Libya is an Arab Muslim state in North Africa. It is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, on the east by Egypt, on the south by Sudan, Chad, and Niger, on the west by Algeria and the north west by Tunisia. 1 Ever since Libyan leader Moammer Qadhafi took over the reins of power from King Idris in 1969, the leader's words and actions have kept Libya in the limelight on the international scene.
Historically speaking, the people of Libya have never been completely independent. They have been under varying degrees of foreign control. At various periods in history the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals and Byzantines ruled all or parts of Libya. 2 Libya was conquered by the Arabs in the seventh century AD, and most of the indigenous peoples adopted Islam, the Arabic language and Arab culture. The Ottoman Turks conquered the country in the mid-sixteenth century, enriching the cultural heritage of the country as well as its history.
Italy, seeking to build its own empire declared war against the Ottoman Empire and invaded Libya in 1911. However, a strong movement was launched against Italian occupation by a Muslim religious and social reform group called the Sanussi brotherhood. 3 During the Second World War the British army succeeded in expelling the Italians and their Nazi German allies, placing Tripolitania and Cyrenaica under British and Fezzan under French control. 4
Libya declared its independence in December 1951, under Muhammad Idris al Sanussi, who became king. 5 King Idris banned all political parties throughout the Kingdom. In 1963 the federal structure of the country was abandoned and a unitary system adopted. 6
Under King Idris Libya's pro-West tilt in foreign policy became quite apparent and Tripoli signed two military agreements with the United States and Britain, which enabled both countries to establish their military bases in Libya and in return it received economic assistance from the western countries. 7 Libya being a poor and underdeveloped country began to rely on foreign aid, but after the discovery of oil reserves in 1959 it became prosperous. 8
In 1969 King Idris was deposed by a group of young army officers led by Col. Moammer Qadhafi. A Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) was established under Col. Qadhafi's chairmanship. Monarchy was abolished and a Libyan Arab Republic was proclaimed. 9
The fiery young Qadhafi now in total control in Tripoli began to determine Libya's foreign policy. From the very beginning, his avowed foreign policy goals were Arab unity, the elimination of Israel, the advancement of Islam, albeit not the Wahabiist brand, support for the stateless Palestinians, removal of foreign, especially western influence in the Middle East and Africa, and support for several "revolutionary" causes. 10
Soon after he took over power, Qadhafi got rid of American and British military bases on Libyan soil and partially nationalized all foreign oil and commercial concerns in Libya. He was quick to realize the importance of possessing oil and played a key role in promoting the use of oil as a political weapon for making the West more pliant on the Arab- Israeli issue. In 1973, he and leaders of other Arab oil exporting countries were hoping that a rise in oil prices and an oil embargo on supporters of Israel would force the US and the West European countries to end all out support for the Zionist state. 11
With the passage of years there was a hardening of the anti-US stance of President Qadhafi. During 1970s and 1980s relations between Libya and the West worsened. Qadhafi was persona non grata in the West, while he saw the US and other western countries as posing a threat to Libyan and Arab interests. 12
Another reasons for the growing hostility between the western powers and Libya was President Qadhafi's brazen ambitions to gain nuclear weapons capability, and his obvious interest in also producing other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 13
During the eighties and nineties the West's relations with Libya further deteriorated. Libya was accused of being involved in international terrorism. British-Libya relations became very tense, when in 1984 a British policewoman was killed by a gunman inside the Libyan People's Bureau (embassy) in London. More problems arose following the arrest of six British citizens in Libya, in retaliation for the arrest of four Libyans in Manchester on charges of involvement in the March 1984 bombings in London and Manchester. On April 15, 1986, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher gave permission to US aircraft to use British bases to carry out a strike on Libyan cities, this action led to a breach of diplomatic relations between the two countries. 14
In 1986 a bomb blast in a Berlin discotheque took the lives of a Turkish woman and two US servicemen and injured 230 people, including more than fifty American servicemen. Libya was identified by the West as the culprit. To avenge these acts of terror, US military aircraft bombed Libya. The European Community governments did not favour the US bombing raid on Libya. The US however, justified the attack by claiming that it was in self-defense, for Libya was targeting US interests and American citizens. 15
At a meeting of foreign ministers of the European Community in April 1986, it was decided that all member states should take the step of cutting down the number of Libyan nationals serving in their respective territories in official capacities, and would henceforth be very selective about giving visas to ordinary Libyan citizens. 16
Conflict with the US erupted again in December 1988 when a Pan Am Boeing 747 en route from London to New York, USA exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. 17 In November 1991, two Libyans were charged with the bombing, in the US and in Scotland. Libya insisted on prosecuting the men in its own courts, this attitude further damaged its relations with West. 18
Libya was also allegedly involved in the bombing of a French UTA DC-10 plane over Niger in September 1989, in which 171 people were killed. 19
The UN Security Council adopted resolution No. 731 in January 1992 demanding that Libya comply with the requests for the extradition of its two citizens involved in the Lockerbie bombing and cooperate with a French inquiry into the bombing of the airplane over Niger. Libya's counter proposal to hold the trial of the two men accused of the Lockerbie bombing and the others alleged to have been involved in the Niger bombing, on its own territory, was rejected by the US, the UK and France, which urged the UN to impose sanctions on Libya. On March 31, 1992, the UNSC through resolution No. 748 imposed economic sanctions against Libya if it refused to comply with its previous resolution and to make a firm commitment to renounce international terrorism by April 15. 20
Since Libya did not budge on the issue, the US, the UK and France announced in August 1993 that they would ask the UN Security Council to strengthen the sanctions imposed on Libya if Tripoli failed to comply with resolutions 731 and 748 by the deadline of October 1, 1993. The Libyan government decided not to heed this ultimatum, but expressed its willingness to enter into discussions with those three countries on a consensus venue for holding the trial of the two Lockerbie suspects. 21 It also offered to allow French officials to interrogate the four men suspected of complicity in the Niger bombing. 22 This offer was not accepted by Washington, London and Paris. The Security Council adopted resolution 883 in November providing for the strengthening of the economic sanctions in force against Libya if the country failed by December 1, 1993 to fully to comply with resolutions 731 and 748. 23
In view of the resolutions of the UN Security Council, the European Union in its regulation 3274/93 of November 29, 1993 reviewed its trade policy for Libya. It reduced export credits and stopped the sale to the country of subsidized goods. 24
Washington decided to increase pressure on Libya through the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which became controversial. Its aim was to further weaken the Libyan economy as a punishment for that country's alleged support of international terrorism. The legislation would also allow the US to impose sanctions on any other country investing more than US $ 40 million in Libya's oil and gas industry in any one year. Later the sum was decreased to 20 million. 25
The European Union being first and foremost a trading entity and Europe being dependent on Middle Eastern and North African oil, European governments protested strongly against this piece of legislation, and lost no time in registering their protest with the World Trade Organization (WTO). At that time trade between the European Union (EU) and Libya was worth some $ 20,000 million, each year, while almost 90% of Libya's oil was exported to western Europe. The oil exports of Libya accounted for around 10% of Europe's petroleum supplies. European oil companies, particularly those from Spain and Italy, had strong interests in the Libyan petroleum industry, and were, therefore, the most vulnerable to the imposition of the new sanctions. Responding to the European complaint Washington invoked Article 21 of the GATT, which in certain situations permits a signatory to derogate from the agreement, especially if its national security is compromised. 26
This EU-US dispute was partially settled in April 1997 when the two sides agreed to limit the impact of ILSA upon European countries. Henceforth, the US Administration would make especial efforts to protect European companies from the adverse effects of the legislation. 27
Qadhafi had been critical of the Arab League for its lack of support on the Lockerbie issue which resulted in a formal proposal from the League in July 1997 for the two Libyan suspects in the Lockerbie case to be tried by Scottish Judges under Scottish law but in a neutral country. Later in September, the League also called for relaxing of the air embargo on Libya and adopted a resolution permitting aeroplanes carrying Qadhafi, Muslim pilgrims or those performing humanitarian tasks to land on their territory. 28 This was in defiance of UN resolutions. The Arab League was apparently trying to impress upon the international community that further sanctions would be counter-productive for it would only hurt the ordinary people, particularly the Palestinians living in Libya. Besides, it would undermine economic cooperation and isolate Libya further, making it more of a maverick state.
The Arab governments probably understood that these types of pressures would only negatively impact upon nationalist and Islamist public opinion and not only discredit but destabilize incumbent regimes. 29
These concerns about instability are more easily understood by the Europeans, also because instability has more potential to impact upon Europe owing to its nearness to the Middle East and North Africa and the trans-Mediterranean movements of people. 30 Besides, both sides are aware that they are important for each other.
As pointed out by an analyst, from the point of view of geopolitics, a country or entity can be of importance as an international actor if it offers some major opportunities and/or poses risks. Libya embodies both. 31
Libya is a country rich in oil and natural gas reserves, sectors which dominate its economy, while the EU countries are largely dependent on energy resources from neighbouring Middle East and Maghreb. Also, the EU is an important trading partner of Libya and around 70 percent of its trade is with the EU member states. In 2003 the main destinations of Libyan exports were Italy (39 percent), Germany (13 percent), Spain (13 percent), Turkey (7 percent), and France (6 percent). In 2004 Libya exported an estimated US $15.1 billion worth of products to Europe. 32 According to 2008 official trade data as reported to the Global Trade Atlas, large quantities of Libyan oil was sold to European countries such as Italy (523,000 bb/d), Germany (210,000 bbl/d), Spain (104,00 bbl/d) and France (137,000 bbl/d). Libya also exported 368 Bcf of natural gas to Europe. 33
From a political point of view also, partnership with Europe is beneficial for both parties. Libya is physically quite close to the European Union, it can therefore play a very important role in securing the external borders of the EU. It alongwith other Maghreb countries acts as a buffer between aspiring African migrants and European states, and can help control migration flows through its territory. Friendly relations with the European Union would be helpful for Tripoli in maintaining its internal political order. Qadhafi is aware that the prospects of his continuing hold on power and the preservation of the domestic political structure created by him over several decades would have better chances of survival if he is able to secure the goodwill of strong external allies. 34
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's conference of foreign ministers granted observer status to Libya in 1999. In 1995, when the first Euro-Med conference was held, it was ignored. In the 1999 conference the partners declared that Libya would be given full membership of the Barcelona Process as soon as the UN Security Council sanctions were lifted, and Libya had applied the whole range of Barcelona acquis. The first condition for joining the process was fulfilled in 2003, when the Security Council lifted sanctions. 35 The second condition was yet to be met, for Qadhafi was not ready to implement the human rights regime and the norms of good governance required for membership. 36
Relations between Libya and the EU saw a marked improvement after Tripoli gave up the two Lockerbie suspects for trial in the Hague and agreed to pay compensations to the families of victims of Lockerbie, the Berlin discotheque, and the 1989 UTA Flight 772. 37
Libya has signed various bilateral agreements with EU member states, especially with Italy, Germany and France. Thus European countries' ties with Libya differ from member state to member state, though there are certain specific EU policies that relate to Libya. These policies can be discerned in a landmark conclusion adopted by the October 11, 2004 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of the EU. In this document the Council withdrew the stringent sanctions adopted by the EU to implement the UN Security Council Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993). The arms embargo in effect since 1986 was now also lifted. The Conclusion commented upon all important matters regarding Libya. 38
The EU invited Libya at least twice (in 1999, when the country gained observer status, and in 2004, through its GAERC Conclusion) to join the Barcelona Process. However, Libya is to-date hesitant about accepting it because of the removal of restraints on domestic politics it involves. The Barcelona Declaration adopted at the first Conference in 1995 requires members to: "... act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international law, in particular those arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are party, develop the rule of law and democracy in their political system, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system". 39
Although the Declaration recognizes the freedom of partners to develop freely their political or economic systems it nevertheless uphold the concepts of democracy and rule of law. The West's viewpoint on democracy and the rule of law vastly differs from perceptions on these twin concepts in Libya. Therefore the principles of the Barcelona Declaration clash with the internal political structure of Libya. On its part, however, the GAERC has emphasized that it considers Libya's full integration into the Barcelona Process as an important objective of engagement, though participation in the process, and subsequent progress towards an Association Agreement, would depend on Libya's readiness to fully and unconditionally accept the Barcelona Declaration and the Barcelona acquis. 40
With its status of an observer, Libya is deprived of the economic benefits given to other partners in the programme. 41
It is noteworthy that within the framework of the European Union's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Libya is recognized as one of the partners. The ENP strategy paper, adopted in May 2004, states that "... [t]he privileged relationship with neighbours will be built on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development". 42
Just as Libya does not fulfill the criteria of western type of democracy and rule of law, there are other EU partners as well which do not have any immaculate human rights records, nor democratic institutions at par with those of Europe. Among these countries are Syria, Algeria and Belarus, to name a few. 43 The EU does exercise some influence over its Mediterranean partners regarding democracy, good governance and the observance of human rights. The instruments available to it, such as economic cooperation agreements with individual countries enable it to put pressure on partners. Financial support is withheld or withdrawn if any of the member states mistreat their own people. Thus most of its partner states in the Mediterranean region and elsewhere at least publicly, make a great show of being upholders of the democratic and market-oriented systems. 44
As pointed out earlier, Libya, under the leadership of President Qadhafi has, since several decades been seen as a maverick state, defying the discipline imposed on states by the international order. In recent years EU-Libya relations have greatly improved and several leaders and high officials from EU member states and the European Commission visited Libya, after Tripoli publicly pledged in December 2003, to end its weapons of mass destruction programme. 45 In April 2004 Qadhafi also visited Brussels.
Libya signed the NPT in 1968, ratified it in 1975, and in 1980 it concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It also supported the 1995 NPT Review which it had rejected earlier, for Israel never joined the treaty. Qadhafi admitted that despite these commitments, Libya had been engaged in developing a nuclear weapons programme, to counter the covert Israeli nuclear programme. 46 Israel, which is seen as the main threat to their security by the Arab countries and Iran, violated International Law by conducting a surgical air strike to destroy Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 to prevent the Iraqi government from using the reactor for the creation of nuclear weapons. 47 This Israeli action was soundly condemned by the international community.
The UN Security Council and the General Assembly adopted resolutions 487, and 36/27 respectively in June 1981 and November 1981, characterizing the bombing as premeditated and an unprecedented act of aggression and called upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. 48 Israel however, did not pay heed to chastisement by the UN.
Libya underwent a transformation after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Having seen that Saddam Hussain's stubbornness had led him and his country to disaster, President Qadhafi softened his approach towards the West and the issue of WMD. Besides, the startling revelations about the alleged sale of nuclear expertise to many countries, including Libya by the architect of the Pakistani nuclear device 49 and the public confession by the scientist forced the Libyan leader to renounce his WMD programme. In January 2004, US and British teams dismantled Libya's facilities, with IAEA verifying the process. 50
France and Libya signed an agreement in March 2006 to cooperate in the development of peaceful nuclear technology. This was apparently done to reward Libya for withdrawing its programme to develop weapons of mass destruction, but analysts linked this deal with the matter of the release of Bulgarian medics, in which the French Presidency played a central role. The French government however, denied any connection between these two events. 51
EU-Libya relations were adversely affected when six Bulgarian medical personnel who had been arrested in 1999 by Libyan authorities for allegedly contaminating children with the HIV virus, were convicted and sentenced to death by a Libyan court. 52 Despite reliable medical reports which stated that the children had been infected with HIV before the arrival in Libya of the accused in 1998, the judge upheld the earlier verdict of death sentences for the six Bulgarians. The EU Commissioner for Justice called upon Tripoli to review the judgment. He called the incident an 'obstacle' to comfortable EU-Libya relations. 53
Despite international pressure to intervene in the matter, the Libyan government remained aloof. However, in July 2007 the Libyan High Judicial Council commuted the sentences to terms of life imprisonment, after the families of those infected were given a compensation deal reportedly worth US $ 1 m. for each child. Bulgaria formally requested that the medics be allowed to serve out their sentences in Bulgaria. The EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy and the French
President's wife came to Libya to plead for the release of the detained medical staff and their handing over to Bulgarian officials. The two missions succeeded and two days later all six medics were released and sent back to their own country. In August Bulgaria wrote off a debt of $ 56.6 m. owed by Libya, from the Soviet era, and announced that it would divert the funds into providing both treatment for the children infected by HIV and compensation for their families. 54
The European Union and Libya held a meeting in November 2007 for preparing a framework agreement that would enable them to establish their first contractual bilateral relationship. It was evident that the EU became amenable to holding these negotiations after the Bulgarian medics were released. 55
The framework agreement focused on the issues that were already agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Libya and the European Commission on July 23, 2007. These were energy, illegal migration, fisheries and maritime governance, transport, visa facilitation, trade, education, agriculture, environment, justice and home affairs and public health etc. 56
A major political objective of the framework agreement was to strengthen relations and cooperation between Libya and the European Union and its Member States, in the new context of Libya's return to the fold of the international community and its willingness to establish closer relations with the European Union. It was also indicative of the existence of strong common interests.
It was now necessary to set the EU's relations with Libya into an unambiguous and comprehensive legal framework. 57
It was envisaged that this agreement would create mechanisms for political dialogue and cooperation in the realms of foreign and security policy, as well as for dialogue and cooperation on economic issues. A free trade area was also proposed. 58
Here, it would be relevant to point out that until 2004, Libya was not a beneficiary of significant EU financial assistance. The European Council in 2004 gave the green signal for financial assistance in the health and migration sectors. The EU henceforth provided financial assistance through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). 59
Special attention is being given in EU-Libya cooperation to the problems of HIV and migration. An HIV Action Plan for Libya was prepared and signed by the Commission, several EU member states and the Libyan government in November 2004. The EU earmarked Euro 8.5 million to support the Action Plan. 60 The funds were intended for urgent policy advice and technical support to the Libyan health authorities, and modernization of the capacity of the Benghazi Center for Infectious Diseases and Immunology (BCIDI), raising it to international standards. 61
Libya has a population of more than 5 million people, more than 150,000 of whom are foreigners. 62 Being rich in energy resources, the country attracts foreign nationals. There are agreements on free movement of people between Libya and most of its partners in sub-Saharan Africa, which is to promote Libya's policy of friendship with Africa and the consolidation of the African Union, in the setting up of which Libya played an active part. The country has therefore become a transit area for legal and illegal immigrants, who's intended destination is Europe. 63
Thus, in order to secure its external borders it is very important for the EU to develop its relations with Libya. Particular emphasis is now being placed on institutionalized cooperation. GAERC in its October 2004 Conclusion emphasized that cooperation with Libya on migration was essential and urgent, because of its importance in the African continent. GAERC has been expressing concern about increased illegal immigration across the Mediterranean from, or through Libya. It has emphasized that Libya has to adopt an effective role in preventing the loss of life at sea, and in maintaining public order at the ports of entry. 64
In December 2004 officials from the Commission who had visited Libya presented a report on the latter as a transit country for illegal immigration. Based on this report, in June 2005 the JHA Council adopted a concrete policy framework for cooperation with Libya in the field of migration. 65
The Commission has undertaken the financing of two projects under the thematic programme "Migration and Asylum" one with regard to the control of Libya's borders with Niger and the other on assistance to those illegal immigrants who agree to voluntarily return to their homelands. 66 Libya made cooperation in this regard conditional on the delivery of speedboats and radar equipment. 67
Libya is important for the EU for its oil and gas resources and its physical proximity to Europe. The country has signed bilateral agreements with several EU member states, especially Italy, Germany and France. For this reason, the level and quality of the EU countries' relations with Libya differ from member state to member state and it cannot be claimed that the EU has an absolutely coordinated policy towards this country. 68
Libya is the only country of the Mediterranean region which is not a member of the EU -sponsored Barcelona Process and to date only has observer status. That is it does not benefit from the financial cooperation offered under the process. 69
To enhance political and economic dialogue and cooperation with Libya, the External Relations Council of the EU reiterated the need to enter into a legal framework agreement with Libya. An EU-Libya dialogue began in November 2008. 70
To enhance its relations with Libya, besides health and migration sectors, the EU has also offered market access to Libya in fisheries and agricultural products and cooperation in tourism. 71
1 The World Encyclopedia, Vol. 12, London: World Book International, p. 238.
4 The Statesman's Year Book 2009, New York: Macmillan, 2008, p. 792.
5 Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 14, p. 612.
6 Kinga Tibori Szabo, "Libya and the EU", Budapest: Center for EU Enlargement Studies, Central European University, p. 9, at http://online.ceu.hu/cens/assets/files/libya.
7 World Infopaedia: Libya, New Delhi: Pragun Publication, 2007, p. 71.
9 The Europa World Year Book 2008, Vol. II, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 2819.
10 World Infopaedia, op.cit., p. 22.
12 The Middle East and North Africa, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 773. 13 Kinga Tibori Szabo, op.cit., p. 12.
14 http://www.country- data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-8238.html. 15 Kinga Tibori Szabo, op.cit., p. 13.
17 The Middle East and North Africa, op.cit., p. 774.
18 Kinga Tibori Szabo, op.cit., p. 13.
19 http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/UTA_Flight_772. See also http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3163621.stm.
20 The Europa World Year Book, op.cit., p. 2821.
21 Ibid, p. 2822.
22 The Middle East and North Africa, op.cit.
23 The Europa World Year Book, op.cit., p. 2822.
24 Kinga Tibori Szabo, op.cit., p. 14.
25 The Middle East and North Africa, op.cit., p. 775. 26 Ibid.
28 The Europa World Year Book, op.cit., p. 2822.
29 R. Aliboni, Including Libya? EU, Arab World and the US, Paper presented at the conference on "Libya: Current Relations and Future Prospects" United States Department of State, Washington D.C., 25 February 2000, http://www.mafhoum.com/press2/80P4.htm.
31 Kinga Tibori Szabo, op.cit., p. 16.
34 Kinga Tibori Szabo, op. cit., p. 16.
35 Ibid, p. 22.
36 The Middle East and North Africa, op.cit., p. 784.
37 The Europa World Year Book, op.cit., pp. 2822-2824.
38 Kinga Tibori Szabo, op.cit., p. 17.
39 Ibid, p. 23.
40 Ibid, p. 24.
42 Ibid, p. 25.
46 http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/3939.html. See also http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Nuclear/index.html.
47 http://palestinefacts.org/pf_1967to1991_iraq_1981.php. 48 http://imeu.net/news/article006419.shtml.
49 The Middle East and North Africa, op.cit., p. 783.
50 http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/3939.html. See also http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Nuclear/index.html.
51 The Middle East and North Africa, op.cit., p. 784. 52 Ibid.
53 The Europa World Year Book, op.cit., p. 2825
54 The Middle East and North Africa, op.cit., p. 783. See also http://balgariaport.com/story_read_bulgaria_decides_to_waive_libyan_debt_447.php (The Bulgarian Post 2/8/07)
56 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/227 & guiLang uage=enu.
61 Kinga Tibori Szabo, op.cit., p. 20.
62 Ibid, p. 21.
63 Ibid, p. 21.
64 Kinga Tibori Szabo, op.cit., p. 22.
66 EU-Libya: negotiations on future Framework Agreement start, Brussels, Nov 12, 2008, http:// europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? reference=IP/08/1687&format =HTML&age=0&language=EN&guiLanguage =en.
67 Kinga, p. 22.
68 Kinga, p. 17.
70 ec.europa.eu/world/enp/mid_term_review/final_concept_note_Libya_en.pdf. 71 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2487315120070724. See also Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 53, No. 7/8, July 2007, p. 48064.
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|Publication:||Pakistan Journal of European Studies|
|Date:||Jan 31, 2009|
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