European journal of philosophy: vol. 25, no. 2, June 2017.
Kant claims that logic concerns how we ought to think. This claim is standardly used to support a normative interpretation of Kant's logic. Clinton Tolley contends that the standard interpretation is at odds with Kant's commitments about normativity on the one hand and about logic on the other. The author argues that both Tolley and the champions of the standard interpretation have missed three crucial points. First, Kant distinguishes two kinds of formal rules of thinking, which pertain to the structural and veridical features of thoughts respectively. Second, to see whether Kant's logic is normative, it is just as important to examine what he calls "applied logic" as it is to consider "pure logic." Third, at least two kinds of logical norms can be extracted from Kant's logic broadly construed (which includes pure and applied logics as complementary parts): evaluative norms (for the formal assessment of all our thoughts) and imperatival norms (for regulating our epistemic conduct). The author explicates these points with a view to surfacing the original philosophical insights underlying Kant's normative conception of logic.
Theorising from the Global Standpoint: Kant and Grotius on Original Common Possession of the Earth, JAKOB HUBER
The paper contrasts Kant's conception of original common possession of the earth with Hugo Grotius's superficially similar notion. The aim is not only to elucidate how much Kant departs from his natural law predecessors-given that Grotius's needs-based framework very much lines in with contemporary theorists' tendency to reduce issues of global concern to questions of how to divide the world up, it also seeks to advocate Kant's global thinking as an alternative for current debates. Crucially, it is Kant's radical shift in perspective--from an Archimedean "view from nowhere," to a first-personal standpoint through which agents reflexively recognize their systematic interdependence in a world of limited space--that provides him with the more thorough and ultimately convincing global standpoint. This standpoint does not come with ready-made solutions to shared global problems, but provides a promising perspective from which to theorize them.
Schopenhauer on the Rights of Animals, STEPHEN PURYEAR
The author argues that Schopenhauer's ascription of (moral) rights to animals flows naturally from his distinctive analysis of the concept of a right. In contrast to those who regard rights as fundamental and then cast wrongdoing as a matter of violating rights, he takes wrong (Unrecht) to be the more fundamental notion and defines the concept of a right (Recht) in its terms. He then offers an account of wrongdoing that makes it plausible to suppose that at least many animals can be wronged and thus, by extension, have rights. The result, the author argues, is a perspective on the nature of moral rights in general, and the idea of animal rights in particular, that constitutes an important and plausible alternative to the more familiar views advanced by philosophers in recent decades.
The Compatibility of Freedom and Necessity in Marx's Idea of Communist Society, DAVID JAMES
Taking a well-known passage from the third volume of Capital as his starting point, the author explains on what grounds Marx thinks that freedom and necessity will be compatible in a communist society. The necessity in question concerns having to produce to satisfy material needs. Unlike some accounts of this issue, the author argues that the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society has more to do with how production is organized than with the direct relation of the worker to the object produced or to his own productive activity. Moreover, the author shows how self-realization and a form of activity that possesses an intrinsic value are made possible by the organization of the production process and how this is integral to Marx's account of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society.
Heidegger, Art, and the Overcoming of Metaphysics, MATT DILL
In this paper, the author advances a new interpretation of Heidegger's reflections on art as we find them in his essay "The Origin of the Work of Art." The author begins by uncovering the fundamental concern that motivates Heidegger's essay. He shows that Heidegger's reflections on art are part of his attempt to uncover a path beyond the history of metaphysics. He then suggests that while Heidegger does think that art may allow for the overcoming of metaphysics, recent interpreters have mistaken the kind of art that. Heidegger has in mind here. The kind of art that can allow for the overcoming of metaphysics, he argues, is not art that simply thematizes and/or reconfigures cultural worlds (as these interpreters have argued). It is instead what Heidegger calls "primal poesy." After discussing the nature of primal poesy, the author shows in more detail how this kind of art may be capable of getting us beyond the history of metaphysics. Finally, he reconsiders the more common reading of "The Origin of the Work of Art" in light of the interpretation he has offered.
The Sound of Silence: Merleau-Ponty on Conscious Thought, PHILIP J. WALSH
We take ourselves to have an inner life of thought, and we take ourselves to be capable of linguistically expressing our thoughts to others. But what is the nature of this "inner life" of thought? Is conscious thought necessarily carried out in language? This paper takes up these questions by examining Merleau-Ponty's theory of expression. For Merleau-Ponty, language expresses thought. Thus it would seem that thought must be independent of, and in some sense prior to, the speech that expresses it. He also claims, however, that thinking just is linguistic expression, and thus that language constitutes thought. The primary aim of this paper is to make sense of this constitutive claim while maintaining that, for Merleau-Ponty, there is an inner life of thought that exists independently of linguistic expression, and that this inner life rightly deserves the label "thought," The upshot of this account is twofold. First, it explains why the mainstream view of Merleau-Ponty's theory of expression seems plausible, but is ultimately inadequate. Second, it functions as a corrective to contemporary debates about the nature and scope of phenomenal consciousness and the sense in which conscious experience has content.
Motivational Indeterminacy, AVNER BAZ
A fundamental and pervasive assumption in much contemporary moral philosophy and the philosophy of action is that whenever we do something intentionally there is an objectively correct answer to the question of what has motivated us to do it. However inscrutable and complex it might be, we are supposed to have, in every case, a determinate and in principle fully determinable, even if possibly also complex, motive. The author calls this "the assumption of motivational determinacy." Drawing on ideas of Merleau-Ponty and of Wittgenstein, and appealing to basic features of our experience as perceivers and agents, which the author illustrates by means of passages taken from a couple of short stories by Alice Munro, he questions that assumption. He argues that the world as it presents itself to us and to which we find ourselves always already responding prior to reflection and explicit judgment is (in a sense clarified in the paper) indeterminate, and its solicitations are therefore indeterminate as well. And if so, then, at least for a wide range of morally significant human doings, there may not be one final, complete, and objectively true answer to the question of what has moved us to do this or that.
What Is It to Depsychologize Psychology? STINA BACKSTROM
In this essay, the author distinguishes two ways of depsychologizing psychology: "antipsychologism" and "nonpsychologism." Both positions are responses to the Fregean sharp distinction between the logical and the psychological. But where antipsychologism, which the author finds in John McDowell, attempts to overcome the sharp distinction by arguing that psychological states and their expressions are apt to be articulated into judgments, Stanley Cavell's nonpsychologism, a powerful and neglected alternative, wants to overcome the sharp distinction by abandoning judgment as the paradigm expression of thought and communication.
Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability, SOMOGY VARGA
This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Low-level theorists argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low-level properties (textures, shapes, colors); high-level theorists argue that we have perceptual experiences of high-level properties (functional properties, causal relations, and so on); while disunified view theorists argue that perceptual seemings can present high-level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support for the high-level view.
The Moral Insignificance of Self-consciousness, JOSHUA SHEPHERD
In this paper, the author examines the claim that self-consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self-conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but the author argues it is false. He considers two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best-known arguments relevant to self-consciousness's significance take the indirect route. He examines them and argues that (a) in various ways they depend on unwarranted assumptions about self-consciousness's functional significance, and (b) once these assumptions are undermined, motivation for these arguments dissipates. He then considers the direct route to self-consciousness's significance, which depends on claims that self-consciousness has intrinsic value or final value. He argues what intrinsic or final value self-consciousness possesses is not enough to generate strong moral reasons against harming or killing.
In Defense of a Democratic Productivist Welfare State, MICHAEL MOEHLER
In this article, the author defends a democratic form of the productivist welfare state. He argues that this form of the state can best cope, theoretically and practically, with the diversity of deeply morally pluralistic democratic societies for two reasons. First, the justification of this form of the state rests solely on general facts about human nature, basic human needs, and efficiency considerations in a world of moderately scarce resources. Second, this state does not aim to promote a specific view of justice, but human flourishing more generally, expressed in terms of individual and collective productivity. The proposed democratic productivist welfare state supports its citizens up to the level that allows them to develop and exercise their talents and abilities without providing incentives for free riding. The author argues that, under the specific empirical circumstances that he describes, in particular certain informational restrictions concerning the precise productive and destructive capacities of the members of society in practice and the soundness of the Aristotelian principle, this goal may best be achieved in practice by the introduction of an unconditional basic income at subsistence level, if society is sufficiently developed economically to provide such an income. On productivist grounds, such an unconditional subsistence income also addresses, pragmatically and partially, the problem of historical injustices against the weakest members of society and provides all group members with the means for democratic participation.
Joint Action and the, Expression of Shared Intentions: An Expanded Taylorian Account, SEAN BOWDEN
After having identified several shortcomings of the so-called standard accounts of shared intentions, this paper develops a novel framework for understanding such intentions. The framework advanced hinges on a notion of "expression," as well as on the claim that shared intentions are expressed--that is, manifested, grasped, shaped, and clarified--throughout the unfolding of the joint actions they animate, as well as in the various expressive activities and behaviors that accompany joint action. This claim is defended with particular reference to the work of Charles Taylor on expression, as well as recent work on embodied cognition.
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|Title Annotation:||CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES: PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACT|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Sep 1, 2017|
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