Facing the CSS Challenge.
For many, the term Force XXI has only one meaning--digitization. But for those who serve in the Army's first Force XXI division--the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood, Texas--Force XXI has many implications. This article focuses on only one of the challenges of being a Force XXI organization--combat-service support (CSS). Under the old Army of Excellence modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), CSS was organic to the mechanized engineer battalion in the form of a battalion support platoon found in the headquarters company. The support platoon consisted of a food-service section, a distribution section, and a maintenance section. Force XXI changed all of that. No longer is CSS organic to the engineer battalion; instead, support has been reorganized under the command and control of the forward-support battalion (FSB). Today, the engineer support element (ESE) provides CSS to the engineer battalion.
The engineer battalion was not the only organization in the division to undergo such a change. CSS to maneuver battalions was also reorganized under the command and control of the FSB. However, there were some fundamental differences between the CSS to maneuver battalions as compared to the engineer battalion. The reorganization established forward-support companies (FSCs) for each supported maneuver battalion, while the ESE--initially an engineer support platoon (ESP)--was established to support the engineer battalion. The ESE--which is not a company--is, in fact, subordinate to the base support company. This subtle difference has a significant impact on how CSS is provided to the engineer battalion.
The Army leadership knowingly took significant risks with engineer CSS structure several years ago. Experiences at National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 99-05, Fort Irwin, California, proved that this risk was so great that it placed the overall maneuver mission at risk, and the initial ESP was upgraded to an ESE.
The multifunctional ESE operates on a centralized CSS concept, providing all classes of supply, food service, distribution, and tactical field maintenance to the engineer battalion and to itself. The ESE leader is capable of cross leveling between the engineer repair sections/teams to weight the main effort as the mission dictates. The three forward engineer repair sections (FERSs) and three engineer combat repair teams (CRTs) provide the immediate capability and task-organization flexibility to support our Force XXI engineer battalions (see Figure 1, which is from FM 5-71-3, Brigade Engineer Combat Operations [Armored]).
Headquarters Section Provides command and control and overall supervision of the element and its assigned or attached personnel. Through the direction of higher headquarters and the allocation of a logistics officer (03/90A00) as the leader and an E7 as the senior equipment-maintenance NCO and operations sergeant, the headquarters section is designed to provide a flexible command-and-control environment.
Food-Service Section -- Plans and conducts food-service support to the engineer batta] ion along with Class I support, using its assigned mobile-kitchen trailer. The food-service section can be modularized to support companies taskorganized in an attached command relationship.
Distribution Section u Provides petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) and supply-point distribution to the engineer battalion. This section, like the others, is capable of being modularized. Of note is the extremely limited distribution capability outside of bulk POL (see Figure 2).
FERSs/Engineer CRTs u Provide maintenance support for engineer equipment. Each of the repair sections provides command and control for the repair teams. The engineer repair technician (W3/919AO) and the senior maintenance-section NCO provide maintenance and task-organization expertise. Each engineer CRT is organized with mechanics; recovery assets; contact trucks; cargo trucks; and forward repair systems, heavy (FRSH) and is supported with surge capability (the ability to push more maintenance support forward) in the FERS. Regardless of the task organization, each company CRT is always collocated with the engineer company to provide immediate forward repairs, and the team "works for" the engineer company first sergeant, even though its higher headquarters is the ESE. Additionally, mechanics in the Force XXI division are now multifunctionaluor capable of providing unit-level and direct-support maintenanceuwith the theory being that they are now able to complete levels u20 and u30 maintenance without delay to the customer.
ESE Field Test
The new ESE leader came in March, with much experience under the Force XXI CSS design. Since he had previously served as a battalion maintenance officer and a supportoperations officer in an FSC (supporting a maneuver battalion in the Force XXI design), he believed he knew how this element was supposed to operate. He had the concept but did not have the personnel or equipment with which to implement his plan. He discovered this the hard way when he went to the field for the first time with the ESE. Observing the engineer forwardsupport area and its growing unit maintenance-collection point, it became clear to the ESE leader that maintenance was the major concern for the ESE during the field exercise.
In late January 2000, the 299th Engineer Battalion deployed to the field for 2 1/2 months of continuous field training. The primary focus of the training was the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System Limited User Test. However, the 1st Brigade Combat Team saw this time as an opportunity to conduct its NTC train-up and test the new CSS redesign.
During the first week of the test, 90 percent of the battalion's armored vehicle-launched bridges (AVLBs), which drove an average of 37 miles and maintained an operational-readiness rate of about 78 percent, were parked in the engineer forwardsupport area and remained there for the entire field exercise. The Ml 13 armored personnel carriers (APCs), which averaged more than 430 miles during those 2 1/2 months, suffered through an average operational-readiness rate of 78 percent.
The design faced many challenges and was off to a rocky start. One of the obvious reasons was that only one officer was responsible for the entire support system for the engineer battalion. To maintain long-term operations, it was almost impossible for him to focus on one area with any proficiency. The ESE leader thought he would be able to concentrate on the other classes of supply (I, III and V), but Class IX and maintenance operations became the focus from day one. Managing the design places a tremendous burden and responsibility on even the most seasoned maintenance warrant officer. Additionally, the ESE had to help with maintenance on equipment such as the FRSH. The ESE had limited lift and welding capabilities but had the same amount of equipment to maintain as a maneuver battalion. The battalion executive officer, the Si, and the S4 had to turn away from their assigned duties and focus on maintenance so the ESE leader could focus on logistical support. Essentially, this pulled three staff officers awa y from their traditional missions and prevented the battalion from using the administrative and logistical-operations center as another command-and-control node for tactical operations.
The maintenance technician spent most of his time resourcing parts and attending maintenance meetings at the brigade support area when the executive officer wasn't available. This kept him from his job of providing technical expertise in the direct-support arena within the engineer forwardsupport area. The motor sergeant spent most of his time going forward to take parts to the CRT and acting as a backup for the battalion maintenance technician.
The CRTs spent more time going back to the engineer forward-support area for parts and supplies than they spent staying forward, which kept the teams from diagnosing and fixing problems in the forward area. As a result, critical systems were constantly being evacuated and returned to the fight after a lengthy stay in the engineer forward-support areauif they returned at all. Since most of the senior leadership was occupied with looking for parts and trying to manage maintenance operations, little emphasis was placed on mission-specific logistics planning for support of the battalion. The initial extended test revealed some obvious limitations in the new ESE design.
Resources. With 78 soldiers authorized, the ESE is substantially smaller than the FSCs that support the armor and infantry battalions, which have 172 and 165 personnel respectively. The food-service and distribution sections in the FSCs are larger since they admittedly support larger battalions. But the disparity is not limited to these sections.
After operating for 2 1/2 months, the battalion completed an in-depth analysis of why the CSS was so challenging. The analysis was narrowed to the following areas: personnel and equipment resources, senior leadership, and the command and control within the ESE and its relationship with the engineer battalion.
Including tanks, Bradleys, mortar carriers, command-post (CP) vehicles, and APCs, both the armor and infantry battalions have 66 tracked vehicles. The Force XXI engineer battalion also has 66 tracked vehicles: 8 M577/M 1068 CP vehicles, 28 Ml 13 APCs, 12 AVLBs, 12 M9 armored combat earthmovers (ACEs), and 6 M548 cargo carriers with Volcanos.
Similarly, armor battalions have 40 wheeled vehicles, infantry battalions have 38, and the Force XXI engineer battalion has 41. Despite comparable vehicle strengths in all supported battalions, the armor and infantry battalions are supported with 67 maintenance personnel in the FSC maintenance sections (not counting turret mechanics), while the engineer battalion is supported by only 47 maintainersuless than 70 percent of the maneuver-battalion strength. Eight Unit-Level Logistics System (ULLS) clerks support the maneuver battalions, while the ESE has only four.
The ESE also lacks the tools to support the engineer battalion, although this is mostly a supplyurather than an MTOEuissue. It has only one of three authorized common number-one tool sets. It has no FRSH or Palletized Load System (PLS) transporters (three trucks and six racks are authorized). It is also nursing three aged M88A1 medium recovery vehicles in an attempt to continue providing recovery and lift support to the battalion. This lack of tools has a direct impact on the ability of the ESE to provide responsive support. There are also MTOE disparities: the FSC prescribed load listing (PLL) sections operate out of expandable vans, have 12-ton van trailers to carry PLL, and have a SAMS-1 computer to order direct-support parts. None of these items are authorized for the PLL section of the ESE.
Figure 2, page 23, shows that, compared to the FSC, the ESE has 70 percent as many mechanics, 50 percent as many PLL clerks, and less than 50 percent as many senior NCOs. This design does not posture the ESE to successfully support an engineer battalion. These shortages cause Class IX operations to suffer, and quality assurance (QA) and quality checking (QC)--as they relate to the verification of faults, repair work, and scheduled services--are substandard. Furthermore, the requirement for these same NCOs to train and develop the junior enlisted soldiers only exacerbates the problem.
In garrison, scheduled services are conducted by the FERS, which leaves the CRTs to perform unscheduled maintenance. In the field environment, the CRTs fix forward with the supported engineer company while the FERS remains in the unit maintenance-collection point located in the engineer forward-support area to provide direct-support-level maintenance and recovery. An engineer line company CRT goes forward in an Ml13A2 APC, an M1031 contact truck, and an M88A1 medium recovery vehicle, while the FERS maintains a 5-ton truck and a high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). The CRT that supports the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and ESE maintains a 5-ton truck; an M984 heavy expanded-mobility tactical, truck (HEMTT) wrecker; and an Ml031 contact truck. Figure 2 shows the contrast between the FSC and the ESE in both numbers of personnel and equipment.
Leadership. The ESE has one officer authorized, compared to five officers authorized in each FSC (commander, executive officer, supply-and-transport [S&T] platoon leader, maintenance-platoon leader, and maintenance-control officer). The ESE is authorized seven maintenance leaders in the grade of staff sergeant or higher: a warrant officer and six NCOs. In contrast, the FSCs are authorized a warrant officer and 14 NCOs (13 NCOs for armor battalions). The impact of the leadership shortfall in the ESE is threefold: QA/QC is constrained, focusing on multiple missions (for example, deadlined pacers vs. services) is more difficult, and continued training of mechanics suffers. When the 45-man ESP was reorganized in January 2000 as the 78-man ESE, much of the manning fill was junior soldiers-privates and privates first class. This fill of junior soldiers made training and QA/QC extremely difficult.
Command and Control. The MTOE does not provide clear guidance for the command or management of maintenance elements within the ESE. There are five mechanics in the ESE headquarters that are responsible for maintaining the vehicles of the engineer-battalion HHC. The remainder of the mechanics are in three FERSs and three CRTs. This organization is clearly intended to support each of three line engineer companies with one FERS and one CRT. But the warrant officer and one E7 are identified by MTOE to supervise the FERSs, while the CRTs are each led by an independent E7, falling under the control of the ESE headquarters. This organization is flawed in two ways: If the three FERSs are consolidated according to the MTOE, FERS mechanics may not be responsive to the needs of the CRTs and their supported companies. However, if each FERS is under the control of a CRT chief, the ESE forfeits the ability to mass mechanics on engineer-battalion priorities.
Although a captain leads the ESE, this position is not considered a company command. The ESE is subordinate to the brigade support company (BSC) in the FSB. The ESE leader does not have the same access to the parent battalion as the FSCs supporting the maneuver battalions. As a subordinate to the BSC, which provides general support to the brigade, the ESE is subject to being tasked to support the brigade or FSCs. The ESE also remains subject to support BSC taskings and training priorities. Regardless of its desires to provide the best possible support to the engineer battalion, the ESE is bound by chains of command to support BSC ranges, formations, and inspections. The tie to a second chain of command, shortnotice taskings, and required training make it difficult to make long-range plans for the ESE and to shield mechanics from outside distracters.
With the knowledge gained while in the field, the engineer battalion, along with the ESE leader, organized the ESE to best support the battalion. This organization, represented in Figure 3, page 26, creates the modularity discussed in FM 5-71-3. The company support teams are aligned to help establish habitual support and working relationships with the companies. The CRTs and FERSs are for the garrison, while the distribution and food-service sections operate under the separate section NCOICs.
The battalion took the shortfalls within the ESE as an opportunity to develop a feasible solution. The first barrier to overcome with the ESE was its shortage of leadership and experienced mechanics. In May, the battalion pulled a captain from an authorized MTOE slot and moved him into an unauthorized battalion-motor-officer (BMO) position to work alongside the ESE leader. The goal was to free the ESE leader to concentrate on logistics, and the new BMO would oversee maintenance operations. The BMO was in a better position to set the priorities for the battalion and provide a better conduit of information into command channels. To move the battalion forward again, a consolidated service team was created out of the FERS teams to work on scheduled services for the entire battalion and not focus on one company. Until this time, services on some vehicles were severely outdated due to the previous design of an ESP that had only 45 personnel and could barely keep up with unscheduled maintenance, much less services. The battalion-with the support of the division-was able to contract out all wheeled services, and the consolidated battalion service team focused on the tracked vehicles.
Services were now a battalion-resourced training event that was scheduled on the battalion training calendar and took priority over all other training. Platoon leaders were required to brief the battalion commander on their respective service plans. Between May and mid-July 2000, the battalion completed all but one line-platoon service before deploying to the NTC in August. This last platoon--deploying to the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, the later part of August--conducted services to integrate new Ml 13A3 APCs after the battalion deployed to the NTC.
Another area that needed emphasis and reengineering was Class IX operations. After the Limited User Test, the PLL section was down to three clerks. The battalion augmented the section with four military occupational specialty (MOS) 1 2B clerks, one from each company. This allowed the PLL clerks to concentrate on ordering parts and reestablishing the Class IX recoverable items flow back to the FSB. With the BMO in place, the maintenance technician and the motor sergeant could get back into the "trenches," where they could direct the priorities set by the BMO and mentor the mechanics. These actions were necessary to prepare the battalion for combat operations and the upcoming NTC rotation.
Results of Adjustments
The battalion tested the adjustments made to the ESE during NTC Rotation 00-10. The NTC provided an opportunity to see if the adjustments would change the outcome from that of our experiences in the field during the early part of the year. While operating tempo was high--the M113 fleet averaged more than 317 miles, the M9s more than 302 miles, and the M548 and Ml 068 more than 160 miles--the results were nothing short of unbelievable!
Augmenting the structure and implementing different programs allowed the battalion to emerge out of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration with a 100 percent operational-readiness rate on all home-station combat systems (M113A2 APCs, M9 ACEs, M1068 CP vehicles, M548 cargo carriers, mine-clearing line charges [MICLICs], and Volcanoes). Throughout the rotation, there were periods (often on non-battle days) when operational readiness fell below 90 percent. However, faults were quickly identified and equipment repaired, allowing the battalion to consistently cross the line of departure with a 90 percent or better operational-readiness rate for each battle and end the rotation on training day 14 with an operational-readiness rate in excess of 93 percent.
The ESE is not adequately resourced to provide logistical requirements unique to an engineer battalion that is embedded in a maneuver brigade. Again, the 299th Engineer Battalion--with assistance from the 1st Brigade and the 4th Infantry Division--successfully overcame these resourcing shortfalls by making the following adjustments:
* Contracting wheeled services.
* Assigning an officer out of an MTOE position to be the BMO.
* Assigning four (PLL school-trained) MOS l2Bs to augment the PLL clerks in the ESE.
* Creating a consolidated battalion service team.
However, an ESE with 70 percent of the mechanics, half the PLL clerks, and less than half the senior NCOs of an FSC remains inadequately resourced to support an engineer battalion, either in garrison or during continuous operations. The only viable option is to convert the ESE to an engineer support company (ESC) and remedy the shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and leadership.
Transitioning From ESE to ESC
With the Army's recent decision to field the Bradley to the Force XXI engineer battalions, it is imperative that we use the lessons learned from our experiences in fighting the ESE. These lessons are vital in order to identify a recommended design for an ESC that is capable of sustaining all logistical requirements of a Bradley-based engineer battalion. Figure 4 shows the major equipment found in a Bradley-based engineer battalion, as well as a comparison of equipment densities found in armor, infantry, and engineer battalions.
The recommended organization of the ESC is based on the following design considerations:
* We used doctrine (FM 5-71-3, Change 2, page 6-5) as a foundation for the proposed organization. The ESC must "operate on a centralized CSS concept, providing all classes of supply, food service, distribution, and tactical field maintenance to the engineer battalion and to itself" The ESE (now the proposed ESC) must be "capable of cross leveling between the engineer repair sections/teams to weight the main effort as logically required. The three FERSs and three engineer CRTs provide the immediate capability and task-organization flexibility to support our Force XXI engineer battalions."
* We examined the logistical requirements for sustaining a Force XXI engineer battalion equipped with the M2A2 Operation Desert Storm-Engineer (ODS-E) Bradley instead of the M113. Additionally, we accounted for the fielding of the Wolverine and nine additional M9 ACEs.
* We incorporated our experiences in fighting the ESE over an extended period of time in a multitude of environments. Experiences that highlighted the impact(s) of such things as having only four PLL clerks, being improperly equipped to environmentally protect ULLS-Ground (ULLS-G) boxes, conducting maintenance operations with a shortage of senior NCOs and mechanics, and lacking recovery and lift assets.
* We used the organizational structure of the FSC that supports a Bradley infantry battalion as the basis for our recommended organization. The reason was twofold: The engineer battalion will be a Bradley-based organization and, as an organic member of the brigade, we thought it was important that the CSS structure that supports all organic battalions be fundamentally structured the same.
Figure 5, page 28, shows the proposed ESC design, which would increase the number of personnel supporting an engineer battalion from 78 to 139--a net increase of 6l personnel.
The headquarters platoon consists of the minimum personnel to operate a company. The addition of the executive officer, first sergeant, and operations NCOs brings the required leadership to run the company effectively.
The support platoon, made up of the food-service and distribution sections, can now coordinate efforts under the command and control of a dedicated officer and NCO to provide necessary logistical support. This is especially critical with fuel, because of the 12 Wolverines. The addition of four Load-Handling Systems (LHS) (the M985 HEMTT cargo truck replacement) will provide the capability to haul 25-millimeter ammunition and critical engineer supplies.
The maintenance platoon requires the greatest change. The maintenance-control officer and the maintenance technician can work in unison to command and control the maintenance effort and tackle critical issues. It is clear that the Bradley requires more mechanics to maintain; it takes 57 man-hours to service a Bradley compared to 7.6 for an Ml 13,40 for a Wolverine, and 22.2 for an AVLB. Additionally, the complexity of the Wolverine--along with the increase of nine M9 ACEs--also indicates a need for more mechanics. Three additional M88A2s (the Hercules, which is now being fielded to replace the M88A1) are in the design to allow the fix-forward concept to work. The service-and-recovery section can be the link between the CRTs and the FERSs that are located either in the engineer forward-support area or the task-force support area. They can act as a not-mission-capable vehicle-transfer point, allowing the original three M88A2 Hercules to remain forward with the supported company.
The current ESE structure was to be outfitted with time-and labor-saving enhancements designed to support an engineer battalion with modem equipment. Because both the ESE and the engineer battalion have not been fielded with the complete complement of enhancements and must maintain legacy equipment, the small organizational size and structure do not fully support Force XXI engineer battalions. Because of this--and the Army's decision to field Bradleys in the engineer battalions--the structure and organization of the ESE must change; otherwise, we risk resorting to techniques that are not in consonance with the Force XXI concept.
Our experiences at both Fort Hood and the NTC proved that the ESE is still insufficient and that an upgrade of the ESE to an ESC is needed that will match the paradigm already established for infantry and armor battalions. Transforming the ESE to an ESC will--for the first time--ensure that the FSB is both properly resourced and structured to provide the logistical requirements of fixing, arming, and fueling the Force XXI engineer battalion. While many may be critical of this change, consider the following: If no adjustments are made to the CSS structure that supports the Force XXI engineer battalion, the logistician and the engineer will be placed in an untenable position. The battlefield functions of mobility, countermobility, and survivability will--at the very least--be degraded, putting at risk successful mission accomplishment and--more importantly--the lives of our soldiers. An increase of 61 personnel--with the associated equipment--is a small price to pay so that our soldiers can fight and win on th e battlefields of the twenty-first century.
Captain Judson is the maintenance officer for the 299th Engineer Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas. He previously served as platoon leader assistant S3 plans, and company XO in the 9th Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Schweinfurt, Germany. A graduate of the Engineer Captain 's Career Course, GAS3, and Northern Warfare School, CPT Judson holds a bachelor's from the University of Maine and is working on a master's in business administration at Regis University.
Major Muraski is the executive officer for the 299th Engineer Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas. He previously served as assistant brigade engineer, adjutant, and company commander in the 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Infantry Division (L). MAJ Muraski is a graduate of the Engineer Officer Advanced Course; Command and General Staff College; Ranger School; and Sapper, Airborne, and Air Assault Schools. He holds a bachelor's in geology from St. Mary 's University and a master 's in geodesy from Purdue University.
Lieutenant Colonel Bedey commands the 299th Engineer Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas. He previously was an assistant S3 and company commander, 15th Engineer Battalion, 9th Infantry Division (Motorized); and battalion executive officer, 62d Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy). LTC Bedey is a graduate of the Engineer Officer Advanced Course and Command and General Staff College and holds a bachelor 's in construction engineering from Montana State University and a master is in construction management from Colorado State University.
Figure 1. Engineering Support Element Personnal TOE 63108F00 Engineer Support Element 1-1-76-78 Headquarters Food-Service Distribution Section Section Section 1-0-12-13 0-0-9-9 0-0-10-10 1 90A00 0-3 1 92G40 1 77F30 1 63 H40 1 92G30 2 77F20 1 63B30 1 92G20 4 77F10 1 52D20 6 92G10 3 88M10 1 63Y20 2 92A20 1 52D10 1 63B10 1 63S10 1 63Y10 2 92A10 Engineer Support Element 1-1-76-78 Headquarters Forward Engineer Repair Cambat Repair Section Section Team 1-0-12-13 0-1-27-28 0-0-18-18 1 90A00 0-3 1 63 H40 1 90A00 W03 3 63A40 1 63B30 1 63 H40 1 63 H20 1 52D20 3 62B20 5 63Y20 1 63Y20 2 62H20 1 63H10 2 92A20 3 44B10 8 63Y10 1 52D10 3 63B10 1 63B10 6 63H10 1 63S10 3 63W10 1 63Y10 3 63Y10 2 92A10 Figure 2: Compare and Contrast - CSS Personnel and Equipment CSS Personnal (Current) Forward Support Company Armor Pure Strength Officers 5 Warrants 1 Enlisted 166 Total 172 Maintenance Personnel (less 45 series) All positions 70 Maintenance sections 67 Senior NCO(E6+) 13 PLL Clerks 8 Forward Support Company Infantry Pure Strength Officers 5 Warrants 1 Enlisted 159 Total 165 Maintenance Personnel (less 45 series) All positions 70 Maintenance sections 67 Senior NCOs (E6+) 13 PLl Clerks 8 Engineer Support Element Strength Officers 1 Warrants 1 Enlisted 76 Total 78 Maintenance Personnel (less 45 series) All positions 50 Maintenance sections 47 Senior NCOs(E6+) 6 PLL Clerks 4 Figure 2. Compare and Contrast - CSS Personnel and Equipment CSS Personnel (Current) Forward Support Company (Armor Battalion) MTOE 63115FFCM4 Maintenance-Control Section 12-ton semi van, supply 1 5-ton expansible van 1 SAMS-1 computer 1 Recovery Section M88A2 Hercules 3 M984 HEMTT wrecker 1 5-ton wrecker 1 Service Section M113 APC 1 M1031 contact truck 1 Welding trailer 1 2 1/2-ton truck 7 5-ton cargo carrier 4 2 1/2-ion shop vans 4 Combat Repair Teams (3 teams) M113 APC 3 M88A2 Hercules 3 M1031 contact truck 3 1/2-ton cargo carrier 3 5-ton cargo carrier 3 HCMTP (FASH) 3 Distribution Section M978 HEMMT fueler 7 M977 HEMMT cargo 10 Forward Support Company (Infantry Battalion) MTOE 63115FFCM4 Maintenance-Control Section 12-ton semi van, supply 1 5-ton expansible van 1 SAMS-1 computer 1 Recovery Section M88A2 Hercules 3 M984 HEMTT wrecker 1 5-ton wrecker 1 Service Section M113 APC 1 M1031 contact track 1 Welding Trailer 1 2 1/2-ton truck 7 5-ton cargo carrier 4 2 1/2-ton shop vans 4 Combat Repair Teams (3 teams) M113 APC 3 M88A2 Hercules 3 M1031 contact truck 3 2 1/2-ton cargo carrier 3 5-ton cargo carrier 3 HCMTP (FRSH) 3 Distribution Section M978 HEMMT fueler 9 M977 HEMMT cargo 11 Engineer Support Element (Engineer Battalion) TOE 63108F100 Headquarters Section M1031 contact truck 1 M9B4 HEMTT wrecker 1 Forward Engineer Repair Sections (3 teems) HSTRU trailer 3 Welding trailer 3 MTV cargo carrier 4 Combat Repair Teams (3 teams) M113 APC 3 M88A2 Hercules 3 M1031 contact truck 3 MTV cargo carrier 3 PLS transporter 3 HCMTP (FASH) 3 Distribution Section M978 HEMMT fueler 6 M977 HEMMT cargo 3 Figure 4. Compare and Contrast - Supported Forces (Future) Armor Battalion Tracked Vehicles M1064A3 mortar carrier 4 M577/M1068 CP vehicle 8 M113 ambulance 10 M1 tank 44 Subtotal 66 Infantry Battalion Tracked vehicles M1064A3 mortar carrier 4 M577/M1068 CP vehicle 8 M113 ambulance 10 M2 BIFV 44 Subtotal 66 Engineer Battalion Tracked vehicles M577/M1068 CP vehicle 8 M2 ODS-E 29 M113 ambulance 3 Wolverine 12 M9 ACE 21 M548 transport 6 Subtotal 79 Wheeled Vehicles Tractor/Semitrailer 3 LMTV 10 HMMWV 21 Scout HMMWV 6 Subtotal 40 Total Vehicles 106 Forward Support Company Personnel 172 Wheeled Vehicles LMTV 12 HMMWV 20 Scout HMMWV 6 Subtotal 38 Total Vehicles 104 Forward Support Company Personnel 165 Wheeled Vehicles HEMMT 6 5-ton cargo carrier 8 HMMWV 27 Subtotal 41 Total Vehicles 120 Forward Support Company Personnel 139
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|Title Annotation:||combat-service support|
|Author:||Judson, Captain William L.; Muraski Jr., Major Richard J.; Bedey, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A.|
|Publication:||Engineer: The Professional Bulletin for Army Engineers|
|Date:||May 1, 2001|
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