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Difficulties in obtaining MICAP Support to Bagram Air Field. (INSIDE LOGISTICS: EXPLORING THE HEART OF LOGISTICS.

My logisticians are a humorless lot ... they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.

--Alexander the Great

Introduction

The United States Air Force has been at war for more than ten years in Afghanistan and the pace continues to increase. Every day, the aircraft of the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan are flying combat missions against our enemies, many of which support troops in contact. (1) All airframes are needed to support flying operations, but many times a few aircraft are not mission capable because of parts. This, in turn, drives a supply mission impaired capability awaiting parts (MICAP) situation where the aircraft cannot perform part or any of its mission because a part, or parts, are needed to fix the aircraft. MICAP parts are critical to completing the mission at Bagram Airfield and every other location supporting the war effort. MICAP parts are also critical at home stations where vital training is conducted to prepare units for their wartime mission. Every available airframe at Bagram Airfield could have a mission assigned to it, but part delays reduce the warfighting capability.

Being at war is considered the normal mode of operation for most Airmen and this may drive some complacency or lack of aggressiveness when at home station supporting the war effort. There are other factors that may be contributing to long lead-times in the supply chain such as organizational changes. The Air Force Global Logistics Support Center (AFGLSC) activated in May 2007 became the Air Force's supply chain management process owner. (2) As in any reorganization, there will be inefficiencies and learning curves to provide the level of service the customer expects.

This article looks at the overall logistics system supporting the warfighter, some of the agencies involved, the priorities and policy for parts requisition and shipment, gaps in support in the logistics pipeline, and provides some recommendations for improving logistics support to the warfighter.

Mission Capability (MICAP)

First, let us take a look at the definition of a MICAP, how it is determined, the different categories, and the priorities in support. "A MICAP is defined as a customer's request to identify parts required at the base on the highest priority basis." (3)

These orders apply when materiel is needed to repair mission essential equipment. Of note, MICAP procedures should be used to satisfy customer requirements only after all efforts are made to resolve materiel shortage problems through local resources. These local resources will include mobility readiness spares packages (MRSP), contingency readiness spares packages (CRSP), (4) aircraft parts store (APS), and storage and issue. MICAP requirements dictate special methods and procedures be used to obtain items required by Air Force organizations to maintain mission capability. Customer MICAP orders are determined several different ways, but most importantly by how they will affect the overall mission. A MICAP can be determined by priority, urgency of need designator (UND), (5) urgency justification code (UJC), (6) force activity designator (F/AD), (7) and transaction exception code (TEX). (8) Once a MICAP is determined, it is further broken down by category. When ordering a MICAP part for an aircraft, engine, or equipment specific UJCs and standard reporting designators (SRD) (9) are used for identification. For every asset there is a specific SRD assigned to identify whether the MICAP is valid and considered MICAP-reportable. There is a different level of MICAP that receives continuous tracking and priority from sourcing to destination--an Air Mobility Command (AMC) MICAE The following is the definition of an AMC MICAE
 18 AF TACC/XOCL directs AMC MICAP shipments providing expeditious
 logistics supporting recovery actions for AMC, AMC-gained, and
 operational support airlift (OSA) aircraft that are not mission
 capable (NMC) or have reported mission essential discrepancies away
 from home station. 18 AF TACC/XOCL also directs AMC MICAP shipments
 of recovery equipment return to tasked unit upon completion of
 aircraft recovery. Shipments designated as AMC MICAP will be
 identified by the project code (PC), PACER HAUL, 196 and required
 delivery date (RDD) 999. (10)


Roles Supporting the Warfighter

The maintenance supply liaison (MSL) is the primary focal point for the expeditionary maintenance group (EMXG) to interface with base-level supply and the AFGLSC. Specifically,
 the MSL monitors the overall maintenance and supply interface,
 resolves supply support problems, reviews reports and coordinates
 supply related training needs for decentralized supply support
 personnel ... The LRS/CC, through the MSL, is the liaison between
 maintenance units and the Air Force Global Logistics Support Center
 (AFGLSC) (11,12)


The particular relationship, as will be illustrated later, produces many gaps in support as the base-level unit logistics readiness squadron (LRS) and AFGLSC have no interface with subordinate and owning commands. There are numerous occasions when the MSL or the expeditionary logistics readiness squadron (ELRS) commander must track down the location of the part and then attempt to find the right leadership to contact and influence part movement--not very effective or efficient. The role of the deployed MSL within the EMXG includes various tasks and responsibilities. In a wartime environment, the MSL provides 100 percent supply support to ensure maintenance needs are met and there are no supply delays in maintaining combat capabilities. In this environment, the MSL is directly involved in all the expeditionary aircraft maintenance squadron (EAMXS) decentralized supply processes, ensuring supply discipline is maintained and engaging with support units to ensure quick parts availability to keep the aircraft fully mission capable. Additionally, the MSL provides supply support to the maintenance backshops assigned to the EMXG to ensure test spares and backshop capabilities are fully serviceable to support aircraft and weapons needs. The MSL works directly with the AFGLSC to expedite parts movement and ensure critical items are identified to prevent long lead-times or nonsupport.

The AFGLSC concept was designed to reduce the mobility footprint and consolidate weapons system support into two functions: Combat Air Forces (CAF) and Mobility Air Forces (MAF) materiel management. Within each CAF or MAF, the mission readiness division is primarily responsible for the sustainment of Air Force weapon systems through MICAP support, awaiting parts (AWP) management, and customer support responsibilities. (13) The weapon system manager is the single point of contact (POC) for managing overall weapon system operational support, to include current and past supportability problems, modification plans and spares, aircraft transfers, CRSP management, contingency operations, nonsupportable MICAPs, and AWP management. (14) Weapon system managers are charged with providing the warfighter supply support 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Working through the AFGLSC, the MSL ensures the right part is ordered to provide the right capability. The MSL also monitors the progress of the MICAP part until it is received at the base. Some factors that determine how quickly a part gets to a base are covered in the Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS). To determine the precedence in requisition and shipment, the UMMIPS outlines specific guidance.

Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System

As stated in Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 23-110, USAF Supply Manual, Volume 1, Part 1, Chapter 24, "The Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System (UMMIPS):"
 UMMIPS provides a ready basis for expressing the relative
 importance of requisitions and materiel movement transactions using
 a series of two-digit codes (01-15), referred to as priority
 designators (PDs) and the designation, or nondesignation, of a
 required delivery date (RDD)." (15) Additionally, the priority
 designator is based on a combination of the F/AD and the UND. These
 factors determine the priority of issuance and shipment for a given
 activity. (16)


The F/ADs define the relative importance of a force or unit in meeting Department of Defense (DoD) objectives is ranked with I being highest and V being the lowest. (17) The UND expresses the need of an item as determined by the requisitioning activity and is defined by alphabetic letters A, B, or C with A being the highest. (18)

The PD (numerals 01 through 15 with 01 being the highest) is based on the relationship of the F/AD and the UND. (19) Tables 1 and 2 below, show the relationship between the F/AD, LIND, and PD.

The following examples explain the appropriate use of UND A.

* "Required for immediate end use and without which the force or activity is unable to perform its assigned operational mission." (20)

* "Required for immediate installation on, or repair of, mission-essential materiel and without which the force or activity is unable to perform its assigned operational mission." (21)

The first part of the designation in UMMIPS is the F/AD. What is interesting is that a continental United States (CONUS) unit (366th Fighter Wing at Mountain Home Air Force Base [AFB]) has a F/AD of 2 and the combat units (fighter aircraft) at Bagram Airfield also have a F/AD of 2. Thus, within UMMIPS, the priorities at Bagram Airfield are the same as at Mountain Home AFB. This fact leads to difficulties in thinking and processing Bagram's MICAPs as a priority over other organizations within the same F/AD. To compensate for this, the AFGLSC does a rack and stack within a F/AD based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Project Codes--9GJ for Iraq and 9GF for Afghanistan. The assigned project code is what gives some bases a higher MICAP priority than the rest of the Air Force. (22)

All of this information ties together in the Time-Definite Delivery (TDD) standards identified in DoD Instruction 414001-R, DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation. Table AP8 T1 of this regulation identifies TDD as:
 ... maximum amount of time that should elapse during any given
 pipeline segment for items that are in stock or for items that are
 processed as part of planned direct-vendor deliveries. They
 represent 85 percent of the aggregate times that the wholesale
 supply system is capable of delivering required materiel to its
 customers. (23)


Additionally, Bagram Airfield would fall under Area D (Table 3) for timeline determination. (24) However, in a MICAP situation, the EXP category in Table 3 indicates the TDD standard for Bagram Airfield. The EXP column is for:
 Commercial door-to-door air service is only for outside the
 continental United States (OCONUS) shipments that are
 transportation priority 1 or 2. It is an alternative service to be
 used when established Air Mobility Command channel service is not
 adequate. The intransit-to-theater standard for commercial
 door-to-door service encompasses the total time for contract
 transportation rather than individual nodes. A required delivery
 date (RDD) equal to '999' indicates an expedited handling
 requirement for Non-Mission-Capable-Supply (NMCS) overseas customers
 or CONUS customers deploying within 30 days. This RDD applies to
 requisitions with priority designators 01 through 03 and is
 reserved for US Forces. (25)


According to these time standards, a critical MICAP part supporting combat missions will take approximately six and one-half days to arrive once sourced. This timeframe is sometimes met in the commercial air express sector. When it is not met the cause is usually processing time at the base level to get into the commercial airlift system. For AMC channel missions, this timeframe is rarely if ever met.

Gaps in the Logistics Pipeline

After many months of observation, personal experience, and analysis, one could see there are seams and gaps in the logistics pipeline. From sourcing the part to receipt in hand, there are numerous hand-offs and individual logistics stovepipes along the way. To help illustrate this, these segments are broadly broken out into seven specific segments as identified in Table 4.

Based upon the 455th EMXG's experience and MICAP board data from 26 October 2009 to 5 April 2010, the data showed that the observations had validity. Over this period, Bagram Airfield had a total of 1,407 MICAPs, of which 280 (20 percent) were considered a problem. The following data examples are derived from the 455th EMXG's MICAP boards and consist of MICAP parts that were awaiting shipment, release, or a mission for two days or more. Anything less than two days was not considered a problem in this analysis. Using this data, and as indicated in Figure 1, one sees that most of the delays were coming out of United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), Air Force Central Command, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC), Air Combat Command (ACC), and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). As shown later in this article, some of these delays can be attributed to the sourcing priority used by the AFGLSC.

Further breakdown of location delays show that Lakenheath Air Base (AB), Dover AFB, Aviano AB, Spangdahlem AB, and Al Udeid AB were the primary locations where the delays were taking place (see Figure 2).

The delays are grouped into three categories: Awaiting Release, Awaiting Shipment, and Awaiting Mission. Table 5 provides a description for each type of delay.

Within these three broad categories the locations with the most delays in Awaiting Release were Lakenheath AB, Spangdahlem AB, Defense Logistics Agency, Aviano AB, and Tinker AFB (see Figure 3).

Within the Awaiting Shipment category, the specific locations with the most delays were Lakenheath AB, Aviano AB, Spangdahlem AB, Balad AB and Seymour Johnson AFB (see Figure 4).

Within the Awaiting Mission category, the most frequent delays were at Dover AFB, Al Udeid AB, and Ramstein AB (see Figure 5).

The ELRS and the EMXG determined what the numbers meant as indicated in Figures 1 through 5. What the charts do not show is some of the causes discovered while working this process. The following is a break out of some of these causes for gaps and delays in the sourcing and delivery process.

* AFGLSC Sourcing Policy for Bagram Airfield--Order of Sourcing. The order of sourcing is OCONUS or deployed AOR (area of responsibility) units in or near theater (contingency sites), OCONUS units in USAFE, source of supply (depot), CONUS units, other OCONUS units not in or near theater (26)

* Time-Definite Delivery (TDD) Standards. As identified earlier, the TDD standards for MICAPs supporting combat missions at Bagram Airfield is approximately six and one-half days. The preparation and processing at base level plus weekend sourcing typically causes the delays when the six and one-half days cannot be met.

* Transportation Mode Selection. Selection procedures (Worldwide Express [WWX], AMC gray tail) may cause some of the delays. For USAFE, if the part is sourced mid-day on Friday, it will not move via WWX until Monday night. Furthermore, some bases in USAFE could truck (with military members) MICAPs to Ramstein AB and get the part to the theater sooner, instead of waiting three to four days for WWX. This requires a change in mindset. During a recent part delivery, it took more than 10 days to get the part off of a particular base because the part moved from traffic management office (TMO) to the aerial port where it sat for many days because there was no mission.

* Weekends. There is, at times, a lack of aggressiveness over weekends to continue moving the part to the theater. There are WWX carriers that do not pick up on weekends, stand-by personnel that do not pull the part from supply, and people who do not push the part out of TMO.

* Segmented Pipeline. Each segment may pursue moving MICAPs, but that is in isolation and the entire supply and transportation chain is not considered. A perfect example of this was a part at a USAFE base that TMO released to the AMC function at the same base. TMO had done its job in releasing the part to the next activity, yet there was not going to be an airlift mission out for many days. When this concern was identified, a senior master sergeant at 735 SCMG/LGWT stated that the unit had "met their obligation." This is a perfect example of the stovepipe mentality that needs to be fixed.

* Points of Contact. Although AFGLSC manages all of the MICAPs, Bagram Airfield's leadership monitors their MICAPs more closely and continually tries to push the part through the system. When a part is held up at various segments along the way, Bagram leadership is left to determine who to call or e-mail to break this part loose and keep it moving. Between the AFGLSC and Bagram Airfield's leadership, there is no actionable oversight as the part moves or stops along its journey. When problems were encountered in a particular command, the major command staff instructed us to call the LRS commander or the Air Mobility squadron commander. Trying to figure out who to call at a depot, DLA, or a base, is not easy as there are many locations and parts. Additionally, over a weekend, it is virtually impossible to get action. Why is it left to the end user to try and find the right POC to take action?

* Aggressiveness. Being at war for a numbers of years has numbed some individuals to understanding how critical every single airframe is to prosecuting the war. There is little doubt that leadership understands, but the Airmen and noncommissioned officers (NCO) often do not. There are many examples of parts taking more than one day to just pull from supply, ship out of TMO, and so forth.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Examples of Gaps in Support

"A MICAP is a failure of the supply chain and should be viewed as such." (27) This is true, yet it does not appear that it is taken seriously. MICAPs seem to be the norm, and working aggressively to remedy this situation is a continual process. The expense on manpower, equipment, and transportation costs continues without any visible or quantifiable means of attempting to abate the problem.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

It is easy to see the logistical challenges of getting parts to the warfighter in a land-locked country surrounded by virtually impassible mountain ranges. One of the most reliable methods of getting MICAPs into Bagram Airfield is utilizing DHL. With sourcing from the US or Europe, the routing is through Leipzig, Germany, then Bahrain, providing a MICAP delivery to Bagram Airfield in just four to five days. Even the best method of transportation still wastes multiple days in transit, making it imperative that MICAP processing on bases, through DLA, or suppliers is done as expeditiously as possible. And with the DoD TDD standard for Bagram Airfield MICAPs at six and one-half days (see Table 3), that gives a unit or DLA one to two days to completely process a MICAP part before it is picked up by DHL.

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]

Yet it seems our own Airmen may be causing the largest delays by making poor choices in airlift selection or a general lack of urgency in moving the part. As the data showed earlier in the article, it has been easy to track the total work stoppage that happens in supply warehouses, TMOs, and aerial ports on the weekends. However, when you add in the down days, the part stops movement for four days, which may translate into weeks an airframe is down for parts. In the war zone, where each aircraft is slotted to perform multiple sorties in one day, taking even a single aircraft out of the fleet is detrimental to the war effort. Not moving parts on the weekends or days off has become so accepted, one sees it documented in the comments in the Enterprise Solution-Supply (ES-S). (28) On a recent 1A MICAP at Bagram Airfield, the comment stated, "Asset has not moved due to 4-day ... holiday." According to DoD 4140.1-R, DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management and Regulation, "all requirements with an RDD of '999' [MICAPs], 'N__', or 'E__' shall be processed on a 24-hour basis, 7 days a week." (29) The source must be considered when selecting a part to ensure the quickest source to delivery time.

Additionally the trend seems to be to choose the easiest mode of transportation and not necessarily the mode that will get it to the destination the quickest. Recently GLSC sourced an F16 canopy MICAP from a USAFE base. TMO processed the MICAP quickly, yet never seemed to look at the fastest method in getting that part to Bagram Airfield. The options could have been FedEx, DHL, or by trucking the part to Ramstein AB, Germany for an almost daily AMC channel mission into the AOR. Instead, it was transported to the aerial port at this USAFE base to be manifested. After five days of flying this canopy around Europe, it returned to the same USAFE base before being flown to Ramstein AB via Sicily. It then took another six days for it to be loaded onto an AMC mission to Bagram Airfield (see Table 5).

Another example is a MICAP refueling receptacle for the HH-60 that was sourced to an ACC west coast CONUS base. In this case, established AMC channel service was inadequate because the base did not have AMC channel missions leaving from it. Instead of utilizing commercial door-to-door service as DoD 4140.1-R allows for MICAP parts, the unit chose to truck the part across the United States to Dover AFB, Delaware. Once at Dover AFB it had to be processed and manifested for an AMC channel mission, which took multiple days. All the while the HH-60 in question was grounded.

The release of parts by DLA is also a factor in delaying MICAP parts resolution. The release is typically granted by only one individual, so when that person is off for the weekend or on leave, the MICAP part sits. On two separate occasions with F-15 connectors, there were 5 and 12 days of unnecessary delay while awaiting the release. Additionally the releases came only after a multitude of calls, e-mails, and finally a push from the top down within the DLA chain of command.

Additionally, delays in DLA sourcing new MICAP requirements also waste precious time. One night, from 1600 to 1700 local time, Bagram input 13 new MICAP requirements for F-15 actuators. Yet at 0230 local time (9.5 hours later), only 7 of the 13 MICAPs had been worked. When the MSL called to inquire on why MICAP parts were not being worked, he was told, "they went to a briefing."

Issues like these happen every day and with many of the MICAP requirements. This translates into a team of individuals at Bagram Airfield working to ensure the parts are getting processed. In the ELRS, there are two MSL NCOs (technical sergeants) that cover MICAP requirements 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for their entire deployment--no days off. Day and night, they are calling and e-mailing on every MICAP part. Twice a day they create a tracker with the updated status on each MICAP part for ELRS and EMXG leadership to review. In addition, they create slides and attend the daily EMXG staff meeting with the ELRS operations officer to explain MICAP status. The ELRS commander and operations officer are actively engaged, every day, with escalating MICAP issues. Between the four individuals calling and e-mailing the sourcing LRS, aerial ports, fighter MICAP functional experts, and SCMGs (supply chain management group), there are on average 30 calls or e-mails every 24 hours.

What We Are Doing to Improve Warfighter Support

The line between disorder and order lies in logistics....

---Sun Tzu

In addition to helping expedite MICAP parts in the off-base logistics pipeline, new processes have been implemented at Bagram Airfield. First, the 455th ELRS improved MICAP parts delivery to EAMXS. The original process required maintenance to come to the other side of Bagram Airfield and pick up its part. The drive alone for this process is typically one hour. Additionally, on average, it took about four hours from the time supply called maintenance to pick up the part until the time it was picked up. The new process requires supply to call vehicle operations who delivers the part to the other side of the base at the aircraft parts store (APS). The APS then finishes the delivery to the required user. Now, instead of an average of 4 hours for pickup, vehicle operations averages 11 minutes. This in turn ensures EAMXS personnel focus on maintenance and the ELRS provides the logistics chain to support the requirement. This new process frees over 1,800 man-hours back to EAMXS to help put aircraft back into service as quickly as possible.

Suggestions for Overall Improvement

As the AFGLSC continues to refine its processes, there are particular areas that need additional attention across the entire supply chain supporting the warfighter.

* Sourcing Priorities. Sourcing priorities need to be examined to ensure the entire logistics chain is considered when sourcing a part. If WWX carriers are not available on weekends, then other options should be considered. This is especially important in overseas sourcing locations as customs and country holidays come into play and limit responsiveness to the warfighter. There may need to be some adjustments based on when a part is sourced that determines where it is sourced, not just a standard policy based on location, but one also based on time and transportation availability. Additionally, there needs to be some type of decision support software to enhance this process.

* Time-Definite Delivery Standards. The TDD standards for MICAP parts supporting combat missions at Bagram Airfield is approximately six and one-half days. A thorough examination of how these parts are moved from sourcing to receipt needs to be done. Maybe not to the same level as an AMC MICAP requirement, but there needs to be some separate category for combat mission support compared to home station support.

* MICAP Management. AMC MICAP requirements receive the utmost visibility to ensure the timeliest delivery. Understandably, these parts are needed to continue supporting the entire logistics chain. However, beyond this type of MICAP requirement, there are no separate levels or categories of visibility and action for fighter aircraft MICAPs. There needs to be separate levels or categories of MICAP requirements to ensure the warfighter gets the support needed. The F/AD for Bagram Airfield and for Mountain Home AFB fighter aircraft is the same. Thus, the requisition and transportation priority is really no different, even though one mission is actually wartime engagement and the other is training. The authors recommend specifying a certain cell within the AFGLSC for total MICAP management for either Bagram Airfield or Afghanistan. Each location should have a name or person they would get to know and this person at AFGLSC would be completely familiar with all the challenges supporting a given location. That person would lead efforts to make timely MICAP parts deliveries, make steps to reduce the occurrence of MICAPs, and make appropriate adjustments to stock levels. With various personnel working within an F15 and F-16 support cell, it is difficult to become familiar with each location's needs, logistics constraints, and concerns.

* Complete Visibility of the Entire Logistics Chain. There needs to be better management of the entire logistics chain in order to provide the quickest sourcing and delivery time. Is the right transportation mode considered? Have missions been examined to determine if the source selected really is the best source to get the part to the customer the quickest? Does someone follow each part along the pipeline to ensure it does not delay at any given location for too long? Have time standards been evaluated to ensure organizations are not just meeting our obligation but actually sourcing and delivering as quickly as possible? There needs to be one agency to call when the base supported can see the logistics chain is not working at its optimum and get immediate support. Could automated software be developed that would flag concerns based on preset timelines? This would allow personnel to focus only on those areas needing attention and not on everything, all the time.

* Stock Control Support. Stock control personnel need to be brought back into the AOR or have personnel at AFGLSC work hours that directly support the information needs of the AOR. Additionally, there needs to be improved communication support in order to run the necessary logistics support systems (Enterprise Solution-Supply [ES-S], Discoverer, and other systems) to effectively handle the supply and planning functions. Without a tool like Discoverer, or the ability to run reports locally (for example C01), the reports must be requested from outside this location.

* Right Metrics. Are the right metrics developed? If averages are used, then the anomalies and problems in the process will get buried in the successes. The right metrics should include every single MICAP that goes outside a certain boundary, not only at each stage of the pipeline, but along the entire sourcing to delivery timeline. Each segment of the pipeline should be analyzed for every single anomaly to find the root cause and eliminate it in the future. This would better help isolate and resolve problems in the supply chain.

* Proper Oversight of the Process and Standby Personnel. Are MICAP requirements monitored at the base level to ensure when providing lateral support, the work is performed in a timely manner? Is the right level of leadership involved at the base or depot level to ensure the part is quickly pulled and shipped? Are weekends properly covered and the right personnel available?

* MAJCOM Involvement. Are major commands (MAJCOMs), depots, and DLA involved to help influence proper sourcing and transportation of MICAP parts? Should a logistics readiness center be established to properly and expeditiously support the warfighter?

Conclusion

A wise man learns from his experience; a wiser man learns from the experience of others.

--Confucius

The purpose of this article was to highlight some of the difficulties in dealing with MICAP parts and requirements. In addition, it educates the reader on the importance of dealing with various MICAP situations and the impact they have on warfighter support. If you are a logistics readiness officer (LRO), learn about the MICAP requirements and parts--dive in and become the expert. LROs need to know how to help the system work to better support aircraft maintenance and thus operations (see Table 7).

Article Acronyms

AB--Air Base

ACC--Air Combat Command

AFB--Air Force Base

AFGLSC--Air Force Global Logistics Support Center

AFMC--Air Force Materiel Command

AMC--Air Mobility Command

APS--Aircraft Parts Store

AWP--Awaiting Parts

CAF--Combat Air Force

CONUS--Continental United States

CRSP--Contingency Readiness Spares Package

DLA--Defense Logistics Agency

DoD--Department of Defense

EAMXS--Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron

ELRS--Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron

EMXG--Expeditionary Maintenance Group

F/AD--Force Activity Designator

LRO--Logistics Readiness Officer

LRS--Logistics Readiness Squadron

MAF--Mobility Air Force

MAJCOM--Major Command

MICAP--Mission Capable

MRSP--Mobility Readiness Spares Package

MSL--Maintenance Supply Liaison

NCO--Noncommissioned Officer

NMC--Not Mission Capable

NMCS--Not Mission Capable Supply

OCONUS--Outside the Continental United States

OSA--Operational Support Airlift

PC--Project Code

PD--Priority Designator

POC--Point of Contact

RDD--Required Delivery Date

SCMG--Supply Chain Management Group

SRD--Standard Reporting Designator

TDD--Time Definite Delivery

TEX--Transaction Exception Code

TMO--Traffic Management Office

UJC--Urgency Justification Code

UMMIPS--Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System

UND--Urgency of Need Designator

USAFE--United States Air Forces in Europe

WWX--Worldwide Express

Core values make the military what it is; without them, we cannot succeed. They are values that instill confidence, earn lasting respect, and create willing followers. They are the values that anchor resolve in the most difficult situations. They are the values that buttress mental and physical courage when we enter combat. In essence, they are the three pillars of professionalism that provide the foundation for military leadership at every level.

--Sheila E. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force

I cannot trust a man to control others who cannot control himself

--Gen Robert E. Lee, CSA

When the political and tactical constraints imposed on air use are extensive and pervasive--and that trend seems more rather than less likely--then gradualism may be perceived as the only option.

--Gen Joseph W. Ralston, USAF

Integrity is the fundamental premise for military service in a free society. Without integrity, the moral pillars of our military strength, public trust, and self-respect are lost.

--Gen Charles A. Gabriel, USAF

Travis Condon, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Carl Johnson, Captain, USAF

Rebecca J. Selby, Captain, USAF

Mary Richardson, Technical Sergeant, USAF

Jeremy Ridgway, Technical Sergeant, USAF

Notes

(1.) The term troops in contact means ground forces that are in contact with the enemy.

(2.) Air Force Global Logistics Support Center, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) Programming Plan 07-01 to Air Force Global Logistics Support Center (AFGLSC) Implementation of PAD 07-13, 28 November 2008, paragraphs 5.2, 5.3, and page 4.

(3.) Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 23-110, Basic USAF Supply Manual, Volume 2, Part 2, USAF Standard Base Supply System, Chapter 11, "Customer Requirements," April 2010.

(4.) The CRSP is a readiness spares package for consumable (XB3/XF3) items. The CRSP concept allows MAJCOMs to use either mobility readiness spares package (MRSP) or in-place readiness spares package (IRSP) details to manage consumable item support for contingency deployments. See AFMAN 23-110, Volume 2, Part 2, Chapter 26, "War Reserve Materiel."

(5.) The UND identifies how seriously mission capability is hindered when required materiel is unavailable. Requisitioning programs also use this code to determine priority. See AFMAN 23-110, Volume 2, Part 2, Chapter 3, "Data Elements and Definitions."

(6.) The UJC indicates on issue requests the urgency of need and the type of requirement (that is, the justification). See AFMAN 23-110, Volume 2, Part 2, Chapter 3, "Data Elements and Definitions."

(7.) The F/AD signifies the relative order of importance of the activities requesting supplies and equipment. See AFMAN 23-110, Volume 2, Part 2, Chapter 3, "Data Elements and Definitions."

(8.) The TEX code identifies to the computer those transactions that require special processing due to exception conditions. See AFMAN 23-110, Volume 2, Part 2, Chapter 3, "Data Elements and Definitions."

(9.) The TEX code identifies to the computer those transactions that require special processing due to exception conditions. See AFMAN 23-110, Volume 2, Part 2, Chapter 3, "Data Elements and Definitions."

(10.) AMCI 23-102, Expeditious Movement of AMC M1CAP/VVIP Assets, 29 June 2009, paragraph 2.1, page 2.

(11.) The Air Force has transitioned to a Global Logistics Support Center (GLSC) concept. The GLSC provides fleet-wide supply support to all Air Force weapon systems and leverages consolidated repair facilities and ALC capability to optimize air frame availability.

(12.) AFI 21-101, Aircraft and Equipment Maintenance Management, Chapter 11, "Maintenance Supply Support," 12 April 2010, paragraph 11.2, page 194.

(13.) Ibid.

(14.) Air Force Manual 23-110, Volume 2, Part 2, Chapter 2," Organization and Responsibilities," April 2010, paragraph 2.73, page 46.

(15.) Air Force Manual 23-110, Volume 1, Part 1, Basic Air Force Supply Procedures, Chapter 24. "The Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System," April 2010, Section 24A, paragraph 24.1.1., page 24-1.

(16.) AFMAN 23-110, Volume 1, Part 1, Chapter 24, "The Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System," paragraph 24.1.2., page 24-1.

(17.) AFMAN 23-110, Volume 1, Part l, Chapter 24, "The Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System," paragraph 24.2., page 24-1.

(18.) AFMAN 23-110, Volume 1, Part l, Chapter 24, "The Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System," paragraph 24.3., page 24-2.

(19.) AFMAN 23-110, Volume 1, Part 1, Chapter 24, "The Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System," paragraph 24.4., page 24-2.

(20.) DoD 4000.25-1-M, Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures, October 2007, paragraph AP2.14.3.1.1, page AP2 14-1.

(21.) DoD 4000.25-1-M, paragraph AP2.14.3.1.2, page AP2 14-2.

(22.) Author's e-mail from Tom Brucato, Chief Fighter MICAE 735 Supply Chain Management Group, 20 May 2010.

(23.) DoD 4140-01R, DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation, Appendix 8, "Time-Definite Delivery Standards," 23 May 2003, paragraph 8.1.1., page 242.

(24.) DoD 4140-01R, Appendix 8, paragraph 8.2.1.4, page 244. Area D. Hard lift areas--all other destinations not listed as determined by the US Transportation Command, for example: low-use Alaska (Eielson AFB, Adak, Eareckson AS, and Galena); low-use Japan (Itazuke, MCAS Iwakuni, Misawa AB); low-use Korea (Kunsan AB and Kimhae); Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia); New Zealand (Christchurch); Singapore (Paya Lebar); Greece (Souda Bay); Turkey (Incirlik AB); Southwest Asia (Saudi Arabia (Dharan and Riyadh), Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman (Fujairah)); and Israel (Tel Aviv). The time standards for port of debarkation (POD) for Area D are lower than the other areas.

(25.) DoDI 4140.1-R.

(26.) Author's e-mail correspondence with Staff Sergeant Kevin O. Whitely, 735 SCMG/LGWF-1, 3 May 2010.

(27.) 635 SCOW/XP, 635 SCOW Operating Instructions OI-1, Supply Chain Operations, 28 April 2010.

(28.) Enterprise Solution-Supply (ES-S) provides enterprise-wide asset visibility and order management of Air Force-owned supply items. This includes near real-time visibility of depot and base supply inventory data (both SCS and SBSS systems) and the capability to place, source, and route orders for Air Force-managed items. ES-S also includes MASS (MICAP Asset Sourcing System) which has the ability to view, verify, modify, and monitor high priority customer orders at all or selected bases. ES-S has a workflow capability which automatically detects and displays status changes for better order tracking; automatic base asset sourcing features; 24-month order history, and a built-in report capability with both standard summary reports and ad hoc report generation.

(29.) DoD 4140.1-R, paragraph C8.8.2.3.

(30.) Don Taylor, "Minding Your Own Business: Equal Pay for Equal Work: It's Not as Simple as it Sounds," Amarillo Globe News, [Online] Available: http://amarillo.com/stories/1999/10/03/bus_pay.shtml, 3 October 1999.

Lieutenant Colonel Travis Condon is currently the 436th Deputy Mission Support Group Commander, Dover AFB, Delaware. At the time of the writing of this article he was deployed as the 455th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron Commander at Bagram Airfield and assigned to the 366th Logistics Readiness Squadron at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho.

Captain Carl Johnson at the time of the writing of this article was deployed as the 455th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron Operations Officer at Bagram Airfield and is assigned to the 155th Logistics Readiness Squadron at Nebraska Air National Guard, Lincoln, Nebraska.

Captain Rebecca J. Selby at the time of the writing of this article was deployed as the 455th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron Director of Operations and Installation Deployment Officer at Bagram Airfield and assigned to the New Jersey Air National Guard's 108th Wing at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey.

Technical Sergeant Mary Richardson at the time of the writing of this article was deployed as one of two Maintenance Supply Liaisons within the 455th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness at Bagram Airfield and assigned to the 60th Logistics Readiness Squadron at Travis Air Force Base, California.

Technical Sergeant Jeremy Ridgway at the time of the writing of this article was deployed as the 455th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron Maintenance Support Liaison at Bagram Airfield and assigned to the 18th Logistics Readiness Squadron at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan.
Table 1. UMMIPS Requisition Priority Designator

 Urgency of Force/Activity Requisition
 Need Designator Priority
Designator UND (F/AD) Designator (PD)

 A I 01
 II 02
 III 03
 IV 07
 V 08

 B I 04
 II 05
 III 06
 IV 09
 V 10

 C I 11
 II 12
 III 13
 IV 14
 V 15

Table 2. UMMIPS Urgency of Need Designator

 Urgency of Need Designator

 A B C
Force/Activity
 Designators Requisition Priority Designator

 I 01 04 11
 II 02 05 12
 III 03 06 13
 IV 07 09 14
 V 08 10 15

Table 3. UMMIPS--Time Definite Delivery Standards

Segment Description

 1 Supply/Depot pulling the part and
 providing to TMO/shipment activity

 2 TMO/Shipment activity moving part
 transportation node (commercial aircraft,
 organic aircraft, truck, or other

 3 Transportation node moving part forward
 (commercial aircraft or Air Force aerial
 port

 4 Arrival at Bagram

 5 MO receipt at Bagram

 6 Supply Receipt at Bagram

 7 Expeditionary Maintenance Group receipt
 at Bagram

Table 4. Self-Defined Logistics Pipeline Segments

Segment Description

 1 Supply/Depot pulling the part and
 providing to TMO/shipment activity

 2 TMO/Shipment activity moving part
 transportation node (commercial aircraft,
 organic aircraft, truck, or other

 3 Transportation node moving part forward
 (commercial aircraft or Air Force aerial
 port

 4 Arrival at Bagram

 5 TMO receipt at Bagram

 6 Supply Receipt at Bagram

 7 Expeditionary Maintenance Group receipt
 at Bagram

Table 5. Type of Delay

Type of Delay Description of Delay

Awaiting Release Base supply or the depot has
 the part, has the order to
 release the part, but the part
 has not yet been released to
 any shipment activity.

Awaiting Shipment The Traffic Management Flight,
 or similar function, has the part
 but has not yet
 scheduled/aligned against a
 specific mission (DHL, FedEx,
 AMC Msn #)

Awaiting Mission Part is aligned to a mission,
 load planned, but has not yet
 physically moved.

Table 6. F-16 Canopy Timeline

15 April MICAP Processed/Sourced to Aviano

16 April Processed and departed Aviano on AMC
 mission

17 April Arrived Turkey

20 April Departed Turkey on AMC mission

20 April Arrived Greece

20 April Departed Greece on AMC mission

21 April Arrived back at Aviano

21 April Departed Aviano on AMC mission

21 April Arrived Sicily

21 April Departed Sicily on AMC mission

22 April Arrived Ramstein

25 April Load planned at Ramstein

29 April Manifested at Ramstein

29 April Depart Ramstein on AMC mission

30 April Arrive at Bagram

Table 7. Leaner or Lifter (30)

 LEANER LIFTER

Wrestle the gorilla until they Wrestle the gorilla until the
get fired gorilla gets tired

Always have an excuse Don't make excuses, don't
 fix blame, the fix problems

Try once Try again

Go with the flow Direct the flow and create a
 path for others to follow

Satisfied with meeting Are achiever, they start their
quota, do just enough to get own engines, they don't rely
by on others for their personal
 motivation

Quick to pass the buck Take responsibility for their
 actions and help others
 become accountable

Would rather cause Solve problems and don't
problems than do work consider it work
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Author:Condon, Travis; Johnson, Carl; Selby, Rebecca J.; Richardson, Mary; Ridgway, Jeremy
Publication:Air Force Journal of Logistics
Date:Sep 22, 2011
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