ESC weathers the Desert Storm.
Yet most ESC personnel seemed unconcerned by this anomaly. A colonel gestured toward one of the maverick devices, which displayed the image of another military officer delivering an operational report. "Our morning intel briefing," the colonel explained, as if the large box sitting on his floor were a normal part of the all-source network that feeds ESC's intelligence analysis function.
Of course, television sets like this one were almost as ubiquitous as yellow ribbons during Operation Desert Storm. But at ESC, the colonel had more than a rooting interest in what the Riyadh briefer had to say that morning. Both the command and the colocated Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWC) had been instrumental in preparing US troops for the EW challenges the deserts of the Middle East would present. As he turned the set off, the colonel knew that men he commanded were gathering and analyzing data to plot the next phase of the Air Force's electronic combat and [C.sup.3]CM efforts to aid the ground forces now approaching Kuwait City. Some of this data would be fed into flight-route planning programs developed by the ESC's Air Force EW Center (AFEWC) to help pilots from several coalition nations reach their targets and return safely.
Yet the colonel also knew that as well as it had aided operational commanders in Kuwait and Iraq, the command faced some difficult questions about the scope of such aid in the future. Like the rest of the military, budget cuts and the resulting decrease in personnel levels had presented ESC with hard choices.
INTEL, SECURITY AND EC
From its home at Kelly AFB, just outside San Antonio, TX, the ESC performs three main missions: intelligence support to Air Force, unified and specialized commands for peacetime, emergency and contingency requirements; oversight of operations, communications and computer security for the Air Force; and support of Air Force EC and [C.sup.3]CM activities, including the development and implementation of techniques and systems and the training of personnel. It also administers a rapid radio relay service through a network of AN/FLR-9 systems located in Alaska, Japan, Italy, the UK and the Philippines. The five "Elephant Cages" can be used for secure communications, navigational aid and direction finding for air and sea rescues.
ESC formulates all-source intelligence requirements, and plans and procures systems for this purpose which both feed and make use of national and Air Force data bases.
The security operations are the responsibility of the ESC's Air Force Cryptologic Support Center (AFCSC). ESC acts as executive agent for Air Force operations, communications and computer security as well as supervising the use of Tempest equipment within the service. It surveys units in the field to determine their vulnerability to security breaches; sets guidelines for encryption and restricted access through passwords, physical barriers and personnel controls; and distributes and maintains Air Force encryption devices, codes and cyphers. Approximately 4% of the ESC roster works in this area, with a budget of approximately $117.8 million.
The command's EC/[C.sup.3]CM role involves planning and executing a variety of combat operations, through threat analysis, computer-based modeling, EC software deployment to meet changing threats and maintenance of threat data bases. Development of offensive and defensive [C.sup.3]CM techniques are also under the ESC purview, as is maintenance of the Constant Web [C.sup.3]CM data base. AFEWC is the primary ESC agent in the EC/[C.sup.3]CM area. ESC also provides crews to operate Compass Call and RC-135 electronics and to create hostile environments for Air Force training exercises. The center also has become increasingly involved in the procurement of AF EC gear. In fiscal 1991, 13% of ESC's budget and 10% of its manpower will be involved in EC/[C.sup.3]CM tasks.
Since 1979, when ESC was formally constituted and its [C.sup.3]CM and EC missions were expanded, the command had been supporting an increasing number of customers with an ever-widening array of services. But according to Maj Gen Gary W. O'Shaughnessy, commander of the ESC, the tightening defense budget has forced him to reexamine the application of his shrinking resources. His first response was to trim 200 billets from the headquarters staff. Next, he plans to remove a layer of the command's management architecture. Currently, most ESC units report to one of six wings, which in turn report to one of three divisions responsible to ESC headquarters. O'Shaughnessy expects to dissolve four of the six wings by the end of the year, leaving a UK wing in place until USAFE reduces its European presence.
The downsizing of his command will have a significant effect on ESC's mission, according to O'Shaughnessy. "There will be certain things we can't do," he explained. "We used to use the expression, 'you have to do more with less.' Now we're probably going to have to do less with less. We had to reprioritize what was important to us."
This refocus will mean concentrating the ESC's resources on specific areas which O'Shaughnessy considers essential to the command's mission. "We have to do that which gives the Air Force the biggest bang for the buck. We have many other customers, but since we're Air Force resources, we no longer have the luxury to service many customers. So our primary focus came down to ... the tactical operators." Thus, ESC will step back from what O'Shaughnessy termed some "national" concerns: non-tactical EW acquisition and broad-based intelligence analysis.
"The type of data that would support the national-level customers, the kind of data that would support decision makers in the JCS may be important," he said, "but there are other folks and other systems that may be able to do that while we apply the limited resources we have to ... those commands that have a mission that requires putting bullets or iron on the target and has to have some sort of a real-time intelligence feed to do it. We have to seek the proper balance in using our scarce resources."
AFEWC PITCHES IN
Even with a somewhat reduced role, the ESC and its components will find more than enough to do - as the events in Iraq proved.
The AFEWC provides a good example. As the repository of most of the ESC's EC and [C.sup.3]CM expertise, the center has four primary mission areas: EC evaluation, analysis and planning support during wartime, exercises and test operations for all DOD and AF commands; the provision of EC technical studies and services; EC data base support; and an increasing involvement in EC systems acquisition. A toolkit that includes extensive modeling capabilities, mobile monitoring equipment and an ever-expanding library of threat data and analyses has been assembled to support these efforts.
The importance of the right tool for the i ob was demonstrated during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. AFEWC was involved early in the planning process and supported the coalition throughout the conflict. For example, more than 500 requests for information from its data bases and technical libraries were filed in one month alone during the course of hostilities. These data resources include the Constant Web [C.sup.3]CM data base, which contains the order of battle and communications capabilities of forces worldwide. These can be used to plan [C.sup.3]CM strategies and the application of such assets as the Compass Call. The EW Integrated Reprogramming data base supports global tactical and strategic missions, and holds parametric data for virtually every noncommunications emitter in the world. AFEWC maintains the blue and gray portion of this data base, and manages the US noncommunications data base and the joint service parametric data base of US radar and jamming signatures. The Blue Airborne Target Signatures data base, used mostly as a technical reference, includes antenna patterns, radar cross section and infrared signatures for US aircraft. Finally, an electro-optic parametric data base stores information on missile seekers, infrared jammers, threat warning systems and laser range finders and. target designators.
Naturally, AFEWC briefers were reluctant to reveal exactly what data was provided to the coalition commanders and planners. However, it is known that the center shipped a minicomputer-based version of its Constant Web data base, called MICROWEB, for use in Desert Storm. It is not difficult to imagine the utility of the other data resources to the military strategists in the desert.
Certainly this kind of information was used in the AFEWC-developed modeling programs deployed in the gulf region. Perhaps the most high-profile system was the Improved Many-on-Many (IMOM) model, used to plan fighter and bomber attack routes for the thousands of sorties flown daily over Iraq and Kuwait. The unique feature of the IMOM is its incorporation of EC-related threats and the effects of appropriate countermeasures and aircraft self-protection systems in the mission-planning scenario.
The program displays a map of the target area on a terminal screen (current IMOM systems are either VAX or Unix based). The location of hostile radars including both air surveillance ("lookers") and threat ("shooters" such as SAM installations) systems - are plotted based on the latest intelligence data. The coverage areas of these radars are then painted on the screen, with lookers appearing in blue and shooters in red. To make the models more accurate, terrain effects are incorporated into the depiction of these coverage envelopes, frequently distorting what would ideally be a circular coverage area - and sometimes (as was the case in the 1986 air raid on Libya) revealing corridors of vulnerability.
Depending upon their goals, IMOM operators can then experiment with different countermeasures to increase the enemy's vulnerability. For example, the effects of stand-off jamming on the radar sites can be easily simulated. Data on the jamming capabilities of such platforms as the EF-111 or the EA-6B are stored in the program's memory; depending upon where the operator places these assets on the map, the color of the radars' affected coverage areas will turn to green as jamming dampens their effectiveness. Operators also can discover why certain deployments work better than others, taking into account such parameters as terrain masking and jamming frequency. Naturally, radar sites can be removed to replicate the effects of a successful Wild Weasel mission.
For air strike planning, a course to the target can be plotted on the screen. The line marking the course will bear the color of whichever radar system can detect the platform at any given location. The detection calculation is based on the radar cross section of the aircraft, the complement of EW gear on-board and the altitude at which the aircraft is flying. Should the altitude be changed to bring the platform beneath the coverage envelope, the color of that point in the route will alter to reflect safe passage. Again, the effect of stand-off jamming will be apparent in all detection evaluations.
Through experimentation, intelligence and operations officers can plot the safest route - both in terms of bearing and altitude - to and from a target. The results can be output in overlay form for use with an aircrew's charts.
The IMOM systems were augmented by the deployment of Sentinel Byte and Tactical Sensor Planner (TSP) systems. The Sentinel Byte devices can incorporate a greater variety of intelligence data than the IMOM; the TSP, as a PC-based tool, is not as capable as the IMOM.
The systems were tremendously successful, according to AFEWC briefers. "Long ago, in an area far, far away," said Col Steven Peacock, a Vietnam veteran who is AFEWC commander, "we were lucky if we went out with any idea about what the enemy was doing other than a briefing from the intel guys that was, oddly enough, like the one we had the day before.... A lot of it [the AFEWC effort] has paid off. We haven't seen near the numbers of aircraft shot down [in the Middle East] that we would have expected to. And I think it's because the aircrews are smarter and have a lot more knowledge about where the threat is now - and a much, much better capability."
The success of IMOM did not go unnoticed by coalition allies, Peacock reported. The British and the Saudis requested IMOM which Air Force staffers provided. Peacock said it might be possible for some of the coalition allies to purchase IMOM systems through the Foreign Military Sales program, were they to be interested.
In addition to the models, AFEWC's wartime role includes the provision of specially tailored combat analysis teams to assist operational commanders in forward locations. Such teams recommend EC employment strategies and analyze what the briefers termed "electronic events." It is likely such teams saw action during Desert Storm.
Fortunately, AFEWC will not be deploying systems and personnel to conflict areas all the time. As Middle Eastern operations wind down, life at AFEWC will again focus on peacetime support of AF and DOD operations. This is a full plate, according to the AFEWC spokesmen. For example, the center is responsible for the exercise and testing of Air Force reprogrammable EW equipment. Training in the use of such equipment also falls under the AFEWC's mission, and staffers are looking forward to the rescheduling of the Serene Byte reprogramming exercise cancelled by the events in the Persian Gulf. (AFEWC supports such exercises as Green and Red Flag and Team Spirit as well.) To aid in its reprogramming efforts, AFEWC also performs flagging analysis to compare unusual radar emissions to existing threat information.
The center evaluates and validates operational EC threat simulators and the EC components of aircrew training devices. Last year, eight aircrew training devices were tested, including those for the F-111, B-1, F-15, F-16 and Special Operations Forces aircraft. Range simulators also are validated by AFEWC.
Noninstrumented test ranges can call on AFEWC to provide monitoring equipment. Most of this mobile monitoring capability will soon be housed in three new Comfy Arrow vans, the latest generation of the old MOTES units that monitor RF emissions (although plans are on the drawing board for a millimeter-wave capability). Currently, Comfy Arrow units come in two types. The Comfy Arrow-Large is used to perform precision capture, measurement and technical analysis of free-space electromagnetic emissions. An IFF tracker augments its measurement capabilities, which include coverage between 30 MHz and 18 GHz, frequency resolution of 10 Hz and time resolution of 20 psec. The Comfy Arrow-Standard is installed in a custom shelter carried by a military 2.5-ton truck. Closed-circuit television trackers replace the IFF system of the larger configuration. AFEWC hopes to add a communications measurement/analysis van in the future as well.
Much of AFEWC's staff performs studies and analyses requested by DOD and Air Force agencies. Last year the center provided more than 80 such studies, relating to such topics as airborne laser dazzlers, laser jamming of IR missiles and high-power microwave upset of electronic systems. A number of computer models have been developed to aid in these tasks. One of the more interesting is the Threat Engagement Model (TEAM), which can be used to investigate the effectiveness of countermeasures in missile engagement scenarios. Both surface-to-air and air-to-air scenarios can be replicated, using a variety of missiles and aircraft. The characteristics of different radar warning receivers and chaff and flare dispensers can be modeled. The program is useful in judging the effects of dispenser positioning and various rates of chaff and flare deployment in endgame situations. AFEWC has been working on the program for approximately two years, and hopes to have a "roduction" version ready within the next 12 months.
Another important effort is the EW Vulnerability Assessment (EWVA) program. EWVA will develop a methodology by FY 1993 to assess the vulnerability of US electronic systems to ECM in all electromagnetic environments. The assessment will have two parts. In the first, the system's vulnerabilities will be identified; in the second, the system will be reexamined from an operational viewpoint to determine which of those vulnerabilities actually pose a threat. Both receptions and emissions will be reviewed, and ECCM and ESMCM techniques will be recommended. It is hoped this methodology will be implemented Dod-wide in FY 1994. While AFEWC will carry responsibility for validating vulnerability assessments of Air Force systems, it is not anticipated that all of these assessments will be performed by the military; contractor help is envisioned.
Support of the Air Force's EC equipment acquisition efforts is the center's newest mission. Much of this support takes the form of studies and analyses, including computer modeling of equipment and system performance. A list of the programs AFEWC has aided appears in Table 1. For the Follow-On Wild Weasel program, AFEWC modeled the performance of several versions of the F-16, F-15 and ECR Tornado in a deep strike scenario. Analysts examined platform survivability, how much threat it was exposed to and other parameters, all leading to an assessment of whether the platform could successfully perform its mission. While the results are classified, the briefers indicated that while each platform had different strengths, none had the combination of characteristics the Air Force sought for the ideal aircraft.
AFEWC's ASPJ activity provided a useful lesson in developing measures of effectiveness (MOEs). "What we're finding out," explained Peacock, "is that not only is the user not prepared to say how effective he wants something to be - I mean, any real clear capability - but that we're not prepared to quantify that in some way." To solve this problem, AFEWC developed a program to generate MOEs. The center is now looking for funds to apply this program to other systems, such as Northrop's ALQ-135.
In the future, Peacock anticipates AFEWC will be involved in determining the winner of the EF-111 System Improvement Program. AFEWC has a long history with this effort, having studied the pros and cons of several early program proposals - essentially seeking the most effective improvements possible within the program's anticipated financial constraints. AFEWC personnel will sit at some of the selection boards, Peacock said.
The AFEWC budget for FY 1991 is approximately $32.1 million, a slight decrease from the previous year, when additional funds were allotted for the center's entry into acquisition support. Peacock reported that personnel levels had increased in recent years to meet the growing demand for AFEWC services. Personnel cuts would mean the center would have to drop some mission areas, he said: "Taking 10 less analyses a year really isn't the answer."
WEAVING A SECURITY BLANKET
The Air Force Cryptologic Support Center (AFCSC), under the command of Col R.L. Reavis, carries overall Air Force executive agent responsibilities for communications security (COMSEC), computer security (COMPUSEC), operations security (OPSEC) and Tempest protection of electrical emanations. It acquires and manages the service's cryptologic assets and provides maintenance and logistics support for ESC's mission. More than 750 people work for the AFCSC; 60% provide COMSEC support, 30% work in selected communications/electronics maintenance areas and the rest are involved in COMPUSEC, OPSEC and Tempest. The annual budget is approximately $127.1 million.
Here too, an emphasis is being placed on increasing cost-effectiveness. Throughout the center, security philosophy is shifting from masking every system vulnerability to matching resources to the threat. This philosophy can be seen in the Air Force's implementation of recent changes in national Tempest policy through the center's Smart Tempest program (see "The Air Force Smart Tempest Program" by Dennis Richburg and Anita Hunt, JED, July 1989, p. 48). Prior policy, which required extensive use of Tempest equipment, was described by AFCSC staff members as inflexible and extremely expensive. That policy was changed in 1988 to allow more use of non-Tempest equipment and the development of standards less stringent than those of the existing NACSIM 5100A standard. (For more information on these new standards, see "Tempest Standards Will Be Tri-level" in this month's EC-Monitor.") Equipment that meet these new standards will allow the AFCSC to mold security levels more closely to the threat environment, saving money.
Of course, to match resources to the threat, one must know what the threat is. More attention is being paid to threat measurement by the AFCSC, particularly threats based in the US. Nowhere is this attention more pronounced - and the effort to ration resources in clear relationship to threats more apparent than in COMPUSEC. Central to this area is the new Communications-Computer Systems Security Vulnerability Reporting Program (CVRP). This ambitious effort will combine product assessment, vulnerability and incident reporting and countermeasures development in one regime. The hope is to provide combined COMSEC, COMPUSEC and OPSEC support to AF commands.
In examining the COMPUSEC problem, AFCSC discovered a significant lack of information, particularly on the part of the user, on the security posture of Air Force computer systems. The AFCSC itself was hampered by poor information on the configuration and use of computer systems throughout Air Force commands. AFCSC decided to kill two birds with one stone through the development of the Automated Risk Evaluation System (ARES), the first link in the CVRP data chain. ARES is an automated tool that helps local security officers perform the risk analyses that are a normal part of their jobs. At the same time, it enables the officer to collect and clearly report the kind of data the AFCSC needs to begin to monitor overall COMPUSEC - the kinds of equipment at each command, the types of information processed, etc.
This information is added to that gleaned from Security Posture Assessments and visits made by AFCSC personnel to command sites. Such visits are another important part of AFCSC CVRP and vulnerability assessment efforts. At the request of base commanders, newly created Electronic Security Survey Teams (ESSTs) are dispatched to bases to provide an initial vulnerability assessment. The ESSTs are vulnerability commandos; they perform covert and overt Tempest, COMSEC and COMPUSEC attacks on the base's computer and communications systems. These technicians then report their findings to the base commanders, offer recommendations for improved security to base personnel and add data to the AFCSC's data base of threat and security information. AFCSC staffers made it clear that these assessments were shown only to the base commander who invited them; they are not available to commanders higher up the organization chart without the original officer's permission.
The ESSTs generally deal with the least complex - but most common - security problems, which are generally caused by ignorance of basic security issues and improper procedures. Technical vulnerabilities will be handled by Electronic Security Engineering Teams, which will help base engineers to correct equipment and software shortcomings. Should unique equipment vulnerabilities be uncovered for which countermeasures do not yet exist, a Countermeasures Engineering Group will be assigned to develop a solution to the problem.
This effort, while two years old, is still in the developmental stage. Not all the teams have been formed, and the ARES program is now going through its third iteration before widespread distribution. But the AFCSC is confident it will be the linchpin of a strong COMPUSEC, COMSEC and Tempest effort. Vulnerability data bases are being formed, and teams of experts are being assembled to deal with computer virus and worm emergencies. Incidence reporting is being strongly encouraged, and the center is putting the word out that it is aggressively pursuing the identification and prosecution of hackers.
Yet even the progress made so far has barely dented the problem. "What's really scary about this security survey team function is that it is very easy to be successful. You don't have to have a lot of expertise," said one AFCSC staffer. "The security posture at the organizational level is very poor, to be quite honest. We have a lot of problems to solve."
THE JEWC GOES TO WAR
While colocated with ESC headquarters the JEWC is a field activity of the Joint Staff in Washington, DC. The JEWC is an offspring of AFEWC, formed in 1980 from AFEWC's non-Air Force personnel to provide EW support to operational forces worldwide with EW combat analysis, systems engineering and advice for EW planning and execution. It handles all EW support for the Navy, Marines and Army, as well as Air Force support beyond AFEWC's ken. The two organizations often support each other; for example, AFEWC maintains some of the data bases used by the JEWC to complete studies and analyses.
A closer link with ESC is provided by the fact that General O'Shaughnessy also directs the JEWC. While the JEWC director is not a strictly Air Force billet, every director so far has come from that service. Vice directorships are rotated on a three-year basis among the other services; Army COL John Dickson currently holds this position.
The center will operate this fiscal year with a budget of $5.384 million, down from $6.034 million the previous year. Of its 179 members, 41 are from the Air Force, 46 from the Navy, 46 from the Army and 10 from the Marine Corps. Forty-six civilians and two foreign officers, one each from the UK and Canada, round out the staff. According to Colonel Dickson, the JEWC may add an Australian staffer in the near future.
In peacetime, the JEWC provides a wide range of Ew-related services, including operational planning, analytical support, staff augmentation and training, exercise participation and evaluation, systems engineering, MIJI (meaconing, intrusion, jamming and interference) analysis, operational testing and compilation of the DOD EW plan.
Important parts of its operational planning and analytical support functions are the Proud Flame and Proud Focus packages. Proud Flame is a predictive analysis package that provides an operational assessment of the threats to be expected for all JCS contingency targets. The assessment covers 11 topic, with threat suppression capabilities, use of lasers, air defense/early warning/GCI radars and SAMs representative of the data contained in the report. The JEWC maintains such data on other potential targets as well, with the goal of providing up-to-date reports within 24 hours of a request. While the report does not detail friendly capabilities, it will take them into account in analyzing the threat environment. The report will include suggestions for suppression and recommended routes.
The Proud Focus report, which contains more technical analysis shows the effectiveness of US EW equipment, identification of US vulnerabilities and assessment of enemy command and control.
While Dickson is proud of these packages, he thinks they could do more. The data in these assessments are primarily useful to aviators; the inclusion of more ground-based [C.sup.3] information such as the location and capabilities of regimental command posts or divisional [C.sup.2] structures - would widen the utility of these packages, he said.
Like AFEWC, the JEWC uses a variety of advanced compute-rbased models to support its operational mission. Such models were used on recent studies of attack helicopter self-protection requirements and future support jamming needs. Computer modeling and simulation are also becoming more pronounced in the JEWC's training support function. Recognizing the growing use of computer wargaming for training and doctrine development, the JEWC developed the Joint EC/EW Simulation Integrator model. When attached to the Air Warfare Simulation model at the Warrior Prep Center, the effects of EW on the order of battle can be determined and integrated into the wargaming scenario. The center is looking into the provision of a similar capability for the Army's Core Battle Simulation system.
The Persian Gulf conflict provided the JEWC with its largest wartime support challenge. A JEWC team arrived at Florida's MacDill AFB on August 2 to provide immediate liaison and Proud Flame Support. In the first two months of Desert Shield, the center prepared more Proud Flame packages than it had in all of 1988. By the time of deployment, JEWC staffers composed a CENTCOM EW cell to coordinate EW operations, particularly frequency deconfliction. An action center at the JEWS provided crisis management and administrative support; meanwhile liaison offices in Washington and Europe (as well as in two classified locations) prepared troops for the expected threat environment through predictive analysis and aided in the daily analysis functions demanded when hostilities began. Meanwhile, some systems engineering tasks also were performed, to provide new capabilities to meet the unique challenges presented by Iraq.
One point for future improvement highlighted by Desert Storm was the importance of ensuring JEWC participation in the military's contingency plans. "No matter how good the relationship is [between JEWC and field commanders], we found that if we're not into their op plans and not into their movement orders, we don't get on their airplane when they go off to the theatre," Dickson explained. "And we had a hell of a time in Desert Storm getting into country. The commander wanted us there, but he didn't have a seat on the airplane for us because we hadn't been planned for. And as a result we were a little bit late. And it was very frustrating - to the point where I ended up buying commercial tickets and sending some guys over in some cases, just to get them into country. But then you've got bunking problems and berthing spaces on ships and that sort of stuff. So it's a real challenge."
EYE ON THE FUTURE
O'Shaughnessy himself faces a few challenges as ESC embarks on its post-Desert Storm course. "In ESC, computer security is a mission that's just emerging," he said. "If our adversaries' intelligence resources in the decrease as they may in the Soviet Union and other countries as they're pinched for dollars, there's a lucrative way of gaining intelligence through computers. If you know how to get into somebody else's computers, you don't have to use as many agents, and you don't have as big an intelligence structure."
Sifting through data more efficiently will be another goal. As O'Shaughnessy explained, "Intelligence and EW sometime become vacuum cleaners and we need to be able to find system that can fine tune that data and get it to the right place at the right time." Formatting intelligence and EW data in graphic and map form will be a big part of this effort.
O'Shaughnessy sees counter-narcotics as one "national" effort the command may still be able to support effectively. Treaty monitoring and verification, as well as ensuring security when Soviet inspectors perform their own verifications at US installations, also are broad-based missions the ESC will pursue. The command also will look at the security requirements of space communications.
Finally, the ESC will follow the lead of the rest of the military in prepping for low-intensity conflicts. "I think we have to spend a lot more time in ESC focusing on the small-country war," O'Shaughnessy offered. "We have to develop skills to be able to work better in that area." The lessons of Desert Storm should serve them well.
RECENT AFEWC RD&A ACTIVITIES
Tasking Project Agency Follow-on Wild Weasel AF/XO ASPJ AF/XO F-16 self protection AF/SA Missile/laser warning SAF/AQ MILSTAR SAF/AQ Laser IRCM SAF/AQ Infrared search & track TAC B-1B defensive system SAC Nuclear asset security SAC/SP AFSATCOM SAC/SC Airlift defensive systems MAC/XP Harm Block IV & LCS AFOTEC
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|Title Annotation:||Electronic Security Command, Operation Desert Storm|
|Author:||Hardy, Stephen M.|
|Publication:||Journal of Electronic Defense|
|Date:||Apr 1, 1991|
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