Dividends of peace: the economics of peacekeeping. (Economic and Social Implications).
The 1990s could be called the decade of peacekeeping. The number and variety of peacekeeping operations increased dramatically between 1991 and 2000. Of the 54 peacekeeping operations that the United Nations established between 1948 and 2000, 36 were after 1991. The missions were deployed worldwide: 14 in Africa, nine in Europe, six in the Americas, and three in Asia. (1) The increasing number of UN peacekeeping operations and personnel deployed throughout the 1990s reflected a new activism and multilateralism on the part of the international community in trying to solve some of the most severe security and humanitarian crises of the period.
Much has been written on the costs of peacekeeping operations in the past ten years. Relatively little has been written on the evolution, benefits, and long-run savings of these costs, however. These issues deserve attention not only as a formal inquiry but also because the financing of peacekeeping operations has been a matter of bitter debate, contention and misunderstanding throughout the 1990s. Reviewing the economics of peacekeeping operations is a complex and difficult undertaking: figures are difficult to obtain and are never as comprehensive as one would like. Furthermore, although the direct costs of peacekeeping operations are quantifiable, there are many related costs that are more difficult to identify and assess. Accordingly, we will limit ourselves to five points: first, peacekeeping operations costs throughout the 1990s; second, perspectives on these costs, which despite considerable increase remain relatively low, especially when compared to major member states' national defense budgets. Third, we will indicate how the financing of peacekeeping operations became a major domestic issue, especially in the United States. Fourth, we will assess whether or not peacekeeping operations costs have represented a good investment and how to consider the long-run return on that investment in terms of the original objective of conflict prevention. Finally, we will make some suggestions aimed at overcoming the shortcomings of peacekeeping financing.
THE COSTS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN THE 1990S
As the table opposite indicates, the 1990s witnessed a vast array of peacekeeping initiatives and UN-dominated operations.
The financial costs of these missions, which included military, police, humanitarian, rehabilitation and other tasks, were a striking departure from years before: They increased to close to ten times above what the United Nations spent on peacekeeping operations between 1948 and 1990. In 1991, the cost of peacekeeping operations was $0.4 billion and rose to $3.8 billion in 1993. The costs of peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990s reached a total of $19.9 billion. As such, the budget of peacekeeping operations during the 1990s far exceeded the regular budget of the United Nations, which did not surpass $13.7 billion between 1991 and 2000. (2)
Already a major departure from past expenditures, these amounts do not represent the full sum spent by the UN system on security and humanitarian crises associated with peacekeeping. To approach a fuller picture of the costs involved, one has to add the humanitarian, rehabilitation and other economic costs that were paid by other international organizations, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Bank. The sums are quite staggering. In 1994, UNHCR's budget (4) peaked at over $1.4 billion, primarily because of refugee emergencies in former Yugoslavia, the Great Lakes region of Africa and elsewhere. (5)
Furthermore, the cost of multinational deployments and interventions, particularly in Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor, were also excluded from the peacekeeping cost figures. Although peacekeeping operations were authorized by the Security Council and conducted within the framework of the United Nations, the countries involved in and leading these deployments and interventions covered their costs. (6) In Somalia, Operation Restore Hope and UNITAF cost the United States more than $1 billion, (7) and the intervention in Haiti, approximately $2 billion. (8) In Bosnia, countries that participated in the NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), designed to enforce the Dayton Peace Agreement, bore more than $5 billion in operation costs through the end of 1996. (9)
Direct contributions by countries and regional organizations, such as the European Union, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and nongovernmental organizations, also cover humanitarian, rehabilitation and other economic costs. In Haiti, non-military interventions cost the United States over $1 billion. Private and nongovernmental organizations also have spent hundreds of millions of dollars. (10)
THE ECONOMICS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
In contrast with the costs of peacekeeping operations prior to the 1990s, the above figures provide a telling indication of the willingness of the international community to engage in peacekeeping operations activities in the aftermath of the Cold War. Rising peacekeeping operation costs illustrate both the quantitative and qualitative changes that peacekeeping underwent after 1990. Yet, another side of the story reveals the limits of the international community's engagement in peacekeeping operations: the relatively small amount of funds allocated for this purpose in the 1990s. In this perspective, it is useful to put the costs of peacekeeping efforts in the context of total spending by member states, particularly major member states, on military personnel and defense. Increasingly, states see peacekeeping operations in a security context rather than in solely humanitarian terms.
The total UN expenditures for peacekeeping for the 1990s amounted to $19.9 billion. On the other hand, total world military expenditures for the period 1991 to 1999 amounted to approximately $6.9 trillion. (11) That is, the amount of money assessed by the United Nations from its members to confront the crises that arose in the 1990s was equal to only 0.3 percent of the total amount world governments spent on their militaries. For the United States alone, the total federal budget outlays for national defense functions between 1991 and 1999 were approximately $2.5 trillion, (12) or 125 times greater than the total UN peacekeeping budget.
On average, for every $1 spent on UN peacekeeping during the 1990s, $349 was spent on domestic militaries. Even for Western powers that contributed significantly to UN peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping remained a small proportion of military spending. In 1994, the most expensive year in UN peacekeeping history, the United States spent $1.08 billion for UN peacekeeping missions and $313.6 billion on national defense. During the same period, France and the United Kingdom spent $0.15 billion and $0.23 billion, respectively, on UN peacekeeping and spent $42.6 billion and $42.7 billion, respectively, on national defense. Thus, for every $1 spent on UN peacekeeping, the United States spent $290 on national defense, France spent $282, and the United Kingdom spent $182. (13)
Thus, despite the fact that the level of defense spending in Western countries declined steadily after the end of the Cold War, little of the excess was redirected to peacekeeping operations.
Moreover, given the relatively low level of funds allocated to peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990s, especially at a time when peacekeeping operations and local conflicts were making daily media headlines, one would think that allocation of these funds was not a difficult issue for key member states and contributors. As a matter of fact, the contrary is true. Funding of peacekeeping operations came to be a major domestic issue, in the United States in particular.
DEBATING THE FINANCING OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
Problems with the funding of peacekeeping emerged early in the 1990s, even as the end of the Cold War permitted an expansion of peace operations. Peacekeeping had been a minor budget item up through the 1980s, averaging only $50 million a year through the decade. As the number of UN peace operations exploded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the costs jumped accordingly for both the United Nations and the United States, which pays about 30 percent of the costs of UN peacekeeping operations. (15) From 1989 to 1991, the budget for assessed peace operations more than tripled for the United States, from $29 million to $115 million. This figure quadrupled again for 1992, reaching $460 million.
To meet these escalating costs, the new Clinton administration's first budget submission asked for a total of $913 million, almost twice the $460-million budget during the final year of the Bush administration. The new figure included two additions: a supplemental request for $293 million in 1993 funds and, as part of the $620 million in fiscal year 1994 funds, a contingency fund of $175 million to be spent on unspecified, unanticipated peacekeeping bills. These funds were badly needed: 1993 and 1994 were two of the most active years for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and Africa. Yet Congress cut off funds for US forces in Somalia and Rwanda, restricted the deployment of US troops to Haiti, barred the service of US forces in peacekeeping under foreign command and prohibited the use of defense funds to pay peacekeeping assessments. (16)
From a general point of view, the US reluctance to meet the needs of the peacekeeping operation's needs generated debts for the United Nations: the bigger the debts, the longer the United Nations took to pay salaries for troops, and the harder it was to get nations to contribute troops. This, in turn, made it more difficult for the United States to hand off missions like Somalia to the United Nations. (17) The debts also made it more difficult for the United Nations to fund the kind of improvements in the management of peacekeeping sought by the United States. Ultimately, the funding problem of peacekeeping operations became a serious matter of contention between the United States and the United Nations.
As a result, meeting the costs of peacekeeping throughout the 1990s was extremely difficult for the United Nations, in part because member states failed to pay their assessments promptly. As of September 2000, member states owed the United Nations $2.5 billion for peacekeeping operations. The single largest debtor was the United States, owing close to $1.5 billion. (18) This made it very difficult for the United Nations to act in a timely fashion and to reimburse member states for the troops they provided for the missions. This is particularly significant because eight out of the top 10 contributors of personnel to UN peacekeeping forces in the 1990s, Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Jordan, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria and Pakistan, are developing nations that cannot easily carry a deficit of millions of dollars. (19)
The disparity between major member states' national defense budgets and the costs of peacekeeping operations, combined with the reluctance displayed by some member states, the United States in particular, to meet peacekeeping operations' needs, raises the question of whether the member states saw the connection between the costs for peacekeeping and those for defense. In fact, it shows that they hardly noted that connection. Ultimately, it suggests that the economics of security reflects the priorities of those states for security as they see it. They did not consider peacekeeping an effort that had any relation to the costs of defense in the long run.
Even so, willingness to spend on peacekeeping operations reflected political priorities. Not all regions were equal. Nothing shows this more than the disparity of expenditures between UN involvement in the Balkans and that in Africa. As the table below shows, the international community, despite its reluctance to spend on peacekeeping operations, was more willing to incur substantial costs in the Balkans than it was in Africa.
If it was difficult for major member states, particularly for the United States, to make the case of national interest and defense imperatives for involvement in peacekeeping, it was even more difficult to justify involvement in specific regions. As the figures above demonstrate, it was more difficult to justify involvement in Africa than the Balkans.
The only way that member states are likely to give higher priority to expenditures on peacekeeping operations is if they see a clear and direct connection between these expenditures and those for security and defense. This largely depends on the assessment of the extent to which the peacekeeping operations succeeded and whether or not their implementation averted spending in other sectors, such as defense, that might have been necessary had they not taken place.
COSTS OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT
How does one evaluate the costs of peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990s? Did they produce results sufficient to justify the costs involved? To answer these questions, some caution is required: how does one judge peacekeeping efforts fairly? They are complicated operations with many unpredictable and difficult-to-measure variables.
When evaluating the UN peacekeeping operations of the 1990s, it is important to keep in mind that initiatives undertaken in peacekeeping cannot solve all the problems encompassed in such crises, regardless of the expenditures. Complete resolution arrives only incrementally and requires time, especially because peacekeeping occurs in areas suffering from political, social and economic instability, often with long legacies of trauma and grievance. One should not forget that peacekeeping forces are not the only actors involved. They are part of a local, national, regional and global constellation of actors, all of whom collaborate or compete politically, diplomatically or militarily for their own goals. UN peacekeeping operations must be viewed as part of a nexus of influences that affect the outcomes, positive and negative, of each mission. The diversity of tasks in peacekeeping operations implies various timelines of evaluation, with each discrete time period defined by unique constraints and possibilities. Furthermore, the complexity of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s did not favor easy and quick results. With these qualifications in mind, therefore, we assess the outcomes of the peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. The results of peacekeeping operations were mixed, at best. Consequently, the returns on the investments in peacekeeping are uneven.
Several UN operations are nonetheless success stories. These include El Salvador, Mozambique and Guatemala, at least initially. Additionally, UNPREDEP's diplomacy mandate in Macedonia played a significant role in preventing war from spreading to its area of operation and contributed to Macedonia's internal stabilization, (21) with minimal costs compared to those of other peacekeeping efforts. (22) The UN operations in East Timor also provide some reason for optimism, although success in East Timor is not yet a foregone conclusion. Apart from these cases, the results from peacekeeping operations oscillate between mixed results and rather clear failures.
The UN peacekeeping operation in Kosovo produced mixed results. It did help to place more than one million refugees into homes or temporary shelters, redeeming the UNHCR's failures at the onset of the refugee crisis. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) deserve credit for demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and preventing civil war between supporters of the KLA and Ibrahim Rugova's League of Democrats of Kosovo (LDK), which threatened to break out in the chaotic and violent conditions of post-war Kosovo. This is no small achievement, as few post-war guerrilla armies easily agree, even in principle, to disband and surrender their weapons as the KLA did in September 1999. (23) However, after achieving the KLA's disarmament, there were serious problems in achieving further progress. There has been little serious effort to move against elements associated with the KLA who are widely believed to operate quasi-criminal underground economic networks and are generally considered responsible for much of the ugly climate that continues to characterize Kosovo. Despite considerable progress, an atmosphere of lawlessness and disrespect for public institutions persisted in the spring of 2002. This may change once the newly formed government gains traction.
Moreover, the failure to enact any credible strategy for dealing with the Serbs in Kosovo remains a major problem. After the war, approximately 150,000 Serbs fled Kosovo. Perhaps 100,000 remain in enclaves or in a Serb enclave north of the divided city of Mitrovica. Here, the stakes are high. Failure to reintegrate the Serbs could lead to the formalization of Kosovo's de facto partition along the Ibar River, which divides the northern and southern portions of Mitrovica. The Serb enclaves in the rest of Kosovo would then be threatened with a renewed round of violence.
Failure in some cases is all too clear, as in Bosnia, Somalia, Angola, Liberia and Rwanda. These failures admittedly are associated with the combatants' unwillingness to arrive promptly and genuinely at a peaceful settlement. Just as important, however, is UN involvement and its failure to meet self-designed goals and plans to achieve peace.
The failures of the UN peacekeeping operations in the 1990s are no more evident than in Africa. Although the humanitarian assistance brought to people in Somalia in 1992-1993 should not be overlooked, (24) neither the peace enforcement nor the peace-building components of UN operations managed to produce results. Almost 10 years later, Somalia is still crippled by social, economic and political disintegration. Somalia still has no central government, in the face of continued resistance from armed militias around the country. This failure plagues the United States in its current war against terrorism and demonstrates the link between peacekeeping and defense: The failure of the peacekeeping operation in Somalia may raise the costs of a military campaign at a later date. The lack of real effort by the United Nations to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is an additional, if not the single most significant failure of the United Nations in the 1990s.
It is tempting to suggest that these mixed results show that the amount of funds allocated to peacekeeping operations in the 1990s didn't yield impressive outcomes. Yet, the cases of success prove that not all peacekeeping expenditures were wasted. In addition, doing less was not an option. Domestic pressure demanded that the major democratic Western nations take action. Accordingly, there was no way to avoid involvement and the associated expenditures. Acting as bystanders in order to minimize the financial outlays would have cost Western administrations politically in the long run. There were some indications that administrations made the connection between peacekeeping expenditures and national security needs. Although the crises did not involve major security threats, turning a blind eye would have established dangerous precedents and threatened regional, if not international, order. From this perspective, the strategy of containment, even if insufficiently robust, was probably a good investment, especially in the Balkans.
The return on the funds spent and invested in peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990s can only be ensured in the long run with proper reconstruction policies. Without reconstruction programs, the peacekeeping operations of the 1990s will be fruitless. Such follow-up requires additional financial commitment on the part of the international community. Expanded follow-up operations will invariably raise the costs of the mission. This will increase the need to demonstrate the mission's effective use of funds, provide for transparency, monitor the funds allocation and combat corruption. Any other kind of approach risks creating donor fatigue. Ultimately, reconstruction funds show that the economy of peacekeeping operations is part of a continuum, ensuring long-term settlements and preventing new crises.
CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A BETTER INVESTMENT POLICY IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
What do we learn from focusing on the costs, benefits and outcomes of peacekeeping operations? The first lesson is that the costs of peacekeeping must not be viewed too narrowly. Peacekeeping cannot be seen solely in terms of interposing forces between conflicting parties. A peacebuilding or reconstruction component may be required to ensure success. Limiting the missions may diminish costs but also reduce success; the benefits of the mission may be lost altogether. Conversely, more funds may increase returns.
Second, finance mechanisms need to be improved to avoid the funding delays and shortages that can cripple success. Throughout the 1990s, shortages and delays were critical in causing peacekeeping operations failures. Contributions for peacekeeping operations are based on needs that arise unexpectedly, making the funding process erratic and subject to a double layer of qualification and evaluation: one in the Security Council and another in the parliaments, where missions compete with national defense funds, development funds, or contingency funds of different kinds. The proper financing of peacekeeping operations requires financial commitments in a predictable and timely manner.
The third lesson makes a case for doing it right. Although peacekeeping costs are typically minimal compared to Western national defense budgets and have been low relative to need, the budgets for peacekeeping operations nevertheless have been quite substantial throughout the 1990s. This means that arguments for peacekeeping must be clear and compelling to convince skeptical states and political parties of peacekeeping's essential role.
The conclusion that peacekeeping funding needs to be greater, more prompt and more predictable has led to a number of proposals for the establishment of a permanent peacekeeping fund to which countries would contribute regularly, perhaps replenishing it on a periodic basis. This contribution might be on an as-needed basis. Some have suggested that it be expressed as a percentage of nations' yearly military defense budgets.
It is difficult to motivate countries to contribute funds for the financing of international institutions. In addition, there are concerns that having funds readily available could be an incentive to spend too readily, perhaps unduly. However, this concern has to be balanced by others, such as the high cost of not having the necessary funds available in a timely manner, which could result in increased expenditures later as well as less effective operations.
Any improvement must go beyond mere ad hoc policies. It must build a commitment to handling crises that are already strategic enough to be part of institutional and public policies. When peacekeeping operations are part of a regular budget line, they will become part of public policy on the international level. Peacekeeping will then become a tool for prevention as well as resolution.
The discussion of needs, costs and results raises many issues, particularly as we enter a new phase of peacekeeping driven by the threat of terrorism and the need for multilateral responses. Political considerations drive peacekeeping operations, but economic considerations can undermine or enhance these undertakings. To increase the return on peacekeeping investments, the cost side of the equation needs to be addressed. This will not always equal smaller costs. Peacekeeping is becoming more complicated and necessarily more expensive, but it also promises to be a more effective response to violent conflict. If done well, the marginal cost of peacekeeping will yield a greater peace dividend, both to the country in conflict and the wider international community.
UN Peacekeeping Operations from 1991 to late 2000 (3) Mission Full title Date est. MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara Apr. 1991 UNAVEM II United Nations Angolan Verification Mission II May 1991 ONUSAL United Nations Mission in El Salvador July 1991 UNAMIC United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia Oct. 1991 UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force Feb. 1992 UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia Mar. 1992 UNOSOM I United Nations Operation in Somalia Apr. 1992 ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique Dec. 1992 ONUSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II Mar. 1993 UNOMUR United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda June 1993 UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti Sept. 1993 UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda Oct. 1993 UNMOT United Nations Observer Mission in Tajikistan Dec. 1994 UNAVEM III United Nations Angolan Verification Mission III Feb. 1995 UNCRO United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation Mar. 1995 UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (deployed in the Former Mar. 1995 Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina Dec. 1995 UNMOP United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka, Croatia Jan. 1996 UNTAES United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia Jan. 1996 UNSMIH United Nations Support Mission in Haiti July 1996 MINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala Jan. 1997 MONUA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola June 1997 UNTMIH United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti Aug. 1997 MIPONUH United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti Dec. 1997 UNCPSGC United Nations Civilian Police Support Group in Croatia Jan. 1998 MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic Apr. 1998 UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone July 1998 UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo June 1999 UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone Oct. 1999 UNTAET United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Oct. 1999 MONUC United Nations Organisation Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo Dec. 1999 UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea July 2000 Defense Spending and UN Peacekeeping Funding 1991-1999 (1998 Constant Dollar-1998 Exchange Rates) (14) Defense Spending ($US billions) Country 1990 1994 1996 1998 France 44.1 42.6 39.8 39.2 UK 51.3 42.7 39.0 37.1 US 379.2 313.6 283.8 269.8 UN Peacekeeping Funding ($US billions) Country 1994 1995 1996 1997-98 France 0.15 0.27 0.09 0.07 UK 0.23 0.24 0.10 0.07 US 1.08 0.43 0.29 0.30 UN Peacekeeping Missions In Africa and Europe Initiated Between 1991 and 1999 Region Mission Duration Africa Angola UNAVEM II May 1991-Feb 1995 UNAVEM III Feb. 1995-June 1997 MONUA June 1997-Feb 1999 Central Afri- can Republic MINURCA April 1998-Feb 2000 Chad UNASOG May 1994-June 1994 DR of Congo MONUC Nov 1999-present Liberia UNOMIL Sept 1993-Sept 1997 Mozambique ONUMOZ Dec 1992-Dec 1994 Rwanda UNAMIR Oct 1993-March 1996 Rwanda/Ugan UNOMUR June 1993-Sept 1994 da Sierra Leone UNOMSIL July 1998-Oct 1999 UNAMSIL Oct 1999-present Somalia UNOMSOM I April 1992-Mar 1993 UNOMSOM II Mar 1993-Mar 1995 Western MINURSO April 1991-present Sahara TOTAL UN AFRICA Balkans Bosnia & Herzegovina UNMIBH Dec 1995-present Croatia UNCRO Mar 1995-Jan 1996 UNTAES Jan 1996-Jan 1998 UNMOP Jan 1996-present UNPSG Jan 1998-Oct 1998 Former Yugoslavia UNPROFOR Feb 1992-Mar 1995 UNPREDEP Mar 1995-Feb 1999 Kosovo UNMIK June 1999-present TOTAL UN BALKANS NATO Balkans IFOR 1996 costs SFOR II 1997-June 1999 costs KFOR 1999 costs TOTAL 1996-1999 NATO Region Personnel Strength Costs (troops, military ($US million net) observers, civilian 1991-1999/2000 police) Africa Angola 476 175.8 4,220 887.2 4,200 300.3 Central Afri- can Republic 1,375 62.5 Chad 9 0.07 DR of Congo 5,537 200.0 Liberia 303 99.3 Mozambique 8,123 486.7 Rwanda 5,500 453.9 Rwanda/Ugan 81 2.3 da Sierra Leone 207 53.6 10,437 565.8 Somalia 3,550 42.9 28,000 1,643.5 Western 261 372.0 Sahara TOTAL UN $5,345.87 AFRICA ($5.3 billion) Balkans Bosnia & Herzegovina 2,057 733.3 Croatia 7,071 In UNPROFOR 5,349 558.8 27 In UNMIBH 114 28.7 Former Yugoslavia 38,599 4,616.7 (20) 1,110 149.5 Kosovo 4,450 66.3 TOTAL UN $6,153.3 BALKANS ($6.1 billion) NATO Balkans 5,000.0 9,000.0 10,000.0 TOTAL $24,000.0 NATO ($24 billion) Source for UN figures: United Nations website: www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/missions, SIPRI Yearbook 1993-2000 editions. Source for NATO figures: The Military Balance 1997/98-1999/2000 editions. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London: Oxford University Press.
(1) See online at <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu_mission/body.htm>.
(2) The regular budget of the United Nations, in US dollars, was the following: 1991, 1.1 billion; 1992, 1.2 billion; 1993, 1.2 billion; 1994, 1.3 billion; 1995, 1.3 billion; 1996, 1.3 billion; 1997, 1.3 billion; 1998, 1.3 billion; 1999, 1.3 billion; 2000, 1.2 billion; 2001, 1.2 billion (note that figures for 2000-2001 are projected).
(3) See online at <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/cu_mission/body.htm>.
(4) UNHCR is funded almost entirely by direct, voluntary contributions from governments, non-governmental organizations and individuals. There is also a very limited subsidy from the regular budget of the United Nations, which is used exclusively for administrative costs.
(5) See <http://www.unhcr.ch/fdrs/main.htm>. For the evolution of the UNHCR's budget throughout the 1990s, see <viewbin.pdf> on the UNHCR website.
(6) For a more detailed view of the costs for member states in this context, see Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, eds., The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999). Although this book tends to focus primarily on costs to the United States occasioned by its involvement in UN peacekeeping-related situations, it is certainly one of the best publications on the issue of the costs of the conflicts in the 1990s.
(7) Mike Blakey, "Somalia," in Brown and Rosecrance, p. 101-102.
(8) This American expenditure was in addition to peacekeeping assessments the United States owed the UN and did not include the $56 million spent in six months of post-intervention peacekeeping, of which the United States would pay 25 percent. See Mike Blakey, "Haiti," in Brown and Rosecrance, p. 102.
(9) Andrea Kathryn Talentino, "Bosnia," in Brown and Rosecrance, p. 42. Obviously, these are not the only costs that were borne by NATO in the context of the Bosnian conflict. NATO originally became involved in the Bosnian war in support of the United Nations, as together with the Western European Union, the alliance monitored and enforced UN sanctions in the Adriatic. The alliance also monitored and enforced the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia, provided close air support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on the ground and carried out air strikes to lift the siege of Sarajevo. These tasks implied financial costs, as did the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) that succeeded IFOR at the end of 1996 and was deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina to maintain the security environment necessary to enable the country to rebuild after the devastation of years of conflict.
(10) Ibid., pp. 43 and 44.
(11) See SIPRI Yearbook. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, p. 260.
(12) For figures, refer to the table "Federal Budget Outlays for National Defense Functions: 1980 to 1999," in Statistical Abstract of the US: 1999 (Washington DC: Bureau of Census, 1999) p. 368.
(13) Figures for peacekeeping operations include contributions toward UN peace keeping assessments during 1994 but do not include voluntary contributions by country in support of Security Council resolutions. Defense spending data reflect an agreed definition of total defense spending adopted by NATO. For further information, see Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense, 1995 ed., table "Selected Country Responsibility Sharing Indicators and Contributions"; 1999 ed., table E-12. Available online at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied.html>.
(14) Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense: A Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense, 1999 ed., tables E-4 and E-12.
(15) United Nations generally creates a separate fund for each peacekeeping operation, but funds them in two different ways. Most peacekeeping operations are assessed missions. The United Nations payment formula is based primarily on each nation's income, but permanent members of the Security Council pay a higher rate. The United States is the highest contributor, with now 25% or so of the contributions. Member states also make "voluntary" contributions to peacekeeping operations that are not assessed missions, and through in-kind contributions to other operations. Congress funds these two types of contributions through different subcommittees of its appropriations committees: assessed operations through the Commerce-Justice-State (CJS) subcommittees, and voluntary contributions through the Foreign Operations subcommittees.
(16) Jeremy D. Rosner tells the story in The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch and National Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995) pp. 77-82.
(17) For more on the effect of lack of funding on peacekeeping operations, see Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, p. 46.
(18) See www.un.org/News/facts/finance.htm. In December 2000, an agreement was finally reached that led the United States to commit itself to pay approximately 1 billion US dollars of back dues in peacekeeping costs. For more on this, refer to Hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on United Nations reforms, January 9, 2001 (copyright 2001 Federal News Service, Inc.), p. 1.
(19) As of 31 Aug. 2000, the United Nations owed 73 countries a total of over US$800 million. Online at <www.un.org/News/facts/finance.htm>.
(20) Includes UNPROFOR, UNCRO and one year of UNPREDEP
(21) See Henryk J. Sokalski, "Preventive Action: The Need for a Comprehensive Approach," in Jeremy Ginifer, Espen Barth Eide and Carsten F. Ronnfeldt, Preventive Action in Theory and Practice. The Skopje Papers, (Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1999) p. 63.
(22) Regrettably, when a permanent member of the Security Council, China, vetoed further extension of the mission's mandate in February 1999, UNPREDEP came to an end. Had the operation continued, many negative developments along Macedonian borders with Kosovo in early 2001 might have been avoided.
(23) The KLA did not necessarily surrender all weapons. It is likely that a significant number of them ended up in covert weapons stocks, not yet all discovered by KFOR.
(24) See, for instance Mike Blakey, "Somalia," in Brown and Rosecrance, p. 82.
Jean-Marc Coicaud is senior academic officer in the Peace and Governance Program at the United Nations University in Tokyo. He also teaches social and political philosophy at the New School University in New York. He previously served in the Executive Office of the UN Secretariat as a speechwriter for former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. A former fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, Coicaud has held appointments as cultural attache with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, legislative aide with the European Parliament, associate professor at the University of Paris and visiting professor at the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris. Coicaud holds a Ph.D. in political science-law from the Sorbonne and a Doctorat d'Etat in Philosophy from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques of Paris. He has written extensively on the subject of international law and is the author of books on authoritarian democracy and on legitimacy and political power. His book Dilemmas of International Democratic Culture, which he wrote while on sabbatical as a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace in 2000-2001, will be published in 2003.
Harriet Hentges is executive vice president and chief operating officer of the United States Institute of Peace and until 1999 chaired its Balkans Initiative. Hentges possesses broad international and management experience in business, government and nonprofit organizations. She has specialized in third world trade and development issues as well as in international business development strategies. She has served as a senior executive of an international trading company and as co-founder and manager of an investment banking firm specializing in international transactions. Hentges also worked as an international economist in the U.S. Department of State and in the Office of the U.S. Special Trade Representative during the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations and as a consultant to the U.S. Agency for International Development on private enterprise development. Hentges holds a Ph.D. in international economics from the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.
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|Author:||Hentges, Harriet; Coicaud, Jean-Marc|
|Publication:||Journal of International Affairs|
|Article Type:||Statistical Data Included|
|Date:||Mar 22, 2002|
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