uncover the social ties of the members of the faction with lower classes in urban society, connections with other networks and political allies probably made the faction a deep-rooted political organisation. During the Revolt, the faction nevertheless became a reservoir of social relations through which it was able to recruit support to counter its rivals and mobilize support to attain its goals. Its social capital was a powerful mobilising force, a treasure chest in times of need, and a strong conductor of political ideas on corporatism. At this point we can ask if the rival faction had a similar weapon.

The social composition of the faction of Maximilian

The faction of Maximilian--the Monetans--which supported the regency of the Habsburg prince during the Flemish Revolt, had branches in every town in Flanders. They had a similar composition to the Bruges faction of Willem Moreel, and the factions of Maximilian in the different cities were bound together politically and socially on a county-wide level. (82) As was true for the Moreel faction, the nucleus of Maximilian's faction in Bruges consisted of a core and a periphery. The core of the Maximilian faction in Bruges was the social network of Pieter Lanchals, Maximilian's financial advisor. A native of Bruges, Pieter Lanchals originated from a lower social stratum, but because he was very talented in financial affairs, he rose high in ducal service. Charles the Bold had a use for commoners with political insight, talent, and familiarity with financial techniques, because, like Maximilian, he needed politically independent servants who could devise clever policies to support his political ambitions with financial means. In these circumstances, Lanchals progressed rapidly through the bureaucratic ranks. (83) Maximilian appointed Lanchals to the "financial commission" he erected in the Autumn of 1477 and from then on the Bruges native made financial policy for his lord--he did this for a short time together with Willem Moreel and Maarten Lem in 1479-80. After the departure of Maarten Lem and the imprisonment of Willem Moreel in 1481, Lanchals would become a personal rival of his former colleagues. During the reign of the regency council he was banished from the county, and his goods were confiscated. However, after Maximilian had conquered the county in June 1485, Lanchals was appointed sheriff of Bruges, a position he used to carry out Maximilian's policies. In short, Pieter Lanchals obeyed his master, and probably even influenced Maximilian on financial policy issues. In return, Lanchals was rewarded with gifts, money, and luxurious goods with which he could live a lavish "noble" lifestyle. (84) For his task as Maximilian's financial commissioner, for example, he received a daily wage of 48's. par. in 1480 from the general treasurer of Burgundian finances. (85) As a part of bastard feudalism, this kind of patronage was a typical tool of centralisation used by princes in the construction of their state apparatus. (86) Due to his loyalty to Maximilian, the "parvenu" Lanchals was able to climb the social ladder. Thanks to the loyalty of talented officers, the court could increase its social capital in town.

When governing Bruges, Pieter Lanchals was surrounded by a network of relatives. Maybe it was a clique, but there is a lack of source material to reconstruct all the social ties between the members in order to confirm this hypothesis. Pieter Lanchals was married to Catherine van Nieuwenhove. Her father, Michiel van Nieuwenhove, was the brother of Klaas, whose children were part of the Moreel faction. But the children of Michiel chose the opposite side of the political spectrum. This fact demonstrates that kinship does not always determine political choices. All kinds of ties and contacts between people are responsible for their political behaviour. As the already mentioned Bruges chronicler stated: political lines sometimes crossed families during the Flemish Revolt. Jan van Nieuwenhove (son of Michiel), for example, one of Lanchals' brothers-in-law, became burgomaster of Bruges in September 1487, when Lanchals was sheriff of the town. Jan's son Maarten, whose portrait was painted by Hans Memling, also made a career in ducal service. He was the receiver of extraordinary revenues for the count o( Flanders after 1490. (87) While Maximilian held power as regent for his son (June 1485-January 1488), other members of Lanchals' social network also held political office in Bruges or at court. Michiel van Theimseke, another of Lanchats' brothers-in-law, was treasurer in the city in 1487. (88) Jacob Dheere, a cousin of jan van Nieuwenhove (son of Michiel), was appointed alderman in June 1487, the same year that his brother Michiel Dheere became treasurer of Bruges in June 1485. Pieter Lanchals' son-in-law, Wouter Merghaert, was a process-server in the Council of Flanders. (89) Another son-in-law, Nicolas van Delft, was clerk of the city council from June L485 until its demise in February 1488. He would be appointed burgomaster of Bruges after the surrender of the city in December 1490. (90) These examples show that Pieter Lanchals utilized a social network that joined him in political service to Maximilian during his regency. Lanchals therefore acted as a broker for the distribution of rewards, honors, and offices controlled by the Burgundian court. This patronage and brokerage was the vital glue of the core of Maximilian's faction in town, which created strong resemblances with early modern court factions. (91)

The periphery of the faction comprised two components, which entered into a coalition with the social network of Pieter Lanchals after the death of Mary of Burgundy in 1482. But in contrast to the Moreel faction, the Lanchals faction hardly had left the stage of political coalition, because the two components were hardly linked between themselves. The first component consisted of a group of frustrated wealthy citizens who had been sidelined during the reign of Mary of Burgundy by the faction of Willem Moreel. For example, several aldermen appointed by Maximilian in June 1485 after his conquest of the country had previously held office during the reign of Charles the Bold, but had been removed from office by the revolt of 1477. (92) Personal rivals of Willem Moreel were also put into office during Maximilian's regency. The brothers Houtmaerct who had a personal quarrel with Willem Moreel in 1478, henceforth joined the Maximilian faction. (93) Some of the members of this component of Maximilian's faction also had made a fortune in international trade, such as Donaas de Moor. But because they had implemented a severe fiscal policy during the reign of Charles the Bold, they were condemned for corruption in the revolt of 1477 or banished from town. After the faction of Willem Moreel had taken over power, Donaas de Moor, for example, had to pay back the wages he had earned as city councillor in the years preceding the revolt--he was banished in 1483. (94) During the period 1485-88 the personal and political rivals of the Moreel faction finally found the opportunity to return to the political scene. But the social support for this coalition partner o( the network o( Pieter Lanchals was low. Most of the wealthy patricians married internally and none of them had social connections with representatives of the guilds.

Some of them, however, had social ties with the second component of the periphery of the faction, which consisted of noblemen from the Franc of Bruges. Those noblemen were also ousted politically from the city of Bruges during the reign of Mary of Burgundy, because the Bruges craft guilds had fought in 1477 against the political power of the Franc of Bruges, the surrounding countryside of Bruges that was ruled by a council (termed the fourth 'Member of Flanders'). The main source of animosity between the Bruges craft guilds and the Franc council was economic competition, because the Franc was home to economic rivals of the craft guilds. By abolishing the political power of the council of the Franc of Bruges in 1477 (95), the city of Bruges again became the political centre of its surrounding countryside. When the guilds gained power in the city council of 1477, they again had the means to dominate the surrounding countryside--to the detriment of the rural nobility that had previously governed the Franc. As a consequence the nobles joined Maximilian in his opposition to the growing power of the coalition between the networks around Willem Moreel and the urban guilds in 1477. The nobles of the Franc of Bruges were wealthy men who had lost power in 1477, but in the Flemish Revolt they finally got the chance to return to the highest political levels. In June 1485, Joost van Varsenare, a nobleman who had a number of fiefs in the Franc of Bruges, became burgomaster of the aldermen of Bruges. (96) Several nobles, like the brothers van Halewyn, joined the burgomaster in his attempt to dominate Bruges politics in the following years. The burgomaster of the councillors in 1485 was Joost van Halewyn. His half-brother Karel van Halewyn became bailiff of the city and the Franc of Bruges. Joost's father-in-law, Guy de Baenst, was appointed burgomaster of the Franc of Bruges, restored in its political rights by Maximilian in October 1485. (97) Pieter Lanchals married the daughter of one of them, Roeland van Halewyn, in October 1486. (98) In short, the nobles of the Franc of Bruges regained power in 1485 by joining the social network around Pieter Lanchals. They were socially connected by family ties, and some of their daughters were married to Bruges aldermen during the reign of Charles the Bold. Jacob Dheere was married to Kateline van Stavele, daughter of Jan, a noble alderman of the Franc. Jacob was the burgomaster of the Franc of 1486 and decapitated by the faction of Willem Moreel in March 1488. (99) But the nobles had neither political not social connections with the craft guilds of Bruges, which had became their political rivals in 1477.

The basis of the wealth of the Maximilian faction depended on courtly patronage, feudal revenues, and income derived from land. As in the case of Pieter Lanchals, several members of the faction held important positions at court which gave them annual or daily revenues. Jan van Nieuwenhove (son of Michiel), Lanchals' brother-in-law, was waierkaljuw of Flanders. He had a yearly income of 80 lb. par. from this office, and with the profits of the office his personal loans to Maximilian were paid back. (100) An in-depth analysis of the feudal income of Joost van Varsenare and Guy de Baenst (respectively, burgomaster of Bruges and of the Franc of Bruges in 1485) shows both noblemen not only had accumulated wealth from their offices, but also from feudal revenues and land holdings. Because he was an heir of the former general receiver of the dukes of Burgundy Pieter Bladelin, Joost van Varsenate had inherited the castle and city of Middelburg in Flanders. In 1476 he sold his rights on this seigneurie to Guillaume Hugonet, the chancellor of Burgundy, for 16,800 lb. par. (101) He had fiefs and land in Sint-Ktuis, Moerkerke, Varsenare, Woumen, Cadiand, Aardenburg, Oostk-erke, Maldegem, and Oostburg. Guy de Baenst had comparable possessions in Aardenbutg, Oostkerke, Lapscheure, Boekhoute, Sint-Kruis, Sluis, and in the county of Zeeland. (102) These fiefs provided Maximilian's allies with revenues, prestige, and status.

The wealth of the faction could likewise be invested in political power. As was true for the faction of Willem Moreel, the faction of Maximilian financed its politics with the sale of annuities. Laurence Derycke's research on annuity buyers points out that a select company of leading figures dominated the public annuity market during the faction's reign. Their participation in public debt probably was inspired by economic gain, but it also has to be understood within a broader context of consolidating political power structures in the city. Since large investments in the public debt could lead to an increased grip on the urban government and public finances, considerations about the strengthening of the faction's power position were of decisive importance in the strategies of investment of these leading figures. (103) Pieter Lanchals, for example, bought twelve annuities in the period between 1485 and 1487. This purchase provided the city with a total sum of ] lb. par., and Lanchals henceforth had an annual interest of 1,104 lb. par. (104) Also members of the components of the periphery of the faction bought annuities, albeit less intensively. Willem Houtmaert bought four annuities in I486 for a total sum of 2,002 lb. par., Joost de Baenst (the brother of the above-mentioned Guy de Baenst) bought one annuity in April 1486 for a sum of 1,043 lb. par. (105) Most of these finances were spent on "aides" (these are voluntary subsidies for the state), which the city had granted to finance Maximilian's war against France. The investment of the Maximilian faction therefore directly supported archducal policy, while the costs of the annuities were paid with urban taxes.

The only voluntary loan to the city granted by the faction of Maximilian merits further attention because of a remarkable fact, in January 1488, ten citizens lent voluntarily to the city (for a total sum of 3,560 lb. par.). (106) This loan was a panic measure of the faction in order to fight the Ghent army which had invaded the surrounding cities of Bruges--but their efforts would be in vain. Because of the urgency and the political aim of the loan, most creditors belonged to the wealthy part of the Maximilian faction. Lanchals' brother-in-law Jan van Nieuwenhove (son of Michiel), for example, lent 300 lb. par. One creditor, however, did not belong to Maximilian's faction. Jan de Boot, a member of the core of the Moreel faction in 1483-85 voluntary lent 300 lb. par. to prevent challengers to archducal power from taking over power in the county. How to explain Jan de Boot's strange act? At first sight it can indicate the regime had exerted a certain political pressure on its adversaries to lend money to the urban administration. But there can also be another explanation. Maybe Jan de Boot's tie with the Moreel faction was based on mutual usefulness, and therefore he switched to the other faction when he could no longer exploit the Moreel taction for some reason. I categorized Jan de Boot as a faction member of the Moreel faction because he exercised power during the reign of the faction in town and he was surety for Willem Moreel in February 1482. However, Jan de Boot was married to Lysbette Dhondt, the sister of Jan Dhondt. Jan Dhondt was a wealthy citizen of Bruges who was appointed receiver of Bruges by Maximilian in June 1485. (107) Jan de Boot therefore had a relational tie with a member of the periphery of the Maximilian faction. Maybe Jan Dhondt convinced Jan de Boot to contribute to the loan of January 1488. Or did Jan de Boot opportunistically lend to the new regime because he thought the Moreel faction would never return to power again? This complicated case shows an historian cannot always reconstruct boundaries of factions because he lacks adequate sources, but also because of their own vagueness. The case of Jan de Boot serves as a warning to the historian who wants to rationalize political history. Some faction members could have been quite opportunistic in their political choice. As was noticed for sixteenth-century factions, followers could move from one faction to another especially in times of political turmoil. (108) This opportunism can be explained by the nature of political conflicts themselves. Because their outcome never was clear for the contemporary, he had to make the best of the opportunities that presented themselves. On such occasions, economic interests, social ties, ideological factors, but also opportunistic choices could determine an individual's political position.

The two factions compared

As did the faction of Willem Moreel, the faction of Maximilian clustered social capital. Their nuclei consisted of dense and cohesive networks, bound together by relational ties and patronage. But their resources differed widely. While Willem Moreel and his companions gained economic goods and financial means from international trade, the members of Lanchals' network gained their economic capital from fief holding, court patronage, and political services when governing the city. The economic state capital Maximilian invested in Lanchals through patronage therefore seeped through to the members of the sheriff's network. But the strong relationship that the faction of Pieter Lanchals and his companions had with the archduke was also its downfall. Once Maximilian of Austria was imprisoned in Bruges in February 1488, the network lost its political protector. It no longer received the economic capital of the state, and it was evident that if the legitimacy of the Archduke was attacked, the network would lose its authority to govern Bruges. Factions are difficult to maintain if their resources become exhausted. (109) The lack of filtered state capital seriously weakened the social network of Pieter Lanchals in spring 1488. When imprisoned in the city of Bruges, the Archduke and his local faction were deprived of state finances and military forces to prevent the rival faction from striking back. The execution of Pieter Lanchals and Jan van Nieuwenhove (son of Michael) was not only a vengeful act, it was a resolute strategy of Moreel's faction to erase the social capital of Maximilian's state apparatus in the city. Once Lanchals' social network was gone, its rivals could take over power. Only political allies who had joined the Lanchals faction in the preceding years in its periphery remained loyal to the Archduke, but they too became the victim of repression. (110) Once Maximilian lost his faction in town, he no longer had access to the necessary social capital to govern the city. Patronage therefore is a weak tie between the ruler and local factions. When patronage disappears, the court no longer has the people in town to rule it. From this point of view, Heers, Blockmans, Beik, and others are right when they claim the weakness of the central state apparatus stimulated factional struggle.

But factional conflict would not have taken place without the presence of a cohesive alternative political body in town. The Moreel faction was a dense kinship group, and its social base was more deeply rooted in urban society than the social base of Maximilian's faction. In contrast to the latter, the components of the Moreel faction did have the support of a wide range of merchant networks and the craft guilds in town. Neither the noblemen of the Franc of Bruges, nor the social network of Pieter Lanchals, nor the wealthy Brugians who joined them had social connections with representatives of the guilds. The "authority of violence" Maximilian's faction professed during the regency of the Habsburg prince was designed to mask the inadequate social support of the regime and its lack of political legitimacy and social trust. However, by using violence, the regime could not destroy the structural social and political ties between the members of the Moreel faction. Because Pieter Lanchals and his companions did not have powerful social networks to rely on when Maximilian was imprisoned, neither their relatives nor other faction members could stop their execution. The challenging faction now could fill the political vacuum because the social capital of the faction enabled it to disperse persuasive ideas and to mobilise sufficient resources in times of need.

But the faction of Willem Moreel also had its weaknesses. Twice during the Flemish Revolt, in spring 1485 and autumn 1490, Archduke Maximilian succeeded in conquering the city. In each case a blockade of the city was efficient at eroding the economic power basis of the faction. Without the revenues from international trade, the faction lost its vital resources. But other aspects also weakened the faction. Although 1 did not study the aspect of the legitimacy of the faction in detail, it is possible the faction never succeeded in accumulating sufficient authority to contest the legitimacy of the regency of Maximilian. The suggestive evidence of shifting faction members can prove that some members only adhered to the faction out of opportunistic motives, not because they were convinced of the legitimacy of its rule. Although social ties between people seem to have been one of the most important guidelines in factional struggle, it was not the only one. The faction had assembled sufficient social capital in town to overtake the rule of rivals in times of their weakness, but it did not succeed in gaining political support outside town. Maximilian of Austria could mobilise financial and military means from regions other than the county of Flanders after he was released in Bruges. The Flemish Philippins had very few allies outside Flanders in their revolt against Maximilian of Austria. The lack of social capital and political support for the Flemish 'rebels' in other regions was difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. (111)


This article demonstrates that social theory (especially Bourdieu's thinking, social network analysis, and social capital theory) is a valuable tool for describing factional struggle, but historical research is needed to concretize sociological terminology. Although social capital helps to define the structure of factions, it does not explain why and when a faction succeeded in seizing political power. Detailed historical research has pointed out that differences in social structure, political ideas, and the economic resources of factions can explain why one faction was more powerful than another in moments that state power was weak. Both factions in Bruges--the faction of Willem Moreel, and the faction of Maximilian--had a dense and cohesive core. Both were clusters of social capital, which created trust among the members, channelled information, dispersed ideas and goods, and protected members of the faction from political attacks. In contrast to the faction of Maximilian, however, the resources of the faction of Willem Moreel originated from international trade. The Maximilian faction in contrast only received profits from fief holding and courtly patronage. When the economic and symbolic capital of the state was insufficient to govern the county--for example when tax revenues collapsed and the legitimacy of power was undermined--the local court faction could lose power in the city for its resources were insufficient to avert the political attack of its rivals. Because its social capital was provided with sufficient resources, the Moreel faction could easily regain power when the Maximilian faction lost control over coercive means.

As elsewhere, factional struggle in Flanders was about economic interests, political motives, and strong ideas. In Bruges, the faction of Willem Moreel tried to protect its economic wealth by introducing a corporate model of urban government, and in collaboration with the Ghent elite, a federal model of territorial government. In contrast, the Burgundian-Habsbutg dynasty tried to increase its fiscal revenues by governing the cities and the county of Flanders in an autocratic way. But in its attempts to accumulate financial means, the dynasty was a giant with feet of clay. At moments when its authority was contested, violence could keep the local networks of the court in power only for a temporary period. Loyal networks of the prince could not survive politically (or even physically) the combination of contested legitimacy to wield power, insufficient economic resources, and weak social support in Bruges. State structure was fragile in Flanders, and it would remain politically weak when powerful alternatives to the dynasty were present in the main cities of the county. The patronage relation of the state could hardly break the economic and marriage networks of urban rivals. Revolt could spread out like a plague when challengers felt the need to gain power to the detriment of the state elite and if they got the opportunity. It was a "damned plague", not only for the inhabitants of the cities who became the victim of violence, inherent in factional struggle, but also for the central state and its local allies.

Department of Medieval History Ghent, Belgium


The research of this article was financed by an IAP-project {VI, 32) of the Federal Science Policy of Belgium. 1 want to thank Marc Boone, Elisabeth Crouzet.-Pavan, Jan Dumolyn, Martha Howell, Sherman Hutton, Susie Sutch, Katerine Wilson, and the redaction of the journal of Social History for their comments and help.

(1.) "Twelcke was wel een vermaledyde fdaghe, daer dye stoic van Brugghe in groot verdriet mede quam, want tvolc was so partyich van dese//benden da: den eenen hroedrc yeghen dander was. Jae, datmeer es, man ende wijj malcanderen ghetraut hebbende, haiLLm ompaeys om der partyen wille" (Diis die Excellente Cronike van Vlaenderen, W. Vorsterman, ed. [Antwerp, 1531] 26lv.).

(2.) In I486 Maximilian of Austria had minted new coins, the 'Moneta archiduciun . Consequently, the political supporters of Maximilian were called 'Monetanen'. 'Want het vole binnen der stoic gheworden was van twee secten, waerof deene hieten Monetanen, te wetene die metten Roomschen amine [Maximilian of Austria) waren, ende dandere hie ten Phelippinnen, dats te verstane die metten hertoghe Pheiips [Philip the Fair] waren ende metten///Leden slams [The three Members of Flanders; i.e. the cities Ghent, Bruges and Ypres]1 (Dits die Excellente Cronike, 261v.).

(3.) For example J. Heers, Factions and political life in the medieval West (New York, 1977) and W. Blockmans, "Veto, partijstrijd en staatsmacht. Een vergelijking (met de nadruk op Vlaanderen)," in J. Marsilje, ed., Bloedwraak, partijstrijd en pacf/icaue in laai-middeieeum Vlaanderen (Hilversum, 1990), 9-33.

(4.) W. Beik, "Urban factions and the social order during the minority of Louis XIV," French Historical Studies, 15 (1987), 66-67. See also his Urban protest in seventeenthcentury France. The culture of retribution (Cambridge, 1997), 173-198.

(5.) The combination of both methodological tools is an excellent means to discover patterns of social relations. C. Verbruggen, "Literary strategy during Flanders' golden decades: combining social network analysis and prosopography," in K. Keats-Rohan, ed., Prosopography, Approaches and applications (Oxford, 2007), 599.

(6.) J. Padgett and C. Ansell, "Robust action and the rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American journal of Sociology, 98 (1993), 1310.

(7.) M. Weber, Economy arid society. An outline of interpretive sociology (London, 1968, R. Roth and C. Wittich, eds.). H. Bruhns, "Ville et Etat che: Max Weber," Les Annates du Recherche Urbaine, 38 (1988), 4. T. Ertman, "State formation and state building in Europe," inT. Janoskin, et al., eds., The handbook nf political sociology. States, civil societies, and globalization (Cambridge, 2005), 367-383.

(8.) N. Elias, Uber den Prozess der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und Psychogenetische Untersuchungen (Basel, 1939), II, 434-454- J.-P. Genet, "Which state rises?," Historical Re search, 65 (1992), 119-133. C Tilly and W. Blockmans, eds., Cities and the rise of states in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800 (Oxford, 1994). R. Bonney, ed., The rise of the fiscal state in Europe, c. 1200-1815 (Oxford, 1999).

(9.) P. Bourdieu, "Rethinking the state: genesis and structure of the bureaucratic field," Sociohgical theory, 12 (1994), 4-

(10.) P. Bourdieu and J. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago, 1992), 119. Following Gaggio, I view social capital not as a publicly owned, unintentionally produced and functionally deployed resource (as James Coleman or Robert Putnam do). It is the property of individuals, and networks, as a resource that is constructed in the arena of political deliberation, and therefore as a relational practice that can be as productive of conflict and inequalities as of order and harmony (D. Gaggio, "Do social historians need social capital?," Social History, 29 (2004), 510; see also D. Halpern, Social capital (Cambridge, 2005), 38-39).

(11.) J. Dumolyn, "The political and symbolic economy of state feudalism. The case of late-medieval Flanders," Historical Materialism, 1 5 (2007), 126-128. See also M. Hicks, Bastard feudalism (Harlow, 1995).

(12.) M. Boone, "Elites urbaines, noblesse d'etat: bourgeois et nobles dans la societe des Pays-Bas bourguignons (principalementenFlandre cten Brabant)," in J. Paviot, ed., Liber Amicorum Raphael De Smedt. 3 Historia. (Louvain, 2001), 61-85. j. Dumolyn, "Nobles, patricians and officers: the making of a regional political elite in late medieval Flanders," Journal of Social History, 40 (2006), 431-452.

(13.) Sociological and political studies confirm Bourdieu's point of view concerning the necessity of social capital for the political support of a government; see for example: K. Newton, "Political support: social capital, civil society, and political and economical performance," Political Studies, 54 (2006), 846-864; R. Jackman and R. Miller, "Social capital and politics," Annua! Review of Political Science, 1 (1998), 47-7.3; S. Szreter, "The state of social capital; bringing back in power, politics, and history," Theory and Society, 31 (2002), 573-621.

(14.) See for example the discussion between R. Davies, "The medieval state: the tyranny or a concept?," and S. Reynolds, "There were states in medieval Europe: a response to Rees Davies," in the Journal of Historical Sociology, 16 (2003), respectively 280-299, and 550-555.

(15.) F. Buylaert, "Familiekwesties. De beheersing van vetes en private contlicten in de elite van het laatmiddeleeuws Gent," Stadsgeschiedenis, I (2007), 1-19. See also M. Van Dijck, "De stad als onafhankelijke variahele en centrum van modcrniteit. Langetermijntrends in stedeiijke en rurale criminalirdrsprocessen in de Nederlanden (1300-1800)," Stadsgeschiedenis, 1 (2006), 7-26.

(16.) Heers, Factions and political life, 10-11.

(17.) High density refers to a great number of actual relations or social ties among the set of actors in the cluster (M. Emirbaycr and j. Goodwin, "Network analysis, culture, and the problem of Agency," American journal of Sociology, 99 (1994), 1447-1449). See also S. Wasserman and K. Faust, Social network analysis. Methods and applications (Cambridge, 1994); P. Carrington, et al., eds., Models and methods in social network analysis (Cambridge, 2005).

(18.) About this topic: C. Tilly, Trust and rule (Cambridge Mass., 2005).

(19.) L. Martines, April Wood. Florence and the plot against the Medici (Oxford, 2003). E. Crouzet-Pavan, Enfers et paradis. L'ltalie de Dante et de Giotto (Paris, 2001). D, Kent, The Rise of the Medici. Faction in Florence, /426-I434 (Oxford, 1978). C. Lansing, The Florentine Magnates. Lineage and faction in a medieval commune (Princeton, 1991). E. Ives, Faction m Tudor England (London, 1979). R. Shephard, "Court factions in early modern England," Journal of Modern History, 64 (1992), 723-728. D. Potter, "Politics and faction at the court of Francis I: the Duchesse d'Etampes, Montmorency and the dauphin Henri," French History, 21 (2007), 127-146.

(20.) J. Boissevain, Friends of friends. Networks, manipulators and coalitions (New York, 1974), 192-205. R. Nicholas, "Factions: a comparative analysis," in S. Schmidt, et al., eds., Friends, followers, and factions: a reader in political clieritelism (Berkeley, 1977). 5 i 58.

(21.) Blockmans, "Vete, partijstrijd en staatsmacht," 32-3.

(22.) J. Block, Factional politics and the English Reformation, 1520-1540 (Woodbridge, 1993), 2-3. See also T. Mayer, "Faction and ideology: Thomas Starkey's dialogue," The Historical foumal, 28 (1985), 1-25. A. Duffm, Faction and faith. Politics and religion of the Cornish gentry before the Civil War (Exeter, 1996). S. Clay, "La guerre des plumes: la presse provincial et la politique de factions sous le premier Directoirc a Marseille, 1796--1797," Annates historicfues de la Revolution francaise, 308 (1997), 221-247. D. Luebke, His majesty's rebels. Communities, /actions & rural revolt in the Black Forest, 1725-1745 (Ithaca, 1997).

(23.) Crouzet-Pavan, Enfers et parodis, 152. G. Milani, I comuni italiani (Rome, 2005), 129-139. J,-CI. Maire-Vigueur, Cavaliers et citoyens. Guerre et (kins I'Italic commu-nale, Xlh-XUle siecles (Pans, 200.3).

(24.) M. Van Gent, Pertijelike saken: Hoeken en Kabeljauwen in het Bourgondisch-Oostenrijkse tijdpcrk (VGravenhage, 1994). S. Ter Braakc, Met recht en rekenschap. De ambtenaren bij hetHofvan Holland en de liaagse Rekenkamer in de Habsburgse Tijd (1483-1558) (Hilver-sum, 2007), 258-309.

(25.) M. Boone, "Une sociere urbanisee sous tension. Le comte de Flandre vers 1302," in R. Van Caenegera, ed., 1302. Le desastre de Coartrot. Fairs et mythes de la bataille des Eperons d'Or (Antwerp, 2002), 27-77. S. Cohn, Lust for liberty. The politics of social revolt in medieval Europe, !200-1425. Italy, France, and Flanders (Cambridge Mass., 2006), passim.

(26.) D. Nicholas, The van Arteveldes of Ghent. The varieties of vendetta and the hero in history (New York, 1988).

(27.) Chronijcke van Ghendi door Jan van den Vivere en eenige andere mnteekenaars der XVI.' en XVUe eeuvj, F. de Potter, ed. (Ghent, 1885), 18. See J. Haemers, De Gentse opstand (1449-1453). De strijd tussennetwerken om het stedehjke kapiuiul (Kortrijk, 2004), 140. The mentioned chroniclers used a typical medieval vocabulary to describe political alliance and friendship, see K. Oschema, und Ndfie im spdtmittelalterlichen Burgund. Studien zum Spannungsfeld von Emotion und Institution (Koln, 2006), 255-269.

(28.) W. Blockmans and W. Prevenier, The promised lands: the Low Countries under Bur-gundian rule, 1369-1530 (Philadelphia, 1999), 196-203. W. Blockmans, "Autocratie ou polyarchies La luttc pour le pouvoir politique en Flandre de 1482 a 1492, d'apres des documents inedits," I landclmgcn nm de Koninklijke Commissie voor, 140 (1974), 257-368. A. Janssens, "Macht en onmacht van de Bmgse schepenbank in de pcriode 1477-1490," 1 landelingen van het Genootschap vnor Geschiedenis, 1 33 (1996), 5-45.

(29.) See for example J. Murray, Bruges, cradle of capitalism, 1280-1390 (Cambridge, 2005).

(30.) L. Martines, "The authority of violence: notes on Renaissance Florence," in E. Lecuppre-Desjardin and A.-L. Van Bruaene, eds., Emotions in the heart of the city (14th-16th century) (Turnhout, 2005), 33. M. Boone, "La justice en spectacle. La justice urbaine en Flandre et la crise du pouvoir bourguignon (1477-1488)," Revue Historique, 125 (2003), 43-65.

(31.) R. Wellens, "La revoke brugeoise de 1488," Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis, 102 (1965), 5-52; J. Haemers and E. Lecuppre-Desjardin, "Conquerir et reconquerir 1'espace urbain. Le triomphe de la collectivite sur i'individu dans le cadre de la revoke brugeoise de 1488," in C. Billcn and C. Deligne, eds., Voisinages, coexistences et appropriations. Groupes sociaux & territoires urbains duMoyen Age au 16'' siede (Turnhout, 2007), 119-143.

(32.) J. Haemers, C. Van I lootebeeck, and H. Wijsman, eds., Entre la ville, la noblesse et I'Etav. Philippe de Cleves (1456-1528), homme politique et bibliophile (Turnhout, 2007).

(33.) P. Stabcl and J. Haemers, "From Bruges to Antwerp. International commercial firms and government's credit in the late 1 5th and early 16th century," in C. Sanz Ayan and R. Garcia Garcia, eds., Bctnai, credito y capital. La monarquia Hispaniea y antiguos Raises Bajos, 1505-1700 (Madrid, 2006), 21-37.

(34.) Boissevain, Friends of friends, 195-200. Boissevain considers a multiplex network as a social network with two or more types of relations linking actors (see also Emirbayer and Goodwin, Network analysis, 1448).

(35.) Martines, April Blood, passim. See also G. Xhayet, Reseaux de pouvoir et solidarity de parti a Liege au mown age (1250-1468) (Geneve, 1997), 397.

(36.) B. Erickson, "Social networks and history," Historical methods, 30 (1997), 149-158. J. Scott, Social network analysis, 2nd edition (London, 2000), 114-120.

(37.) J. Haemers, "Moreel (Willem) " NationaalBiografisch Woordenboek, 18 (2007), 681-689; A. Janssens, "Willem Moreel en Hans Mernling. Bijdrage rot het onderzoek naar de schilderijen van Mernling in opdracht van de famtlie Moreel," Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis, 140 (2003), 83-84.

(38.) T.-H. Borchert, De portretten van Hans Mernling (Bruges, 2005), 168 and 172.

(39.) A. Schulte, Die Fugger in Rom, 1495-1523: mit Studien zur Geschichte des lurchlichcn Einanzwesens jener Zeit (Leipzig, 1904), 1, 8; M- Vacs, "Les fondations hospitalieres fla-mandes a Rome du XVe au XVIIIe siecle," Bulletin de. I'lnsiiim lusumque beige de Rome, 1 (1919), 195.

(40.) R. Doehaerd, Etudes Anversoises. Documents sur le commerce international a Anvers (Paris, 1963), II, 102; O. Mus, "De Brugse compagnie Despars op het eindc van de 15e eeuw," Handelingen van het Genootschap voor, 101 (1964), 96. On the economic activities of companies in Bruges: P. Stabel, "Entre commerce international et economie locale. Le monde financier de Wouter Ameyde (Bruges tin XVe-debut XVIe siecle)," in M. Boone and W. Preventer, eds., Finances et finances privees au bos MoyenAge (Louvain, 1996), 75-99.

(41.) Willem Moreel had several houses in Bruges, a fief in Zuienkerke ('Qostcleyhem'), Jan de Keyt had fiefs in Moerkerke, Oostkerke, and Dudzele (janssens, "Willem Moreel," 70; Haemers, "Moreel," 682-683; State Archives in Bruges: 'Burg van Brugge', nr. 64, 14v and Archives departementalesdu Nord (Lille, France--henceforth: ADN): B 17732, 'Keyt').

(42.) M. Howell, "The social logic of the marital household in cities of the late medieval Low Countries," in M. Carlier and T. Soens, eds., 7 he household in late medieval cities. Italy and Northwestern Europe compared (Louvain, 2001), 194.

(43.) Dits die Excellente Cronike, 222v-224v.

(44.) A. Janssens, "Daar komen de Brugse kruisboogschutters van de 'oude' Gtlde van Sint-Joris (tweede helft vijftiende eeuw)," Brugs ommeland, 46 (2006), 63.

(45.) J. Everaert, "Les Lem, alias Leme. Une dynastic marchande d'origine flamande au service de ['expansion portugaise," in Adas. Ill coli'updo international de historia da Madeira (Madeira, 1993), 817-838. J. Paviot, "Les flamands au Portugal au XVe siecle (Lisbonne, Madere, Acores)," Amis de Historia de Alem-Mar, 7 (2006), 28-32.

(46.) General State Archives (Brussels): Chambers of Accounts, nr. 17404, 4r; State Archives in Bruges: 'Burg van Brugge', nr. 64, 261v.

(47.) City archives of Bruges (henceforth: CAB): Register of the City council, 1468-1501, 141 v.

(48.) J. Gailliard, Bruges et le franc ou leur magistrature et leur noblesse, avec des donne'es historiques genealogique sur chaque famile (Bruges, 1857), I, 319. About the Adornes: N. Geirnaert and A. Vandewalle, eds., Adornes en Jeruzalem. Internationaal leven in het I5de-en\6de-eeuwse Brugge (Bruges, 1983).

(49.) Dies die Excellent? Cronike, 222v-224v.

(50.) CAB: 'Klerk van de Vicrscharc', nr. 828bis, 253.

(51.) He was a captain in the Bruges army that fought against Maximilian and died in battle in 1489. J. Haemers, "Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin. De juridische en militaire strijd tussen vorst, stad en adel om sociale erkenning en politieke macht (1472-1492)," Handelingen van het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis, 142 (2005), 252-253.

(52.) CAB: Accounts of the city, 1479-1480, 167v. About his fief: Stare Archives of Bruges, 'Burg van Brugge', nr. 64, 263v and General State Archives (Brussels): Chambers of Accounts, nr. 13788, 2v.

(53.) Haemers, "Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin," 235-236.

(54.) Reviewing historical research on factions, Shephard ("Court factions," 744) stated "natural tics of local and regional honor" shaped factions in the era of bastard feudalism.

(55.) See for example P. Bourdieu, "Les strategies matnmoniales dans le systeme de re production," Annates. Economies, Societe's, Civilisations, 27 (1972), 1105-1127 and C. Levi-Strauss, Les structures ele'menraires de la parente (Paris, 1949). For medieval Flemish cities: J. Dumolyn, "Investeren in sociaal kapitaal. Netwerken en sociale transacties van Bourgondische ambtenaren," Tijdschrift voor Sociale Geschiedenis, 28 (2002), 417-438; M. Howell, "From land to love. Commerce and marriage in Northern Europe during the late Middle Ages," Jaarboek voor Middelewwse Geschidenis, 10 (2007), 216-253.

(56.) ADN: B 3495, nr. 123686.

(57.) About cohesive groups: Erickson, "Social networks," 153. Wasserman and Faust, "Social network analysis," chapter 7. D. Knok and S. Yang, Social network analysis, 2nd edition (Los Angeles, 2008), 72-73.

(58.) K. Robbins, "The social mechanisms of urban rebellion: a case study of leadership in the 1614 Revolt at La Rochelle," French Historical Studies, 19 (1995), 559-590.

(59.) In February 1477, for example, Willem travelled to the widow of Charles, Margaret of York, in Malines to negotiate a resolution to the political crisis (in order to 'vercrighenc zekere nieuwe pointen ende artikelen van previlegen'; CAB: Accounts of the city, 1476-77, 128v). About the revolt of 1477: W. Blockmans, ed., 1477. Het algemene ende gewesieliike privilegien van Maria van Bourgondie voor de Nederlanden (Courttai, 1985).

(60.) He was 'principael bouchoudere' of the city (CAB: Accounts of the city, 1478-1479, 44v).

(61.) CAB: Register of the City council, 1468-1501, 94v.

(62.) Maarten Lem was burgomaster in 1477 and 1480, Willem Moreel in 1478, Jan van Rieheke (who was imprisoned together with Willem Moreel in December 1481) exercised this function in 1479.

(63.) In 1438 Duke Philip the Good had suppressed a revolt of the craft guilds by abolishing the political and economic rights of the guilds. See J. Dumolyn, De Brugse up.stisnd, 1436-38 (Kortrijk, 1997).

(64.) About the Bruges craft guilds: P. Stabel, "Guilds in late medieval Flanders: myths and realities of guild life in an export-oriented environment," Jowncd of Medieval History, 30 (2004), 187-198; J. Dumolyn "Population et structures professionnelles a Bruges aux XlVe et XVe siecles," Revue duNurd, 81 (1999), 43-64.

(65.) M. Prak, "Corporate politics in the Low Countries: guilds as institutions, 14th to 18th centuries," in idem, et ah, eds., Craft guilds in the early modern Low Countries. Work, power and representation (Aldershot, 2006), 74-82.

(66.) J. Dumolyn and J. Haemers, "Patterns of Urban Rebellion in Medieval Flanders," Journal of Medieval History, 31 (2005), 369-393; M. Boone, "The Dutch Revolt and the medieval tradition of urban disstnt" Journal of Early Modern History, 11 (2007), 351-375.

(67.) CAB: Fonds Adornes, nr. 361; General State Archives (Brussels): Chambers of Accounts, nr. 17412, Iv.

(68.) CAB: Procuraties, 1485, 1 32r, and 1492, It.

(69.) For what follows, see Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, III, 373.

(70.) CAB: Fonds Adornes, nrs. 363 and 368.

(71.) Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, 1, 321.

(72.) Namely Marc van de Velde and Steven van der Gheinste were made part of the city-bench that was appointed atter the imprisonment of Maximilian in February 1488; fan Dhamere was burgomaster. Frans Ridsaert was councillor of Bruges in 1483 and 1488. Boudin Petyt, Jan Losschaert, and Colard de Labye were made part of the city bench of April 1482 that was appointed after the death of Mary of Burgundy (CAB: Registers of the City council, 123v and l72r). See also: J. Van Leeuwen, "Balancing tradition and rites of rebellion: the ritual transfer of power in Bruges on 12 February 1488," in idem, ed., Symbolic communication in late medieval towns (Louvain, 2006), 65-81.

(73.) L. Derycke, "The public annuity market in Bruges at the end of the 15th century," in M. Boone, K. Davids and P. Janssens, eds., Urban public debts. Urban government and the market for annuities in Western Europe, 14th-l8th centuries (Turnhout, 2003), 165-181.

(74.) CAB: Accounts of the city (AC), 1476-77, 99v and 1 lOv; AC, 1477-78, 118v; AC, 1478-79, 126v-128r; AC, 1478-79, 151r-v.

(75.) Steven van der Gheinste and Boudin Petyt had bought one annuity each, Frans Ridsaert and Colard de Labye two each, and Jan Dhamere three. CAB: Accounts of the city (AC), 1477-78, 115r-v, 118v, 122r-v;AC, 1478-79, 150r; AC, 1481-82, 143r.

(76.) Prak, "Corporate politics," 74-76. J. Dambruyne, "De middenstand in opstand. Corporatieve aspiraties en transformaties in het zestiende-eeuwse Gent," Handelmgen van de "Maatschappij wot Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde te dent, 57 (2003), 71-122.

(77.) Haemers, "Philippe de Cleves," 55-58.

(78.) The list of tax payers is edited by W. Blockmans, "De belastingsbetalers tc Brugge (1488-1490) en te Gent (1492-1494), register van persoonsnamen," in idem, C. Pauwe-lyn and L. Wynant, cds., Studien hetrejjende dc sociale strukturen te Brugge, kortrijk en Gent in de 14e en 15e eeuw. Deel III; mbelien en register van persoonsnamen (Kortrijk, 1973), 211-287. A short analysis of the political circumstances of these loans: W. Blockmans, "Nieuwc gcgevens over de gegoede burgerij in Brugge in de 13e en vooral 15e eeuw," in idem, et al., eds., Studiiin hctrcfjende de sociale strukturen te Brugge, Kortrijk en Gent in de 14e en 15e eeuw. Deel 1: Tekst (Kortrijk, 1971), 138. The original account in CAB: Accounts of the war, nr. 5 (1488-1489), 4r-19v.

(79.) An unskilled labourer daily earned about 48 d. par. in 1488 (E. Seholliers, "Lonen te Brugge en in het Brugse Vrije (XVe-XVIle eeuw)," in Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant (Bruges, 1965), II, 87-160).

(80.) In 1477 Bruges had about 40,000-45,000 inhabitants. A. Janssens, "Het Brugse bevolkingsaantal in 1477," in Van middeleeuwen tot heden. Bladeren door Brugse kunst en geschiedenis (Bruges, 198 5), 29-35; Dumolyn, "Popularion et structures profcssionnelles," 6.3.

(81.) Respectively 204 lb. par., 300 lb. par., 600 lb. par., 96 lb. par., and 288 lb. par. (Block-mans, "De belastingbetalers," 234, 240, 244, 267, 278).

(82.) The two daughters of Mathijs Peyaert, the leader of the Ghent faction of Maximilian, were married to members of the Bruges faction of Maximilian: Yeronimus Lauwerein and Filips van den Berghc. V. Fris, "Pehaert (Mathieu)," Biographie Nationale, 16 (1901), 867-869; J. Haemers and T. Soens, "Lauwerein (Yeronimus van)," Nationaal Biografiscfi Woordenboek, 18 (2007), 584-592.

(83.) M. Boone, "Lanchals (Picter)," Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek, 13 (1990), 471-780.

(84.) A similar case, of Pieter Bladelin, is dealt with in W. Declercq, J. Dumolyn, and J. Haemers, "Vivre noblement. The material and immaterial construction of elite-identity in late medieval Flanders; the case of Peter Bladelin and William Hugonet," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 38 (2007), 1-31.

(85.) This is about twelve times the daily wage of an unskilled labourer in Bruges (ADN: B2121, 93v).

(86.) A case-study about patronage in fifteenth-century Flanders in W. Blockmans, "Patronage, Brokerage and Corruption as Symptoms of Incipient State Formation in the Burgundian-Habsburg Netherlands," in A. Maczak, ed., Klientelsysteme im Europa der Fruhen Neuzeit (Munich, 1988), 117-126.

(87.) ADN: B 2140, 92r. In 1487 he was already in civil service as receiver of tolls in Bruges (CAB: Accounts of the city, 1487-88, 3 lr). His portrait in Borchert, De portretten van Hans Memling, 173.

(88.) CAB: Registers of the City council, 165v.

(89.) CAB: Accounts of the city, 1477-78, 154v.

(90.) CAR: Registers of the City council, L85r.

(91.) Shephard, "Court factions," 723-724- Ives, Faction in Tudor England, 3-7.

(92.) For example Geraard de Groote, Jan van Wulfsberghe, and Jan Dhondt (CAB: Registers of the City council 148v and 157r).

(93.) In August 1478 Renier Houtmaerct (alderman in I486) was forced to go on a pilgrimage by the Bruges city council, led by Maarten Lem, because he had called Willem Moreel a 'son of a whore' ('hoerezuene'; CAB: Mcmoriaal van de Camere, 1478, 19r). In June 1485, Maximilian appointed his brother Willem Houtmaert, who also had quarrelled with Moreel in 1478, as one of the new treasurers of the city (CAB: Registers of the City council, 148v).

(94.) CAB: Accounts of the city, 1476-77, Hv, and 1482-83, 4Gv-4U

(95.) In spring 1477, the Bruges craft guilds successfully had strived for the loss of the political rights of the Franc (W. Prevenier, "Realite et histoire, Le quatrieme membre de Flandre," Revue duNord, 43 (1961), 6-14).

(96.) Haemers, "Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin," 223-225.

(97.) F. Buylaert, "Sociale mobiliteit bij stedelijke elites in laatmiddcleeuws Vlaanderen. Een gevalstudie over de Vlaamsc familie De Baenst," Jaarboek voor Middeleeuwse Ge-schiedenis, 8 (2005), 201-25 ].

(98.) Boone, "Lanchals," 472.

(99.) Gailliard, Bruges et le Franc, V, 149.

(100.) ADN: B 5346 and B 2121, 62r.

(101.) Haemers, "Middelburg na Pieter Bladelin," 222-225 (for what follows).

(102.) Buylaert, "Sociale mobiliteit," 212-214.

(103.) Derycke, "The public annuity market," 181. For comparable evidence in Ghent: M. Boone, "'Plus dueil que joie.' Renreverkopen door de stad Gent in de Bourgondis-che periods: tussen private belangen en publieke financien," Gemeentekrediet van Beigie, driemaandeiijks tijdschrift, 45 (1991), 3-26.

(104.) CAB: Accounts of the city, 1485-86, 1 14v, 117v, and 1488-89, 103r, 108v.

(105.) CAB: Accounts of the city, 1485-86, 115v, M6v,and 1488-89, 104v, 109r.

(106.) CAB: Accounts of the city, 1487-88, 30v.

(107.) ADN: B 4121, 79v; CAB: Procuraties, 1485, 13lr.

(108.) Shephard, "Court factions," 733.

(109.) Boissevain, Friends of friends, 196-197.

(110.) Wellens, "La revolte brugeoise," 45-48.

(111.) J. Haemers and L. Sicking, "l)e Vlaamse Opstand van Filips van Kleef en de Nederlandse Opstand van Willem van Oranje. Een vergelijking," Ujdschrifl voor Gcschk'dcnis t (119 )(2006), 328-347- More general: W. Blockmans, "Voracious states and obstructing cities: an aspect of state formation in preindusfrial Europe," Theory arid Society, 18 (1989), 733-755.

By Jelle Haemers

Ghent University
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Author:Haemers, Jelle
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Date:Jun 22, 2009
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