European Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 22, No. 1, March 2014.
This paper argues that there is a very important, though often neglected, dissimilarity between the two Gricean conceptions of "what is said": the one presented in his William James Lectures and the one sketched in the "Retrospective Epilogue" to his book Studies in the Way of Words. The main problem lies with the idea of speakers' commitment to what they say and how this is to be related to the conventional, or standard, meaning of the sentences uttered in the act of saying. Since the later notion of "what is said," or "dictiveness," is claimed to be logically independent from "formality" (roughly, conventional meaning), Grice seems to maintain that there are cases in which content that is not expressed by a sentence in a context may nevertheless count as what is said. The author proposes an account of what is said that brings together the two apparently irreconcilable approaches. The price to be paid for a Gricean, however, is to accept a duality of behavior between (natural language counterparts of) logical constants and logical variables.
The Solution to the Consequence Problem According to Anti-Individualism, FRANK BAREL
For quite some time now there has been an ongoing debate whether authoritative self-knowledge is compatible with anti-individualism. One influential line of argument against compatibilism is due to Paul Boghossian. This paper argues that Boghossian misconstrues what the anti-individualist really is committed to. The author elaborates this defense of compatibilism by showing how the Twin Earth thought experiment is meant to speak in favor of anti-individualism. This will partly show that Boghossian is wrong in his denial that empirical background knowledge is imported into the Twin Earth experiment. The main points argued are that Boghossian fails to realize, both (1) that anti-individualism does not involve concept-individuation in terms of reference, and (2) that anti-individualism assumes a core of representational success. In effect, these two points constitute an entirely new way to defend compatibilism, a way that seems to have gone unnoticed in the literature.
The Sortal Dependence of Demonstrative Reference, IMOGEN DICKIE
"Sortalism about demonstrative reference" is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism by distinguishing two sortalist views, arguing that one of them is false and that the other is true, and then using the latter argument to develop a new response to the objection to sortalism based on examples where we seem to succeed in referring even though we get sortal classification wrong or do not attempt to classify at all.
Situation and Limitation: Making Sense of Heidegger on Thrownness, KATHERINE WITHY
As Heidegger acknowledges, our understanding is essentially situated and so limited by the context and tradition into which it is thrown. But this "situatedness" does not exhaust Heidegger's concept of "thrownness." By examining this concept and its grammar, the author develops a more complete interpretation. She identifies several different kinds of finitude or limitation in our understanding, and touches on ways in which we confront and carry different dimensions of our past.
Explanation, Contrast, and the Primacy of Practice, LARRY WRIGHT
The common practice of giving (comparing, rejecting, and inferring) explanations of phenomena is at the root of articulate learning, including the enterprises we collect under the norm "science." The way that practice privileges a single item from the myriad relevant to any phenomenon tells us something about articulateness itself.
Raz on the Right to Autonomy, NICOLE HASSOUN
In The Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz argues against a right to autonomy. This argument helps to distinguish his theory from his competitors' theories, for many liberal theories ground such a right. Some even defend entirely autonomy-based accounts of rights. This paper suggests that Raz's argument against a right to autonomy raises an important dilemma for his larger theory. Unless his account of rights is limited in some way, Raz's argument applies against almost all (purported) rights, not just a right to autonomy. However, on the traditional way of limiting accounts like his, Raz's account actually supports the conclusion that people have a right to autonomy. So, unless there is another way of limiting his account that does not have this consequence, Raz's argument against a right to autonomy does not succeed.
The Problem of Agency and the Problem of Accountability in Kant's Moral Philosophy, IULIANA CORINA VAIDA
This paper discusses the function and scope of incompatibilist or transcendental freedom in Kant's moral philosophy. The prevailing view among scholars is that the function of transcendental freedom is to enable us to articulate a first-person conception of ourselves as rational agents involved in deliberation and choice. Thus, the scope of transcendental freedom is rational agency in general. In order to perform this function, freedom has to be merely conceivable. The author argues that our first-person conception is neutral with respect to causal determinism, and that the function of transcendental freedom is to provide the metaphysical conditions of the possibility of genuine moral responsibility and perfect justice, and to get rid of moral luck. In order to perform this function, transcendental freedom has to be not just conceivable, but metaphysically real. The author's view suggests that we only have reason to attribute freedom to ourselves in situations in which we are aware that the moral law commands us categorically, not in purely prudential choices. Thus, the scope of transcendental freedom is not rational agency in general, but only moral agency.
Categorial Indeterminacy, Generality and Logical Form in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, CHRISTOPHER CAMPBELL
Many commentators have attempted to say, more clearly than Wittgenstein did in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, what sort of things the "simple objects" spoken of in that book are. In the view of the author all such attempts are misplaced. The Tractarian notion of an object is categorially indeterminate: in contrast with both Frege's and Russell's practices, it is not the logician's task to give a specific categorial account of the internal structure of elementary propositions or atomic facts, nor, correlatively, to give an account of the forms of simple objects. The few commentators who have hitherto maintained this view have mainly devoted themselves to establishing that this was Wittgenstein's intention, and do not much address the question why Wittgenstein held that it is not the logician's business to say what the objects are. The present paper means to fill this lacuna by placing this view in the context of the Tractatus's treatment of logic generally, and in particular by connecting it with Wittgenstein's treatment of generality and with his reaction to Russell's approach to logical form.
* Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the Review. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.
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|Title Annotation:||PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS|
|Publication:||The Review of Metaphysics|
|Date:||Jun 1, 2014|
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