European Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 25, No. 1, March 2017.
A cryptonormative judgment, roughly speaking, is a judgment that is presented by the agent who makes it as nonnormative (either generally or in some particular respect), but that is in fact normative (either generally or in that particular respect). The idea of cryptonormativity is familiar from debates in social theory, social psychology, and Continental political philosophy, but has never been treated in analytic metaethics, moral psychology or epistemology except in passing. This paper argues that cryptonormative judgments are pervasive: familiar cases from everyday life are most naturally diagnosed as cryptonormative judgments. Secondly, they reveal that normative judgment is a state that can be quite deeply nontransparent to its bearer, in a way that is not, for example, assimilable to the phenomenon of self-deception. Thirdly, they shed light on debates over amoralism and lend some support to a picture of normative psychology that links normative judgment constitutively to motivation. The paper concludes with some remarks about the social and political insidiousness of cryptonormativity, looking forward to future work.
A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge, MICHAEL KREMER
Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that faces a significant challenge: accounting for the unity of knowledge. Jason Stanley, an intellectualist opponent of Ryle's, brings out this problem by arguing that Ryleans must treat "know" as an ambiguous word and must distinguish knowledge proper from knowledge-how, which is knowledge only so-called. This essay develops the challenge and shows that underlying Ryle's distinction is a unified vision of knowledge as a capacity to get things right, covering both knowledge-how and knowledge-that. The essay shows how Ryle specifies the general notion into knowledge-how and knowledge-that, and it discusses the mutual interdependence exhibited by the two forms of knowledge. Ryle's positive view of knowledge, properly understood, emerges as an important, neglected alternative that should be brought back into the ongoing conversation about practical and theoretical knowledge.
Enkratic Agency, DAVID HORST
An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because he believes he should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency, for it tells us how agents should think and act. However, this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties, for it makes it a mystery how an agent's thinking and acting can be guided by the enkratic requirement, which is something that an adequate conception of enkratic rationality must be able to explain. This motivates exploring a different account of enkratic rationality. On this view, enkratic rationality is primarily a constitutive requirement on agency; it is a standard internal to agency, that is, a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one's agential powers well.
Object-Dependent Thought Without Elusion, SOLVEIG AASEN
When unknowingly experiencing a perceptual hallucination, a subject can attempt to think specifically about what is, as far as he can tell, the perceived object. Is the subject then deceived about his cognitive situation? This essay answers negatively. Moreover, the essay argues that this answer is compatible with holding that thought specifically about a certain object--singular thought--is object-dependent. By contrast, both critics and advocates of the view that singular thought is object-dependent have assumed this view to be committed to postulation of illusions of object-dependent thought in cases like that mentioned. The core ingredient in the illusion-free version of the view is a special form of disjunctivism. Alleged cases of illusion are not considered parasitic on the good case where the object thought about is perceived.
Kant's Criticism of Common Moral Rational Cognition, MARTIN STICKER
There is a consensus that Kant's aim in the Groundwork is to clarify, systematize, and vindicate the common conception of morality. Philosophical theory hence serves a restorative function. It can strengthen agents' motivation, protect against self-deception, and correct misunderstandings produced by uncritical moral theory. This paper argues that Kant also corrects the common perspective and that Kant's Groundwork shows in which senses the common perspective, even considered apart from its propensity to self-deception and without being influenced by misleading theory, is deficient. Critical practical philosophy needs to set agents right about the stringency of some of their duties, and agents need to be made aware that they have certain other duties. The paper discusses how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of the stringency of the duty not to make false promises and how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of duties to self. Finally, the paper discusses how his critical practical philosophy can become popular and achieve the correction of the common perspective. The paper stresses the role of education informed by philosophical theory for this and contrasts it with so-called popular philosophy.
Kierkegaard on Impartiality and Love, SHARON KRISHEK
Soren Kierkegaard has long been known for his existentialism and his demanding religiosity, but only recently has he been recognized as a philosopher who can contribute significantly to our understanding of human love. Foregrounding impartiality and duty, Kierkegaard's seminal Works of Love (1847) for many years was dismissed as too dogmatic to be philosophically illuminating. However, influential studies of the last couple of decades have done much to change this picture. The new view is that the positions espoused in his essay are quite compelling. While largely accepting this reevaluation of Works of Love, this paper nevertheless considers its analysis of love to be lacking.
Nietzsche, Nature, Nurture, AARON RIDLEY
Nietzsche claims that we are fated to be as we are. He also claims, however, that we can create ourselves. To many commentators these twin commitments have seemed self-contradictory or paradoxical. The argument of this paper, by contrast, is that despite appearances there is no paradox here, nor even a tension between Nietzsche's two claims. Instead, when properly interpreted these claims turn out to be intimately related to one another, so that our fatedness (and our acknowledgement of our fatedness) emerges as integral to our capacity to become self-creators. The paper also offers, in the course of undermining a false alternative that is deeply entrenched in the philosophical tradition, a reading of Nietzsche's doctrine of amor fati that actually--and perhaps uniquely--makes full sense of section 276 of The Gay Science, the chief source for this aspect of his thought.
A Comedy We Believe In: A Further Look at Sartre's Theory of Emotions, MARTIN HARTMANN
This paper discusses recent interpretations of Jean-Paul Sartre's early theory of emotions, in particular his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. Despite the great interest that Sartre's approach has generated, most interpretations assume that his approach fails because it appears to be focused on malformed, irrational, or distorted emotions. This paper argues that these criticisms adopt a rationalistic or epistemically biased perspective on emotions that is wrongly applied to Sartre's text. In defense of Sartre, this paper shows that the directional fit of emotions is not toward an evaluatively loaded world which is independently given and, at best, represented by emotions, but toward a world shaped through the impact of emotions themselves. Sartre's idea of emotions magically transforming reality for the subject so that the latter is better able to cope with problematic aspects of practically relevant situations encapsulates the world-shaping capacities of emotions, which are thus not reserved for a restricted class of emotions. Recognition of the transformative powers of emotions will also direct attention away from their seemingly representative elements to their normative and practical aspects and offer a new basis for delineating the criteria forjudging them. The plausibility of this position is discussed with reference to some of Sartre's examples, such as fear, sadness, and horror, but also with reference to Joan Didion's account of grief in The Year of Magical Thinking.
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|Title Annotation:||PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Jun 1, 2017|
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