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EW in the Third World.

EW in the Third World

It is perhaps as well to preface any discussion of electronic warfare in the "Third World" with a definition of what exactly this gloriously imprecise term means. Geographically, the area under discussion includes Central and South America, Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, China and parts of Micronesia. Traditional definitions of Third World status -- predominantly agrarian, nonindustrialized nations whose populations live on or below the poverty line -- are becoming increasingly meaningless in that the defined region includes both the immensely wealthy oil states and a number of industrialized economies such as Chile, India, South Korea and Taiwan. Equally importantly, the region incorporates or is bounded by the fully developed economies of Israel, South Africa, Australia and Japan.

In truth, then, there can be no catch-all definition of the area in the 1990s other than perhaps very high levels of national debt, an overweening desire for better standards of living and massive political instability. The stupidity of the developed countries' Third World loan policy in the 1970s has left a legacy of crippling inflation and poverty throughout the region which continues to destabilize both the rule of law and the ability of governments to function effectively. To this heady cocktail we can add the superpowers' use of the region as a surrogate battlefield for their conflicting ideologies and the rise of religious fundamentalism as a direct result of the general economic and political chaos which prevails.

If the foregoing paints a bleak picture, it is meant to -- this powder keg of unresolved conflict, bitterness, appalling poverty and political ambition represents the largest market for Western military equipment in the last decade of the 20th century. While there is no place for morality in arms sales, the industry must find itself between a "rock and a very hard place" in its future dealings with the region in that, on the one hand, sales mean jobs and, on the other, the equipment sold will represent an increasingly real threat to the vendor nations. Lest any reader dismiss such thoughts as apocalyptic nonsense, let him ponder the wisdom of supplying Iraq with sophisticated weaponry in view of its invasion of Kuwait; the implications of nuclear weapons in the Indian subcontinent; or the prospect of such weapons in the hands of countries liek Libya and Iraq. All of these scenarios have or are likely to happen and all threaten our very existence.

Whether or not the reader agrees with the described dangers inherent in the Third Worlds arms market, there is no gainsaying that it exists. With regard to the EW sector, a number of distinct trends seem to be evolving:

1) The introduction of sophisticated Western and Soviet weaponry into the region during the past 30 years has increased awareness of the value of EW among its constituent nations. In the Middle East particularly, this awareness has been emphasized by the success with which Israel has used the technology in its post-1967 conflicts with its Arab neighbors.

2) The US-Soviet rapprochement is likely to see a lessening of direct involvement in the region, a situation which is likely to encourage the military growth of regional "superpowers" (such as Japan) to fill the vacuum. Such local "polcemen" will want sophisticated weaponry, including EW, and increasing levels of technology transfer/offset as befits their perceived political and/or economic status.

3) An indigenous manufacturing/design capability such as that already existing in Chile, Taiwan and South Korea will continue to grow as the decade unfolds.

4) Interest in all forms of surveillance tools will increase as the countries of the region strive to protect increasingly scarce natural resources (especially oil).

5) An increase in the cost of base facilities looks likely to more frequently involve the provision of sophisticated weaponry as part or whole payment.

6) The importance of the retrofit market will increase.

7) The growing likelihood of barter agreements for equipment rather than payment in hard currency.

Against this background, what then is the state of EW provision with in this region? As with any survey of this type, the information supplied must be bounded by a number of caveats. As with the European survey published last month ("NATO EW -- At the Turning Point," JED, August 1990, p. 35), what follows restricts itself to coverage of SIGINT/warning, active radar jamming and disposable systems because of space limitations. Also, the reader will not find coverage of Japanese systems -- not because of a lack of information, but rather because the country's activities in the field warrant an article in their own right (see "Making the East Less Inscrutable," JED, February 1990, p. 35). Again, because of customer confidentiality, only known (or, at least, likely) programs are included. This does not mean a lack of awareness of other activities in the region but rather that there is insufficient hard evidence with which to go into print. Speculative data are indicated as such. Finally, the reader will find little reference to land-based systems. As far as JED can ascertain, land EW (other than secure radios) is the least developed area of the overall technology in the area and, as with the noted difficulty in identifying the scale of some vendor country's market share, information is thin on the ground. Indeed, one of the few examples so far identified is UK contractor Racal's sale of two of its RACEWS (Racal Automated Communications EW System) to unidentified Middle Eastern customers.

With regard to the noted move toward self-sufficiency in EW provision, Chile is an excellent illustration of the trend. Already possessing a very capable aerospace industry, the major contractor ANAER's Division Electronica, based on Santiago, has developed a range of airborne EW equipment which includes the ITATA ELINT system, the Caiquen III RWR, the Eclipse chaff/flare dispenser and the Medusa stand-off jammer. Taking these in order, the ITATA system covers the 3-MHz to 18-GHz frequency spectrum in six system-specific bands. The equipment comprises a programmable superhet receiver, a digital pulse analyzer and a high-gain wide-band dish antenna. Operationally, the system is deployed on a small number of Chilean Air Force Beech 99A aircraft and is reported to be available for export.

The Caiquen III is a processor-controlled crystal-video RWR covering the 2- to 18-GHz band which can classify and display up to 16 threat emitters simultaneously. The receiver can be interfaced with the Eclipse dispenser and is known to be in service on Chilean Air Force Mirage and Hunter Aircraft. ENAER has also developed an F-5 Caiquen installation but this is thought not to have been implemented.

The Eclipse dispenser comprises five LRUs and can incorporate up to four launch modules housing a maximum of 64 RR-170 chaff cartridges and 34 MJU-7B IR flares. Eclipse is fitted to Chilean Air Force Mirage and Hunter aircraft and like ENAER's other EW products is available for export.

The remaining mentioned item, the Medusa jammer, was first revealed at the 1986 FIDA exhibition and can reportedly generate up to 1 kW of "white" noise. The Medusa appears to be one of a family of jamming systems, details of which remain classified.

India, South Africa, Taiwan and South Korea also have the industrial capability to produce indigenous EQ equipment, a capability which seems to be peaking in Taiwan. Alongside almost certain license production of Israeli kit, the country is developing an ECM suite for its new fighter aircraft. What the foreign content of this system might be remains speculative, but it seems likely that the system will have a considerable locally built (if not designed) content.

The following detailed look at "bought in" provision within the region is split into geographical areas -- Central and South America, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, the Indian sub-continent and Southeast Asia, China and the Pacific.



As a result of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War, the Argentine military has considerable interest in acquiring EW equipment to update its capabilities, but little money with which to turn requirements into hardware. Known examples of Argentinian EW provision include CSEE's Dagaie chaff/IR decoy launchers for the country's MEKO frigates, the Selenia-Elsag/Breda SCLAR launcher on its Almirante Brown-class destroyers, MEL/Signaal's dual-mode Scimitar surface-ship radar jammer and an ELTA SIGINT system installed in a small number of naval Electra surveillance aircraft. Possible provision includes RAFAEL SRCR/LRCR chaff rockets on Dabur-class fast attack craft (FACs), Elettronica's Colibri ESM on naval SH-3 ASW helicopters and ELTA/Elisra jamming/threat warning equipment on air force IAI Dagger strike/interceptor aircraft. A similar Israeli input can be expected if the 24 IAI-modified Skyhawks ordered in 1982/83 are ever delivered.


The Brazilian navy is known to have acquired Plessey's Shield chaff/IR decoy launcher and a member of Decca's 1- to 18-GHz RDL family of ESMs for use on its frigates. The Brazilian air force's 16 Mirage IIIEBR interceptors are likely to be fitted with the Thomson-CSF Type BF crystal-video RWR and are, in any case, the subject of an upgrade program being undertaken by Dassault. Whether or not this will include EW gear is uncertain. Thomson is also undertaking an avionics update on the service's S-2 Tracker ASW aircraft which includes the DR 3000 ESM system. The ongoing Italian-Brazilian AMX strike aircraft program presupposes use of some if not all of the EW suite (radar jammer, IR/radar threat warning, chaff/flare dispenser and MAW) developed for the aircraft by the Italians. Equally, Brazil's purchase of warships from Italy may carry Elettronica EW systems such as members of the ELT-300 and -500 families of surface-ship radar jammers.


Alongside the previously described national airborne EW program, Chile is reported to have signed a $200 million contract with IAI's Bedek Aviation Division for the upgrading of 14 of its F-5E/F aircraft. Part of the package comprises an integrated ECM suite made up of an RWR, radar jammer(s) and a chaff/flare dispenser. As currently structured, this "F-5 Plus" program will involve the installation of IAI-supplied component kits by ENAER. Israel is also the country of origin for both the Chilean navy's SAAR-4 FACs and the Elbit ACDS decoy launchers fitted to them. Additionally, RAFAEL has supplied SRCR and/or LRCR chaff rockets to the Chilean navy for use on an as yet unidentified class of warship.


The 13 IAI Kfir C7/TC7 aircraft operated by the Colombian air force are probably equipped with elements of the EW suite (Elisra threat warning system, ELTA jammers and IMI chaff/flare dispenser) developed for the type in Israel. IAI's contract to update the country's Mirage V inventory may also include provision of EW equipment. On the naval side, Colombia's Caldas-class frigates are fitted with the CSEE Dagaie chaff/IR decoy launcher and MEL's Scimitar multimode radar jammer.


Like Colombia, Ecuador has acquired a small number of Israeli Kfir interceptors which are likely to carry Israeli-manufactured threat warning systems and chaff/flare dispensers. The country's 15 Mirage F.1JE/JB aircraft are likely to carry Thomson Type BF RWRs, while the navy's Esmeraldas-class corvettes are fitted with the Italian SCLAR chaff/IR decoy launching system.


One of South America's few users of Soviet bloc aircraft, the Peruvian air force's Su-22 inventory can be expected to carry the standard RWR/chaff launcher kit carried by such aircraft. Its 10 Mirage 2000 interceptors are likely to be fitted with the Thomson-CSF Serval threat warners and the company's Remora dual-mode radar jamming pod. The Peruvian navy operates the Selenia-Elsag/Breda SCLAR chaff/IR decoy launcher (Carvajal-class frigate), the MEL/Signaal Scimitar radar jammer and may also make use of both other Italian EW equipment and the French Dagaie decoy launcher.


The Venezuelan navy is reported to have acquired Sperry's Guardian Star ESM equipment for retrofit into its Lupo-class frigates together with Elettronica's Colibri ESM for its AB-212 ASW helicopters. For its Mariscal Sucre-class frigates, the service has acquired the Italian SCLAR decoy launcher. As the only South American operator of the F-16A Fighting Falcon, Venezuela may also have received the AN/ALR-69 threat warner and the AN/ALE-40(V) dispenser associated with the type.



With a front-line strength of approximately 350 Soviet-supplied MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, Su-7, Su-20 and Mi-24 aircraft, the Algerian air force can be expected to be equipped with at least the Sirena-series RWRs. There are tentative reports that the country's two Super King Air 200T coastal patrol aircraft are equipped with Elettronica's ELT-263 ESM system.


The 16 F-16C/D aircraft Bahrain has on order will presumably carry the standard AN/ALR-69 threat warner and AN/ALE-40(V) chaff/flare dispenser. The Bahrain navy is reported to have acquired Racal's Cygnus radar jammer and the French Dagaie decoy launcher for use on its FACs.


The Egyptian air force is becoming increasingly well equipped with EW systems. The range currently includes Selenia's SL/ALQ-234 jamming pod (Mirage V and MiG-21), Racal's Prophet RWR (MiG-21), Litton's AN/ALR-46(V)2 RWR (F-4E), Litton's AN/ALR-69 RWR (F-16), Selenia's IHS-6 stand-off ESM/ECM system (Commando 2E helicopters), Litton's AN/ALR-73 passive detection system (E-2C) and Westinghouse's AN/ALQ-131 jamming pod. "Possible" systems include Thomson-CSF's Serval RWR (Mirage 2000), Westinghouse's AN/ALQ-119(V) jamming pod (F-4E), Tracor's AN/ALE-40(V) dispenser (F-4E and F-16) and Thomson's Remora jamming pod (Mirage 2000).

In addition, the service operates four Beech 1900C and two EC-130H ELINT aircraft. No details of the 1900C installation have yet surfaced (although ESL's Guardrail system would be a suitable contender), while the EC-130Hs appear to have originated in a $28.2 billion contract issued in 1978 for two "airborne reconnaissance and ground processing systems." The reader should also note that the numerous Soviet aircraft still operated by Egypt will, in part, still be equipped with standard Soviet RWRs, chaff dispensers and the like. Most interestingly, Egypt appears also to have developed its own training jammer system which is pod mounted and carried beneath a two-seat MiG-21U trainer.

The Egyptian navy is known to operate the CEIEC-921A ESM (Chinese Romeo-class submarines), the Bofors Protean decoy launcher (FACs) and Racal's Cygnus noise/deception jammer (Ramadan-class FAC). The service may also make use of EW equipment originating in Italy.


Any analysis of the Iranian Islamic Republic is difficult, an appreciation of its EW provision even more so. Prior to the fall of the shah, the US supplied some F-4 aircraft which were fitted with Litton's AN/ALR-46(V) RWR and there are reports of the delivery of 172 Dalmo Victor AN/ALR-62 RWRS and 80 Westinghouse AN/ALQ-119(V) jamming pods. How much (if any) of this equipment remains operational is anyone's guess, although it is worth noting in this context the covert support Israel gave to Iran during the Gulf War. Equally tentative must be whether or not the F-14s supplied to Iran carried their standard Sanders AN/ALQ-126 deception jammers and Litton AN/ALR-45 RWRs.

Perhaps more interesting is the fate of the three IBEX SIGINT C-130H aircraft delivered during the mid-1970s. Fitted out by E-Systems, those aircraft were equipped for COMINT/ELINT operations and worked with four US-built ground stations at Tabriz, Mount Kerents, Bushehr air base and Chah Bahar (manned by naval personnel). One IBEX aircraft was lost prior to the revolution and Iraq claims to have shot down another. For the record, the best estimate available suggests Iran can currently muster 40 to 50 F-4D/F-4E/RF-4E, 75 F-5E, more than 40 F-6/F-7, 3 or 4 P-3F and a "small number" of F-14A aircraft as its front-line strength. No information has surfaced concerning EW equipment used by the country's navy.


The Iraqi air force continues to operate a large number of Soviet aircraft (Tu-22, Tu-16, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-29, Su-7 and Su-25) and while there is no direct evidence of its EW capabilities, it would be surprising if there was no such provision. The same lack of information applies to the services more than 90 Mirage F.1-E strike platforms. There are continuing rumors of French EW kit (Thomson's Type BF RWR, the same company's Remora and Barem jamming pods plus Matra's Sycomor dispenser) being supplied in support of these aircraft. However, the reader should be aware of the considerable disinformation concerning French deliveries to Iraq during and after the Gulf War. In view of this, equal skepticism should perhaps be given to reports that Iraq has received Matra's ARMAT antiradiation missile. Again, as with Iran, there is no firm information available concerning EW provision within the Iraqi navy.


Alongside the indigenous EW systems described in the August 1990 issue of JED, Israel has received considerable EW support from the US. Known items include the AN/ALR-73 passive surveillance system (E-2C), the AGM-45 Shrike and AGM-78 standard anti-radiation missiles (F-4), the AN/ALQ-131(V) jamming pod (F-15) and the AN/ALQ-119(V) jamming pod (F-4). "Possibles" include the AN/APR-36/37 and AN/ALR-46(V) RWRs (F-4), the AN/ALE-40(V) dispenser (F-4) and the AN/ALR-56A threat warning system (F-15A). There has also been considerable speculation as to whether Israel has received a small number of RU-21A/RC-12D Guardrail aircraft; Israel continues to deny this and the rumors keep surfacing.

When considering Israeli EW, it is worth noting the country's penchant for upgrading purchased systems, a trend which has resulted in the Purple Fist variant of the AGM-78, an AN/ALQ-119 the "insides of which you would not recognize," a national modification program for the Loral Rapport III EW suites used on some Israeli F-16s and local modifications to Teledyne drones to produce radar decoys.


Jordan is the launch customer for the Thomson-CSF/Matra/Dassault Electronique/SAT ICMS integrated countermeasures suite designed for use on the Mirage 2000. Additionally, approximately 20 of the country's F-5E/F aircraft are being upgraded with a new nav/attack system and provision for Selenia's SL/ALQ-234 jamming pod. This equipment incorporates an integral threat reception/classification subsystem.


Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the country had on order 32 F-18C aircraft plus EW gear and its Navy had acquired both Racal's Cygnus Jammer and the French Dagaie Decoy Launcher System. The status of this equipment is now obviously very much in doubt.


While no firm information is available concerning current EW provision within Libya's armed forces, it is interesting to note that Egyptian forces were subject to stand-off jamming from Mi-8 helicopter platforms during the early 1980s border conflict between the two countries.


Following losses to Polisario guerillas in the Western Sahara, Morocco has equipped its Mirage F.1 strike aircraft with chaff/flare dispensers which are most likely to be of French origin. The country's air force is also reported to operate two Falcon 20 business jets configured for some as yet unidentified ECM use. Like many of the Middle Eastern countries, Morocco has acquired the French Dagaie decoy launcher for its navy.


The 18 Jaguar S strike aircraft operated by the Omani air force are fitted with a Marconi Defence Systems' RWR (probably a variant of the ARI.18228 system used by the RAF) and an unidentified chaff/flare dispenser. For this latter item, the Omanis are known to have ordered IR decoy flares from UK contractor Wallop. Britain also supplies the country's navy with EW equipment in the form of Racal's Cygnus jammer.


Qatar's 12 Mirage F.1-E fighter-bombers are probably equipped with the Thomson Type BF RWR, while the country's navy has acquired the Dagaie decoy launcher and Racal's Cygnus jammer.

Saudi Arabia

The Royal Saudi Air Force operates the AN/ALR-56C threat warner on its 42 F-15C aircraft and is being supplied with Marconi's Sky Shadow jamming pod and RHAW system for its Tornados. Whether the Tornado "fit" includes the Bofors BOZ chaff/flare dispenser remains unclear. Also unclear is the truth of reports suggesting that Saudi F-5Es have been fitted with the AN/ALR-46(V) RWR and AN/ALE-40(V) chaff/flare dispensers. In this latter context, Saudi Arabia is another customer for Wallop's IR decoy flares.

Looking to the future, if the Saudis do decide to purchase the Hawk 200 attack aircraft, such machines will almost certainly carry EW gear such as Marconi or Racal RWRs and Vinten Vicon 78 chaff/flare dispensers. For its navy, the country is acquiring Thomson's DR 4000 ESM and Janet jamming systems and is thought to be already operating the Dagaie decoy launcher.


While the exact nature of Syria's overall EW capability remains unclear, its existence can be inferred from Israeli reports and the Soviet Union's willingness to supply the country with a range of sophisticated weaponry.


The Tunisian navy is reported to have acquired French Dagaie decoy launchers for its FACs.

United Arab Emirates

The Hawk 100 trainer/strike aircraft ordered by the UAE are likely to be fitted with the Vicon 78 chaff/flare dispenser and an RWR. The 36 Mirage 2000 interceptor/reconnaissance/training aircraft being acquired also carry EW gear which is believed to be either of American or Italian origin. Indeed, integration of this equipment has considerably delayed delivery of the aircraft. The UAE navy is reported to have acquired both Racal's Cygnus jammer and the French Dagaie decoy launcher system.



The Nigerian navy is reported to have acquired or is acquiring examples of the Selenia-Elsag/Breda SCLAR decoy launcher, the Bofors Protean chaff launcher, the Decca dual-band RCM-2 radar jammer and the Decca RDL 2 intercept receiver.

South Africa

While unquestionably a developed country, it is convenient to include South Africa in this survey by virtue of its geographical location. In terms of EW, Israel is the country's main supplier. Accordingly, the South African air force is currently operating four IAI 707 tanker conversions which, if the photographic evidence is anything to go by, also carry part or all of ELTA's EL/L-8300 strategic SIGINT suite. IAI's hand may also be seen in the indigenous Cheetah modification to the basic Mirage III airframe which undoubtedly incorporates a similar EW fit to that used in IAI's Kfir multirole fighter. In this context, it is worth noting that a considerable number of Israeli aerospace workers moved to South Africa in the wake of the layoffs resultant from the cancellation of the Lavi. These people are probably heavily involved in South Africa's program to develop a twin-engine fighter for the mid-1990s, a project which, it is rumored, will use much of the avionics and defensive aids suite developed for the Lavi.

In the naval arena much the same story holds true, with the South African navy making use of RAFAEL's SRCR/LRCR chaff rockets, Elbit's ACDS decoy launching system and ELTA's MN-53 passive intercept equipment. Other systems which may have been acquired include equipment of Italian origin and RAFAEL's Rattler radar jammer.



The Indian air force comprises a mix of Soviet (MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-25, MiG-27 and MiG-29) and Western (Mirage 2000, Jaguar, Hunter and Canberra) aircraft types. Of these, the Soviet aircraft can be expected to at least carry threat warners and/or dispensers. Among the Western types, the Mirage 2000 could be fitted with either Thomson-CSF's Serval RWR or Dassault Electronique's ABD 2000 autonomous radar jammer. The service's Jaguar strike aircraft all exhibit the tail fairing associated with a Marconi Defence Systems RWR and there are reports of a jamming pod being supplied by what is now SATech in Sweden.

For its navy, India has procured small numbers of Soviet Tu-142M, Ka-25 and Ka-27 maritime reconnaissance/ASW types which undoubtedly carry ESM equipment. The service's 20 Sea King 42B ASW helicopters are being fitted with Marconi Defence System's Hermes ESMs, while its Sea Harrier 51 "jump jets" carry Vinten's Vicon 78 chaff/flare dispenser. The national armament R&D establishment at Pune is developing a medium-range chaff launcher for surface ships and there are unconfirmed reports that ARGO has supplied India with its Phoenix submarine ESM system.


Known Pakistani EW provision includes the purchase of Westinghouse AN/ALQ-131(V) jamming pods for use on the country's F-16 interceptor/strike aircraft and General Instrument AN/ALR-606(V)2 ESM systems for its P-3C Orions.




Like South Africa, Australia (and, for that matter, New Zealand) is usually considered a developed country. Its inclusion here is for the sake of completeness and because of its geographical location.

For its part, the Royal Australian Air Force operates a number of EW systems, including Sanders' AN/ALQ-126B deception jammer (F/A-18), Litton's AN/ALR-67(V) threat warner (F/A-18) and AWA Defence Industries' Modir IR jammer (C-130). The service has also procured an ESM system from ELTA for its P-3C maritime patrol aircraft; is negotiating for the purchase of Northrop's AN/ALQ-162 CW jammer (for the F/A-18) and has conducted trials with Texas Instruments' AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missile and Westinghouse's AN/ALQ-131(V) jamming pod with a view to their use on its F-11C fleet. The country's navy is also known to operate two HS 748 transports which have been modified into ECM trainers.


The Royal Brunei Armed Force's Air Wing is procuring 16 British Aerospace Hawk 100 aircraft for training and strike duties. Sales of Hawk 100/200s into the region seem certain to use EW equipment drawn from an expanding "approved" range which includes Marconi Defence Systems' Sky Guardian 200 RWR, Racal's Prophet RWR, Thomson-CSF's Sherloc RWR and Modular Self Protection System (Barem jammer and Sherloc RWR) and Vinten's Vicon 78 chaff/flare dispenser. Marconi Defence Systems' new Apollo warning/jamming equipment would also be a suitable candidate for such aircraft.


The Indonesian navy has procured the French Dagaie decoy launcher for its FACs. Perhaps more interestingly, ELTA floated a proposal to install a variant of its EL/L-8300 SIGINT suite in the Boeing 737 Surveiller, three of which are operated by the Indonesian air force. Whether or not his proposal has been followed through remains uncertain.


The Royal Malaysian Air Force has purchased Tracor AN/ALE-40 and ALE-41 dispensers and Litton AN/ALR-64(V) RWRs for use on either its F-5 or A-4 aircraft. The country's future procurement of Mirage 2000, F-16 and/or Hawk 200 types will undoubtedly incorporate EW equipment of one sort or another. For its part, the Malaysian navy is reported to have acquired both the MEL/Signaal Scimitar naval jammer and CSEE's Dagaie decoy launcher.

New Zealand

As part of the Kahu A-4K update program, the country's Skyhawks are not fitted with General Instrument AN/ALR-66(VE) RWRs and an unidentified dispenser system.

North Korea

North Korea's Romeo-class submarines are known to be fitted with the Chinese CEIEC-921A ESM system. The Soviet aircraft (MiG-21, Mig-23, MiG-29, Su-7 and Su-25) operated by the country's air force can be expected to have RWR/dispenser provision at the very least.

People's Republic of China

The PRC has a reasonably extensive indigenous EW industry, of which, know products include the 2- to 18-HGz CEIEC-921A submarine ESM; the 2- to 18-GHz CEIEC RW-23-1 shipboard radar warner; the I/J-band CEIEC Model 970 battlefield radar jammer; the CIEC GT-1 airborne chaff/flare dispenser; the I/J-band SCRIEE KG 8605 internally mounted airborne noise jammer; the SCRIEE KG 8606 I-band internally mounted airborne noise jammer; the 2- to 18-GHz GHz SCRIEE KJ 8605 RWR; the 1- to 18-GHz SCRIEE KZ-8608 airborne ELINT system; the CSTS EAJ-7 shipboard noise jammer and the CSTC ERC-1 naval decoy launcher. Most, if not all, of these systems are available for export. In addition to these national products, the country is reported to have acquired an EW suite for its Jianghu V-class frigates from Italian contractor Elettronica.

South Korea

The Republic of Korea's air force makes fairly extensive use of EW equipment, identified systems including the AN/ALR-46(V) RWR (F-4D/E); the AN/ ALE-40 dispenser (F-4D/E, F-5E/F and probably F-16); the AN/ALR-69 threat warner (F-16) and the AN/ALQ-131(V) jamming system (under negotiation for RF-4C aircraft). Looking to the future, Korea is reported to be interested in acquiring ECR Tornados, the ICAP-II EA-6B jamming aircraft and ESL's Quick-Fix helicopter-mounted battlefield communications jammer.


Singapore's air force has acquired a small number of EW systems including the AN/ALR-73 ESM (E-2C) and the AN/ALR-69 threat warner (F-16). The country has issued an upgrade RFP for its F-5E/F fleet which appears to incorporate requirements for both an RWR and a chaff/flare dispenser. In addition, there are unconfirmed reports that Singapore has purchased RAFAEL's SRCR/LRCR chaff rockets for use on its FACs.


A percentage of Taiwan's fleet of 246 F-5E interceptor/strike aircraft have been fitted with AN/ALR-46(V) RWRs and AN/ALE-40(V) chaff/flare dispensers. General Instrument is supplying its AN/ALR-66(V)2 ESM system for use in the country's S-2 Tracker update progam and is in the process of setting up a Taiwan-based EW maintanance/repair facility serving the whole of the Pacific Rim. Taiwan is also developing an Indigenous Defensive Fighter aircraft which is reported to incorporate a fully integrated EW suite. The Taiwanese navy operates a mixture of American and Israeli EW systems, examples of which include the ARGO 680/681 ESM; an update of the AN/WRL-1 surface ship ESM (now covering the J-band); an ELTA equipment described as the "EL 1040 naval EW system;" an ESM based on Hughes' AN/SLQ-31 and a variant of Raytheon's Sidekick jammer. The service also uses a chaff rocket launcher designated as the CR-201 and may have acquired RAFAEL SRCR/LRCR chaff rockets and Rattler jammers together with Elbit's ACDS decoy launcher.


Known airborne EW systems used by the Tahis include the AN/AL-46(V) RWR (F-5E); the AN/ALE-40(V) chaff/flare dispenser (F-5E and possibly 4-16); the AN/ALR-69 threat warner (F-16); Elletronica's ELT/263 ESM system (F-27 Maritime Enforcer and/or Learjet 36A) and an ELTA ELINT system (possibly the EL/L-8310 equipment mounted in three IAI 201 Arava aircraft). The Thai navy has acquired Dagaie decoy launchers and may use RAFAEK's SRCS/LRCR chaff rockets.
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Title Annotation:electronic warfare
Author:Streetly, Martin
Publication:Journal of Electronic Defense
Date:Sep 1, 1990
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