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Espionage 101 ... and much more.

Tapped Phones. Bugged Offices. Stolen papers. Covert recordings. Undercover employees. Phony repair people. Car phone monitors. Fax intercepts. Pretext calls. Dumpster divers. Still with me? Competitive intelligence professionals. Renegade employees. Foreign governments. The list goes on.

How are you supposed to cope? Information security was not taught in school. You never saw any of this in your job description. And yet, keeping business information where it belongs is now your responsibility. Knowledge is no longer just power, it's money too. Big money.

Picture this. You're the chief of research and development at a mid-sized snack food company. You have just discussed a new, top secret project with your 15-member staff.

Your company is developing a new cookie. Encapsulated chocolate bits make noises when bitten - from loud pops to whistles to burps - depending on the speed of the bite. Your kids loved the idea.

But this is only half the secret. In addition to being sonic, it's natural, ovenbaked, oil-free, Kalorie-free, and yogurt-enriched. The staff affectionately names the project SNOOKY the Cookie. Top management is excited. Sales potential is incredible, especially if your company gets to the marketplace first.

One evening a few weeks into the project, Sam, a young man who joined your company about a year and a half ago, goes to a party with his wife. He has a few drinks and begins answering, "SNOOKY development" when people ask him what he does for a living.

One guest overhears this laughing remark and draws Sam aside. He tells him they have something in common. He works for a food company, too. "Sam, maybe we should talk. Let's get together for lunch," the other party guest suggests over cocktails.

They meet for lunch, and Sam is led to believe that their meeting is really a job interview. Over a good bottle of wine, the party guest, who happens to work for your company's competitor, elicits from Sam all the information he needs.

He has gently extracted information that gives him an idea for the overall direction of the SNOOKY project, its time frame, and half the secret to Kalorie-free. He also knows that the early product experiments are promising.

From seemingly innocuous party conversation, your competitor has learned about your project. It hires a research specialist. Your company's dumpsters are now being checked regularly. This activity routinely provides the competition with each day's work and results.

You later learn of an air-conditioning repairperson showing up at your company after hours-on a regular basis. No one knows why.

Ultimately, your competitor will hit the market with a similar product six weeks before you do. Its development cost will be 10 percent of yours. And Sam ... well, he will still work for you. The competition wouldn't want him. There were plenty of other ways to scoop SNOOKY without leaving an obvious trail.

This leaves everyone in your company saying, "If I were a paranoid person, I'd swear they were spying, but gee, what a coincidence." Everyone except Sam. He would keep quiet. Very quiet.

Many executives, even corporate security directors, vacillate dangerously when dealing with information leaks. Maybe it's the fear of looking silly while dealing with this invisible monster. It may be unfamiliarity with the mechanics of dealing with espionage.

In either case, the business community is awakening to what governments have known since the dawn of time: If your information has a dollar value, or power value, it's a target. Eventually, someone will try to take it.

Why is this such a growing problem?

* The cold war was political. It's over.

* World War III is an economic war. It's here.

* Information is where the money is.

* Information theft is easy, safe, and lucrative.

* Electronic eavesdropping laws are difficult to enforce.

* Advanced electronics have made communications interception easy and cheap.

* Competition is now global.

* There are more competitors than ever before.

* Business ethics are not what they used to be.

* Personal reputation and accountability plumb lines only stretch so far.

The pressure is on as never before, and in a crowded business community the haze of anonymity cloaks many questionable practices.

Think about your location. Would anyone tum away the air conditioner repairperson on an emergency call after normal business hours? Wouldn't the security officer shut off the alarm and open thg locked doors? Would the air conditioner be serviced - or would bugs be planted? Would phones be tapped? Would pictures be taken? Would computer disks be duplicated and papers photocopied? Would data be altered?

Historically, the business response to theft can be summed up in one word: LAG-locks, alarms, and guards. It's a good start but rather prophetic in the description of its efficiency.

Example: If your PC is stolen, it will probably be fenced (resold) for less than 10 percent of its value. The thief receives one payment of approximately $100. The risk is high, but it must be worth it....

Yes, a missing computer is rather compelling evidence that a theft has occurred. Businesses respond with locks, alarms, and guards. For street-level crime this makes sense. Nobody likes replacing $1,500 computers. But what protects the $1.5 million R&D program? Usually very little.

Industrial spies steal the information, not the containers. Information is worth more. Continuing with our computer example, nothing will appear to be missing. The computer will still be on the desk. The information will still be on the disk drive. Chances of being caught stealing the information are slim.

The information will be sold for what it is really worth. And an industrious spy will sell the same information many times over. Every competitor is a potential customer. Obviously, LAG is an ineffective deterrent.

Paranoia is often used as the excuse to avoid confronting the espionage problem. It's understandable. After all, this is a tough problem and most executives are ill-equipped to deal with it themselves.

Spy Maxim #1: Trust your instincts. With eavesdropping and espionage, the thought would not have crossed your mind if a real problem did not exist.

Spy Maxim #2: Only failed espionage gets discovered. You never hear about successful eavesdropping or espionage attacks. You're not supposed to. It's a covert act. Frequency of publicity is on a par with commercial airline flights: Only failed missions make the news. Watergate, for example, was a classic case of espionage incompetence in action.

This apparent quiet gives the victim a false sense of security. Not only is information theft prevalent and invisible, it is also silent. Discovery relies heavily on the victim's intuition and preparedness to handle the problem.

How much spying is going on? Due to the covert nature of spying, we will never know for certain. Fortunately, however, we can use failed espionage attempts as a gauge. They reveal over and over again that the problem does exist.

Also, the plethora of electronic surveillance equipment openly sold in spy stores and executive toy catalogs gives a good indication of the magnitude of electronic eavesdropping. Word filtering back through the press and from electronic eavesdropping detection specialists can make you a believer; it's happening on a daily basis. Consider the following news samples:

Washington Post News Service (June 10, 1990). An article indicated consumer surveillance gear alone is now a $100 million industry. In the same article, Steve Brown, a buyer for The Sharper Image, said, "Maybe the nineties are going to be the spy decade," and indicated that his company was expanding into spy gadgetry "...because it's fun, different, and (will) cause excitement in the stores."

Corporate Security newsletter (July 1991). "The number of wiretaps approved by federal and state courts rose 14 percent from 1989 to 1990.... Sixty percent of the taps involved alleged drug law violators, but the main thing for the corporate security manager to remember is that 18 percent of the approved taps were aimed at businesses. (And don't forget the illegal taps either.)"

Detroit Free Press (April 15, 1990). "Gerber Products Company, citing concerns about industrial espionage and public safety, announced Tuesday that it will discontinue public tours of its Freemont baby food plant after almost 80 years.

"Kellogg Co. of Battle Creek canceled its plant tours in 1986 after attracting 260,000 visitors the year before. Upjohn Co. of Kalamazoo canceled its company tours last year. Other companies have either cut back or eliminated tours, citing security and safety reasons."

Time (May 28, 1990). "According to US officials (FBI), several foreign governments are employing their spy networks to purloin business secrets and give them to (their) private industry."

USA Today (June 11, 1991). "The Securities and Exchange Commission filed a civil complaint against the Phillip Morris director of headquarter services and two stockbrokers. In 1988, the executive leaked insider information about the pending takeover of Kraft Inc. to the two stockbrokers. Interestingly, the executive discovered the secret information when he was entrusted to sweep the board room for electronic listening devices."

Aside from the obvious fact that eavesdropping and espionage will eventually desiccate a bottom line, wipe out a competitive advantage, and leave a company a shell of its former self, you need to know three more facts.

Spy Maxim #3: Espionage is preventable. Information is like any other corporate asset. Management has a responsibility to protect it. Stockholders can claim negligence and hold company executives responsible if this asset was lost due to improper protection efforts. Simple LAG is not proper protection.

Spy Maxim #4: The law only protects those who protect themselves. You can't just wander into the courtroom crying, "They stole my business secrets," and expect help. You have to show the extraordinary steps you took and maintained to elevate your business information to secret status. Simple LAG is not extraordinary.

Spy Maxim #5: Counterespionage is not a do-it-yourself project. Don't buy eavesdropping detection gadgets. Don't play detective. And don't hire a private detective and let that person play debugging expert. This is serious business. Counterespionage work is a full-time speciality in the security field. Professional help is available.

To find eavesdropping detection and espionage prevention consultants, contact an independent security consultant who specializes in electronic eavesdropping detection and espionage prevention. Recognizing this person may not always be easy. There are too few of them and too many pretenders.

Once you have a few names, take your time to make the right choice. Your relationship will be long-term and encompass

* periodic inspections of sensitive areas for electronic eavesdropping,

* information security surveys,

* information security policy reviews,

* employee security awareness development,

* vulnerability testing and security audits, and

* general security resource assistance.

Do not hire someone who only checks rooms and phones. This is like locking only one door in the building. Information theft occurs in many other ways, too.

When interviewing potential consultants, ask for a detailed resume and check it for accuracy. Look for a pattern.

* True counterespionage consultants devote their careers to practicing their craft.

* Counterespionage will not be supplementary to some other income source.

* Ten-plus years of solid security and electronic countermeasures experience is normal.

* A license and bond are required in most states.

Also, expect satisfactory responses to the following points:

* formal security and electronics-related education

* the type of instrumentation used

* proof of insurance

* professional affiliations

* CPP certification

* fees based solely on providing knowledge and service

* a policy of not accepting remuneration from security item recommendations

Additional criteria, such as personal rapport and the ability to blend in with your surroundings, should also be considered.

At all costs, resist the temptation to bypass Mr. or Ms. Right for Mr. or Ms. Almost-as-good just because some travel expenses are involved or the fee appears to be a bargain. This is false economy.

Use the best person you can find. You may only get one chance to do it right. Fees and expenses are minor when compared to the value of what you are protecting.

The most viseble part of the counterespionage consultant's job is the electronic countermeasures sweep: the search for eavesdropping devices. It is also the task that is least understood by clients.

A knowledgeable consultant will make removing the mystery his or her first priority. Expect to be educated on the countermeasures process in terms equal to your prior knowledge.

Everything should be explained in lay terms. Deliberately hiding behind jargon in any speciality is rude and should always arouse your suspicions about the true competence of the speaker. From the consultant's viewpoint, the more you know, the more you will appreciate his or her efforts on your behalf.

Contrary to what you may see advertised, no do-it-yourself magic is involved in eavesdropping detection. You can't dial a special phone number to see if your phone is tapped. No one instrument will detect all bugs. No one gadget will protect you from all wiretappers.

Electronic eavesdropping detection is labor-and equipment-intensive hard work. When your consultant conducts inspections f your company's sensitive areas, don't be surprised if you meet one to three additional technicians and see more han $70,000 worth of electronic test equipment. This is how it is really done.

Electronic eavesdropping detection and counterespionage onsulting begin well before the electronic intruments are unpacked. Once your chosen consultant has arrived at you office, a number of procedures should take place concerning sweep inspection and test instrumentation:

* Background interview. On arrival, the consultant should conduct a background interview with you to obtain an overview of you security concerns. This discussion should not be held in the areas to be inspected. Like a doctor, your consultant will want to understand fully the symptoms and circumstances that preceded your call for assistance.

* Security measures survey. This includes an inspection f perimeter nd interior physical security hardware - doors, locks,windows, vents, alarm devices, wastepaper disposal ethods, etc.

It should also nclude eview f your security policies and procedures. Be prepared to take a full our of your facility. Have all he necessary keys available and, if possible, a copy of the floor plans.

* Visusal inspection. The areas in questions should be visually inspected or all types of electronic eavesdropping evices and evidence of past attempt. The consultant and technical assistants rely heavily on their experience, eyes, and minds. These are the finest detection instruments available.

In addition to discovering actual devices' during this stage of the inspection, they will also e searching for evidence oir prior eavesdropping attempts (bits of wire, tape, holes, fresh paint or putty, disturbed dust, etc.) The visual inspection should be thorough and include furniture, fixtures, wiring, duct ork,and small items in the area.

* Acoustic ducting evaluation. Unexpected sound leakage into adjacent areas has been the cause of many information leaks, especially in-house leaks. Open air ceiling plenums, air ducts, common baseboard heater ducts, rest rooms, coffee rooms, walls common with storage rooms, and holes in concrete floors have all aided eavesdroppers.

* Telephone instruments inspection. An extensive physical examination of the communications systems must be undertaken. More than 16 types of attacks involving bugs, taps, and compromises can be made on a basic telephone instrument, according to a National Wiretap Commission report. The newer electronic telephones have other vulnerabilities, some of which are simple system features that can be abused.

After an instrument is inspected, it is put back together and its screws are sealed over with friable security tape, providing visual proof that the phone has not been opened since the last inspection. A good consultant will have these seals custom made so that they cannot be easily duplicated.

Executive and security personnel should periodically inspect these seals. Broken seals indicate an intrusion, while missing seals indicate a switch of telephone sets. Either condition is suspicious.

* Telephone wiring inspection. Wiring associated with the telephones under test are inspected for attachments and damage. Damaged wiring is often the only evidence of a prior wiretap.

* Junction blocks inspection. Junction blocks are places where telephone wires connect to each other in the building. These connected wires form a path between the telephone instrument and the on-premises telephone switching equipment.

In some cases, such as simple residential phone service and fax machines, internal wiring connects directly to outside cables that lead to the phone company's central office. Junction blocks are an easy and relatively safe place to attach a wiretap device.

Extra wiring paths can also be constructed at junction blocks - using the spare wiring already in place - to route the call to a remote device or a listening post. This type of common attack is called a direct, or bridge, tap.

* Telephone room inspection. The building's telephone room houses junction blocks for the internal phone system, switching equipment for the internal telephone system, and telephone company junction blocks for incoming lines. This is another area of vulnerability that requires an inspection from both a wiretapping and physical security standpoint.

In large buildings, this room is usually in the basement or utility area. Historically, telephone, telephone rooms have received minimal security attention. Expect this to change as more people realize that this room is their business's communications nerve center.

* Electrical measurements of phone line. Measurements are taken and compared against telephone industry standards. Readings that deviate from the norm can help reveal certain types of wiretaps.

* Time domain reflectometry analysis. In this test, a pulse is injected into the telephone line. If the two wires are parallel to each other, the pulse continues its trip smoothly. If the pulse passes a point where it sees a change in the wiring - splices to other wires, a wiretap, a wall plug, the end of the wires, etc. - a portion of the pulse is reflected back.

An instrument called a time domain reflectometer (also known as TDR or cable radar) injects these pulses, reads their reflections, and measures the time difference between the two events. This allows the TDR to calculate the distance to the irregularity.

A time verses irregularity graph is displayed on the TDR's display. This signature is interpreted, and imperfections in line integrity are calculated to within a few inches of their actual location. An inspection of these points is then made. This allows a thorough examination of the wiring, even when it's hidden from normal view.

Time domain reflectometery allows reliable testing of phone wiring up to 2,000 feet in length and detection of some wiretap attacks at distances of up to 36,000 feet.

* Nonlinear junction detection (NLJD). This detection technique is used to locate the semi-conductor components used in electronic circuits, for example, diodes, transistors, etc. Bugging devices that contain these components (transmitters, tape recorders, amplified microphones, miniature TV cameras, etc.) are discovered in this manner. They are detectable even when hidden inside walls and objects. Discovery is not dependent on the eavesdropping device being active at the time of the search.

Nonlinear junction detectors are used only by the best equipped firms due to the cost of the instrument ($15,000 to $20,000). Firms using dual-frequency NLJDs ($32,000+) are even rarer.

Ownership of the proper instruments is, of course, only one indication of competence. But, as the old saying goes, "Its hard to drive a nail without a hammer."

* Radio frequency spectrum analysis. Eavesdropping devices that transmit a radio signal over the air or on building wiring can be detected by an instrument called a spectrum analyzer ($5,000 to $35,000).

A spectrum analyzer can be considered a radio with a long and continuous tuning dial. The received signals are shown on a display screen for visual analysis and are also converted to sound. Each signal is then individually evaluated by the technician to determine if it is carrying voice, data, or video information from the area.

Low-cost pocket bug detectors ($10 to $700) and other broadband receiving devices ($500 to $2,000) should not be confused with or used instead of spectrum analyzers.

The effectiveness of these devices ranges from fairly useful in a rural residential setting to useless in an urban business environment. This is due to their common principle of operation: The strongest signal will be from the bug in the room. The closer a site is to a metropolitan area, where thousands of transmissions are being made all the time, the more faulty this logic becomes. Besides, the rule book does not say the transmitter has to be in the same room as the microphone.

The frequency range of most spectrum analyzers used in countermeasures work is approximately 10 kilohertz (kHz) to 1.8 gigahertz (gHz), although many of the older 100kHz to 1 megahertz (mHz) units are still in use, too.

Eavesdropping radio transmissions can occur at any frequency in these ranges. To give you an idea of the reception capability of a spectrum analyzer, think of your FM radio for a moment. Its tuning capacity is from 88 mHz to 108 mHz, 20 mHz in all - a choice of 4,000 frequencies for an electronic eavesdropper. This is only 1/90th of what most spectrum analyzers receive.

Radio frequency spectrum analysis should also include the conversion of video signals received to a television-type display. This technique detects video bugging devices and computer emissions.

Radio transmissions from bugging devices are usually detectable even if the device is only in the vicinity of the areas being inspected. This means that although only certain rooms may be slated for inspection, entire sections of buildings benefit from this particular test.

* Ultra-violet light inspection. In some cases ultra-violet light (long and short wave) is used to inspect room surfaces. High-frequency light can reveal fresh paint and putty, structural changes, hidden wiring, and other evidence of tampering not usually visible under normal light.

Other tests that may be conducted include detection of infrared light transmissions, laser beams, tracking beepers in vehicles, piezo-film and fiber-optic microphones.

* Final report. When the inspection is finished, you should receive a full verbal debriefing that highlights all serious problems found and specifies the immediate correction steps that need to be taken.

You should also receive a written report within a week that includes

* a description of all the areas and communications equipment inspected,

* an explanation of all tests conducted,

* the findings,

* a review of other espionage loopholes found,

* security improvements since the last inspection, and

* recommendations for information security improvements.

Final reports are important documents. Safeguard each one. They show your continuing effort to provide information security for areas in your company. This is your proof that you took extraordinary steps to legally classify your business information as proprietary and secret.

You have gone above and beyond LAG. Courts will now listen, stockholders will be quiet, and the industrial spies will have to move on to your competitor's door.

Your counterespionage consultant would be seriously remiss if only electronic eavesdropping issues were addressed. Few information leaks can be blamed on active electronic eavesdropping devices alone.

Sure, theft of your thoughts is the most devastating form of espionage. That information is the freshest. But this is only one piece of the puzzle. To see the entire picture, a good spy collects the other parts as well. Each part may seem innocuous in and of itself, but each is synergistically related to the others.

Keep in mind:

* Spies don't look like spies. They come in both sexes, all ages, and all colors.

* Spies rarely handle all information-gathering jobs directly. Many chores are farmed out.

* Spies can be hired professionals, actual end-users, employees, labor representatives, to name just a few.

* And most importantly, each attack is preventable.

A good spy can enter most premises, day or night, without attracting undue attention. It may mean taking a job as an office temporary, as a contract guard, or as a member of the cleaning crew. Perhaps he or she is posing as a telephone, air conditioner, or computer repairperson, maybe even as a company executive returning to work a little overtime. The possibilities are endless. These loopholes exist even in security conscious facilities.

Retrieving secret company paperwork from the trash is easier than people think. Most paper trash is collected in plastic garbage bags, section by section, from within office buildings. The bags are stuffed with envelopes and other information that identifies whose garbage it is. And most dumpsters are located in areas with public access.

With this in mind, the spy merely pulls one or two papers from each bag until the bag with the target's garbage is found. The whole bag is then removed for inspection at a more comfortable location. This operation is conducted on a regular basis.

On May 16, 1988, the US Supreme Court decided that "The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home." In other words, this practice is legal. This decision spawned new profit centers for many private detective agencies who now openly advertise garbage retrieval service.

Much valuable information is also left in plain view during the workday and after hours. Correspondence, manuals, appointment books, Rolodex files, wall writing boards, and other written material all contain information that is free for the looking. Some of these items can be read or photographed (long distance) through windows.

Computers represent a gold mine of information to the spy. Whether the information be accessed remotely or disks can be copied on-site and carried off, the results are the same. They have high value, and there is low risk and no evidence of loss.

To further complicate matters, sabotage is also a potential threat. Imagine planting a virus in your competitor's computers, timed to erupt when it's to your advantage. Chances are someone else has had the same thought about you, too.

Dictation tapes are also a great source of fresh, and irrefutable, information.

Most building locks are on a master key system (easily pickable), and who knows how many master keys exist? Most secretaries keep keys to their boss's offices and filing cabinets in their desks with locks that are easily pickable. They sometimes keep each other's desk keys there, too.

To make matters worse, desks are rarely locked. You can see where this scenario is heading. In most businesses the concept of locks and keys providing security is a cruel joke.

Sometimes paperwork is marked SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL. When not secured, this marking calls undue attention to the document. Better ways are available to let insiders know that certain paperwork requires special handling, without alerting the outsider.

Carbon film typewriter ribbons store useful reproductions of whatever has been typed on them. Spies will take old ribbons and replace them with new ones. No one is the wiser, and the latest correspondence is theirs.

Many plain paper fax machines have similar carbon film rolls. A perfect copy of the original document can be found. Used rolls are routinely placed in the trash, a bonanza for the dumpster diver.

Company telephone directories may be handy for employees, but they are outright invaluable to spies, executive recruiters, and competitors. Telemarketing people consider these to be the most valuable documents they can obtain. Brokering purloined corporate telephone directories is now a recognized profession.

It is not uncommon for filing cabinets to contain more than just files. Often, they are used to hold valuable documents, corporate seals, checks, keys, etc. Unfortunately, the locking mechanisms that come with these units fall into the low security category... easily picked, shimmed, or jimmied.

The nerve center of most operations is probably not the president's office or the coffee machine. You could live without both for a few days. No, the most vital room in business today probably doesn't even have a working lock on the door, a fire alarm, an intrusion detector, or even paint on the walls. The telephone room is the most important room in most businesses.

All phone conversations funnel through this room. Its a tapper's heaven and sabotage hell. Even an accidental fire there could stop the transaction of business.

Most modern business telephone systems, automatic private branch exchanges (PBX), are computer driven. They often have a remote maintenance administration and testing system (RMATS or similar designation) feature that allows off-premises access to them.

The purpose of this feature is to allow telephone maintenance technicians full access to the PBX from their location. With this, routine diagnostic tests, programming of station and system assignments and features, and repair assessment can be economically performed.

The RMATS feature is accessed by calling the telephone number associated with this feature and linking a PC with the internal PBX computer.

In most cases, access is password protected. However, original default passwords are rarely changed. They are printed in maintenance manuals, and they can be "hacked" by dedicated spies or computer hobbyists.

The PBX software can also be entered through an on-site terminal by the system administrator (an authorized company employee), a telephone company craftsperson, or any outsider who knows the proper procedures.

Some of the dangers of this unauthorized access include

* complete deprogramming of the PBX,

* secret reprogramming to allow access to WATS services,

* executive override type features (forced access to busy extensions),

* bridge taps (software created extension lines), and

* monitoring of the station message detail recording (SMDR) memory. (SMDR maintains a detailed record of each extension's calls.)

Telephone privacy is usually assumed. However, due to the nature of telecommunications transmission (unsecured street terminations, radio transmission via satellites and terrestrial links, easy access to phone line junction boxes, etc.) only an average degree of security can be ensured without using encryption techniques. This is especially true of international traffic, much of which is monitored by governments.

Cordless and mobile telephones are not secure either. Radios capable of receiving the frequencies used by home cordless telephones, coupled with amplified antenna systems, are available. They allow reception as far away as I mile.

This has recently become a serious method of industrial espionage for the determined spy and opportunistic hobbyist alike. The good news: Encryption is available for both types of phones.

Cellular telephone communications can be received by the public over hundreds of square miles. Note: After intensive lobbying by the cellular telephone industry, monitoring of car telephone transmissions was made illegal by federal law on January 1, 1987. This law is considered unenforceable and should not be relied on for privacy.

Again. All these attacks are preventable. You do not have to be a victim.

Congratulations. Your business knowledge is now more complete than ever. No longer will your ideas, plans, strategies, hard work, and privacy disappear mysteriously. No longer will you stand helpiess as the opposition picks your pocket. No longer will you live in fear that stockholders will revolt and judges won't take you seriously.

You will not have to stand by and wonder if your electronic eavesdropping sweeps are being conducted properly. And yes, you now know the qualities to seek when enlisting the aid of professional counterespionage counsel. You are prepared.

A final word: You may see yourself in this article. If you do, do not discuss electronic eavesdropping or espionage concerns in person or via telephone while in suspected areas. Do not leave this article or other counterespionage literature in these areas either. Continue conducting business in a normal manner while developing your defense. The element of surprise is an important part of electronic eavesdropping detection.

Kevin D. Murray, CPP, is the director of MURRAY Associates in Clinton, NJ. Murray is a member of the International Association of Professional Security Consultants and ASIS.
COPYRIGHT 1992 American Society for Industrial Security
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 1992 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

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Title Annotation:includes bibliography; industrial espionage
Author:Murray, Kevin D.
Publication:Security Management
Date:Jul 1, 1992
Previous Article:Taking training to the T.
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