El regalismo borbonico y la importacion del galicanismo: el camino politico hacia una religion de estado en la Espana del siglo XVIII.
In the eighteenth century, Spain and her empire underwent a dramatic restructuring process of governmental infrastructure, leading to one of the most impressive renovations of political authority in the early modern world. Both in the Spanish American colonies and the Iberian Peninsula itself, the Spanish crown sporting its new Bourbon headship took advantage of every opportunity to transition away from the operations of the Habsburg consensus-style of governance and work towards increased political centralization for the monarchy to promote more of an absolutist approach in its assertion of political power while at the same time being careful not to invite too much risk of revolt or instability. Over the course of the century, then, a major change occurred in the institutional culture of Spanish governance. Professionally trained bureaucrats, sometimes referred to as <<regalists>>, carefully studied the latest trends in imperial statecraft and fashioned political rhetoric couched in Enlightenment terms of <<progress>> to justify their political moves, emphasizing the greater efficiency and economic prosperity that such reforms would bring.
The regalism of Spain's Charles III intersected with what many consider to be the pinnacle of Enlightenment in Spain. Under the auspices of his monarchical authority from 1759-1788, the political jurisdiction of the Spanish crown was pushed to new frontiers in the name of progress. While the Catholic Church had served as something of an institutional arm for the Spanish monarchy since its early days of empire, that relationship began to change increasingly in the later 18th century as the Bourbon government pushed for greater independence of a national church, episcopacies, and secular clergy at the expense of the Roman hierarchy, specifically the Curia and regular clergy and illustrated most profoundly in the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767. While the institution of the Catholic Church traditionally had been important for the Spanish Crown to utilize in promoting social order and unity in its diverse empire, the way in which the Bourbons made use of the Church was now doubly important in the 18th century to maintain some semblance of social order during such major government restructuring. Since by this time popular fears of Jews and Muslims tainting the purity of Spanish Catholicism had subsided because those groups had been expelled, the Crown could now focus on directing the specific kind of Catholicism practiced in Spain (1). So instead of allying with Catholic clergy to maintain the purity of Spanish Catholicism, the Crown worked at cementing its political authority over Spanish clergy in order to do its bidding on multiple fronts as quasi-agents of the state. Under Bourbon headship, a more independent national church would remain Catholic in name, but in practice the operations and governance concerning religious activity of both clergy and laity was controlled directly by Madrid. Taming the Spanish Inquisition, eliminating grounds for convening church councils, establishing its own royal seminaries, increasing restrictions on pastoral publications, and directly prohibiting certain kinds of popular religious practices as well as limiting the number of holy day observances, the Spanish crown increasingly dictated how religion was practiced and the form it would take, particularly in its Iberian possessions.
By the reign of Charles IV (1788-1808), regalist ministers would take political authority over Spanish Catholicism to its furthest extent by granting bishops full faculty of authority in the last days of the 18th century. Yet, as the dynamics of larger European events led to the popular perception of the Catholic Church under attack, and with the re-establishment of papal authority and the Catholic Church in France through Napoleon's Concordat in 1801, Crown policy over Spanish religion was forced to make a political about-face and retreat from further initiatives to establish a church independent from Rome in order to avoid provoking political upheaval at home and abroad. In the pages that follow, this study will illuminate the monarchy's efforts at nationalizing the Catholic Church in Spain proper, the resistance it faced in the process from different sides, and the consequences such efforts would have for both Spain's political and religious landscape as it entered the 19th century. The first task at hand, however, involves understanding the larger 18th-century terrain for reform and putting into perspective the Spanish monarchy's jurisdiction over religious affairs in the earlier part of the 18th century to better grasp how the second half of the century witnessed the development of a state-run, a state-sponsored Catholic Church.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF ENLIGHTENMENT, CATHOLIC ENLIGHTENMENT, AND REGALIST POLITICS OF SPANISH CATHOLICISM IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 18TH CENTURY
Coming out of the late 17th and early 18th centuries a general sense of crisis emerged in Spain, leading Bourbon state policy down a road towards reform. In the latter years of the 17th century, during the twilight of the Habsburg monarchy under the sickly Charles II (1665-1700), Spain had witnessed a closing off from European culture at the same time that the rest of Europe was opening up to new worlds, both geographically and intellectually. Geographically, Spain still maintained its empire but had loosened its grip on the American colonies by giving more positions to local Creoles in colonial government. In the intellectual arena, Spaniards who dared to entertain the validity of new scientific theories and share the ideas of <<heretics>> such as Galileo and Descartes in university settings or in print ran the risk of being silenced by the Spanish Inquisition or university establishment given the greater influence and <<orthodoxy>> of Aristotelian-Ptolemaic science which had been accepted as quasi-canon in Spain for centuries. Spanish Catholicism, while not in decline, became ever more dramatic and emotional in its expression in all sectors of society and was reinforced by the baroque artwork produced and placed within churches and homes of elite.
Thus, by the early 18th century and with the victory of the Bourbon dynasty in the War of Spanish Succession (1700-1714), many in Spain were now conscious of the political and cultural crisis that had befallen them for quite some time. In such a moment, Enlightened Absolutism in the Spanish context became one proposed path towards revival and made the turn towards a more French or <<Gallican>> style of royal control over the Church a possibility (2). Yet, power was continually being contested, and no one institution or group--the fledgling Spanish dynasty included--had a monopoly on it. As the events of the century unfolded, it was the institution of the Bourbon state that most successfully established power, sometimes referred to as Enlightened Absolutism. The work of regalist state ministers (3) over decades had been designed to take advantage of every opportunity to improve the institutional apparatus of the Bourbon state so that reforms could be effectively orchestrated and implemented. Thus, regalist reform gradually launched itself and became dominant over other movements of reform since none other had such an institutional mechanism as a resource.
When examining the dynamics of Bourbon attempts to make Spain prosperous and advance governmental authority in the 18th century, the kinds of reforms and means of their implementation are typically associated with the larger context of <<Enlightenment>> In fact, even though other programs or <<brands>> of Enlightenment existed, the predominant brand of Enlightenment in Spain was that embodied by government initiatives and celebrated for its ability to import and adapt French encyclopedic and physiocratic ideas regarding science and economic progress (4). Known for the expanse of state power over the Church, this brand of Enlightenment was limited to the work of a small minority of politically pro-monarchical and antirevolutionary bureaucrats who were primarily concerned with economic reform (5). And since the architects of such government reform were themselves Catholic, did not propose reforms that contested orthodoxy, and sometimes proposed reforms that either coincided with or actively embraced uniquely Catholic ideas of renewal (albeit for different motives), it is easy to interpret governmental attempts to renovate Spanish Catholicism as Catholic Enlightenment. Yet this kind of approach neglects an important consideration, the existence of an authentically Spanish Catholic Enlightenment (6). Essentially, attempts at increasing the Crown's authority over the Catholic Church in Spain at times helped and at other times problematized the Spanish Catholic Enlightenment (7). Briefly defined, the Spanish Catholic Enlightenment was a movement of distinctly religiously-motivated and uniquely Spanish efforts at implementing science, reason, progress, and greater social utility for Catholicism within Spain. Characterized by initial unity, in that neither theology nor ecclesiology divided it, this phenomenon of Enlightenment experienced tension by mid-century as politically charged events fragmented different Catholic groups towards the poles of the monarchy or the papacy, or the rejection of either one. By the 1760s and 1770s, it had split into at least two authentically Catholic versions that subsequently fractured into multiple Catholic enlightenments. From the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 on into the later decades of the 18th century, the importation of the Gallican Catholic Enlightenment by Spanish Jansenists worked toward an independent national church and thus enjoyed much political sponsorship from the Bourbon monarchy, such as it had in France. Yet, the Spanish state's increasing political sponsorship of this Gallican variety escalated tensions between proponents of Catholic Enlightenment to the extent that all other brands of Catholic Enlightenment in Spain became less tolerated, progressively alienated from the cause of lights, and their advocates more condemning of the Gallican variety by the end of the century. Along with other events in France and Tuscany in the 1780s and 1790s, this increasing condemnation paved the way for the conservative reaction which occurred in early 19th-century Spain (8). Thus, as the regalist ilustrados of the Bourbon bureaucracy made inroads for Enlightened Absolutism in the domain of the Catholic Church, they pushed the proverbial envelope, creating controversy through their attempts at religious reform not directly endorsed by Rome (9), and in the process produced enemies and alienated friends both at home and abroad. In order to understand both the successes and obstacles which the Bourbon state encountered as it increased its power over Spanish Catholicism, one must consider the dynamics of the uniquely Catholic Enlightenment and how the interplay of events and the state's political activity in turn affected the trajectory of Catholic Enlightenment and even established the ultimate extent of state authority over the Church in Spain.
On the whole, the Bourbon monarchy is commonly associated with 18th-century attempts at enlightening Spanish Catholicism primarily because of the efforts under Charles III (10). Yet it was the political gains over the Catholic Church made by Philip V (1700-1746) and Ferdinand VI (1746-1759) that enabled the government ministers under Charles III and later Charles IV to consolidate power and enact far-reaching reforms of Spanish Catholicism, specifically, through the formation of a secular and regular clergy subservient to the crown before the papacy.
In the War of Spanish Succession, the papacy had sided with the Austrian Habsburg claimant for strategic reasons in 1709, and the Bourbon claimant Philip V responded by cutting off communications with Rome, leading to many episcopal vacancies, broken economic links between the two courts, and the unresolved matter of many marriage dispensations. Some Spaniards likened their contemporary situation to that of England under Henry VIII, fearing a complete break that would witness the state sale of monastic lands or, worse yet, the end of Roman Catholicism in the land of <<the Catholic kings>> (11). Yet other Spaniards, such as Benito Jeronimo Feijoo (popular author (12) and member of the Council of Castile by 1748), Gregorio Mayans (official of the Royal Library under Philip V), and even the Valencian Andres Piquer (of the university of Valencia and later court doctor for Ferdinand VI) embraced the situation as an opportunity to critique the extravagance of baroque Catholicism as well as to discuss new ideas in science and argue their acceptability for Catholics. Gatherings for the discussion of ideas typically held in the salons of the nobility and intellectual and political elite, otherwise known as tertulias, enabled many to share such ideas without the threat of attack from reactionary sectors of Spanish society as well as to network with the men and women there who had access to administrative and political posts. Especially such gatherings in Madrid, some even held in the homes of clerics, provided a direct social connection between ilustrados and government officials desiring innovative thinkers to help conceive of and implement Bourbon reforms to revitalize Spain and its monarchy, not just in the realm of commerce and political economy but also in its power over ecclesiastical affairs and the corresponding wealth and social influence associated with them. Overall, in the first half of the 18th century, the Bourbon monarchy found it prudent to join forces with reform-minded clerics and laymen who desired a more enlightened form of Spanish Catholicism and were cognizant of the great effort and political maneuvering such change would require at home and abroad. Their united effort would promise more long-term success for such far-reaching goals. Particularly, the monarchy would look to clerics that worked from a position of strength and influence, and in 18th-century Spain the greatest of these came from the Society of Jesus.
While the political stance of the Spanish monarchy was decidedly set against the Jesuits by 1767, the case was quite the opposite over the first half of the century as regalism had been employed in order to protect and favor the Jesuits specifically as an order. Under the monarchical authority of both Philip V until 1746 and his son Ferdinand VI, government ministers who were either Jesuits themselves or favorably disposed to them had pursued greater power over the Spanish church by appointing benefice holders and limiting the powers of the papal nuncio in Spain (initially attempted in the Concordat of 1737). The king's Jesuit confessor Francisco Ravago and the pro-Jesuit Secretary of State Jose Carvajal y Lancaster and the young Manuel Ventura y Figueroa were the forces behind the thirteen-year effort of the Concordat of 1753 that effectively gave the Spanish monarch control over all but 52 remaining benefices in the land (13). Essentially, the monarchy now had the power to appoint the clergymen deemed most politically useful to serve in any church office in Spain. Even though the Jesuits were known for their pro-papal stance, such regalist action on their part did not contradict their orderly essence: The rationale for the terms of the Concordat had targeted the ever present abuses of the Roman Curia in carrying out their duties in Spain, and the result of taking these duties away from the Curia would mean more power and influence for those who considered themselves the most loyal and obedient to the pope in all of Christendom (14). These ministers assumed that the Jesuits would continue to be favored by the monarchy because of their vast wealth and popularity which made them a social force with which to be reckoned. And by 1753, only Jesuits had taken advantage of regalist rights in Spanish ecclesiastical matters, making the monarchy predisposed towards the Jesuits for political positions.
Thus, while the nature of the Concordat of 1753 did not inherently disrupt the unified nature of the Catholic Enlightenment in Spain nor break the alliance between monarchy and those clerics and laymen seeking a more enlightened Catholicism, the heavy Jesuit involvement in reaching it, compounded with regalist acts in favor of Jesuits, did not allow for many political favors for others, indirectly alienating those of Jansenist or Augustinian bents. Furthermore, as recently as 1747, a series of politically charged events ensued as the Crown sought to exert further control over the Catholic Church in the name of reform that in effect gave official royal sanction to the theological views of Jesuits to the exclusion of others within Catholic orthodoxy, which in turn created an ever-deepening political divide between the parties seeking religious reform. It was the direction of Bourbon state policy over religious matters, then, that not only shattered the unified nature of Catholic Enlightenment in Spain, but also created the political polarization that would eventually hamper further efforts to increase political authority over Spanish Catholicism.
The event that began a heated public battle for controlling interest over Spanish Catholicism and politically polarized different theological positions within Catholic orthodoxy in relation to state activity was the Spanish Inquisition's 1747 publication of its index of prohibited books that dared to include even papally-approved books. The work of particular controversy was that of the Italian Cardinal Enrico Noris, an Augustinian, whose 17th-century Vindiciae augustinianae and Historia pelagiana had clarified the differences between Augustinian Catholicism and Jansenism and received a special declaration of orthodoxy from the pope. The act of the Spanish Inquisition to prohibit the works of Noris and of other writers revered by Spanish Dominicans and Augustinians, and to include it in a list with many papally prohibited works of Jansenists such as Pasquier Quesnel (1634-1718), was clearly the work of the Jesuits, since the Inquisitor General had charged two specific Jesuits with the work of compiling the index. While Benedict XIV (1740-1758) responded directly to the inquisitor in a brief outlining the error that had been committed, sending a copy directly to the head of the Augustinian order as well as assuring the order of the papal efforts on their behalf, Ferdinand VI remained reluctant to ameliorate the situation in Spain. Urged by his Jesuit confessor Ravago who supported the acts of his Jesuit brothers, Ferdinand VI instead employed regalist measures to defy the papal response and make clear the monarchy's position against such doctrine considered Jansenist. In a letter to Rome which defended royal support of the Inquisition's actions, Ferdinand VI justified the prohibition of such theological works as necessary for the peace of his people, to avoid any danger such works would pose to the purity of Catholicism in Spain, and to maintain his regalias over the Inquisition. While the episode resulted in a regalist coup of the Bourbon state over Spain's ecclesiastical affairs, the monarchy's excessive display of partisanship towards Jesuit theology caused a stir among Spaniards of different theological inclinations. For the many Catholics who disagreed with the Jesuit theological doctrine of probabilism, such political manuevering by the state put them on the defensive as somehow less than orthodox Catholics. Thus, in this case not only had the regalist actions of the Bourbon monarchy damaged papal relations (they would only be repaired somewhat when Ravago was relieved of his duties in 1754), but they also had created political malcontents at home where they previously had not existed. It was these disgruntled Catholics who would be labeled <<Jansenist>> by their opponents as they waged a campaign in order to defend the orthodoxy of theological positions held by Augustinians, Dominicans, and various Thomists in Spain (15).
II. ANTI-JESUIT POLITICS, PHILO-JANSENIST CATHOLICS, AND THE RESURGENCE OF REGALISM UNDER CHARLES III
In 1754, a near trifecta of events led to a change in the state's partisanship towards the Jesuits. From 1746 to 1754, the work of Ferdinand VI and his ministers was characterized by continuing the reform program begun by Philip V and employing regalism to support the Society of Jesus, their doctrine of probabilism, and the social class of the aristocracy theologically and socially connected to the Jesuits through their education in the elite colegios mayores. However, in the years of 1754 and 1755 and in the political context of the Seven Years' War, a series of events occurred which gradually inclined the Bourbon government to use regalism to favor anti-Jesuits (those that espoused the doctrine of probabiliorism which opposed Jesuit probabilism) and a new social class of manteistas, university-educated men of the lower nobility who had been excluded from the Jesuit-run colegios mayores and resented their strong influence. In the space of about a year, the three most powerful ministers of Ferdinand VI's government left Madrid. The talented secretary of state Carvajal, who had followed a path of cautious, armed neutrality in the Atlantic, unexpectedly died; the pro-Jesuit minister of finance and navy the Marquis of Ensenada (Zenon de Somodevilla y Bengoechea, 1702-1781) was deposed by plotting politicians, including the British ambassador who desired an end to his aggressive ship-building program; and finally in 1755, Ensenada's ally Ravago, who had used his post to influence the Inquisition, royal ecclesiastical policy, and the king in a pro-Jesuit fashion, was removed as the king's confessor (16).
The immediate political result of these events was to create a virtual power vacuum at the monarchical level. From 1754-1759, Ferdinand VI failed to push his new ministers to achieve needed economic reforms. Until her death in 1758, the king became dominated by his extravagant queen Maria Barbara of Braganza. And after her death, Ferdinand's resulting depression and self-imposed isolation created a crisis of sovereignty as it became obvious that royal ministers acted without the ability to consult the king on governmental measures and those servants who managed to see him questioned his mental stability. The loss of political authority was so extensive that in the summer of 1759 a group of Spanish bishops petitioned Rome to fill the many clerical vacancies that existed, a clear violation of the Concordat of 1753. The soon-to-be Spanish king Charles III intervened from Naples to prevent a papal response that would undermine the political gains of the Bourbons over the Catholic Church in Spain. Nevertheless, by the time Charles III arrived in Spain in October this <<species of interregnum>> had crippled the political authority of the Spanish monarchy and left the new Caroline ministers faced with a substantial challenge to re-establish it (17). In this moment, then, Enlightened Absolutism could not be assumed as having a bright future in Spain, and Charles III would specifically use Spanish Catholicism and the clergy as a much-needed support in achieving the degree of power that would later be designated as Enlightened Absolutism (18). Furthermore, this political objective would further lead the Bourbon monarchy under Charles III away from the Jesuits and, through royal appointments and policies, openly embrace those alienated by them. As king of Naples, Charles had been predisposed to such a change in policy because of the influence of his prime minister Bernardo Tanucci and the success he met in reducing the power of the Roman Curia and increasing that of the state in ecclesiastical affairs. Such efforts put Tanucci, and by extension Charles, in close contact with Italian and French Jansenists (19). Thus, in Spain a new alliance now materialized between the crown and clerics sympathetic to Jansenist ideas, especially those of the Gallican variety (20).
The implications of the Concordat of 1753 allowed for that alliance to be cemented. While at its inception in 1753, it was a financial operation centered on the control of church money connected to the thousands of benefices now under the authority of the king of Spain, Charles III would use the power it granted to the monarchy to hand-pick men who favored the state's reform initiatives and place them in particular regions of Spain where such reform was targeted. (Mayans himself had observed the potential it had, hoping it would result in the bestowal of benefices to the most virtuous and educated men.) The end result was to give the Bourbon monarchy greater control over religious affairs than it had ever enjoyed in Spain. Clerical appointments under Charles III created an upper clergy <<addicted to the system of Enlightened Despotism>> (21). Meanwhile, Charles III, following his pattern from Naples, appointed ministers who were manteistas and seized opportunities whenever he could to replace grandees with them to expand his influence in governance. Since manteistas equated Jesuit ideas with a defense of socio-political interests represented by the colegios mayores and aristocracy in Spain, they worked to erode Jesuit power whenever possible. In fact, these ministers successfully crafted arguments that Thomism (or the doctrinal school aligned with Dominicans and Augustinians and opposed to the laxity of Molinism) better supported regalist rights, while the Jesuit school excused regicide and supported papal prerogatives over all others. The overall policy under the administration of Charles III was then that the dutiful submission of Spanish <<vassals>> to the absolute authority of their king was incompatible with probabilism. For clerics and laymen, being a good patriot was to be an advocate of Thomism and probabiliorism, or at least an enemy of probabilism or Molinism.
Yet, the ministers of Charles III soon realized that even though the Concordat of 1753 had in theory given the monarchy power to appoint candidates for all but 52 ecclesiastical offices in Spain, in practice the Council of Castile and its chamber dealing with ecclesiastical appointments had never had the resources to successfully install its candidates in all vacancies. With much of the jurisdiction over Spanish benefices still in the hands of the Roman Curia, the Minister of Grace and Justice Manuel de Roda and leading lawyer (fiscal) of the Council of Castile Pedro Rodriguez Campomanes, among other Caroline ministers, conveniently blamed the failed political situation on the Jesuits, claiming that they continually conspired to keep power in the hands of Rome. Since the Society of Jesus comprised an international organization with headquarters outside of Spain and were bound by a special vow of loyalty to the pope, the monarchy saw the Jesuit order as a challenge to royal power (22). While the ministers of Charles III did not find the correct political opportunity to expel the entire order from Spain until 1767, an anti-Jesuit campaign began to manifest itself and gather steam so that by 1766 a diverse and populous group of ministers, aristocrats, clergy, and lesser nobility all advocated the elimination of the Jesuits from Spain for being too privileged, powerful, ruthless, ambitious, and divisive in society. These indictments would eventually be used as grounds that the continued presence of the Jesuits in Spain undermined the political stability of the Bourbon state. The success of the ministers over the years was to seize occasions to persuade more Spaniards of this fact. By 1767, enough were convinced to the extent that the king's action against the Jesuits did not provoke social revolt.
In 1761, one such occasion presented itself, marking the first sign of a change in theological direction at the political level. A Jesuit success in Rome led to one of their first defeats in Spain. A catechism of the French abbe Francios-Philippe Mesenguy, denying the infallibility of the pope, attacking the Jesuits, and praised by many Italian Jansenists, received papal condemnation as Jansenist and as thus containing false propositions dangerous for the life of the Church. While Clement XIII's papal brief and letter of condemnation were sent to all bishops, Spain along with other Catholic regions prohibited their publication. When the Inquisitor General Manuel Quintano Bonifaz (1755-1784) in league with the papal nuncio published the brief anyway, Charles III responded fiercely by banishing Bonifaz from court and accepting his return only after he had been publicly humiliated. Charles III used his royal privilege, the exequatur regium, to act against the papal documents, showing strong favor towards the Jansenist author.
It was not until April 2, 1767 that the Spanish monarchy issued a royal pragmatic, decreeing that because of serious or <<grave causes>> the Jesuits residing in Spain and its colonies would have to leave immediately (23). Even then, the pragmatic did not spell out what the grave causes were in order to avoid their public refutation or a weakened anti-Jesuit coalition. Yet, in the 12 months preceding the pragmatic, it was quite clear to many that the Jesuits were under investigation as the prime suspects behind the riots that had occurred during Holy Week (Semana Santa)--March 23-26, 1766--in nearly 70 cities and towns of Spain, including Madrid, which had forced the king and his family to flee the capital for personal safety, an incredible political embarrassment to Charles III and his ministers by prohibiting such literature as <<verses and seditious and injurious papers to the public and particular person>> of the king (24). But the literature continued to be circulated, and largely because of this, by September a Consejo Extraordinario was formed. At this moment <<anti-Jesuitism went par for course with regalism>> (25). Having filled clerical posts with various kinds of anti-Jesuits (men of Jansenist, Augustinian, Dominican leanings, or with other reasons to hate the Society), the regalist ministers sailed smoothly ahead with their plans. On January 29, 1767, the Consejo Extraordinario submitted its report to the king concluding that the Jesuits were anti-monarchical and their relaxed theology of probabilism was conducive to a moral and physical <<tyrannicide>> (tiranicidio), or regicide (26). Unable to tolerate such a despotic body, in April of 1767, Charles III used much of what was in the report to expel the Jesuits from Spain.
A major consequence of the expulsion was that now the monarchy and clergy sought the wealth and social influence the Jesuits had enjoyed as well as the territory which the Jesuits had occupied in education and pastoral work. The amount of power the monarchy held over the Spanish church by 1767 enabled Caroline ministers to assume responsibility for how Jesuit positions and wealth would be allocated. In such a situation, a large amount of the Catholic presence in Spain in terms of churches, schools, libraries, and clerical posts was now directed by the state officials in Madrid. Their political views and desires for religious reforms would dictate the kind of enlightened Catholicism that took shape in Spain as it depended on the extent to which particular reforms benefited the church and state, respectively (27).
Thus, the expulsion of the Jesuits and the resulting religious environment in Spain from 1767 onwards marked a key turn towards an even greater link between state policy and the directives of the Catholic Church in Spain. While in the early years of Philip V's reign, some Spaniards had feared the monarchy would separate from Rome following the pattern of Henry VIII of England, by 1767 Charles III had consolidated the political gains made by his predecessors allowing him to shape Spanish Catholicism into a <<royal church>> (28), headed by the monarchy but still in communion with Rome and paying lip-service to the papacy, and had accomplished this feat without outbreaks of social disturbance. State sponsorship was a pre-requisite for any successful measure aimed at enlightening Spanish Catholicism so that Spanish clergy, whether they were truly <<addicts>> of Enlightened Despotism or simply trying to succeed as best they could with the resources at their disposal, increasingly accepted regalism as a tool in achieving Catholic reform in the later 18th century. Along with this trend came an importation of Gallicanism in the sense that Spanish government ministers and clerics borrowed the rhetoric and were encouraged by the progress of French Catholics who argued against direct Roman authority in the administrative affairs of the French church in the name of traditional liberties French kings and bishops had exercised in previous centuries. <<A product in large measure of the French Jansenist controversy, and always adjacent to Jansenism>>, this Gallican mode of Enlightenment spread into Catholic Europe, was celebrated in the Dutch Council of Utrecht in 1763, and as it spread it brought the same divisions it had created in France (29). While such divisions emerged among Spanish Catholics under Charles III, the Caroline ministers were able to advance political authority over the Spanish church relatively unchecked. It was not until the series of political events brought by the French Revolution and then Napoleon that a conservative reaction gained enough force in Spain to halt the advances of the royal church and force a retreat of political authority over ecclesiastical affairs.
III. BEYOND 1767: GALLICANISM UNLEASHED IN SPAIN
Establishing royal authority over the Spanish church was seen as instrumental in achieving the larger Bourbon initiatives of agricultural, industrial, and commercial development to improve Spain's standing as a European power. The government of Charles III would not be satisfied with the successes against ultramontanism in the defeat of the Jesuits; instead it would continue to work towards a royal church through reforms in the later 1760s and 1770s. While Caroline reforms worked to promote civic humanism within and through the Catholic Church, they were primarily aimed at complimenting and enforcing larger goals of Bourbon ministers. Looking at the correspondence and notes of Caroline ministers, it is evident that their ideology of reform was based on three pillars: the conservation of the monarchy, the preservation of public tranquility, and the expansion of prosperity, all within the larger context of international rivalry with other imperial states such as Britain, France, and Portugal (30). Using the notion of felicidad publica (public happiness or welfare) along with patriotic sentiments, policy makers were able to justify regalist measures that would revitalize Spain and her empire through economic prosperity and material plenty. Such regalist jurisprudence expanded monarchical authority over different arenas of life that in any way could promote commerce and population growth. In this larger context of imperial prerogatives, ministers, such as Campomanes, radically redefined the distinction between temporal and spiritual affairs so that regalism could be used to argue for state jurisdiction over all church affairs not strictly spiritual. Thus, the state's primary responsibility to promote the general welfare of the public gave it license to encroach upon Church jurisdiction and centralize authority over it in Madrid in order to cover Church land and other forms of wealth which, when appropriated by the state, could be sold or converted into more productive uses that would allow more people to benefit (31).
Even with the loss of Church jurisdiction over this newly defined temporal realm of Catholic affairs, those Spaniards working towards a Catholic Enlightenment witnessed a flourishing of reforms under Charles III that promoted civic humanism within and through the Catholic Church. The demand for internal forms of religiosity, more Christo-centric in nature, that would diminish the prevalence of external forms of piety and <<superstition>>; an emphasis on Christian morality mediated by increased pastoral visitations, teaching of the catechism, and missions; a personal knowledge of the Bible through increased use of Scripture in sermons and individual reading of Scripture; increased education of clergy and laity through the promotion of seminaries, libraries, and academies; de-emphasizing dogmatic Christianity while promoting more flexible applications of Church administration through episcopalism and conciliarism; oversight of diocesan clergy, especially benefice holders --and a smaller role for regular clergy within the ecclesiastical body and fewer exemptions within the diocese--, all of these were common goals of candidates for the episcopacy and naturally also of enlightened bishops in the later 18th century (32). Regalist ministers in Madrid sponsored such episcopal candidates since the goals of such clerics allowed for greater royal control of church affairs. Thus under Charles III, sometimes collaboration occurred between the Caroline ministers and various Catholic refomers when particular goals coincided, and the state would enact measures to promote these ends, even if state action was driven more by political and economic rather than religious motivations. One example of coinciding visions of reform centered on diminishing the Spanish Inquisition's power. As detailed above, Charles III had effectively checked its power in 1761, and by the 1770s the Holy Office was characterized by inconsistency and contradiction, especially when led by reform-minded clerics such as Felipe Bertran, who was specifically appointed to create a kinder, gentler Inquisition (33). Although still able to pose a threat by its mere existence and then at times by acting against the enlightened ministers Pablo de Olavide (1776-1778) and Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos (1796), minister of Charles III and Charles IV, the Inquisition was less zealous and consistent in its censorship of literature so that <<after about 1770, Gallican, Jansenist, and radical regalist readings circulated readily>> (34). A landmark event occurred in 1782, under Inquisitor General Bertran, when the Holy Office approved the reading of Scripture in the vernacular. Since the individual's knowledge of Scripture was seen as fundamental for students of Erasmus and others advocating Catholic Enlightenment, sometimes state attempts at expanding political power over the Spanish Inquisition needed the help of those Spaniards desiring an authentic Catholic Enlightenment. Enlightened Absolutism sought the political subjection of the Inquisition more than they feared any danger the reading of Scripture in the vernacular might pose to the uniformity of Spanish Catholicism.
Since the overarching objectives of enlightened ministers in Madrid were to grow a royal church, regalist ministers focused on the submission of Spanish bishops and archbishops to the needs of the state and only exalted them in relation to the usurpations of their authority from Rome. After accomplishing this latter goal, they did little to hide their ultimate objective of using the Spanish clergy as an instrument for Enlightened Absolutism. And with royal power to select clergy under the Concordat of 1753 and the larger real patronato, Charles III and his ministers effectively converted the Spanish clergy into society's spokesmen for the royal brand of Enlightenment that focused on the conservation of the monarchy through economic prosperity and material plenty. In cases in which the Spanish clergy worked for reforms that did not promote economic prosperity or material plenty, Caroline ministers found ways to overturn such efforts or, in extreme cases, essentially depose the specific cleric by relocating them to another clerical post that had less potential for achieving reform. Furthermore, while national and provincial councils as well as diocesan synods remained in theory an institutional means for clerics to work towards reforming Catholicism as practiced within the country, archdiocese, or diocese (respectively), the reign of Charles III <<constituted a desert>> in the larger history of councils (35). In 1768, Campomanes and the Council of Castile achieved effective control of such assemblies by publishing an edict which obligated all diocesan synods to submit their acts and proceedings first to the Council of Castile for approval. What occurred in practice was the elimination and modification of some acts before their publication to promote the government's ends (36). Thus, piece by piece, all that existed outside of the strictly spiritual realm in the diocese was claimed under government jurisdiction by the forces of Enlightened Absolutism.
Another area in which Charles III and his ministers directed the way in which Catholicism was practiced in Spain was through their reforms over regular clergy and the education of clergy. As a social group, regular clergy tended to be less educated and thus tolerated more of the excesses of baroque Catholicism and even religious superstition. But with the suppression of their exemptions under epispocal authority and the 1787 requirement that each religious order within Spain have their superior within the Spanish realm, the government developed regular clergy who were more subservient to state interests. Charles III also shaped the education of clergy through a royal cedula in 1768 which ordered the erection and reform of diocesan seminaries. The end results were to bring such seminaries under direct episcopal control and exclusive leadership by secular clergy, the promotion of Augustinian and Thomist doctrine, a prohibition of Jesuit theology, and the fulfilment of a Tridentine objective. Accordingly, eleven new seminaries were established under Charles III, the most noteworthy being that of Salamanca under Bishop Bertran in 1779 (37). On the whole, the adopted curricula was either Jansenist, Augustinian, or more open to both. Streamlining religious reform with temporal needs in the realm of teaching and seminary reform after 1767, the Bourbon government was then able to shape the formation of the clergy and the laity with access to education, in a way that began to fuse Jansenism and regalism in a Gallican fashion (38).
Even though a strong working relationship developed over the course of the 18th century between the crown and prominent lay and clergy men seeking Catholic Enlightenment, increasingly there was less room for reform motivated out of uniquely religious reasons that did not correspond directly with the aims of the state. After the expulsion of the Jesuits, Bourbon policy regarding Spanish Catholicism was to promote those men who endorsed an importation of a Gallican-style ecclesiology or at least reforms that supported such a model for Church-State relations. The Bourbon monarchy could more successfully negotiate what was and was not appropriate Catholic reform by the reign of Charles III so that men who endorsed other notions of Catholic Enlightenment not only did not receive state support but also were publicly branded as insubordinate and contaminating the purity of Spanish Catholicism. Yet, the state's support of a Catholic Enlightenment that was Gallican in inspiration and friendly to Jansenism was still ultimately separate from and subservient to an enlightened program of economic progress and luxury that better empowered Enlightened Absolutism in the 18th century (39). Yet, coherence in state policy was maintained between the enlightened strands of economic progress and Jansenist reform: The objectives of the former always trumped those of the latter. Overall, government policy regarding religious affairs, compounded with larger European developments, caused this particular state-sponsored strand of Catholic Enlightenment to alienate all others--such as proto-republican and ex-Jesuit ones--to the extent that it somehow was portrayed as embodying a more <<Catholic>> Enlightenment or a more <<orthodox>> vision for Catholic society.
In the immediate aftermath of the Jesuits' expulsion, however, this outcome was not yet clear as some clerics dared to publicly disagree with royal policy on ecclesiastical matters and found themselves in dire straits as a result. The anti-Jesuit alliance that the Bourbon ministers had built among a diverse group of Spaniards contributed to such public disagreement since many of these clerics had previously received favorable treatment from the state before the expulsion and had no reason to believe that their diverging views on religious affairs would receive such backlash from the monarchy. For example, Josep Climent i Avinent, Bishop of Barcelona from 1766 to 1775, was a Jansenist-friendly bishop who had risen quickly to his episcopate because of his anti-Jesuit stance and Barcelona's strong Jesuit presence. Strategically then, the Bourbon monarchy promoted Climent in order to work towards the expulsion of the Jesuits. After their expulsion, Climent clashed with regalist ministers over reform objectives and episcopal jurisdiction, specifically in the cases of church councils, publishing and circulating religious literature, and pastoral intervention between parishioners and the state. The crux of the matter for Climent was that even though the representatives of Enlightened Absolutism in Spain claimed to be the staunchest defenders of Catholicism and proponents of Catholic renewal, they could not exist on an equal playing field with advocates of the brand of Enlightened Catholicism who, like Climent and under the auspices of Tridentine reform, sought to return to the practices of the early Church and could not prioritize temporal political demands before the spiritual needs of the Church. Since the <<Jansenism>> of regalist ministers prioritized temporal political demands and mandated Catholic reform from the top down in the name of state, rather than ecclesiastical authority, Climent was too bold in his claims to episcopal authority, and in 1775 he was forced to resign his post, branded a <<Catalan separatist>> by the Council of Castile (40).
Isidro Carvajal y Lancaster, Bishop of Cuenca, was one of eight bishops who voted against the expulsion of the Jesuits but was the only one of those eight who voiced his disagreement to the king after the fact as well. After writing to the king's confessor with concern for the Jesuits, Charles III ordered Carvajal to write a report in response arguing why Jesuits should receive support (41). In his report, Carvajal expressed support, or at least sympathy, for the Jesuits, and even petitioned for a greater use of censorship in existing periodicals and printed pamphlets that represented the Holy See of Rome and the Society of Jesus in a bad light. Campomanes and the Count of Floridablanca Jose Monino, both energetic ministers of the Bourbon government, found that Carvajal's report gave them a great occasion to publicly refute it as an example of fanaticism and superstition as well as to perpetuate the fear that such forces, although defeated in the expulsion, were not completely eliminated. Carvajal, an aged, devout, and reform-minded cleric, was publicly humiliated and removed from office, symbolically punished to set the tone for what was considered incorrect episcopal behavior under the Bourbon monarchy. This made it clear that from now on nothing but criticism of Jesuits would be tolerated in Spain (42). The forces of regalism were in full force against those of ultramontanism. Charles III would even proceed to put further pressure on Rome, seen in the conclave that elected Clement XIV as pope in 1769, and then over the next few years to secure the ultimate dissolution of the entire Jesuit order in 1773 (43).
Thus, by the 1770s the Bourbon state had made clear to clerical and lay advocates of Catholic renewal in Spain that the ends of regalism took priority over religious reform in and of itself. Nevertheless, the fusion of Spanish Jansenism and regalist reform seemed to bring the project of Catholic renewal to new heights. It had led to the promotion of Augustinian and philo-Jansenist theology, the elimination of the Jesuits, the reform of seminaries as well as the establishment of new <<royal>> ones, the reduction of holy days so as to enforce proper observance on the remaining ones, and the prohibition of some excessive popular religious practices such as self-flagellation.
By the 1780s and 1790s, the relationship between royal initiatives and (the exceedingly more Gallican) Spanish Jansenism made many clerics and laymen, otherwise favorably disposed to a Catholic Church more independent from Rome, more hesitant to follow the path of regalist reform in religious affairs and more inclined to feel Catholicism threatened in the political climate of those decades. In such a context, the royal church that the Bourbon monarchy had worked so hard to shape would have to reconstitute itself in a much more conservative form that would remain subservient to Rome since many Spaniards now looked more towards the papacy and ultramontanism as the only alternative position of strength they could embrace to ensure the continued vitality of Spanish Catholicism.
IV. JANSENIST REFORM, LARGER EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS, AND THE PROBLEM OF GALLICANISM IN SPAIN IN THE LATER 18TH CENTURY
One event that proved controversial in the long run was the Spanish Inquisition's decision to approve the publication and reading of Scripture in the vernacular, headed by the reform-minded Inquisitor Felipe Bertran in 1782. Many in the political and ecclesiastical establishment had long desired this. As the Augustinian camp came out in favour of the policy, others found that to advocate such a policy was one step down the slippery slope towards an outbreak of Jansenism in Spain. Even though the full reaction to this religious turn in Spain would not come until the 1790s, the significance of it was to confirm the existence of two theological camps that from now on remained resolutely divided from each other in the political arena, one that advocated an <<external, ceremonial, and formulaic religiosity preferring that the faithful not directly and personally know holy Scripture ...>> and the other that in contrast advocated an <<internal and anti-ceremonial religiosity, desiring that the faithful enter into direct contact with the original sources of Christianity>> (44).
The 1786 Synod of Pistoia in Habsburg Tuscany would also have a profound impact in Spain. Convened by Bishop Scipione de Ricci, moderated by the theologian Pietro Tamburini, and facilitated by the Grand Duke Leopold as the first in a series leading to a national council, this synod was decidedly Jansenist and <<bore a frankly reformist and anti-curial stamp>> (45). The first news of the synod reached Spain through the letters of ex-Jesuits living in Italy, but the fuller details of the proceedings were revealed in April of 1787 in the pro-Pistoia, pro-Ricci accounts of the Mercurio Historico y Politico, the French-inspired gazette published in Madrid. While the monarchy never directly endorsed the actions of the synod, it did so indirectly by giving the Mercurio royal license to publish praises for Ricci's efforts and pages containing large portions of his pastoral instructions. While royal approval was never given to publish a Castilian translation of the Acts of Pistoia in Spain, the synod's influence was so great--according to Appolis, it had more impact on Spanish Jansenism than the Civil Constitution of the Clergy--that by 1789 the Inquisition began prohibiting the work of Tamburini and opened up several delegations for cases surrounding the Jansenist Acts of Pistoia (46). The monarchy of Charles III or Charles IV would never be vocal in its support for Pistoia, yet political tolerance for Spanish supporters of its acts served as an underlying threat to many who felt something must be done to protect the fabric of Spanish Catholicism if the monarchy would not respond appropriately.
After Pistoia, the fusion between Spanish Jansenism and regalist reform of the Church took on an even stronger Gallican flavor, further exacerbating tensions within Spanish Catholicism and creating political instability for the Bourbon monarchy (47). While not all regalists were Jansenists, their goal was the establishment of a national church and the reduction of the Church to the spiritual arena so that it would look more like the early Church, poor with less emphasis on differences between clergy and laity. The Bourbon minister Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos is possibly the best representative of this fusion between Spanish Jansenism and regalist reform. Author of various plays and essays, most infamously the Informe sobre la Ley Agraria, Jovellanos backed Jansenist reform and supported a vision of the Church that was poorer in material possessions, especially farmland. His praise for the work of Felipe Bertran in the new seminary of Salamanca was compounded with his later promotion of the ultra-Jansenist Antonio Tavira as bishop of Salamanca by the end of the century. In his brief tenure as Minister of Grace and Justice, Jovellanos entrusted the overhaul of the University of Salamanca to Tavira, <<the herald of Spanish Jansenists>> and who as bishop of the Canary Islands in 1791 was accused of proclaiming the doctrines of Pistoia there. At one point Jovellanos would positively remark on the intellectual and theological environment in the historical center of Spanish learning, <<All of the Salamancan youth is Port-Royalist, of the Pistoian variety>> (48).
Thus, by the time Charles IV became king in 1788, the forces of regalism and Spanish Jansenism appeared to have radically transformed Spanish Catholicism into what could be described as an independent state religion that served both religious and political interests. Yet, as coming events would soon reveal, this <<advancement>> towards the past, a Spanish religiosity more reflective of the early Church, was inherently dependent on a viable system of Enlightened Absolutism, a system in which the king had effectively supplanted Roman authority to become a quasi-pope in church administration (49). By the early 1790s, that system had finally achieved a political strength similar to the Bourbon absolutism of Louis XIV. By the later 1790s, the contingency of different European events brought political instability into that system. With the tumultuous events of the French Revolution, response of certain European monarchies, and critical reaction of the papacy, the once silenced pro-Jesuit and ultramontanist contingent now found a new reactionary voice and gained supporters in fearful Catholic circles, leaving Spanish Jansenists in a precarious position, having to renew their fight to maintain dominance in the political arena over their previously defeated rivals.
Even though Charles IV maintained much of his father's regalist stance, many of his ministers were newly installed, enough of a change of guard for some historians to note that Bourbon Absolutism ceased to be <<enlightened>> and remained simply despotic after 1788. Yet this trend coincided more with the onset of Revolution in France and the ensuing political instability felt throughout Europe. As Charles IV received new reports of events occurring France, his ministers fought to preserve his regalian rights by trying to keep such news from spreading, taking pains to make censorship more rigid and publications more closely monitored. In fact, Bourbon ministers intentionally approved the publication of tracts that promoted regalism in order preserve the health and strength of the state. For instance, the essay of Gregorio Mayans on the Concordat of 1753, previously considered too politically radical for publication, was published for the first time around 1789-90. Figures such as Jovellanos, who voiced disapproval of the revolutionary actions in France yet maintained firm belief in reformist ideals, would remain involved in politics for the time being, and publications such as the Mercurio historico y politico would continue to be critical of politics in other areas of Europe. Yet by 1793, government ministers were harnessing regalism for defensive purposes to galvanize Spain in its opposition to the French in the name of king and religion rather than for offensive purposes that pursued a strategic program of reform--religious or otherwise.
As the Terror raged in France, an emboldened Pius VI sought to exert his authority as the traditional defender of orthodoxy and issued the 1794 papal bull Auctorem Fidei which condemned all that had been done at the Synod of Pistoia, including the publication of its acts, in an effort to essentially condemn all that was now perceived as Jansenism. <<This bull was a new Unigenitus, condemning conciliarism, Erastianism (in the form of the Gallican articles of 1682), iconoclasm, vernacular worship, and all the writings commended by Ricci, including, of course, Quesnel's Moral Reflexions. But unlike Unigenitus, it provoked no appeals. Almost all those who still believed in these things were now outside the Church>> (50). Outside of France, if they were still within the Church fold, they were otherwise dedicating their efforts to the political and social priorities in their home country. Refusing to accept the renewed claims to papal authority, the government of Charles IV did not publish the bull in order to defend regalist claims to authority over the Spanish church. Thus, while falling short of appealing the bull, Spain and other Catholic countries of Europe refused to acknowledge it. Caroline ministers felt that instead of the papal bull it was the French Revolution which posed more immediate danger to Bourbon political authority in Spain.
Yet, from the perspective of many Spanish Catholics, the radicalism in France, the papal retaliation against Jansenism, and the Synod of Pistoia were seen as inter-related phenomena. Many religious leaders in Spain had been enraged by the spread of Pistoia's ideas in their own land. And they saw it as no coincidence that their fellow clergy who supported the acts of the synod were the same ones who exhibited tacit approval of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. According to leading Spanish Jansenists at the time, it was the former regalist and reform-minded Archbishop of Toledo Francisco Lorenzana who, along with the Spanish nuncio, had encouraged the pope to promulgate the bull (51). Politically unable to publish the papal bull in Spain, Lorenzana as the newly installed Inquisitor General condemned the Acts of Pistoia. Now with the support of Lorenzana and the nuncio, those who saw the pope as the only savior who could rescue Catholicism in Spain from the clutches of heresy and excommunication would attempt to accept the bull as a doctrinal document from Rome. Showing the renewed strength of ultramontanism, the Spanish Inquisition began prohibiting works associated with Jansenism, including all manner of Spanish translations of the Bible, in order to send a clear message of Pistoian condemnation to both regalist ministers and Spanish Jansenists.
In 1798, the Castilian translation of ex-Jesuit Rocco Bonola's La liga de la teologia moderna con la filosofia en dano de la Iglesia de Jesucristo (The League of Modern Theology and Philosophy against the Church of Jesus Christ) accused Jansenists of making an alliance with the Republic of Letters for the common goal of undermining the authority of the Catholic Church, and the Synod of Pistoia was evidence of this alliance. Spanish Jansenists snootily responded to the work with another by an Augustinian friar whose book satirized La liga and maintained that <<Jansenism>> as a heresy was a ghost created by Jesuits to work against the very orthodox practice of advocating the Gospel's moral rigor. The Secretary of State Mariano Luis de Urquijo promptly followed with a prohibition of both works that had enflamed the situation. All of this had returned the Roman curia to meddling in Spanish affairs and thus alerted government ministers, most notably Manuel de Godoy and Urquijo, that episcopalism at this point was a political necessity, that is, the restoration of power to bishops and the reduction of the bishop of Rome to a ceremonial leader or figurehead of the Church. As earlier solicited by Floridablanca, the Bourbon state began to call for the return of the original rights of bishops diminished by the papacy through the Roman curia. Some ministers advocated direct action by the monarch against Rome in order to cement the political support of Spanish bishops, while others pursued a more moderate course relying on diplomacy in Rome to work towards a bull that would accomplish such a goal. But before either of these paths were followed, the death of Pius VI introduced a precarious situation.
Spanish representatives were excluded from the Roman conclave that followed and with overall weakened relations with Rome, the matter of issuing marriage dispensations in Spain had loomed unresolved for some time. Charles IV, by way of his minister Urquijo, boldly proceeded during this papal vacancy to decree in September 1799 that, until a new pope was announced, all bishops and archbishops could enjoy full faculty of authority, <<conforming to the early discipline of the Church, for marriage dispensations and other matters that pertain to them>> (52). This move had extensive political consequences for Spain. It allowed for greater royal access to Church wealth which would come in handy later to resolve the state's financial problems. From a diplomatic perspective, it worked against the Spanish papal nuncio to convey that the jurisdictional powers of the episcopacy were considered ordained to bishops by virtue of their office, not delegated down from Rome via the nuncio. And finally, from the perspective of religious discipline, the decree was a clear statement in support of the discipline of the early Church, making it the <<Magna Carta>> of administrative Spanish Jansenism (53).
So it seemed that royal policy would continue to favor a Spanish Catholic Church independent (only in the sense that it was) from Rome and guided by the ideas of Spanish Jansenists in government. However, for many Spaniards, previously supportive or at least sympathetic to regalist policies in the Church, the decree of Urquijo seemed to create heretical Jansenists everywhere out of bishops, professors, lesser clergy, regulars and seculars. Many now saw Jansenists coming out of the woodwork from every which way in Spain and became leery of the religious direction of royal policy. At this point even the Council of Castile, the former bastion of regalists, in league with an assembly of Madrid's priests succeeded in prohibiting Urquijo from printing some translations of classic regalist works <<because they diminished papal authority>> (54). Thus, by the time of the election of Pope Pius VII in March of 1800, regalist policy in religious matters was forced to make an abrupt halt, soften its position, and even withdraw its Gallicanized stance completely. Urquijo tried to revoke his earlier decree and was soon relieved of his duties after the pope had demonstrated his support for those who had dared to attack the Jansenists and voiced his lament to the Spanish king for the ministers who led their bishops down a path which had harmed the See of Rome. Charles IV, by means of his prime minister Godoy, finally accepted the bull Auctorem fidei in Spain out of the same regalist motivations that had caused him to reject it some years earlier. While some Spanish Jansenists such as the exiled Jovellanos would hold out for a resurgence in political power for their cause to even the score against the ultramontanist, Jesuit camp, the subsequent concordat between the papacy and Napoleon in 1801 and the Frenchman's ensuing military activity left little room for a renewed alliance between regalism and Spanish Jansenism to proceed with a royal church independent from Rome.
In the end, the events of the late 1790s and early 1800s show the limits of political authority in shaping the direction of Spanish Catholicism. By the early 1800s the active pursuit of power over ecclesiastical affairs was officially halted at the state level (55). The decisions of Bourbon ministers in tandem with their reactions to politically charged international events, such as the 1786 Synod of Pistoia in Tuscany and the 1790 Civil Constitution of the Clergy in revolutionary France, increasingly polarized Spanish Catholics between the poles of monarchy and papacy to the point that some of the Bourbon ministers themselves were repelled by this radical, Gallicanized brand of Catholicism by 1800. Catholics and even philo-Jansenists who had earlier advocated one form or another of regalist reform of Spanish Catholicism now saw this Gallican brand of Catholic Enlightenment as contributing to anticlericalism and de-Christianization, especially when judging by events in France. The reaction to such developments increased the number of Spaniards recognizing ultimate papal jurisdiction over Spanish Catholicism. With the uneasy peace between France and Spain from 1795 until the Napoleonic invasion beginning in 1807, Spanish regalism acted primarily in the defensive mode, protecting the monarchy's absolutism and traditional aristocratic privileges from the disastrous fate it had recently faced in allied France, rather than seek innovative reform and independence from Rome for Spanish Catholicism (56). All of this prepared the way for the clerical and royalist reaction in the Bourbon restoration of Ferdinand VII. In that same year of 1814, the pope would reinstate the Jesuit order, a return that would receive a royal celebration in Spain. Ferdinand VII and his ministers would use the Throne to re-appropriate the Altar for the purposes of political conservatism. From this point on, any Bourbon attempts towards a <<state religion>> would focus on the institutional independence of Spanish Catholicism only to the extent of its wealth and finances while decisions on theological, ecclesiological, and reform issues would ultimately be deferred publicly to Rome, in the end promoting the traditional image of the Spanish monarch as defender of the faith.
Andrea J. SMIDT
Professor of History and Humanities. Geneva College
(1) For example, William J. Callahan finds that the <<Caroline Church>> considered popular religious practices outside those of the church proper as something to suppress, or at best a necessary evil. William J. CALLAHAN, Church, Politics, and Society in Spain, 1750-1874 (Cambridge, MA: 1984).
(2) The terms Gallican and Gallicanism refer to an ecclesiology, originating in Medieval France, in which the monarch (i.e., the civil authority) holds ultimate authority over the Catholic Church in his particu lar domain, meanwhile recognizing that the papacy holds some traditional authoritative elements and remains ceremonial figurehead of Catholicism as bishop of Rome. A true expression of this remains the 1682 Declaration of the French Clergy on the Liberties of the Gallican Church.
(3) For a summary of regalist trends in Spain as part of the larger context of continental Catholic Europe see the work of Nigel Aston in the compilation edited by Stewart J. BROWN and Timothy TACKETT, The Cambridge History of Christianity, Volume VU: Enlightenment, Reawakening and Revolution, 1660-1815 (Cambridge, Eng: 2006), 24-5.
(4) Most traditional studies of the Enlightenment tend not to refract it into a study of various lights but instead focus on the most radical mode or <<brand>> of Enlightenment that seems to have predominated only in France, the encyclopedic Enlightenment that later historical interpretations would position as the metanarrative of Enlightenment: Lockean or empirical reason winning its assault on superstition or religion. More recent studies, however, have found the historical record to reflect a much more complex relationship between Christianity and the Enlightenment. See Helena ROSENBLATT <<The Christian Enlightenment>> in the fifteenth chapter so titled in Brown and Tackett, The Cambridge History of Christianity, Volume VII: Enlightenment, Reawakening and Revolution, 1660-1815, 283-301; J.G.A. POCOCK, <<Enthusiasm: The antiself of Enlightenment>>, in Lawrence E. KLEIN and Anthony J. LA VOPA (eds.), Enthusiasm and Enlightenment Europe, 1650-1850 (San Marino, CA: 1998), 7; Jonathan SHEEHAN, <<Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of Secularization: A Review Essay>>, American Historical Review 108 (no.4): 1061-1080; James BRADLEY and Dale K. VAN KLEY, <<Introduction>>, in James Bradley and Dale K. Van Kley, eds Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe, (Notre Dame: 2001) 14-17. The introduction offers six distinct strands of Enlightenment.
(5) The works of historians such as Antonio Dominguez Ortiz, Richard Herr, and Jean Sarrailh are extensive studies of the Spanish 18th century and serve as definitive works in the field as they demonstrate that Spain under the Bourbon monarchy again was an active participant in Western European economic, political, and intellectual affairs. Antonio DOMINGUEZ ORTIZ, Sociedad y estado en el siglo XVIII espanol (Barcelona and Madrid: Ariel Historia, 1976); Carlos III y la Espana de la Ilustracion (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1988). Richard HERR, The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958). Jean SARRAILH, L'Espagne eclairee de la seconde moitie du XVIIIe siecle (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1954).
(6) Over the past forty years, the concept of a Catholic Enlightenment has emerged as a distinct phenomenon as scholars have brought to light increasing evidence of movements in Catholic lands striving to restore the structure of the Church towards a less hierarchical version of ecclesiastical relations that harkened back to the spirit of the early Church. In rekindling this spirit of early Christianity, Catholic Enlightenment was also associated with attempts to make the Church of more service to the faithful, especially by making its liturgy and doctrine more intelligible for all classes of people, and Christianity as a faith more reasonable and useful to society (although the proposed means of doing that varied by theological bent). Given the religious landscape of its day, this naturally translated into an opposition to or suppression of the excesses of baroque Catholicism; a push for the use of the vernacular in the Mass and in Scripture; education of the laity and clergy, and with it, an openness to the newer sciences; and finally, a strengthening of regional or national churches that was often accompanied by a call for open, deliberative procedures in matters of church governance. In sum, Catholic Enlightenment <<bears everywhere the marks of a revival of Christian humanism>>. BRADLEY and VAN KLEY, <<Introduction>> in Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe, 15.
(7) At times, the initiatives for reform and renewal of Spanish Catholicism that emanated outside of the Bourbon government directly competed with the monarchical brand of Enlightenment. In these instances, the figures and initiatives of a uniquely Catholic Enlightenment were identified as obstacles to government-sponsored programs of Enlightenment. Thus, it is the existence of competing strands of Enlightenment in the area of Spanish Catholicism that makes the push for a more independent Spanish Church governed by the state significant.
(8) For a more in-depth analysis and consideration for the Spanish Catholic Enlightenment, see my forthcoming chapter: Andrea J. SMIDT, <<Luces por la Fe: The Cause of Catholic Enlightenment in 18th-century Spain>> in Ulrich L. LehNer and Michael PRINTY, eds., Brill's Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe (Brill: 2010).
(9) By the 19th century, the main kinds of <<regalist>> or <<absolutist>> types of power exercised over the Spanish Church centered on appropriating its finances and wealth rather than any ideological or ecclesiological reforms.
(10) Especially during the reign of Charles III, the efforts of regalism in matters of religion shifted towards a new focus: the revival of patristic theology over that of Jesuit moral theology, a drive to purify the Catholic faith from all that was considered <<superstition>>, and a push for greater independence of national churches, episcopacies, and secular, parish clergy at the expense of the Roman hierarchy.
(11) Teofanes EGIDO, <<El Regalismo y las relaciones iglesia-estado en el siglo XVIII>> in Historia de la Iglesia en Espana, Vol. IV: La Iglesia en la Espana de los Siglos XVII & XVIII edited by Antonio Mestre SANCHIS (Madrid: 1979), 225-232.
(12) In his 9-volume Teatro critico universal (Universal Theater of Criticism) published between 1726 and 1740 and essay series Cartas eruditas y curiosas (Inquiring and Erudite Letters) from 1742 to 1760, Feijoo pointed out the intellectual backwardness of Spain and introduced the ideas of many foreign writers into thousands of Spanish homes through these popular works, broadening cultural horizons in Spain to include other European developments, especially in the medical field of scientific inquiry.
(13) Teofanes EGIDO, <<El regalismo y las relaciones iglesia-estado en el siglo XVIII>> in Historia de la Iglesia en Espana, Vol. IV, 173-88.
(14) This is a clear example of the legal rationale that regalist jurisprudence sought in order to strengthen the monarchy's power over the national church at the expense of the pope. The Jesuit role in this case was crucial as it represented both monarchical and papal interests in practice and in theory, respectively. Carlos Maria RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ-BREA, <<Secularizacion, regalismo y reforma eclesiastica en la Espana de Carlos III: un estado de la cuestion>>, Historia Moderna (tomo 12) 1999, 359.
(15) William DOYLE, Jansenism: Catholic Resistance to Authority from the Reformation to the French Revolution (New York: 2000), 68; Antonio MESTRE SANCHIS, <<Religion y cultura en el siglo XVIII>> in Historia de la Iglesia en Espana, Vol. IV, 652-4.
(16) Rafael OLAECHEA, <<La politica eclesiastica del Gobierno de Fernando VI>>, in La Epoca de Fernan do VI. Ponencias leidas en el coloquio conmemorativo de los 25 anos de la fundacion de la Catedra Feijoo (Ovie do: 1981), 139-225.
(17) Charles C. NOEL lays out the political transactions and implications of 1758-1759, using the term of Archdeacon William Coxe for the time period, in <<The Crisis of 1758-1759 in Spain: Sovereignty and Power during a 'Species of Interregnum'>>, in Robert ORESKO, G.C. GIBBS, and H.M. SCOTT, eds, Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton (Cambridge, Eng and New York: 1997), 580-607.
(18) <<Spaniards' energies must be harnessed, their talents nourished and directed toward the monarchy's needs, their knowledge and skills developed. ... The body of the church and its hierarchy needed to be controlled, then mobilised to preach and support reform.>> NOEL, <<Charles III of Spain>>, in H.M. SCOTT, ed, Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe, (Ann Arbor, MI: 1990) 124.
(19) While in the 17th-century Jansenism was a movement originating in the southern Netherlands and extending to France which theologically affirmed the Catholic Church's Augustinian tenets regarding the role of grace over that of good works in salvation, by the 18th century it had extended its reach to Spain and other parts of Catholic Europe and became more focused on political and legalistic matters involving the support of episcopal jurisdiction and authority at the expense of papal supremacy. See Doyle, Jansenism: Catholic Resistance to Authority
(20) The efforts of government ministers became more associated with <<Jansenism>> under Charles III. Jansenists and Spanish ilustrados of the humanist, Erasmian bent shared ideas which coincided well with those of government reformers: a hatred of scholasticism, a desire to restrain the excesses of baroque religiosity and encourage more internal forms of piety, a promotion of episcopalism and conciliarism, a push for a reduction in privileges and exemptions of regular clergy. All of these were fundamental points of convergence between Jansenists, indigenous schools of enlightened thought, and the ilustrados of the Bourbon state under Charles III in the 1760s. And while the causes of Jansenism and regalism in Spain often supported each other in a mutually beneficial relationship, the exact relationship is hard to pinpoint, since the relationship developed gradually over the 18th century, constantly varied depending on the particular balance of interests at stake at any given moment, and led to unique coalitions of political and religious partners for each measure or act emanating from Madrid. Charles Noel spells out some dynamics of this unique relationship in <<Clerics and Crown in Bourbon Spain 1700-1808: Jesuits, Jansenists, and Enlightened Reformers>>, in BRADLEY and VAN KLEY, eds, Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe, 119-153. The tenuous nature of the regalist-Jansenist relationship is discussed specifically in the context of Barcelona during the episcopacy of Josep Climent i Avinent in Andrea J. SMIDT, <<Piedad e ilustracion en relacion armonica. Josep Climent i Avinent, obispo de Barcelona, 1766-1775>>, Manuscrits. Revista dHistoria Moderna, 2002, num. 20, 91-109.
(21) Teofanes EGIDO, <<El regalismo y las relaciones iglesia-estado en el siglo XVIII>> in Historia de la Iglesia en Espana, Vol. IV: La Iglesia en la Espana de los Siglos XVII-XVIII, 183.
(22) Spain was not unique in this stance; first, in 1759, Portugal expelled the Jesuits, and in 1764, the French dissolved the order in its realm. Before the Catholic monarchies managed to persuade Pope Clement XIV to dissolve the Jesuits entirely in 1773, Charles III followed suit with his European neighbors on April 2, 1767. For the political process of the expulsion in Spain, see Teofanes EGIDO LOPEZ and Isidoro PINEDO, Las Causas <<Gravisimas>> y Secretas de la Expulsion de los Jesuitas por Carlos III (Madrid: 1994).
(23) The Jesuit presence in the Spanish empire had also been an obstacle to an alliance with neighboring Portugal during the Seven Years' War. The Portuguese had been the first Catholic monarchy to suppress the Society of Jesus from its empire in 1759, but the continued existence of Jesuits and their activity in Spanish-Portuguese borderlands in South America had thwarted the Portuguese objective of eliminating their interference in slave-raiding the Guarani peoples in the reductions of Paraguay. Thus, the extinction of the Jesuits as an order in the Spanish empire was a first and necessary step to loosening Portugal from their British allies and bringing them closer to their Iberian neighbors, an attractive proposition to fortify Spain in the Americas and Mediterranean during the Seven Years' War and beyond. The third Family Pact of 1761 had begun a new set of diplomatic talks with Portuguese ministers who proposed two objectives: an ecclesiastical goal of the expulsion of the Jesuits and a political goal of a stronger Portuguese-Spanish alliance that would work to combat the English in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Enrique GIMENEZ LOPEZ, <<La expulsion de los jesuitas como problema de estado>>, Anales de la Real Sociedad Economica de Amigos del Pais (1997-1998): 249-264.
(24) (Translation mine.) EGIDO, Las Causas <<Gravisimas>>, 29.
(25) (Translation mine.) EGIDO, Las Causas <<Gravisimas>>, 35.
(26) The evidence collected by the Consejo Extraordinario placed the Jesuits in and around and before and after the riots so that they could no longer be explained by the spontaneity of the people of Madrid. While the testimonies do not clarify the supposed protagonism of the Jesuits in the riots, they do show, that since the fall of Ravago as the king's confessor in the 1750s <<the Society had radically changed its attitude in the short space of 10 years: from ultra-regalist Ravago, the posture becomes more genuinely and consistently ultramontanist. And on the other extreme, the rest of the clergy, because of the need to find anti-Jesuit testimony during the months of the investigation, appear as the closest ally to the reforming and 'Jansenist' team>> (translation mine). EGIDO, Las Causas <<Gravisimas>>, 91.
(27) Dominguez Ortiz details Charles III's policy of secularization for the ends of absolutism in Carlos III y la Espana de la Ilustracion.
(28) The term has been used most notably by CALLAHAN in Church, Politics, and Society in Spain 1750-1874 and by NOEL in <<Clerics and Crown>>. Here, I use the term to emphasize the Gallican nature by which it proceeded into the later 18th century.
(29) Dale K. VAN KLEY, <<Civic Humanism in Clerical Garb: Gallican Memories of the Early Church and the Project of Primitivist Reform, 1719-1791>>, Past and Present 200 (1): 77-120.
(30) This is the central point of the transatlantic study of Gabriel B. PAQUETTE, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759-1808 (Basingstoke, Eng and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Paquette makes a helpful distinction between enlightened absolutism and regalism: the former was more of an international trend while the later was more Iberian in origin. After distinguishing between the two in his introduction, he argues that Bourbon officials would identify their actions more with regalism because of the particular Iberian precedents they were clearly familiar with, which went back historically as far as the Visigothic period.
(31) Ibid., Chapter Two <<FelicidadPublica, Regalism, and the Bourbon Ideology of Governance>>, pp. 56-92.
(32) Joan BADA ELIAS, <<L'illustracio a la Catalunya de la segona meitat del segle XVIII>>, in Bisbes, Illustracio i jansenisme a la Catalunya del segle XVIII, edited by Joaquim M. PUIGVERT (Girona, Spain: 2000), 156-163.
(33) Bertran as bishop of Salamanca had been known for his efforts to purify the Catholic liturgy, his work against the devotion of the Sacred Heart, and even for founding a vocational school for goldsmiths. Also, in 1770 the already weakened Inquisition received a new, crippling blow to its power when a Royal Cedula prevented it from working on any cases besides those strickly dealing with heresy and apostasy. Carlos Maria RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ-BREA, <<Secularizacion, regalismo y reforma eclesiastica en la Espana de Carlos III>>, 362.
(34) NOEL, <<Clerics and Crown>>, 143.
(35) Teofaner EGIDO, <<El regalismo y las relaciones iglesia-estado en el siglo XVIII>>, in Historia de la Iglesia en Espana Vol. IV: La Iglesia en la Espana de los Siglos XVII-XVIII, 202-3.
(36) For example, the acts of the 1769 synod of Pisador finally received royal approval in 1784 and were published in 1786. Even though the clergy had moved to prohibit the use of holy days as market days, the published acts contrasted with the original acts by allowing for the continued observance of markets on such days which undoubtedly was an attempt of the Bourbon state to prevent Catholicism as practiced to get in the way of economic prosperity and vendors from losing a day's work and profits for each day the markets would be closed. See Jesus MENENDEZ PELAEZ in SAUGNIEUX, ed, Foi et Lumieres dans l'Espagne du XVIIIe siecle, (Lyon: 1985), 167-86. Here he contrasts the archival records of the synod of Pisador of 1769 in Oviedo with the royally approved acts of 1784, published in 1786.
(37) The curriculum he imposed there became the model for Spanish seminaries in the 19th century. Focusing on piety and promoting civic virtue, Bertran's seminary became the focus of Jovellanos' praise and contributed towards the <<splendid renovation>> of the Spanish Church. See Francisco MARTIN HERNANDEZ, <<La formacion del clero en los siglos XVII y XVIII>>, in Historia de la Iglesia en Espana, Vol. IV, 523-582.
(38) In effect, the brand of Enlightenment sponsored by the monarchy led to a certain reduction in freedom of thought and intellectual discussion in Spain. While in the first half of the 18th century, salon culture had been a primary forum for educated society and for the free exchange of ideas. In the second half of the century, however, royal academies and economic societies became popular venues for nobles and wealthy merchants by the 1760s and 1770s. In these forums the monarchy could better suppress all expressions of thought that conflicted with regalist ideology, whether they be doctoral dissertations at universities or books at diocesan seminaries.
(39) In theory, the state's enlightened reforms that focused on economic prosperity and progress would have been better accommodated by the Jesuitical side of Catholic Enlightenment with its optimism regarding human nature and disposition towards moral laxism.
(40) See Francesc TORT I MITJANS, El Obispo de Barcelona Josep Climent i Avinent (1706-1781): Contribucion a la Historia de la Teologia Pastoral Tarraconense en el Siglo XVIII (Barcelona: Editorial Balmes, 1978). See also SMIDT, <<Fiestas and Fervor: Religious Life and Catholic Enlightenment in the Diocese of Barcelona, 1766-1775>> (Ohio State University, Department of History, 2005).
(41) While Carvajal's report would not arrive in royal hands until after the expulsion of the Jesuits, he used the opportunity to put forward his own defense of Church organization and wealth that worked to disprove the arguments of regalist ministers such as Campomanes and directly reproached them for imposing obstacles in the field of episcopal liberty, most notably in the area of convening national and provincial councils. See NOEL, <<Opposition to Enlightened Reform in Spain: Campomanes and the Clergy, 1765-1775>>, Societas. A Review of Social History 3 (1973): 21-43. EGIDO, <<El regalismo y las relaciones iglesia-estado en el siglo XVIII>> in Historia de la Iglesia en Espana, Vol. IV, 237-240.
(42) Bishop Climent i Avinent of Barcelona wrote to the French Jansenist Clement of Auxerre that he would cease to write any more anti-Jesuit tracts since Spain was now overpopulated with them. Because expressing sympathy towards Jesuits was now known to be extremely dangerous, a multitude of clerics actively wrote and published against the Jesuits to prove their loyalty to <<Spain>>. Correspondence of the Abbe Clement, bishop of Versailles and Josep Climent, bishop of Barcelona, manuscript 1289, Archives du Seminaire de Saint-Sulpice: Paris. Letter of Climent, 5 April 1768, fol. 11-12.
(43) Clement XIV would also be prevailed upon by Catholic states to abandon the practice of publishing the annual bull of In coena Domini in 1773, a practice that had been used to exert papal authority over temporal affairs by excommunicating princes and other political leaders. Rafael OLAECHEA, Las relaciones hispano-romanas en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII. La Agencia de Preces, (Zaragoza, 1965), vol. 1: 352 ff.
(44) (Translation mine.) Antonio MESTRE SANCHIS, <<Religion y cultura en el siglo XVIII>> in Historia de la Iglesia en Espana Vol. IV, 733.
(45) VAN KLEY, <<Catholic Conciliar Reform in an Age of Anti-Catholic Revolution>> Religion and Politics, 82.
(46) Antonio MESTRE SANCHIS, <<Repercusion del sinodo de Pistoia en Espana>>, in Claudio LAMIONI ed, Il sinodo di Pistoia del 1786: Atti del Convegno internazionale per il secondo centenario, Pistoia-Prato, 25- 21 setiembre 1986 (Rome: 1991), 425-439.
(47) <<... Regalism combined with episcopalism and Jansenism ...>> (translation mine). Emilio LA PARRA, <<Regalisme i monarquia hispanica (1750-1808)>> in Bisbes, Illustracio i jansenisme a la Catalunya delsegle XVIII, 145.
(48) Words of Jovellanos as quoted in MESTRE SANCHIS, <<Religion y cultura en el siglo XVIII>>, Historia de la Iglesia en Espana, Vol. IV, 718-723.
(49) This was exactly the potential of regalism in the century of lights as stated by Carlos Maria RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ-BREA. <<El Principe se convertiria asi en el autentico vicario de Dios en el Reino y, por extension, en la verdadera cabeza de la Iglesia catolica de sus territorios>>. RODRIGUEZ LOPEZ-BREA, <<Secularizacion, regalismo y reforma eclesiastica en la Espana de Carlos III>>, 358.
(50) DOYLE, Jansenism: Catholic Resistance to Authority (New York: 2000), 85.
(51) As Archbishop of Toledo, the ultra-orthodox Francisco Lorenzana was known for his reforms to purify preaching in the archdiocese of its difficult style and his social projects which included an attempted revival of the silk industry.
(52) Decree of Urquijo as quoted in MESTRE SANCHIS, <<La repercusion del sinodo de Pistoia en Espana>>, 434-435. (Translation mine.)
(53) Rafael OLAECHEA, Las relaciones hispano-romanas; Antonio MESTRE SANCHIS, <<La repercusion del sinodo de Pistoia en Espana>>, 435.
(54) Antonio MESTRE SANCHIS, <<Religion y cultura en el siglo XVIII>>, Historia de la Iglesia en Espana, vol. IV, 739-743.
(55) Some argue that the cause of Spanish Jansenism played into state affairs well into the 19th century even after the Napoleonic invasion had uprooted Enlightened Absolutism as the deliberations and initiatives of the Cortes of Cadiz by 1812 worked in the name of the king to preserve the power and authority of Spanish government, including in the realm of religious affairs. Others maintain that the papal concordat of 1801, which granted the pope more concessions over the French church than he had ever possessed in Old Regime France, undid the work of the French Jansenists for Gallican liberties and was a death sentence for Jansenists everywhere. While in Spain the 1801 acceptance of Auctorem Fidei in the long run spelled out to the Spanish Jansenist camp that regalism would no longer be following the same path of innovation in religious matters--except for those strictly related to appropriating Church wealth and maintaining political control over clergy--the continued toleration that they received in and outside of the court of Charles IV gave the surviving Jansenist remnant some hope of realizing their ideals.
(56) With the absence of a Bourbon monarch during the French occupation of Spain, the old program of Spanish Jansenism made a slight resurgence in the spirit of innovation found in the Cortes of Cadiz as early as 1810 and until 1814. While the same divisions existed between ultramontanists and their newly named opposition of <<liberals>>, most political groups at the Cortes still found the convening of a national church council a necessity given the unique situation. Yet the council would never come to pass, and the innovative Cortes stopped far short of suggesting a separation of the Church from the state as it tried to negotiate a new role for priests and impose a reduction in Church privileges and wealth that subjected it to greater state control. For an elaboration see both the work of MESTRE SANCHIS, <<La repercusion del sinodo de Pistoia en Espana>>, 435-439 and of LA PARRA, El primer liberalismo y la Iglesia (Alicante: 1985).
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|Title Annotation:||ESTUDIOS: LA ECLESIOLOGIA DE LA REVOLUCION (1786-1825)|
|Author:||Smidt, Andrea J.|
|Publication:||Anuario de Historia de la Iglesia|
|Date:||Jan 1, 2010|
|Next Article:||La eclesiologia de la revolucion en el Sinodo de Pistoya (1786).|